Photo Credit: Reuters/Marco Djurica

In an address to fellow members of parliament from Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AK Parti), Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ”defended the nation’s police and vowed to increase their powers to deal with unrest.”   Erdoğan said that the police have acted with “common sense” in response to the protests, although much of the criticism his government has faced since the protests began has related to police brutality. As the Prime Minister argued, “Firing tear gas is a most natural right of the police. Have they fired a bullet? Have they used guns?…[in the face of a] comprehensive and systematic movement of violence, [the police displayed an] unprecedented democratic stance and successfully passed the test of democracy.” Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç also mentioned on Monday that the government “could even use elements of the Turkish Armed Forces” to quell the protests if necessary.

The Prime Minister held two counter-protests in Ankara over the weekend, where he announced to a crowd of his supporters, “If anyone wants to see the real picture of Turkey, this is Turkey.” The Turkish government also began “working on legislation to restrict the use of Twitter and other social media” due to its role in facilitating the protests.

United States Secretary of State John Kerry discussed the protests with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu during their weekly phone call this week. According to State Department Spokeswoman Jen Psaki, the United States ”remain[s] focused on calling on all parties to ease tensions and to resolve the situation through dialogue, taking into account views from across the political spectrum. We also continue to urge all sides to exercise restraint and avoid violence.” Ms. Psaki also said that while she has not seen reports that the Turkish government is considering deploying the army to quell the protests, the State Department ”remain[s] concerned about any reports of activity including police brutality, including violence. There were some reports over the weekend about the prosecution of medical professionals who were treating injured people…all of these reports are greatly concerning and we’re very focused on monitoring closely.”

Photo Credit: the Royal Court

In a commencement speech at Mutah University’s Military Wing on Sunday, King Abdullah II of Jordan discussed domestic and regional challenges and emphasized the need for continued political reform.

King Abdullah pointed to those who doubt the genuine nature of Jordan’s political reforms as being a domestic challenge for the country. He said, “Among the domestic challenges, for example, are attempts by some to doubt the level of success on the political reform path because of lack of understanding or correct interpretation of the concerns, and because of the debate and sparring between political, ideological and partisan currents that accompanied the democratization process.” He added that the “will for positive change exists and is solid,” and described a “political reform roadmap” whereby parliament and the Lower House are given wider, consolidated political roles.

Jordan is also hosting over 500,000 Syrian refugees, facing a faltering economy, and dealing with the backlash from an Internet censorship law that went into effect earlier this month. In response to the law, Reporters Without Borders wrote King Abdullah a letter urging him to “restore access to the websites currently blocked within Jordan, and to rescind the recent press law’s repressive provisions, so that it guarantees freedom of information.”

In an op-ed for the LA Times, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s David Schenker describes the Internet censorship as an effort aimed at stabilizing the country by curbing “what it considers irresponsible reporting — on matters such as corruption — that incite citizens.” He noted that, in response to protests, 85 out of 150 MPs have signed a petition calling for a review of the law, and the minister of state for media affairs and communications Mohammad Momani announced that “the government might be willing to reconsider it.”

King Abdullah met on Monday with European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. They discussed the rising toll of the Syrian crisis and the impact of Israel’s settlement policy on the peace process.

Photo Credit: Reuters

Two Saudi Arabian women have been sentenced to ten months in jail and a two year travel ban for helping a Canadian woman leave her Saudi husband. Equality Now, an NGO dedicated to women’s rights, explained that the Canadian woman had begged Fawzia Al Ayuni and Wajiha Al Huaider to help her and her children flee. Ms. Al Huaider told Human Rights Watch that their involvement with Natalie Morin began in 2009 when her mother called the activists asking them to help her daughter who she claimed was being abused by her husband, Sa’eed al-Shahrani. The family lives in the Eastern Province city of Dammam.

The Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is also home to the majority of the country’s Shia population which has borne witness to two years of unrest writes Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His recent paper titled “The Forgotten Uprising in Eastern Saudi Arabia” outlines the history of “the regime’s sectarian discrimination against Shia and economic neglect and political marginalization of the region” and the Saudi government’s response to the unrest. The kingdom’s Shia population has demanded increased participation, the release of political prisoners, an elected consultative council and a constitution but the government has not responded adequately, explains Wehrey. To quell tensions and improve conditions in the Eastern Province, Wehrey recommends, among other things, the removal of Saudi troops from Bahrain, the repeal of sedition laws, and recognition of the Shia Jafari legal code. For a brief of Wehrey’s paper, click here.

