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      <title>Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</title>
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      <description>Table of Contents for Process Safety Progress. List of articles from both the latest and EarlyView issues.</description>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 08:02:28 +0000</pubDate>
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      <dc:title>Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</dc:title>
      <dc:publisher>Wiley</dc:publisher>
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         <title>Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</title>
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         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70067?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 04:53:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T04:53:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>Issue Information</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 145-146, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
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         <dc:creator/>
         <category>ISSUE INFORMATION</category>
         <dc:title>Issue Information</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70067</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70067</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70067?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ISSUE INFORMATION</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>45</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
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      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70047?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 04:53:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T04:53:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
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         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70047</guid>
         <title>ISD (inherently safer design) considerations for blue ammonia projects</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 182-191, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
As the energy industry is exploring new opportunities in the blue ammonia productions, there is the need to increase awareness of the opportunity to incorporate inherently safer design (ISD) considerations particularly in the front end of the project development where there is the greatest opportunity to implement ISD measures. The hazards associated with each of these process modules may not always be well recognized. As a result, the pre‐FEED (front‐end engineering design) phase may miss the greatest opportunity to introduce corresponding ISD measures that will greatly reduce the required engineering barriers in the later project phases. The aim of this paper is to illustrate a risk‐based approach to this process, starting with hazard identification, followed by ISD goal identification and implementation. This paper will also highlight key lessons learned, including important ISD measures that may be missed by typical engineering contractors, and the key focus areas that process safety engineers should address in pre‐FEED to mitigate process safety risks in a typical integrated blue ammonia production facility.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As the energy industry is exploring new opportunities in the blue ammonia productions, there is the need to increase awareness of the opportunity to incorporate inherently safer design (ISD) considerations particularly in the front end of the project development where there is the greatest opportunity to implement ISD measures. The hazards associated with each of these process modules may not always be well recognized. As a result, the pre-FEED (front-end engineering design) phase may miss the greatest opportunity to introduce corresponding ISD measures that will greatly reduce the required engineering barriers in the later project phases. The aim of this paper is to illustrate a risk-based approach to this process, starting with hazard identification, followed by ISD goal identification and implementation. This paper will also highlight key lessons learned, including important ISD measures that may be missed by typical engineering contractors, and the key focus areas that process safety engineers should address in pre-FEED to mitigate process safety risks in a typical integrated blue ammonia production facility.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Chee Seang Ong
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>ISD (inherently safer design) considerations for blue ammonia projects</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70047</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70047</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70047?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>45</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70048?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 04:53:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T04:53:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
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         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70048</guid>
         <title>Chemical compatibility of fuming nitric acid, fuming sulfuric acid, and their mixtures with metals</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 192-200, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Fuming nitric acid and fuming sulfuric acid, as critical industrial chemicals, can exhibit high reactivity with metals, posing significant thermal safety risks. This study systematically evaluated the thermal stability of fuming nitric acid, fuming sulfuric acid, and their mixed acid, alongside their chemical compatibility with common structural metals. Utilizing differential scanning calorimetry with custom glass crucibles effectively prevented side reactions with the container, allowing for precise characterization of thermal behavior. Findings revealed that while none of the three acids exhibited exothermic decomposition, their thermal stability varied. Metal compatibility results were distinct: gold was inert across all systems; titanium demonstrated good compatibility only with fuming nitric acid, reacting exothermically with the others; both aluminum and copper triggered vigorous exothermic reactions in all acids, indicating a high thermal runaway risk—the copper/mixed acid system further displayed autocatalytic behavior; the stainless steels showed complex, composition‐dependent reactivity.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fuming nitric acid and fuming sulfuric acid, as critical industrial chemicals, can exhibit high reactivity with metals, posing significant thermal safety risks. This study systematically evaluated the thermal stability of fuming nitric acid, fuming sulfuric acid, and their mixed acid, alongside their chemical compatibility with common structural metals. Utilizing differential scanning calorimetry with custom glass crucibles effectively prevented side reactions with the container, allowing for precise characterization of thermal behavior. Findings revealed that while none of the three acids exhibited exothermic decomposition, their thermal stability varied. Metal compatibility results were distinct: gold was inert across all systems; titanium demonstrated good compatibility only with fuming nitric acid, reacting exothermically with the others; both aluminum and copper triggered vigorous exothermic reactions in all acids, indicating a high thermal runaway risk—the copper/mixed acid system further displayed autocatalytic behavior; the stainless steels showed complex, composition-dependent reactivity.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Yang Cheng, 
Hongyong Xu, 
Xin Li, 
Junjun Tian, 
Guanghai Li, 
Min Sheng, 
Fangfang Wang
