Filing is simple, secure, and free of charge. Beneficial ownership information reporting is not an annual requirement. A report only needs to be submitted once, unless the filer needs to update or correct information. Companies that are required to comply must file by the following deadlines:

• Reporting companies created or registered to do business in the United States before January 1, 2024, must file by January 1, 2025.
• Reporting companies created or registered to do business in the United States in 2024 have 90 calendar days to file after receiving actual or public notice that their company’s creation or registration is effective.

To find out more about the reporting process, visit https://www.fincen.gov/boi.

September 2023, The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an alert to U.S. financial institutions and the broader public to bring attention to a prominent virtual currency investment scam called “pig butchering.”

These scams are referred to as “pig butchering” because they resemble the practice of fattening a hog before slaughter. The victims in this situation are referred to as “pigs” by the scammers who leverage fictitious identities, the guise of potential relationships, and elaborate storylines to “fatten up” the victim into believing they are in trusted partnerships. The scammers then refer to “butchering” or “slaughtering” the victim after victim assets are stolen, causing the victims financial and emotional harm. In many cases, the “butchering” phase involves convincing victims to invest in virtual currency, or in some cases, over-the-counter foreign exchange schemes —all with the intent of defrauding them of their investment. Pig butchering scams are largely perpetrated by criminal organizations based in Southeast Asia who use victims with the description “Pig Butchering.” Multiple U.S. law enforcement sources estimate victims in the United States have lost billions of dollars to these scams and other virtual currency investment frauds.

This alert explains the pig butchering scam methodology and provides red flag indicators to assist with identifying and reporting related suspicious activity that usually involves the initial contact with the victim through text messages, direct messages on social media, or other communication tools and platforms, usually under the guise of accidentally reaching a wrong number or trying to re-establish a connection with an old friend. The scammer, who may claim to be an investor or money manager, may also create a social media background, and a significant number of scammers who contact victims are likely victims themselves of human and labor trafficking rings operated by criminal organizations and are perpetrating such activity against their will.  Scammers also use:

• Instant messaging services and text messages

• Professional networking sites

• Social media

• Dating sites

All of the above channels of communication are used to showcase wealth and an enviable lifestyle. Once the scammer elicits a response from a victim, the scammer will communicate with them over time to establish trust and build a relationship before the “Investment” Sales Pitch wherein the scammer will introduce the victim to a supposedly lucrative investment opportunity in virtual currency and direct them to use virtual currency investment websites or applications designed to appear legitimate, but which are fraudulent and ultimately controlled or manipulated by the scammer. This includes the use of legitimate applications with third-party plugins that allow the scammer to manipulate or falsify information presented to the victim. A scammer may also request remote access to the victim’s devices to register accounts with virtual currency service providers (i.e., virtual asset service providers, or VASPs) on the victim’s behalf, or instruct their victims to take screenshots of their device so that the scammers can walk them through the process of purchasing virtual currency. According to the FBI, many victims also report being directed to make wire transfers to overseas accounts or purchase large amounts of prepaid cards to purchase virtual currency.

NB: The use of virtual currency and virtual currency kiosks is also an emerging method of payment. Once a victim acquires virtual currency, the scammer directs them to “invest” the funds through investment websites or applications, although the funds are funneled to virtual currency addresses and accounts controlled by scammers and their co-conspirators. Occasionally, a scammer will leverage high-pressure sales tactics such as telling their victim that they will lose out on the opportunity if they do not invest by a certain deadline. A scammer may also encourage the victim to bring their friends and family to invest in the scheme. In more recent iterations, the scammer will invite the victim to join online or mobile games, advertised as “play-to-earn” games offering financial incentives to players, but which in reality are fake gaming applications created by the scammer to steal virtual currency from players.

The Promise of Greater Returns.

Once the victim invests with the scammer, the scammer will show the victim extraordinary returns on the investment that has been fabricated. The scammer may even allow the victim to withdraw a small amount of that investment to further build the victim’s confidence before urging the victim to invest more. Victims have been known to liquidate holdings in tax-advantaged accounts or take out home equity lines of credit (HELOC) and second mortgages on their homes in order to increase their investments.

