Photo Credit: Jonathon Fickies/ Bloomberg via Getty Images

Egypt’s National Association for Change (NAC), a broad coalition of pro-democracy groups led by Mohammed ElBaradei, criticised U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson for her comments regarding the Egyptian Army and the mass opposition protests scheduled for June 30 after the ambassador spoke at Cairo’s Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies on Tuesday. The ambassador was speaking to several Egyptian NGOs and political parties when she mentioned that the United States “would not welcome [the Egyptian] army’s return to power if President Morsi [is] forced out by 30 June protests,” according to Ahram Online. NAC spokesperson Ahmed El-Noqr called Patterson’s statements “blatant interference” in Egyptian internal affairs and called upon Egypt’s foreign ministry to ”warn her against repeating [her statements] again [and] tell her she would be considered unwelcome in the country if she did.” He also called the Egyptian army a national institution “that belongs to the people and does not receive orders from abroad.”

The U.S. State Department did not respond to the criticism, however, the speech and comments come four days after the U.S. House of Representatives adopted 6 amendments to the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act sponsored by Congressmen Gerry Connelly (D-VA), Frank Wolf (R-VA), and Brad Schneider (D-IL), which “expands an existing report to include information on how the Egyptian military is supporting the rights of individuals in civil society and democratic promotion efforts.” The amendments come in response to the Egyptian government’s conviction of 43 NGO workers, “including 17 Americans, for their involvement in pro-democracy groups.” Representatives Connelly and Wolf are also circulating a bi-partisan letter to Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi “to immediately reconsider the court action and permit the NGOs to continue their work.” 55 Congressmen have signed the letter so far.

Photo Credit: Algerian Foreign Press

In an effort to reassure the Algerian public of his good health, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika made a television appearance last week from his hospital bed in Paris. President Bouteflika suffered a stroke in April, and an initial statement from his office claimed that he would return to Algiers within a week. His continued absence from the country has fueled succession rumors and questions about whether he will finish out his third term.

The video footage showed President Bouteflika meeting with Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal and the army chief of staff, General Gaid Salah. Sellal said the president’s health seemed “fine,” and that he had given him detailed instructions on running the country. Though it is speculated that President Bouteflika’s illness will make it unlikely that he will run for a fourth term next year, members of the National Liberation Front (NLF) insisted on their support for his candidacy. According to Bahaa Eddin Taliba, deputy head of the NLF, “We are not thinking about an alternative, because we are convinced that the covenant between the president and the people is not over yet.”

The president’s illness is viewed as an opening by Islamist parties. Leaders of the Islamist Green Algeria Alliance met last week, reportedly to discuss “specific ideas regarding the next presidential elections,” and agreed to “introduce these ideas to partisan institutions.”

Meanwhile, amid speculation that the president is not well enough to finish his current term, the Algerian press is calling for the application of Article 88 of the Constitution, which would require the president of the Council of the Nation to act as head of state for a maximum of 45 days while the presidential seat is declared vacant, and then remain in power for anther 60 days until elections can be held.

In an analysis for Foreign Policy, Riccardo Fabiani outlined three possible succession scenarios for Algeria, and noted that the current regime’s failure to groom a successor could increase the chances of formerly marginalized politicians at becoming “compromise candidates”.

On Tuesday, June 18, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing titled “Elections in Iran: The Regime Cementing its Control.” Mr. Alireza Nader, Senior International Policy Analyst at RAND Corporation, Dr. Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, and Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, Senior Associate at the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, testified. The subcommittee’s chairman, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), presided.

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

In Rep. Ros-Lehtinen’s opening statement, “in our fervor to repudiate all things Ahmedinejad,” Ros-Lehtinen called Iranian President-elect Hassan Rouhani a “moderate hope.” She argued that it would be detrimental for the United States to “lull itself” into believing that the election was a victory for the Iranian people, as it was still ultimately Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini who made the decision to let Rouhani become President. In her view, the regime continues with “cementing its control” and will march on with its nuclear program. She called Rouhani part of the “core of the inner circle and an ally of those who led the 1979 revolution. She also mentioned Rouhani’s 1999 role in leading a violent crackdown on a student uprising against the regime, his role in concealing Iran’s nuclear program for 20 years before becoming the project’s chief international negotiator, as well as condemned the Iranian government for deeming women and members of religious minorities in the country ineligible to run for President.