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Chemical compatibility of fuming nitric acid, fuming sulfuric acid, and their mixtures with metals</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70048</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70048</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70048?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>45</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70056?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 04:53:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T04:53:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70056</guid>
         <title>Incident investigation as a key tool in risk management</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 178-181, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This paper details the development and implementation of Element 17 (Incident Investigation) at the Brinsa chemical plant. The authors highlight the unwavering commitment to process safety and the progress toward a robust management system at a small facility. Over 7 years of implementation, crucial support from management lines has been instrumental in achieving remarkable results. The importance of incident investigation is highlighted not only for identifying root causes and preventing future recurrences, but also as a catalyst for the continuous development and improvement of the process safety management system. The integration of this tool into the CCPS RBSP framework at Brinsa has made it possible to address not only specific safety issues but also to strengthen the safety culture and improve the response capacity to potential risks. The case study derived from Brinsa's internal investigation vividly illustrates the importance of proactively addressing plant‐specific risks. In this context, detailed instructions were developed for the safe delivery of critical equipment during major maintenance, a task that had previously raised concerns about potential chlorine exposure. The interdisciplinary and thoughtful approach applied in developing these instructions allowed for consideration of all relevant variables, from proper equipment handling to mitigating potential hazardous substance leaks. The successful testing of these instructions in 2023 not only validated their effectiveness but also demonstrated Brinsa's ongoing commitment to the safety of its operations. This study demonstrates how incident investigation, when used effectively, is not only a reactive tool, but also a fundamental pillar for proactive risk management and the promotion of a safe and resilient work environment in the chemical industry.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This paper details the development and implementation of Element 17 (Incident Investigation) at the Brinsa chemical plant. The authors highlight the unwavering commitment to process safety and the progress toward a robust management system at a small facility. Over 7 years of implementation, crucial support from management lines has been instrumental in achieving remarkable results. The importance of incident investigation is highlighted not only for identifying root causes and preventing future recurrences, but also as a catalyst for the continuous development and improvement of the process safety management system. The integration of this tool into the CCPS RBSP framework at Brinsa has made it possible to address not only specific safety issues but also to strengthen the safety culture and improve the response capacity to potential risks. The case study derived from Brinsa's internal investigation vividly illustrates the importance of proactively addressing plant-specific risks. In this context, detailed instructions were developed for the safe delivery of critical equipment during major maintenance, a task that had previously raised concerns about potential chlorine exposure. The interdisciplinary and thoughtful approach applied in developing these instructions allowed for consideration of all relevant variables, from proper equipment handling to mitigating potential hazardous substance leaks. The successful testing of these instructions in 2023 not only validated their effectiveness but also demonstrated Brinsa's ongoing commitment to the safety of its operations. This study demonstrates how incident investigation, when used effectively, is not only a reactive tool, but also a fundamental pillar for proactive risk management and the promotion of a safe and resilient work environment in the chemical industry.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Oscar Fabian Garzón Tiempos, 
John Fredy Diaz Gómez
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Incident investigation as a key tool in risk management</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70056</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70056</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70056?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>45</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70059?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 04:53:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T04:53:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70059</guid>
         <title>Explaining persistent management of change underperformance in a safety‐critical gas organization</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 168-177, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Management of change (MOC) is a critical process safety control used to govern engineering and organizational modifications in safety‐critical systems; however, despite widespread procedural adoption, it often underperforms in practice. This study identifies the organizational and managerial mechanisms that erode the practical authority of MOC and provides insight into strengthening change governance. A qualitative explanatory study was conducted in a safety‐critical gas distribution organization. Twenty‐two semi‐structured interviews with managers, supervisors, and HSE and technical experts were analyzed using inductive content analysis, followed by realist synthesis based on context–mechanism–outcome configurations. Findings show that MOC degradation is primarily driven by governance erosion rather than isolated procedural gaps. Organizational conditions triggered mechanisms such as managerial disengagement, discretionary enforcement, formalistic compliance, and risk‐signal dilution, leading to outcomes including informal change implementation, bypassed HSE review, superficial documentation, and incomplete closure. Training and documentation gaps were identified as downstream consequences of weakened decision authority. Overall, MOC underperformance is best understood as a gradual loss of practical authority rather than a simple compliance issue. Improving effectiveness requires embedding MOC as a mandatory approval gate within managerial decision‐making and reinforcing accountability and consistent enforcement.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Management of change (MOC) is a critical process safety control used to govern engineering and organizational modifications in safety-critical systems; however, despite widespread procedural adoption, it often underperforms in practice. This study identifies the organizational and managerial mechanisms that erode the practical authority of MOC and provides insight into strengthening change governance. A qualitative explanatory study was conducted in a safety-critical gas distribution organization. Twenty-two semi-structured interviews with managers, supervisors, and HSE and technical experts were analyzed using inductive content analysis, followed by realist synthesis based on context–mechanism–outcome configurations. Findings show that MOC degradation is primarily driven by governance erosion rather than isolated procedural gaps. Organizational conditions triggered mechanisms such as managerial disengagement, discretionary enforcement, formalistic compliance, and risk-signal dilution, leading to outcomes including informal change implementation, bypassed HSE review, superficial documentation, and incomplete closure. Training and documentation gaps were identified as downstream consequences of weakened decision authority. Overall, MOC underperformance is best understood as a gradual loss of practical authority rather than a simple compliance issue. Improving effectiveness requires embedding MOC as a mandatory approval gate within managerial decision-making and reinforcing accountability and consistent enforcement.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Saba Saei, 