The Point of No Return

When a victim’s pace of investment slows or stops, the scammer will use even more aggressive tactics to extract any final payments. The scammer may present the victim with supposed losses on the investment and encourage them to make up the difference through additional deposits. If the victim attempts to withdraw their investment, the scammer may demand that the victim pay purported taxes or early withdrawal fees. Once the victim is unable or unwilling to pay more into the scam, the scammer will abruptly cease communication with the victim, taking the victim’s entire investment with them.

Case Study:

In November 2022, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia announced the seizure of seven domain names used in a pig butchering scam. According to court records, from at least May through August 2022, scammers induced five victims in the United States by using the seven seized domains, which were all spoofed domains of the Singapore International Monetary Exchange. The term “spoofed” refers to domain spoofing and involves a cyberattack in which fraudsters or hackers seek to persuade individuals that a web address or email belongs to a legitimate and generally trusted company, when in fact it links the user to a false site-controlled by a cybercriminal. The scammers convinced the victims that they were investing in a legitimate cryptocurrency opportunity. After the victims transferred investments into the deposit addresses that the scammers provided through the seven seized domain names, the victims’ funds were immediately transferred through numerous private wallets and swapping services in an effort to conceal the source of the funds. In total, the victims lost over $10 million.

You may be able to recover some of your losses by claiming the loss on your tax return.  Be sure to tell your Tax Preparer about this loss as soon as possible as well as your financial institutions that your money was illegally stolen from you.

Michael B Nelson, Esq.

I. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions

The legislative framework generally referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) consists of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, as amended by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Public Law 107–56 (October 26, 2001), and other legislation, including the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AML Act).^[2] The BSA is codified at 12 U.S.C. 1829b, 12 U.S.C. 1951–1960, and 31 U.S.C. 5311–5314 and 5316–5336, and notes thereto, with implementing regulations at 31 CFR chapter X.

The BSA authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury (the “Secretary”), inter alia, to require financial institutions to keep records and file reports that are determined to have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters, risk assessments or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or counter-intelligence activities to protect against international terrorism, and to implement AML programs and compliance procedures.^[3] Regulations implementing the BSA appear at 31 CFR chapter X. The authority of the Secretary to administer the BSA has been delegated to the Director of FinCEN.^[4]

Under 31 U.S.C. 5314, the Secretary “shall require a resident or citizen of the United States or a person in, and doing business in, the United States, to . . . keep records and file reports, when the resident, citizen, or person makes a transaction or maintains a relation for any person with a foreign financial agency.” The term “foreign financial agency” encompasses the activities found in the statutory definition of “financial agency,” ^[5] notably, “a person acting for a person as a financial institution, bailee, depository trustee, or agent, or acting in a similar way related to money, credit, securities, gold, or a transaction in money, credit, securities, or gold.” ^[6] The Secretary is also authorized to prescribe exemptions to the reporting requirement and to prescribe other matters the Secretary considers necessary to carry out 31 U.S.C. 5314.

The regulations implementing 31 U.S.C. 5314 appear at 31 CFR 1010.350, 1010.306, and 1010.420. Section 1010.350 generally requires each U.S. person having a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, a bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country to report such relationship to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for each year such relationship exists, and to provide and report such information specified in a reporting form prescribed under 31 U.S.C. 5314. The FBAR is used to file the information required by this section and must be filed electronically with FinCEN.^[7] 31 CFR 1010.306(c) requires the FBAR to be filed for foreign financial accounts exceeding $10,000 maintained during the previous calendar year. No FBAR is required to be filed if the aggregate value of foreign financial accounts did not exceed $10,000 at any time during the previous calendar year.

The FBAR must be filed on or before April 15 of each calendar year for accounts maintained during the previous calendar year.^[8]

31 CFR 1010.420 outlines the recordkeeping requirements associated with foreign financial accounts required to be reported under section 1010.350. Specifically, filers must retain records of such accounts, to include type of account, account number, name of foreign financial institution maintaining the account, address of the foreign financial institution, and maximum value of the account during the calendar year, for a period of five years and make the records available for inspection as authorized by law.

II. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

Reports of foreign financial accounts (31 CFR 1010.350), records to be made and retained by persons having financial interests in foreign financial accounts (31 CFR 1010.420), filing of reports (31 CFR 1010.306(c)), and FinCEN Form 114—FBAR.

Form Number: FinCEN Form 114—FBAR.

Affected Public: Individuals, businesses or other for-profit institutions, and non-profit institutions that qualify as U.S. persons.

Renewal without change of a currently approved information collection.

