State v. Patterson

Argued September 9th at 9:00 AM.

Question: Did the district court apply the correct standard when determining competency when it adopted a medical provider’s competency determination?

The State appeals the district court’s ruling that Colton Patterson is incompetent to stand trial and unrestorable to competency. Patterson was charged with second-degree sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child. An initial evaluation found Patterson incompetent but likely restorable with restoration treatment involving targeted education focused on trial-related topics. After restoration treatment, Patterson scored 84%, then 100% later on a legal-knowledge quiz administered to patients. However, another doctor evaluated Patterson in a 75-minute interview and concluded that Patterson was unrestorable. The district court ultimately adopted this doctor’s opinion, concluded Patterson was incompetent and unrestorable, and rejected the State’s argument that the facts underlying the evaluation showed Patterson was competent. The State argues the district court erred in adopting the doctor’s diagnosis and therefore the district court did not evaluate Patterson’s ability to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense. The State also argues the district court misapplied the burden of proof and should have placed the burden of proof on the defendant to prove competency under State v. Brown. The defendant argues the district court applied the correct standard and did not err in adopting the doctor’s opinion.

State v. Amyda

Argued September 9th at 9:00 AM.

Question: Did the district court err in admitting a video of alleged sexual abuse without proper authentication and without establishing the video was an original under the best evidence rule and not a “deepfake”?

Max Amyda seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse. The victim’s sister received a video allegedly taken by Amyda showing him sexually abusing the sleeping victim. Amyda argued the video was inadmissible because no witness testified that they witnessed the conduct or could describe how the video was produced, and therefore the video could not be authenticated. Amyda also argued the video was inadmissible under the best-evidence rule under a theory that the video was an AI-generated “deepfake” based on his argument that Amyda’s hand tattoo did not match the tattoo in the video, (although the State presented evidence that Amyda’s tattoo had been tattooed over after the video was taken). The Court of Appeals held that circumstantial evidence, including the victim recognizing her room and Amyda’s tattoo, sufficiently authenticated the video. The Court of Appeals further held that Amyda’s argument that the video was an AI deepfake was not supported by any evidence in the record and therefore amounted to unsubstantiated speculation.

Robert Teig v. Iowa Judicial Branch, et al.

Submitted September 9th without oral argument.

Question: Does Iowa Court Rule 35.4, deeming attorney-client files confidential, conflict with the disclosure requirements of the Iowa Open Records Act, and did state agencies fail to comply with the Act’s requirements to designate and publicly announce the person responsible for handling records requests?

Robert Teig sued the Iowa Judicial Branch, the Iowa Office of Professional Regulation, and the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Discipline Board alleging violations of Iowa Code chapter 22 after each refused to provide copies of documents regarding an attorney-discipline complaint he filed against federal prosecutors. The district court dismissed Teig’s open records claims based on Iowa Court Rule 35.4(3), providing that disciplinary files are confidential, and later granted defendants’ summary judgment motion on Teig’s remaining requests based on attorney-client privilege and work-product protections. The district court did not reach Teig’s argument that OPR and the Board did not comply with chapter 22’s requirement to delegate and publicly identify a records custodian. Teig argues that a court rule such as Rule 35.4 cannot override the Iowa Open Records Act under separation-of-powers principles, citing State v. Thompson, and that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the record shows no delegation was made and the requested materials are not protected by attorney-client privilege and work product protection.

Joshua Davenport v. Nathanael K. Fuller, PA-C

Argued September 9th at 1:30 PM.

Question: Is a general surgeon an individual licensed to practice in the same or substantially similar field as a physician’s assistant in order to provide a certificate of merit under Iowa Code section 147.139 in a lawsuit against the physician assistant for malpractice?

Joshua Davenport brought a medical malpractice action against Nathanael Fuller, a physician assistant, after Fuller allegedly misdiagnosed Davenport’s diverticulitis that progressed to bowel perforation and septic shock. Davenport’s expert witness, who submitted a certificate of merit, was a general surgeon with active trauma-call experience, but none in family medicine. The district court dismissed the suit, reasoning that a general surgeon does not practice in the same field as a family-practice physician assistant. Davenport contends that the district court misinterpreted the meaning of the word “field” under the statute—Davenport argues it should be defined by licensure of the expert and not by the expert’s specialty. Davenport further argues that Fuller failed to show that physicians and physician assistants are not substantially similar fields given the regulatory overlap of their responsibilities. Fuller argues the district court correctly concluded Davenport’s expert is not licensed to practice in the same or substantially similar field, including that the expert was not a physician assistant and did not practice in the area of family medicine.

In re Detention of Joshua Andrew Harlow

Argued September 9th at 1:30 PM.

Question: Does Iowa Code section 229A.2(10), regarding commitment of sexually violent predators, satisfy due process when it allows for confinement for a special sentence violation unrelated to a sexual offense without proof of an overt act?

Joshua Harlow discharged his sentence for a 2017 sexual-abuse conviction and began serving a lifetime special sentence under Iowa Code chapter 903B. He returned to prison later for failing to report to a work-release facility. The State petitioned to civilly commit Harlow as a sexually violent predator based on that confinement under Iowa Code chapter 229A, without alleging a recent overt act. The State argued that the legislature’s 2023 amendment to Section 229A.2(10) which defines “presently confined” includes confinement for a special-sentence violation such as Harlow’s. The district court denied Harlow’s motion to dismiss and found him to be a sexually violent predator. Harlow argues the Iowa Supreme Court’s decisions in In re Detention of Wygle and In re Detention of Gonzales concluded that confinement only for a special-sentence violation is not a “recent overt act” as due process requires, and the 2023 amendment therefore violates the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The State argues the 2023 amendments comport with due process requirements.

State v. McKnight

Submitted September 9th without oral argument.

Question: Can a defendant who pleaded guilty to two counts of willful injury appeal his concurrent sentences and argue his sentences are illegal because there was no factual basis for two separate counts of willful injury and therefore the convictions merged into one count, despite not filing a motion in arrest of judgment?

Jerell McKnight pled guilty to two counts of willful injury after shooting a man several times, and was sentenced concurrently on both counts. McKnight argues on appeal that the convictions should have merged because neither his plea nor the court’s findings established a “break in the action” between the shots. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for a lack of jurisdiction, holding that his claim was unpreserved based on McKnight’s failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment. McKnight contends that a failure to merge the convictions is an “illegal sentence” claim that Iowa courts have allowed to be raised at any time, without applying traditional error-preservation rules. McKnight alternatively argues the Iowa Supreme Court should adopt plain-error review.

In the Matter of $11,500 Seized from Bitcoin Depot Operating, LLC

Argued September 10th, 9:00 AM.

Question: Does Iowa Code chapter 533C, requiring digital-asset kiosks to provide refunds to customers who fell victim to fraud, apply retroactively to transactions prior to the statute’s effective date such that the district court may order seized funds be returned to the victim-customer?