Omid Akbarzadeh, 
Parisa Moshashaei, 
Saber Azami‐Aghdash, 
Seyed Shamseddin Alizadeh
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Explaining persistent management of change underperformance in a safety‐critical gas organization</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70059</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70059</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70059?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>45</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70060?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 04:53:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T04:53:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70060</guid>
         <title>A holistic risk identification approach for LPG storage systems using a combination of HAZOP, fuzzy FTA, ETA, and FMECA methods</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 149-159, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The safe operation of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) storage systems is critical due to the potential hazards. This paper develops a comprehensive risk assessment framework to improve the safety evaluation of LPG storage systems in Algeria. First, hazard and operability study (HAZOP) identifies possible hazards and consequences, which are then assigned as top events in the fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA) in order to address the inherent uncertainties. Subsequently, event tree analysis (ETA) evaluates different accident scenarios and consequence pathways. Finally, the results are transformed into a failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) framework, where basic events are assessed to prioritize risks and recommend mitigation measures. By combining HAZOP's systematic hazard identification, FFTA's uncertainty handling, ETA's consequence mapping, and FMECA's risk prioritization, the proposed framework offers a holistic approach that is both robust and adaptable. The proposed methodology is applied to an Algerian LPG storage facility, demonstrating its effectiveness in identifying high‐risk and providing actionable safety improvements. A comparison with a standard FTA/ETA methodology is applied to validate the approach.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The safe operation of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) storage systems is critical due to the potential hazards. This paper develops a comprehensive risk assessment framework to improve the safety evaluation of LPG storage systems in Algeria. First, hazard and operability study (HAZOP) identifies possible hazards and consequences, which are then assigned as top events in the fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA) in order to address the inherent uncertainties. Subsequently, event tree analysis (ETA) evaluates different accident scenarios and consequence pathways. Finally, the results are transformed into a failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) framework, where basic events are assessed to prioritize risks and recommend mitigation measures. By combining HAZOP's systematic hazard identification, FFTA's uncertainty handling, ETA's consequence mapping, and FMECA's risk prioritization, the proposed framework offers a holistic approach that is both robust and adaptable. The proposed methodology is applied to an Algerian LPG storage facility, demonstrating its effectiveness in identifying high-risk and providing actionable safety improvements. A comparison with a standard FTA/ETA methodology is applied to validate the approach.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Ammar Chakhrit, 
Nour El Houda Benharkat, 
Mohammed Wadi
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>A holistic risk identification approach for LPG storage systems using a combination of HAZOP, fuzzy FTA, ETA, and FMECA methods</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70060</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70060</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70060?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>45</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70061?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 04:53:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T04:53:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70061</guid>
         <title>Thermal stability evaluation of chemicals by DSC: Impact of crucible types and recommendation by ASTM E537‐24</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 201-212, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) measurements of chemical thermal stability are highly sensitive to test conditions, which can compromise data accuracy. In accordance with ASTM E537‐24, this study systematically evaluated the effects of crucible types and headspace gases (nitrogen vs. air) on DSC results, and elucidated the underlying mechanisms responsible for these effects. The results show that non‐sealed and pin‐holed crucibles lead to sample loss and distorted heat‐flow data, while air atmospheres introduce oxidative interference. High‐pressure gold‐plated crucibles meet the core requirements of ASTM E537‐24; however, their relatively large headspace and specific surface area of sample promote evaporation. To ensure data reliability, the ratio of total internal volume to sample volume must be kept at 5 or less, which, for certain energetic compounds, increases the risk of container rupture during the test. To overcome these limitations, a flame‐sealed glass capillary crucible (5 μL volume) was introduced, enabling precise and safe testing with minimal sample quantities. Validation using 2,4,6‐TNT confirmed that this approach achieves results in excellent agreement with theoretical values, and the method enhances both accuracy and safety. The study provides experimental guidance for optimizing DSC test conditions and improving the fidelity of thermal‐stability evaluations under ASTM E537‐24.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) measurements of chemical thermal stability are highly sensitive to test conditions, which can compromise data accuracy. In accordance with ASTM E537-24, this study systematically evaluated the effects of crucible types and headspace gases (nitrogen vs. air) on DSC results, and elucidated the underlying mechanisms responsible for these effects. The results show that non-sealed and pin-holed crucibles lead to sample loss and distorted heat-flow data, while air atmospheres introduce oxidative interference. High-pressure gold-plated crucibles meet the core requirements of ASTM E537-24; however, their relatively large headspace and specific surface area of sample promote evaporation. To ensure data reliability, the ratio of total internal volume to sample volume must be kept at 5 or less, which, for certain energetic compounds, increases the risk of container rupture during the test. To overcome these limitations, a flame-sealed glass capillary crucible (5 μL volume) was introduced, enabling precise and safe testing with minimal sample quantities. Validation using 2,4,6-TNT confirmed that this approach achieves results in excellent agreement with theoretical values, and the method enhances both accuracy and safety. The study provides experimental guidance for optimizing DSC test conditions and improving the fidelity of thermal-stability evaluations under ASTM E537-24.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Weiye Li, 
