OPEN TARGET

Two impossible things before breakfast

2007-11-15T15:38:00.000-05:00

Yesterday was a surreal experience. I testified before the House Homeland Security Committee with Kip Hawley, the TSA Administrator, about the recently surfaced April 2006 TSA management email that clearly by its terms was intended to alert screeners to covert testing being conducted at the time by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. In "Alice in Wonderland " fashion, Hawley claimed that the words didn't mean what they said. Without any evidence to substantiate it, he claimed that the sender thought the covert teams might not be legitimate government testers but Al Qaeda operatives probing the system for weaknesses. There was no mention of Al Qaeda or terrorists in the email. The testers were described as being from DOT or the FAA, and it's true that neither agency is now authorized to test aviation security. But, reading the message in full, it's clear on its face that the sender meant to give screener's the heads up so as to improve their performance on a legitimate government security test. Contradicting himself, Hawley continued to call the sending of the message a "mistake," and to applaud the swift recall of the message. If the email was meant not as a tip off to compromise a legitimate test but to alert screeners to a terrorist probe, what was the mistake in sending it, and why was it recalled? And, why, by the way, has TSA not released the recall message? Clearly, the message was recalled because somebody figured out that tipping off the screeners to a legitimate test, once it inevitably leaked out, would be hugely embarrassing to TSA.

The second impossible thing Hawley insisted upon was the consistently poor performance of screeners in spotting concealed weapons (even, by the way, according to insiders, when screeners are tipped off) was more of a good thing than a bad thing. Screeners are missing things because they're constantly tested, and the tests are intentionally being made harder and harder. Indeed so, and that's as it should be. Terrorists (or, at least, the ones we need most to worry about) will be wily about concealing weapons, not amateurish, so we want the tests to be as "real world" as possible. But, it can't be a good thing that screeners keep missing concealed weapons year after year, time after time, investigation after investigation. Just today, TSA's before another House committee defending itself against the latest GAO report indicating a failure to spot concealed bombs (consistently, at 19 airports around the country, this time).

I'm reminded of the Alice in Wonderland quote about being asked to believe six impossible things before breakfast. At least TSA's asking us to believe only two impossible things!

FBI issues holiday season warning to LA and Chicago shopping malls

2007-11-09T14:52:00.001-05:00

Though "raw" intelligence, the FBI was right to pass on to LA and Chicago shopping malls a purported warning of an Al Qaeda attack during the upcoming holidays. One of the lessons of 9/11 for government is it is better to pass on warnings, however imprecise and indeterminate, than to sit on them until disaster strikes.

It would be prudent for the owners/operators of at least the largest and/or most popular shopping malls in these two cities to start deploying (or, as the case may be, intensify) armed police patrols; bomb detection and chemical sensors; and survelliance cameras. Such measures might well deter would be terrorists, and they would certainly reassure shoppers that the powers that be are vigilant and on the proverbial case.

We can never make ourselves invulnerable to terrorism. But, we can and should take commonsense steps like these to decrease the chances of a terror attack, and to minimize the consequences of attacks not prevented.

TSA compromises undercover tests

2007-11-08T12:37:00.000-05:00

This coming Tuesday I'm to testify at a House Homeland Security Committee hearing on the revelation that, in at least one instance, TSA intentionally compromised undercover tests of screeners' ability to spot concealed guns, knives, and bombs. (The tests in question were, apparently, those of the Inspector General). It's criminal that TSA apparently cares more about its reputation than the security of the nation. Pretending that screeners are better than they are at spotting deadly weapons won't fool terrorists; it only fools ourselves.

GAO report on border inspectors' laxity

2007-11-07T16:22:00.000-05:00

It is shocking that, according to GAO, Customs and Border Protection inspectors allowed at least 21,000 into the country last year who oughtn't to have been admitted because of immigration law violations or criminality. The concern, of course, is that if these miscreants can scam the system, so can terrorists, especially terrorists as wily as Al Qaeda.

This gaping hole in our nation's security is easy to explain. There are too few inspectors. The relative few we have aren't adequately trained. (And, needless to say, these two problems are related. If you have too few inspectors to begin with, you can't spare any of the few you have for training.) Supervisors don't hold inspectors to account, and supervisors aren't held to account for not holding inspectors to account. Morale is low throughout the Department of Homeland Security, and CBP is no exception. Then, there's the creeping complacency that comes from the absence of follow-on attacks since 9/11. And, to be fair to the inspectors, part of the problem is the huge number (about 8,000) of forms of identification that those who try to cross the border through legal points of entry can present. This is why Secretary Chertoff is right to push back hard against those in Congress - Republicans and Democrats alike - who balk at the planned implementation this coming January of the requirement for land border crossers (including Americans) to present passports. Finally, paradoxically, the consequence of the Administration's commendable doubling of Border Patrol agents and additional efforts to stem the flow of illegal immigration is encouraging people to try to sneak in through legal ports of entry.