Bitcoin Depot sought the return of $11,500 seized from a kiosk after Gary VanderWerf told police he had been defrauded into sending Bitcoin to a scammer. The district court denied the return of the funds under Iowa Code section 533.1004, which requires digital-asset kiosk operators such as Bitcoin Depot to refund defrauded customers who meet certain conditions. Bitcoin Depot contends that the statute cannot be applied to VanderWerf’s transaction unless it expressly applies retroactively, and that even if it did apply retroactively, it would only create a separate refund obligation rather than determining who has the right to possess the seized funds under the return-of-seized-property statute. Further, it contends that VanderWerf did not provide the proof of fraud as the statute requires. The Attorney General argues it has authority to represent the State in the appeal and the State had authority to appear in the underlying seized property action. The Attorney General argues the district court correctly refused to order return of the seized property to Bitcoin Depot based on the victim-customer’s right to a refund under Iowa Code chapter 533C.

[Note: Nyemaster Goode represents the appellant]

State v. West

Argued September 10th at 9:00 AM.

Question: Where the alleged sexual abuse in a criminal prosecution may have occurred outside of Iowa, was there sufficient evidence that Iowa had territorial jurisdiction over a truck driver for sexually abusing a child during a month-long, multi-state trip?

John West, a long-haul trucker, was convicted in Muscatine County of seven counts of second-degree sexual abuse and four counts of lascivious acts with a child from a truck-driving trip he took with an eleven-year-old boy. Parts of the abuse occurred while they were out of state, and the child could not definitively testify whether any of the abuse occurred in Iowa. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that evidence that an incident occurred at a Muscatine motel at the outset of the truck-driving trip, and West taking the child out of state, were sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish Iowa’s territorial jurisdiction under Iowa Code section 803.1. West contends that the conduct the court of appeals found supported territorial jurisdiction over West related only to a charge he was acquitted of, indecent acts with a child, and therefore cannot establish jurisdiction over the lascivious acts with a child and second-degree sexual abuse charges he was convicted of because Iowa Code section 803.1 requires that the elements of the charged offenses occur in Iowa.

In the Interest of E.S., Minor Child

Submitted September 10th without oral argument.

Question: Should an appeal from a juvenile court permanency order be reinstated where the Court of Appeals dismissed it as untimely based on filing mistakes while the appellant was representing herself?

After a permanency hearing and termination of parental rights trial, the juvenile court found grounds to terminate a mother’s parental rights but declined to do so. Instead, the district court dismissed the termination petition and changed the permanency goal from reunification with the mother to sole custody to the father.  The pro se mother-appellant filed her petition one day after the deadline under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.201(1)(b). The Court of Appeals dismissed the mother’s appeal, holding that because she chose to proceed without counsel, she was held to the same standard as a lawyer and did not show that the delay was outside her control.

Swan Lake Road Farms, LLC v. Iowa Utilities Commission

Argued September 10th at 1:30 PM.

Question: Did the district court err in affirming the Iowa Utilities Commission’s grant of a franchise despite finding Iowa Code § 306.46 unconstitutional, and did the district court err in ordering compensation rather than requiring the utility to obtain eminent domain authority?

The Iowa Utilities Commission granted ITC Midwest a franchise to build a new transmission line along Swan Lake Road in Johnson County. The Commission relied on Iowa Code section 306.46 to place poles and lines in the road’s right-of-way on land owned by Swan Lake Road Farms without paying compensation. Swan Lake challenged this ruling as an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court agreed with Swan Lake that applying section 306.46 constituted an unconstitutional taking, but left the franchise in place and ordered ITC Midwest to pay just compensation through condemnation-commission proceedings.

Swan Lake argues on appeal that the district court erred on the grounds that once a taking is found, the utility can only proceed with eminent domain authority if the franchise is “necessary for public use” under Iowa Code section 478.15, asking the Supreme Court to reverse the franchise and order an evidentiary hearing on the necessity for public use.

State v. Belt

Argued September 10th at 1:30 PM.

Question: Does a district court have discretion to remove an elected official from office under Iowa’s removal from office statute based on one instance of the elected official’s intoxication at a public town hall event as being intoxicated in his official capacity?

Following a two-day bench trial, the district court removed Scott Belt, a Pottawattamie County supervisor, from office after finding that he was intoxicated while serving as emcee of a November 2025 town hall. The district court found there was clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Belt was intoxicated at the town hall meeting. Belt contends that Iowa’s removal statute is discretionary, rather than mandatory, and that the district court failed to consider that it had discretion to deny the petition for removal under the circumstances. Further, he contends that the State failed to prove he was acting in his “official capacity” at a voluntary event with no official business on the agenda, and he seeks attorneys’ fees. The State argues removal was appropriate because Belt was acting in his official capacity even if the town hall was not a statutorily required meeting, and the district court properly exercised its discretion in removing Belt.

NewRez LLC, d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing v. Lynae D. McMillen Dickey Tesdall

Submitted September 10th without oral argument.

Question: Is a homeowner who signs a mortgage, and not the promissory note, a “borrower” entitled to notice of the right to cure a default before foreclosure?

Lynae Tesdall and her partner bought a house and signed the mortgage. The mortgage documents described Tesdall and her partner both as “Borrower,” but only Tesdall’s partner signed the promissory note. After her partner moved out and defaulted, the lender sent notice of the right to cure only to him and not to Tesdall. The lender then filed the foreclosure action without notifying Tesdall, and Tesdall argued the lender’s failure to provide notice of the right to cure prevented foreclosure. The district court concluded Tesdall was not a “borrower” in default under Iowa Code section 654.2D because she did not sign the promissory note and therefore was not entitled to a right to cure. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the lender, agreeing with the district court that a “borrower” is someone who has been loaned money and is obligated to repay, notwithstanding being labeled “Borrower” on a mortgage. Tesdall contends that the statute’s plain text includes Tesdall based on the plain-language definition of mortgage, and that reading the statute otherwise would undermine homeowner protections.

The post Summary of Iowa Supreme Court Cases Argued and Submitted Sept. 9 and 10 appeared first on Nyemaster Goode On Brief.

The last four Iowa Supreme Court terms—from the 2022-2023 term to the recently concluded 2025-2026 term—have seen a stylistic shift in how the Court articulates its rulings. Brevity has become the order of the day. Not only have the Court’s opinions become shorter on average, but even factoring in those fractured rulings involving separate opinions, the Justices are using fewer words to say what they wish to say.

Opinions by the Numbers

The 2025-2026 term of the Iowa Supreme Court concluded on June 30. While it might seem straightforward to simply count the number of cases decided by the Court, there are different ways to measure the output of a term. The Court released 107 published decisions, decided 106 cases, released 105 majority opinions, and yet only decided 104 cases by opinion. This term involved a unique situation in which one appeal—City of Davenport v.  Office of Auditor of State of Iowa, No. 24-1160—resulted in the release of two opinions: one divided opinion released in December 2025 regarding an appellate procedural issue, and one unanimous opinion released in April 2026 on the merits. Two other appeals were divided 3-3, resulting in the underlying judgment being affirmed as a matter of law. However you want to count it, the Court’s output level was right in line with the last few terms.