Shuangkui Li, 
Jinjun Wang, 
Youwei Chen, 
Chengke Wang, 
Xiaobao Lv, 
Min Sheng
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Thermal stability evaluation of chemicals by DSC: Impact of crucible types and recommendation by ASTM E537‐24</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70061</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70061</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70061?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>45</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70063?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 04:53:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T04:53:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70063</guid>
         <title>Light transmission and deposition rates in combustible dust clouds</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 213-222, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
A commonly applied “rule of thumb” for combustible dust is that a light bulb would be nearly obscured by a 6‐foot‐thick cloud of dust if the dust density was near that required to be explosible (i.e., the minimum explosible concentration [MEC]). This heuristic is based on Eckhoff's normative text on this topic: “a cloud of 40 g/m3 of coal dust in air is so dense that a glowing 25‐W lightbulb can hardly be seen through a dust cloud 2 m thick.” The coal dust cloud described by Eckhoff would be close to the MEC. This heuristic is well known, and the author has used it repeatedly to illustrate how dense a dust cloud must be to be explosible. This paper demonstrates the heuristic is correct by evaluating light transmission fractions for combustible dust clouds over a range of densities and thicknesses. Large‐scale open‐air tests are presented to illustrate the appearance of an explosible dust cloud. It is also shown that horizontal surface dust deposition rates at cloud densities well below the MEC would create an intolerable housekeeping burden, and that the highest density tolerable from a worker respiratory protection standpoint is over 3 orders of magnitude less than the MEC.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A commonly applied “rule of thumb” for combustible dust is that a light bulb would be nearly obscured by a 6-foot-thick cloud of dust if the dust density was near that required to be explosible (i.e., the minimum explosible concentration [MEC]). This heuristic is based on Eckhoff's normative text on this topic: “a cloud of 40 g/m&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt; of coal dust in air is so dense that a glowing 25-W lightbulb can hardly be seen through a dust cloud 2 m thick.” The coal dust cloud described by Eckhoff would be close to the MEC. This heuristic is well known, and the author has used it repeatedly to illustrate how dense a dust cloud must be to be explosible. This paper demonstrates the heuristic is correct by evaluating light transmission fractions for combustible dust clouds over a range of densities and thicknesses. Large-scale open-air tests are presented to illustrate the appearance of an explosible dust cloud. It is also shown that horizontal surface dust deposition rates at cloud densities well below the MEC would create an intolerable housekeeping burden, and that the highest density tolerable from a worker respiratory protection standpoint is over 3 orders of magnitude less than the MEC.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
J. Kelly Thomas
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Light transmission and deposition rates in combustible dust clouds</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70063</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70063</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70063?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>45</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70065?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 04:53:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T04:53:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70065</guid>
         <title>A multi‐criteria risk assessment methodology for industrial risks</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 160-167, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Traditional risk assessment methodologies for major industrial hazards predominantly rely on the binary combination of probability and severity. This paper proposes a comprehensive multi‐criteria risk assessment methodology integrating six key indicators: occurrence probability, hazardous phenomenon intensity, phenomenon kinetics, target exposure, target vulnerability, and non‐detectability. Each indicator is evaluated on a standardized 1–10 scale, enabling the integration of both qualitative and quantitative data. The methodology incorporates the ALARP principle through three risk tolerance zones (Acceptable, ALARP, Unacceptable). The methodology is applied to a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) scenario of an LPG storage sphere at the Hassi R'Mel industrial complex in Algeria. The results demonstrate that the proposed approach provides more nuanced risk characterization than traditional methods, with the radar chart visualization offering intuitive comparison of risk profiles. A 16.7% reduction in risk was achieved through inventory limitation, moving the scenario from Unacceptable to the ALARP zone, thereby validating the methodology's practical utility for industrial risk management.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Traditional risk assessment methodologies for major industrial hazards predominantly rely on the binary combination of probability and severity. This paper proposes a comprehensive multi-criteria risk assessment methodology integrating six key indicators: occurrence probability, hazardous phenomenon intensity, phenomenon kinetics, target exposure, target vulnerability, and non-detectability. Each indicator is evaluated on a standardized 1–10 scale, enabling the integration of both qualitative and quantitative data. The methodology incorporates the ALARP principle through three risk tolerance zones (Acceptable, ALARP, Unacceptable). The methodology is applied to a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) scenario of an LPG storage sphere at the Hassi R'Mel industrial complex in Algeria. The results demonstrate that the proposed approach provides more nuanced risk characterization than traditional methods, with the radar chart visualization offering intuitive comparison of risk profiles. A 16.7% reduction in risk was achieved through inventory limitation, moving the scenario from Unacceptable to the ALARP zone, thereby validating the methodology's practical utility for industrial risk management.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Mouaadh Hassani, 
Hamza Zerrouki, 
Mohamed Seddik Hellas, 
Rachid Chaib
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>A multi‐criteria risk assessment methodology for industrial risks</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70065</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70065</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70065?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>45</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70062?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 04:53:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T04:53:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70062</guid>
         <title>Process safety primer—CCPS tools: Golden rules and key principles</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 147-148, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Albert Ness
</dc:creator>
         <category>EDUCATION</category>
