Throughout his tenure, Rox has authored nearly 500 posts covering the Iowa Supreme Court, the Iowa Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit – making him the most significant contributor in the blog’s history.

Rox brought to On Brief an unmatched combination of journalistic skill and deep knowledge of Iowa’s appellate courts. A former longtime editorial writer for The Des Moines Register and an emeritus member of that paper’s editorial board, Rox brought decades of experience distilling complex legal proceedings into clear, accessible analysis for attorneys, litigants, and the public. He also has served as a reporter for Courthouse News Service, further underscoring his commitment to making court proceedings transparent and understandable to a broad audience.

Beyond his written contributions, Rox lent his voice and credibility to the broader conversation about Iowa’s judiciary. He participated in panels and discussions concerning judicial retention, transparency in government, and the role of Iowa’s courts — always bringing the same thoughtful perspective that characterized his blog posts.

On behalf of the entire editorial team at On Brief and our colleagues at Nyemaster Goode, we extend our deepest gratitude to Rox for his contributions.

We wish Rox all the best.

Thank you, Rox.

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Jay Straight and Lori Straight v. Hagie Manufacturing Co., No. 25-0326

Opinion date: March 11, 2026

On appeal from Harrison County District Court

[Disclosure: Nyemaster Goode attorneys Dana W. Hempy and Katie L. Graham represented Hagie Manufacturing in this case.]

Issue:

• Were plaintiffs’ negligence claims for damage to a chemical sprayer barred by the economic loss doctrine?

Jay and Lori Straight’s son, Jackson, was operating the family’s mechanized sprayer applying chemicals to a field when the front axle broke and the machine fell to the ground. Jackson was not injured and there was no damage to the chemical tank, although the chemicals could no longer be used.

The Straights filed suit in Harrison County District Court against the sprayer’s manufacturer, Hagie Manufacturing, claiming negligent failure to warn, manufacturing defect, design defect, and negligence. The Straights sought damages for the sprayer itself, the chemicals in the sprayer at the time, and for loss-of-use while the sprayer was being repaired.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hagie on three of the Straights’ four claims, saying the economic loss doctrine barred all claims except for the Straights’ failure-to-warn claim, and it concluded the Straights could seek damages for the cost of the lost chemicals. However, the court subsequently granted Hagie’s motion to reconsider and dismissed all of the Straights’ claims.

On appeal, the Straights argued that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to their claims and instead say they can bring tort claims seeking damages for the sprayer and loss of the chemicals because the sprayer’s axle breaking was a “sudden and dangerous occurrence.” Hagie countered that the economic loss doctrine applies and Straights only have contractual remedies.

The Court of Appeals, in a three-judge panel decision written by Court of Appeals Judge Sharon Soorholtz Greer joined by Court of Appeals Judges Julie Schumacher and Mary Chicchelly, held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in Hagie’s favor.

In discussing the economic loss theory, the Court of Appeals cited the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Determan v. Johnson, which said that a plaintiff who has suffered only an economic loss due to the negligence of another has not been injured “in a manner which is legally cognizable or compensable.” In that case, a home purchaser sued the prior owners who built the home for damages after the purchaser discovered serious structural issues with the roof.

While the roof did not collapse as the plaintiff had feared, she sued seeking damages for the cost of repairing the roof. The Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the economic loss doctrine applied in that case because, while the defects “present a genuine safety hazard to persons and property, that risk has not come to pass,” the economic loss doctrine applied to the plaintiff’s tort claims, and her remedy was in contract law.

In the Straights’ case, the incident was not described as violent and the broken axle did not cause any personal injury or damage to property beyond the sprayer itself.

“Although the Straights, in their briefing and at oral argument, emphasize that the axle failure was a violent, sudden, and dangerous occurrence, that characterization alone is not determinative,” the Court of Appeals said.

“We instead consider not only the type of risk, but also the nature of the defect, the manner in which injury occurred, and the types of damages to be recovered,” Court of Appeals Judge Soorholtz Greer wrote. “Here, the nature of the defect claimed was improper welding and a faulty front axle, the risk involved a possibility of a malfunction or breakdown, and the damages requested were for the repair of the sprayer and its components—all related to economic losses.”

Finally, the Court disagreed with the Straights’ claim that the chemicals that remained in the sprayer tank and were no longer usable constitute “other property” damaged when the sprayer broke down. That’s because the chemicals were part of the sprayer as a fully integrated system and the chemicals in the sprayer do not constitute other property or transform the Straights’ contract claims into tort claims.

“The core function of the sprayer is to spray chemicals on fields. Without the chemicals, the sprayer would not function as intended,” Soorholtz Greer wrote. “Because the chemicals in the sprayer’s chemical tank are an integral part of the sprayer, the Straights’ claim for damages does not extend beyond the sprayer itself.”

State of Iowa v. Jeffrey Dewayne Davis, No. 24-1302

 Opinion date: Feb. 11, 2026

On appeal from Scott County District Court

Issues: Did a trial court improperly admit a domestic-abuse victim’s statements made to a prosecutor outside the courtroom; and, did the court err by adding a habitual-offender sentence enhancement without holding a separate hearing?

Jeffrey Davis was convicted after a Scott County bench trial on charges of domestic abuse assault, third or subsequent offense, assault on a peace officer, and interference with official acts resulting in bodily injury based on accusations of his girlfriend and his physical encounter with a police officer when he was arrested.

Davis argued on appeal that statements made by his girlfriend, R.H., to a county prosecutor regarding her unwillingness to testify should not have been admitted at trial. And, he challenged the district court’s habitual-offender sentencing enhancement based on his prior convictions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in part and reversed in part in a panel decision written by Court of Appeals Judge Tyler Buller, joined by Court of Appeals Judges Mary Chicchelly and Samuel Langholz.

The district court allowed R.H.’s statements to be admitted at trial after finding Davis violated a no-contact order when he was recorded in phone calls from jail encouraging R.H. not to testify. R.H. told the prosecutor she would go to jail herself rather than comply with the subpoena, and she did not appear for trial.

The Court of Appeals held that the district court properly allowed R.H.’s statements. “While a criminal defendant ordinarily has the constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him,” the Court of Appeals said, “he forfeits that right when he engages in wrongdoing intended to prevent the witness from testifying at trial.”

“We have listened to the recorded jail calls ourselves, as well as the district court’s summary of them, and we have little trouble concluding the State met its burden here,” Court of Appeals Judge Buller wrote. “As the district court put it, the three submitted recordings involved Davis ‘clearly’ trying to ‘persuade, cajole, sweet talk the complaining witness into not testifying.’”

The Court of Appeals panel, however, disagreed with the district court’s handling of the recidivist enhancement of Davis’ sentence. Initially, the district court told the parties it planned to hear the State’s evidence on Davis’ prior convictions in a separate proceeding at the conclusion of the trial for enhancement purposes if the defendant were found guilty. The second phase of the bifurcated trial did not happen, however, as the trial court determined there was sufficient evidence of prior convictions.

The Iowa Supreme Court has found that failure to comply with the bifurcated-trial process under the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure requires reversal and remand to afford the State the opportunity to prove the enhancement following the proper procedure. Thus, the Court of Appeals vacated Davis’ recidivist enhancement and remanded the case for further proceedings in which the trial court can afford the State and Davis the bifurcated-trial proceeding, or Davis can engage in a proper colloquy and stipulate to the prior co

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Chicago-based Invernergy’s Worthwhile Wind affiliate invested millions of dollars and several years on preliminary planning for the project that could see up to 55 windmills generating 165 megawatts of electricity. Worth County initially supported the project, as it had supported prior projects. But after Worth County saw turnover of two of the three members of its Board of Supervisors, reflecting a change in public sentiment on windmills, it enacted a moratorium on new wind projects and then an ordinance regulating future wind farms.

Worthwhile Wind sued, claiming it had a vested right to complete the project under the law as it existed before enactment of the ordinance, and that the ordinance was unenforceable because it had been enacted in bad faith.

The Worth County District Court agreed, the County appealed, and the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court in a decision written by Justice Christopher McDonald joined by Chief Justice Susan Christensen and Justices Edward Mansfield, Thomas Waterman, Dana Oxley and David May. Justice Matthew McDermott filed a dissenting opinion.

