Commentaries By Peter Schiff

The Great Reflation

europac admin — Fri, 31 May 2013 16:12:04 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Friday, May 31, 2013

This week economists, investors and politicians were treated to some of the "best" home price data since the frothy days of 2006 when home loans were given out like cotton candy and condo flipping was a national pastime. The Case-Shiller 20 City Composite Home price index was up a startling 10.9% for the 12 month period ending in March. Prices in all 20 cities were up, with some (Las Vegas, Phoenix, and San Francisco) notching gains of more than 20%. Meanwhile the National Association of Realtors announced that April pending home sales volume reached the highest level in nearly three years.

The strong housing data is taken as proof that the economy has turned around and that a recovery is under way. Cooler heads may simply see how government policies have channeled money into real estate in order to reflate a bubble that has been collapsing for the last five years. Although the money is entering the market through slightly different paths than it did in 2005 and 2006, its effects on housing, and the broader economy, are the same as they were before the bubble burst. When the inevitable happens again, the ensuing damage will be eerily familiar.

After five years of dismal real estate performance and a lackluster economy, it’s hard to fault people for believing that rising home prices are a good barometer of economic health. There can be little doubt that rising home prices feel good. Even single digit appreciation can make modest home buyers feel like mini-moguls. The effect is magnified in a falling interest rate environment where any appreciation can be instantly turned into an opportunity for cash out refinancing. The “wealth effect” created by such activities then translates into consumer spending and other seemingly positive economic developments. But some things can taste great but be very harmful (cinnamon buns come to mind). It felt good when real estate prices were rising during the pre-financial crisis bubble, but that rise only exacerbated the problems when the bubble burst. The questions we should now be asking ourselves is why are prices rising, are those higher prices sustainable, and what are the costs to the broader economy?

The truth is that most buyers cannot afford today's prices without the combination of government guarantees and artificially low mortgage rates. The Federal Reserve has been conducting an unprecedented experiment in economic manipulation. By holding interest rates near zero and by actively buying more than $40 billion monthly of mortgage-backed securities and $45 billion of Treasury bonds, the Fed has engineered the lowest mortgage rates in generations. At the same time, Federal control of the mortgage industry has become nearly complete, with government agencies Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA buying or guaranteeing virtually all new mortgages. In addition, a variety of Federal programs, such as the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) are in place to help keep underwater homeowners in homes that they could not otherwise afford. Taken together, these programs create far more favorable terms for home buyers than those that existed before the crash.

The big difference between then and now however is that banks are much more reluctant to extend loans to people with bad credit. But that has not stopped money from flowing into real estate. Ultra low interest rates also mean that fixed income investments, that have long been the staple of hedge funds and private equity funds, no longer deliver decent returns. To find yields in such an environment, many of these professional investment funds have scooped up single family homes out of foreclosure and put them into the rental market in order to generate a decent return on equity. These buyers come to the table with war chests full of cash which puts them in a position to avoid all of the credit obstacles that continue to plague individual buyers.

This trend has allowed a recovery in home sales even while the national home ownership rate has dropped to 65%, the lowest rate since 1995 (down from almost 70% during the last decade). Now that most of the available foreclosures have been picked through (with the rest log jammed with litigation and red tape), many of the new classes of investment buyers are striking deals directly with the large home builders to buy homes before they are even built. It is no coincidence that the southern tier markets with the fastest appreciation, and the fastest declines in inventories, have been those with the greatest participation of institutional investors.

But their activities have a latent downside. The new ownership class is not motivated to buy and hold the way Mom and Dad would. They are not looking for a place to live, raise families, and retire. They are simply looking for a decent return on equity relative to other investments. Many would happily put money in higher yielding bonds where landlord headaches don’t exist. If better deals beckon, or if risks increase in the real estate market, the homes they bought will be dumped even faster.

In the meantime, bidding wars involving hedge funds are forcing real buyers to pay more, oftentimes pricing them out of the market completely. Then as these properties hit the rental market, an absence of qualified tenants will depress rents. Lower rents will in turn put downward pressure on property values. Many rental houses will also sit vacant. Though hedge funds are cash buyers, most borrow large percentages of that cash to lever up their returns. However, when interest rates rise and rents fall, hedge funds will be forced to sell. But where will the buyers come from? The current crop of renters cannot afford to buy even with mortgage rates at historic lows. When rates rise, prices will have to plunge before real buyers could even qualify for mortgages.

The current combination of low rates and investor demand has succeeded in pushing up prices. But that doesn’t mean the market is healthy. For the first quarter of 2013, the Federal Reserve reports a 10% delinquency rate for residential mortgages (those with payments that are at least 90 days past due). This is more than 6 times the rate in the first quarter of 2006. In contrast, credit card delinquencies currently stand at 2.65%, the lowest rate in decades and 31% lower than the rate in the first quarter of 2006. Whether it is by choice, or simply by the ability to pay, Americans are clearly placing a low priority on paying their mortgages.

But rising home prices are currently creating residual benefits even for those who have no intention of selling. In the second quarter of this year, rates on 30 year mortgages hit the lowest level on record. Although the data has not yet been published, it would be logical to assume that homeowners have taken the opportunity to refinance, lower their payments, and in some cases, pull money out. But even if they haven’t, there is evidence to suggest that an owner’s belief that his home has appreciated is enough to encourage greater spending.

The “wealth effect’ from rising home prices combined with the similar influence of rising stock prices creates an aura of recovery. In fact, this week's revisions to first quarter GDP revealed that consumer confidence and spending are up despite real discretionary per capita incomes plunging at a 9.03% annualized rate. That is worse than the largest plunge during the 2008-2009 crisis (7.52%). Additionally, the household savings rate fell to an abysmal 2.3%, the lowest since the 3rd quarter 2007. Debt-financed consumption supported by inflated asset prices is what led to the financial crisis of 2008. It's amazing how willing we are to travel down that road again.

Of course rising asset prices are completely dependent on continued Fed support. As we have seen time and again, whenever the Fed even hints at tapering its massive QE programs the stock market sells off. The housing market is even more dependent on that support. Given the risks, it is arguable that no private market for home loans would even exist without government intervention. The bubble that popped in 2008 consisted mainly of government-guaranteed mortgages. This time, the mortgages are not merely government-guaranteed, but government owned.

In the meantime, by blowing more air into a deflating housing bubble, the Fed is misdirecting money into a sector that investment capital should be avoiding. A successful economy can’t be built on housing. Rather, a robust real estate market must result from a healthy economy. You can’t put the cart before the horse. As a nation, we do not need more houses. We built enough over the last decade to keep us well sheltered for years. Private equity funds should be using their investment capital to fund the next technology innovator, not wasting it on townhouses in Orlando and Phoenix.

Of course the real risks in housing center on the next leg down, in what I believe will be a continuation of the real estate crash. We can’t afford to artificially support the market indefinitely. When significantly higher interest rates eventually arrive, the fragile market will again be impacted. We saw that movie about five years ago. Do we really want to see it again?

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. Please feel free to repost with proper attribution and all links included.

The Biggest Loser Wins

europac admin — Thu, 23 May 2013 17:00:24 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Thursday, May 23, 2013

While the world's economies jockey one another for the lead in the currency devaluation derby, it's worth considering the value of the prize they are seeking. They believe a weak currency opens the door to trade dominance, by allowing manufacturers to undercut foreign rivals, and to economic growth, by fighting deflation. On the other side of the coin, they believe a strong currency is an economic albatross that leads to stagnation. But the demonstrable effects of currency strength and weakness reveal the emptiness of their theory.

A country that attracts investment from abroad (through stable and fair governance, low taxes, a growing economy, and a productive labor force) and produces goods that are in demand on the global stage will generally see a rising currency. In essence, this is the reward for a job well done. Strong currencies then help nations stay strong by conferring greater purchasing power to its citizens and businesses, which keeps input costs low, thereby enhancing international competitiveness. Strong currencies also encourage savings, keep real interest rates low, lower capital costs, and allow for greater productivity and higher real wages.