Frequency: Annual.

Estimated Number of Respondents: 1,503,807 FBAR filers.^[9]

III. Estimated Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden

The estimated average burden associated with the FBAR reporting and recordkeeping requirements will vary depending on the number of reportable foreign financial accounts and the applicability of special rules provided in the regulations which provide some relief from the full scope of the reporting obligations.^[10]

The information required to be reported on the FBAR is basic information U.S. persons will have received on account statements from the foreign financial institutions where the accounts are opened and maintained. Those statements will provide a U.S. person with the information needed to complete and file the FBAR. No special accounting or legal skills are necessary to transfer the basic information required to be reported, such as the name of the foreign financial institution, the type of account, and the account number, to the FBAR.

The special rules located at 31 CFR 1010.350(g) provide a variety of relief to FBAR filers by (1) limiting the information reported in the FBAR to the number of accounts and certain other basic identifying information, if the filer has a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, 25 or more reportable accounts; (2) allowing for entities to file consolidated FBARs on their own behalf and on behalf of entities for which they have a direct or indirect ownership interest of over 50 percent; and (3) exempting reporting of foreign financial interest in accounts involving certain trust and retirement plans. However, filers reporting financial interest in, or signature authority over, 25 or more foreign financial accounts are required to maintain a record of the detailed account information on each of their foreign financial accounts, including the account number, the name of the foreign financial institution that holds the account, the address of the foreign financial institution, the maximum value of the account during the calendar year, and the type of account.^[11]

For the reasons noted above, FinCEN estimates that the approximate FBAR reporting burden will vary depending on the number of reportable foreign financial accounts and will range from approximately 20 minutes to 90 minutes. FinCEN estimates the average reporting burden per FBAR filer will be 55 minutes.

Past estimates of the FBAR recordkeeping requirement took into account time to store paper copies of the FBAR form and estimated that the approximate recordkeeping burden was 30 minutes. Since 2011, FBARs have been filed electronically. Electronically filing the FBAR allows a filer to save an electronic copy of the report, which satisfies the recordkeeping part of the requirement. FinCEN estimates it would take a filer five minutes to save an electronic copy of the FBAR. In addition to maintaining a copy of the form, those filers who take advantage of the special rules related to financial interests in or signature authority over 25 or more accounts would be required to respond to requests for detailed information on those accounts. However, FinCEN believes that in most cases, such information would be maintained by filers in the ordinary course of business in the form of periodic account statements and other business records which would be maintained mostly electronically. There is no requirement in the FBAR regulations to maintain such information in any particular format.

For these reasons, FinCEN estimates that the FBAR recordkeeping burden will be approximately five minutes.

FinCEN estimates the total annual reporting and recordkeeping burden per FBAR filer will be one hour (55 minutes for FBAR reporting, and five minutes for FBAR recordkeeping).

Estimated Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden: The estimated total annual PRA burden is 1,503,807 hours (1,503,807 ^[12] FBARs multiplied by one hour).

Estimated Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Cost: Of the 1,503,807 FBARs filed in calendar year 2022, 1,434,362 were filed by individuals, and 69,445 were filed by entities. FinCEN cannot quantify the cost to individuals who file FBARs on their own behalf. For entities, FinCEN estimates the following annual burden cost: 69,445 hours × $52.55 ^[13] per hour = $3,649,334.75.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number. Records required to be retained under the BSA must be retained for five years.

IV.  Request for Comments:

Himamauli Das, is the Acting Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and has published the above information with footnotes below for the general public and professional tax preparers to raise and respond in writing comments which will become a matter of public record. Comments are invited on: (i) whether the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (ii) the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the collection of information; (iii) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; (iv) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and (v) estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.

V.  CONCLUSION:

I found this above information helpful in understanding the purpose of these filings and appreciation of the time it estimates practioners to prepare and file the FBAR as well as the estimated time and cost to retain such filings as well as the retention period of the BSA.

We specialize in the advice, preparation of current and/or delinquent FBAR for tax filers and the representation of delinquent or non-filing of FBAR IRS audits, examinations, civil and criminal fraud representations at the Examination level, Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).

If you have any confidential questions or concern protected under the Attorney/Client privileges, please email or call us for a confidential communication as to your specific situation.  Remember that the best outcome is when you approach the U.S. Government through your attorney rather than the Government first approaching you.

