An employee was struck by a forklift and sustained multiple broken toes and ribs as well as a crushed toe and broken foot.

The employer and union disputed whether the injury was a “critical injury” under the OHSA. The employer and union called in a Ministry of Labour inspector to decide the issue. He decided that it was not a critical injury. However, he said that he had been told about only the toe injury and broken ribs, and not the multiple broken toes or broken foot.

The union appealed the inspector’s decision. The union attempted to argue that the broken foot was a critical injury.

The OLRB decided, based on previous decisions, that “an appeal from an Inspector’s Orders is restricted to the issues considered by the Inspector”. Because the inspector was aware of the injured toes but not the broken foot, the OLRB could decide only whether the toe injury constituted a critical injury. The OLRB could not decide the issue of whether the broken foot was a critical injury.

If the case proceeds to a hearing, we will obtain guidance as to whether a broken foot constitutes a critical injury under the OHSA, which would require the employer to report the injury to the MOL.

CAW Local 707 v. Ford Motor Company of Canada, 2013 CanLII22067 (OLRB) (April 19, 2013)…

The collective agreement required the employer to provide “coveralls”. The employer provided summer coveralls with reflective “visibility markings” and which also protected the employee’s clothing. The employer did not provide winter coveralls, which were lined on the inside and therefore warmer.

The crane operators complained that the summer coveralls were not warm enough in the winter and fit too tightly to wear enough clothes to keep warm. They said that although the crane cabs were heated, they were drafty and the door must be opened and closed frequently.

The arbitrator decided that the need to wear warmer clothing underneath the coveralls in winter “was not established as a health and safety regulation or a requirement of the Collective Agreement.” The safety issues – visibility and protection of clothing – was adequately addressed by the summer coveralls.

This case appears to be part of a trend of unions attempting to achieve certain job benefits – such as winter clothing – for employees on the basis of safety. Here, the union was unable to establish that the lining in winter coveralls was a safety requirement.

Resource Development Trades Council of Newfoundland and Labrador v. Long Harbour Employers Association Inc., 2013 CanLII 12447 (NL LA) (January 7, 2013)…

The brochure quotes an official as saying, “It is well recognized that texting while driving dramatically increases the risk of a motor vehicle injury or fatality. We are asking employers to send a clear message to workers and supervisors that your company neither requires nor condones texting while driving.”

The brochure goes on to state that employers should “Prohibit texting while driving. OSHA encourages employers to declare their vehicles ‘text-free zones’ and to emphasize that commitment to their workers, customers, and communities.”

OSHA states that if it receives a “credible complaint that an employer requires texting while driving or organizes work so that texting is a practical necessity, we will investigate and will issue citations and penalties where necessary to end this practice.”

One expects that Canadian workplace safety inspectors would similarly take action, under occupational health and safety legislation, against employers who require or encourage employees to text while driving, or impose such great demands on employees that they are practically required to text while driving.…

The employee had an erratic attendance record. The employer imposed reporting requirements on the employee as to when and how he must report to his supervisor if unable to arrive at work at all or on time. The employee breached those conditions and was disciplined. The employee then filed grievances challenging the discipline and alleging that the conditions were unfair, constituted harassment, and failed to take into account his sleep apnea and drinking problem.

The adjudicator held that the employer, faced with the employee’s poor attendance record, which was a departure from the norm, was entitled to impose the reporting requirements.

The adjudicator went on to state that the employee’s sleep apnea and drinking patterns did not amount to a disability. The adjudicator’s comments are interesting:

“130 The difficulty is that the grievor’s argument confuses an ailment with a disability. Depression and stress are commonly experienced by many people in the course of their working lives. Neither is, by that fact, disabling. The same can be said of sleep apnea. The fact that one experiences such conditions does not establish a prima facie case of disablement or, all the more so, a prima facie case of discrimination based on a disability. Needed in this case was evidence that the conditions were so bad that they disabled or at least limited the grievor’s ability to comply with the reporting conditions. But the grievor offered no such evidence other than the conditions themselves.