It is often argued that a weak currency confers advantages in foreign trade. But the edge only results from putting exports on sale. Any merchant will tell you that it's easy to sell more if you cut prices, but most would prefer charging full retail. However, exports are not an end in themselves, they are a means to pay for imports. The goal of an economy is not to work, but to consume. If citizens in one nation buy goods produced in another, they must pay with exports. When a nation's currency appreciates imports cost less and fewer exports are needed to pay. This means goods and services at home will be cheaper and more plentiful, and citizens won't need to work as hard to buy them. This is the definition of rising living standards.

But when it comes to relative currency valuations, the United States dollar exists in a world of its own. As the international reserve, the dollar is the de-facto beneficiary of any other country's intervention. When countries intervene, they do so specifically against the dollar. In addition, many countries, (China and Taiwan for instance) maintain a pegged relationship to the Greenback. Therefore in a world dominated by interventionist banks, the factors that push the dollar have been inverted. The dollar falls when fundamentals either improve abroad or deteriorate at home (both cases increase the propensity for intervention). The rest of the world's currencies compete on their own merit. As a result, it is not an accident that over the last decade Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland, three of the world's strongest economies, have produced strong currencies.

Since 2001, all three have had generally appreciating currencies, accompanied by steadily rising exports, strong economic fundamentals, and low unemployment. From 2001 to 2012, the Kiwi Dollar appreciated by 98% against the U.S. dollar, but its exports in local currency terms increased by 40% (170% in U.S. dollar terms). Over the same time frame, the Aussie dollar appreciated by 103% and exports increased by 102% in local currency (and 305% in U.S. dollar terms). In Switzerland the story was the same, currency up 82%, exports up 53% in local terms and (and 175% in U.S. terms). Where exactly did they encounter export troubles due to their rising currencies?

At the same time, the strengthening currencies made few negative impacts on other aspects of economic performance. At the time when the Swiss bankers caved to international pressure in September 2011 and pegged its previously surging franc to the euro, their economy had shown some of the best economic performance on the Continent. More recently, Australia and New Zealand reported stunning job creation figures. Adjusted for population, the U.S. would have had to create more than 600,000 jobs per month to keep pace with Australia, and 900,000 jobs per month to match New Zealand (U.S. job creation has averaged about 169,000 per month over the last year).

These lessons have been wholly lost on the Japanese who are frantically trying (and succeeding) in severely devaluing the yen. Although Japan's export machine had not suffered from the yen's appreciation from 2001-2012 (up 30% in local currency exports and 98% in dollar terms), newly installed prime minister Shinzo Abe and his minions at the Bank of Japan believe a weaker yen is the key to renewed economic strength. But the collapse of the yen has helped push up both the Aussie and Kiwi dollars, which has spurred bankers in Australia and New Zealand into taking unneeded and ultimately self-destructive actions. In April they threw in their lot with the interventionists and cut interest rates to stop the rise of their currencies. But the moves fly in the face of the modern playbook which states that policy should be tightened during periods of full employment, strong growth, and surging real estate prices. The misplaced fear of a strong currency seems to trump all other concerns.

While there is little reason to believe that strong currencies stifle exports, there is ample evidence that they increase domestic purchasing power (which is a real test of economic success). In the United States, oil currently sells for about $97 per barrel, about 16% below the $113 high price seen in April 2011. And so while our economy falters, at least consumers are not saddled with surging energy costs. While the 20% devaluation of the yen since that high in 2011 has made Japan the champion of Keynesian economists, it also means that oil in Japan is currently selling for its highest price since the summer of 2008, just prior to the onset of the global financial crisis. And it's not just oil, the Japanese must pay more for everything they import. How this benefits the rank and file has yet to be properly explained.

The latest data confirms that the banzai attack on the yen has not helped Japan's trade position. The weaker currency led to higher import costs, resulting in the 10th month in a row of trade deficits. Although April exports rose 3.8 percent from a year earlier, the trade deficit widened to 879.9 billion yen ($8.6 billion), the worst April since at least 1979. But the falling yen is creating a clear and present danger in Japan's enormous bond market. In less than one month, yields on 10 year Japanese Government Bonds have more than doubled, approaching nearly 1%. While those rates may sound manageable for most countries, Japan has the highest debt to GDP ratio in the developed world. If they had to pay 2% (the same rate as its inflation target), the country would need to devote more than half of its tax revenue just to service its debt! Clearly this possibility is dawning on stock investors who pushed down the Nikkei by more 7% today.

Never in the course of history has a country's economy failed because its currency was too strong. It's a pathology that simply does not exist. On the other hand, the list of those ruined by weak currencies is extensive. The view that a weak currency is desirable is so absurd that it could only have been devised to serve the political agenda of those engineering the descent. And while I don't blame policy makers from spinning self-serving fairy tales (that is their nature), I find extreme fault with those hypnotized members of the media and the financial establishment who have checked their reason at the door.

A currency war is different from any other kind of conventional war in that the object is to kill oneself. The nation that succeeds in inflicting the most damage on its own citizens wins the war. The only real way to win is not to play.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. Please feel free to repost with proper attribution and all links included.

Symptoms Don't Lie

europac admin — Fri, 10 May 2013 16:15:48 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Friday, May 10, 2013

A good doctor will not simply make a diagnosis based on measurements. The symptoms and complaints expressed by the patient are at least as important in making a determination as the data provided by diagnostic tools. When the data says one thing and the symptoms continuously say another, it makes sense to question the reliability of the instruments. This would be particularly true if the instruments are furnished by a party with a stake in a favorable diagnosis, say an insurance company on the hook for treatment costs. The same holds true for the U.S. economy. Although our government-supplied data suggests we are experiencing low inflation and modest economic growth, the economy shows symptoms of low growth, rising prices, and diminishing purchasing power

In my latest commentary I discussed how the Big Mac Index (The Economist Magazine's 30 year data set on Big Mac prices) provided strong anecdotal evidence that inflation in the United States is higher than official figures. More information has come in since then that tells me the same thing: that Americans are downsizing their lives as their incomes fail to keep pace with rising prices. These symptoms are at odds with the widespread belief in an accelerating recovery that has resulted in braggadocio in Washington and euphoria on Wall Street.

Earlier this week Tyson Foods, one of the nation's largest providers of packaged meat products, announced that although their top line sales revenue increased by almost 2% (roughly in line with U.S. GDP growth), operating margins collapsed by almost 50%, leading to a 43% decline in profit. Consumer shifts away from relatively higher priced/higher margin beef and pork products to lower cost/lower margin chicken products were to blame. Tyson also noted that cost conscious consumers shifted away from higher margin packaged chicken products to fresh meat cuts, thereby sacrificing convenience for cost.

According to government statisticians, the Tyson announcement would reveal modest growth and low inflation. After all, revenue at the company grew and spending on their products had increased modestly. But rising prices were obscured by consumers purchasing lower quality products. Not only are consumers avoiding the beef and pork that they otherwise may have preferred, but they are opting out of the convenience of prepared foods. This behavior is symptomatic of diminished consumer purchasing power. This is known as getting poorer.

The trend corresponds with the steady increase in the share of income that Americans devote to food and energy. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis data, in 2002 Americans spent about 17.8% of income on food and energy. In the first quarter of 2013 the share had risen by a factor of 20% to 21.3% of income. Increased share of spending on necessities like food and energy is consistent with falling living standards. In the poorest countries almost all of income is devoted to such things.