The legal doctrine of vested rights applies when governments change zoning regulations after property owners have made investments under the previous rules. But courts have uniformly held that, by itself, private investment without any engagement with the local government is not enough to support a claim for vested rights, Justice McDonald wrote, and the Iowa Supreme Court has in a number of cases rejected vested rights claims where the owner or developer had not obtained a validly issued permit.

“Applying these principles here, we conclude that Worthwhile’s vested rights claim fails as a matter of law,” the Court said. “Worth County never formally approved a plat. Worthwhile never applied for or obtained a permit to construct or operate the commercial wind turbines that are the object of the project.”

As the Court explained, its precedents establish that only a “lawfully authorized project—a project for which the developer had obtained a permit or other official government authorization to proceed—can support a vested rights claim. This is because the vested rights claim is based on reliance on administrative approval of the development rather than reliance on the law or, in this case, the absence of law.”

The Court rejected Worthwhile Wind’s argument that, because some parts of Worth County are not zoned and no permit is required or available, a developer could never acquire vested rights regardless of the size of its investment.

“The vested rights doctrine protects settled expectations; expectations that crystallize when the government, through its established permitting or approval process, has signaled that a proposed use conforms with the applicable regulatory framework,” Justice McDonald wrote. “In an unzoned area, no such signal has been given. A developer who spends money in an unzoned area does so with knowledge that local government retains the full scope of its legislative power to enact zoning regulations.”

The Court also disagreed with Worthwhile Wind’s claim that Worth County acted in bad faith in enacting the new ordinance regulating windmill projects–that is, it acted illegally in creating the new windmill rules and that it acted with the intent of blocking Worthwhile Wind’s project.

First, the Court said, Worthwhile Wind failed to show that the Worth County Board of Supervisors acted illegally, as the new ordinance’s regulatory measures, such as setback distances, height limitations, noise restrictions, and shadow flicker standards, are regulations local governments routinely adopt in the exercise of their police power.

“Worthwhile presented no evidence that the substantive provisions of the new ordinance lacked a rational basis or bore no reasonable relationship to the public welfare,” the Court said.

As for the argument that the new ordinance was enacted with the improper purpose of blocking the Worthwhile Wind project, McDonald wrote, “There is a meaningful difference between a county attempting to properly regulate a proposed future use and a county passing an ordinance with the improper purpose of frustrating a particular project.”

In his dissent, Justice McDermott said the majority abandoned the Court’s precedents on resolving the question of whether a property owner has acquired a vested right by applying a two-part test asking whether the property owner made substantial expenditures toward the use prior to the zoning change and whether those expenditures were lawful.

The majority abandoned that two-part test, Justice McDermott wrote. “Instead, the opinion flatly asserts that no vested right exists unless a property holder possesses a permit at the time of a zoning change. Applying this new standard, the majority concludes that Worthwhile had no vested right because it had not sought or received a permit when the Board adopted the moratorium—even though no permit was required.”

On that point, Justice McDermott noted that the Worthwhile Wind project targeted sites in unzoned areas of the county. “The majority penalizes Worthwhile for lacking a permit that the county had made clear was never required in the first place. The majority doesn’t explain what permit was even available, let alone required.”

Beyond the effect of the Court’s decision on the Worthwhile Wind project, Justice McDermott said the decision will affect all future wind energy projects.

“Worthwhile had spent three years and millions of dollars developing this project when the Board passed the moratorium. By declaring Worthwhile’s efforts insufficient to establish a vested right, the majority leaves future energy developers completely exposed as they consider the immense cost, risk, and complexity of large-scale wind energy projects,” Justice McDermott wrote. “By turning away from our vested-rights precedents, we have severely undermined predictability not only for the developer in this case, but for all developers considering complex wind energy projects in our state.”

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• Beecher Store, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue Alcoholic Beverages Division, No. 24-1422, concerning whether a statute imposing enhanced penalties for second violations unlawfully selling alcohol to minors can apply when the second violation happened minutes after the first;
• State of Iowa v. Alicia Elaine Fredricksen, No. 24-0442, concerning whether a defendants’ statements about plans to commit violent acts against government employees qualified as a threat of terrorism under Iowa Code section 708A.5.

The remaining opinions from February are summarized below.

Brea Anne Griffith, individually, as administrator of the Estate of Michael Lee Griffith, and on behalf of L.M.G., a minor, and Brian Griffith v. John L. Kulper and Travis J. Galloway, No. 24–0097

Opinion date: February 6, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that the co-employee defendants had actual knowledge of the specific peril—missing gate pins—that caused a worker’s death to sustain gross negligence claims under Iowa Code section 85.20.

Michael Griffith died on the job after falling through an open catwalk gate into a lime surge hopper at a quarry operated by his employer, Wendling Quarries. A post-accident inspection revealed that the metal pins required to secure the gate were missing and had been replaced with a strip of wire. Griffith’s wife, Brea, and his father, Brian, sued three co-employees alleging gross negligence. A jury awarded approximately $2.84 million in damages against two of the defendants. The court of appeals affirmed, and the defendants sought further review.

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded for dismissal of the civil action with prejudice. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove gross negligence because plaintiffs failed to prove the defendants had actual knowledge of the missing pins.

Under Iowa Code section 85.20, the workers’ compensation system is generally the exclusive remedy for on-the-job injuries, but a narrow exception permits tort claims against co-employees for gross negligence. To establish gross negligence, a plaintiff must prove three elements: knowledge of the peril to be apprehended, knowledge that injury was probable rather than merely possible, and a conscious failure to avoid the peril. The first and third elements require actual knowledge of the specific peril. Both defendants testified without rebuttal that they did not know the pins were missing or that the gate was unsecured.

The Supreme Court found that the court of appeals erred by relying on constructive knowledge, reasoning that Galloway’s cursory drive-by inspection showed what he should have discovered rather than what he actually knew. The Court noted that a failure to inspect is not, by itself, sufficient to prove gross negligence under Iowa law. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Estate of Kara B. Tornell and Preston H. Tornell v. Trinity Health Corporation et al., No. 24–0720

Opinion date: February 6, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether a nonlawyer estate administrator may prosecute a wrongful-death action in district court without an attorney.
• Whether the district court erred by dismissing the lawsuit without granting the plaintiff’s request for time to retain counsel.

Kara Tornell died the day after she was admitted to the emergency department of a West Des Moines hospital. Her husband, Preston Tornell, a nonlawyer, was appointed administrator of her estate and filed a wrongful-death medical malpractice lawsuit against the hospital, clinics, and treating physicians. No attorney signed the petition or appeared in district court. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the case could not proceed without a lawyer for the estate. Preston argued he could represent the estate as sole beneficiary, or alternatively, that he should be given time to hire an attorney. The district court treated his pro se petition as a “legal nullity” and dismissed the lawsuit without granting time to retain counsel. A divided court of appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeal’ decision, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and remanded with instructions to grant Preston at least thirty days to retain trial counsel.

The Court held that a licensed attorney must represent the estate in a wrongful-death action, reasoning that estates are legal entities distinct from their administrators and that wrongful-death lawsuits involving claims of a surviving spouse and children require a lawyer’s professional judgment. The Court also identified potential conflicts of interest because the estate had at least one creditor and Kara was survived by Preston and their seven children, whose individual consortium claims also had to be brought by the administrator. However, the Court agreed with the dissenting judges below that Preston had preserved his alternative request for time to hire counsel and that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the case without granting that request. The Court rejected the view that Preston’s suit was a “legal nullity” because Preston was not authorized to represent the estate. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

State of Iowa v. Joshua Kelly Uranga, No. 23–1001

Opinion date: February 13, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under Iowa Code section 692A.105 for failing to register temporary lodging away from a principal residence when the defendant’s only residence changed.

Joshua Uranga, who has been required to register sex offender since 2002, was convicted of violating sex offender registration requirements for the second time, a class “D” felony. Iowa Code section 692A.104 requires a sex offender to register a change in residence. Uranga had registered an address in Pilot Mound as his residence, but authorities suspected he was not living there. He was evicted from that address on November 18, 2021, and testified that he moved to a new residence in Boone on November 19. He registered the new address on November 30. The State charged him under Iowa Code section 692A.105, which requires a sex offender to notify the county sheriff about temporary lodging away from the offender’s principal residence for more than five days. Uranga objected to jury instructions that he argued misstated the elements of the offense, but the district court overruled his objection. The court of appeals affirmed Uranga’s conviction.