Representative Ted Deutch (D-FL) continued with his opening statement, in which he called President-elect Rouhani a “token moderate” who intended to reengage the international community respectfully. He commended the Iranian people for their “civic action” on election day, but expressed his disappointment with the number of candidates that were disqualified, as well as the suppression of reformist activists and websites. He called Rouhani a supporter of the regime that has been  hostile towards the United States and Israel. He called on Iran to end  its support of international terrorist organizations, as well as Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. He called the Iranian government unsustainable and urged that it needs to do more to support its young population that finds itself more and more frustrated with everyday life. Representative Adam Kinzinger (R-IL) followed, arguing that the threats that Iran poses to American interests are far more urgent now than they were even ten years ago, and thus the United States simply cannot afford to wait and “see how things play out” in Iran with Rouhani as President.

Afterwards came Representative David Cicilline (D-RI), who described his disappointment with Iran’s democratic process overall and the lasting power of Iran’s Supreme Leader over the country’s elections, foreign policy, and nuclear program. He also expressed his concern for Iran’s elections on the future of the country’s people in general. Representative Tom Cotton (R-AR) called Iran “a totalitarian state” in his opening statement, expressing his disappointment at how every candidate in the election was screened by the Supreme Leader. He argued that Rouhani was not a moderate, and said that Iran wants to join the civilized world, it cannot hold “sham elections” and fail to recognize Israel.

Representative Brad Schneider (D-IL) called on those in attendance to recognize that the President in Iran represents just a small part within a wider power structure, and was eager to hear from the panel about any transformative policies that may come from the Iranian presidency in the near future. In his opening statement, Representative Mark Meadows (R-NC) was not optimistic about Iran’s future in his opening statement, citing the threats the regime poses to both the United States and Israel in addition to the support the regime provides Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.

In Representative Juan Vargas’s (D-CA) opening statement, he argued that the United States must remain steadfast against Iran’s nuclear program and presence in Syria. Finally, in Representative Grace Meng’s (D-NY) opening statement, she argued that the question that people should ask is not who Rouhani is or was, “but where he is going.”

As the panelists began their opening testimonies Mr. Nader argued that Rouhani’s election ultimately shows the population’s frustration with the regime, the nuclear program, and the country’s diplomatic and economic isolation from the rest of the world. Inflation in Iran currently stands at about 30%, though some say the figure is actually much higher. He argued that Khameini’s policies could “unravel the Islamic Republic,” and that Khameini could look to back out of the crises he faces through Rouhani. He expressed that U.S. sanctions could be viewed within Iran as a way to cause the regime to implode, and that future sanctions should continue to put pressure on Iran’s nuclear program without causing additional damage to Iranian society. Creative solutions like sanctions that target Khameini’s business holdings are solid ideas while targeting food security in Iran may only make things worse. Sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program should also be separated from sanctions on Iran’s regional behavior and human rights record.

Dr. Maloney continued with her opening statement, beginning that the outcome of the election in Iran should not alter American foreign policy in Iran as of this time. She also argued that while any dismiss the election as illegitimate, it did provide the opportunity for many to challenge the regime and to discuss issues that had been off the table in Iran for years. She contended that the presidency matters in Iran, as shown by the affect Mahmoud Ahmedinejad had on American foreign policy and America’s expanded sanctions regime in Iran, as well as by the control Ahmedinejad had over Iran’s budget and state institutions. Rouhani won, according to her analysis, not only because he led a “smart campaign” but because he took advantage of the disarray and lack of unity within the conservative camp. She called Rouhani a “pragmatic conservative” who represents a new political force in Iran, and has the opportunity to bail Iran out of the crises it faces similar to how the President did the same after the Iran-Iraq war. She suggested that the US offer tangible rewards in exchange for concessions on nuclear power. She cautioned that Rouhani will experience real restraints in designing policy for Iran in the future, though his new role could help the United States reach the deal it needs with Iran on the country’s nuclear program.