Photo Credit: MPR Photo/Jeffrey Thompson

During the recent mark up of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (H.R. 1960), Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN) introduced an amendment (H.R. 4310) that would place certain restrictions on the sale of tear gas to transitioning countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The amendment reads, “None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to provide tear gas or other riot control items to the government of a country undergoing a transition to democracy in the Middle East or North Africa unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that the security forces of such government are not using excessive force to repress peaceful, lawful, and organized dissent.”  The amendment passed by voice vote on June 14, 2013. Rep. Ellison first proposed this amendment in the House version of the FY13 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill.

Human Rights First applauded Ellison’s action in a press release, and Human Rights First’s Robyn Lieberman said, “By screening for excessive force against peaceful protest, the amendment sets forth the proposition that the U.S. withhold the sale of crowd control items from human rights violators, rather than waiting for them to use U.S. weapons to commit abuses.  It’s time that U.S. arms transfers got in line with U.S. policy goals.”

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Mesut Özcan began his opening remarks by arguing that Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East always starts with its economic ties with its neighbors, mentioning the free trade agreements Turkey has signed with Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan in recent years, as well as the deep energy and other economic ties it has established with Russia and Georgia. Throughout its tenure as Turkey’s ruling party, Turkey has made its primary goals to build these ties gradually and over time to meet EU ascension criteria. The Arab Spring, however, affected Turkish foreign policy in general “not evolutionary, but revolutionary.” As the protests unfolded, Turkey realized that it had to side with the movements toward democracy in whatever way it could. However, it also had to recognize that Turkey’s policy towards one country undergoing a democratic transition would inherently be different from others. Turkey understood that in the Arab Spring, people not only demanded greater participation in their governments, but “greater services.” Thus, Turkey decided to build relationships with these new regimes, such as the one in Egypt, and redesign Turkey’s financial support for those countries after that. 

Şaban Kardaş opened by arguing that Turkey’s goal for its increased engagement with the Middle East over the last decade has always been part of an attempt to build a “regional structure” with itself at the center. He denied the suggestion that Turkey was turning away from the West, and shrugged off suggestions that its foreign policy is one that strictly adheres to the typical labels people attribute, such as “zero problems with neighbors” or “neo-Ottomanism,” but the real point is just to establish itself as a regional power. In fact, Ahmet Davutoğlu used the term “central power” to describe this strategy when he was an academic, not one of these other terms. With respect to the Arab Spring, Kardaş argued that Turkey’s approach has been similar to that of the West, and that the AK Parti has always worked to build present itself as pro-democracy and pro-transformation in support of those movements. However, the Arab Spring has also forced Turkey to abandon somewhat its goal to become a “neutral regional player” for the Middle East because civil wars in places like Libya and Syria have forced Turkey to take sides.  Turkey also has to deal with the widening sectarian divide across the region as a result of the Arab Spring.

Kardaş also denied that Turkey is ceding its relationship with the West in favor of expanded relations with the Middle East, arguing that Turkey cannot exert its power in the region without its ties to the West, as shown by Turkey’s stance on intervention in Syria. Finally, Kardaş argued that Turkey’s support for democracy in the Arab World in the wake of the Arab Spring means that Turkey must reaffirm its commitment to advancing democracy at home.

Before opening up the panel to questions from the audience, Christian Ostermann asked the panel how the Arab Spring has impacted Turkey-Israel relations. Mesut Özcan argued that stability in Israel’s relationship with Egypt “died with Mubarak[‘s regime]” and thus required Turkey to play a greater role in mediating between the two countries. He also mentioned that the conflict in Syria also affects Turkey’s relationship with Israel overall.

In response to a question on how Turkey, being a Sunni-majority country, has affected its relations with its Shi’a neighbors, Bülent Aras argued that Turkey has worked to improve its relations with Iran and Iraq, in addition to its Sunni-majority partners like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. However, its efforts with Shi’a-majority countries have obviously been less successful. Aras argued that states can talk and build ties, but have less power in repairing sectarian relations “at a societal level.” Mesut Özcan conceded that when it comes to repairing sectarian ties in countries like Iraq, for example, Sunni Iraqis will say Turkey needs to do more to counter the greater Shi’a influence in the country and form Iran, whereas Shi’a Iraqis will probably say Turkey is doing too much to balance against Shi’a power in the country. Thus, Turkey “cannot please everyone.” However, Şaban Kardaş argued that Turkey is “not just going to give up on fixing sectarianism” in the Middle East. In response to a question on Turkey’s role in the widening rift between Iraq and its Kurdish Regional Government, Özcan argued that Turkey has sought to build a relationship with all of Iraq, but the soured personal relationship between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has naturally made this plan more difficult.

