Patent – Patently-Ohttps://patentlyo.comAmerica's leading patent law blogen-USFri, 23 Feb 2018 10:44:08 PSThttps://wordpress.org/?v=4.8.5hourly1http://www.mbhb.comhttp://patentlyo.com/media/2014/10/mcdonnell-boehnen-hulbert-berghoff-logo2.pngSponsored by MBHB LLPPatCon 8 Conference in San Diego Next Weekhttp://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PatentlyO/~3/1b1t62gNZww/22552.htmlPatentJason RantanenFri, 23 Feb 2018 10:05:54 PSThttps://patentlyo.com/?p=22552By Jason Rantanen

Next week is PatCon, the largest annual gathering of patent law, economics, and business professors. This year’s conference takes place at University of San Diego on Friday & Saturday, March 2-3, and features Joe Matal, Carter Phillips, Patent Pilot Program judges, PTO economists, prominent local attorneys, and over 50 academics (providing up to 12.5 hours of CLE credit). I’ll be there, talking about the Compendium of Federal Circuit Decisions, one of my ongoing works in progress. More information on PatCon can be found here.

]]>
By Jason Rantanen Next week is PatCon, the largest annual gathering of patent law, economics, and business professors. This year’s conference takes place at University of San Diego on Friday & Saturday, March 2-3, and features Joe Matal, Carter Phillips, Patent Pilot Program judges, PTO economists, prominent local attorneys, and over 50 academics (providing up […]https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/22552.html
Patent Agent Privilege in Texashttp://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PatentlyO/~3/eGL9BA1nGlA/patent-agent-privilege.htmlPatentDennis CrouchFri, 23 Feb 2018 08:56:13 PSThttps://patentlyo.com/?p=22546In an important new decision, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized “patent-agent privilege” as a form of attorney-client privilege.  The court writes:

[B]ecause patent agents are authorized to practice law before the USPTO, they fall within [Texas Rules of Evidence] Rule 503’s definition of “lawyer,” and, as such, their clients may invoke the lawyer-client privilege to protect communications that fall within the privilege’s scope.

In re Silver (Texas 2018) [160682]

 

In the case, the trial court had concluded that a party’s communications with a patent agent were only privileged to the extent that the patent agent was acting under an attorney’s direction.  The court here reverses that judgment — no supervision is necessary.   The court does offer a major caveat — that communications outside of the patent agent’s authorized practice area might not be protected:

The client’s communications with a registered patent agent regarding matters outside the agent’s authorized practice area might not be protected because these communications are not necessarily made to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services.

In announcing a potential line, the court did not actually draw the line as to when a communication strays too far.Image result for texas memes

]]>
In an important new decision, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized “patent-agent privilege” as a form of attorney-client privilege.  The court writes: [B]ecause patent agents are authorized to practice law before the USPTO, they fall within [Texas Rules of Evidence] Rule 503’s definition of “lawyer,” and, as such, their clients may invoke the lawyer-client privilege […]https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/patent-agent-privilege.html/feed33https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/patent-agent-privilege.html
Ulbricht v. U.S.: Privacy Interest in your Home Router Traffichttp://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PatentlyO/~3/zpVHbPFVuFI/ulbricht-privacy-interest.htmlPatentDennis CrouchFri, 23 Feb 2018 07:56:02 PSThttps://patentlyo.com/?p=22543by Dennis Crouch

Important petition for writ of certiorari outside of patent law, but still well within the technology law sphere: Ulbricht v. U.S., Supreme Court Docket No. 17-950, questions presented:

  1. Whether the warrantless seizure of an individual’s Internet traffic information without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.
  2. Whether the Sixth Amendment permits judges to find the facts necessary to support an otherwise unreasonable sentence.

Ulbricht is known as the Dread Pirate Roberts, Frosty, Altoid, and creator of the Silk Road dark web marketplace.  Here, Ulbricht challenges his conviction and sentencing for drug trafficking, money laundering, and hacking — arguing that the evidence used to convict was illegally obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.

Without warrant, the government tracked Ulbricht’s communications to a particular IP address and then began skimming data from all communications passing through his home wireless router (located in his living room).  This allowed the government to identify the source and destination of all messages, including all of Ulbricht’s devices that he used for communications (including his laptop whose seizure became the sting target). Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the government needs a court order, but does not need to show probably cause as required by the Fourth Amendment.  The government did obtain such an order prior to beginning its router-skimming operation.  The petition here argues however that the US Constitution requires more.