Mr. Sadjadpour made the third and final opening testimony, where he expressed his surprise at the outcome of the election in Iran, joking that “there are no experts on Iranian politics, only students.” He called the elections unfair but nonetheless surprising in that the only somewhat moderate candidate won. He was even more surprised that the Supreme Leader allowed Rouhani to win, yet viewed the decision more as a way for the regime to avoid creating mass popular discontent in Iran, and called the result overall “light rain after eight years of drought” for Iran’s people. While Rouhani’s predecessors like Khatami and Ahmedinejad show that the President matters within Iranian politics, Rouhani is “no Nelson Mandela or even a Khatami.” He recalled Henry Kissinger’s observation that few nations have as many common interests as the United States but as many reasons why the countries do not interact. Sadjadpour also called Iran one of the only countries where the United States’ strategic and moral interest coincide rather than “clash,” as the latter is the case for many countries in the Arab World. He concluded by arguing that for the United States, the best way to hurt the Iranian regime is to diminish its control the creation and distribution of information. He cited the success that BBC Farsi enjoys and suggested improving Voice of America in Iran.

Rep. Ros-Lehtinen began the discussion section by asking what the United States can expect to be “different” about Iran’s future given Rouhani’s election, as well as asked what role Ahmedinejad will play within that future. Mr. Nader argued that the survival of the Islamic Republic means that major domestic changes in Iran seem unlikely, and that Rouhani will focus more on alleviating external pressure on Iran. Dr. Maloney argued that his top priority will be to reach a deal with the international community on the nuclear issue because that will be the only way to solve Iran’s long term economic problems, though perhaps a few political prisoners will be released under his administration. Nader followed up by stating that Ahmedinejad made a lot of enemies towards the end of his Presidency, and his future political career does not look bright. Dr. Maloney suggested that Ahmedinejad will be on trial soon and his top priority going forward will be to stay out of prison.

Rep. Ted Deutch followed up by asking how Iran’s offers to compromise on the nuclear issue will change, and how those offers will affect the unity of purpose against Iran within the P5+1 countries. Mr. Maloney argued that the European negotiators with whom he has met called Rouhani frustrating to work with and that Iran will continue to oppose the sanctions. Mr. Deutch followed up by asking if the new “spokesperson” will cause Iran to “give up less” in negotiations, to which Mr. Sajadpour replied that it will be difficult for the P5+1 to offer meaningful concessions on the nuclear program if Iran is not willing to make meaningful compromises. Mr. Nader followed up by mentioning that while uranium could be enriched at lower levels, nuclear enrichment in Iran will not stop under Rouhani. However which way the issue may change, sanctions from China and Russia will continue against Iran.  Before Rep. Kinzinger asked his questions, he took a moment to acknowledge the parliamentarians from many countries around the world, including Kyrgyzstan, where he was deployed at one point with the U.S. Air Force. He pledged his support for their struggle towards democracy within their home countries. With respect to Iran, he argued that the United States lost a huge opportunity in 2009 to strongly condemn the Iranian regime after the rigged election, and then asked if the Iranians could continue to develop uranium enriched at levels higher than international laws permit them to. Mr. Nader responded by arguing that more intrusive IAEA inspections will keep Iranian enriched uranium at satisfactory levels. In response to Rep. Kinzinger’s other question on how to engage Iran if the country acquires a nuclear weapon while Rouhani is in power, Dr. Maloney argued that Rouhani’s election should not change Washington’s strategic calculus towards Iran. Mr. Sadjadpour also argued that we should continue to pursue negotiations with Iran, and if they comply and the United States gets what it wants, it has executed successful foreign policy, and if Iran fails to cooperate in negotiations, “then we expose them as the problem.” Mr. Sadjadpour followed up by arguing that the Iranian regime possesses no “Machiavellian brilliance,” and that much of their long term policies are ad hoc and probably had no idea who would win the election that day.

