On the Assembly of Things

Outlaw Biology

ckelty — Tue, 19 Jan 2010 04:05:04 +0000

I’ve posted an essay I wrote for the Symposium on Outlaw Biology at UCLA (Jan 29-30). Any thoughts, suggestions, withering critiques are welcome.

Essay is located here.

Collaboration

rabinow — Sat, 02 Jan 2010 14:47:31 +0000

Friends,

I am beginning to put together a piece on collaboration; especially with reference to the labinar and ARC. If you have thoughts, notes you would like to contribute I would appreciate it.

At this stage I think the piece will be mostly about how we imagined the projects with then a section on evaluation and lessons learned.

looking forward to your collaboration,

Paul

anthrax and drumming

rabinow — Wed, 30 Dec 2009 20:31:09 +0000

While everyone is talking about “systemtic failure”– did he say vital systems? there is the case of a drumming group in New Hampshire who were so ardent that they released anthrax from the hides of the drums they were beating.

One woman is critically ill. Might be a genetic component. Hard to argue with.

all my best,

Paul

Synthetic Biology in Nature Biotech.

rabinow — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 18:42:12 +0000

This months issue of Nature Biotechnology is a special issue on synthetic biology. The issue includes an article by the Berkeley Human Practices Lab on security and preparedness: http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v27/n12/full/nbt1209-1109.html.

Human Practices in Le Monde

rabinow — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 18:39:11 +0000

Dear Friends,

Please see news of our work in human practices as reported recently in Le Monde Un gene ethique qui vaut de l’or. Comments welcome.

Reawaken

rabinow — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 00:22:09 +0000

Friends,

ARC has been in slumber land. It would be heartening if we could summon some energy now that various semesters are winding down to each contribute a bit of energy, thought and concern.

I have asked Lyle to post something on the H1N1 epidemic and its discontents. Perhaps Carlo will contribute as well.

Other thoughts as to how we can reawaken this venue, my friends, would be most welcome.

Paul

…The Clock is Ticking

mstalcup — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 20:49:48 +0000

The US Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism has released The Clock is Ticking, a progress report on what has happened with the recommendations made in the 2008 World at Risk publication. If you don’t remember their argument from last year, the doom portended in both titles serves as a reminder of the Commission’s conviction that “Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.” Or, you might not remember the argument because the Commission didn’t make one. That is not to say that they are wrong (and the way they phrase it, they almost have to be correct), but they didn’t provide much explanation of why, beyond the contemporaneous existence of terrorists and weapons. The second point they emphasized was “Terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon.” Here are actually two claims, causally linked – because terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain or make weaponized biological organisms than controlled nuclear materials, that is what they will probably try to do. Implicitly, they assume that terrorists will share their logic, and that obtaining biological weapons must be a major terrorist goal. The Commission’s focus in this status update is, therefore, that we should focus our efforts of biological threats. Because we are not, “the clock continues ticking and we are now closer to a possible attack.”

The report centers around biological weapons, discusses secondarily nuclear nonproliferation activities, and ignores chemical. While they don’t give evidence to support their causal logic, as a representation of US government thought about biological weapons, The Clock is Ticking shows evolving sophistication. Everyone agrees that nuclear weapons pose great risks, but there are multiple, ongoing efforts aimed at them. The problem, the Commission explains, is that the US is failing to address the “interrelated security, intelligence, and health policy issues” of biothreats in a similar fashion, and yet it is most amenable to intervention: the difference between an attack with explosives and a biological organism is that early recognition, diagnosis and treatment of a disease could nullify the “mass destruction” label. So, says the report, “A major part of the U.S. long-term biodefense strategy should be based on reaching a level of preparedness that will prevent mass casualties, and in turn, effectively remove bioweapons from the category of WMD.”

As far as the Assembly of Things or anthropology of the contemporary, at least, paying attention to these reports is a way of taking the pulse of government efforts as they relate to science, and especially biology. The report is peppered with reminders that we don’t want to limit scientific advances; we need scientific advances in order to conquer the threat those same advances present. The way that the threat is conceptualized and the results of that conceptualization seem like they deserve further analysis, from a position of adjacency. The report presents a WMD threat, and divides it into four areas (1) Biological Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism; (2) Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism; (3) Government Organization and Culture; and (4) The Role of the Citizen. There are things to say about each of these, but I am going to stop here for now, except to say that there may be a lot of reasons why the Commission thinks that a biological attack is going to occur, but the only one they offer is “because it can.” The sun may also stop shining tomorrow but that is unlikely to convince the citizens whom they describe as essential to preparedness to join the effort.

Any thoughts on this report, or related matters?

Finally, a project worth funding…

ckelty — Sat, 03 Oct 2009 15:38:29 +0000

Princeton professors respond to a call for defense funding by proposing to weaponize irony

Foucault lectures

rabinow — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 14:52:18 +0000

http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/foucault/mfaa.html

Friends,

Four of the year long lectures of Foucault are now up on the Berkeley library site (in French).

There are several English language lectures as well.

what are the veridictional modes of advertising?

stavrianakis — Wed, 22 Jul 2009 13:37:20 +0000

A recurring theme when speaking with engineers , biochemists, cell biologists and others, informally or interviewing more formally, is the disjuncture between the ‘real’ answer (their term) and the public relations or grant application answer. No big surprise and of course the securing of funds is the right answer and in that sense could be seen as ‘any’ form of advertising. But what is the veridictional mode of this self and science promoting discourse? Unlike most advertising, the truth claims are made to a target audience which is made up of a current user base. It is not attempting to expand user base by highlighting the benefits of a seven blade razor over a six blade device. If one looks around the Berkeley campus one can see an example of this “auto-advertising” and it struck me that the question is the same, how are claims being made in this game? with what effect on conduct or practice? Any suggested readings on advertising and truth claims?