This week we also learned the seemingly positive news that the March trade deficit narrowed to $38.8 billion. But the reduction didn't come from increased exports (which actually declined), but by the sharpest drop in imports since February 2009. Oil imports declined to a seventeen-year low, in part due to rising domestic production, but also due to a record low in 13 years in gasoline consumption. While some may argue that is a function of greater energy efficiency, I believe it's more likely that usage is down because of high prices and high unemployment. Even more significant is that our trade deficit with China in March dropped by a whopping 23.6%, hitting a three-year low. On a year over year basis, the decline in our deficit with China was 90% attributable to the decline in imports.

In contrast to the declining import figures, the government reported that personal spending rose by .2% in March. If we are buying less stuff from abroad, where are Americans spending the extra money? If the prices are stable, and imports are way down, consumer spending should also be down and savings should be up. But the savings rate in March held steady at a meager 2.7%. The sad truth is that Americans are buying fewer Chinese products because they are spending more money on food, rent, utilities, healthcare, insurance, and other necessities that can't be imported. Again, this is consistent with a falling standard of living, as inflation forces consumers to forgo the things they want in order to buy the things that they need.

It was also announced this week that the big three airlines (United, Delta, and American) will be raising their "change fees" for booked tickets by 33%, from $150 to $200. However, it's unlikely that such a hike will make much of an impact on CPI. According to the CPI, airline fares in the United States increased only .3% from 2011 to 2012. This mild increase came at a time when airlines were rolling out more new fees than most air travelers could have possibly imagined.

But even if the government fully factored in the increase in fees, they would likely ignore the change in behavior that the increase would elicit. With the cost of changing a ticket so dramatically higher than it has been in the past, it is likely that far fewer Americans would be willing to change their travel plans once their tickets have been purchased. So even while the spending increase may be relatively small, the lost convenience is not factored into the equation. A ticket with low price (or no price) change option is a much better product than a ticket with high penalties.

CPI reports that from 2007 to 2012 air travel increased on average 4% per year. But that's only half the story. A new study released by MIT reports that during those five years, U.S. airlines cut the number of domestic flights by 14%,with the cuts falling most heavily on mid-sized regional airports. By 2012, the industry also closed more than 20 smaller airports, began using a higher percentage of larger airplanes, and reported record crowding on remaining flights. In other words, air travel not only became more expensive but less convenient and more crowded.

How much loss in value does this inconvenience and lack of flexibility create? It's hard to say, but we all have experienced it with varying degrees of frustration. But what is sure is that the government isn't interested in such trivialities.

The combination of these symptoms suggests that the extent to which people are being impoverished by accelerating inflation is not reflected in official government measurements. This explains why unemployment remains high even as GDP appears to rise. It is my belief that the unprecedented expansion of the money supply under the current Fed leadership is pushing up prices for stocks, bonds, real estate, and consumer goods. Market indices neatly capture the price increases for all of these categories except for the latter, which has been concealed by an overly adjusted CPI.

If consumer inflation data were reported more accurately, it would be revealed that much of the apparent growth is an illusion. The patient is getting sicker, but the doctors are too distracted to notice.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. Please feel free to repost with proper attribution and all links included.

Changing the Conversation

europac admin — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 17:08:41 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Friday, April 26, 2013

Don Draper, Mad Men’s master advertiser likes to say “when you don’t like what they are saying, change the conversation.” When it comes to the current economic weakness, which was confirmed again today by the release of lower than expected GDP data, Washington would love do just that. Fortunately for them, they consistently outdo the master minds of Madison Avenue when it comes to misdirection. If the government doesn’t like what people are saying, they don’t bother just to change the conversation, they change the meaning of the words.

The latest example of this was revealed earlier this week when the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) announced new methods of calculating Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that will immediately make the economy “bigger’ than it used to be. The changes focus heavily on how money spent on research and development (R&D) and the production of “intangible” assets like movies, music, and television programs will be accounted for. Declaring such expenditures to be “investments” will immediately increase U.S. GDP by about three percent. Such an upgrade would immediately increase the theoretic size of the U.S economy and may well lead to the perception of faster growth. In reality these smoke and mirror alterations are no different from changes made to the inflation and unemployment yardsticks that for years have convinced Americans that the economy is better than it actually is.

Today’s data release confirms that the economic “recovery” is weaker than expected and remains heavily dependent on Federal support. Personal spending was indeed up 3.2%, the biggest jump in two years, but real earnings were down by 5.3%, the biggest fall since 2009. Not surprisingly the buying was made possible by a drop in the savings rate, which came in at just 2.6%, the lowest since the 4th quarter of 2007. No doubt, rising home prices and falling mortgage rates (made possible by Fed stimulus) allowed Americans to refinance their homes and to borrow and spend the money that they did not earn. With GDP continuing to disappoint, a statistical make-over couldn't come at a more convenient time.

In the simplest terms, GDP is calculated by combining a nation’s private spending, government spending, and investments (while adding trade surplus or subtracting trade deficits). Business spending on R&D, a portion of which comes in the form of salaries, has traditionally been considered an expense that does not explicitly add to GDP. But now, the United States will lead the rest of the world in redefining GDP. Washington has now declared that the $400 billion spent annually by U.S. businesses on R&D will count towards GDP. This equates to about 2.7% of our nearly $16 Trillion GDP. The argument goes that, for example, the GDP generated by iPhones has far exceeded the cost spent by Apple to develop the product. Therefore, Apple’s R&D is not an expense but an investment.

The BEA also argues that the cost of producing television shows, movies, and music should count as investments that add to GDP. Supporters of the change often hold up the blockbuster television comedy Seinfeld as an example. Given that the show’s billions in earnings far exceeded its initial costs, they argue that the production expenses should be considered “investments” (like R&D) and be added into GDP.

Economists who have staked their reputations on the efficacy of Keynesian growth strategies have argued that such changes will more accurately reflect the realities of our 21^st century information economy. But their analysis ignores the failures so often associated with R&D and artistic productions. For every breakthrough iPhone there are dozens of ill-conceived gizmos that never get off the drawing board. For every Seinfeld, there are countless failures and bombs that leave nothing but losses.

In essence, the new methodology is an exercise in double accounting. For instance, suppose a company employs an accountant who works in the sales department, who is then transferred to the R&D department at the same salary. He still counts beans but now his salary will be billed to the R&D budget rather than sales. In the old methodology, the accountant’s impact on GDP would come only from the personal consumption that his salary allows. Going forward, he will add to GDP in two ways: from his personal consumption and his salary’s addition to his company’s R&D budget. The same formula would apply to a trucker who switches from a freight company to a movie production company (for the same salary). If he moves refrigerators, he only adds to GDP through his personal spending, but if he hauls movie lights, his contribution to GDP is doubled. It makes no difference if the movie bombs.

These double shots are different from traditional investments, which inject savings (or idle cash) back into the marketplace. Until money from personal or corporate savings is invested, it is not adding to GDP.

Another change that will artificially boost GDP concerns how government salaries will be counted. Unlike most private sector compensation, wages, salaries, and pension contributions paid to government workers are added directly to GDP. This distinction makes sense and eliminates potentially double accounting. Profits generated by private companies add to GDP when they are ultimately spent or invested by the company. Wages reduce profits, and therefore reduce GDP. But that reduction is cancelled out by the consumption of the employee receiving the wages. Governments do not generate profits, so salaries are the only way that public spending adds back to GDP.

The new system magnifies the GDP impact of government pensions, which are a principal component of public sector compensation. Going forward, the pensions will be calculated not from actual contributions, but from what governments have promised. Under the old system, if a state had a $10,000 pension obligation but only contributed $1,000, only the $1,000 would be added to GDP. Under the new system the entire $10,000 would be counted. So now governments can magically grow the economy simply by making promises they can’t keep.

The bottom line is that now certain private sector salaries (in R&D and entertainment) will be counted twice and public pension contributions will be counted even if they aren’t made. The economy will not actually be any larger or grow any faster, but the statistics will claim otherwise. With the stroke of a pen, our debt to GDP ratio will come down. Will this soothe the fears of our creditors? Will critics of big government take comfort that spending as a share of GDP may be lower? My guess is that the government is confident that its trick will work, and that distracting attention with a statistical illusion is the sole motivation for the change.