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

The Court reasoned that sections 692A.104 and 692A.105 impose different registration requirements. Section 692A.104 requires a sex offender to notify the sheriff within five business days of changing a residence—the requirement Uranga arguably violated. Section 692A.105, by contrast, is triggered only when a sex offender stays away from a principal residence for more than five days. The latter was the provision under which Uranga was actually charged. Because the evidence showed that Uranga’s principal residence changed from Pilot Mound to Boone within one to two days, the State did not prove that he was away from his principal residence for more than five days at any point during the relevant timeframe. The Court held that the State could not secure a conviction under section 692A.105’s temporary lodging provision based on conduct that, at most, violated section 692A.104’s change-of-residence provision, which the State did not charge. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Amanda Cooke v. Iowa Department of Health and Human Services, No. 24–2031

Opinion date: February 13, 2026

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether the “reasonable and prudent person” standard for child supervision under Iowa Code section 232.68(2)(a)(4)(b) permits consideration of the caregiver’s role, training, and regulatory obligations as part of the “similar facts and circumstances.”

A five-month-old child died from anoxic brain injury after she was found with her face in a blanket while napping at Amanda Cooke’s registered childcare home. Cooke, a state-registered category “B” childcare provider, had placed the infant in a Pack ‘n Play in the basement—an area not approved for regular use—with a blanket draped over the side and no baby monitor. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a founded child abuse assessment, finding that Cooke denied the child critical care by failing to provide proper supervision. On judicial review, the district court reversed, concluding that the “reasonable and prudent person” standard is an objective “generic person” standard that cannot consider the caregiver’s training or professional status.

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order, upholding HHS’s founded child abuse assessment against Cooke.

The Court first determined that it owed no deference to HHS’s interpretation of the statute, because the “reasonable and prudent person” standard has independent legal meaning outside the agency’s expertise. Interpreting the statute without deference, the Court focused on the qualifying phrase “under similar facts and circumstances” in section 232.68(2)(a)(4)(b), concluding that those words must not be rendered superfluous. The relevant facts and circumstances include not only external factors like the child’s age and sleeping arrangement but also the circumstances under which the child came into the caregiver’s care—here, placement with a trained, compensated, state-registered provider who had agreed to follow specific safe sleep regulations. The Court found that HHS’s analysis properly considered objective circumstances common to all registered childcare providers rather than Cooke’s subjective beliefs, and thus upheld the assessment. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Northwest Bank & Trust Company v. Pershing Hill Lofts, LLC, John M. Carroll, and John G. Ruhl, No. 22–1941

Opinion date: February 20, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether an exclusivity clause in a nonbinding financing proposal was independently enforceable and, if so, whether the developer breached it.
• Whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding the financing proposal from the fraud trial.

In 2015, Northwest Bank and developer Pershing Hill Lofts signed a financing proposal for a building redevelopment project in Davenport. The proposal was expressly a “summary of terms that may lead to a commitment to lend” and listed the award of Grayfield tax credits as a condition of the proposed loans. Its final paragraph contained an exclusivity clause in which the developer agreed to work solely with the bank in exchange for the bank’s due diligence efforts. After Pershing Hill did not receive the tax credits, the bank emailed the developer proposing either to “kill the deal” or proceed under materially different terms. Pershing Hill subsequently sought financing elsewhere. The bank sued for breach of contract and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment to Pershing Hill on the contract claim and excluded the financing proposal from the fraud trial, at which the jury found for the defendants. The court of appeals reversed on both rulings.

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision and affirmed the district court judgment. Regarding the contract claim, the Court agreed that the exclusivity clause could be severed from the otherwise nonbinding financing proposal and was sufficiently definite to be enforceable, with a clear duty of exclusivity supported by consideration in the form of the bank’s due diligence work. However, the Court concluded that Pershing Hill’s duty of exclusivity was discharged when the condition underlying the proposed loan structure—the Grayfield tax credits—failed to materialize and the bank itself proposed to abandon or modify the deal. Because Pershing Hill did not seek alternative financing until after the credits were denied and the bank had abandoned the original terms, there was no breach as a matter of law.

Regarding the evidentiary ruling, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the financing proposal from the fraud trial under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403, reasoning that admitting the defunct proposal risked causing the jury to conflate the contractual exclusivity duty with the fraud claims. The bank was still permitted to present extensive testimony about the parties’ course of dealing. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of the Court, in which all participating justices joined. Justice Waterman took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

State of Iowa v. Sherral Jermaine Tolbert, Jr., No. 24–0971

Opinion date: February 20, 2026

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County

Issues:

• Whether a district court’s acquittal-first jury instructions on murder and voluntary manslaughter misstated the law or violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.
• Whether a prosecutor’s mention of specific punishments during voir dire constituted reversible misconduct.
• Whether a prosecutor had a disqualifying conflict of interest based on prior employment in the public defender’s office.

Sherral Tolbert spotted Levonta Baker—a former friend turned rival gang member—driving in the direction of Tolbert’s grandmother’s house. Tolbert turned around and pursued Baker, pulling alongside Baker’s parked car and firing six shots, killing Baker. The State charged Tolbert with first-degree murder. Tolbert did not deny shooting Baker but argued he acted in the heat of passion, warranting only a voluntary manslaughter conviction. The district court gave acquittal-first instructions—directing the jury to consider lesser included offenses only if it first acquitted on the greater charge. The jury acquitted Tolbert of first-degree murder but convicted him of second-degree murder.

The Supreme Court affirmed Tolbert’s conviction for second-degree murder. Regarding the jury instructions, the Court held that malice aforethought (a deliberate intent to harm) and heat of passion are mutually exclusive mental states, meaning voluntary manslaughter is a true lesser included offense of murder rather than a form of mitigation that must be considered even after a murder finding. The Court noted that Iowa has used acquittal-first instructions for over a century and that this approach aligns with the majority of jurisdictions.

Regarding the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the Court did not condone the prosecutor’s mention of specific punishments during voir dire, but ultimately found the remark insufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial. The trial court instructed jurors that they had “nothing to do” with the punishment.

Regarding the conflict-of-interest challenge, the Court upheld the district court’s finding that the prosecutor’s brief prior tenure in the public defender’s office did not give rise to a conflict, as the prosecutor was never assigned to Tolbert’s case and did not acquire any confidential information. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

State of Iowa v. Rodney Dee Brown, No. 24–0409

Opinion date: February 27, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether jury instructions misstated the law by not requiring the term “illegal act” in the enticing-a-minor statute to be defined as an “illegal sexual act.”
• Whether there was sufficient evidence of specific intent to commit an illegal act to support the conviction.

On April 8, 2023, thirteen-year-old Diya went to a supermarket to buy cleaning supplies for her father. Rodney Dee Brown, a seventy-one-year-old man, followed her through the store, repeatedly approached her, and then offered her a ride in the parking lot as she fled the store shaking and in tears. Diya recited Brown’s license plate number to her mother over FaceTime, and police later contacted Brown at his home. Brown admitted interacting with Diya but claimed she approached him, described her as a “pretty young girl,” and said he thought she was eighteen. Brown was indicted for enticing a minor under Iowa Code section 710.10(4). At trial, he objected to the marshaling instruction’s use of the undefined term “illegal act” and asked the court to specify the intended crime, but the court denied the request. The jury convicted Brown of the charged offense. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted further review.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and the district court judgment.

The Court rejected Brown’s challenge to the jury instructions, noting that section 710.10(4) does not require the intended illegal act to be a sexual act. The statute separately addresses sexually motivated offenses through a registration provision and a different subsection, section 710.10(2), that specifically criminalizes enticement with intent to commit an illegal sex act.

The Court also found that Brown’s course of conduct—following Diya, staring at her, repeatedly approaching her, and offering a ride despite her obvious distress—along with his contradictory statements to police, provided substantial evidence from which the jury could infer specific intent to commit an illegal act such as assault, kidnapping, or stalking. Chief Justice Christensen authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Justice Mansfield filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice McDermott, expressing concern about the marshaling instruction’s failure to define “illegal act” for the jury. Justice Mansfield argued that the instruction should have specified the alleged illegal act or acts. However, he agreed that the court of appeals properly rejected the specific argument relating to the jury instructions that Brown raised on appeal.

Cody Lee Smith v. State of Iowa, No. 24–1296

Opinion date: February 27, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on a postconviction relief application when the State’s motion was never served on the applicant and the applicant’s request for counsel was never acted upon.