         <dc:title>Process safety primer—CCPS tools: Golden rules and key principles</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70062</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70062</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70062?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>EDUCATION</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>45</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70066?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 18:55:23 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-13T06:55:23-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70066</guid>
         <title>Impact of metal corrosion on the process safety of foam fire suppression system</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The long‐term storage of foam extinguishing agent may lead to metal corrosion, which poses substantial risks to the safety and operational reliability of fire suppression systems. This study systematically investigated the performance evolution of foam extinguishing agent interacting with aluminum alloys through accelerated aging tests under elevated temperatures. The results showed that the aluminum alloy surface underwent significant corrosion. Meanwhile, the expansion ratio of the foam decreased by 37.46% and 12.84%, accompanied by precipitation and gelation. Molecular dynamics simulation revealed the mechanism by which aluminum ions coordinate and bridge with xanthan gum through electrostatic interactions, leading to foam concentrate changes. Fire suppression tests demonstrated that prolonged contact between the foam extinguishing agent and metal materials leads to performance deterioration. Moreover, the aged extinguishing agent exhibited poor miscibility with water during discharge, thereby hindering the effective progression of the fire suppression process. The findings highlight the critical importance of compatibility between foam agent and metallic material in process safety management. These results provide a scientific basis for the full life‐cycle management of foam extinguishing agent and the maintenance of system reliability.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The long-term storage of foam extinguishing agent may lead to metal corrosion, which poses substantial risks to the safety and operational reliability of fire suppression systems. This study systematically investigated the performance evolution of foam extinguishing agent interacting with aluminum alloys through accelerated aging tests under elevated temperatures. The results showed that the aluminum alloy surface underwent significant corrosion. Meanwhile, the expansion ratio of the foam decreased by 37.46% and 12.84%, accompanied by precipitation and gelation. Molecular dynamics simulation revealed the mechanism by which aluminum ions coordinate and bridge with xanthan gum through electrostatic interactions, leading to foam concentrate changes. Fire suppression tests demonstrated that prolonged contact between the foam extinguishing agent and metal materials leads to performance deterioration. Moreover, the aged extinguishing agent exhibited poor miscibility with water during discharge, thereby hindering the effective progression of the fire suppression process. The findings highlight the critical importance of compatibility between foam agent and metallic material in process safety management. These results provide a scientific basis for the full life-cycle management of foam extinguishing agent and the maintenance of system reliability.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Kai Wang, 
Qihang Yue, 
Peiyao Chen, 
Xikang Zhang, 
Lichen Zhang, 
Zhengyang Wang, 
Wei Wang, 
Liming Hu, 
Biao Zhou
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Impact of metal corrosion on the process safety of foam fire suppression system</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70066</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70066</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70066?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70058?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 00:30:59 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-30T12:30:59-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70058</guid>
         <title>Integrating operational and organizational change management—Success in the organizational cultural environment</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The adoption and evolution of operational change management, based on element 13 of the RBPS (CCPS), has marked a turning point at Brinsa. This process, built from the ground up with active workforce participation, has not only optimized operational safety and efficiency but has also been the catalyst for the development of a comprehensive organizational change management program, led by the Human Resources team. This paper shows how the participatory methodology initially employed, facilitated by a small technological application that allowed operational staff to identify opportunities for improvement, fostered a work environment where each member feels integral to the safety process. The interdisciplinary interaction between leaders and experts from different areas reinforced this approach, allowing for effective evaluation and execution of the MOC's. This process not only ensured rigorous monitoring of the initiatives and the updating of documentation but also reaffirmed the importance of change as a positive and fundamental element for organizational progress. The experience gained from this participatory approach and its successful operational implementation have taught the organization the invaluable value of understanding and embracing change, according to the authors' analysis. The sequential and structured development of the Change Management program not only maintained operational control but also elevated ownership and collaboration to unprecedented levels, establishing a replicable model for integrating operational and organizational change management. This case study demonstrates how the synergy between operational and organizational change management can strengthen safety culture, foster continuous innovation, and substantially improve efficiency across Brinsa.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The adoption and evolution of operational change management, based on element 13 of the RBPS (CCPS), has marked a turning point at Brinsa. This process, built from the ground up with active workforce participation, has not only optimized operational safety and efficiency but has also been the catalyst for the development of a comprehensive organizational change management program, led by the Human Resources team. This paper shows how the participatory methodology initially employed, facilitated by a small technological application that allowed operational staff to identify opportunities for improvement, fostered a work environment where each member feels integral to the safety process. The interdisciplinary interaction between leaders and experts from different areas reinforced this approach, allowing for effective evaluation and execution of the MOC's. This process not only ensured rigorous monitoring of the initiatives and the updating of documentation but also reaffirmed the importance of change as a positive and fundamental element for organizational progress. The experience gained from this participatory approach and its successful operational implementation have taught the organization the invaluable value of understanding and embracing change, according to the authors' analysis. The sequential and structured development of the Change Management program not only maintained operational control but also elevated ownership and collaboration to unprecedented levels, establishing a replicable model for integrating operational and organizational change management. This case study demonstrates how the synergy between operational and organizational change management can strengthen safety culture, foster continuous innovation, and substantially improve efficiency across Brinsa.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Oscar Fabian Garzón Tiempos, 
John Fredy Diaz Gómez