A similar type of hocus pocus has been successfully used to make inflation appear much smaller. A few months ago I produced a video showing how changes in methods used to calculate the Consumer Price Index (CPI) have resulted in a widening gap between increases in real prices and the CPI. The changes, that incorporate such concepts as hedonic adjustments and substation bias, were made to make the CPI more “accurate,” but have instead produced consistently lower results. Although I used a basket of 20 goods for that experiment, I gave particular attention to such things as newspaper and magazine prices and health insurance costs. But just recently I came across another data set that leads to the same conclusion.

Since the late 1980’s, The Economist Magazine has compiled something called the “Big Mac Index,”(BMI) a global survey of the cost of McDonald’s signature hamburger. Although the index is primarily used as a means to compare purchasing power parity around the globe, it also can be used to track the prices of Big Macs in the U.S. over many years.

From 1986 to 2003 the U.S. BMI rose roughly in line with the CPI. Although the burger occasionally rose faster or slower, over that 17 year period both indexes increased by about 68% (or about 4% per year). But from April 2003 to January 2013 the CPI Index is up just 25% percent (from 183.8 to 230.28 or about 2.5% per year) while the BMI is up 61% (from $2.71 to $4.37 or about 6.1% per year), or more than twice the official inflation rate.

What could possibly account for the difference? Has the Big Mac gotten bigger, better, tastier, or healthier? As an iconic product, McDonald’s has been reluctant to change a proven formula. If the Big Mac hasn’t changed, is it possible that our inflation yardstick has?

It has been estimated that if the government used the same methodology to measure inflation that it used during the 1980’s, we would be currently dealing with official inflation that would be many times higher than today’s official 1.5% rate. The Big Mac appears to confirm this.

But now the government appears ready to distort the figures even further. With little resistance from the media or the public, the Obama Administration and Congressional Republicans seem ready to switch the inflation measurements used for Social Security away from the CPI in favor of the even more attenuated “Chain Weighted CPI.” This index, which is consistently lower than the CPI, looks to incorporate changes in spending patterns when consumers switch to more affordable products (in other words, it measures the cost of survival, not the cost of living). And while many admit that this is a manipulation, no one really seems to care.

Similarly clumsy tricks have been used to make our unemployment problem appear less severe. Over the years new methods have been introduced to factor out those who have “dropped out” of the labor force or to count part-time or temporary workers as employed.

All this takes us right back to Don Draper. If you can’t change the conversation, change the words. If that doesn’t work, just change the dictionaries.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. Please feel free to repost with proper attribution and all links included.

Japan Steps into the Void

europac admin — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 18:18:19 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Friday, April 19, 2013

In the years following the global financial crisis, economists and investors have gotten very comfortable with very high, and seemingly persistent, government debt. The nonchalance may be underpinned by the assumption that globally significant countries that can print their own currencies can't get trapped in a sovereign debt crisis. However, it now appears that Japan is preparing to put this confidence to the ultimate stress test.

For the better part of 20 years, successive Japanese governments and central bankers have been trying, unsuccessfully, to use quantitative easing strategies to pump up a deflated asset bubble. The economy has by and large not responded. The sustained and impressive growth that Japan delivered during the 45 years following the Second World War (which had made the country one of the most successful economic stories in world history), has never returned. For the last 20 years Japan has offered a "zombie" economy characterized by low growth, stagnation, and exploding government debt. The Japanese government now owes approximately $12 trillion, a figure representing more than 200% of GDP. The IMF expects that this figure will reach 245% by the end of this year. This gives Japan the unenviable title of having the world's highest government debt-to-GDP ratio. But Shinzo Abe, the newly elected Prime Minister of Japan, and Haruhiko Kuroda, his newly-appointed Governor of the Bank of Japan, feel much, much more debt needs to be issued to turn the economy around.

The hope that Abe would be a new kind of prime minister with a bold economic formula helped revive the long dead Japanese stock market. Between May and November of 2012, the Nikkei traded within a range of 8200-9400. As Abe's victory began to be expected, the Nikkei started moving up, reaching 10,000 by the time he was sworn in on December 26 of last year. The euphoria continued throughout the spring and by April 2 the Nikkei stood at 12,003 points. Then on April 4, BOJ Governor Kuroda made good on Abe's dovish rhetoric and announced a plan to end years of mildly declining prices by doing whatever necessary to create 2% inflation (in reality these price declines have been one of the few consolations to Japanese consumers). To achieve its goals, the government is prepared to double the amount of Yen in circulation. Stocks immediately rallied, and in less than a week the Nikkei had breached 13,000 points, taking the index to a 4 1/2-year high. It is rare that any major stock market can achieve a 50% rally in less than a year. But the rally will be costly.

The Japanese government already spends 25% of tax revenue to service outstanding debt (compared to 6% in the US). These costs become even more astonishing when one considers the extremely low rates Japan pays. Ten-year Japanese government bonds now pay less than 0.6%, and five-year yields are now a little more than 0.20%. How much will debt service costs increase if Abe succeeds in pushing inflation to 2.0%? Two percent rates would triple long term borrowing costs. Given the size of its debts, increases of such magnitude could hit Japan with the force of 10 Godzillas.

Japan has an aging demographic and as more time goes by, the pool of potential bond buyers continues to shrink. Unlike the United States, where individual savers are mostly irrelevant in the sovereign debt market, Japanese investors have largely set the market in their own country. There is evidence to suggest that Japanese savers are increasingly considering overseas sources of yield for protection from the inflation that Abe is so determined to create.

As the Nikkei has moved upward, the Japanese Yen has taken the opposite trajectory, falling more than 20% against the U.S. Dollar since the beginning of 2012, and nearly 12% since the beginning of this year (the decline has been even greater in terms of several other currencies). This steep drop, which has taken a huge bite out of the nominal gains in Japanese stocks is unusual in the foreign exchange markets, and has threatened to destabilize an already weak global financial system.

Earlier this year the falling yen issue sparked a full-fledged headline war. On February 16th, participating members of the G20 issued a statement, clearly aimed at Japan, warning against competitive devaluations and currency wars. A day later, Japan's Finance Minister stated flatly that Japan was not attempting to manipulate its currency. After some hesitation, the G20 seemed to accept this statement. For now it seems the international powers have fallen in behind Japan. Both IMF Chief Christine Lagarde and Ben Bernanke have praised Abe's policies. The prevailing opinion seems to be that weakening a currency should not be considered manipulation as long as it's done to revive a domestic economy, not specifically to harm competitors. Such an opinion qualifies as a great moment in rhetorical shamelessness.

In addition to his plans for inflationary monetary policy, Abe is also attempting to wage war from the fiscal side as well. His Liberal Democratic Party has called for over $2.4 trillion USD worth of public works stimulus over the next 10 years. This spending represents approximately 40% of Japan's current GDP and, adjusted for population, would be the equivalent of nearly $600 billion USD annually in the United States.

It should be obvious to anyone with even half a brain that Japan's prior experiments with ever larger doses of quantitative easing have failed. Leaders in both Japan and the United States, however, are following this path with reckless abandon. According to Abe, the entirety of Japan's economic problems can be blamed on the fact that consumer prices have been declining by one tenth of one percent per year. If only Japanese consumers were forced to pay two percent more per year for the things they need or desire, all would be well.

Abe's wish may already be coming true. McDonald's announced this morning that, for the first time in 5 years, the price of hamburgers and cheeseburgers in Japan will be rising by 20% and 25% respectively. This is much needed relief for bored Japanese consumers who have likely grown tired of paying the same low prices year after year. No doubt they will be so excited by this development that they'll will rush to the stores to buy more burgers before prices go up again. Of course there is no official concern that low-income Japanese will now have to pay more for low cost food.