“131 The importance of managing attendance is not eliminated by the mere assertion that one has an illness. Not every physical or emotional ailment amounts to a disability requiring accommodation. Some ailments – such as depression, emotional stress or headaches or, in Mr. Riche’s case, sleep apnea – may impact a person’s life without necessarily making it impossible for them to comply with the usual expectations of working life. For example, depression may be mild, moderate or totally disabling. The severity of its impact will depend upon the severity of the cause, the person’s psychological makeup and the steps he or she takes to combat it. It is not a sufficient excuse on the part of an employee to justify his or her repeated tardiness or frequent absences by saying, “I’m depressed”, or, “I had a headache.” Something more is required to enable the employer to know that the ailment is truly disabling, that is, something beyond the control of the employee as opposed to simply an excuse. In part, that is the reason the jurisprudence emphasizes the obligation on the part of the employee seeking accommodation to explain the nature of the problem and to co-operate in its treatment. Without such an explanation, the employer has no way of knowing whether the ailment is severe enough to amount to a disability or what to do about it by way of an accommodation if so required.”

The adjudicator went on to state that employers are not required to accommodate “issues that an employee is able to control”. Here, the adjudicator held that the employee was able to control his problem with sleeping in – for instance, by putting his alarm clock on the other side of the room. Also, the grievor’s statements that he was a “heavy drinker” and a “happy drunk” were not enough to establish that he was an alcoholic, particularly when he stopped short of calling himself an alcoholic and did not call evidence from his family doctor.

As this case demonstrates, not every health condition will be a disability, and the mere assertion by an employee that he has a health issue may not be enough , in every case, to require the employer to accommodate.

Riche v. Treasury Board, 2013 PSLRB 35 (Public Sector Labour Relations Board, April 19, 2013)…

The capital safety planner was to be involved from the outset in every project that the employer undertook.  He or she would impose requirements for health and safety on projects.

The arbitrator decided that the capital safety planner would not be performing functions of a manager or a superintendent, nor would he or she be employed in a confidential capacity in matters relating to labour relations or in a confidential planning or advisory position in the development of management policy.

Instead, the capital safety planner would implement policy that had already been developed by reviewing the work on each project, identifying the risks, and then determining the steps and resources necessary to address them.  Further, project safety was not a confidential matter that required the person to be excluded from the bargaining unit.

Lastly, the arbitrator noted that the union bargaining unit included other “professional and technical employees including a variety of planning positions”, so it would not appear inappropriate to include the capital safety planner in the bargaining unit.

B.C. Hydro and Power Authority v. Canadian Office and Professional Employees Union, Local 378 (B.C. Arbitrator, January 18, 2013)…

The employee, Ashworth, alleged that the manager demanded that she close the door and then positioned herself in front of the closed door and started screaming and pointing her finger in the employee’s face.  The employee claimed that she became afraid and was asked to be allowed to leave, but the manager continued to be abusive.  The employer subsequently terminated her employment.

The employer appears to have argued that the employee’s complaint did not make out a safety-reprisal case because the incident did not raise workplace safety issues under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, and therefore there was no basis for the employee’s claim that she was fired for raising safety issues.

That argument flows from a line of cases, of which Conforti v Investia Financial Services Inc, 2011 CanLII 60897 (ON LRB) is most notable. In that case, the OLRB stated that “it appears the OHSA only requires an employer to put a workplace harassment policy and program in place and to provide a worker with information and instruction as appropriate”, but that the OHSA does not actually require the employer to prevent harassment.  As such, an employee’s claim that she was fired for asking the employer to prevent harassment does not engage the OHSA and cannot form the basis for a reprisal claim.

The OLRB, in Ms. Ashworth’s case, was not persuaded that the case should be dismissed at this stage for failure to disclose a prima facie reprisal case.  Although the decision does not say it, the OLRB may have felt that the manager’s conduct might constitute workplace violence – rather than harassment – in which case the employee’s complaint could possibly succeed.  The OHSA does require employers to take reasonable steps to avoid workplace violence – but not harassment.