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Integrating operational and organizational change management—Success in the organizational cultural environment</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70058</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70058</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70058?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70057?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 00:11:51 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-30T12:11:51-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70057</guid>
         <title>From organizational failure to systemic prevention: A 24Model analysis of university laboratory accidents</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Within the complex environment of university laboratories that integrate teaching and research, the direct cause of accidents in university laboratories is often manifested in human error, but their root causes often reside in organizational defects. To develop targeted prevention strategies, this study applies the 24Model, an accident causation model, to examine 35 Chinese laboratory safety accidents, aiming to systematically analyze the causal relationship between accidents and various influencing factors. By categorizing the influencing factors into immediate, indirect, radical, and root causes, this study statistically identifies the specific manifestations and frequencies of unsafe factors revealing that cultivating a good safety culture and building a robust management system are key to ensuring laboratory safety at the root. Then, a series of systematic prevention strategies is proposed, providing practical guidance for laboratory safety managers to implement root cause governance and enhance overall safety at the organizational level.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Within the complex environment of university laboratories that integrate teaching and research, the direct cause of accidents in university laboratories is often manifested in human error, but their root causes often reside in organizational defects. To develop targeted prevention strategies, this study applies the 24Model, an accident causation model, to examine 35 Chinese laboratory safety accidents, aiming to systematically analyze the causal relationship between accidents and various influencing factors. By categorizing the influencing factors into immediate, indirect, radical, and root causes, this study statistically identifies the specific manifestations and frequencies of unsafe factors revealing that cultivating a good safety culture and building a robust management system are key to ensuring laboratory safety at the root. Then, a series of systematic prevention strategies is proposed, providing practical guidance for laboratory safety managers to implement root cause governance and enhance overall safety at the organizational level.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Xiaomei Chen
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>From organizational failure to systemic prevention: A 24Model analysis of university laboratory accidents</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70057</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70057</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70057?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70055?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 09 Mar 2026 22:24:49 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-09T10:24:49-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70055</guid>
         <title>AIChE's Center for Chemical Process Safety: Forty years driving process safety globally</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
On the night of December 2–3, 1984, water contamination of a tank of methyl isocyanate in Bhopal, India initiated a series of events that led to a catastrophic toxic release, killing more than 20,000 residents and injuring more than 200,000. Immediately after, leaders from the chemical industry asked AIChE to lead a collaborative effort to eliminate catastrophic process incidents by advancing the state‐of‐the‐art in technology and management practices, serving as the premier resource for information on process safety, supporting process safety in engineering, and promoting process safety as a key industry value. In the spring of 1985, CCPS was founded. Since that time, CCPS has incorporated experience‐based learning from major and minor accidents and near‐misses into a world‐class collection of guideline documents, resource books, and online content. This paper will reflect on 40 years of CCPS's accomplishments.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On the night of December 2–3, 1984, water contamination of a tank of methyl isocyanate in Bhopal, India initiated a series of events that led to a catastrophic toxic release, killing more than 20,000 residents and injuring more than 200,000. Immediately after, leaders from the chemical industry asked AIChE to lead a collaborative effort to eliminate catastrophic process incidents by advancing the state-of-the-art in technology and management practices, serving as the premier resource for information on process safety, supporting process safety in engineering, and promoting process safety as a key industry value. In the spring of 1985, CCPS was founded. Since that time, CCPS has incorporated experience-based learning from major and minor accidents and near-misses into a world-class collection of guideline documents, resource books, and online content. This paper will reflect on 40 years of CCPS's accomplishments.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Scott Berger, 
Louisa Nara
</dc:creator>
         <category>EDUCATION</category>
         <dc:title>AIChE's Center for Chemical Process Safety: Forty years driving process safety globally</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70055</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70055</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70055?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>EDUCATION</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70053?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 22:19:11 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-06T10:19:11-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70053</guid>
         <title>Thermal in‐breathing of atmospheric storage tanks for Power‐to‐X applications</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Storage tanks are generally exposed to overpressure or vacuum, caused by prolonged exposure to solar radiation or a sudden ambient temperature drop in combination with intense rainfalls. Maintaining control over overpressure and vacuum in the headspace is essential for tanks containing volatile media to prevent tank rupture and tank collapse, respectively. Several products of Power‐to‐X applications like methanol or ethanol are very volatile, and storage tank headspaces may experience not just vapor contraction but also sustained condensation when subjected to extreme rainfalls. Methanol and ethanol are not specific to Power‐to‐X, but these technologies have gained traction in Europe and elsewhere to minimize fossil fuel consumption and reduce carbon footprint. Power‐to‐X converts excess electricity, typically from renewable sources, into energy carriers, chemical products, or e‐fuels. In recent years, Europe has experienced extremely hot summers with prolonged droughts, eventually followed by intense storms and floods. In this article, the authors examine the effects of extreme weather with focus on in‐breathing of storage tanks for Power‐to‐X applications. For this purpose, field measurements on storage tanks simulating extreme weather events are presented. Finally, a numerical model calculating the required thermal in‐breathing for atmospheric storage tanks is described and validated with those measurements.