Including dissenting, concurring, and per curiam opinions, the Court issued 149 total opinions, a slight increase from the last few terms. In particular, the justices collectively authored 20 concurring opinions, compared to an average of 13 since the Court gained its current composition in the 2022-2023 term. Justice Mansfield issued the greatest number of opinions this term, including eight dissenting opinions and 12 separate opinions overall. However, the number of non-unanimous cases, 23, was consistent with the last few terms. So was the number of closely divided cases, which was 13.

This term featured a dramatic discrepancy in reversal rates between the Iowa Court of Appeals and the district courts. The Court of Appeals was fully affirmed in only 22% of appeals from that court, with full reversals in 62% of appeals and a mixed disposition in the remaining 16%. District court rulings, by contrast, were affirmed in 49% of appeals. There tends to be a slightly higher reversal rate on appeals taken on further review from the Court of Appeals, likely due to an adverse selection effect reflecting the types of cases likely to be selected for further review. Nevertheless, this is the highest spread we have seen in recent history.

This term, nearly all of the Supreme Court’s cases came from the two traditional sources of jurisdiction: 51 cases heard on direct appeal and 45 cases heard via further review. The Court only heard one case via discretionary review, three cases via interlocutory appeal, and three cases via certiorari. The Court also decided two attorney discipline cases and one certified question from a federal district court. These figures stand in marked contrast to last year’s mere 33 direct appeals and 22 appeals combined via discretionary review, interlocutory appeal, or certiorari.

The Supreme Court decided 28 criminal cases and 78 civil cases. Though the ratio of civil cases to criminal cases has been gradually trending higher over the years, this is the highest ratio of civil cases to criminal cases since at least 2020.

Finally, 84 of the Court’s 107 published decisions were unanimous. This rate of 78% unanimous decisions is right in line with the historical average for the Court in its current composition. From the 2022-2023 term onward, the Court’s unanimous decision rate has ranged between 77% and 81%.

Length of Published Opinions

The published opinions of this term’s Court totaled 2,118 pages. While that may seem like a colossal amount of verbiage, it pales in comparison to the 3,135 pages of opinions the Court released only four years ago, during the 2021-2022 term. The shift to the current composition of the Court, beginning with the 2022-2023 term, has heralded an era of relative economy. Between the 2018-2019 term and the 2021-2022 term, the average Supreme Court ruling, encompassing all separate opinions but excluding opinions released per curiam, totaled 27.2 pages. Between the 2022-2023 term and the most recent term, another four-year span, the average ruling totaled 20.2 pages—a 25% decrease in length.

An astute reader might suspect that this decline would be attributable to the contemporaneous decrease in separate opinions and non-unanimous opinions catalogued in statistical overviews of prior terms in this magazine. This probably explains some of this statistical effect. A majority opinion that does not need to respond to a dissenting opinion may not need to say as much. But the Justices’ individual writings are getting shorter as well. The average individual opinion issued between the 2018-2019 term and the 2021-2022 term, inclusive of all concurring and dissenting opinions measured separately, was 17 pages. During the past four terms, that figure is 15 pages—a smaller, but nevertheless distinct, decrease.

This shift in writing style has manifested itself at both ends of the statistical spectrum. The outlier opinions are shorter, but so is the median opinion for each term. Each of the four terms between the 2018-2019 term and the 2021-2022 term featured at least one ruling totaling over 100 pages, inclusive of all separate opinions. The Court has only published one 100-page ruling since. The median opinion length has also steadily declined, with this most recent term featuring the shortest median opinion (16 pages) of the past eight years.

Frequency of agreement

This term’s justice alignment data stands out in at least three ways. First, the range of agreement percentages is wider than it has been since the Court obtained its current composition. While the data still shows most justices agreeing with each other between one-third and two-thirds of the time in divided cases, the average range of each justice’s alignment metrics—the discrepancy between the justices’ highest and lowest agreement levels—is 25% higher than it was last term. The Court’s collective standard deviation—a measurement of the distance of each agreement level from the average—also increased moderately term-over-term.

Second, this most recent data shows a relative lack of agreement among Chief Justice Christensen, Justice Waterman, and Justice Mansfield. These three justices have been the closest the current Court has come to a set of justices voting together reliably over the last few terms. Justices Christensen and Mansfield agreed with each other only 52% of the time in divided cases: by far that pair’s lowest agreement figure. And Justices Waterman and Mansfield, who have frequently been the two justices most likely to agree with one another, agreed on fewer than two-thirds of divided cases this term. That is also an all-time low value for the period for which we have alignment data.

Third, there are two trends involving Justice May worth noting. One, Justices McDonald and May have, for the second time in three terms, been the justices who have agreed most frequently. This term, that value was 91%. And two, Justice May, also for the second time in the most recent three terms, was the justice most likely to appear in the majority in divided cases: also 91% of the time. Justices Oxley and McDermott were most likely to author or join dissenting opinions, siding with the majority only 52% of the time in divided cases.

Justice alignments in closely divided cases

There were 13 “closely divided” cases this term, where a change to one vote would have changed the result. The most common four-justice majority was comprised of Justices McDonald, Oxley, McDermott, and May, who joined as a majority to decide three such cases. This, like some of the alignment data identified above, is a return to a pattern that emerged in the 2023-2024 term. This term, Justices McDonald and May were far most likely to sit with the majority in closely divided cases, at 82% and 80% respectively.

We caution readers against drawing too much from these small sample sizes, however. In prior statistical overviews, we have speculated whether the data was showing that Justices Oxley or McDermott were acting as a decisive “swing vote.” In reality, the safest takeaway from this data is that the outcomes and lineups of divided cases remain unpredictable.

The post A statistical review of the 2025-26 Iowa Supreme Court term: “The Incredible Shrinking Judicial Opinion” appeared first on Nyemaster Goode On Brief.

This case began when Frank Santana was mowing his pasture with a horse drawn sickle mower while Jenny Shafer filmed him. After Santana finished mowing, he got off the mower and asked Shafer to hold the horses while he raised the sickle bar. Shafer held one horse by its lead rope, standing on the side away from the sickle bar. When the sickle bar dropped to the ground, the noise spooked the horses. The horses moved backward, then forward, and Shafer fell. The steel wheel of the mower ran over her and dragged her several feet, leaving her paralyzed from the waist down and with medical expenses over $700,000. Shafer sued Santana for $18.2 million. The district court dismissed the suit on summary judgment, ruling that Santana was immune under the Iowa’s Domesticated Animal Activities Act. The court of appeals agreed that the Act applied but reversed on the question as to whether Shafer could raise a fact question on the issue of recklessness, which could defeat the statutory immunity. Santana sought further review.

Iowa Code section 673.2 shields an owner from liability for injuries “resulting from the inherent risks of a domesticated animal activity.” Section 673.1(3)(a) defines a domesticated animal activity to include “driving a domesticated animal.” Shafer argued that once Santana dismounted and stopped the horses to raise the sickle bar, he was no longer “driving” them, so the Act’s immunity should not apply. The Court disagreed with how the court of appeals got to its answer, even though it agreed with the answer itself. Rather than relying on a generic dictionary definition of “driving,” the Court explained that the term is one of art within the equine community and means “the activity of an individual controlling the movement of an equine harnessed to a nonmotorized vehicle, such as a carriage.” Applying that definition, the Court found that the horses remained harnessed to the mower throughout the sequence of events, so Santana was still driving them even during the brief pause to secure the sickle bar. The Court rejected Shafer’s attempt to separate the activity into discrete moments, explaining that liability should not turn on whether the horses happened to be standing still or moving at the precise instant of injury. Relying on a parade case involving a runaway pony, the Court reasoned that a domesticated animal activity has to be viewed in its entirety and not broken into isolated snapshots. Because Shafer was at minimum a spectator to that activity when she was holding the horses, the statutory immunity applied to her injuries, and the burden shifted to her to identify an exception.