Rep. Cecilline asked that if the Supreme Leader’s motivation to allow Rouhani to win had to do with dispelling criticism for the regime both in Iran and abroad, how does that affect U.S. sanctions on the country and the Supreme Leader’s ability to progress towards attaining a nuclear weapon? Mr. Nader argued that the Supreme Leader is using Rouhani to build confidence in the international community (after essentially being forced to support Ahmedinejad over the last four years) and will not move towards developing a nuclear weapon until Iran is welcomed internationally. Dr. Maloney agreed, and argued that the best way to avoid an “Iranian ploy” is “to continue to approach negotiations with full seriousness.” Mr. Sadjadpour followed up, however, by arguing that the Iranian regime possesses less “Machiavellian brilliance” than the U.S. assumes: much of their long term policies are ad hoc and probably had no idea who would win the election that day. But the Supreme Leader definitely has gained some popularity in Iran as a result of the election. Afterwards, Rep. Meadows asked the panelists to expand on some of their previous statements with his time, to which Mr. Nader argued that the regime has little favorability in Iran and that the days of the Islamic Republic are numbered, though little domestic change will happen while Khameini is still alive. Mr. Sadjadpour argued that while Khameini is an unpopular figure who helped lead Iran’s “revolution without democracy” in 1979, what the people want right now is “democracy without revolution” because they see how transitions in countries like Syria have destroyed the state from the inside and do not want to see Iran face a similar reality, even though such a movement is highly improbable.

Rep. Schneider likewise thanked the visiting parliamentarians before he asked the panelists to elaborate on the significance of the election turnout and whether or not the election should change U.S. strategic calculus on strengthening or weakening sanctions. Dr. Maloney described the election as insanely significant for the Iranian public because the “blatantly rigged” elections in 2009 disinterested many Iranians from voting altogether. As for sanctions, she argued that changes in sanctions need to come at the negotiating table and not from U.S. lawmakers because sanctions from the latter suggest to the Iranian people an attack on them directly. Otherwise, “our benchmark shouldn’t change” but the U.S. should be prepared to “give meaningful sanctions relief in exchange for meaningful concessions in the nuclear issue.” In response to Rep. Yoho’s question regarding how the U.S. should engage Rouhani given his human rights record and stances on Syria and Israel, the panelists argued that his stances on said issues are highly unlikely to change: Dr. Maloney argued that Iran overall will not change its stance on Syria if its role in Syria further harms Iran’s standing in the world, and Mr. Sadjadpour called rejecting Israel one of the few pillars from the 1979 revolution that have survived to today.

Rep. Vargas asked about what the dynamic between the Supreme Leader and President Rouhani will look like, especially given that they are both clerics, and how U.S. sanctions should change as a result. Mr. Nader described how the problem with Ahmedinejad was that “in Persian culture, you respect your elders,” and that Ahmedinejad often defied Khameini’s commands. Dr. Maloney discussed how Khameini has spent years publically making remarks against Rouhani, especially with regard to his stance on the nuclear issue. Whether or not Rouhani now takes the opportunity to defy the Supreme Leader on this issue, the United States should work to ensure it does not have to change its own stances on Iran’s nuclear program. Finally, Rep. Meng likewise welcomed the women dignitaries, and asked how the U.S. can reconcile its goal to aid Iran’s marginalized youth and women while also weakening the regime. Mr. Nader argued that regime change is ultimately out of America’s hands, but both he and Mr. Sadjadpour agreed that improving Voice of America (VOA) in Iran could have a huge effect against the regime. Millions of people in Iran receive their news through satellite TV channels, and the only alternative to state-sponsored news is BBC Farsi, which enjoyed an enormous leading up to the election. Mr. Sadjadpour expressed his dissatisfaction with VOA in Iran and argued that for the cost of an F-15 fighter jet, the United States could expand the station’s reach to several million more Iranians. Nonetheless, Mr. Nader argued that the U.S. should still focus first and foremost to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and Dr. Maloney argued that going forward, the top priority for the Iranian people is still to improve the economy.

With that, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen expressed her satisfaction with the discussion and adjourned the hearing.

1. Policymakers must anticipate economic downturns and shock by fostering a strong middle class. An enduring and stable middle class safeguards democracy.
2. Even imperfect, “sham” elections can “sow the seeds of public expectations that over time blossom into democratic demands that cannot be ignored.”  Statistically speaking, authoritarian regimes that are at least partially open “are the likeliest to become more democratic, especially if they provide for multiparty electoral competition.” Therefore, public engagement in the political process is important.
3. Armed rebellions rarely lead to a democratic government even when authoritarian regimes are overthrown. Instead, democratic transitions are more likely to succeed when civil society is engaged in mobilizing the masses through nonviolent protests like in Egypt and Tunisia.
4. Inclusive economic growth is critical. In bolstering economic reform, the international community “should support the economic policies of domestic reformers through development grants and loans, sovereign loan guarantees, and debt forgiveness.”
5. New democracies must demonstrate to citizens that they “can protect their core rights and establish fair economic and political rules.” “If people believe that legal systems and public institutions work for them, rather than against them, it gives them a stake in the system and a greater willingness to tolerate the inevitable turbulence of a transition,” they argue.
6. Rule of law is strengthened by devolving power to localities. It’s “not a panacea” but where there are well-established local governing institutions, power devolution can deepen democracies and mitigate secessionist movements.
7. Democratizing nations should rely on “good neighbors,” which include political and economic alliances, not just borders. Weak authoritarian neighbors can stunt democratic progress and must be compensated for through stronger alliances with those of positive influence.