Cody Smith pleaded guilty to assault while displaying a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to sixty days in jail. Approximately a year and a half later, Smith filed a pro se application for postconviction relief (PCR), along with a separate request for appointment of counsel. The PCR application was placed in a new case file, but the request for counsel mistakenly ended up in the old criminal file and was never acted upon. The State filed a motion for summary judgment on the PCR application but never served it on Smith, who was incarcerated and without an attorney. Months later, the district court granted the State’s unopposed motion. A divided court of appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded with instructions for further proceedings.

Under Iowa Code section 822.6, similar to the summary judgment provisions within the Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure, a party must be served with a motion for summary disposition of a PCR application must be given an opportunity to resist it before the court may rule. Because the State never served Smith with the motion, the Court held the resistance deadline was never triggered, and Smith had no opportunity to respond. The Court also noted that Smith, as a confined person, was excused from registering for electronic filing and could not be expected to monitor the court’s electronic docket for filings. The situation was compounded by the failure to act on Smith’s request for counsel. On remand, the Court directed the district court to consider Smith’s application for appointment of counsel and to ensure proper service of the State’s motion with an opportunity for Smith to respond. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Estate of Jill Cataldo by Zachary Mead v. RCHP-Ottumwa, LLC, Matthew Jay Breeding, and Elvin McCarl, No. 24–1994

Opinion date: February 27, 2026

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether the two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful-death action arising from medical malpractice begins to run when the injury and its cause are discovered during the patient’s lifetime, or only upon the patient’s death.

On January 25, 2021, Jill Cataldo went to Ottumwa Regional Health Center for a knee replacement. During her recovery, she was diagnosed with acute respiratory failure. Her doctor allegedly failed to detect a femur fracture on X-ray, and a male nurse allegedly fell on her, worsening the break. The fracture released fat emboli into her bloodstream, causing a pulmonary embolism. Cataldo was transferred to Iowa Lutheran Hospital on February 5, 2021, and died on February 17. Her estate filed a wrongful-death action on February 17, 2023—exactly two years after her death. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the two-year limitations period under Iowa Code section 614.1(9)(a) began no later than February 5, 2021, when the estate discovered the injury and its cause. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling. The Court held that Iowa Code section 614.1(9)(a) requires medical malpractice actions, including wrongful-death claims, to be brought within two years of the date on which the claimant knew or should have known of the injury. The estate argued that a wrongful-death claim does not exist until the victim dies and that the limitations period should therefore begin at death. The Court rejected this argument, relying on Iowa’s longstanding treatment of wrongful-death claims as derivative of the decedent’s own injury rather than as independent causes of action that arise only at death. Under this principle, death is treated as a worsening of the victim’s injury, not a new injury that resets the limitations clock. Because the estate discovered the injury and its negligent cause by February 5, 2021, the two-year period expired on February 5, 2023—twelve days before the estate filed suit on February 17, 2023. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

The post February 2026 Opinion Roundup appeared first on Nyemaster Goode On Brief.

State Auditor Rob Sand served a subpoena on the City of Davenport in the course of an audit seeking documents related to the City’s $1.9 million settlement of harassment claims brought by three City employees. The City provided most of the requested documents, but in a motion to modify the subpoena filed in Scott County District Court it sought to protect City Council communications with its attorneys during a closed meeting.

The district court concluded that while state law does not authorize the Auditor to examine attorney work product related to the city’s case, it does authorize examination of otherwise privileged attorney-client communications. The court ordered that minutes or recordings from the closed session be produced for an in-camera review of minutes or recordings from the closed session to determine whether any should be shielded from the Auditor.

The City challenged that order in an interlocutory appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court. In its April 17 decision written by Justice Edward Mansfield, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that the Auditor’s subpoena power is limited regarding attorney-client communications. All participating members of the Court agreed. Justice Thomas Waterman took no part in consideration or decision of the case.

Confidential communications between attorneys and their clients may not be disclosed in testimony under Iowa Code Section 622.10(1), and the Iowa Supreme Court has long held that any confidential communication between attorney and client is absolutely privileged from disclosure against the client’s will. “As long ago as 1874, in discussing the predecessor to section 622.10(1), we said that the statute ‘is but declarative of the common law,’ and ‘such communications were effectually locked at the common law, and could not be revealed at all’,” Justice Mansfield wrote.

The Court also dismissed Sand’s argument that the State Auditor’s authority under Iowa Code Section 11.41 to access confidential information when conducting audits trumps the attorney-client privilege. That privilege in Iowa “exists today not just by reason of statute, but by virtue of the common law,” Justice Mansfield wrote, quoting from a 2025 legal treatise that said,

“[I]n Iowa, the common-law privilege presumably protects communications between the attorney and client from outside intrusion by legal compulsion (such as a discovery request or a subpoena), even if the attorney is not called to testify and even if the communicative information sought will not be directly introduced into evidence in a litigation proceeding.”

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“Whether a duty exists is a threshold question of law in a negligence case; the defendant cannot be held liable without it,” Justice Dana Oxley wrote for the Court. “Because the district court erred in concluding that D.R. Horton owed [the subcontractor’s employee] a duty of care and in submitting the claim to a jury, we hold that D.R. Horton is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict.”

The decision was joined by all participating members of the Court. Chief Justice Susan Christensen did not participate in consideration or decision of the case.

Plaintiff Tim Kono was an employee of Royal Plumbing—a company that was subcontracted by Defendant D.R. Horton for a residential construction project. Kono was installing water and sewer lines on the project when a wall of the trench he was working in collapsed, covering him with what the Court described as an “SUV-sized mound of dirt” for about two minutes while coworkers worked to extricate him. The trench had been excavated without proper shoring or a trench box to prevent a cave-in. Instead, “benching” that cut stair steps into the side of the trench was used. But in this case, OSHA concluded, the trench was improperly benched and the soil was unstable.

After Kono was unburied, he was taken to a hospital for treatment of physical injuries that required surgery. He also suffered emotional injuries from the incident, which were “severe and long-lasting,” Justice Oxley wrote. Kono sued for physical and emotional damages. He received workers’ compensation benefits and settled negligence claims against three of his coworkers, leaving D.R. Horton as the sole defendant. The Polk County jury awarded more than $20.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The district court denied D.R. Horton’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

In reversing the trial court, Justice Oxley wrote that the Iowa Supreme Court has “long recognized that a general contractor typically does not owe a duty of care to the employee of a subcontractor,” citing its decisions dating back to 1980.

Kono argues that exceptions to that precedent apply in cases when a general contractor retains control or where the work at issue involves a peculiar risk not mitigated by ordinary caution. Neither exception applies in this case, the Court said.

In making the case that D.R. Horton retained control of the construction project, Kono cited D.R. Horton’s corporate safety manual, but the Court rejected that argument because the manual was never made part of the plumbing subcontractor’s contract with D.R. Horton. Nor did the Court agree with Kono that an exception applies because D.R. Horton retained “complete authority” under its contract with the plumbing contractor, saying that retention of its general rights to “direct all work” and “be awarded all final decisions” under the contract is insufficient to impose a duty of care.

Finally, the Court rejected Kono’s argument that D.R. Horton owed a duty of care under the “peculiar risk” exception. Kono argued that trenching work creates a peculiar risk of cave-ins. The Court disagreed, finding this issue is controlled by its 1996 decision in Robinson v. Poured Walls of Iowa Inc., which held that residential excavation work does not constitute a peculiar risk as a matter of law.

“The baseline rule that a general contractor owes no duty of care to the employees of an independent contractor stands under the facts of this case,” Justice Oxley wrote. “D.R. Horton did not retain control—neither by contract nor through its conduct—over the operative detail of the work that caused Kono’s injuries. And trenching work for a residential construction project, as a matter of law, does not create the type of peculiar risk that imposes a duty on the general contractor.”

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Courtney Cortez Chestnut v. Iowa Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal Investigation, Sex Offender Registry, No. 24-1330

Opinion date: Dec. 17, 2025
On appeal from Polk County District Court
Issue: Was the extension of a sex-offender’s registration requirement based on legislation applied retroactively an unconstitutional ex post facto penalty?

The Iowa Legislature in 2005 amended the statute that requires convicted sex offenders to register as sex offenders for an additional 10 years if they violate the original 10-year registration requirement. The amendment was made retroactive four years later.