Perhaps the most shocking thing is DHS' defense of itself. The New York Times account had DHS pointing out that its current regulations allow inspectors to waive people into the country without looking at any documents at all if the travelers can somehow otherwise convince the inspector that they are Americans. DHS should be ashamed of such a regulation, and it should get rid of it post-haste, rather than using it as a justification for behavior that threatens the nation's security. Heaven help us.

The Law is what we say it is

2007-09-06T15:06:00.001-04:00

Thank goodness for congressional hearings. They're often the only way to get a straight answer out of government officials.

For some time, I and other security experts have been calling for 100% screening of air cargo in the hold of passenger planes. About a fifth of the cargo transported by air is transported on passenger planes. Unlike luggage, virtually no cargo is screened before being loaded onto planes. As a result, of course, a terrorist could easily plant a bomb that could blow a plane right out of the sky.

The good news, or at least so we thought, was that the bill recently signed by the President to implement the remaining 9/11 Commission recommendations, among other things, mandated 100% screening. It didn't do so fast enough for my taste; the deadline was within three years, though Britain, Israel, and the Netherlands all screen 100 % of air cargo for explosives right now, suggesting that it's technologically and economically feasible at the present time.

But, we learned from Secretary Chertoff's testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee yesterday that the Administration deems there to be even more wiggle room in the law than there actually is. Under intensive questioning from Congressman Ed Markey (D. Mass), a longtime proponent of 100% air cargo screening, Chertoff conceded his intention to permit, at least to some degree, shipping companies to continue to do their own screening. When asked by Markey whether DHS intended to comply with the law by having the government take over the screening function, Chertoff's reply was, " If there is a philosophical issue that you can't trust private industry to do anything, then I have to say, you've got no business getting on an airplane."

Excuse me? Mr. Secretary, the whole point of creating TSA after 9/11 and federalizing the airport screening function as to passengers and luggage was the bipartisan recognition that, left to their own devices, airlines will put profit before security.

Much has been written about the President's use of "signing statements" to indicate which provisions of new laws he intends to ignore. Without so much as a signing statement this time, the Administration will apparently ignore a key post 9/11 recommendation that this new law was intended to implement. As a consequence, chalk up another victory for industry, and, terrorists.

Read it Twice, and still can't believe it

2007-07-10T17:04:00.001-04:00

Today's Congressional Quarterly Homeland Security newsletter story that DHS is now letting private companies evaluate whether other private companies have strict enough security programs in place with regard to maritime commerce would be funny if it were a joke. But, it isn't a joke.

The "C-TPAT" or "Customs Trade Partnership" Against Terrorism program was already laughable. In exchange for filing paperwork with DHS claiming to have a rigorous security regime in place, shipping companies can reduce dramatically (by some accounts, to zero) their chances of having their cargoes inspected, thereby speeding their flow through the supply chain. Any audits to confirm that firms' security representations are, in fact, true, were done only after the fact, turning Ronald Reagan's sensible "trust, but verify" dictum on its head. The last time I checked, a couple of years ago, only 11% of the companies in the program had been subjected to audits to confirm their representations. And, also by the way, any verification that was done by DHS was not only after the fact, but also limited to whatever features of the program shippers deigned to allow DHS to scrutinize. Loopholes big enough for the Titanic to slip through, you might say.

But, at least, until now, it was DHS that was doing the validation. The notion that, going forward, private companies will be doing the asssements of other private companies, for a fee, is beyond belief. What incentive do private companies have to examine other companies vigorously? Haven't we seen this movie before? Private companies ran airport security before 9/11. The whole point of creating TSA and federalizing screeners was the belated recognition that, left to their own devices, private industry will put profit ahead of security every time.

Will we ever learn?

Profile in Courage

2007-02-23T16:30:00.000-05:00

Profiles in Courage is, of course, the title of the book that 1960 presidential candidate John F. Kennedy authored (or, at least, is said to have authored), helping to launch him into the White House. This campaign season's most plausible aspirant for the the JFK mantle of youth, vigor, and optimism is Barack Obama, Democrats and Republicans alike can agree. He himself is no slouch in the book department. While his have won no Pultizer Prizes (as Kennedy's did), they have both become runaway bestsellers.

But, this post isn't about the Senator's books, nor is really about his campaign, even. I'm still a Republican, and this isn't meant to be a political endorsement of any candidate. But, precisely because I believe so strongly that the issue of homeland security should be treated in a nonpartisan manner, I feel compelled to salute the "gentleman from Illinois" for being a "profile in courage" on this issue.