In its decision, the Second Circuit relied upon the analogy to old-school-telephones and held that the collected internet traffic was “akin to data captured by traditional telephonic pen registers and trap and trace devices.” As such, no warrant was needed.

= = = = =

Two important telecom cases are pending before the court this term –

  • Carpenter v. United States (Whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cellphone records revealing the location and movements of a cellphone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment).
  • United States v. Microsoft (Whether a US provider of email services must comply with a probable-cause-based warrant by making disclosure of electronic communications within that provider’s control, but that are stored abroad in a foreign country) (Argument set for Feb 27).
]]>
by Dennis Crouch Important petition for writ of certiorari outside of patent law, but still well within the technology law sphere: Ulbricht v. U.S., Supreme Court Docket No. 17-950, questions presented: Whether the warrantless seizure of an individual’s Internet traffic information without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. Whether the Sixth Amendment permits judges to […]https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/ulbricht-privacy-interest.html/feed6https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/ulbricht-privacy-interest.html
Patent Eligibility: Handling Disputed Issues of Material Facthttp://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PatentlyO/~3/8u-RThKkCdQ/eligibility-handling-disputed.htmlPatentDennis CrouchThu, 22 Feb 2018 19:34:47 PSThttps://patentlyo.com/?p=22528Following the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Berkheimer, AATRIX, and ATS, the role of evidence and factual conclusions in the eligibility analysis is in a somewhat confused state. That setup makes Cleveland Clinic’s recent petition for writ of certiorari quite timely.

Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, Supreme Court Docket No. 17-997 (2018) questions presented:

In this case, the patents were fully examined by the PTO and found to be novel and not obvious, including for one of the patents, confirmation after two ex parte reexaminations. The PTO further found that the prior art taught away from the claimed inventions. Notwithstanding …, the district court declared [the patents] invalid at the pleading stage. It gave the patents a cursory review, and refused to construe any claim terms. It took 55 separate claims – each claiming a distinct invention with many different limitations – and analyzed them as if all of the claimed inventions were a single method with two simplistic steps. The court did not permit evidentiary submissions or development of the record, and while the district court purported to take judicial notice of the prosecution history, it ignored the PTO record in its analysis. The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court, invalidating valuable patent rights in a new and nonobvious diagnostic method using known techniques to detect an element in blood, but where the inventors had discovered that adapting known techniques for an entirely new purpose yielded medically-relevant data not known in the prior art and, in fact, taught away from by the prior art.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the court below erred in holding, contrary to Mayo, that a method involving natural phenomena is ineligible for patent protection if it claims known techniques that have been adapted for a new use and purpose not previously known in the art.

2. Whether Mayo authorizes a district court to invalidate valuable patent rights on the pleadings when there are disputed questions of fact, a disputed question of claim construction or scope, and/or an undeveloped evidentiary record, notwithstanding the presumption of patent validity and settled procedural and Seventh Amendment safeguards that ordinarily prevent the resolution of such disputed questions on the pleadings.

The petition was filed in January and was supported by an Amicus brief filed by Raymond Mercado.  In the wake of Berkheimer and AATRIX the petitioner then filed a supplemental brief setting up the conflict between Judges Moore and Stoll on the one hand and Judge Reyna on the other (Judge Reyna was also author of the Cleveland Clinic decision).

The defendant in this case, True Health Diagnostics, has waived its right to respond to the petition. If the Supreme Court has any interest in the case, the most likely next step would be to ask True Health for responsive briefing — likely followed by a request for the views of the Solicitor General.

]]>
Following the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Berkheimer, AATRIX, and ATS, the role of evidence and factual conclusions in the eligibility analysis is in a somewhat confused state. That setup makes Cleveland Clinic’s recent petition for writ of certiorari quite timely. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, Supreme Court Docket No. 17-997 (2018) questions […]https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/eligibility-handling-disputed.html/feed36https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/eligibility-handling-disputed.html
Eligibility: A Factual Dispute Requires Alleged Factshttp://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PatentlyO/~3/Qf24bK2ytEE/eligibility-factual-requires.htmlPatentDennis CrouchThu, 22 Feb 2018 08:30:12 PSThttps://patentlyo.com/?p=22514The recent non-precedential opinion of Automated Tracking Solutions v. Coca Cola provides something of a backstop to AATRIX and Berkheimer.   The ATS panel includes Judges Moore and Stoll – the two leading judges pushing for more formality in considering factual conclusions underlying an eligibility decision.  In ATS, however, the panel affirmed a district court judgment on the pleadings that the asserted patent lacks eligibility.  The panel restated its prior conclusions that “patent eligibility under § 101 is a question of law that may contain underlying issues of fact.” However, in this case the court found no material facts in dispute.