Courtney Chestnut was adjudicated delinquent for second-degree sexual abuse of a minor committed as a juvenile in 1994. He was subsequently convicted of violating the registration requirement, which triggered extensions in his case. Chestnut argues the statute’s retroactivity provision violates the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions in his case.

The Iowa Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the registration extensions for Chestnut were for new crimes committed as an adult, not additional penalties for his original 1994 adjudication as a juvenile.

The ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions, as explained by the Iowa Supreme Court in a 2019 decision, “forbid enactment of laws that impose punishment for an act that was not punishable when committed or that increases the quantum of punishment provided for the crime when it was committed.”

Iowa’s sex-offender registration requirement enacted in 1995 was regulatory or remedial, not punitive, the Iowa Supreme Court said in a 1997 decision; thus, that requirement was properly applied to Chestnut for his 1994 adjudication. But the Iowa Supreme Court, in a 2018 decision, held that a 2009 amendment making retroactive extended registration periods for violations of registration requirements was punitive as applied to juveniles.

The Iowa Court of Appeals, however, held that the extensions of Chestnut’s registration requirement are a consequence of his criminal conduct as an adult–that is failing to register as a sex offender on at least three occasions–not a consequence of his original delinquency adjudication.

“As a result, no ex post facto violation occurred by extending Chestnut’s registration period,” wrote Judge Ahlers on behalf of a unanimous panel.

Philip Baxter West Jr. v. Sophia Lyn Stafford, No. 25-0076

Opinion date: Dec. 17, 2025
On appeal from Warren County District Court
Issue: Did a jury fail to fairly value the loss of a plaintiff’s dog killed in a car accident?

When Philip West Jr. was struck by a car driven by Sophia Stafford in Indianola while walking his dog, he sought damages not only for his physical and emotional injuries but for the loss of his beloved dog, a Boston terrier named Bolt. A jury awarded West $11,127.24 in past medical expenses, $6,000 for past physical and mental pain and suffering, and $2,219.88 for the loss of a pet, which he considered inadequate.

In his appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial or an increase in the jury award, West argued that, in setting the award, the jury failed to fully compensate him for future medical expenses, emotional damage, and the loss of Bolt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, saying there was insufficient evidence that West is owed for future medical expenses and emotional injury.

As for the loss of Bolt, the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Chief Judge Tabor, said the jury, which was instructed to consider Bolt’s fair market value that included the purchase price, fairly compensated West for the loss of his dog

That prompted a response from Court of Appeals Judge Tyler Buller, who wrote in a special concurring opinion that courts have failed to recognize the value society places on pets. Iowa Supreme Court precedent treats pets as personal property, he wrote, “the same as a toaster, a toothbrush, or a trashcan. I think most pet owners would bristle at that notion. Almost two thirds of Americans own a pet, and 97% of pet owners consider pets part of their family.”

Buller cited legal academic articles, recent court cases, and opinion surveys including a 2023 Pew Research Center survey finding that just over half of pet owners consider their pets as much a part of their family as a human family member. “Even a cursory search reveals that an avalanche of academic writings–as well as some courts and state legislatures–urge the law should recognize pets are part of the family unit, not lifeless personal property.”

In re the Marriage of Kelsey R. Meester and Tyrus D. Meester Upon the Petition of Kelsey R. Meester n/k/a Kelsey R. Webb and concerning Tyrus D. Meester; Tyrus D. Meester Respondent –Appellant, No. 25-0261

Opinion date: Jan. 7, 2026
On appeal from Black Hawk County District Court
Issue: Did the district court properly award custody and divide property in a divorce decree?

Tyus Meester appealed the Black Hawk County District Court’s decree dissolving his marriage with Kelsey R. Meester that placed the couple’s child in Kelsey’s physical care. Tyrus sought joint physical care or more visitations with the child. He also claimed the district court’s property division was inequitable because he was not given credit for the premarital student loans that Kelsey paid off during the marriage.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with Tyrus and affirmed the district court.

In discussing the custody question, the Court of Appeals focused on Tyus Meester’s alcohol problems that included three convictions for OWI–one of which involved a rollover accident–and one conviction for public intoxication. As the district court said, “Tyrus fails to recognize that he has a drinking problem and that he abuses alcohol. Tyrus fully intends to drink during scheduled parental time but intends to utilize an alternate caregiver while doing so.”

Because the district court was in a position to assess the parties and their credibility, the Court of Appeals held, “we find that placing the child in Kelsey’s physical care is in his best interest. This does not diminish Tyrus’s important role in the child’s life, which Kelsey has a duty to maintain.”

With respect to the division of the parties’ property, the Court of Appeals disagreed with Tyrus’ argument that the district court erred by failing to assign $123,633.94 as an asset to Kelsey for her premarital college debt that was paid off during the marriage with marital funds.

The Court of Appeals has previously said that automatically setting aside premarital assets or debts is “contrary to our distribution scheme,” and that when crafting an equitable division, the district court can only award assets and debts that then exist and must generally do so based on their value at the time of trial. “The credit that Tyrus seeks does not align with these equitable distribution principles,” said Judge Badding on behalf of a unanimous panel.

In re the Marriage of Jennifer Angela Humphrey and Marc Allen Humphrey Upon the Petition of Jennifer Angela Humphrey, Petitioner-Appellant, and Concerning Marc Allen Humphrey, Respondent-Appellee, No. 24-2072

Opinion date: Jan. 7, 2026
On appeal from Dallas County District Court
Issue: Did the district court properly award custody and divide property in a divorce decree?

Jennifer Humphrey appealed the Dallas County District Court’s decree dissolving her 19-year marriage with Marc Humphrey. Jennifer challenged the court’s placement of the couple’s two minor children in Marc’s physical care, its financial provisions, and its denial of her attorney fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on all three issues.

The Court of Appeals decision’s lengthy recitation of the couple’s bitter two-year-long divorce litigation and their often-stormy marriage is a backdrop for its analysis of Jennifer’s arguments.

During their marriage, the couple experienced extreme financial highs and lows and marital stress. Marc’s income as a personal-injury trial attorney fluctuated depending on courtroom wins and losses; Jennifer, alternately a nurse, devoted stay-at-home mother, and talented regular at the gambling casino, could be volatile, as when she smashed the windows of their Mercedes with a baseball bat and punctured its tires with a screwdriver following a heated argument.

The couples’ conduct throughout lengthy divorce proceedings mirrored their marriage with admonitions from the trial court for both parties, using terms such as “shenanigans” and “scorched earth” tactics. Ultimately, the court awarded joint legal custody for their two minor children in Marc’s physical care, and ordered Jennifer to initially pay $827.14 a month in childcare. It awarded most of the couple’s assets and nearly all of the debts to Marc, awarded Jennifer a $170,000 equalization payment in lieu of spousal-support, and denied both parties’ requests for attorney fees.

Jennifer alone appealed, seeking more favorable financial terms and child custody arrangement, and trial and appellate attorney fees. The Court of Appeals disagreed on all three.

“At bottom, joint physical care is not in the best interests of the parties’ children,” the Court said. “We emphasize–like the district court–that this decision is not based on a conclusion that Jennifer is an unfit parent. To the contrary, we see no reason to disagree with the district court’s findings that ‘[t]he children are safe in both their parents’ care’ and that ‘both love their children.’”

Finally, after analyzing the couple’s disputes over valuation of their assets and debts in seeking an equitable division, the Iowa Court of Appeals concluded the district court made a reasonable division. As for attorney fees, the Court noted that neither party has a right to fees, that both parties were guilty of “dragging out” the litigation, and even after recognizing Marc’s higher income, it said, “we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in declining to award attorney fees under these circumstances.” Judge Langholz authored the opinion on behalf of a unanimous panel.

State v. Breack Allen Bradford, No. 23-1518

Opinion date: Dec. 17, 2025
On appeal from Warren County District Court
Issue: Did the district court err in allowing hearsay evidence and remote testimony from a defendant’s accuser via closed-circuit video?

Breack Bradford appealed his conviction by a Warren County jury for second-degree sexual abuse for sexually abusing his minor daughter, L.B. Bradford argued that allowing testimony from a child protective worker to whom L.B. had disclosed the abuse violated his constitutional right to confront his accuser. And he said the court erred in allowing L.B. to testify outside his presence at trial.

The Iowa Court of Appeals disagreed with Bradford on both issues and affirmed his conviction.