Lefteris Pitarakis/Associated Press

On Monday, senior officials of the Group of Eight (G8) met for a two-day conference to draft a statement on the war in Syria acceptable to both Russia and to those who seek to depose President Bashar al-Assad. The meeting’s host, British Prime Minister David Cameron, stated that he hoped the gathering would lead to a joint declaration that would serve as the basis for future talks in Geneva. According to a Western official, Members of the G8 hope that Assad can be persuaded to send a representative to those discussions though the Geneva conference is now likely to be delayed until late August or September.

At the conclusion of the summit, the communique claimed, “We remain committed to achieving a political solution to the crisis based on a vision for a united, inclusive, and democratic Syria,” and call for the Geneva talks to be held “as soon as possible.” They also confirmed that additional contributions of almost $1.5 billion will be provided to meet humanitarian needs in Syria and in neighboring countries.

According to USA Today, Russian President Vladimir Putin told President Barack Obama during the meeting that he does not agree with Obama’s decision to provide military aid to Syrian rebels but supports negotiations to end Syria’s civil war. Obama later remarked, “We do have differing perspectives on the problem but we share an interest in reducing the violence, securing chemical weapons and ensuring that they’re neither used nor are they subject to proliferation,” adding that, “We want to try to resolve the issue through political means if possible.”

Meanwhile, Obama has received backlash at home after declaring he would provide more military assistance to the Syrian rebels in light of Assad’s use of chemical weapons. Representative Tom Cotton said he was not ready to sign off on a plan until he acquires more information on Obama’s proposal while Senator Rand Paul claimed America should cut off funding to the Syrian rebels and remove itself from the conflict altogether.

Photo Credit: Reuters/Marco Djurica

In an address to fellow members of parliament from Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AK Parti), Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ”defended the nation’s police and vowed to increase their powers to deal with unrest.”   Erdoğan said that the police have acted with “common sense” in response to the protests, although much of the criticism his government has faced since the protests began has related to police brutality. As the Prime Minister argued, “Firing tear gas is a most natural right of the police. Have they fired a bullet? Have they used guns?…[in the face of a] comprehensive and systematic movement of violence, [the police displayed an] unprecedented democratic stance and successfully passed the test of democracy.” Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç also mentioned on Monday that the government “could even use elements of the Turkish Armed Forces” to quell the protests if necessary.

The Prime Minister held two counter-protests in Ankara over the weekend, where he announced to a crowd of his supporters, “If anyone wants to see the real picture of Turkey, this is Turkey.” The Turkish government also began “working on legislation to restrict the use of Twitter and other social media” due to its role in facilitating the protests.

United States Secretary of State John Kerry discussed the protests with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu during their weekly phone call this week. According to State Department Spokeswoman Jen Psaki, the United States ”remain[s] focused on calling on all parties to ease tensions and to resolve the situation through dialogue, taking into account views from across the political spectrum. We also continue to urge all sides to exercise restraint and avoid violence.” Ms. Psaki also said that while she has not seen reports that the Turkish government is considering deploying the army to quell the protests, the State Department ”remain[s] concerned about any reports of activity including police brutality, including violence. There were some reports over the weekend about the prosecution of medical professionals who were treating injured people…all of these reports are greatly concerning and we’re very focused on monitoring closely.”

Photo Credit: the Royal Court

In a commencement speech at Mutah University’s Military Wing on Sunday, King Abdullah II of Jordan discussed domestic and regional challenges and emphasized the need for continued political reform.

