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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" media="screen" href="/~d/styles/atom10full.xsl"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/css" media="screen" href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~d/styles/itemcontent.css"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:openSearch="http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/" xmlns:georss="http://www.georss.org/georss" xmlns:gd="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005" xmlns:thr="http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0" xmlns:feedburner="http://rssnamespace.org/feedburner/ext/1.0" gd:etag="W/&quot;C0YMQn09fCp7ImA9WhRXE0s.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772</id><updated>2011-12-19T22:06:23.364-08:00</updated><category term="credit market" /><category term="Indian economy" /><category term="liability dollarization" /><category term="financial frictions." /><category term="Bayesian estimation" /><category term="Nowcasting; Bridge model; Factor model; Emerging markets; India" /><category term="custom duties" /><category term="Yuan" /><category term="depository receipts" /><category term="Emerging Market DSGE Models" /><category term="labour market" /><category term="Asia" /><category term="environment" /><category term="search-matching models" /><category term="moral hazard" /><category term="GST" /><category term="trade misinvoicing" /><category term="robustness" /><category term="Capital account openness" /><category term="capital controls" /><category term="tax policy" /><category term="structured uncertainty" /><category term="Policy Simulation" /><category term="capital flows" /><category term="global financial crisis" /><category term="Bretton Woods II hypothesis" /><category term="Real Business Cycles" /><category term="foreign investors" /><category term="Internationalisation" /><category term="DSGE models" /><category term="Outbound FDI" /><category term="metropolitan areas" /><category term="urban governance" /><category term="East Asia" /><category term="effectiveness of capital controls" /><category term="Volatility and Growth." /><category term="de facto convertibility" /><category term="political stability" /><category term="Informal economy" /><category term="one-way bets" /><category term="India" /><category term="fiscal policy" /><category term="capital market integration" /><category term="impossible trinity; financial stability" /><category term="floating versus managed exchange rate" /><category term="DSGE model" /><category term="interest-rate rules" /><category term="Exchange rate regime" /><category term="financial globalisation" /><category term="Thirteen finance commission" /><category term="economic development" /><category term="property tax" /><category term="macroeconomic stabilisation" /><category term="Macroeconomics" /><category term="inflation" /><category term="emerging economies" /><category term="home bias" /><category term="financial accelerator" /><category term="Macroeconomic Modelling" /><category term="fiscal and monetary rules" /><category term="Ordered Probit models" /><category term="infrastructure finance" /><category term="currency regime" /><category term="interest rate rules" /><category term="Panel data" /><category term="currency exposure of firms" /><category term="urban public finance" /><category term="monetary policy" /><category term="Monetary policy transmission; Exchange rate pass-through; Exchange rate regime; Financial development; India" /><category term="Indian multinationals" /><category term="intergovernmental fiscal relations" /><category term="health" /><category term="Business cycles" /><category term="Monetary policy; inflation measure; statistical system." /><category term="monetary interest rate rules" /><category term="Renminbi" /><title>NIPFP Working Papers</title><subtitle type="html" /><link rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/" /><link rel="next" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default?start-index=26&amp;max-results=25&amp;redirect=false&amp;v=2" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><generator version="7.00" uri="http://www.blogger.com">Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>48</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>25</openSearch:itemsPerPage><atom10:link xmlns:atom10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/NipfpWorkingPapers" /><feedburner:info uri="nipfpworkingpapers" /><atom10:link xmlns:atom10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" rel="hub" href="http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/" /><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;C0YMQn08fip7ImA9WhRXE0s.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-2040200322839512524</id><published>2011-12-19T22:06:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-12-19T22:06:23.376-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-12-19T22:06:23.376-08:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="tax policy" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="emerging economies" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="labour market" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="interest rate rules" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="credit market" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Informal economy" /><title>Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Presence of Informal Labour Markets</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 97&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_97.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, Emanuela Lotti and Bo Yang&lt;br /&gt;
November 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How does informality in emerging economies affect the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy? To answer this question we construct a two-sector, formal-informal new Keynesian closed-economy. The informal sector is more labour intensive, is untaxed, has a classical labour market, faces high credit constraints in financing investment and is less visible in terms of observed output. We compare outcomes under welfare-optimal monetary policy, discretion and welfare-optimized interest-rate Taylor rules alongside a balanced-budget fiscal regime. We compare the model, first with no frictions in these two markets, then with frictions in only the formal labour market and finally with frictions on both credit markets and the formal labour market. Our main conclusions are first, labour and financial market frictions, the latter assumed to be stronger in the informal sector, cause the time-inconsistency problem to worsen. The importance of commitment therefore increases in economies characterized by a large informal sector with the features we have highlighted. Simple implementable optimized rules that respond only to observed aggregate inflation and formal-sector output can be significantly worse in welfare terms than their optimal counterpart, but are still far better than discretion. Simple rules that respond, if possible, to the risk premium in the formal sector result in a significant welfare improvement.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-2040200322839512524?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/ir6ViS9wA2s" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/2040200322839512524/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=2040200322839512524" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/2040200322839512524?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/2040200322839512524?