Following a question regarding the characterization of the AK Parti’s foreign policy as “neo-Ottoman,” Kardaş argued that not even Foreign Minister Davutoğlu would call Turkish foreign policy “neo-Ottoman, and Turkey’s attempt to embrace its neighbors’ cultures and build economic ties with them as a strategy of building “regional depth” is just “classic geopolitics.” Aras argued that Turkey’s activist foreign policy with its neighbors as a stepping stone to becoming a world power is no different from what Brazil has done in Latin America.

Finally, after a question from the audience regarding the implications of the emerging protests all over the country directed against the AK Parti and the Prime Minister, Aras argued that the protests have become an urgent issue for Erdoğan the way the Kurdish issue has. He also argued that they are, to an extent, “a rhetorical issue” that other countries will use against Turkey, as it is the only reality in Turkey that is broadcast eight to nine hours a day on American television. However, he ultimately thinks that Erdoğan will grant concessions to the protesters. Kardaş argued that the identities of the protesters are far more varied than most people understand: originally, most of the protesters were environmentalists dissatisfied with the plans to develop the park, and have since expanded to “fringe Marxists and Leninists” who have done “most of the vandalism” since the protests began, as well as to people who were already staging protests in Taksim, particularly those who feel isolated in Turkey’s political system and are looking to “engage their demands.”

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF. 

Henri Barkey began by addressing the Ankara-Baghdad relationship. Barkey claimed that in March 2011, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Iraq, and it was the first time that any foreign leader addressed Iraqi parliament. It was also the first time that a Turkish prime minister traveled to Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. Barkey argued that with Iraq becoming more and more unstable, the KRG is emerging as a place of refuge, and the relationship between Ankara and Erbil has become closer. He further claimed, “As Erdogan has turned his back on Assad, he sees his relationship with the Kurds in Iraq as access to the main state. The KRG has a lot of oil and gas and the Turks are very hungry for both.” He argues that, for Ankara, the KRG relationship is more important to them than the Baghdad relationship because the KRG has a very important role in the Kurdish peace process in Turkey. Barkey asserts that the KRG has an influence on the PKK and has served as a channel of communication between Ankara and the PKK. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sees the evolving relationship between Turkey and the KRG however as potentially destabilizing to the unity of Iraq, Barkey added. Moreover, Maliki fears that a resolution to the Kurdish problem would allow Turkey to become the regional hegemon. Barkey concluded by saying that the relationship between Baghdad and Ankara is ultimately going to get worse.

Denise Natali further discussed the relationship between Turkey and the KRG. She started off by asking the rhetorical question, “How far can this KRG-Turkey relationship really go?” Natali argued that the KRG needs Turkey in order to secure an independent revenue source from Baghdad but stated that Baghdad is actually a larger market for Turkey and therefore Turkey risks losing that market. She further emphasized that Baghdad is, in fact, the KRG’s source of funding and Turkey could potentially lose its funding source if the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil does not improve. Natali posed the open-ended question of whether the KRG has enough leverage to export autonomously if Baghdad were to cut off its funding. She concluded by asserting that Turkey cannot afford to lose its relationship with either the KRG or Baghdad.

Lastly, Alireza Nader expounded on Turkey’s relationship with Iran. He began by saying the relationship between the two has been one of rivalry much more than cooperation and that both are competing for regional influence. Most recently, he argued, the Iranian leadership views the Turkish position on Syria as being a fundamental challenge. “The loss of Syria would mean a loss of Iran’s key Arab ally,” he claimed. Furthermore, Iranian officials haven’t been happy with Turkey’s behavior and have described Turkey’s Islam as a “fabrication” and “American Islam,” he claimed. Finally, Nader argued, there is competition between Iran and Turkey in Iraq. Iran has a strong presence in northern Iraq and Kurdish officials tend to be very familiar with Iran, he said. The major issue now is that Turkey is suspicious of Iran and Syria providing support to the PKK. Nader claimed that Iran, for example, declared a ceasefire with the PJAK (a PKK-affiliated group in Iran), which has caused concern for Turkey, adding that Turkey has complied with a number of sanctions against Iran and is trying to wean itself off of Iran’s crude oil. Nader concluded by saying, “As long as the Islamic Republic rules Iran, and Turkey tries to maintain influence in the region, cooperation will be very limited.”