The idea that informs Abe's plan, that rising prices entice consumers to buy before the prices go up, is clearly suspect as economic law dictates that demand increases when prices fall. Any store owner will tell you that cutting prices is the best way to move merchandise. Apart from this problem, how does Abe expect consumers to buy more when their currency is losing purchasing power and more of their incomes will be needed to pay interest on the national debt?

The boldness of Abe's plans should provide the rest of the world with a crash course in the ability of debt accumulation to jumpstart an economy. The good news is that the effects should not take too long to be seen. I believe that we will be treated with a stark lesson on the limitations of inflation as an economic panacea.

Hopefully, failure of this latest Japanese experiment will help convince leaders in the U.S. and Japan that the only true path to prosperity is free market capitalism. Rather than trying to reflate busted bubbles and micro-manage Keynesian style recoveries, politicians and central bankers should recognize their respective roles in creating the problems and get out of the way.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Gold in the Crosshairs

europac admin — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 15:58:28 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Monday, April 15, 2013

In the opening years of the last decade, most mainstream investors sat on the sidelines while "tin hat" goldbugs rode the bull market from below $300 to just over $1,000 per ounce. But following the 2008 financial crisis, when gold held up better than stocks during the decline and made new record highs long before the Dow Jones fully recovered, Wall Street finally sat up and took notice. The new devotees helped to push gold to nearly $1,900 by September of 2011. For the next year and a half it held relatively steady, trading mostly between $1,500 and $1,800 as more mainstream investors caught the fever. But now it appears that the brief love affair is at an end. It was really only a flirtation as the two were never a good match in the first place. Gold's new suitors never understood the fundamental case for gold and now they are turning their affection back to their true love: U.S. equities.

This is creating a brutal season for gold investors. The metal is in the midst of its largest pull back in nearly five years, and as the selling has gathered momentum powerful Wall Street voices as diverse as Goldman Sachs and George Soros have declared the end of its nearly fifteen year run of dominance.

The story line put out by most of these analysts is that gold shined as a safe haven during the Great Recession, but its allure has evaporated with the recent "improvements" in the global economy, particularly in the United States. Ironically, this ignores the fact that gold actually performed better in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis than it did during or following the crisis. That may be because the inflationary monetary policy that fueled the housing bubble also powered gold. Deflation fears led to gold's 35% decline in 2008, but once the Fed reopened the monetary spigots gold rallied to new highs. But in 2008 gold fell in concert with nearly every other asset class. This time, it's falling while other assets are rising. The negative spotlight makes the current decline potentially more meaningful.

Neither the new round of Keynesian expansion in Japan nor the recent fallout from the Cypriot solvency crisis produced gold rallies. Bears cite these failures as the signs that the bull is dead. The latest warning bell came late last week when the Bank of Cyprus announced that it would be selling its gold reserves in order to raise the cash to pay its debts. Concerns quickly spread that other heavily indebted Mediterranean countries with large gold reserves like Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain would follow suit. The tidal wave of selling would be expected to be the coup de grace for gold's glory years. While this neat narrative may be sufficient to convince the financial media that an historic shift is underway, wiser minds will see more nuance.

While the vast majority of economists see gold as the "barbarous relic" described by Keynes, the sentiment has not stopped many central bankers from holding huge quantities as currency reserves. It is a curious phenomenon that the countries with the most daunting debt problems have the highest percentage of gold in their foreign exchange reserves. Many of these countries were formerly prosperous, and at various points in their histories had gold-backed currencies that required large reserves. These legacy assets now account for the bulk of their reserve wealth.

The United Stated leads the pack with both the largest amount of gold in reserve (8,133 tons) and one of the highest percentages (76%). Other heavily indebted developed countries are not far behind: Italy has 2,450 tons and 72% of reserves, France has 2,435 tons and 71% reserves, Portugal has 382 tons and 90% reserves, and Greece has 112 tons and 82% reserves. Tiny Cyprus, whose travails are creating global ripples, has just 14 tons (58% of reserves).

In contrast, the quickly developing emerging market economies are conspicuous for very small gold reserves, particularly in comparison to their much larger reserves of foreign currencies. Many of these countries have generated large amounts of U.S. dollar reserves as a result of ongoing trade surpluses. While China has more than 1,000 tons of gold, the cache only represents 2% of their enormous foreign exchange coffers. Even gold loving India has just 10%. Neither Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, nor Brazil has more than 10% (with most having far less than 5%). Bankers and political leaders in all of these countries, particularly India and China, have lamented publicly about the very high percentage of U.S. dollars in their reserves, and have even spoken fondly about the reliability and importance of gold.

The heavy debtors in the Eurozone have few pleasant options to deal with their insolvency. As illustrated by Cyprus, the choices may come down to painful austerity or raiding supposedly sacred bank deposits. The sale of gold reserves may provide a much more palatable option for politicians. After all, do voters really care how much gold sits in national vaults? For now at least, international central bank gold agreements limit the amount of gold that they can sell in a given year. But as these sovereign debt crises deepen for countries like Italy and Portugal, many justly question how long these paper agreements will keep the selling pressure at bay.

While I believe that they may indeed succumb to the temptation, such moves may not be disruptive, or even negative for gold. Large divestitures by some countries may lead to corresponding accumulations of cash rich, but gold poor, creditor nations like India, China, Russia, and Indonesia. Such transactions would likely take place through private, direct, and tightly communicated sales. As a result, they would be far less disruptive than would be the case were they to occur in relatively thinly traded public markets as many now fear.

Such a transfer in gold holdings would be the logical result of the drift of the global economy over the past half century. Despite its current disfavor, gold is real wealth. Governments and bankers know this. As the emerging economies gain wealth, and the developed countries dissipate wealth through welfare-state debt accumulation, it is inevitable that the gold follows. It's not a question of if, but when.

While nations buying gold will pay for their purchases with dollars, the sellers will not re-invest the proceeds into Treasuries. Dollars raised through gold sales will be converted to local currency and used to repay debt. This will put downward pressure on both the U.S. dollar and Treasuries. In addition, emerging market central bankers will be more likely to hold onto gold for the long-term, thereby providing a bullish impact on the market. In essence, such a shift would flush out the weak hands who don't have the resources to protect their wealth in favor of stronger hands that do.

Creditor nations that buy gold cheap from bankrupt nations forced to sell at distressed prices will see the value of their reserves swell, thereby gaining the independence and confidence they need to finally break their reliance on the U.S. dollar as their principal reserve asset. When the reign of "king dollar" finally comes to a belated end, let's hope all the gold we allegedly have stored in Fort Knox is actually there. We're going to need every ounce of it.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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The Stockman Backlash

europac admin — Thu, 04 Apr 2013 17:23:15 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Thursday, April 4, 2013

This week, while economists should have been closely considering the implications of the actual bankruptcy of Stockton, California, they instead heaped scorn on the perceived ideological bankruptcy of David Stockman. In other words, Stockman trumped Stockton.

Ronald Reagan’s former Budget Director contributed “Sundown in America” a multi-page opinion piece to the Sunday New York Times which loudly and eloquently described the illusions of our current economic system. While I don’t agree with everything Stockman believes, I think he is showing great wisdom and courage in making dire predictions and calling for extreme changes in our policy and politics.

What was perhaps more surprising than the Times’ uncharacteristic decision to run the piece in the first place was the vitriolic and largely ad hominem backlash against Stockman that quickly emerged from across the political spectrum. The attacks have focused primarily on his history and personality, and not on his arguments. One would be hard pressed to find any journalistic reaction that did not use the words “screed” “rant” or “unhinged.” I believe these responses reveal an acute sensitivity from mainstream economists that arises from defending contorted Keynesian logic.

It can’t be easy to take the position that debt doesn’t matter and that spending creates economic growth. To do so with any hope of success requires team unity, and Stockman has never really been a team player. His reputation as an apostate and a naysayer has made him an easy target.