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/ir6ViS9wA2s/monetary-and-fiscal-policy-in-presence.html" title="Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Presence of Informal Labour Markets" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/12/monetary-and-fiscal-policy-in-presence.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;CkAESXY5fyp7ImA9WhRXE0s.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-5205793762927537609</id><published>2011-12-19T21:58:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-12-19T21:58:28.827-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-12-19T21:58:28.827-08:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="emerging economies" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="liability dollarization" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="monetary policy" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="financial accelerator" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="fiscal and monetary rules" /><title>Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a DSGE Model of India</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 96&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_96.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Paul Levine and Joseph Pearlman&lt;br /&gt;
November 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We develop a optimal rules-based interpretation of the ‘three pillars macroeconomic policy framework’: a combination of a freely floating exchange rate, an explicit target for inflation, and a mechanism than ensures a stable government debt-GDP ratio around a specified long run. We show how such monetary-fiscal rules need to be adjusted to accommodate specific features of emerging market economies. The model takes the form of two-blocs, a DSGE emerging small open economy interacting with the rest of the world and features, in particular, financial frictions. It is calibrated using India and US data. Alongside the optimal Ramsey policy benchmark, we model the three pillars as simple monetary and fiscal rules including and both domestic and CPI inflation targeting interest rate rules. A comparison with a fixed exchange rate regime is made. We find that domestic inflation targeting is superior to partially or implicitly (through a CPI inflation target) or fully attempting to stabilizing the exchange rate. Financial frictions require fiscal policy to play a bigger role and lead to an increase in the costs associated with simple rules as opposed to the fully optimal policy. These policy prescriptions contrast with the monetary-fiscal policy stance of the Indian authorities.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-5205793762927537609?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/o_2g3tf23Pk" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/5205793762927537609/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=5205793762927537609" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5205793762927537609?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5205793762927537609?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/o_2g3tf23Pk/monetary-and-fiscal-policy-in-dsge.html" title="Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a DSGE Model of India" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/12/monetary-and-fiscal-policy-in-dsge.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;A08ERnc7eip7ImA9WhRXE0g.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-2236977909576589382</id><published>2011-12-19T21:43:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-12-19T21:43:27.902-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-12-19T21:43:27.902-08:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="financial frictions." /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="monetary interest rate rules" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="DSGE model" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Bayesian estimation" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Indian economy" /><title>An Estimated DSGE Model of the Indian Economy</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 95&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_95.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Vasco Gabriel, Paul Levine, Joseph Pearlman and Bo Yang&lt;br /&gt;
November 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We develop a closed-economy DSGE model of the Indian economy and estimate it by Bayesian Maximum Likelihood methods using Dynare. We build up in stages to a model with a number of features important for emerging economies in general and the Indian economy in particular: a large proportion of credit-constrained consumers, a financial accelerator facing domestic firms seeking to finance their investment, and an informal sector. The simulation properties of the estimated model are examined under a generalized inflation targeting Taylor-type interest rate rule with forward and backward-looking components. We find that, in terms of model posterior probabilities and standard moments criteria, inclusion of the above financial frictions and an informal sector significantly improves the model fit.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-2236977909576589382?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/xuOIV8yb3fs" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/2236977909576589382/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=2236977909576589382" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/2236977909576589382?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/2236977909576589382?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/xuOIV8yb3fs/estimated-dsge-model-of-indian-economy.html" title="An Estimated DSGE Model of the Indian Economy" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/12/estimated-dsge-model-of-indian-economy.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;A0QHQH8ycSp7ImA9WhRXE0g.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-6847221717179780136</id><published>2011-12-19T21:35:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-12-19T21:35:31.199-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-12-19T21:35:31.199-08:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="search-matching models" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="labour market" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Informal economy" /><title>Informal Labour and Credit Markets: A Survey</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 94&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_94.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nicoletta Batini, Young-Bae Kim, Paul Levine and Emanuela Lotti&lt;br /&gt;