Ashworth v Boston Pizza, 2013 CanLII 20917 (ON LRB)…

An employee of a trash-removal business consumed three beers before work, climbed up on a roof to retrieve loose shingles, and then fell off the roof and became paralyzed below the waist.  A corporation was charged as the injured worker’s “employer”.  A representative of the corporation was also charged as a supervisor, and another individual, one Haniff, was charged with obstructing the MOL inspector by not answering questions.

There was much debate in the case about who was the “employer”.  The company was ultimately found to be the employer and convicted of failing to ensure that the worker wore fall arrest equipment and was trained in fall arrest.

Haniff attended at the Ministry of Labour office, as requested by the inspector and handed the inspector an envelope that contained the telephone record for the corporate defendant. However, Haniff, who admitted that he had taken the initial call from the homeowner asking to have the trash removed, failed to answer the inspector’s other questions about what Haniff did after taking the call, and in particular whether he directed the workers to go to the job site.

Justice of the Peace Mary Ross Hendriks stated:

“Section 62(1) of the Act, which also falls under Part VIII – Enforcement,  states:

 Obstruction of inspector

 62(1) No person shall hinder, obstruct, molest or interfere with or attempt to hinder, obstruct, molest, or interfere with an inspector in the exercise of a power or the performance of a duty under this Act or the regulations or in the execution of a warrant issued under this Act or the Provincial Offences Act with respect to a matter under this Act or the regulations.

“Specifically, subsection 62(2)(a) of the Act creates a positive duty to assist, on “every person” to “furnish all necessary means in the person’s power to facilitate any entry, search, inspection, investigation, examination, testing or inquiry by an inspector,” in the exercise of his or her powers or the performance of his or her duties under the Act or regulations.

“Mr. Haniff’s refusal to answer any of his questions when they met hindered Inspector Lomer’s ability to conduct his investigation, and thwarted his ability to explore undisclosed events and workplace relationships which were relevant to his investigation.”

Haniff was therefore guilty of the Occupational Health and Safety Act offence of obstructing the inspector.

The case shows the importance of co-operating with lawful requests from Ministry of Labour inspectors in the course of an investigation.

Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. J.R. Contracting Property Services et al., 2013 ONCJ 202 (CanLII)

 …

The employee’s work refusal complaint to the Ontario Ministry of Labour had been made in bad faith, according to the arbitrator.

The employee worked as a plumber at a hospital.  In January 2011, he engaged in a verbal exchange with another employee.  The employee alleged that the other employee threatened him.  The arbitrator decided that the employee’s “honest belief [that he had been threatened] graduated into an attitude of increasing certitude, elevated worry, and finally rectitude.  That certitude and eventual rectitude blinded [the employee] to any other possible view of the matter and led him to question the motives and conduct of almost everyone around him.”

The employee went on  “stress leave”. At some point, he insisted on an immediate return to work.  There was a delay in his return because his doctor took time to get back to the Hospital.  The employee then responded by filing a work refusal complaint with the Ministry of Labour under the Occupational Health and Safety Act and sent an emotional e-mail to the Hospital CEO the next day.

The arbitrator decided that the work refusal complaint was “highly questionable”.  The arbitrator held that it was not made in good faith in the sense that it was a “reckless claim– intended to place additional pressure on the Hospital.”  The Hospital had just cause to impose discipline for making the work refusal allegation.

However, because the employee had five years of service and no disciplinary record, the bad-faith work refusal was not enough to dismiss for cause.  But the arbitrator nevertheless decided that he should not be reinstated: the employee was convinced that numerous people had lied about him in the past and continued to lie about him at the arbitration. He had two years to re-evaluate but his position had only hardened.  If he were reinstated, he would “continue his quest for justice as he sees it”. Also, he had found permanent employment with another major public sector unionized employer, which he judged to be equivalent or superior to what he enjoyed at the hospital. 