Famously, Stockman left the Reagan White House in protest over the Gipper’s half-finished mandate. Yes, Reagan had cut taxes, but he never really cut spending. Stockman never bought into the easy idea, championed by Jack Kemp and Dick Cheney, that deficits don’t matter and that tax cuts pay for themselves. And although the Reagan revolution did clear the way for a return to better growth in the 80’s and 90’s, Stockman knew that the piper would call someday to collect the debt. Despite his foresight on that topic, his criticism of the Reagan legacy has earned him the derision of the Republican establishment for whom that particular hero worship is sacred.

This may have informed the attack issued by neo-conservative apologist and Iraq war cheerleader, David Frum, who offered a solely psychological assessment: “Stockman provides an insight into the gloomy mindset that overtakes us in older age, it’s a valuable warning to those of still middle-aged that once we lose our faith in the future, it’s time to stop talking about politics in public.” So much for respecting our elders.

Bloomberg’s Jeff Kearns, whose support of Fed policy has earned him regular taps at Ben Bernanke’s televised press conferences, provided the most common mainstream dismissal of Stockman: “His warning that the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing is steering the world’s largest economy toward a crash is at odds with nine quarters of job growth, record stock prices and unprecedented corporate earnings.” This “he must be wrong because things look good now” position supposes that economics can’t be understood or predicted, only observed. I received very similar treatment back in 2006 and 2007 when I tried to tell the mainstream that the real estate market was a house of cards. How could it be bad, they said, if it goes up every year?

Despite his misalignment with the Republican hierarchy, the Left has an even greater revulsion for Stockman. Since the crisis, he has become perhaps the most respected figure (with the possible exception of Alan Meltzer) to take the position that a system based on fiat currency is doomed. Those who most visibly argue these points, like Ron and Rand Paul, and myself, come from the libertarian movement. As a result, we can be easily dismissed as cranks. However, Stockman was once a card-carrying member of the power elite. His embrace of these principles is taken more seriously and is thus ripe for instant attack from liberal economists.

While the usual suspects of Jared Bernstein and Joe Wiesenthal weighed in with heaps of invective, the loudest heckles have come from, whom else, Paul Krugman. He began his multi-post campaign by questioning the “mystery” of why the New York Times would sully Krugman’s own gravitas by forcing him to share column inches with someone as “non serious” as Stockman. He then offers the back of his hand:

“I thought Stockman would offer some kind of real argument, some presentation, however tendentious, of evidence. Instead it’s just a series of gee-whiz, context- and model-free numbers embedded in a rant — and not even an interesting rant. It’s cranky old man stuff.” For the record, Stockman is only 66.

In actuality, Stockman’s NYT piece offers a litany of objectively dismal facts and cogent explanations of how we got here. While most are celebrating the nominal high of U.S. stocks (see my recent analysis of the current rally), he points out that in the five and half years it has taken for the S&P 500 to set a new high, “Real median family income growth has dropped 8 percent, and the number of full-time middle class jobs, 6 percent. The real net worth of the ‘bottom’ 90 percent has dropped by one-fourth. The number of food stamp and disability aid recipients has more than doubled to 59 million, about one in five Americans.” But Krugman fails to find the currency of his stock and trade, the macro-economic statistical models that attempt to describe how an economy works. In truth, those academic ordeals only matter in getting tenure and impressing the global elite. The real economy is much easier to understand.

Case in point: Stockton, California, which on Monday became the largest U.S. city to file for bankruptcy protection. Stockton, a city of 300,000 and two hours from San Francisco, is following the path blazed by many smaller California municipalities that have been unable to support lavish spending, salary and pension guarantees. And although Stockton has tightened its belt over the last few years (unlike similarly bankrupt San Bernadino, which is not even trying), it lacks the capacity to close the gap. Despite its enormous advantages in geography, infrastructure and location, the city is too bloated with government and clogged with taxes and regulation to allow for robust growth. As a result, Stockton is looking to pin the losses on its creditors.

As Stockman makes clear, the United States has been plagued by the same problems that doomed Stockton. His critics argue that the Federal Reserve’s printing press provides a foolproof immunity to such pedestrian problems. But in the end, these paper protections will only exist on paper. We’re all Stocktonians now.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Flying High on Borrowed Wings

europac admin — Mon, 01 Apr 2013 19:03:07 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Monday, April 1, 2013

After selling off an astounding 56% between October of 2007 and March 2009, the S&P 500 has staged a rally for the ages, surging 120% and recovering all of its lost ground too. This stunning turnaround certainly qualifies as one of the more memorable, and unusual, stock market rallies in history. The problem is that the rally has been underwritten by the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policies But for some reason, this belief has not weakened the celebration.

Although the Fed has been tinkering with interest rates and liquidity for a century, nothing in its history could prepare the markets for its activities over the last four years. (See 'The Stimulus Trap' article in my latest newsletter). And while most market analysts give credit to Ben Bernanke for saving the economy and sparking the rally, they have not fully grasped that market performance is now almost completely correlated to Fed activism. A detailed look at stock market movements over the past four years reveals a clear pattern: upward movements are directly tied to the delivery of fresh stimulants from the Fed. Downward movements occur when markets perceive that the deliveries will stop. In other words, the rally is really just a bender. The rest is commentary.

Since 2008, the Fed has injected fresh cash into the economy with four distinct shots of quantitative easing and has added two kickers of Operation Twist. In recent months, the Fed has dispensed with the pretense of designing, announcing, and serving new rounds of stimulus and is now continuously monetizing over $85 billion per month of Treasury and mortgage-backed debt. The new cash needs a place to go, and stocks, which now often provide higher yields than long term Treasury bonds, and which offer much better protections against inflation, provide the best outlet.

But the four year rally has been punctuated by several sharp and brief drops. It is no coincidence that these episodes occurred during periods in which the delivery of fresh stimulus was in doubt. If the Fed were ever to follow through on its promise to exit the bond market, we believe the current rally would come to an immediate halt. This provides yet another reason to believe that stimulus is now permanent.

A close look at the performance of the S&P 500 over the past four years tells the story.

Source: Yahoo! Finance, Euro Pacific Capital. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. (Click here to enlarge)

In May 2007, with the "Goldilocks" economy of 2005 and 2006 still in control, the S&P finally eclipsed the March 2000 high of the dotcom era. It ultimately hit an all-time high of 1565 in October 2007. But later in the year, things began to unravel when bankruptcies of premier subprime lenders signaled real trouble. A blood bath, though, did not materialize. As late as August 2008, the S&P was trading at nearly 1300, down a less-than-tragic 16% from its high. But when Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and AIG imploded almost simultaneously in September 2008, the markets panicked. Hundreds of billions of dollars of potentially worthless debt now sat on the books of the nation's financial system. No one knew where the next bomb would explode. A stampede thus ensued. (A minor replay of this dynamic just occurred in Cyprus. See my recent commentary for more on this).

Less than a month later the index fell below 900, a fall of more than 30%. By November 21, the S&P had lost another 100 points. Four days later, the Fed introduced the first round of what would come to be commonly known as "quantitative easing". This consisted of purchasing $600 billion of government-sponsored enterprises debt and mortgage-backed securities. By the day of the announcement (even though nothing had yet been done), the S&P rallied almost 50 points to 851. Still encouraged by the Fed, the S&P was at 931 on January 6, 2009, significantly higher than in late November.

Despite the first round of asset purchases, the market was still in chaos and had not yet stabilized. By early March, the S&P had lost an additional 25%, bringing total "peak-to-trough" losses at more than 50%. On March 18, 2009, the Fed announced that it was going to expand the size of its stimulus program. This time it really got the stock market's attention. The new guidelines called for a total purchase of $1.25 trillion of MBS and $300 billion of Treasury debt. On the day of the announcement, the S&P opened at 776 and by the time the asset purchases were complete a year later, in March 2010, the S&P was trading at 1171, an increase of 50%.