November 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This paper reviews the literature on the informal economy, focusing first on empirical findings and then on existing approaches to modelling informality within both partial and general equilibrium environments. We concentrate on labour and credit markets, since these tend to be most affected by informality. The phenomenon is particularly important in emerging and other developing economies, given their high degrees of informal labour and financial services and the implications these have for the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy. We emphasize the need for dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) and ultimately dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models for a full understanding of the costs, benefits and policy implications of informality. The survey shows that the literature on informality is quite patchy, and that there are several unexplored areas left for research.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-6847221717179780136?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/s1fn4MCYKKY" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/6847221717179780136/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=6847221717179780136" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6847221717179780136?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6847221717179780136?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/s1fn4MCYKKY/informal-labour-and-credit-markets.html" title="Informal Labour and Credit Markets: A Survey" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/12/informal-labour-and-credit-markets.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;Ak4BSHgyfyp7ImA9WhRXE0g.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-5740982329118172939</id><published>2011-12-19T21:29:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-12-19T21:29:19.697-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-12-19T21:29:19.697-08:00</app:edited><title>Millenium Development Goals: How is India Doing?</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 93&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_93.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sudipto Mundle&lt;br /&gt;
November 2011&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-5740982329118172939?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/h9gHDKTjvyo" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/5740982329118172939/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=5740982329118172939" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5740982329118172939?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5740982329118172939?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/h9gHDKTjvyo/millenium-development-goals-how-is.html" title="Millenium Development Goals: How is India Doing?" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/12/millenium-development-goals-how-is.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;AkAGSXwyfip7ImA9WhRXE0g.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-7397946319457610036</id><published>2011-12-19T21:25:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-12-19T21:25:28.296-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-12-19T21:25:28.296-08:00</app:edited><title>Growth and Election Outcomes in a Developing Country</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 92&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_92.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Poonam Gupta and Arvind Panagariya&lt;br /&gt;
October 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the exception Brander and Drazen (2008), who use a comprehensive cross-country database consisting of both developed and developing countries, the hypothesis that rapid growth helps incumbents win elections has been tested exclusively for the developed countries (e.g., Ray Fair 1978). But since sustained rapid growth offers the prospect of pulling vast numbers of the voters out of poverty within a generation, such an effect is far more likely to be present in the developing rather than developed countries. In this paper, we offer the first test of the hypothesis on a large developing and poor country, India, which has seen its economy grow 8 to 9 percent recently. We first generalize the Fair model to allow for multiple candidates instead for just two and then test it using cross-state data. We find quantitatively large and statistically robust effect of growth on the prospects of the candidates of the state incumbent parties to win elections. Specifically, we use the data on 422 candidates in the 2009 parliamentary elections and show that the candidates of incumbent parties in high-growth states have much better prospects of victory than those in low-growth states.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-7397946319457610036?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/5-89uUEzLHM" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/7397946319457610036/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=7397946319457610036" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/7397946319457610036?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/7397946319457610036?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/5-89uUEzLHM/growth-and-election-outcomes-in.html" title="Growth and Election Outcomes in a Developing Country" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/12/growth-and-election-outcomes-in.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;CUYFQXo_fSp7ImA9WhdUEEw.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-4930174696449480249</id><published>2011-09-25T21:58:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2011-09-25T21:58:30.445-07:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-09-25T21:58:30.445-07:00</app:edited><title>Civil Service and Military Pensions in India</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 91&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_91.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Renuka Sane and Ajay Shah&lt;br /&gt;
September 2011&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-4930174696449480249?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/iq1UCkQ4iAs" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/4930174696449480249/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=4930174696449480249" title="1 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/4930174696449480249?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/4930174696449480249?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/iq1UCkQ4iAs/civil-service-and-military-pensions-in.html" title="Civil Service and Military Pensions in India" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>1</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/09/civil-service-and-military-pensions-in.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;DUYASXs4eSp7ImA9WhdVF0s.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-6143707676799219826</id><published>2011-08-23T23:50:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2011-09-23T01:39:08.531-07:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-09-23T01:39:08.531-07:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Nowcasting; Bridge model; Factor model; Emerging markets; India" /><title>Tracking Indian Growth in Real Time</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 90&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_90.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rudrani Bhattacharya, Radhika Pandey and Giovanni Veronese&lt;br /&gt;