Photo Credit: Maryam Rahmanian

In the wake of Hassan Rouhani‘s win in Iran’s elections on Friday, analysts have produced varying responses regarding the election’s implications on Iran’s future. Speaking of U.S.-Iranian relations going forward, Vali Nasr wrote that Rouhani’s election was not a change in Iran, but rather, a “game-changer.” He emphasized that the U.S. would have to take steps to benefit from Rouhani’s victory, saying that ”to take advantage of Rowhani’s victory and break the logjam over nuclear negotiations, Washington has to put on the table incentives it has thus far been unwilling to contemplate…The ball is in Washington’s Court.”

Writing for Bloomberg, Shashank Joshi noted that former reformist presidents Ali Akbar Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami “both put their personal stamps on Iranian policy, foreign and domestic.” He continued, “It is understandable that we, on the outside, treat geopolitical issues as the litmus tests of Iran’s trajectory. But if Rohani can start renewing and protecting cultural, social and political freedoms, the longer-term effects may be just as consequential for the rest of the world.”

Suzanne Maloney argued in Foreign Policy that Rouhani’s win was part of a broader strategy of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “Perhaps allowing Rouhani’s victory is [Khamenei's] way of empowering a conciliator to repair Iran’s frayed relations with the world and find some resolution to the nuclear dispute that enables the country to revive oil exports and resume normal trade.”

The Washington Post’s Jason Rezaian called Rouhani “more cautious than reformist,” and predicted that the new president was more likely to focus on Iran’s economy before bringing about sweeping social change. He said, “Rouhani’s supporters tout his diplomatic skills and prospects for unifying Iran’s polarized political landscape. But as a onetime holder of top positions in Iran’s most important ministries, a lawmaker for 20 years and a former lead nuclear negotiator, he is also the definition of an Islamic republic insider. That has made him adept at navigating the many competing centers of Iranian power — and disinclined to rock the boat.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told world leaders not to be “lulled into complacency” regarding Rouhani’s win, adding that it was the Supreme Leader and not the president who would determine Iran’s unclear policy.

Former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw cautioned the West not to oversimplify the dynamics in Iran, saying, “The mistake that many in the West make about Iran is to write it off as a one-man show, a dictatorship of the Supreme Leader. Power and governance in Iran is highly complex,” and calling Netanyahu’s comments “unthinking and self-defeating.”

Photo Credit: Mohsen Shandiz/Corbis

In his first press conference since Friday’s elections, newly elected Iranian president Hassan Rouhani said he would “follow the path of moderation and justice, not extremism,” and declared his electoral win the beginning of “a new era.” Rouhani won Friday’s election, reportedly receiving 51% of the vote in the first round, meaning that a runoff round was not required. According to the interior ministry, turnout exceeded 72%.

In his speech on Monday, Rouhani expressed hopes for pursuing greater transparency in Iran’s nuclear program and for repairing ties with the West. He said he would take steps to reassure the West about Iran’s nuclear program: “The first step will be showing greater transparency. We are ready to show greater transparency and make clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s actions are totally within international frameworks…The second step is promoting mutual confidence.” However, he also emphasized Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear program and calling on the U.S. to stop interfering in Iran’s domestic affairs and to “put aside oppressive… policies towards Iran.” He remained optimistic about Iran’s relationship with Washington, saying it was a “very old wound that is there; we need to heal this injury.” He urged other countries to “seize this opportunity created by our people and their vote.”

Rouhani also discussed the economy, saying that the government would work to stabilize prices and raise employment by increasing domestic production. He declared it would be a “priority” of his administration to have positive relations with all of its neighbors, and specifically noted its biggest regional rival, Saudi Arabia: “We are not only neighbors but also brothers…Every year hundreds of thousands of Iranian pilgrims visit Mecca. We have many common points with Saudi Arabia.”

On Syria, Rouhani said, “We are opposed to foreign intervention. We hope peace and tranquility will return to Syria through the co-operation with countries of the region and world.” He did not comment on the participation of Iran-backed Hezbollah in the conflict, and added, “Until the next election in Syria in 2014, the current government must be officially recognized by the world countries.”

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF. 

Deputy Prime Minister Atalay began his remarks by commenting on the Gezi Park protests. He reiterated that mistakes were made and an investigation is ongoing. He claimed that, in Turkey, there was a declaration by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the latest decision to come out of the talks was to wait and see what the judicial decision is. If the court decides in favor of the municipality, he explained, the redevelopment plans will continue, but if the court aligns itself with popular demand, Gezi Park will remain as a park. He further added that the construction of the mall was never the government’s intention and that it was simply a misinterpretation. “The incidents have now come to an end in our regard – that’s our take on what is happening,” he claimed.