The second issue was whether Shafer’s evidence of recklessness was enough to survive summary judgment. Iowa law sets a high bar for recklessness, requiring proof that the defendant intentionally performed an unreasonable act and disregarded a known or obvious risk, making harm highly probable. Reckless conduct must be an act that is an extreme departure from ordinary care rather than a mere lapse in judgment. The Court acknowledged that expert opinion can sometimes support an inference of recklessness, but only where it shows the defendant disregarded a risk that was known to him or so obvious that he must have been aware of it. Here, Santana was never deposed, leaving the record without any direct evidence as to what he actually knew about the dangers of operating the mower. Shafer’s own expert, an eighty-two-year-old horseman, claimed that the mower was rusty, the safety rod was not secured, the horses were undertrained, and no one should have stood in front of the horses to hold them. Nonetheless, the Court found these opinions described ordinary negligence instead of a conscious disregard of a known risk. The Court also emphasized that Shafer had held the horses in a similar manner earlier that same afternoon without incident, undercutting any claim that harm was highly probable. Because the Act specifically protects against unpredictable reactions by an animal to a sudden loud noise, the Court concluded that the risks here were the ordinary and inherent risks the legislature intended to immunize. Therefore, this injury was not the product of Santana’s recklessness.

The Court did not pretend this was an easy result to reach. It acknowledged that Shafer’s injuries were severe and that she would be left without a forum to pursue her claim. However, it explained that the legislature made a policy choice to protect owners of domesticated animals from liability for the unpredictable behavior those animals inevitably present, and the Court was bound to apply that choice as written. The Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit.

The post Iowa Supreme Court Upholds Immunity in Horse-Drawn Mower Injury Case appeared first on Nyemaster Goode On Brief.

Thompson v. State, No. 25-0891

Opinion date: April 29, 2026

On appeal from Pottawattamie County District Court

Issue:

• Whether the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in State v. White, 9 N.W3d 1 (Iowa 2024), applies retroactively to invalidate Thompson’s conviction based on his Confrontation Clause challenge.

Eric Thompson was convicted of kidnapping in the first degree and assault causing bodily injury in 2000 and was sentenced to life without parole for kidnapping and sexually abusing a ten-year-old child. At trial, the district court admitted testimony of the child-victim’s deposition wherein Thompson had been ordered to leave the room and observe the deposition from a separate room. Thompson filed prior applications for post-conviction relief arguing that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by this procedure. In his fourth application for post-conviction relief, Thompson argued that the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in State v. White applied retroactively such that the admission of the child’s deposition testimony violated his right to confrontation.

The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of Thompson’s application. rejected Thompson’s arguments and concluded White applies only prospectively, finding the Iowa Supreme Court has several times found that “a change in our understanding of the right to confrontation” generally has not been applied retroactively. The Court separately rejected the “watershed” rule proposed by Thompson, finding that it had only been applied once by the United States Supreme Court regarding the right to appointed counsel and otherwise the “watershed” rule had been repeatedly rejected. Finally, the Iowa Court of Appeals concluded that even if White applied retroactively, any error in the admission of the child-victim’s deposition testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because evidence of Thompson’s guilt was overwhelming. Judge Buller authored the opinion of a unanimous panel.

Skaggs v. Carson, No. 25-1282

Opinion date: May 27, 2026

On appeal from Linn County District Court.

Issues:

• Whether Iowa Code chapter 598C—Iowa’s Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act—permits a district court to grant temporary caretaking authority over a deployed parent’s child to a nonparent rather than to the child’s other, nondeployed parent.
• Whether the district court properly denied the nondeployed parent’s petition to modify the parties’ prior custody-and-support order under Iowa Code chapter 600B.
• Whether the district court erred in awarding the deployed mother’s trial attorney fees and whether the appellate court should award appellate attorney fees.

Brandon Skaggs and Kodi Carson are unmarried parents of a daughter, with a 2021 order that placed the child in Carson’s physical care and granted Skaggs visitation. Carson is a member of the National Guard and, after she spent approximately nine months in Texas for National Guard training, Skaggs petitioned to modify the prior order. While Skaggs’s petition to modify that order to joint physical care was pending, Carson received orders to deploy to Kosovo for nine months and Skaggs then sought a temporary order under Iowa Code section 598C.301 placing the daughter in his physical care. Carson resisted, arguing caretaking authority should be delegated to her mother under section 598C.305.  The district court held an expedited hearing before Carson’s deployment and granted Carson’s request, finding that the statutory requirements were satisfied and that placement with Carson’s mother served the child’s best interest. By the time of the modification trial, Carson had returned from deployment, and the district court denied Skaggs’s modification petition for failure to show a substantial change in circumstances, also awarding Carson $19,000 in trial attorney fees.

On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals first addressed mootness, and found that although the temporary chapter 598C order was no longer in effect after Carson returned from deployment and the issue therefore moot, it would still reach the merits under the public-importance exception to mootness. The Court found that the scope of a court’s authority to place a deployed servicemember’s child with a nonparent is a matter of public concern, no Iowa appellate court had yet construed chapter 598C, and the issue is likely to recur, and such temporary orders tend to evade appellate review due to their expedited and short-lived nature.

The Court then addressed the merits of the temporary order and held that the express terms of section 598C.305 authorized the district court to grant caretaking authority to Carson’s mother as a qualifying nonparent even when a fit, nondeployed parent is available, because the statutory eligibility requirements were met and the arrangement was in the child’s best interest. The Court found that the best-interest standard in section 598C.305(4) incorporates the factors of Iowa Code section 598.41(3) and those set out in the Iowa Supreme Court’s 1974 opinion in In re Marriage of Winter and that nothing in Chapter 598C creates a presumption favoring the nondeployed parent. The Court agreed with the district court that placing the daughter with Carson’s mother—who had already provided substantial care, lived near the child’s daycare and preschool, and preserved stability—served the child’s best interest better than uprooting her to live with Skaggs, who had never been her primary caretaker and would have required changing the child’s daycare, school, and surrounding relationships.

Regarding modification of the prior custody-and-support order, the Court agreed with the district court that Skaggs failed to carry his “heavy burden” of showing a substantial and permanent change in circumstances, because Carson’s periodic military training and deployments were foreseeable at the time of the original 2021 order and were, in any event, temporary rather than permanent. Finally, the Iowa Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the trial attorney-fee award to Carson given the parties’ disparate abilities to pay, and it exercised its own discretion to award Carson $8,000 in appellate attorney fees as the prevailing party on appeal. Judge Langholz authored the opinion of a unanimous panel.