July 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tracking growth in the Indian economy would be best performed using a measure like GDP. Unfortunately official estimates of this indicator are released with quarterly frequency and with considerable delay. This paper compares different approaches to the short term forecasting (nowcasting) of real GDP growth in India and evaluates methods to optimally gauge the current state of the economy. Univariate quarterly models are compared with bridge models that exploit the available monthly indicators containing information on current quarter developments. In the forecasting exercise we perform a pseudo real-time simulation: by properly taking into account the actual publication lags of the series, we replicate the information set available to the policymaker at each point of time. We find that bridge models perform satisfactorily in predicting current quarter GDP growth. This result follows from the actual estimation technique used to construct the official quarterly national accounts, still largely dependent on a narrow information set. Our analysis also suggests mixed evidences about the additional predictive power of Indian survey data with respect to the hard data already used in the national accounts.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-6143707676799219826?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/p9rPBPkBu1g" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/6143707676799219826/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=6143707676799219826" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6143707676799219826?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6143707676799219826?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/p9rPBPkBu1g/tracking-india-growth-in-real-time.html" title="Tracking Indian Growth in Real Time" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/08/tracking-india-growth-in-real-time.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;CUAMQH44cSp7ImA9WhZXFEU.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-631174083177023636</id><published>2011-05-03T21:36:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2011-05-03T21:36:21.039-07:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-05-03T21:36:21.039-07:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Renminbi" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Exchange rate regime" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="East Asia" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Yuan" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Internationalisation" /><title>Who cares about the Chinese Yuan?</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 89&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_89.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Vimal Balasubramaniam, Ila Patnaik and Ajay Shah&lt;br /&gt;
May 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The rise of China in the world economy and in international trade has raised the possibility of a rise of the Yuan as an international currency, particularly after the Chinese authorities have undertaken policy initiatives such as Yuan settlement and Yuan swap lines. In this paper, we measure one dimension of Yuan internationalisation: the role of the Yuan in the exchange rate arrangements of other economies. While the magnitudes are small, our findings show that as many as 34 currencies in the world have been sensitive to movements in the Yuan. This suggests that the Yuan potentially has a significant role to play in global exchange rate arrangements. Contrary to popular belief, however, we find a limited role of the Yuan among Asian economies.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-631174083177023636?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/rGbHvlwR_tM" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/631174083177023636/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=631174083177023636" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/631174083177023636?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/631174083177023636?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/rGbHvlwR_tM/who-cares-about-chinese-yuan.html" title="Who cares about the Chinese Yuan?" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/05/who-cares-about-chinese-yuan.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;CUUNSHg7cCp7ImA9WhZQEko.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-291024039914221562</id><published>2011-04-19T21:21:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2011-04-19T21:21:39.608-07:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-04-19T21:21:39.608-07:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Real Business Cycles" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Volatility and Growth." /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Emerging Market DSGE Models" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Macroeconomics" /><title>Has India Emerged? Business Cycle Facts from a Transitioning Economy</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 88&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_88.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chetan Ghate, Radhika Pandey, and Ila Patnaik &lt;br /&gt;
April 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This paper presents a comprehensive set of stylised facts for business cycles in India from 1950-2009. We find that the nature of the business cycle has changed dramatically after India's liberalisation reforms in 1991. In particular, after the mid 1990s, the properties of India's business cycle has moved closer in key respects to select advanced countries. This is consistent with India's structural transformation from a pre-dominantly agricultural and planned developing economy to a more market based industrial-income economy. We also identify in what respects the behavior of the Indian business cycle is different from that of other advanced economies, and closer to that of other less developed economies. This is the first exercise of this kind to generate an exhaustive set of stylised facts for India using both annual and quarterly data.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-291024039914221562?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/QJXnPqGbDSo" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/291024039914221562/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=291024039914221562" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/291024039914221562?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/291024039914221562?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/QJXnPqGbDSo/has-india-emerged-business-cycle-facts.html" title="Has India Emerged? Business Cycle Facts from a Transitioning Economy" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/04/has-india-emerged-business-cycle-facts.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;DEcCRHg_eCp7ImA9WhZQEUw.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-6878933230189007411</id><published>2011-04-17T21:16:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2011-04-18T01:41:05.640-07:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-04-18T01:41:05.640-07:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="impossible trinity; financial stability" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Exchange rate regime" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="monetary policy" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="capital controls" /><title>Did the Indian Capital Controls Work as a Tool of Macroeconomic Policy?</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 87&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_87.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ila Patnaik and Ajay Shah &lt;br /&gt;