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Storage tanks are generally exposed to overpressure or vacuum, caused by prolonged exposure to solar radiation or a sudden ambient temperature drop in combination with intense rainfalls. Maintaining control over overpressure and vacuum in the headspace is essential for tanks containing volatile media to prevent tank rupture and tank collapse, respectively. Several products of Power-to-X applications like methanol or ethanol are very volatile, and storage tank headspaces may experience not just vapor contraction but also sustained condensation when subjected to extreme rainfalls. Methanol and ethanol are not specific to Power-to-X, but these technologies have gained traction in Europe and elsewhere to minimize fossil fuel consumption and reduce carbon footprint. Power-to-X converts excess electricity, typically from renewable sources, into energy carriers, chemical products, or e-fuels. In recent years, Europe has experienced extremely hot summers with prolonged droughts, eventually followed by intense storms and floods. In this article, the authors examine the effects of extreme weather with focus on in-breathing of storage tanks for Power-to-X applications. For this purpose, field measurements on storage tanks simulating extreme weather events are presented. Finally, a numerical model calculating the required thermal in-breathing for atmospheric storage tanks is described and validated with those measurements.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Nourou Alidou, 
Davide Moncalvo, 
Michael Davies, 
Roman Weber
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Thermal in‐breathing of atmospheric storage tanks for Power‐to‐X applications</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70053</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70053</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70053?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70051?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 20:39:53 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-05T08:39:53-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70051</guid>
         <title>Evaluation of BLEVE models on TTF basis</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Several models have been developed over the years to model the thermal response of vessels containing liquids exposed to high heat fluxes. Accurately modeling the heat transfer through liquid‐containing vessels is an important step in evaluating the potential for a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Cloud Explosion (BLEVE) at Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) processing and storage facilities. Primarily, these models are used to evaluate whether a BLEVE may occur or not; additionally, these models may be used to predict the time to failure (TTF) for a given scenario. TTF can provide a valuable metric in the process of emergency response planning and increasing plant safety. However, due to the varying assumptions that are made while developing transient heat transfer models, different models can result in drastically different predictions. While this paper briefly evaluates conventional BLEVE models and published TTF probit functions, its primary contribution is the development of a novel empirical equation derived from multivariate regression analysis. This data‐driven approach addresses limitations in existing probit equations.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several models have been developed over the years to model the thermal response of vessels containing liquids exposed to high heat fluxes. Accurately modeling the heat transfer through liquid-containing vessels is an important step in evaluating the potential for a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Cloud Explosion (BLEVE) at Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) processing and storage facilities. Primarily, these models are used to evaluate whether a BLEVE may occur or not; additionally, these models may be used to predict the time to failure (TTF) for a given scenario. TTF can provide a valuable metric in the process of emergency response planning and increasing plant safety. However, due to the varying assumptions that are made while developing transient heat transfer models, different models can result in drastically different predictions. While this paper briefly evaluates conventional BLEVE models and published TTF probit functions, its primary contribution is the development of a novel empirical equation derived from multivariate regression analysis. This data-driven approach addresses limitations in existing probit equations.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Thomas Butts, 
Filippo Gavelli
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Evaluation of BLEVE models on TTF basis</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70051</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70051</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70051?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70043?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 21:34:19 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-02T09:34:19-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70043</guid>
         <title>PHA evaluation using loss prevention principles from RAGAGEP</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Connecting RAGAGEP within Hazard Studies to Enhance Safety and Reliability. Process Hazard Analyses (PHA) are integral to hazard identification and risk assessment. Their structured and multidisciplinary approaches allow for the design and evaluation of safety barriers tailored to prevent and mitigate major accident hazards in both new and existing facilities. However, the effectiveness of these barriers relies heavily on adherence to Recognized and Generally Accepted Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP), which are foundational for reducing incidents in safety‐critical systems. RAGAGEP establishes consistent engineering and administrative controls based on widely accepted industry standards. By applying RAGAGEP in PHA studies, companies achieve more robust and reliable safety measures that capture the complexity of potential major accidents and address real operational scenarios, not only theoretical approaches. This adherence not only aligns with regulatory expectations but also promotes the ALARP principle, ensuring that safety risks are minimized. The review of safety barriers under RAGAGEP‐guided PHA scenarios helps identify overlooked hazards, chronic operational issues, and changes made post‐design, providing a comprehensive risk assessment. Ultimately, this approach builds resilience within operations, minimizing the uncertainty of safety barrier effectiveness and offering greater protection to personnel, the environment, and the facility's operational integrity.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Connecting RAGAGEP within Hazard Studies to Enhance Safety and Reliability. Process Hazard Analyses (PHA) are integral to hazard identification and risk assessment. Their structured and multidisciplinary approaches allow for the design and evaluation of safety barriers tailored to prevent and mitigate major accident hazards in both new and existing facilities. However, the effectiveness of these barriers relies heavily on adherence to Recognized and Generally Accepted Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP), which are foundational for reducing incidents in safety-critical systems. RAGAGEP establishes consistent engineering and administrative controls based on widely accepted industry standards. By applying RAGAGEP in PHA studies, companies achieve more robust and reliable safety measures that capture the complexity of potential major accidents and address real operational scenarios, not only theoretical approaches. This adherence not only aligns with regulatory expectations but also promotes the ALARP principle, ensuring that safety risks are minimized. The review of safety barriers under RAGAGEP-guided PHA scenarios helps identify overlooked hazards, chronic operational issues, and changes made post-design, providing a comprehensive risk assessment. Ultimately, this approach builds resilience within operations, minimizing the uncertainty of safety barrier effectiveness and offering greater protection to personnel, the environment, and the facility's operational integrity.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Lueci Vasconcelos do Vale, 