The post July 2026 Iowa Court of Appeals Published Opinions Roundup appeared first on Nyemaster Goode On Brief.

This case began with a police sting operation. After Kevin Charles Lind allegedly offered a prostitute money to “find a friend who had a young girl he could” molest, the prostitute went to the police who then put Lind in contact with a female undercover officer. This officer operated under the codename “Kami.” Kami played the part of a prostitute who had a thirteen-year-old daughter named “Destini.” The officer (Kami) sent Lind photos of Destini that were actually just age-regressed images of a police officer. Destini was a completely fictional person. Lind and Kami nonetheless negotiated a plan under which Lind would meet Kami and Destini at a motel and pay $1,300 for sex acts with both of them. Lind arrived at the motel with over $1,500 in cash and was arrested on the spot. The State charged him with human trafficking as a class “A” felony under Iowa Code section 710A.2(1), but the district court dismissed the charge, and the State appealed.

The central question on appeal was whether Lind’s alleged conduct fell within the statutory definition of human trafficking when there was never any real victim or any real person engaged in human trafficking.

The dispute on the merits of the case narrowed in on a single phrase. The State relied only on subsection (4)(b), which defines human trafficking to “also mean[] knowingly purchasing or attempting to purchase services involving commercial sexual activity from a victim or another person engaged in human trafficking.” In the State’s view, the word “attempting” meant it did not matter whether a real victim existed. Therefore, all that mattered was that Lind believed real people were involved and acted on that belief by driving to the motel with cash. The district court, by contrast, interpreted the phrase to require an actual victim or actual trafficker.

The Court began from first principles, emphasizing that “[i]n Iowa, [m]atters of crime and punishment are creatures of statute,” so the judicial task is to interpret the text and give the legislature’s words their fair meaning. Reading the phrase in (4)(b) in its ordinary sense, the Court explained that it “is most naturally read to mean that there must be an actual ‘victim’ or other ‘person engaged in human trafficking.’” Therefore, because Lind’s transaction was entirely pretend, the phrase did not reach him. The State argued that “attempt” carries a “technical meaning in the law” that requires only intent plus an act in furtherance of that intent, regardless of factual possibility. But the Court explained that a term’s established legal meaning does not automatically govern when the context points the other way. In this case, the surrounding body of law pointed decisively against the State.

That context was the heart of the opinion. The Court walked through the legislative history of Iowa’s sex-crime statutes and found a telling pattern: when the legislature wanted a statute to reach undercover officers posing as victims, it expressly said so. It did so in the 2012 solicitation offense, section 710A.2A, and again in 2023 when it added undercover-law-enforcement language to sections 710.10, 728.12, and 728.15. Yet the legislature never added such language to the human trafficking statute, even while amending that very statute in the same sessions. Under the canons of selective placement and against surplusage, that silence was meaningful: the State’s reading would render the legislature’s deliberate “law enforcement officer or agent” language mere surplusage in the statutes that contain it. As the Court put it, “the legislature knows how to authorize sting operations when it wants to.”

The 2025 amendments sealed the conclusion. That year, the legislature expanded the definitions of both “human trafficking” and “victim” to expressly include a law enforcement officer or agent posing as a person subjected to or engaged in trafficking, the exact sting tactic used against Lind. Because “‘a material change’ in statutory language is presumed to ‘change the force and effect of the existing law,’” the Court inferred that those tactics were not authorized under the earlier 2024 statute. The Court rejected the State’s warning that this reading would “end all Iowa sting operations,” explaining that the legislature has now added the missing authorization. The Court also noted that it is not free to “expand criminal liability beyond what the legislature has created.” And even if doubt lingered, the rule of lenity would resolve it in the defendant’s favor.

The result is a straightforward ruling with an important limitation. Under the 2024 statute, attempting to buy sex from an imaginary victim is not human trafficking, and the dismissal of the charge against Lind stands. But the decision is expressly limited to the 2024 law before its amendment. The Court signaled that the same conduct would “likely fall within the definition of human trafficking” under the amended 2025 statute. For Iowa prosecutors, the takeaway is that the gap exposed in Lind has already been closed going forward, and that, in criminal cases, the words the legislature actually enacted will control over the result the State would prefer.

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On October 24, 2021, Victoria Gibbs left her Cedar Rapids apartment around 5 p.m. to drive to Burlington—a roughly three-hour round trip—leaving three children, ages nine, seven, and four, home alone. The seven-year-old has significant special needs; he is nonverbal, requires a feeding tube, and needs suctioning equipment. Before leaving, Gibbs changed his diaper, fed him, suctioned his sinuses, and propped him among pillows to watch television. Approximately three hours later, police arrived on a report the children had been left alone. Inside, officers found the seven-year-old congested, experiencing coughing fits where he stopped breathing for about ten seconds, with a diaper full of urine. The nine-year-old was calmly watching television upstairs; the four-year-old was on a tablet. The home was clean with food in the refrigerator. Officers reached Gibbs by phone at 8:45 p.m.; she did not arrive until after 10 p.m.

Gibbs was charged with neglect of a dependent person (class “C” felony) and three counts of child endangerment (aggravated misdemeanor). The jury found Gibbs guilty on all counts. After trial, the Supreme Court decided State v. Cole, 3 N.W.3d 200 (Iowa 2024), reversing a child endangerment conviction where a mother left children aged five through twelve alone, while grocery shopping for approximately twenty minutes and when one of the children had special needs. Gibbs moved for arrest of judgment, arguing Cole required reversal. The district court denied the motion, finding that Cole was distinguishable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted further review.

The main issue on appeal was whether there was sufficient evidence to support the child endangerment convictions given the Court’s recent holding in Cole. Under Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a), a parent commits child endangerment when they “[k]nowingly act[] in a manner that creates a substantial risk to a child or minor’s physical, mental or emotional health or safety.” The Court distinguished Cole by identifying several critical differences. First, in Cole, the kids were left alone for twenty minutes, whereas Gibbs was gone five hours on a round trip to Burlington. The second difference was the vulnerability of the children. The mother in Cole took her most vulnerable child, an infant, with her to the store. However, Gibbs left her most vulnerable child, the medically fragile seven-year-old, at home. The third and final difference was the independent unlawfulness of the conduct in Gibbs. Gibbs’s conduct was also a separate felony of neglect of a dependent person under Iowa Code section 726.3, which she did not contest on appeal. The Court in Cole explained that an “easy way to identify a parent-created risk” is when the conduct creating the risk is “independently unlawful.” The conviction as to the seven-year-old was clearly supported, as the child could not fend for himself, required a feeding tube and suctioning, was congested on the day in question, and risked choking to death with no capable caretaker present.

However, the most significant aspect of the decision is the Court’s treatment of the four-year-old and nine-year-old children. The Court held that Gibbs’s criminal neglect of her seven-year-old also created a substantial risk of emotional harm to his siblings. If the seven-year-old experienced a serious medical emergency, his young siblings would have been forced to at least witness, if not respond to, a traumatic event well beyond their age and abilities. The Court stated: “Under our holding today, evidence that one child was placed at risk of death by the actions of the mother may provide sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of emotional harm for siblings also present in the domicile.” The Court distinguished the risks present in Cole as “ordinary risks that children are routinely exposed to and entrusted to handle.” These kinds of risks are different from the extraordinary risk Gibbs created by “entrusting a four-year-old and a nine-year-old to navigate a stressful and potentially traumatic emergency for their medically fragile sibling.”