April 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 2010 and 2011, there has been a fresh wave of interest in capital controls. India is one of the few large countries with a complex system of capital controls, and hence offers an opportunity to assess the extent to which these help achieve goals of macroeconomic and financial policy. We find that the capital controls were associated with poor governance, were unable to sustain the erstwhile exchange rate regime, and did not support financial stability. India's experience is thus inconsistent with the revisionist view of capital controls. Macroeconomic policy in India has moved away from the erstwhile strategies, towards greater exchange rate flexibility combined with capital account liberalisation.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-6878933230189007411?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/oW3HITZzJIU" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/6878933230189007411/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=6878933230189007411" title="1 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6878933230189007411?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6878933230189007411?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/oW3HITZzJIU/did-indian-capital-controls-work-as.html" title="Did the Indian Capital Controls Work as a Tool of Macroeconomic Policy?" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>1</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/04/did-indian-capital-controls-work-as.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;CkMBQ3Y_eyp7ImA9Wx9aFEo.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-5531186439834640759</id><published>2011-03-06T20:00:00.001-08:00</published><updated>2011-03-06T20:00:52.843-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-03-06T20:00:52.843-08:00</app:edited><title>Panchayats and Economic Development</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 86&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_86.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
M. Govinda Rao and T.R. Raghunandan&lt;br /&gt;
March 2011&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-5531186439834640759?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/F59F0IZa9mA" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/5531186439834640759/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=5531186439834640759" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5531186439834640759?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5531186439834640759?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/F59F0IZa9mA/panchayats-and-economic-development.html" title="Panchayats and Economic Development" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/03/panchayats-and-economic-development.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;DUEMSXg7fSp7ImA9Wx9bGUo.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-6124847745568207662</id><published>2011-03-01T03:08:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-03-01T03:08:08.605-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-03-01T03:08:08.605-08:00</app:edited><title>Stimulus, Recovery and Exit Policy G20 Experience and Indian Strategy</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 85&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_85.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sudipto Mundle, M. Govinda Rao and N. R. Bhanumurthy &lt;br /&gt;
March 2011&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-6124847745568207662?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/O7KPbWMgzRk" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/6124847745568207662/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=6124847745568207662" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6124847745568207662?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6124847745568207662?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/O7KPbWMgzRk/stimulus-recovery-and-exit-policy-g20.html" title="Stimulus, Recovery and Exit Policy G20 Experience and Indian Strategy" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/03/stimulus-recovery-and-exit-policy-g20.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;DEAAQXc8fyp7ImA9Wx9UEk4.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-8059093137232631686</id><published>2011-02-08T23:32:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-02-08T23:32:20.977-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-02-08T23:32:20.977-08:00</app:edited><title>Federalism and Fiscal Reform in India</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 84&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_84.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
M. Govinda Rao and Tapas K. Sen &lt;br /&gt;
February 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This paper attempts to analyse the experience of incentivising economic reforms at the state level through central transfers to states. It reviews the experiences of the central government introducing incentives for reform directly through various specific purpose transfers as well as the incentive schemes recommended by various Finance Commissions. The incentive schemes directly introduced by the central government include, accelerated irrigation benefit programme, accelerated power development and reform programme, Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission, education and health sector reforms. The reforms recommended by the Finance Commissions include incentivising tax reforms and fiscal restructuring and consolidation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The review of the experiences of Indian fiscal federalism shows that the incentivising reforms have neither been an unqualified success nor have they been a total failure. There are interesting lessons to be learnt from the experiences for both designing the incentive schemes and implementing them. The paper summarises the lessons of experience. While incorporating these in designing and implementing incentive schemes can be useful in the short and medium term, what matters in the long run is the political incentive for reforms.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-8059093137232631686?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/M4s8mOYdmdw" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/8059093137232631686/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=8059093137232631686" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/8059093137232631686?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/8059093137232631686?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/M4s8mOYdmdw/federalism-and-fiscal-reform-in-india.html" title="Federalism and Fiscal Reform in India" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/02/federalism-and-fiscal-reform-in-india.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;C0YGRHc5cSp7ImA9Wx9UEEs.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-6761704471470363312</id><published>2011-02-06T22:45:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-02-06T22:45:25.929-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-02-06T22:45:25.929-08:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Monetary policy; inflation measure; statistical system." /><title>How to Measure Inflation in India?</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 83&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_83.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah and Giovanni Veronese &lt;br /&gt;