“But this just can’t go on”, the arbitrator concluded, denying reinstatement that would only embolden the employee to persist in further investigation until he was satisfied with the result.  The employee was instead awarded approximately nine months’ wages in lieu of reinstatement.

 C.U.P.E. v. The Scarborough Hospital, 2013 CanLII 16383 (ONLA)…

The charge resulted from the death of a fourteen year old girl when a concrete block privacy wall collapsed on her as she tried to boost herself up onto a change table which was affixed to the wall.

The City was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act with failing, as an employer, to ensure that the wall was capable of supporting all loads to which it may be subjected “without causing the materials therein to be stressed beyond the allowable unit stresses established under the Building Code Act“.  Mr. Justice Epstein of the Ontario Court of Justice found that the “allowable unit stresses” standard no longer existed in the Building Code at the time of the design and construction of the building.  Rather, the “limits states design philosophy” had replaced it.  The Ministry of Labour had, however, failed to update the language in the OHSA.  As such, “The wording in the charging section has no applicabliy to the circumstances of this case in that the concept of allowable unit stress had expired long before” the design and contruction of this building, which had been designed in accordance with the “limits states design discipline”.  As such, the prosecutor had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the City had committed the offence.

According to Justice Epstein, even if the City had committed the offence, it was reasonable for the City to rely on the stamped drawing of the architect and engineer.  It was not readily apparent that the drawing was defective, and in any event the “default position in the industry” is that if walls are joined as shown on the drawing, they need to be interlocked.  There was also an “outright failure” of the masonry subcontractor to properly construct the wall to be stable.  As such, the City had established due diligence by relying on the stamped drawing.

Occupational Health and Safety Act charges against the architect and engineer were previously dismissed for limitations reasons (see our previous post here) but that decision is under appeal.

The court’s acquittal of the City will be of some comfort to employers who rely on stamped documents of architects and engineers in constructing buildings – at least where it could not have been apparent from the drawing that it was deficient.

Her Majesty the Queen v. Corporation of the City of Guelph, Ontario Court of Justice, February 2, 2012 (Epstein J.)…

The employee worked as a janitor in the subway system in Toronto.  He suffered from drug and alcohol addiction and had a criminal history.  His absenteeism record was described as “extreme” with more than 100 days of absence in one year.

The day after he “got smashed” at a wedding reception, the employee attended at work in an impaired state.  His eyes were  glassy and he was waving his arms around and making noises that sounded like a quacking duck.  He was dismissed for being unfit for duty at work. 

The collective agreement specifically provided that that the TTC may discharge an employee for “Being impaired while on duty by reason of consumption of an intoxicating beverage, or drug for other than medicinal purposes” and that “[i]f the factual basis is substantiated, the Arbitration Board shall not inquire into the propriety” of the discharge.  Based on that provision, the arbitrator held that because the employee was impaired at work, the arbitrator had no authority under the collective agreement to overturn the discharge or impose a lesser penalty.

The next question was whether the TTC had satisfied its duty to accommodate the employee’s disability – alcohol and drug dependancy – under the Human Rights Code.  The arbitrator decided that the TTC had already accommodated the employee to the point of undue hardship by: tolerating very high levels of absenteeism over several years; providing him with sick benefits to enable him to attend several rehabilitation programs; giving him extensions of time to comply with the grievance procedure; giving him a mandatory referral to an addictions counsellor; and retaining him in its employ even though he had violated a last chance agreement.  His absenteeism affected his department and his co-workers, who had to pick up the “safety critical type of activities” that the employee’s absence created.  His absences also imposed a significant burden on management (taking ten times the effort of managing other employees).

As such, despite the employee’s admirable efforts to overtime his alcohol and drug dependency, requiring the TTC to reinstate the employee would impose undue hardship on the TTC.  This case illustrates that “undue hardship” can indeed be proven based on excessive absenteeism and the resulting effect on the employer. 

Amalgamated Transit Union Local 113 v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2012 CanLII 51356 (ONLA)…