The four asserted ATS patents are all directed to “inventory control” processes using RFID technology. U.S. Patent Nos. 7,551,089; 7,834,766; 8,842,013; and 8,896,449.  RFID chips include a transponder that is then identified by a reader that receives a signal via an antenna.  


Claim 1 of the ‘766 patent is listed below:

1. A system for locating, identifying and/or tracking of an object, the system comprising:

a first transponder associated with the object;

a reader that is configured to receive first transponder data via a radio frequency (RF) signal from the first transponder;

an antenna in communication with the reader and having a first coverage area;

a processor coupled to the reader, wherein the processor is configured to receive the first transponder data from the reader and to generate detection information based on the received first transponder data, the detection information comprising first sighting and last sighting of the first transponder in the first coverage area; and

a storage device that is configured to store the detection information.

In reviewing this claim, the District Court followed the Alice/Mayo two step framework asking first, whether the claim is directed toward an ineligible abstract idea and if so, whether the claim also includes an inventive step that goes beyond the ineligible aspects to transform the whole into an eligible invention. On appeal here, the Federal Circuit has affirmed. The results:

Step 1: The claim is directed to the process of collecting data, analyzing the data, and determining results based upon the analysis.  As stated, that process is an abstract idea.

Step 2: Recognizing that RFID technology was known at the time, the claim adds no inventive step beyond the abstract idea.

The patentee attempted to establish a disputed factual question – whether the RFID technology as used in the claims was “routine and conventional” at the time.  In Berkheimer, the Federal Circuit determined that issue to be a question of fact.  Here, however, the patentee had failed to make plausible factual allegations in its complaint sufficient to create a dispute here.  “The complaint alleges nothing to support ATS’s contention that RFID was a developing technology Nor does the complaint allege that any o the hardware components in the representative claims–either alone or in combination as a system–are anything but well understood, routine, and conventional.”  Rather, the specification of the patent states that RFID systems are known and can be quite simple. 

Dismissal affirmed.  

= = = =

As an aside, I’ll ask why this case was released as non-precedential while the two parallel 101 cases mentioned above were deemed precedential. Professors Lemley and Gugliuzza (BU) have accused the court (members of the court) of attempting to shift the rule by hiding precedent. Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?

= = = =

And, you have to love the drawings in the patents. You’ll notice the typical corporate shelf in figure 4 above that includes typical documents and files along with weapons, money, and narcotics.

]]>
The recent non-precedential opinion of Automated Tracking Solutions v. Coca Cola provides something of a backstop to AATRIX and Berkheimer.   The ATS panel includes Judges Moore and Stoll – the two leading judges pushing for more formality in considering factual conclusions underlying an eligibility decision.  In ATS, however, the panel affirmed a district court judgment […]https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/eligibility-factual-requires.html/feed53https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/eligibility-factual-requires.html
Science Fiction Law — Still Reeling: Minority Report, Sixteen Years Laterhttp://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PatentlyO/~3/WiJhRxmoLyk/science-fiction-minority.htmlPatentDennis CrouchWed, 21 Feb 2018 07:45:55 PSThttps://patentlyo.com/?p=22481Michigan Law Professor Nicholson Price is teaching an interesting seminar this semester merging science fiction and legal analysis.  We agreed that his students should write blog posts and that I would publish the most worthy on Patently-O.  The first post comes from Lauren Kimmel and is focused on stopping future crimes. – DC

Guest Post by Lauren Kimmel

Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report (starring Tom Cruise) was released over a decade and a half ago; and yet, in many ways, the film has withstood the test of that time. The film takes place in Washington, D.C., in the year 2054—nearly a hundred years after American writer Philip K. Dick published his original short story with the same name and general storyline. In the film, the District’s Precrime Division use futuristic and fatalistic visions of three “precogs” to detect and apprehend would-be, “heat-of-passion” murderers before they are able to carry out their respective homicides.