Lucas S. Andrade A. Almeida
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>PHA evaluation using loss prevention principles from RAGAGEP</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70043</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70043</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70043?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70049?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2026 19:47:54 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-27T07:47:54-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70049</guid>
         <title>Job risk assessment system and operational framework improvement for chemical accident prevention: A study and pilot application of manufacturing industry</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Outsourced maintenance in South Korea's chemical industry exposes subcontractor workers to complex risks such as fires, explosions, and chemical exposure, as existing safety standards often fail as practical control systems. This study and pilot application addresses these gaps through a case study of a manufacturing company, implementing an improved operational framework centered on a collaborative, job safety analysis (JSA)‐based risk assessment process. This framework institutionalizes a joint review process between the primary contractor and subcontractors and is supported by a digital platform that integrates JSA results with work permits and toolbox meetings in real‐time. Following its implementation, the new system yielded substantial improvements in safety performance: the number of lost‐time accidents decreased from 19 to 5, and the Lost Time Injury Rate (LTIR) fell dramatically from 0.289 to 0.04 within a year. The findings demonstrate that integrating a collaborative assessment framework with a digital system creates a practical, effective safety management model. This study provides an empirically validated framework for enhancing safety in outsourced operations within the chemical sector and other high‐hazard industries.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Outsourced maintenance in South Korea's chemical industry exposes subcontractor workers to complex risks such as fires, explosions, and chemical exposure, as existing safety standards often fail as practical control systems. This study and pilot application addresses these gaps through a case study of a manufacturing company, implementing an improved operational framework centered on a collaborative, job safety analysis (JSA)-based risk assessment process. This framework institutionalizes a joint review process between the primary contractor and subcontractors and is supported by a digital platform that integrates JSA results with work permits and toolbox meetings in real-time. Following its implementation, the new system yielded substantial improvements in safety performance: the number of lost-time accidents decreased from 19 to 5, and the Lost Time Injury Rate (LTIR) fell dramatically from 0.289 to 0.04 within a year. The findings demonstrate that integrating a collaborative assessment framework with a digital system creates a practical, effective safety management model. This study provides an empirically validated framework for enhancing safety in outsourced operations within the chemical sector and other high-hazard industries.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Jin Taek Mo, 
Byungtae Yoo
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Job risk assessment system and operational framework improvement for chemical accident prevention: A study and pilot application of manufacturing industry</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70049</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70049</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70049?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70052?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2026 19:40:40 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-27T07:40:40-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15475913?af=R">Wiley: Process Safety Progress: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1002/prs.70052</guid>
         <title>Thermal stability study of trichloroisocyanuric acid</title>
         <description>Process Safety Progress, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Trichloroisocyanuric acid (TCCA) is a widely used novel and highly efficient disinfectant, bactericide, and bleaching agent. However, numerous accidents have occurred during the production, storage, and usage of TCCA, and its thermal stability has not been systematically studied. This study investigates the thermal stability of TCCA in a closed environment using dynamic differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), adiabatic accelerating rate calorimetry (ARC), and a combined testing method; the Friedman method was employed to conduct two decomposition kinetics studies based on DSC test data, as well as a combination of DSC and ARC test data. The results show that TCCA is thermally sensitive, with an onset decomposition temperature of 237.81°C and a decomposition heat release of 940 J/g. The decomposition process is strongly exothermic, and loss of control may lead to severe consequences. The kinetic parameters obtained from the two decomposition kinetic studies are highly consistent. The starting temperature corresponding to a time to maximum rate (TMR) of 24 h for the thermal decomposition of TCCA, TD24, is 216.1°C, which provides important technical and data support for determining safety limits in the production, storage, and use of TCCA.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Trichloroisocyanuric acid (TCCA) is a widely used novel and highly efficient disinfectant, bactericide, and bleaching agent. However, numerous accidents have occurred during the production, storage, and usage of TCCA, and its thermal stability has not been systematically studied. This study investigates the thermal stability of TCCA in a closed environment using dynamic differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), adiabatic accelerating rate calorimetry (ARC), and a combined testing method; the Friedman method was employed to conduct two decomposition kinetics studies based on DSC test data, as well as a combination of DSC and ARC test data. The results show that TCCA is thermally sensitive, with an onset decomposition temperature of 237.81°C and a decomposition heat release of 940 J/g. The decomposition process is strongly exothermic, and loss of control may lead to severe consequences. The kinetic parameters obtained from the two decomposition kinetic studies are highly consistent. The starting temperature corresponding to a time to maximum rate (TMR) of 24 h for the thermal decomposition of TCCA, &lt;i&gt;T&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;sub&gt;D24&lt;/sub&gt;, is 216.1°C, which provides important technical and data support for determining safety limits in the production, storage, and use of TCCA.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Yi Song, 
Zhenyun Wei, 
Xiaohua Ma, 
Jishuang Tan, 
Chuang Zhao, 
Rong Kong
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Thermal stability study of trichloroisocyanuric acid</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1002/prs.70052</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Process Safety Progress</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1002/prs.70052</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.70052?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
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