Bradford’s appeal is the first time an Iowa appellate court has considered the constitutionality of Iowa’s newly enacted “outcry witness” statute, Iowa Code section 622.31B, which created a new exception to the hearsay rule for testimony by another person concerning an out-of-court statement made by the victim. The exception relates to the admissibility of evidence of physical abuse or a sexual offense of a child, a person with an intellectual disability, a person with a cognitive impairment, or a person with a developmental disability.

When she was 11 years old, L.B. disclosed to a school counselor that her father had repeatedly sexually abused her. The school counselor notified the Department of Health and Human Services, which sent child protective worker Sadie Bruce to interview L.B. at the school. L.B. told Bruce the sexual abuse by her father had occurred since before she was nine years old.

Bradford challenged admission of the child protective worker’s testimony about L.B.’s out-of-court statements, claiming the statute violates his right under the Sixth Amendment to be confronted with the witnesses against him. And, he argued the testimony was impermissible “bolstering of the child’s potential testimony.”

The Iowa Court of Appeals said Bradford’s confrontation challenge “fails from the start,” citing a 2004 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, which said that “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of [the declarant’s] prior testimonial statements.” The Iowa statute mandates that the child testify at the trial, which happened in Bradford’s case.

Bradford’s argument that admitting L.B.’s statements through the child protective worker’s testimony “constituted impermissible bolstering” under the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Elliott (2011) also failed. Whereas the outcome of the Elliott case depended entirely on the credibility of three witnesses whose hearsay testimony was introduced to bolster their credibility, the State’s entire case against Bradford did not turn on L.B.’s credibility, the Iowa Court of Appeals said. Rather, the State also presented forensic evidence matching Bradford’s DNA profile to semen found in L.B.’s bedroom.

Finally, Bradford argued the district court erred in allowing L.B. to testify in the courtroom while he viewed her testimony via closed-circuit video in another room. Iowa Code Section 915.38 permits remote closed-circuit video testimony to protect a minor from trauma caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant.

Bradford argued the State failed to prove his presence would cause trauma and that the trauma or emotional distress “is more than de minimis.” The Court of Appeals disagreed, citing testimony from L.B.’s therapist and the district court’s assessment that it would be traumatic for the child to testify in front of Bradford. Judge Badding authored the opinion of a unanimous panel.

State v. Asa James Starr, No. 24-0974

Opinion date: Dec. 3, 2025
On appeal from Woodbury County District Court
Issue: Did a trial court err in allowing testimony outside the scope of the State’s minutes of testimony and in permitting use of the defendant’s juvenile adjudication to prove he was a felon in possession of a firearm?

Asa Starr appealed his conviction by a Woodbury County jury for first-degree robbery, assault while participating in a felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. Starr claimed the district court erred in permitting a witness to testify beyond the scope of the State’s minutes of testimony, and he argues the State was prohibited from using a juvenile adjudication to prove he was a felon in possession of a firearm as an adult. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the district court.

Starr was accused of robbing a woman at a convenience store gas pump at gunpoint and after a brief struggle fleeing in a getaway car driven by an acquaintance, Shalee Parker, who abandoned the car in a nearby neighborhood. Starr and Parker’s vehicle were identified by witnesses and on the convenience store’s video, and Starr’s fingerprints and DNA were found in a subsequent search of the car. Parker confessed to her role in the robbery and agreed to testify against Starr.

After concluding the evidence was sufficient for conviction by the jury, the Court of Appeals focused on remaining issues raised in his appeal: a witness’s identification of Starr in the courtroom during the trial that was not included in the State’s minutes of testimony expected at trial; and, his claim that the State wrongly used his juvenile adjudication to prove he was a felon in possession of a firearm.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.5(3) requires that minutes of testimony state “a full and fair statement” of expected testimony to “provide meaningful minutes from which a defense can be prepared.”

“Yet this general rule does not necessarily entitle Starr to relief,” the Court of Appeals said. “Although the minutes did not specifically state that [the witness] would identify Starr as the young man that he saw in his neighborhood, the defense was on notice that [he] was at the scene and would testify about the person he witnessed.” The purpose of Rule 2.5(3) is to alert the defendant generally to the source and nature of the evidence against him, the Court said, and “the minutes did that here.”

Finally, Starr claimed his juvenile delinquency adjudication for a felony offense should not have been admitted to prove that he violated Iowa Code Section 724.26, Iowa’s felon-in-possession statute, which makes it a felony for a person adjudicated delinquent on the basis of conduct that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult to possess a firearm. Starr sought to exclude his juvenile delinquency adjudication under Iowa Code Section 232.55(2)(a), which states in part: “Adjudication and disposition proceedings under this subchapter are not admissible as evidence against a person in a subsequent proceeding in any other court before or after the person reaches majority….”

The Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the district court’s conclusion that, while there is tension between the two statutes, “the inclusion in the text [of Section] 724.26(1) of the phrase ‘or who is adjudicated delinquent on the basis of conduct that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult’ reasonably implies an exception to [Section] 232.55(2) for proof of such an adjudication, in a prosecution under [Section] 724.26(1).” Judge Badding authored the opinion of a unanimous panel.

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That, a divided Iowa Supreme Court held in a March 13 decision, violated Hidlebaugh’s equal protection and due process rights under the U.S. and Iowa constitutions. The opinion for the Court was written by Chief Justice Susan Christensen joined by Justices Edward Mansfield, Thomas Waterman and Matthew McDermott. Justice David May wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Christopher McDonald and Dana Oxley.

“This case involves an unusual plea agreement where the defendant literally ‘bet the house,’” Chief Justice Christensen wrote.

Hidlebaugh agreed to plead guilty to a charge of failure to register as a sex offender as a habitual offender. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend that any prison sentence be suspended with probation provided that he purchase a home in Dallas County within 70 days. Hidlebaugh represented, and the State agreed, that having a permanent address by owning a home would help resolve his repeated failure to register as a sex offender.

Hidlebaugh was not able to obtain financing to purchase a home within 70 days, and although he pleaded for more time, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years in prison with a three-year mandatory minimum.

Hidlebaugh appealed, arguing that the district court considered an improper sentencing factor by penalizing him for being unable to afford a home, which violated his rights to equal protection and due process under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Iowa Constitution.

The Iowa Supreme Court agreed.

Both the majority and the dissent focused on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Bearden v. Georgia, which held that revoking a probation agreement when the defendant was unable to pay $500 under the agreement violated due process and equal protection. That decision quoted from an earlier opinion that said, “There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”

In Hidlebaugh’s case, the Iowa Supreme Court said, “we must determine whether Hidlebaugh received equal justice when his prison sentence may have resulted from his financial inability to purchase a home within a seventy-day period.”

Under Bearden, a sentencing court must determine whether the defendant’s failure to pay a financial obligation was willful, and if not the court must first consider alternatives before ordering a defendant to serve time in prison. A defendant’s willful failure to satisfy a financial obligation may be considered as an aggravating sentencing factor.

The Dallas County District Court said it was sentencing Hidlebaugh to prison because of his criminal history and because of the plea agreement. “Thus, it is clear that one of the two factors that led to Hidlebaugh’s prison sentence was his financial inability to contract to buy a home during the seventy-day period between plea and sentencing,” Chief Justice Christensen wrote.

That violated Hidlebaugh’s constitutional rights, the Court said, because he is entitled to be sentenced without consideration of an improper factor despite the fact that his criminal history was also considered.

“Finally, we emphasize what we are not addressing in this case,” Chief Justice Christensen wrote. “This case does not involve the imposition of restitution or fine, nor does it involve a defendant’s failure to pay victim restitution. We are simply holding that when the State and the defendant agree to recommend probation if the defendant meets a financial obligation by the time of sentencing, or prison if he doesn’t, the district court may not use that agreement to send the defendant to prison if the defendant demonstrates that, despite his best efforts, he could not meet that financial obligation.”

Writing in dissent, Justice May said the district court was authorized by statute to sentence Hidlebaugh to prison apart from consideration of the plea agreement, and he would have affirmed the sentence.

The trial court was not bound by the plea agreement between the State and Hidlebaugh, Justice May wrote. “No matter what the parties recommended, the court remained free to make its own independent determination as to what sentence was best in light of all of the relevant circumstances.”

Justice May also disagreed with the majority’s reading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bearden, which held that probation may not be revoked “solely” because of a probationer’s inability to pay a fine or restitution but that it could be revoked if the probationer failed to make sufficient efforts to do so. And he noted that the Bearden court used the word “solely” at least seven times in the ruling to emphasize that states may not automatically imprison exclusively based on financial shortcomings.