Looking forward to talking with you,

Michael B. Nelson, Attorney

Footnotes

1.  Public Law 104–13, 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A).

2.  The AML Act was enacted as Division F, sections 6001–6511, of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Public Law 116–283, 134 stat. 3388 (2021).

3.  Section 358 of the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the purpose of the BSA by including a reference to reports and records “that have a high degree of usefulness in intelligence or counterintelligence activities to protect against international terrorism.” Section 6101 of the AML Act further expanded the purpose of the BSA to cover such matters as preventing money laundering, tracking illicit funds, assessing risk, and establishing appropriate frameworks for information sharing.

4.  Treasury Order 180–01 (Jan. 14, 2020).

5.  31 U.S.C. 5312(b)(2).

6.   See31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(1), which exempts from the definition of financial agency a person acting for a country, a monetary or financial authority acting as a monetary or financial authority, or an international financial institution of which the United States Government is a member.

7.  Formerly Form TD–F 90–22.1. FinCEN Form 114 can be completed by accessing FinCEN’s BSA E-Filing System website at http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/​main.html.

8.  In accordance with section 2006(b)(11) of Public Law 114–41, the filing due date for the report is April 15 effective as of the 2016 reporting year. The statute permits the Secretary to extend the filing due date for up to six months. Filers who submit complete and accurate reports to FinCEN no later than October 15 of the year the report is due will be deemed to have timely filed. FinCEN issued a statement on its website in 2016 noting the FBAR date change as a result of the statutory change. FinCEN intends to revise the FBAR regulations at 31 CFR 1010.306(c) to reflect the statutory date change.

9.  The total number of FBARs filed in 2022 for foreign financial accounts held during calendar year 2021 is 1,503,807. Multiple foreign financial accounts may be reported on a single FBAR.

10.  31 CFR 1010.350(g).

11.  Filers availing themselves of special rules under 31 CFR 1010.350(g)(1) and (2) involving 25 or more reportable foreign financial accounts are required to maintain and provide detailed account information for each foreign financial account, if requested by the Secretary or their delegate.

12.  FinCEN received 1,503,807 FBARs in calendar year 2022.

Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions directive

1. SUMMARY:

The directive, issued pursuant to an April 15, 2021 Executive Order.

1. DATES:

Directive 4 (as amended) under Executive Order 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” was issued on May 19, 2023.

Background

On May 19, 2023, the Director of OFAC issued Directive 4 (as amended) “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation”, includes a new Reports section, to require that United States persons who are in possession or control of property in which any entity determined to be subject to the prohibitions of Directive 4 (as amended) has an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect, must submit a report to OFAC on or before June 18, 2023, and annually thereafter by June 30, 2023, and reflects technical and other non-substantive changes.

1. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Directive 4 (as Amended) ^[1] Under Executive Order 14024

Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation

Pursuant to sections 1(a)(iv), 1(d), and 8 of Executive Order 14024, “Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation” (the “Order”), the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control has determined, in consultation with the Department of State, that the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation are political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities of the Government of the Russian Federation, and that the following activities by a United States person are prohibited, except to the extent provided by law, or unless licensed or otherwise authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control:

Any transaction involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, including any transfer of assets to such entities or any foreign exchange transaction for or on behalf of such entities.

All other activities with entities determined to be subject to the prohibitions of this Directive, or involving their property or interests in property, are permitted, provided that such activities are not otherwise prohibited by law, the Order, or any other sanctions program implemented by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Except to the extent otherwise provided by law or unless licensed or otherwise authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the following are also prohibited: (1) any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions of this Directive; and (2) any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions of this Directive.

A listing of entities determined to be subject to the prohibitions of this Directive can be found in the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Non-SDN Menu-Based Sanctions (NS–MBS) List on the Office of Foreign Assets Control website ( https://ofac.treasury.gov/​).

Reports. United States persons who are in possession or control of property in which any entity determined to be subject to the prohibitions of this Directive has an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect, must submit a report to OFACreport@treasury.gov on or before June 18, 2023, and annually thereafter by June 30. Such reports shall include the following:

1. The name and address of the person in possession or control of the property;

2. The date the property came into the possession or control of such person;

3. The entity or entities subject to the prohibitions of this Directive having an interest in the property;

4. A description of the property and its location in the United States or otherwise, including any relevant account types, account numbers, reference numbers, dates, or other information necessary to identify the property;

5. The actual, or if unknown, estimated value of the property in U.S. dollars as of May 31, 2023, for the initial report, and annually thereafter as of May 31. Foreign currencies must be reported in U.S. dollars with the foreign currency amount and notional exchange rate in the narrative; and

6. A copy of the most recent relevant account statement or other documentation to support the estimated value of the property.