Contrary to time (dis)honored tradition, the Senator, a member of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, introduced an amendment that would have the effect of cutting the share of scarce homeland security dollars directed to the key early primary states of Iowa, New Hampshire, and Nevada. The 9/11 Commission and most, if not all, security experts (I, of course, among them) have been arguing for 100% allocation of these funds on the basis of risk. It is an inarguable fact that New York, Washington, DC, and other large cities are far more likely to be the targets of a terror attack than Ames, Iowa, or Keene, New Hampshire. (Okay, we can argue about Las Vegas.) Congress being Congress, it's next to impossible to get to 100%, risk-based funding, but the best you can do is to reduce the minimum allocated to small states. That's exactly what Sen. Obama has proposed.

Putting principle over politics is exactly what presidents should do, especially when, as here, the security of the nation is at stake. So, Senator, kudos, and may your example be followed by your rivals and, ultimately, whichever one of you winds up at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue a little less than 2 years from now.

Right On, Mr. Secretary

2007-02-13T16:33:00.000-05:00

I am not known for agreeing with the leaders of the Department of Homeland Security. Regrettably, the facts have led me to be, more often than not, among their harsher critics. So, it is especially pleasing to me to be in a position to give the Secretary kudos for a change.

He today argued against extending the deadline, as former Senate Governmental Affairs and Homeland Security Committee Chair Susan Collins has proposed, for implementing the Real ID Act. That law would mandate a degree of uniformity in state-issue drivers licenses to make them harder to counterfeit. The more secure these essential pieces of identification are, the harder it will be for terrorists to exploit vulnerabilities that can make them harder to catch. Sen. Collins apparently got an earful from her Maine constituents for her initial support for this bill. State leaders there are concerned about the potential costs of such a measure. But, shouldn't security come first? Shouldn't a key Senate leader on homeland security issues put security issues first? You're right on this one, Mr. Secretary. For the country's sake, may your view prevail.

Declare Victory and Go Home

2007-02-13T15:19:00.001-05:00

The ghost of George Aiken is stirring about. Aiken, of course, is the Vietnam-era Senator from Vermont who famously urged the tormented LBJ to "declare victory and go home." Had he done so in the early 60s when the Senator proferred this advice, tens of thousands of American (to say nothing of even more Vietnamese) lives and limbs would not have been lost, and our international prestige would not have suffered a hit from which we have yet to fully recover.

I heard something arresting yesterday that brought all of this to mind. Our recently (and involuntarily) retired Ambassador to the United Nations, arch-conservative John Bolton appeared on CNN to denounce the then rumored deal with North Korea to halt its nuclear program. What caught my ear was not Bolton's predictable denunciation of that deal. Instead, it was his entirely unpredictable and utterly sensible declaration that we've done all we can reasonably have been expected to do in Iraq. It is, therefore, in his view (and mine) time to leave. The principal lesson from Vietnam should have been that we cannot want a nascent democracy to succeed more than the people in that country do. Likewise, we cannot be more committed to the survival of Iraq than the Iraqis are. It seems increasingly clear that there really isn't an Iraq. It appears as though, all along, it was simply a naturally loose confederation of sectarian/ethnic enclaves unnaturally held together by the tight grip of a ruthless dictator.

As Bolton said yesterday, what matters most to us should be our own national interest. At this point, having done what we could do to give the Iraqis qua Iraqis a chance to succeed, our interest now is in preventing that place from becoming a terrorist training ground and staging point a la pre-911 Afghanistan. One can argue that Iraq is already such a training ground and staging point. Alternatively, if one isn't willing to go that far yet, many believe that the chances of Iraq's becoming a training ground and staging point are actually greater if we stay because of the rabid hatred that our continued presence creates and stokes in the Arab-Muslim world.

In any event, there is no question that the blood, treasure, and attention we are spending on Iraq is diverting us from what I believe to be our greatest vulnerability - our insecurity right here at home. Think of how much safer our airports, seaports, and land borders against terrorist attack would be if we had invested those hundreds of billions into homeland security. The full extent of our Iraq misadventure may only be known one day when an attack at home that might otherwise have been prevented is not.

Declare Victory and Go Home

2007-02-13T15:19:00.000-05:00

Step in the wrong direction

2006-11-29T17:16:00.000-05:00

The President's announcement yesterday in the Baltics of his intent to expand the number of countries whose citizens do not need visas to visit the United States is a step in the wrong direction. It is not for nothing that terrorists like shoebomber Richard Reid and would-be 9/11 hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui were carrying passports from visa waiver countries like Britain and France. Terrorists have been known to steal passports from visa waiver countries and/or to buy or produce fake ones. Why?