Sixteen years later, Minority Report offers some interesting insight about where we are in the narrative of our own law and society. For example, the science fiction of the film bears remarkable, if not alarming, similarity to the technology behind predictive policing, a term used to encompass a range of real-world precrime detection systems currently in use around the country and even across the globe. The National Institute of Justice defines predictive policing as “taking data from disparate sources, analyzing them and then using the results to anticipate, prevent and respond more effectively to future crime.” We do not know exactly what predictive policing looks like from the inside out—but these precrime detection systems likely combine crime-mapping software, statistical data, police reports, and complex algorithms to help police better anticipate the next steps of would-be criminals.

On the one hand, predictive policing presents clear benefits to the communities who make use of it; it may be helpful, for example, in halting everything from drug deals to domestic terrorist activity to mass shootings, to violent or gang-related crimes. But predictive policing also raises serious questions about our own “progress” toward a science-based society. Is science-based progress always a good thing? And, even if it is not, is this our path, for better or worse?

Predictive policing helps us write a story about when and where crime will happen, as well as who will commit it. But in the context of our imperfect society, we must ask, Is this story the right one? Importantly, the “black box” of predictive policing technology obscures from public scrutiny its process for arriving at certain crime predictions, sparking key constitutional and public policy concerns. Where does the data come from? What factors are entered into the algorithms? Are certain factors weighted more than others? Does the technology behind predictive policing change over time to incorporate new patterns and findings—and if so, how? Does it learn (a la artificial intelligence technology), or does human instruction (and, along with it, human error) play a role? Do those developers return to the black box of algorithms to clarify when a crime “occurred” but no one was ever charged (i.e., arrests vs. convictions)?

And most importantly, what is the purpose that we, as a society, want predictive policing to serve—and does the technology ultimately serve this purpose? What’s more, even though computers are not biased, the statistics feeding it might be; moreover, predictive policing is only as good as the officers and analyzers who handle the data. Even if human error, at least in the sense of data input, is not a primary concern, context may be just as important as the data itself. A lack of understanding of the context could (and likely does) exacerbate existing racial and socioeconomic tensions. For example, if police are already patrolling a poorer, primarily black neighborhood and, as a natural result, detecting more crime there than the more affluent and perhaps primarily white neighborhoods they are not monitoring (but where crime may nevertheless be occurring), the crime maps compiled using these statistics may be skewed to reflect a measured bias against the former group. Or, if poorer communities are more likely to see theft—because many individuals lack and cannot afford basic necessities—the data may similarly imply that these communities are simply more “crime-prone” than others—when there is really more to the discussion.

One last consideration and concern is the fact that these predictive policing technologies are developed and carried out by private companies, such as PredPol, HunchLab, and Upturn. We should be asking whether it is a good or bad idea to privatize these services, and trust them with developing and interpreting predictive policing technology. Consider the following quote from Rashad Robinson, Executive Director of Color of Change: “Sending corporate power and corporate interest into the criminal justice system will end in bad results. It will end in profits over people and profits over safety and justice and none of us can afford that.”  Especially when we consider what this process has done to our prison systems, it may be worth thinking twice about privatizing other aspects of the criminal justice system.

]]>
Michigan Law Professor Nicholson Price is teaching an interesting seminar this semester merging science fiction and legal analysis.  We agreed that his students should write blog posts and that I would publish the most worthy on Patently-O.  The first post comes from Lauren Kimmel and is focused on stopping future crimes. – DC Guest Post by Lauren […]https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/science-fiction-minority.html/feed51https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/science-fiction-minority.html
More on Prosecution Disclaimerhttp://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PatentlyO/~3/U6QdwRLvfRY/more-prosecution-disclaimer.htmlPatentDennis CrouchWed, 21 Feb 2018 05:25:19 PSThttps://patentlyo.com/?p=22510By Dennis Crouch

Arendi v. Google (Fed. Cir. 2018)

In its petition for inter partes review (IPR), Google argued the obviousness of all 79 claims of Arendi’s of U.S. Patent No. 6,323,853. The PTAB granted the petition (acting on behalf of the PTO Director) and issued a final decision cancelling the claims. In its decision, the PTAB followed a common district court practice of issuing alternative reasons for its judgment – holding that (1) its preferred broad claim construction rendered the claims invalid; but (2) the claims would still be invalid under a more narrow construction. On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the broad construction, but agreed with the alternative reasoning – thus affirming the obviousness holding.