King Abdullah pointed to those who doubt the genuine nature of Jordan’s political reforms as being a domestic challenge for the country. He said, “Among the domestic challenges, for example, are attempts by some to doubt the level of success on the political reform path because of lack of understanding or correct interpretation of the concerns, and because of the debate and sparring between political, ideological and partisan currents that accompanied the democratization process.” He added that the “will for positive change exists and is solid,” and described a “political reform roadmap” whereby parliament and the Lower House are given wider, consolidated political roles.

Jordan is also hosting over 500,000 Syrian refugees, facing a faltering economy, and dealing with the backlash from an Internet censorship law that went into effect earlier this month. In response to the law, Reporters Without Borders wrote King Abdullah a letter urging him to “restore access to the websites currently blocked within Jordan, and to rescind the recent press law’s repressive provisions, so that it guarantees freedom of information.”

In an op-ed for the LA Times, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s David Schenker describes the Internet censorship as an effort aimed at stabilizing the country by curbing “what it considers irresponsible reporting — on matters such as corruption — that incite citizens.” He noted that, in response to protests, 85 out of 150 MPs have signed a petition calling for a review of the law, and the minister of state for media affairs and communications Mohammad Momani announced that “the government might be willing to reconsider it.”

King Abdullah met on Monday with European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. They discussed the rising toll of the Syrian crisis and the impact of Israel’s settlement policy on the peace process.

Photo Credit: Reuters

Two Saudi Arabian women have been sentenced to ten months in jail and a two year travel ban for helping a Canadian woman leave her Saudi husband. Equality Now, an NGO dedicated to women’s rights, explained that the Canadian woman had begged Fawzia Al Ayuni and Wajiha Al Huaider to help her and her children flee. Ms. Al Huaider told Human Rights Watch that their involvement with Natalie Morin began in 2009 when her mother called the activists asking them to help her daughter who she claimed was being abused by her husband, Sa’eed al-Shahrani. The family lives in the Eastern Province city of Dammam.

The Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is also home to the majority of the country’s Shia population which has borne witness to two years of unrest writes Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His recent paper titled “The Forgotten Uprising in Eastern Saudi Arabia” outlines the history of “the regime’s sectarian discrimination against Shia and economic neglect and political marginalization of the region” and the Saudi government’s response to the unrest. The kingdom’s Shia population has demanded increased participation, the release of political prisoners, an elected consultative council and a constitution but the government has not responded adequately, explains Wehrey. To quell tensions and improve conditions in the Eastern Province, Wehrey recommends, among other things, the removal of Saudi troops from Bahrain, the repeal of sedition laws, and recognition of the Shia Jafari legal code. For a brief of Wehrey’s paper, click here.

Photo Credit: MPR Photo/Jeffrey Thompson

During the recent mark up of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (H.R. 1960), Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN) introduced an amendment (H.R. 4310) that would place certain restrictions on the sale of tear gas to transitioning countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The amendment reads, “None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to provide tear gas or other riot control items to the government of a country undergoing a transition to democracy in the Middle East or North Africa unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that the security forces of such government are not using excessive force to repress peaceful, lawful, and organized dissent.”  The amendment passed by voice vote on June 14, 2013. Rep. Ellison first proposed this amendment in the House version of the FY13 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill.

Human Rights First applauded Ellison’s action in a press release, and Human Rights First’s Robyn Lieberman said, “By screening for excessive force against peaceful protest, the amendment sets forth the proposition that the U.S. withhold the sale of crowd control items from human rights violators, rather than waiting for them to use U.S. weapons to commit abuses.  It’s time that U.S. arms transfers got in line with U.S. policy goals.”

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Mesut Özcan began his opening remarks by arguing that Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East always starts with its economic ties with its neighbors, mentioning the free trade agreements Turkey has signed with Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan in recent years, as well as the deep energy and other economic ties it has established with Russia and Georgia. Throughout its tenure as Turkey’s ruling party, Turkey has made its primary goals to build these ties gradually and over time to meet EU ascension criteria. The Arab Spring, however, affected Turkish foreign policy in general “not evolutionary, but revolutionary.” As the protests unfolded, Turkey realized that it had to side with the movements toward democracy in whatever way it could. However, it also had to recognize that Turkey’s policy towards one country undergoing a democratic transition would inherently be different from others. Turkey understood that in the Arab Spring, people not only demanded greater participation in their governments, but “greater services.” Thus, Turkey decided to build relationships with these new regimes, such as the one in Egypt, and redesign Turkey’s financial support for those countries after that. 