February 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is the best inflation measure in India? What inflation measure is most relevant for monetary policy making in India? Questions of timeliness, weights in the price index, accuracy of food price measurement, and inclusion of services prices are relevant to the choice of measure. We show that under present conditions of measurement, the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPI-IW) is preferable to either the Wholesale Price Index or the GDP deflator.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-6761704471470363312?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/N_o_xn0UhQU" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/6761704471470363312/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=6761704471470363312" title="2 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6761704471470363312?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6761704471470363312?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/N_o_xn0UhQU/how-to-measure-inflation-in-india.html" title="How to Measure Inflation in India?" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>2</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/02/how-to-measure-inflation-in-india.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;Dk8BRXY4fip7ImA9Wx9VF0w.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-5060810425016827970</id><published>2011-02-02T22:34:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-02-02T22:34:14.836-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-02-02T22:34:14.836-08:00</app:edited><title>Indian Social Democracy: The Resource Perspective</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 82&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_82.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah &lt;br /&gt;
February 2011&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-5060810425016827970?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/mqEmeiAxPos" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/5060810425016827970/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=5060810425016827970" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5060810425016827970?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5060810425016827970?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/mqEmeiAxPos/indian-social-democracy-resource.html" title="Indian Social Democracy: The Resource Perspective" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/02/indian-social-democracy-resource.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;DkICRX4yfip7ImA9Wx9VF0w.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-7091642255835065139</id><published>2011-02-02T22:29:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-02-02T22:29:24.096-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-02-02T22:29:24.096-08:00</app:edited><title>Deficit Fundamentalism vs Fiscal Federalism: Implications of 13th Finance Commission’s Recommendations</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 81&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_81.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pinaki Chakraborty &lt;br /&gt;
January 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Thirteenth Finance Commission’s recommendation to increase the vertical share of tax devolution to states will help, but its horizontal distribution formula leaves much to be desired. One, its design is such that two of the four key indicators are in conflict with each other. Two, the Commission’s revised road map for fiscal consolidation at the centre and the states, which recommends state-specific, year-wise, fiscal adjustment paths, not only limits the fiscal manoeuvrability of states but also impinges on their fiscal autonomy. Three, its design of the grant for elementary education has the potential to reduce the expenditure of states rather than augment it. The need to look at intergovernmental transfers from the right perspective of federalism, where the states and the centre are seen as equal partners in development and not from a narrow technocratic viewpoint, cannot be stressed more.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-7091642255835065139?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/bKFtxVVlfXI" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/7091642255835065139/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=7091642255835065139" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/7091642255835065139?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/7091642255835065139?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/bKFtxVVlfXI/deficit-fundamentalism-vs-fiscal.html" title="Deficit Fundamentalism vs Fiscal Federalism: Implications of 13th Finance Commission’s Recommendations" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/02/deficit-fundamentalism-vs-fiscal.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;AkMERn0zeSp7ImA9Wx9VFEg.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-6012170646407174094</id><published>2011-01-30T23:20:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-01-30T23:20:07.381-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-01-30T23:20:07.381-08:00</app:edited><title>Reforming the Indian Financial System</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 80&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_80.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaik &lt;br /&gt;
January 2011&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-6012170646407174094?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/MZt216M8HCU" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/6012170646407174094/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=6012170646407174094" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6012170646407174094?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/6012170646407174094?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/MZt216M8HCU/reforming-indian-financial-system.html" title="Reforming the Indian Financial System" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/01/reforming-indian-financial-system.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;DUUNQnw8eSp7ImA9Wx9WGEs.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-8993345298501443873</id><published>2011-01-24T03:08:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-01-24T03:08:13.271-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-01-24T03:08:13.271-08:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="India" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="capital flows" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="financial globalisation" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="capital controls" /><title>India's Financial Globalisation</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 79&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_79.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaik &lt;br /&gt;
January 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
India embarked on reintegration with the world economy in the early 1990s. At first, a certain limited opening took place emphasising equity flows by certain kinds of foreign investors. This opening has had myriad interesting implications in terms of both microeconomics and macroeconomics. A dynamic process of change in the economy and in economic policy then came about, with a co-evolution between the system of capital controls, macroeconomic policy, and the internationalisation of firms including the emergence of Indian multi-nationals. Through this process, de facto openness has risen sharply. De facto openness has implied a loss of monetary policy autonomy when exchange rate pegging was attempted. The exchange rate regime has evolved towards greater flexibility.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-8993345298501443873?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/WUlDkheWIgw" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/8993345298501443873/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=8993345298501443873" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/8993345298501443873?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/8993345298501443873?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/WUlDkheWIgw/indias-financial-globalisation.html" title="India's Financial Globalisation" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/01/indias-financial-globalisation.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;DkAARnw7fSp7ImA9Wx9WGEs.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-5440451643754322350</id><published>2011-01-24T02:23:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-01-24T02:25:47.205-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-01-24T02:25:47.205-08:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Monetary policy transmission; Exchange rate pass-through; Exchange rate regime; Financial development; India" /><title>Monetary Policy Transmission in an Emerging Market Setting</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 78&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_78.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rudrani Bhattacharya, Ila Patnaik and Ajay Shah&lt;br /&gt;