CONCLUSION AND RESPONDING ACTION

This Directive was written by Andrea M. Gacki the Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control on May 19, 2023. Just for year 2022, the penalties totaled $42,664,006.65 and to date for year 2023, as of August 10, 2023, the part year penalties totals over half of a US$1Billion, at an astounding $556,529,304.18.

Our Law Firm assists with companies that believe they may be in violation of this Directive and wish to become current as well as begin constructive communications with the Office of Foreign Asset Control for the assessment of penalties and limiting further U.S. Government Agencies from seeking further money damages and worse.  Please contact our office in confidence for further conversations on how we may be able to assist you.

Although this article is not designed or meant to be providing legal advice, you may want to consider when talking with us the possibility of mitigating the penalties through our representation of mitigating factors that in the past were weighed in the companies’ favor such as, but certainly not limited to:

1. Client has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the Apparent Violations.
2. Proactively initiating a comprehensive review of its sanctions compliance program, and voluntarily reporting its findings to OFAC
3. Immediately and substantially cooperating with OFAC’s investigation into alleged Violations.
4. Determine design and put into action significant remedial measures to address its sanctions compliance deficiencies;
5. Agreed to implement additional sanctions compliance commitments designed to minimize the risk of recurrence of similar conduct in the future.

Michael B. Nelson, Attorney

2022 CIVIL PENALTIES INFORMATION CHART

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CASE NO. 3:20-cr-00371 WHA
Plaintiff, VIOLATIONS:
18 U.S.C. § 371 – Conspiracy to Defraud the United
v. States and Commit Tax Evasion;
ROBERT T. BROCKMAN

Monday, October 20, 2014

For Immediate Release

U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of New Hampshire

WASHINGTON – A Hampton, New Hampshire, man pleaded guilty today in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire to filing a false federal income tax return for tax year 2009, the Justice Department and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced.

            According to court documents, Menashe Cohen, an oriental carpet dealer, and his sister maintained an undeclared bank account at UBS in Switzerland that had a balance of approximately $1.3 million.  Cohen also maintained bank accounts in Israel and in Jersey, a British Crown dependency located in the Channel Islands off the coast of Normandy, France.  Although Cohen’s return for tax year 2009 reported that he had a financial interest in a bank account in Jersey, the return failed to report that he had financial interests in the accounts located in Switzerland and Israel.  In addition, Cohen’s return only reported $350 in interest income, when in fact he had received approximately $66,500 in interest income during 2009.

            In total, for tax years 2006 through 2009, Cohen failed to report approximately $170,000 in income earned from offshore bank accounts.  In addition, Cohen filed a false and fraudulent Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) for 2009, wherein Cohen reported he had bank accounts in Israel and Jersey on the FBAR, but failed to report his financial interest in the UBS account in Switzerland.

            According to the law, U.S. citizens and residents who have an interest in, or signature or other authority over, a financial account in a foreign country with assets in excess of $10,000 are required to disclose the existence of such account on Schedule B, Part III, of their individual income tax returns (Forms 1040).  Additionally, U.S. citizens and residents must file a FBAR with the U.S. Treasury disclosing any financial account in a foreign country with assets in excess of $10,000 in which they have a financial interest or signature or other authority.

            Cohen faces a statutory potential maximum sentence of three years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000 at his Jan. 26, 2015, sentencing.  In addition, Cohen has agreed to resolve his civil liability for failing to report his financial interest in the UBS account on a FBAR by paying a 50 percent civil penalty to the IRS based on the high balance of his one-half interest in the account.

            This case was investigated by special agents of IRS-Criminal Investigation and is being prosecuted by Senior Litigation Counsel John E. Sullivan of the department’s Tax Division and Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert M. Kinsella for the District of New Hampshire.

Wednesday, February 10, 2021

Former Florida Resident Indicted for Tax Evasion and Failing to Report Foreign Bank Accounts

A federal grand jury returned an indictment today charging Lucia Andrea Gatta, a former resident of Palm Beach County, Florida, with tax evasion and failing to file Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBARs), among other offenses, announced Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Stuart M. Goldberg of the Justice Department’s Tax Division and U.S. Attorney Ariana Fajardo Orshan for the Southern District of Florida.