Visa waiver travelers are not subjected to the scrutiny of the post-9/11 visa issuance process. Nowadays, most applicants are interviewed at our embassies and consulates abroad, and interviewers tend to be conversant in the local language and customs and many are trained to detect fraud. As a consequence, the chances are greater that a potential terrorist can be caught and prevented from even arriving at a port of entry. At ports of entry, inspectors
are usually not trained to speak other languages (Spanish being the occasional exception, needless to say); they are generally unfamiliar with other cultures; and, they tend not to be fraud detection experts. And, in any event, they are under pressure to clear throngs of international visitors into the country as quickly as possible so as not to bog down travel.

We should be ending the visa waiver program, not expanding it. Sure, we would lose our reciprocal freedom to travel without visas, and it would cost a fortune to staff up adequately at our visa issuing posts overseas so as not to unduly slow down travel to the United States. But, this would be a small price to pay to increase our chances of spotting the next Reid or Moussaoui before it's too late.

What should "credible" mean? Why words matter, when it comes to homeland security

2006-11-28T16:33:00.000-05:00

Out of an abudance of caution a little more than a month ago, the Department of Homeland Security alerted seven NFL stadiums and the relevant state and local governments to a threat posted on a website to detonate dirty bombs during various football games around the country. DHS deemed the threat "not credible." Still, the department said that it was advising the appropriate parties of the threat to enable them to take whatever action, if any, they deemed necessary. Fortunately, it all turned out to be a hoax, and gridiron fans were able to enjoy their games in peace.

But, it would be a mistake to leave it at that. We can learn something from how the government handled this threat, in case the next threat (and there definitely will be one) turns out to be "credible." The question we should ponder from this incident is what should credible mean?

Given how this event was handled, a "credible" terrorist threat apparently does now means one that is: (1) corroborated by other intelligence; and (2) communicated by or through a source deemed to be reliable as regards information related to terrorism. In this instance, there was no other intelligence confirming the threat, and the applicable website was not known to be a terrorist mouthpiece.

Certainly, whether there is corroboration for a threat, and whether the source of it is known to be reliable, are critical factors that should be considered by the government in determining whether to pass on threats and to act on them. There have to be some criteria, after all. There are numerous threats each day, and there has to be some rational way to separate the proverbial wheat from the chaff. Otherwise, the government will be paralyzed and the American people will constantly be terrorized, which, of course, is the very goal of terrorism.

But, what if terrorists really did intend to attack us and there was only one warning, posted on some obscure website? Is there some terrorist rulebook somewhere that forbids them from attacking us unless we're warned beforehand, multiple times, by sources known to be privy to terorrists' plots and plans? I don't think so.

In this instance, there was more than sufficient reason, in my judgment, for the government to have passed this information along. It was unusually specific as to target (football stadiums in New York, Atlanta, Miami, Houston, Seattle, Cleveland, and Oakland), date (October 22), and method (dirty bomb). There was some political significance to the date (the end of Ramadan). Al Qaeda is known to favor iconic targets that are symbolic of America (what's more American than football?). Al Qaeda is known to be interested in carrying out dirty bomb attacks (convicted terrorist Jose Padilla, for example, was initially charged with intent to carry out a dirty bomb attack in Chicago some years ago). It's fairly easy to make dirty bombs and to sneak them into the country (undercover congressional investigators have used fake credentials to trick border inspectors into letting them bring enough radioactive material over the Mexican and Canadian borders to make two dirty bombs.). The fifth anniversary of 9/11 was a little over a month before this incident. There has been a steady stream of audiotapes and videotapes this year from bin Laden and his top deputy threatening more attacks on America. And, our prosecution of the war in Iraq, and our support for Israel's prosecution of its war against Hezbollah in Lebanon last summer, has only intensified terrorists' hatred of America and their determination to strike us again. Finally, while it is a good thing that already "hard" targets like airports, seaports, nuclear power plants, and politically symbolic buildings have been hardened since 9/11 to make them harder still to attack, the upshot is that "soft" targets like sports stadiums have, as a consequence, only become more attractive to terrorists.

For all these reaosns, it seems to me that it was right for DHS to pass on the threat to responsible officials. But, for all these reasons, the threat should have been deemed "credible." "Credible" shouldn't be made synonymous with "confirmed from multiple reliable sources." Otherwise, we're setting the bar too high. In future instances, when the threat is real, the government might fail even to pass on information that doesn't meet these tests, or, the recipients of the information might not act on it. As a result, attacks that could be prevented won't be.