January 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some emerging economies have a relatively ineffective monetary policy transmission owing to weaknesses in the domestic financial system and the presence of a large and segmented informal sector. At the same time, small open economies can have a substantial monetary policy transmission through the exchange rate channel. In order to understand this setting, we explore a unified treatment of monetary policy transmission and exchange-rate pass-through. The results for an emerging market, India, suggest that the most effective mechanism through which monetary policy impacts inflation runs through the exchange rate.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-5440451643754322350?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/cg6cS6tfFnE" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/5440451643754322350/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=5440451643754322350" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5440451643754322350?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5440451643754322350?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/cg6cS6tfFnE/monetary-policy-transmission-in.html" title="Monetary Policy Transmission in an Emerging Market Setting" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/01/monetary-policy-transmission-in.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;DkAMRX4zeyp7ImA9Wx9WGEs.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-43142141223783200</id><published>2011-01-24T02:14:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-01-24T02:26:24.083-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2011-01-24T02:26:24.083-08:00</app:edited><title>Export Versus FDI in services</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 77&lt;br /&gt;
[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2011_77.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rudrani Bhattacharya, Ila Patnaik and Ajay Shah&lt;br /&gt;
January 2011 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abstract&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the literature on exports and investment, most productive firms are seen to invest abroad. In the Helpman et al. (2004) model, costs of transportation play a critical role in the decision about whether to serve foreign customers by exporting, or by producing abroad. We consider the case of tradable services, where the marginal cost of transport is near zero. We argue that in the purchase of services, buyers face uncertainty about product quality, especially when production is located far away. Firm optimisation then leads less productive firms to self-select themselves for FDI. We test this prediction with data from the Indian software industry, and find support for it.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-43142141223783200?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/DFVfFFfnPBQ" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/43142141223783200/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=43142141223783200" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/43142141223783200?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/43142141223783200?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/DFVfFFfnPBQ/export-versus-fdi-in-services.html" title="Export Versus FDI in services" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2011/01/export-versus-fdi-in-services.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;CEYMR344eSp7ImA9Wx9QFkQ.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-5573270465920369605</id><published>2010-12-29T22:54:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2010-12-29T22:56:26.031-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2010-12-29T22:56:26.031-08:00</app:edited><title>The Report of the Thirteenth Finance Commission Conundrum in Conditionalities</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 76&lt;br /&gt;[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2010_76.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;M Govinda Rao&lt;br /&gt;December 2010 &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Abstract&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The 13th Finance Commission has forayed into a number of areas partly warranted by its terms of reference and partly due to the approach it adopted. The Commission, besides tax devolution, has recommended as many as 12 different types of grants with a plethora of conditionalities. A critical appraisal of the recommendations shows that the transfer system recommended by the Commissions suffers from the same limitations of inequity and perverse incentives as in the past.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The inability to offset the fiscal disabilities of the states leads to giving several grants. Even here, the approach is ad hoc. In particular, the grants recommended for individual states for their special needs is a classic example of ad hoc approach which is arbitrary and judgemental. The recommendations relating to the GST are the ones which have been resented most by the states and actually, this has taken the reform agenda backwards. The “all or nothing” types of conditions do not leave much room for a “grand bargain”.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A major concern is with a plethora of conditionalities imposed by the Commission. Besides the conditions on GST compensations discussed above, there are several conditions stipulated for achieving fiscal consolidation and incentivising local bodies. There are questions on design, implementation, and monitoring of these conditions. These questions leave one suspect that the Commission lost an opportunity to reform the transfer system yet again.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-5573270465920369605?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/SF8oMi6BxkA" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/5573270465920369605/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=5573270465920369605" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5573270465920369605?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5573270465920369605?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/SF8oMi6BxkA/report-of-thirteenth-finance-commission.html" title="The Report of the Thirteenth Finance Commission Conundrum in Conditionalities" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2010/12/report-of-thirteenth-finance-commission.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;C0AMSXg4fSp7ImA9Wx5aE0o.