In Hidlebaugh’s case, the trial court considered, among other things, Hidlebaugh’s age, his employment circumstances, the pre-sentence investigation, the plea agreement, Hidlebaugh’s family circumstances, the nature of Hidlebaugh’s offense, and Hidlebaugh’s prior criminal record.

“And so Hidlebaugh’s sentencing was exactly what Bearden calls for,” Justice May wrote. “Hidlebaugh was not imprisoned automatically or ‘solely’ because of any one thing, much less a financial thing. Instead, his sentence was the product of a discretionary choice informed by the court’s consideration of a ‘wide range of factors,’ just as Bearden prescribed.”

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The woman, Alicia Fredericksen, raised three arguments on appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court: Her statements were “hypothetical” or “mere fantasies” and did not cause a “reasonable expectation of fear” required under Section 708A.5; statements she made six days before the scheduled hearing were not “imminent” threats; and her threats did not constitute “terrorism” under Section 708A.1(3).

The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed with all three arguments in a Feb. 27 decision written by Chief Justice Susan Christensen joined by all members of the Court.

Fredericksen made statements to her adult son that she had fantasized about torturing the HHS worker assigned to the case by cutting off the caseworker’s fingers and beating her until she was physically incapacitated. Fredericksen also told her son she was going to shoot and kill the judge assigned to the case and the HHS worker when they were in court.

“This appeal turns on whether such a threat—specific in its targets, explicit in its violence, and tethered to a fixed court date—is ‘imminent’ and constitutes a threat of terrorism under Iowa Code section 708A.5 (2024),” Chief Justice Christensen wrote. “Under these circumstances, yes. It does.”

Chapter 708A, Iowa’s terrorism statute, does not define “threat” or “reasonable expectation or fear,” but the Iowa Supreme Court in previous cases has applied the common meaning of the words to mean they are “a promise or expression of intent to inflict distress, evil, injury, or damage on another” and are “understandable as a threat by a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence.”

In this case, the Court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support Fredericksen’s conviction for making a threat based on explicit statements made to her son—who had knowledge of his mother’s temperament and understood her statements as true threats—about her plans to torture the HHS worker before shooting the caseworker as well as the judge at the court hearing. In addition, two other witnesses understood Fredericksen’s threats as expressions of her intent to harm the professionals involved in her juvenile court case, the Iowa Supreme Court said.

Fredericksen argued there was insufficient evidence to prove she would “imminently” act on her threats because she made them six days before the hearing. The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed.

Chapter 708A does not define “imminent,” so the Court has previously relied on the dictionary definition of the word as “ready to take place,” “near at hand,” “hanging threateningly over one’s head,” and “menacingly near.” While the statute does not require a person to threaten the immediate commission of an act of terrorism, the Court said in a 2006 decision, “it does require a reasonable expectation the act is impending or about to occur.”

Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court said, Fredericksen’s threats created a reasonable expectation or fear that her carrying them out was imminent. “Fredericksen’s threats involved a specific date on which she indicated she would act on them, and that date was the scheduled August 9 hearing when she would be in the same room as the targets of her threats.”

Finally, the Court disagreed with Fredericksen’s argument that her threats did not constitute terrorism under Chapter 708A, which defines terrorism in relevant part as an act “intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or to influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a unit of government, by shooting, throwing, launching, discharging, or otherwise using a dangerous weapon at, into, or in a building, vehicle, airplane, railroad engine, railroad car, or boat, occupied by another person, or within an assembly of people.”

Fredericksen contended her threats did not rise to that level because she made them to her son and had not intended they would be relayed to HHS or to the judge in the juvenile court case to influence their conduct in the case. But the statute does not require an intent on Fredericksen’s part that her threats be communicated to her intended targets, Chief Justice Christensen wrote.

“Because Fredericksen’s threats suggest that the objective of her threatened acts would be to exact vengeance or retaliation on two individuals who could steer the outcome of the upcoming juvenile court hearing,” she wrote, “it was not unreasonable for the district court to conclude Fredericksen threatened to commit an act of terrorism that would ‘affect the conduct of a unit of government,’ i.e., the court proceeding in her juvenile court case.”

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• Betz v. Mathiesen et al., No. 23-1794, concerning when a party is on notice of a potential defamation claim sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations;
• State v. TikTok, Inc. et al., No. 24-1566, concerning whether online video provided TikTok possesses sufficient contacts with Iowa to confer personal jurisdiction in Iowa;
• State Public Defender v. Iowa District Court for Scott County, No. 25-0011, concerning courts’ discretion to refuse to allow public defenders to withdraw from criminal defense representations;

The remaining opinions from January are summarized below.

State of Iowa v. Ronald Richard Pagliai, No. 24–0353
Opinion date: January 9, 2026
On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether a district court may assess costs against a defendant in a criminal case that has been dismissed.

Ronald Pagliai was charged with theft in the third degree in three separate cases and interference with official acts in a fourth case. As part of a plea agreement, Pagliai pleaded guilty in two theft cases, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining two cases with Pagliai paying costs in the dismissed cases. The district court entered dispositional orders assessing costs against Pagliai in the dismissed cases. Pagliai appealed, challenging the district court’s authority to assess those costs.

The Supreme Court conditionally vacated the convictions, sentences, and dispositional orders and remanded the case with instructions, holding that no statute authorizes a district court to assess costs in a dismissed criminal case, and therefore the dispositional orders assessing costs were invalid. The Court reasoned that the legislature possesses the sole power to prescribe punishment for crime, and the district court’s dispositional authority is prescribed by statute. The Court explained that a bargained-for but unauthorized disposition impermissibly shifts lawmaking authority from the legislature to the parties and the courts. The Court distinguished Pagliai’s situation from prior cases allowing parties to bargain for cost apportionment in multicount actions where a conviction was entered, noting those cases involved a judgment of conviction in the case.

The Court’s opinion allowed the prosecutor to elect on remand between vacating only the unauthorized dispositional orders or vacating the entire plea bargain and reinstating charges in all four cases. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Mansfield, Oxley, and May.

Justice McDermott concurred in the judgment, arguing that assessing costs on a dismissed charge violates the constitutional presumption of innocence under the federal and state Due Process Clauses.

Justice Waterman dissented, joined by Chief Justice Christensen, arguing that Pagliai waived any objection to the court’s lack of authority when he entered the plea agreement and that defendants should be able to agree to pay costs on dismissed counts as part of a plea bargain.

Mark Fink and Stacey Fink v. Donald Lawson and Linda Lawson, No. 23–1845
Opinion date: January 9, 2026
On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether a district court has the power to reform a faulty easement deed so that it complies with the express intent of the grantor and the actual agreement of the parties.

This dispute arose over an easement granting river access to Lake Delhi in Delaware County. In 2002, the Lawsons purchased property from the Mary L. Becker Trust, and the trust executed a deed purporting to grant the Lawsons an easement across neighboring lots for access to the Maquoketa River. However, the easement deed contained defects: the grantor trust did not actually own the land over which the easement was granted, and the legal description did not reach the river’s edge. For nearly twenty years, the Lawsons used a well-worn path to access the river without incident. In 2021, after new neighbors, the Finks, purchased the lots, disputes arose, and the Finks sued to quiet title. The district court refused to reform the easement deed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded with instructions to reform the easement deed. It held that the district court erred in concluding it lacked authority to reform the faulty deed.

The Court reasoned that in interpreting a deed, the intent of the grantor is the “polestar.” The deed’s stated purpose—granting river access—was clear, and the Lawsons and Beckers mutually understood the easement’s scope based on their long course of conduct. The Court found that the naming of the wrong trust as grantor was a scrivener’s error because Mary Becker served as co-trustee of both trusts with independent authority to dispose of property. Regarding the faulty legal description, the Court relied on the principle that where both parties were mutually mistaken about the property description, and the grantor’s intent is clearly expressed, a court sitting in equity may reform the deed. The Court noted the Finks were not bona fide purchasers harmed by reformation because they knew of the easement’s existence and its legal infirmities before purchasing. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of the Court, in which all participating justices joined. Justices Mansfield and May took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Sara Montague, individually, as parent and next friend of C.M., and as representative of the Estate of Robert McFarland, deceased v. Beth Skinner et al., No. 24–1745

Opinion date: January 9, 2026
On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County

Issues:

• Whether Iowa workers’ compensation law bars gross negligence claims by a state employee against state co-employees.
• Whether the plaintiff adequately exhausted administrative remedies under the Iowa Tort Claims Act by identifying all culpable state employees in her administrative claims.