Mr. Atalay expressed his disappointment with the incidents in Turkey being likened to that of the Arab Spring. “That is not correct,” he said, “I think the distinction should be made in a very clear way.” “As far as our democratic system is concerned, Turkey stands at a separate point. I think it would be doing an injustice to Turkey if we said it was an extension of the Arab Spring,” he added. Commenting further on the demonstrations, he argued that initially there was a very peaceful reaction by people who were environmentalists but radical elements decided to “hijack” the opportunity in order to “pillage the public goods.” Mr. Atalay stated that the AK Party respect people’s freedom to protest and demonstrate but do not approve of a violent approach, which is why investigations are underway. He further argued that the majority of people demonstrating are an extreme nationalist group claiming, “The ones in the street are the ones who want to preserve the status quo. We [the AKP] are the ones who want to change the status quo.”

Mr. Atalay then went on to discuss the Kurdish issue. He began by saying Turkey has had a high level of international cooperation going into fighting al-Qaeda and the PKK. In the past decade, he claimed the government has taken significant steps towards democratization but there were mistakes made in the past, for example, Kurdish people were not allowed to speak their mother tongues. A Kurdish radio, Kurdish television etc. are now allowed, however, and Kurds can send their children to Kurdish-speaking schools, Mr. Atalay claimed. He added that the most recent step in the peace process was brokering a ceasefire with the PKK and “since then, there hasn’t been a single act of terrorism.”  He concluded his remarks on the Kurdish issue claiming, “It will be through policy and dialogue that we will solve any remaining issues.”

Lastly, Mr. Atalay spoke briefly about the Syrian crisis. He stated that there are about 400,000 Syrians in Turkey and many of them remain in approximately 21 camps. “These camps are organized in the best manner possible. [Refugees] receive healthcare services [and] they do not suffer from a disruption in their education,” he claimed. Atalay further asserted that Turkey has been very generous with humanitarian assistance, using a considerable amount of their own budget, whereas others in the international community have not followed suit. He concluded that, ultimately, Turkey does not intend to follow a separate policy from the international community and stated, “We are siding with the Syrian people and their rightful, democratic demands.”

During the question and answer portion, a question about Turkey’s “ban” on alcohol between the hours of 10 pm and 6 am was asked. Mr. Atalay responded by stating that the “ban” on alcohol is only a regulation and not a ban. “Turkey is an open society, and we believe in the coexistence of everyone in a peaceful way,” he stated, adding that Turkey’s standards follow that of the E.U. but they don’t intervene in people’s lives. A second question asked about Turkey’s response to having the highest amount of imprisoned journalists to which Mr. Atalay asserted, “In countries where you have terrorism, you have problems of this nature.” He explained that Turkey has suffered from terrorism for many years and when you have this, you have problems with democratic attitudes and regulations. “As long as people’s thoughts do not incite violence, they can write about everything,” he claimed, adding that “We do not want people in jail, but they are seen as committing crimes against anti-terrorism laws, not for being journalists.” Atalay concluded by saying the AKP’s latest reform package will introduce several improvements regarding this issue.

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Rep. Whitfield began by saying the American-Turkish relationship is very important, explaining that he was one of the founders of the Turkish caucus in Congress. He added that the caucus, which is made up of 130 members, has been very helpful with issues affecting the Turks and it underscores the importance of U.S.- Turkey relations.

When the AK party came to power, he said, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan would come and spend an hour with the Turkish caucus claiming, “The first 4 to 5 years that the AK party was in power, we spent a lot of time with Prime Minister Erdogan.” Rep. Whitfield said the caucus was very impressed with Erdogan, describing him as an excellent politician.

Afterward, Whitfield mentioned that many people started expressing to him their concern about the potential Islamist movement in Turkey. “I do understand that many people feel that Prime Minister Erdogan is becoming more and more autocratic, and that his personality seems to be evolving a little bit because he’s been in power for quite a while, and power has a lot of impact on people,” he stated. He further added that he believed the demonstrations to be a good thing and that, in a free society, people should be able to voice their concerns. “I am pleased that Prime Minister Erdogan is meeting with protesters,” he said.

Rep. Whitfield concluded by stating, “Overall, I continue to be very optimistic about our relationship with Turkey,” and considers Turkey to be a valuable ally.

In response to a question regarding Congress’s stance on the White House’s decision to provide more aid to the rebels, Rep. Whitfield said that he would like to see a no-fly zone implemented. He added that Congress is divided on the issue but claimed he is reluctant to provide more assistance to rebel forces. A follow up question asked what the mechanism of implementing a no-fly zone would be to which Whitfield responded, “Having a no-fly zone would be costly and would require U.S. military intervention.”

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