One Click Substitutes: Arendi’s patent claims a process for substituting information (such as a name or address) in a document based upon a single user command. Basically, following user activation, the program will look for a first bit of information within the document – such as a name in a <NAME> field. A database is then used to lookup related information to fill other fields in the document, such as an <ADDRESS> field. The program might also update the original <NAME> field fit the formal version found in the db.

Prosecution Disclaimer: During prosecution, the claims were particularly amended to require operation “upon a single entry of the execute command by means of the input device.” In order to over come prior art, the patentee distinguished the TSO prior art reference based upon the fact that TSO required a user to select a text string while Arendi’s amended claims did “not require the user to select a text string [but] functions automatically upon a single click.” The examiner included that distinguishing point in the reasons for allowance.

During the IPR, however, the PTAB found that (1) the claims to not expressly exclude typing-in a text string; and (2) the statements by the patentee during prosecution were not sufficient to rise to a prosecution disclaimer that would narrow the claim scope; and (3) the examiner’s reasons for allowance are essentially immaterial because prosecution disclaimer is based upon applicant statements, not examiner statements.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit found “clear and unmistakable” surrender of subject matter – the requirement for prosecution disclaimer under cases such as Middleton, Inc. v. 3M, 311 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003), Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration System, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004); and Sorensen v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 427 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Not so easy in My View: I do not see this case as quite so easy as the Federal Circuit made-out. In particular, the patent applicant never stated or argued (on record) that its invention excluded the manual selection of text, but rather stated that “the present invention does not require the user to select a text.”  Ordinarily, an argument that a claim does not “require” a particular action is seen as a far-cry and treated quite differently from a statement that a claim “does not cover” or “disclaims coverage over” that action.  The “comprising” transition language used by the claim further builds upon this argument that no disclaimer took place.

In any event, the holding is that the scope was disclaimed and thus the first portion of the PTAB decision was rejected.

As mentioned above, the PTAB offered its decision in the alternative – and the Federal Circuit agreed with the second reason.  The claims are obvious under the second analysis since a prior art reference (Goodhand) performs “essentially the same textual analysis” and does not require the user text selection.

In sum, the PTAB found that Goodhand shows all of claim 1’s limitations, when giving effect to the prosecution disclaimer and limiting the scope of the “single entry” command. This finding is supported by substantial evidence. On the PTAB’s findings, the alternative conclusion of unpatentability on the ground of obviousness in view of Goodhand is sustained.

Claim Cancellation Affirmed

 

]]>
By Dennis Crouch Arendi v. Google (Fed. Cir. 2018) In its petition for inter partes review (IPR), Google argued the obviousness of all 79 claims of Arendi&#8217;s of U.S. Patent No. 6,323,853. The PTAB granted the petition (acting on behalf of the PTO Director) and issued a final decision cancelling the claims. In its decision, [&#8230;]https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/more-prosecution-disclaimer.html/feed36https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/more-prosecution-disclaimer.html
Isolating and Measuring a Natural Phenomenonhttp://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PatentlyO/~3/gfYNjO4ReOI/isolating-measuring-phenomenon.htmlPatentDennis CrouchTue, 20 Feb 2018 02:04:44 PSThttps://patentlyo.com/?p=22496by Dennis Crouch

Ex Parte Simons, APPEAL 2016-002684 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd. Jan. 31, 2018) (Decision on Rehearing)

In this case pending before the USPTO, Australian company Haplomic Technologies is seeking to patent a method of mapping whether methylated DNA bases are cis or trans.

16. A method for improving methylation mapping, comprising,

substantially isolating a DNA molecule from the biological sample, wherein the DNA molecule is an individual metaphase chromosome or a chromatid, or a fragment obtained therefrom;

analyzing the DNA molecule to determine the presence or absence of one or more methylated bases in the DNA molecule and

determining whether any two methylated bases are present in cis on the DNA molecule.

In its original decision, the PTAB affirmed an examiner rejection – finding the claim ineligible as directed toward a natural phenomenon.  However, the patentee requested a rehearing – arguing that the PTAB had failed to properly identify the natural phenomenon being claimed.  On reharing though, the PTAB reaffirmed the decision of no patentable subject matter.