Justice Mansfield’s partial dissent, joined by Justice Waterman, agreed that the child endangerment convictions as to the seven-year-old and four-year-old were supported by substantial evidence, but dissented as to the nine-year-old. The dissent argued that the emotional harm theory was too speculative to uphold a criminal conviction. The dissent noted that the nine-year-old had a phone and was not in distress when officers arrived. Justice Mansfield criticized the majority’s approach for creating a “multiplier effect” in criminal charges any time a special-needs child is left with siblings. The dissent also challenged the reliance on “independently unlawful” conduct as circular, since the neglect conviction and endangerment convictions arose from the same underlying behavior. Gibbs is a significant decision for Iowa practitioners because it both clarifies the bounds of Cole’s “ordinary risks” framework and extends child endangerment liability to include emotional harm to siblings who are present when another child is placed at risk of death.

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This case begins in a spot familiar to all Iowa residents: a Casey’s General Store. The defendant, Timothy Hall Jr., had visited this particular Casey’s in Guthrie Center two days in a row. The first day, he got into an argument with a woman in the parking lot, which was brought to the attention of the manager, Joshua Vanhorn. During Hall’s visit the following day, an employee recognized Hall and informed Vanhorn, who approached Hall and asked him to leave. Instead of complying, Hall cursed at Vanhorn and threatened to “bust” his lip. After an investigation, Hall was charged with harassment in the second degree under Iowa Code sections 708.7(1)(b) and 708.7(3)(a) (2024). The district court issued a temporary no-contact order protecting Vanhorn. Hall was convicted of harassment in the second degree at trial and the judge later issued a five-year no-contact order.

Hall raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether sufficient evidence supported the harassment conviction even though Hall did not initiate the contact, and (2) whether the five-year no-contact order was properly issued.

On the first issue, the Court identified the relevant parts of Iowa Code section 708.7. The State was required to prove three things: “(1) Hall ‘purposefully and without legitimate purpose’ had ‘personal contact’ with Vanhorn, (2) Hall threatened to cause bodily injury, and (3) Hall did so with the specific intent to ‘threaten, intimidate, or alarm’ Vanhorn.” Hall argued that even though he threatened Vanhorn, the threat did not fall under the harassment statute because he did not initiate the encounter. The Court held that who initiated the encounter does not matter under the statute. Instead, the key question is whether Hall purposefully engaged in personal contact with Vanhorn. Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(b) defines “personal contact” as an “encounter in which two or more people are in visual or physical proximity to each other.” The Court found that although Hall did not initiate the personal contact, his refusal to leave when asked and his decision to remain within two feet of Vanhorn while making threats amounted to purposefully engaging in personal contact.

The Court then distinguished the Iowa case law Hall relied on, explaining that those cases do not establish initiation of contact as a required element of harassment. Although harassment often arises from contact initiated by the defendant, this is not required. The Court relied on State v. Bunton, where an officer was still considered a victim of harassment even though he initiated the interaction by questioning the intoxicated defendant and offering him a ride home. The defendant in that case purposefully engaged in personal contact with the officer by choosing to be abusive and uncooperative, which led to the continued encounter where he made threatening statements. Because sufficient evidence supported the verdict, the Court affirmed the conviction.

The second issue was whether the five-year no-contact order was properly issued. Before reaching the merits, the Court addressed the State’s procedural arguments. The State argued that Hall failed to preserve error by not challenging the order in district court and that Hall needed to file a separate appeal from the no-contact order. The Court rejected both arguments. On the direct-appeal issue, the Court relied on its 2024 decision in State v. Rasmussen. Under Rasmussen, a no-contact order is subject to review on direct appeal if the district court incorporates it by reference into the sentencing order. That is what happened here because Hall’s sentencing order required him, as a condition of probation, to “Abide by the separate No Contact Order issued herein.” So Hall did not need to bring a separate appeal. The Court also concluded that it could consider Hall’s challenge even though he did not raise it in district court. The Court explained that Hall was challenging the district court’s disposition and the reasons given for it. In the sentencing context, those types of challenges are generally exempt from ordinary error-preservation requirements.

On the merits, Hall argued that Iowa Code section 664A.5 gives district courts discretion because it says that a court “may enter a no-contact order or continue the no-contact order already in effect for a period of five years.” Hall argued that the Court should apply civil-injunction standards to section 664A.5 and require additional proof before a five-year no-contact order is entered. He also argued that the district court must explain its reasons on the record. The Court rejected these arguments, explaining that section 664A.5 differs from section 664A.8, which governs extensions of no-contact orders and expressly requires the court to consider whether the defendant no longer poses a threat. Section 664A.5, on the other hand, applies after a defendant is convicted of, receives a deferred judgment for, or pleads guilty to a qualifying offense, including harassment. Once that condition is met, the district court may enter or continue a no-contact order for up to five years.

The harassment conviction itself was enough to trigger the sentencing court’s authority under section 664A.5. The Court held that the sentencing court was not required to take additional evidence, make additional findings, or separately explain why it was entering the no-contact order. The Court also rejected Hall’s due process argument because Hall had notice and an opportunity to be heard, which is usually what due process requires. Because Hall had not shown reversible error on either issue, the Court affirmed both the conviction and the no-contact order.

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In the majority opinion, Justice Christopher McDonald wrote that the defendant, Andrew Porter, “was in the right place but at the wrong time.” At approximately 7:55 a.m. on November 2, 2023, Porter arrived at the home of his friend, George Civitate, at 3601 Woodland Avenue in Des Moines. Officers observed Porter exit his vehicle carrying a gray duffel bag, a blue backpack, and a blanket, while also accompanied by a dog. Unbeknownst to Porter, the Mid-Iowa Narcotics Enforcement Task Force had spent months developing probable cause to believe that controlled substances, including methamphetamine, were being distributed from Civitate’s house, and had already planned to execute a search warrant that very day. When Porter arrived that morning, officers were already in position conducting surveillance in preparation for its execution. The warrant, however, never mentioned Porter.

Approximately forty minutes later, officers executed the search warrant, breaching the door of Civitate’s residence and placing Porter and the other occupants in handcuffs. Officers observed the blue backpack in the corner of the living room with a jacket draped over it. Justice McDonald writing for the majority and Justice McDermott writing for the dissent disagreed as to whether the backpack was within Porter’s immediate control: the majority described it as “several feet” from Porter and outside his immediate proximity and reach, while the dissent noted the State’s concession that the backpack was “in an area within Porter’s ‘immediate control’ at the time of his arrest.” Porter was then taken outside and interviewed in a police van. During the interview, he denied ownership of the backpack multiple times. Porter then invoked his right to counsel and asked to end the interview. After being escorted back inside the house, Porter was again asked by an officer whether the backpack was his, and he again denied ownership. The officer then searched the backpack and found approximately seventy-eight grams of methamphetamine packaged in seven separate baggies, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.