According to the indictment, Gatta was born in Chile and became a naturalized U.S. Citizen in 2012. The indictment alleges that, for calendar years 2012 through 2014, Gatta failed to disclose her interest in a Swiss bank account on annual FBARs as required by law. Gatta also allegedly evaded assessment of income taxes on the interest and dividend income she earned in her Swiss bank account and failed to file tax returns with the IRS for tax years 2011 through 2014.

The indictment also charges Gatta with naturalization fraud. According to the indictment, Gatta did not disclose to the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) that she had failed to report foreign dividend and interest income during her citizenship application process, and she allegedly presented misleading documents to USCIS to substantiate the false statements she made during her naturalization interview.

If convicted, Gatta faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison for each count relating to her failure to file an FBAR and tax evasion. She also faces a maximum sentence of one year in prison for each of the counts concerning the failure to file tax returns. If convicted of naturalization fraud, Gatta faces a maximum sentence of ten years in prison and automatic denaturalization.

An indictment is an accusation. A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The case was investigated by special agents of IRS-Criminal Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security – Homeland Security Investigations. Trial Attorneys Sean Beaty and Parker Tobin of the Tax Division are prosecuting this case.

Monday, August 20, 2018

For Immediate Release

U.S. Attorney’s Office, Central District of California

          LOS ANGELES – A Los Angeles man pleaded guilty today in U.S. District Court to willfully failing to file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), which would have disclosed his foreign bank accounts, announced Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard E. Zuckerman of the Justice Department’s Tax Division.

          According to court documents, Ben Zion Birman held offshore accounts in Israel at Bank Leumi Le-Israel B.M. from 2006 to 2011. Birman willfully failed to file with the Department of Treasury an FBAR for calendar year 2010, despite having over $1 million in Bank Leumi accounts. In an effort to further hide his money, Birman instructed Bank Leumi to hold bank mail from delivery to the United States, and obtained access to his offshore funds through the use of “back-to-back” loans, which were designed to enable borrowers to tap their concealed accounts. These lending arrangements permitted Birman to have funds issued by Leumi’s U.S. branch that were secretly secured by funds in his undeclared accounts in Israel.

          In December 2014, Bank Leumi entered into a deferred prosecution agreement after the bank admitted to conspiring from at least 2000 until early 2011 to aid and assist U.S. taxpayers to prepare and present false tax returns by hiding income and assets in offshore bank accounts in Israel and other locations around the world. Under the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement, Bank Leumi paid the United States a total of $270 million and continues to cooperate with respect to civil and criminal tax investigations.

          U.S. citizens, resident aliens, and permanent legal residents with a foreign financial interest in or signatory authority over a foreign financial account worth more than $10,000 are required to file an FBAR each year disclosing the account.

          Birman faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison, as well as a period of supervised release, restitution and monetary penalties. Birman’s sentencing is scheduled for December 10, 2018.

          “The Department of Justice is committed to vigorously investigating and prosecuting offshore account holders who maintain undeclared accounts and willfully ignore their U.S. reporting and tax obligations,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Zuckerman.

          Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Zuckerman commended special agents from IRS-Criminal Investigation, who are investigating the case, and Tax Division Trial Attorneys Leslie Goemaat and Melissa Schraibman Grinberg, who are prosecuting the case. The Tax Division thanks Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert F. Conte for his assistance.

According to the indictment, Azizur Rahman, 70, had a financial interest in and signature authority over more than 20 foreign financial accounts, including accounts held in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Singapore, and Bangladesh. For the years 2010 through 2016, Rahman allegedly did not disclose his interest in all of his financial accounts on annual FBARs, as required by law. Rahman also allegedly filed false individual tax returns for the tax years 2010 through 2016 that did not report to the IRS all of his foreign bank accounts and income.

Rahman is also charged with filing a false “Streamlined Submission” in conjunction with the IRS Streamlined Domestic Offshore Procedures. Those procedures allowed eligible taxpayers residing within the United States, who failed to report gross income from foreign financial accounts on prior tax returns, failed to pay taxes on that gross income, or who failed to submit an FBAR disclosing foreign financial accounts, to voluntarily disclose their conduct to the IRS and to pay a reduced penalty if their conduct was non-willful. The indictment alleges that Rahman’s Streamlined Submission did not truthfully disclose all the foreign bank accounts in which he had an interest, and falsely claimed that his failure to report all income, pay all tax, and submit all required information returns, such as FBARs, was non-willful.