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-4096519625498584950</id><published>2010-11-09T22:46:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2010-11-09T22:49:48.635-08:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2010-11-09T22:49:48.635-08:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="trade misinvoicing" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Capital account openness" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="custom duties" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="political stability" /><title>Determinants of Trade Misinvoicing</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 75&lt;br /&gt;[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2010_75.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ila Patnaik, Abhijit Sen Gupta, Ajay Shah&lt;br /&gt;October 2010 &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Abstract&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Traditional explanations for trade misinvoicing -- high custom duties and weak domestic economies - are less persuasive in a world of high growth emerging markets who have low trade barriers. We construct a 35 country data set over a 26 year span, covering both industrialised and developing countries, to study the phenomena of export and import misinvoicing. Capital account openness, differentials in interest rates, political stability, corruption, indebtedness and the exchange rate regime are identified as factors related to misinvoicing. Trade misinvoicing should be seen as one element of de facto capital account openness.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-4096519625498584950?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/aD7ZD4l_J38" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/4096519625498584950/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=4096519625498584950" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/4096519625498584950?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/4096519625498584950?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/aD7ZD4l_J38/determinants-of-trade-misinvoicing.html" title="Determinants of Trade Misinvoicing" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2010/11/determinants-of-trade-misinvoicing.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;C0cMSHoycSp7ImA9Wx5bF0s.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-277010485142412954</id><published>2010-11-02T22:07:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2010-11-02T22:11:29.499-07:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2010-11-02T22:11:29.499-07:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="home bias" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="foreign investors" /><title>Foreign Shareholding: A Decomposition Analysis</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 74&lt;br /&gt;[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp_2010_74.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaik&lt;br /&gt;October 2010 &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Abstract&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Stulz (2005) has emphasised that for home bias to decline, insiders have to reduce ownership so as to make purchase of shares by foreigners possible. We offer a decomposition in the ownership of shares by foreigners into three parts: the change in insider shareholding, the change in market capitalisation and the change in the fraction of outside shareholding that is held by foreigners. As an example, this decomposition is applied to help understand the sharp change in foreign ownership of Indian firms after 2001.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-277010485142412954?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/CqAnQxBBnC8" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/277010485142412954/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=277010485142412954" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/277010485142412954?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/277010485142412954?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/CqAnQxBBnC8/foreign-shareholding-decomposition.html" title="Foreign Shareholding: A Decomposition Analysis" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2010/11/foreign-shareholding-decomposition.html</feedburner:origLink></entry><entry gd:etag="W/&quot;A0QHRno5eCp7ImA9Wx5QF0s.&quot;"><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7526169067922008772.post-5935816689096102833</id><published>2010-09-06T03:26:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2010-09-06T03:35:37.420-07:00</updated><app:edited xmlns:app="http://www.w3.org/2007/app">2010-09-06T03:35:37.420-07:00</app:edited><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="fiscal policy" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Macroeconomic Modelling" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="India" /><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Policy Simulation" /><title>Fiscal Consolidation with High Growth: A Policy Simulation Model for India</title><content type="html">NIPFP Working Paper 73&lt;br /&gt;[&lt;a href= "http://www.nipfp.org.in/working_paper/WP_2010_73.pdf"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sudipto Mundle, N.R. Bhanumurthy, and Surajit Das&lt;br /&gt;August 2010 &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Abstract&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this paper a fiscal consolidation program for India has been presented based on a policy simulation model that enables us to examine the macroeconomic implications of alternative fiscal strategies, given certain assumptions about other macro policy choices and relevant exogenous factors. The model is then used to estimate the outcomes resulting from a possible strategy of fiscal consolidation in the base case. The exercise shows that it is possible to have fiscal consolidation while at the same time maintaining high GDP growth of around 8% or so. The strategy is to gradually bring down the revenue deficit to zero by 2014-15, while allowing a combined fiscal deficit for centre plus states of about 6% of GDP. This provides the space for substantial government capital expenditure, which translates to a significant public investment program. This in turn leads to high overall investment directly and indirectly, via the crowding in effect on private investment, which drives the high GDP growth. The exercise has also tested the robustness of this strategy under two alternative scenarios of higher and lower advanced country growth compared to the base case.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7526169067922008772-5935816689096102833?l=nipfp.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~4/sbRmTlKceO8" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</content><link rel="replies" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://nipfp.blogspot.com/feeds/5935816689096102833/comments/default" title="Post Comments" /><link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7526169067922008772&amp;postID=5935816689096102833" title="0 Comments" /><link rel="edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5935816689096102833?v=2" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7526169067922008772/posts/default/5935816689096102833?v=2" /><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/NipfpWorkingPapers/~3/sbRmTlKceO8/fiscal-consolidation-with-high-growth.html" title="Fiscal Consolidation with High Growth: A Policy Simulation Model for India" /><author><name>Anurodh Sharma</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17090456774948731195</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail" width="16" height="16" src="http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif" /></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><feedburner:origLink>http://nipfp.blogspot.com/2010/09/fiscal-consolidation-with-high-growth.html</feedburner:origLink></entry></feed>