Based on the contents of that search, Porter was charged with several drug offenses, including conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine and possession with intent to deliver. He subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search of his backpack violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. The Polk County District Court denied the motion, and the Iowa Supreme Court granted discretionary review.

The Supreme Court affirmed the denial in a decision written by Justice McDonald, joined by Chief Justice Christensen and Justices Waterman, Mansfield, and May. The majority held that the backpack fell within the scope of the premises warrant under the Fourth Amendment and that Porter had abandoned the backpack for purposes of the Iowa Constitution. Justice McDermott filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Oxley.

Addressing Porter’s federal constitutional challenge, the Court began by concluding that both parties had made a “category error.” The parties framed the central question as whether Porter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack or had forfeited that expectation through abandonment. Rejecting that approach, the Court held that because officers were executing a valid premises warrant and Porter’s backpack was on the premises, the threshold question of whether Porter retained a privacy interest was beside the point. Instead, the proper inquiry was whether the backpack fell within the scope of the warrant the magistrate had already issued. The Court placed the burden on Porter to prove that the search exceeded the warrant’s scope.

The Court went on to discuss the broad scope of a premises warrant, highlighting a key limitation derived from the United States Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Ybarra v. Illinois: absent independent probable cause, officers executing a premises warrant may not search individuals who are merely present on the premises as visitors. This restriction extends to items a person is holding, wearing, or carrying, because such items are considered extensions of the person. In Porter, the majority held that this protection did not apply. The backpack was in the corner of the living room, several feet away from Porter, and he never held, wore, or carried it during the execution of the warrant. Because there was no physical contact with or close physical intrusion upon Porter during the search of the backpack, the Court concluded it was not a search of his person.

Because the backpack was not an extension of Porter’s person, the majority reasoned that it was simply another container on the premises and therefore fell within the scope of the premises warrant. The Court cited Iowa appellate decisions holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require officers executing a premises warrant to obtain independent probable cause or separate warrants for each container on site capable of concealing the objects of the search. The Court also drew support from persuasive authority in other jurisdictions, including the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Gilstrap, which adopted the same physical-possession test. Accordingly, the Court held that Porter’s Fourth Amendment challenge failed.

Turning to Porter’s argument under the Iowa Constitution, the Court began with a thorough analysis of State v. Brown, 905 N.W.2d 846 (Iowa 2018), a case on which Porter relied heavily. In Brown, the defendant was visiting a residence that was subject to a narcotics warrant. While executing that warrant, officers found the defendant and others having recently smoked methamphetamine and detained them. Officers then searched the defendant’s purse, which was located directly in front of her when she was detained, and found marijuana inside. The Porter majority asserted that the Brown Court committed the same category error as the parties in this case, framing the analysis on the assumption that the search was warrantless when it was actually conducted pursuant to a premises warrant.

Setting this purported error aside, the Court distinguished Porter’s situation from that of Brown in two ways: (1) the location of the container searched, and (2) the abandonment of the container. On the first point, the Court noted that the purse in Brown was in the defendant’s “actual possession,” located directly in front of her knees when police entered, making it fall within the Ybarra protection as an extension of her person. By contrast, Porter’s backpack was not in his physical possession, or even in his immediate proximity, when the warrant was executed. On the second point, the majority concluded that Porter abandoned the backpack for purposes of both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 through his repeated denials of knowledge, possession, or ownership. Citing case law from numerous jurisdictions, the Court held that a person who verbally disclaims any interest in an item to law enforcement cannot later claim standing to challenge the search of that item. Therefore, even though officers knew Porter had brought the backpack into the house, the relevant question under Brown was whether he maintained an interest in it at the time of the search, and the Court found he did not. Therefore, the Court held that Porter’s state constitution challenge also failed.

Justice McDermott authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Oxley. The dissent began by criticizing the majority for pivoting away from the arguments actually presented by the parties. Justice McDermott emphasized that neither the State in its arguments nor the district court in its ruling ever claimed the warrant itself justified the search of Porter’s backpack. To the contrary, the State expressly argued that “officers had valid bases for the search that were separate and distinct from the search warrant.” The majority, according to the dissent, barely discussed the fighting issue raised by the parties, abandonment. They instead decided the case on a ground that nobody had presented.

Justice McDermott continued by arguing that reliance on the warrant to justify the search was unavailing, given that the warrant focused exclusively on Civitate as the sole target and never mentioned or even alluded to Porter. The dissent cited binding Iowa Supreme Court precedent, including State v. Brown, State v. Jamison, and State v. Fleming, as establishing the principle that warrants do not extend to the belongings of visitors who happen to be present where a warrant is being executed. The dissent noted pointedly that neither Fleming nor Jamison received any mention in the majority opinion.

Rather than expressly overruling Brown, Justice McDermott argued the majority “hollow[ed] out Brown’s holding through revisionist analysis.” He took particular issue with the majority’s adoption of the physical-possession test, which requires that a visitor be holding, wearing, or carrying an item at the moment of the search to invoke constitutional protection. This is because the Brown Court had previously criticized this test as “completely unrealistic” and held “cannot possibly pass constitutional muster under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.” The dissent further observed that this test creates a legal double standard: constructive possession is sufficient to convict a person of possessing contraband, yet insufficient for that same person to claim Fourth Amendment protection from a search.

Turning to the abandonment question, which was the issue actually raised by the parties, the dissent would have found in favor of Porter. Justice McDermott argued that Porter’s denials of ownership were made while he was “detained, handcuffed, and being interrogated,” and that Porter had already invoked his right to counsel before officers reinitiated questioning about the backpack inside the house. Under these circumstances, the dissent characterized Porter’s denials as less a waiver of privacy and more a refusal to incriminate himself. Justice McDermott warned that allowing officers to “badger” detained visitors until they deny ownership of a bag the officers know belongs to them would “create a perverse incentive for officers to interrogate visitors to manufacture an abandonment excuse.” The dissent concluded that a person’s constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures “do not fade away when visiting someone else’s home, even when police separately have probable cause to search that home.”

Porter draws a new line in Iowa search-and-seizure law. Going forward, officers executing a premises warrant may search any container on the premises capable of concealing the evidence described in the warrant, so long as the container is not in the physical possession of a person not named in the warrant. An officer’s constructive knowledge as to the ownership of the containers is irrelevant. What happens to Brown, however, is less clear. The Court did not expressly overrule it, but the decision significantly narrowed its reach. The majority and dissent also tell very different stories about what Brown actually held, and neither side seems willing to concede much ground. The decision’s treatment of abandonment is also likely to draw attention. Under the majority’s reasoning, a detained, handcuffed visitor who has already invoked his right to counsel can be asked repeatedly about a bag until he denies owning it, and that denial can then be used to defeat a constitutional challenge to the search. The dissent pushed back, warning that the majority’s approach creates a “perverse incentive” for officers to manufacture abandonment through interrogation.

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Throughout his tenure, Rox has authored nearly 500 posts covering the Iowa Supreme Court, the Iowa Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit – making him the most significant contributor in the blog’s history.