When the spigots of quantitative easing shut down in the second quarter of 2010 the S&P turned south, declining to a low of 1022 in July (a 13% decline from March). In late August, just before Bernanke delivered his 2010 Jackson Hole speech, in which he would hint at the next round of stimulus (to be later dubbed "QE2"), the S&P was still hovering a full 10% below its post QE1 high. But the expectation of another shot was enough to ignite a rally. When the formal announcement of QE2 came in November, the index had already advanced to 1193. When the program expired at the end of the 2nd quarter of 2011, the S&P stood at 1307, a 25% increase from before Bernanke jawboned the markets at Jackson Hole.

The market response to QE2 was in many ways similar, if less spectacular, than its prior response to QE1. And like the first go-round, the rally ended with the withdrawal of stimulus. In addition, after the cessation of QE2, the markets had to contend with the farce of the U.S. debt ceiling drama. As a result, the S&P declined from a high of 1343 on July 22 to 1123 by August 19, a drop of 16%. This is also the same time period when the U.S. received its downgrade by Standard and Poor's. Ironically, the U.S. eventually got a temporary reprieve from the spotlight when its problems became overshadowed by funding tensions in Greece and Southern Europe, causing the market to once again flock to the so-called "safe haven" of U.S. assets.

The cover from Europe could only go so far. Pressure soon began to build on the Fed to deliver once again. It acted in September 2011 with its "Operation Twist", a program that consisted of buying longer-term treasuries while selling an equal amount of shorter dated paper. Although Twist was advertised as being balance sheet neutral, the short-term sales the Fed made were somewhat offset by the extension of credit lines to Europe and an extended commitment to the 0% interest rate policy that at the time called for an end date of mid-2013. The day the Fed announced Operation Twist, the S&P opened at 1203. By the following April it had reached 1400, a return of 16%.

But once again the stimulus began to fade. In the second quarter of 2012, a sell off took hold, and by June 5, the S&P traded as low as 1277, a decline of 9% since April. Cue the Fed! On June 20, the Fed announced the extension of Operation Twist, sparking a new rally which has continued into 2013. This buoyancy has been maintained, in part, by the announcement of QE3 on September 13, 2012, which also included another extension of the zero interest rate policy until at least mid-2015. By October, Fed governors were already mentioning inflation targets and when QE4 was launched on December 12, they clarified that zero interest rate policies would be in place until unemployment fell below 6.5%. The current leg of the rally has been somewhat non-linear as the election, the Fiscal Cliff, and the endless empty headlines out of Europe have continued to put pressure on the markets. Despite these obstacles, the S&P has rallied past 1500 and on March 5, 2013, it closed at 1538, within shouting distance of its all-time high of 1576 on October 11, 2007.

When the Fed made the first round of asset purchases in November of 2008, the market was still in a state of flux. However, since the system stabilized in mid 2009, there has been a reliable correlation between the timing of the programs and the performance of the markets. This intention was stated explicitly in Ben Bernanke's November 4,2010, Washington Times Op-ed in which he provided the rationale for QE2:

"This approach eased financial conditions in the past and, so far, looks to be effective again. Stock prices rose and long-term interest rates fell when investors began to anticipate the most recent action. Easier financial conditions will promote economic growth. For example, lower mortgage rates will make housing more affordable and allow more homeowners to refinance. Lower corporate bond rates will encourage investment. And higher stock prices will boost consumer wealth and help increase confidence, which can also spur spending."

With the Fed on pace to expand its balance sheet by over $1 trillion in 2013, there can be little doubt that much of that money is headed straight into the stock market. Treasury bonds are still offering negative real yields and so there is less incentive than ever to own government paper.

Recently, the New York Post's Jonathan Trugman pointed out that Citigroup could be considered the poster child of the dubious rally. Since the crisis began, he reports that the Bank has received $45 billion in TARP funding, an additional $45 billion line of credit from the Treasury, and a government guarantee of $300 billion for its own troubled assets. At the same time, its cost of capital (the money it borrows from the Fed) is near zero, while it earns 3% to 5% on mortgages and 12% to 18% on credit cards. But from an operational standpoint, those gifts have failed to create a flourishing, self-sustaining, business. The company had shed almost 100,000 employees from its period of peak employment a few years ago (down to 260,000 employees) and it announced three months ago that an additional 11,000 cuts are to come. But Citi's share price has risen more than 85 percent since June of 2012, despite scant evidence that the company has turned itself around.

But look what all the Fed intervention has wrought. Each time they have intervened the resulting rally has diminished in intensity, and a sell-off has always ensued when the drug wore off. Through the years, the cycle of stimulus administration has quickened pace and has now arrived at a stage where it is continuous. Currently, the Fed is talking about a potential exit strategy, but as we have argued in the past, and as the chart above surely indicates, any withdrawal of stimulus could likely have dire implications for stocks which will not be tolerated by Washington.

Japan has been unsuccessfully trying to inflate its way out of these problems for the past 20 years(see 'Japan's Dangerous Game' in my latest newsletter). Now many of the indebted nations of the developed world seem intent to follow that example. But the monetary experiment of unending stimulus has, up to now, never been tried on a global scale. No one knows when or how it will end, but I believe it will end badly.

Investing in stocks is supposed to be a way to harness real economic growth, not a way to front run stimulus. Our advice for stock investors is to recognize that and to get as far away from artificially induced highs as possible. More fundamentally sound markets exist. We just have to find them.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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The Stimulus Trap

europac admin — Tue, 26 Mar 2013 17:27:48 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

For years we have been warned by Keynesian economists to fear the so-called "liquidity trap," an economic cul-de-sac that can suck down an economy like a tar pit swallowing a mastodon. They argue that economies grow because banks lend and consumers spend. But a "liquidity trap," they argue, convinces consumers not to consume and businesses not to borrow. The resulting combination of slack demand and falling prices creates a pernicious cycle that cannot be overcome by the ordinary forces that create growth, like savings or investment. They say that a liquidity trap can even resist the extraordinary force of monetary stimulus by rendering cash injections into useless "string pushing." Some of these economists suggest that its power can only be countered by a world war or other fortunately timed event that leads to otherwise politically unattainable levels of government spending.

Putting aside the dubious proposition that the human desire to strive and succeed can be permanently short-circuited by an economic contraction, and that modest expected price declines can quell our desire to consume, the Keynesians have overlooked a much more dangerous and demonstrable pitfall of their own creation: something that I call "The Stimulus Trap." This condition occurs when an economy becomes addicted to the monetary stimulus provided by a central bank, and as a result fails to restructure itself in a manner that will allow for robust, and sustainable, growth. The trap redirects capital into non-productive sectors and starves those areas of the economy that could lead an economic rebirth. The condition is characterized by anemic growth and deteriorating underlying economic fundamentals which is often masked by inflation or asset price bubbles (I look at how stimulus has impacted the U.S. stock market in the March edition of my newsletter).

Japan has been caught in such a stimulus trap for more than a decade. Following a stock and housing market boom of unsustainable proportions in the 1980s, the Japanese economy spectacularly imploded in 1991. The crash initiated a "lost decade" of de-leveraging and contraction. But beginning in 2001, the Bank of Japan unveiled a series of unconventional policies that it describes as "quantitative easing," which involved pushing interest rates to zero, flooding commercial banks with excess liquidity, and buying unprecedented quantities of government bonds, asset-backed securities, and corporate debt. Although Japan has been technically in recovery ever since, its performance is but a shadow of the roaring growth that typified the 40 years prior to 1991. Recently, conditions in Japan have deteriorated further and the underlying imbalances have gotten progressively worse. Yet despite this, the new government is set to double down on the failed policies of the last decade.