Şaban Kardaş opened by arguing that Turkey’s goal for its increased engagement with the Middle East over the last decade has always been part of an attempt to build a “regional structure” with itself at the center. He denied the suggestion that Turkey was turning away from the West, and shrugged off suggestions that its foreign policy is one that strictly adheres to the typical labels people attribute, such as “zero problems with neighbors” or “neo-Ottomanism,” but the real point is just to establish itself as a regional power. In fact, Ahmet Davutoğlu used the term “central power” to describe this strategy when he was an academic, not one of these other terms. With respect to the Arab Spring, Kardaş argued that Turkey’s approach has been similar to that of the West, and that the AK Parti has always worked to build present itself as pro-democracy and pro-transformation in support of those movements. However, the Arab Spring has also forced Turkey to abandon somewhat its goal to become a “neutral regional player” for the Middle East because civil wars in places like Libya and Syria have forced Turkey to take sides.  Turkey also has to deal with the widening sectarian divide across the region as a result of the Arab Spring.

Kardaş also denied that Turkey is ceding its relationship with the West in favor of expanded relations with the Middle East, arguing that Turkey cannot exert its power in the region without its ties to the West, as shown by Turkey’s stance on intervention in Syria. Finally, Kardaş argued that Turkey’s support for democracy in the Arab World in the wake of the Arab Spring means that Turkey must reaffirm its commitment to advancing democracy at home.

Before opening up the panel to questions from the audience, Christian Ostermann asked the panel how the Arab Spring has impacted Turkey-Israel relations. Mesut Özcan argued that stability in Israel’s relationship with Egypt “died with Mubarak[‘s regime]” and thus required Turkey to play a greater role in mediating between the two countries. He also mentioned that the conflict in Syria also affects Turkey’s relationship with Israel overall.

In response to a question on how Turkey, being a Sunni-majority country, has affected its relations with its Shi’a neighbors, Bülent Aras argued that Turkey has worked to improve its relations with Iran and Iraq, in addition to its Sunni-majority partners like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. However, its efforts with Shi’a-majority countries have obviously been less successful. Aras argued that states can talk and build ties, but have less power in repairing sectarian relations “at a societal level.” Mesut Özcan conceded that when it comes to repairing sectarian ties in countries like Iraq, for example, Sunni Iraqis will say Turkey needs to do more to counter the greater Shi’a influence in the country and form Iran, whereas Shi’a Iraqis will probably say Turkey is doing too much to balance against Shi’a power in the country. Thus, Turkey “cannot please everyone.” However, Şaban Kardaş argued that Turkey is “not just going to give up on fixing sectarianism” in the Middle East. In response to a question on Turkey’s role in the widening rift between Iraq and its Kurdish Regional Government, Özcan argued that Turkey has sought to build a relationship with all of Iraq, but the soured personal relationship between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has naturally made this plan more difficult.

Following a question regarding the characterization of the AK Parti’s foreign policy as “neo-Ottoman,” Kardaş argued that not even Foreign Minister Davutoğlu would call Turkish foreign policy “neo-Ottoman, and Turkey’s attempt to embrace its neighbors’ cultures and build economic ties with them as a strategy of building “regional depth” is just “classic geopolitics.” Aras argued that Turkey’s activist foreign policy with its neighbors as a stepping stone to becoming a world power is no different from what Brazil has done in Latin America.

Finally, after a question from the audience regarding the implications of the emerging protests all over the country directed against the AK Parti and the Prime Minister, Aras argued that the protests have become an urgent issue for Erdoğan the way the Kurdish issue has. He also argued that they are, to an extent, “a rhetorical issue” that other countries will use against Turkey, as it is the only reality in Turkey that is broadcast eight to nine hours a day on American television. However, he ultimately thinks that Erdoğan will grant concessions to the protesters. Kardaş argued that the identities of the protesters are far more varied than most people understand: originally, most of the protesters were environmentalists dissatisfied with the plans to develop the park, and have since expanded to “fringe Marxists and Leninists” who have done “most of the vandalism” since the protests began, as well as to people who were already staging protests in Taksim, particularly those who feel isolated in Turkey’s political system and are looking to “engage their demands.”