If convicted, Rahman faces a maximum sentence of three years in prison for each of the counts related to filing false tax documents. Rahman also faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison for each count relating to his failure to file an FBAR or filing a false FBAR. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after taking into account the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Raj Parekh, Acting U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Stuart M. Goldberg, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Justice Department’s Tax Division; and Kelly R. Jackson, Special Agent in Charge, Washington, D.C. Field Office, IRS-Criminal Investigation, made the announcement.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Jamar Walker and Trial Attorneys Sean Beaty and Brian Flanagan of the Justice Department’s Tax Division are prosecuting the case.

A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information are located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 1:21-cr-22.

An indictment is merely an accusation. The defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

BOSTON – A professor and researcher at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was charged and arrested today in connection with failing to disclose contracts, appointments, and awards from various entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the U.S. Department of Energy.

Gang Chen, 56, was charged with a criminal complaint of wire fraud, failing to file a foreign bank account report (FBAR), and making a false statement in a tax return. Chen will make an initial appearance today before Magistrate Judge Donald L. Cabell.

According to charging documents, Chen is a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in China. He is a professor and researcher at MIT where he serves as Director of the MIT Pappalardo Micro/Nano Engineering Laboratory and Director of the Solid-State Solar Thermal Energy Conversion Center (S³TEC). Since approximately 2013, Chen’s research at MIT has been funded by more than $19 million in grants awarded by various U.S. federal agencies.

Since 2012, Chen has allegedly held various appointments with the PRC designed to promote the PRC’s technological and scientific development by providing advice and expertise – sometimes directly to PRC government officials – and often in exchange for financial compensation. This includes acting as an “overseas expert” for the PRC government at the request of the PRC Consulate Office in New York and serving as a member of at least two PRC Talent Programs. Since 2013, Chen allegedly received approximately $29 million of foreign funding, including $19 million from the PRC’s Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTech).

It is further alleged that Chen’s efforts to promote the PRC’s scientific and economic development were partially detailed in a February 2016 email that Chen sent himself using his MIT e-mail account.  The email read:

1. promote Chinese collaboration
2. China places innovation (scientific) as key and core not fashion [sic], but because

we must do it, from the historic trend as well from our stage our economy is no. 2, but from technology (structure of economy) and human resources, we are far from no. 2 we are paying a big price to the environment, not sustainable, as well as from labor costs environmental protection, and development in the same place, the environment is even higher, clean energy is higher cost, and reduce steel, and cement. We must count on technology, cannot grow as past communist 18th convention, scientific innovation placed at the core. We realize not just independent innovation but also internationalize to plan for and facilitate. Closed-door innovation does not work; innovation as the driving force

From at least 2017 to 2019 when Chen was serving in several advisory roles for the PRC and PRC entities, Chen applied for and obtained a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) grant in order to fund a portion of his research at MIT.  In doing so, it is alleged that Chen failed to disclose information about his ongoing affiliations with the PRC as required by DOE.

Chen also allegedly failed to disclose to the IRS in his 2018 tax return that he maintained a bank account in the PRC with more than $10,000 in 2018.

The charge of wire fraud provides for a sentence of up to 20 years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a fine of up to $250,000. The charge of making false statements provides for a sentence of up to five years in prison, three years of supervised release and a fine of $250,000. The charge of failing to file an FBAR provides for a sentence of up to five years in prison, three years of supervised release and a fine of $250,000. Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

United States Attorney Andrew E. Lelling; Joseph R. Bonavolonta, Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Field Division; Patrick J. Hegarty, Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Northeast Field Office; William S. Walker, Acting Special Agent in Charge of Homeland Security Investigation, Boston; Joleen Simpson, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation in Boston; and Jim Breckenridge, Special Agent in Charge of the Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General made the announcement today. Assistant U.S. Attorneys B. Stephanie Siegmann, Chief of Lelling’s National Security Unit, and Jason Casey and Timothy Kistner also of Lelling’s National Security Unit are prosecuting the case with assistance from Trial Attorney David Aaron of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.

The details contained in the charging documents are allegations. The defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

Updated April 18, 2023