In its analysis, the Board first noted that the claims are not directed toward any transformation of the isolated DNA, but rather simply detecting its parts.  We know from prior cases that isolated DNA remains a product of nature (Myriad) and that detecting DNA sequence is also a phenomenon of nature (Ariosa).  Similarly here, the PTAB ruled:

because the DNA is methylated in its cis or trans configuration prior to isolation, and because Appellant’s claims are directed merely to determining the configuration that exists prior to such isolation, Appellant’s claims are directed to a naturally-occurring phenomenon, i.e., a “phenomenon of nature,” and, therefore, to a judicially-created exception to Section 101.

Looking to step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis, the court found that the claims were written so broadly as to preempt the entire area — and did not including any saving inventive concept application.  “In short, Appellant’s claims are directed to determining, by any means, including means well known in the art, the naturally-occurring cis or transposition of methylated sites on a sequence of isolated DNA.”

Part of the applicant’s argument here was essentially that it combined two different ineligible concepts (isolating the DNA and cis testing) to somehow leave the invention patent eligible. The PTAB though rejected that argument.

It will be interesting to see whether the patentee pushes this case to a District Court or the Federal Circuit for review. Although those options are fun, the more likely outcome is that the patentee will narrow the claims and try again. Mark Nuell at Roberts Mlotkowski argued the case for the applicant.

Docs:

]]>
by Dennis Crouch Ex Parte Simons, APPEAL 2016-002684 (Patent Tr. &#38; App. Bd. Jan. 31, 2018) (Decision on Rehearing) In this case pending before the USPTO, Australian company Haplomic Technologies is seeking to patent a method of mapping whether methylated DNA bases are cis or trans. 16. A method for improving methylation mapping, comprising, substantially isolating a [&#8230;]https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/isolating-measuring-phenomenon.html/feed114https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/isolating-measuring-phenomenon.html
Some Laws Regarding Laws of Naturehttp://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PatentlyO/~3/sHHVCqatHn8/some-regarding-nature.htmlPatentDennis CrouchMon, 19 Feb 2018 14:48:16 PSThttps://patentlyo.com/?p=22494United States Declaration of Independence

When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

= = =

Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1

By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea.

= = =

Georgia Code § 5-5-41.

[DNA testing permitted if . . .]  (F) The testing requested employs a scientific method that has reached a scientific state of verifiable certainty such that the procedure rests upon the laws of nature; and

= = =

La. Stat. Ann. § 15:422 (now repealed)

Judicial cognizance is taken of the following matters: . . . The laws of nature

(Note, in general, courts still take judicial notice of laws of nature).

 

 

 

]]>
United States Declaration of Independence When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature&#8217;s God entitle them, [&#8230;]https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/some-regarding-nature.html/feed66https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/some-regarding-nature.html
Apology to Judge Reynahttp://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PatentlyO/~3/QpslSyitaXM/apology-judge-reyna.htmlPatentDennis CrouchMon, 19 Feb 2018 12:00:41 PSThttps://patentlyo.com/?p=22485I want to pause here for a moment to make an apology to Federal Circuit Judge Reyna regarding what could easily be perceived as poor taste humor.  I continue to have the highest respect for the Judge and hope that it was not taken in offense.

Last week when I wrote about the AATRIX Software case, I included an image of Mexican actor Alfonso Bedoya from the 1948 neo-western “The Treasure of the Sierra Madre” along with a modification of the “stinkin’ badges” quote.  The quote was used again in the Mel Brooks classic Blazing Saddles.

At the time when I wrote about AATRIX, I had no conscious thought of Judge Reyna’s Latino cultural heritage. (Judge Reyna dissented-in-part in the AATRIX decision).  A few hours later I deleted the image after considering that it did not reflect well on either myself, Patently-O, or the patent law community.  However, even at that time I did not consciously recognize the potential link to Judge Reyna.  It was only later that I recognized with some horror how it would be interpreted.

Perhaps no offense was taken. Either way though, I do apologize.

– Dennis Crouch

 

]]>
I want to pause here for a moment to make an apology to Federal Circuit Judge Reyna regarding what could easily be perceived as poor taste humor.  I continue to have the highest respect for the Judge and hope that it was not taken in offense. Last week when I wrote about the AATRIX Software [&#8230;]https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/apology-judge-reyna.html/feed21https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/apology-judge-reyna.html