Right now, we're only confusing people. It is, indeed, legitimate to ask why information is being passed on at all if it's not credible. The cynical might even say that it's being done to try to influence the political calendar or to protect bureaucrats from retribution if their judgment turns out to be erroneous. We can do away with confusion and cynicism, and, more important, save lives, by deeming "credible" any threat information that is specific, plausible, and consistent with what we know about terrorists' intentions, methods, and capabilities.

0 to 60 in a flash?

2006-09-19T19:37:00.000-04:00

I'm confused, not generally (as my critics will doubtless claim), but, specifically, by something DHS is claiming now. Appropriately, there's been a lot of pressure (some of it from lowly me) on the department to move toward 100% inspection for radiation of cargo containers destined for U.S. seaports. At present, DHS acknowledges that only about 5-6% of containers are "inspected," meaning, run through an x-ray like "VACIS" machine to spot anomalies that merit a closer look and, in fewer instances, physically opened and searched (for, among other things, radioactive material). Even less than 5-6% of containers are, then, scanned for radiation as a practical matter.

Yet, Secretary Chertoff and his aides have taken lately to claiming that, by the end of the year, 80% of containers will be scanned for radiation, and by the end of next year, about 98%. (See Chertoff's testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on September 12.)

First of it, it wasn't so long ago (see, for example, Deputy Secretary Jackson's testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee last spring) that DHS was supportive only of the goal of inspecting 100% of containers for radiation after they arrived at our ports, but before they left those ports for parts inland. Oregon Democratic Congressman Defazio raised the commonsensical question as to why, if 100% radiation scanning is desirable and doable, DHS wouldn't want to do the scan as soon as possible.

Second, while I'm delighted by DHS' volte face embrace of the notion of 100% radiation scanning as soon as possible, how is it feasible to go from virtually no such scanning today to 80% scanning "by the end of the year." I'm bad at math, but, I think I'm right in figuring that the end of the year is only a little more than three months away. Given DHS' track record, I find it hard to believe that it will make this deadline. And, even if it does make the deadline, I wonder whether the scanning will be as effective as claimed. After all, Chertoff cited the deployment of thousands of personal radiation detectors and radiation portal monitors as the backbone of the scanning effort, and as I pointed out in my book, Open Target, neither of those devices can distinguish between deadly radiation and harmless radiation. Only radiation isotope identifier devices can do that, and Chertoff didn't mention anything about deploying more of them.

Finally, we're going to go, it is claimed, from nothing to 80% in three months, but we'll increase scanning by 18% in a little more than a year. Again, even the math-challenged can see that it doesn't quite add up.

In short, color me "skeptical."

Leaving bad enough alone

2006-09-14T16:24:00.000-04:00

A number of security "experts" have argued recently that airport screeners' focus on finding weapons is misplaced. Finding guns, knives, bombs, and bomb parts hidden on passengers' bodies or in their carry-on luggage is like finding a needle in a haystack - in a word, "hard." It would be much easier, and, they argue, much more effective, to focus on finding terrorists. After all, weapons don't carry out terrorist attacks, terrorists do. So, these experts would train screeners to read traveler's faces and body language for signs of the kind of anger, stress, and determination that are characteristic of terrorists.

My question is this - why would any reasonable person think that screeners would be better at spotting terrorists than at spotting weapons? Investigation after investigation has shown that screeners are, to use a term of art, "really bad" at finding even inartfully concealed weapons, not to mention artfully concealed ones. If screeners can't find guns, knives, and bomb parts right in front of their faces, what makes anyone think that they can distinguish between: the guy who's angry because he slammed the taxi door on his finger when he was dropped off at the airport, and the guy who's angry because we have troops in the Middle East; the guy who's sweating because he had to run through three football field-size terminals to get to the departure gate, and the guy who's sweating because he's trying to sneak a bomb onto the plane and is afraid of getting caught; and the guy who looks "determined" (whatever that means) because he's afraid of flying and is steeling himself to board the plane, and the guy who looks "determined" because he's hellbent on killing as many airline passengers as possible?

This is, of course, not to mention the separate issue of ethnic, racial, and/or religious profiling. Would it surprise anyone if, more often than not, those deemed to look angry or stressed or determined were Arabs or Muslim?

Sure, the Israelis do this, and it seems to work. But, no reasonable person would compare the capabilities of Israeli counterterrorist officials with those of American airport screeners. And, besides, for better or worse (I say, worse), Israel doesn't place the premium on civil rights and civil liberties that we do. (Perhaps if terrorism were to become a daily preoccupation for every American the way it is for every Israeli, we'd drawn the line between security and liberty differently. But, that's a different subject.)