On March 23, 2021, two inmates at Anamosa State Penitentiary armed with hammers from the prison machine shop killed corrections officer Robert McFarland and a nurse during an escape attempt. McFarland’s surviving spouse, Sara Montague, filed gross negligence claims against numerous former co-employees, alleging serious security lapses allowed the inmates to enter the infirmary with weapons. The defendant state employees moved to dismiss, arguing that workers’ compensation law barred such claims by public employees and that Montague had failed to comply with the administrative claims process of the Iowa Tort Claims Act. The district court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed.

The Supreme Court treated the defendants’ appeal as an application for interlocutory review, and affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s ruling. The Court held that workers’ compensation law does not bar gross negligence claims by state employees against co-employees. The Court reasoned that Iowa Code section 85.2, which makes workers’ compensation “exclusive, compulsory, and obligatory” for state and local governments, means the chapter as a whole applies, including section 85.20(2)’s express carveout permitting co-employee gross negligence claims. The Court noted that section 85.2 dates back to 1913 and merely indicated that public employers could not opt out of the workers’ compensation system, unlike private employers who originally had that choice.

However, the Court held that Montague could only proceed against those state employees she had identified by name during the ITCA administrative claims process, requiring dismissal of the claims against those defendants. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Jacob M. Rose and Jeremy P. Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Management, LLC, d/b/a Oakland Manor, No. 23–1788
Opinion date: January 23, 2026
On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of reckless or willful misconduct to overcome statutory immunity under Iowa’s COVID-19 Response and Back-to-Business Limited Liability Act.

Jacob (Jack) Rose was a resident of Oakland Manor, a skilled nursing facility, when he tested positive for COVID-19 and subsequently died in August 2020. A Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) report identified deficiencies in Oakland Manor’s infection-control practices, including improper sanitization, incomplete hand hygiene, inconsistent personal protective equipment use, and failure to completely seal an isolation area. Jack’s sons brought wrongful death and other claims against the facility. Oakland Manor moved for summary judgment based on statutory immunity under Iowa Code chapter 686D, which shields health care providers from COVID-19-related liability absent reckless or willful misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment, and a divided Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court affirmed the district court judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact on whether Oakland Manor acted recklessly.

Under Iowa law, recklessness requires more than the unreasonable risk of harm present in ordinary negligence. To establish recklessness, a plaintiff must prove the actor intentionally performed an unreasonable act, in disregard of a known or obvious risk, making it highly probable that harm would follow. The deficiencies identified in the CMS Report—inconsistent sanitization, incomplete PPE use, an incompletely sealed isolation area—reflected lapses in execution rather than intentional acts done with conscious disregard of risk. The Court noted these are “the very type of shortcomings for which the legislature eliminated civil liability as a matter of public policy.” The Court also found the plaintiffs’ expert opinion insufficient because it was conclusory, lacking factual detail or analysis supporting an inference of intentional conduct rather than mere negligence. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Victoria Abrahamson et al. v. Benjamin Scheevel et al., No. 24–1133
Opinion date: January 30, 2026
On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the two-year statute of limitations under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act applies to claims for improper access to and dissemination of confidential criminal history and intelligence data.
• When the plaintiffs bringing claims for improper access to and dissemination of confidential criminal history and intelligence data suffered their injury for purposes of calculating the applicability of the statute of limitations.

Ten plaintiffs sued a former Estherville police officer, the police chief, and the City of Estherville, alleging that the officer improperly accessed and disseminated confidential criminal history and intelligence data for personal purposes, including stalking and harassing some of the plaintiffs and aiding a private vehicle repossession company. The plaintiffs alleged the misconduct ended by the time the officer resigned on May 3, 2019, but the plaintiffs did not file suit until July 2023. Several plaintiffs claimed they did not learn of the misconduct until 2021 or 2022. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded for dismissal of the action, holding that the claims were time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations in the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act. The Court held that language in Iowa Code section 692.6, which states that a person or governmental body proven to have violated chapter 692 shall be liable for damages, costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney fees “notwithstanding any provisions of chapter 6[6]9 [or] 670 to the contrary,” did not override the statute of limitations contained within section 670.5 The Court held that section 692.6 merely authorizes a plaintiff to sue for damages, as governed by the statute of limitations and other procedural rules.

The Supreme Court also held that the plaintiffs possessed a cause of action at the moment their confidential data were accessed and disseminated. The Court concluded that each plaintiff suffered a legally compensable injury no later than May 2019, when the wrongful acts occurred, making the July 2023 lawsuit untimely. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

State of Iowa v. Malorie Lynn Hallock, No. 24–1166
Opinion date: January 30, 2026
On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether a defendant must object at sentencing to an oral victim-impact statement to preserve error for appeal.

Malorie Hallock pleaded guilty to first-degree theft after embezzling approximately $120,000 from her employer over nine months. Both parties recommended a deferred judgment. At sentencing, the business owner delivered an oral victim-impact statement describing the financial and emotional effects of the embezzlement. The district court rejected the parties’ joint recommendation and sentenced Hallock to the maximum penalty of imprisonment for an indefinite term not to exceed ten years. On appeal, Hallock argued the district court improperly considered unproven allegations contained in the victim-impact statement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Hallock failed to preserve error by not objecting to the statement at sentencing.

The law states that a person or governmental body proven to have violated chapter 692 shall be liable for damages, costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney fees “notwithstanding any provisions of chapter 6[6]9 [or] 670 to the contrary.”

Court vacated the court of appeals decision but affirmed the district court judgment.  It held that a defendant need not object to an oral victim-impact statement presented for the first time at sentencing to preserve error, but concluded the district court did not rely on improper sentencing factors and did not abuse its discretion.

The Court reasoned that procedural errors at sentencing are generally excepted from normal error preservation requirements and may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Court distinguished the presentence investigation report, where error preservation is required because defense counsel receives it in advance and has an opportunity to object. For an oral victim-impact statement delivered for the first time at sentencing, requiring the defendant to object contemporaneously would be “exceedingly unfair” because the defendant and counsel have had no preview or opportunity to consult. The Court also noted that requiring objections during victim statements is unfair to victims and largely unnecessary because courts are presumed to “filter out” improper material absent clear evidence to the contrary.

On the merits, the Court found the victim-impact statement was “overwhelmingly appropriate” and there was no indication the district court relied on any improper material. The Court also found no abuse of discretion, noting Hallock’s age, prior theft conviction, the large amount stolen, and the prolonged nature of the offense. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

State of Iowa v. Douglas Neal Warburton, No. 24–1143
Opinion date: January 30, 2026
On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the defendant’s notice of appeal of a final judgment was sufficient to bring the district court’s denial of a motion for resentencing within the scope of appellate review.
• Whether the defendant was entitled to resentencing to allow a victim-impact statement to be presented.

Douglas Warburton pleaded guilty to lascivious acts with a child and was sentenced to incarceration for up to ten years plus lifetime supervision. At sentencing, the prosecutor noted that no victim-impact statement had been received. The day after sentencing, Warburton moved for resentencing, claiming the victim had provided a written statement after the hearing advocating for Warburton not to be sentenced to prison. The prosecutor’s resistance stated the written statement appeared to have been created after sentencing. The district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction to address the denial of the motion for resentencing because it was not specifically identified in the notice of appeal from the district court’s judgment.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals opinion decision in part and vacated it in part, and affirmed the district court judgment. The Court held that the notice of appeal was sufficient to bring the denial of the motion for resentencing within the scope of review, but the district court did not err in denying the motion.

The Court held that once an appellate court has jurisdiction over a case, it has jurisdiction over all issues presented, and notices of appeal are liberally construed. Because Warburton’s notice stated it was an appeal from the final judgment and “all adverse rulings therein,” and because the motion for resentencing directly challenged the validity of the sentencing proceeding, the denial was within the scope of review.

On the merits of Warburton’s motion, the Supreme Court found no error because a defendant generally has no entitlement to a second sentencing, and the circumstances indicated the victim-impact statement was likely generated after sentencing. The Court also emphasized that the victim’s statutory right to make a statement is an entitlement for the victim, not the defendant, and a defendant cannot compel a victim to provide a statement. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

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