Rox brought to On Brief an unmatched combination of journalistic skill and deep knowledge of Iowa’s appellate courts. A former longtime editorial writer for The Des Moines Register and an emeritus member of that paper’s editorial board, Rox brought decades of experience distilling complex legal proceedings into clear, accessible analysis for attorneys, litigants, and the public. He also has served as a reporter for Courthouse News Service, further underscoring his commitment to making court proceedings transparent and understandable to a broad audience.

Beyond his written contributions, Rox lent his voice and credibility to the broader conversation about Iowa’s judiciary. He participated in panels and discussions concerning judicial retention, transparency in government, and the role of Iowa’s courts — always bringing the same thoughtful perspective that characterized his blog posts.

On behalf of the entire editorial team at On Brief and our colleagues at Nyemaster Goode, we extend our deepest gratitude to Rox for his contributions.

We wish Rox all the best.

Thank you, Rox.

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Jay Straight and Lori Straight v. Hagie Manufacturing Co., No. 25-0326

Opinion date: March 11, 2026

On appeal from Harrison County District Court

[Disclosure: Nyemaster Goode attorneys Dana W. Hempy and Katie L. Graham represented Hagie Manufacturing in this case.]

Issue:

• Were plaintiffs’ negligence claims for damage to a chemical sprayer barred by the economic loss doctrine?

Jay and Lori Straight’s son, Jackson, was operating the family’s mechanized sprayer applying chemicals to a field when the front axle broke and the machine fell to the ground. Jackson was not injured and there was no damage to the chemical tank, although the chemicals could no longer be used.

The Straights filed suit in Harrison County District Court against the sprayer’s manufacturer, Hagie Manufacturing, claiming negligent failure to warn, manufacturing defect, design defect, and negligence. The Straights sought damages for the sprayer itself, the chemicals in the sprayer at the time, and for loss-of-use while the sprayer was being repaired.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hagie on three of the Straights’ four claims, saying the economic loss doctrine barred all claims except for the Straights’ failure-to-warn claim, and it concluded the Straights could seek damages for the cost of the lost chemicals. However, the court subsequently granted Hagie’s motion to reconsider and dismissed all of the Straights’ claims.

On appeal, the Straights argued that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to their claims and instead say they can bring tort claims seeking damages for the sprayer and loss of the chemicals because the sprayer’s axle breaking was a “sudden and dangerous occurrence.” Hagie countered that the economic loss doctrine applies and Straights only have contractual remedies.

The Court of Appeals, in a three-judge panel decision written by Court of Appeals Judge Sharon Soorholtz Greer joined by Court of Appeals Judges Julie Schumacher and Mary Chicchelly, held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in Hagie’s favor.

In discussing the economic loss theory, the Court of Appeals cited the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Determan v. Johnson, which said that a plaintiff who has suffered only an economic loss due to the negligence of another has not been injured “in a manner which is legally cognizable or compensable.” In that case, a home purchaser sued the prior owners who built the home for damages after the purchaser discovered serious structural issues with the roof.

While the roof did not collapse as the plaintiff had feared, she sued seeking damages for the cost of repairing the roof. The Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the economic loss doctrine applied in that case because, while the defects “present a genuine safety hazard to persons and property, that risk has not come to pass,” the economic loss doctrine applied to the plaintiff’s tort claims, and her remedy was in contract law.

In the Straights’ case, the incident was not described as violent and the broken axle did not cause any personal injury or damage to property beyond the sprayer itself.

“Although the Straights, in their briefing and at oral argument, emphasize that the axle failure was a violent, sudden, and dangerous occurrence, that characterization alone is not determinative,” the Court of Appeals said.

“We instead consider not only the type of risk, but also the nature of the defect, the manner in which injury occurred, and the types of damages to be recovered,” Court of Appeals Judge Soorholtz Greer wrote. “Here, the nature of the defect claimed was improper welding and a faulty front axle, the risk involved a possibility of a malfunction or breakdown, and the damages requested were for the repair of the sprayer and its components—all related to economic losses.”

Finally, the Court disagreed with the Straights’ claim that the chemicals that remained in the sprayer tank and were no longer usable constitute “other property” damaged when the sprayer broke down. That’s because the chemicals were part of the sprayer as a fully integrated system and the chemicals in the sprayer do not constitute other property or transform the Straights’ contract claims into tort claims.

“The core function of the sprayer is to spray chemicals on fields. Without the chemicals, the sprayer would not function as intended,” Soorholtz Greer wrote. “Because the chemicals in the sprayer’s chemical tank are an integral part of the sprayer, the Straights’ claim for damages does not extend beyond the sprayer itself.”

State of Iowa v. Jeffrey Dewayne Davis, No. 24-1302

 Opinion date: Feb. 11, 2026

On appeal from Scott County District Court

Issues: Did a trial court improperly admit a domestic-abuse victim’s statements made to a prosecutor outside the courtroom; and, did the court err by adding a habitual-offender sentence enhancement without holding a separate hearing?

Jeffrey Davis was convicted after a Scott County bench trial on charges of domestic abuse assault, third or subsequent offense, assault on a peace officer, and interference with official acts resulting in bodily injury based on accusations of his girlfriend and his physical encounter with a police officer when he was arrested.

Davis argued on appeal that statements made by his girlfriend, R.H., to a county prosecutor regarding her unwillingness to testify should not have been admitted at trial. And, he challenged the district court’s habitual-offender sentencing enhancement based on his prior convictions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in part and reversed in part in a panel decision written by Court of Appeals Judge Tyler Buller, joined by Court of Appeals Judges Mary Chicchelly and Samuel Langholz.

The district court allowed R.H.’s statements to be admitted at trial after finding Davis violated a no-contact order when he was recorded in phone calls from jail encouraging R.H. not to testify. R.H. told the prosecutor she would go to jail herself rather than comply with the subpoena, and she did not appear for trial.

The Court of Appeals held that the district court properly allowed R.H.’s statements. “While a criminal defendant ordinarily has the constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him,” the Court of Appeals said, “he forfeits that right when he engages in wrongdoing intended to prevent the witness from testifying at trial.”

“We have listened to the recorded jail calls ourselves, as well as the district court’s summary of them, and we have little trouble concluding the State met its burden here,” Court of Appeals Judge Buller wrote. “As the district court put it, the three submitted recordings involved Davis ‘clearly’ trying to ‘persuade, cajole, sweet talk the complaining witness into not testifying.’”

The Court of Appeals panel, however, disagreed with the district court’s handling of the recidivist enhancement of Davis’ sentence. Initially, the district court told the parties it planned to hear the State’s evidence on Davis’ prior convictions in a separate proceeding at the conclusion of the trial for enhancement purposes if the defendant were found guilty. The second phase of the bifurcated trial did not happen, however, as the trial court determined there was sufficient evidence of prior convictions.

The Iowa Supreme Court has found that failure to comply with the bifurcated-trial process under the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure requires reversal and remand to afford the State the opportunity to prove the enhancement following the proper procedure. Thus, the Court of Appeals vacated Davis’ recidivist enhancement and remanded the case for further proceedings in which the trial court can afford the State and Davis the bifurcated-trial proceeding, or Davis can engage in a proper colloquy and stipulate to the prior co

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