If we can't make bad things (screeners' inability to spot weapons) better, it is better to leave it at that and not to make bad things even worse.

Here we go again

2006-08-04T11:37:00.000-04:00

The recently released Heritage Foundation report suggesting that TSA get out of the business of trying to secure airports itself and instead simply set policy for the private sector to follow, conduct periodic tests to evaluate compliance with such policies, and provide money to fund airports' security programs should be filed under "BeenThere/Done That." Security was left up to airports and airlines before 9/11, of course, and we got underpaid, undertrained, unmotivated sceeners as a result.

The authors are right to say that, since creating TSA and federalizing airport security, we've spent oodles of money with relatively little to show for it in terms of increased security. Investigation after investigation continues to show that screeners are not better at spotting concealed deadly weapons today than they were five years ago. But, the remedy is not going back to a privatized airport security regime.

The answer is forcing TSA to get serious about rigorously training screeners and holding them and their supervisors accountable when performance consistently fails to measure up. And, technologies like backscatter machines that can invariably spot weapons hidden under clothing and "puffer" machines that can detect trace explosives on passengers should move beyond the pilot stage and be deployed at every checkpoint and every airport in the nation.

Einstein was right when he famously said that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. Going back to a privatized airport security regime would, indeed, be insane.

Open Invitation to Terror

2006-08-02T16:01:00.000-04:00

The GAO testified today before the Senate Finance Committee about its latest attempt to use fraudulent documents to gain enty into the United States. Eighteen times, at nine border crossings, undercover investigators managed to enter the United States from Mexico or Canada with fake driver's licenses and birth certificates without challenge. A couple of times the border inspectors didn't even bother to ask for i.d. Believe it or not, inspectors aren't required to demand proof from those who claim U.S. citizenship; an oral statement to this effect is sufficient. And, when inspectors do ask for i.d., there's no assurance that fake documents will be spotted. For one thing, some 8,000 different forms of i.d. are permitted to be used to establish U.S. citizenship. Needless to say, most inspectors aren't familiar with more than a handful of such documents. Until all those attempting to enter the United States (including those who claim to be Americans returning home) from anywhere in the world (including places elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere) are required to present one standardized, tamper-proof, biometrics-based form of i.d. (a passport), our country will be easier for terrorists to penetrate than it should be. Such a requirement has been legislated, but it is not slated to go into effect until 2008. Will terrorists wait until then to strke again?

Get your story straight

2006-07-21T12:28:00.000-04:00

It's hard to decide which is more egregious and inexcusable - the fact that, three years after the creation of a Department of Homeland Security and nearly five years after 9/11, we still don't have a credible prioritized list of the nation's most critical sectors and sites, or the fact that the department speaks out of both sides of its mouth as to whether the latest version of the list is, in fact, used to make decisions about how to allocate scarce homeland security resources. DHS Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection Bob Stephan insists in a USA Today op-ed yesterday that we shouldn't worry that popcorn factories and petting zoos are included in the "National Asset Database" because it is not used to make funding decisions. According to Stephan, the list at present is merely an unedited compilation of submissions from state and lcoal governments and the private sector. Eventually, the department will pick and choose among these submissions to arrive at a list of the nation's most critical assets prioritzed in order of importance, vulnerability, and risk. But, in his formal response the DHS Inspector General report released last week on this issue, the department's Under Secretary for Preparedness, George Foresman, said that the data "have been and are currently being utilized to support allocation decision-making processes for the department." This, of course, explains why inarguably high-threat places like New York City and Washington, D.C. had their funding allocations cut in the latest round of DHS counterterrorism grants to local communities. Stephan was right to say last year, in an uncharacteristic moment of candor, that, in the absence of a such a prioritized list, the department is esesentially "flying blind" in terms of what to protect and how much money to allocate toward doing so. Either the list at present is a prioritized list of truly critical assets or it is not, and either it is being used to make funding decisions or it isn't. DHS, which is it?

How hard can it be

2006-07-17T16:10:00.000-04:00

Last week's DHS Inspector General report on the department's ludicrous purported list of the nation's most critical sectors and sites is but the latest example of why the Department of Homeland Security cannot be taken seriously. That check cashing businesses, popcorn stands, and funeral parlors would be listed, and that Washington State was said to have more monuments and icons of national significance than Washington, D.C., shows the rank incompetence of those who are at least nominally in charge of protecting the nation from the awful prospect of another terror attack. After three years and millions of dollars, how hard could it possibly be to get this elemental task done right? Unless and until the department produces a creditable list, in priority order, of the sectors and sites whose destruction would have catastrophic consequences for the nation as a whole, there will be no rational way to allocate our limited counterterrorism resources and to focus our limited time, attention, and imagination.

It says it all

2006-07-10T15:47:00.000-04:00

The decision by CIA management to close its Osama bin Laden unit says it all. We are assured, of course, that the decision does not lessen the Administration's determination to find bin Laden and to bring him to justice. But, doesn't this step merely confirm the obvious - finding bin Laden is not the priority it once was, and, despairing of ever finding him, the White House is attempting to make a virtue of necessity by emphasizing that, after all, he no longer exerecises the operational control over Al Qaeda that he once did?

To be sure, the global terror network nowadays is more of a bottoms-up than a top-down phenomenon. More and more cells around the world, and here at home, seem more to be inspired by bin Laden than led by him.

But, this is at least as much bad news as good news. Needless to say, the more terrorists there are left to their own devices to do what they will, whenever, wherever, and however they choose to do it, the more likely it is that there will be other attacks here and elsewhere.

And, if the good news in this is that bin Laden isn't as important as he once was, that's "whistling past the graveyard" talk, if you ask me. He is as much as symbol of terrorism today as ever, and his outsized iconic power only grows each day that goes by without his being captured by the world's sole superpower.

Rather than closing units dedicated to finding bin Laden, our government should be opening more of them. For once, less is not more;more is more.

A Matter of Time

2006-06-06T16:07:00.001-04:00

Today's CBS News and Baltimore Sun stories differ in the details, but the theme is the same - another terror attack on the homeland is only a matter of time. According to the experts CBS News talked to, the next attack is likely to be smaller in scale than 9/11; the Sun's experts say that the next attack will be even bigger than 9/11. My bet is that both sets of experts are right - we are likely to see small scale attacks against "soft" targets like sporting arenas, shopping malls, nightclubs and restaurants before too long, and a large scale attack that makes 9/11 look small by comparison.

The signs are all pointing in the direction of another attack - a steady stream of threatening messages from bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zahawari; an international environment (i.e., Iraq, Iran, the Hamas government in the Palestinian terrorities, and Afghanistan, even) increasingly hostile to us and our interests; the rise and proliferation of "home grown" terror cells inspired by Al Qaeda but not directed by it; the foiling of recent plots abroad and at home that suggest the intensity of terrorists' activity and their absolute determination to strike again; and, perhaps most ominously, a devil-may-care, back to normal attitude on the part of our government as regards the terrorist threat (how else to explain, for example, DHS' decision to dig in its heels and stick to its guns as regards the 40% cut in counterterrorism funding for New York City and Washington, DC announced last week, the top two terrorist targets in the country?)

Perhaps the hardest circle to square is the fact that key government leaders acknowledge that the signs are pointing to another attack (one story quotes the State Department's Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism to this effect) and yet we continue to underprepare for that contingency. The latest example is the CQ News story this afternoon that Senate conferees are likely to drop port security funding from the supplemental appropriations bill when they meet later today. Old Testament prophets put it better than I can - "when there is no vision, the people perish."

Alternate universe

2006-06-01T18:32:00.000-04:00

Can truth be stranger than fiction? Indeed so. Make that, especially so, at the Department of Homeland Security. The cognoscenti will recall that the latest round of counterterrorism grants to regions around the country was to be more risk-based than ever before. Yet, somehow the areas encompassing the only two cities that have been attacked by terrorists - New York and Washington, DC - wound up taking a 40% cut yesterday when the allocations were announced. On the other hand, areas that any reasonable and unbiased person would agree are relatively low risk places like Omaha, Nebraska and Louisville, Kentucky, saw an increase in funding. Department spokesmen defend the indefensible with a straight face.

Either DHS officials really believe that this allocation of scarce homeland security dollars makes the country as safe as possible, or they don't and they're just claiming that it does. If the former, our security has been entrusted to incompetents (to use a polite word); if the latter, our security has been entrusted to dissemblers (to use another polite word).

What's that again?

2006-05-24T17:26:00.000-04:00

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said something intriguing in today's USA Today interview. In response to the question, "Have you caught any known or suspected terrorists under the US-VISIT program?," the Secretary replied, "We have sent people back who have connections to terrorism. It's rare you have a card-carrying terrorist because most of the ones we know about are either dead or in jail. But when you see somebody who has links to al-Qaeda, the evidence may not be sufficient to convict them of a crime, but it is sufficient to say this is a person we should be worried about for terrorism. We have certainly sent back people with such links." (emphasis added).

Exactly what "links" to terrorism is the Secretary talking about? Isn't aiding and abetting terrorism a crime? If that's the link he's talking about, why weren't those people detained and tried by our criminal justice system? If he's talking about other kinds of links, shouldn't any link to terrorism be a crime? Shouldn't the last thing for us to do with someone we suspect of being linked to terror be to send that person back to wherever he came from? What assurance do we have that the authorities in whatever country he came from will keep watch over him when he returns?

And, one more thing. I find it hard to believe that most of the terrorists our government knows of are either dead or in jail. It seems to me that USA Today should have asked a follow up question or two.

Trojan Horses

2006-05-24T17:11:00.000-04:00

Will our government ever learn? Yesterday's New York Times reported that, thanks to pressure from Congressman Frank Wolf, the State Department agreed not to allow computers purchased from a company linked to the Chinese government to access the department's classified information systems. Wolf was right to fear that the Chinese might have used such access to spy on some of the most sensitive information available to the United States government. That such access might have been granted but for this congressional pressure shows how unserious our government remains about countering even obvious threats to the national security.

This story comes on top of the news that the personal information of 26 million veterans was recently stolen from the home of a Department of Veterans Affairs employee. There is nothing to indicate that the thief was a terrorist or anyone connected to terrorists. But, likewise, for all we know, the thief could well be a terrorist or someone linked to terrorism. How is it that employees are able to take such sensitive information out of government buildings undetected anyway? If the VA is this lax with sensitive information in its possession, can we have any confidence that the Department of Homeland Security's even more sensitive information is any better protected?

Heads up to terrorists?

2006-05-20T10:52:00.000-04:00

Today's New York Times story shows that we've learned nothing from the flap over the Dubai Ports World deal. The conventional wisdom following that incident was that at least it highlighted the gaps in port security and the Administration and Congress would now work overtime to close them.

And, yet, as the headline of today's story succinctly puts the essence of it, "to speed flow of goods, some ships are tipped by Coast Guard before inspections." The Coast Guard is supposed to conduct "surprise" inspections of incoming ships from time to time to, among other things, see to it that neither terrorists nor weapons of mass destruction and other implements of terror are sneaked into our country by sea. And, yet, bowing to complaints from industry about slowing down the flow of commerce, the Coast Guard sometimes gives ships advance notice that they will be inspected, potentially tipping off terrorists in time for them to slip away and to hide any weapons they may have stashed on board.

Part of the problem all along with the Administration's approach to homeland security is that it has paid disproportionate attention to industry concerns and complaints. Certainly security measures should be implemented in such a way as not to unduly inconvenience and financially penalize the private sector. But, when security and profit collide, security should trump, especially in the post-9/11 world when we know that terrorism is a real threat and not merely a theoretical one.

The article also points up another problem with the Department of Homeland Security from day one -underfunding. The Coast Guard is supposed to patrol 95,000 miles of coastline and to police 361 ports, and yet the total force (39,000) is not much larger than that of the New York City police department. So, to supplement its meager forces, the Coast Guard has to rely in part on, believe it or not, volunteers!

You'll recall that among the arguments the Adminstration and its supporters advanced in support of the notion of turning over port terminal operations to a country linked to terrorism was that, at the end of the day, port security would have remained in the hands of the Coast Guard. Today's Times article helps to show that those hands have a very weak grip, indeed.

"Mini-Amnesty" for potential terrorists?

2006-05-20T10:21:00.000-04:00

The latest report by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General (which I used to head), noted in today's Washington Post, is but the latest evidence that the Adminstration's latest border security proposals are unserious and politically motivated.

Part of the reason that our borders are insecure is that we have too few Border Patrol Agents and too little effective technology to help us patrol them. The President's speech on Monday night at least rhetorically addresses these problems, though, again, I would have preferred that he give the Department of "Homeland Security" the manpower (i. e., more Border Patrol agents) it needs to get the job done, rather than our already dangerously overstretched military.

But, another part of the reason is that the relatively few illegal aliens we do catch are all too often released for lack of detention space to house them until they can be deported to their respective countries of origin. According to the DHS OIG report, 36% of the 774,112 illegal aliens caught in the past three years were released on account of the lack of detention space. To end the "catch and release" program, as the Administration has pledged to do by the fall, would require adding 35,000 beds, but the White House has proposed spending only $386 million, which would pay for only 6,700 more beds. What's really troubling about this is that, as result of the shortfall in detention space, illegal aliens are released before the Department of Homeland Security can determine whether they are criminals are, worse, terrorists!

The Senate passed a measure on Thursday that would add 20,000 beds, and a House bill to be voted on next week would add nearly 5,000. Let us hope for the sake of national security that the Administration and Congress will finally get serious about every aspect of border security by providing enough funds to end this "mini-amnesty" program for potential terrorists once and for all.