I believe that the United States is now following Japan into the mire. After the crash of 2008, we implemented nearly the same set of policies as did Japan in 2001. In the past two years, despite the surging stock market and apparently declining unemployment rate, the size and scope of these efforts have increased. But as is the case in Japan, we can clearly witness how the stimulus has perpetuated stagnation. (See my analysis of the new plans of the Japanese government).

In 2008, one of the country's biggest problems was that we had over-leveraged too many non-productive sectors of the economy. For instance, we irresponsibly lent far too much money to people to buy over-priced real estate. Since then, the problem has gotten worse. Currently the process of writing, securitizing, and buying home mortgages has been essentially nationalized. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (which are now officially government agencies) write and package the vast majority of new home mortgages, which are then guaranteed (almost exclusively) through the Federal Housing Administration, and then sold to the Federal Reserve. According to a tally by ProPublica, these government entities bought or insured more than nine out of 10 home mortgages originated last year, a $1.3 trillion business. Compare this to 2006, when the government share was only three in 10. As a result of this, our lending is far more irresponsible than it has ever been.

In the fourth quarter of 2012, 44% of all FHA borrowers either had no credit score or a score of 679 or lower. In addition, the overwhelming majority of FHA guaranteed loans are being made at 95% or greater loan-to-value. This means down payments are an afterthought. Under the FHA's Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), loans are now even extended to underwater borrowers whose mortgages may be worth far more than their homes. As a result, the FHA could be exposed to enormous losses in the event of future housing market downturns. Such an outcome would be likely if mortgage interest rates were ever to rise even modestly from their current low levels.

In fact, losses on low-quality mortgages have already left the FHA with $16 billion in losses. To close the gap, it has had to raise the insurance premiums it charges to borrowers. With those premiums expected to rise again next month, many fear that marginal borrowers could be priced out of the market. But rather than learning from its mistakes, the government just announced that Fannie Mae would pick up the slack, lowering its lending standards to match the ones that had led to losses at the FHA. In other words, we haven't solved the problem of bad lending - we have simply made it bigger and nationalized it.

The overall financial sector is equally addicted to cheap money. Banks have seen strong earnings and rising share prices in recent years. But their businesses have largely focused on the simple process of capturing the spread between the zero percent cost of Fed capital and the 3% yield of long term Treasury debt and government insured mortgage backed securities. As a result, banks are not making productive private sector loans to businesses. Instead, the capital is being used to pump up the already bloated housing and government sectors.

Corporate profits are indeed high at the moment, but much of that success comes from the extremely low borrowing costs and extremely high leverage. Investors chasing any kind of yield they can find are pouring money into companies with dubious prospects. This January, yields on junk rated debt fell below 6% for the first time. Currently they are approaching 5.5%. Consumers are using cheap money to buy on credit. Savings rates are now hitting post-recession lows.

Lastly (but certainly not least), the Federal government is now totally dependent on the Fed's largess. Without the Fed buying the bulk of Treasury debt, interest rates would likely rise, thereby increasing the cost of servicing the massive national debt. While Congress and the media have focused on the $85 billion in annual cuts earmarked in the "Sequester," an increase of Treasury yields to 5% (3% higher than current levels) on the $16 trillion in outstanding government debt would translate to $480 billion per year of increased interest payments. Such an increase would force a tough choice between raising taxes, cutting domestic spending or reducing interest payments sent abroad for debt service. If foreign creditors begin to doubt that America has the resolve to make the hard choices, they may refuse to roll-over maturing obligations, forcing the government to actually repay principal. With trillions maturing each year, actual repayment is mathematically impossible.

But for now most people feel that the transition is underway to a healthy economy. The prevailing debate is when and how the Fed will let the economy fly on its own. Many of the top market analysts have great faith that Ben Bernanke can pull the monetary tablecloth off the table without disturbing the dishes. Those who hold this view fail to understand that the United States is caught in a stimulus trap from which there is no easy exit. How can the Fed wean the economy from stimulus when stimulus IS the economy? In truth, the trick Bernanke must actually perform is to pull the table out from beneath the cloth, leaving both the cloth and the dishes suspended in air. (Read how Iceland confronted its own crisis while avoiding the stimulus trap).

What would happen to the Treasury market if the Federal Reserve, by far the biggest buyer and largest holder of Treasury bonds, became a net seller? Who will be there to keep the sell off from becoming an interest rate spiking rout? It may sound absurd to those of us who remember the economy before the crash, but our new economy can't tolerate "sky high" rates of four or five percent. What would happen to the housing market and the stock market if interest rates were to return to those traditional levels? The red ink would flow in rivers. With yields rising and asset prices falling, how long would it take before the Fed reverses course and serves up another round of stimulus? Not long at all.

That means any talk of an exit strategy is just that, talk. Not only can the Fed not exit, but it will have to delve further into the stimulus abyss. While doing so, the Fed will continuously insist that the exit lies just behind an ever moving horizon. It will repeat this mantra until a currency crisis finally forces a painful exit.

Unfortunately, the longer the Fed waits to exit, the more painful the exit will be. But trading long-term pain for short-term gain is the Fed's specialty. In the meantime, Wall Street watches in uncomprehending stupor as the economy settles deeper and deeper into the stimulus trap.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Cyprus Lifts the Curtain

europac admin — Thu, 21 Mar 2013 17:07:08 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Thursday, March 21, 2013

This week financial analysts, economists, politicians, and bank depositors from around the world were outraged that European leaders, more specifically the Germans, currently calling many of the shots in Brussels and Frankfurt, could be so politically reckless, economically ignorant, and emotionally callous as to violate the sanctity of bank deposits in order to fund a bailout of Cyprus. The chorus of condemnation may have been the deciding factor in giving the Cypriot parliament the confidence to unanimously vote down the measures in hopes that Berlin will cave or Russia will swoop in with a bailout.

The decision to inflict pain on both large and small depositors was almost universally described as a historic blunder. But the mistake was to do so in a manner that was not camouflaged by financial smoke and mirrors. In truth, rank and file depositors have been paying, and will continue to pay, for all manner of bailouts and stimulus. (Read about the Stimulus Trap in my just released newsletter). Whether it's through lower interest payments on deposits, inflation, higher taxes, higher borrowing costs, or the accumulation of unsustainable sovereign debt, Cypriots will bear the burden of past profligacy. But the new plan for Cyprus was far too transparent, simple, and direct to survive in a world dependent on deceit and obfuscation. It was dead on arrival.

All over the world, most notably in the United States, Britain and Japan, central bankers are actively pursuing inflation targets of two to three percent. But isn't inflation, which allows governments to pay off debt through the creation of new money that transfers purchasing power from savers to borrowers, just a deposit tax in disguise? (Read more about Japan's plan to do just that). British citizens of all means have been living with such a three percent stealth tax for the past three years, and it is expected to stay that high for at least two more years. Yet a one-time tax of 6.75% in Cyprus is seen as the ultimate act of betrayal?

Many are lamenting that Cyprus' membership in the EU prevents it from devaluing its own currency to get out of the jam. How would such a course be morally superior? Taking actual losses on deposits is no different than taking losses through devaluation and inflation. Both result in the loss of purchasing power. Asking for a depositor haircut at least deals with the problem honestly and immediately. Although it's not quite as honest, devaluation can also be effective.

The same dynamic holds true with bailout funds. Suppose the EU were to come through with more funds? All that means is that Cypriots will have to pay more in future debt and interest repayments. In so doing they would saddle future generations with a burden that they had no hand in creating. How is that fair?

And it's not as if depositors at Cypriot banks, many of whom are reported to be Russian citizens seeking tax havens, were not complicit in the risk taking. Bloomberg reports that over the past five years euro deposits at Cyprus banks returned more than 24 percent cumulatively, almost double the returns on comparable German accounts. The banks were able to offer such returns because they were exposed to riskier assets (i.e. Greek government bonds). What's so wrong with asking those who took greater risks to earn higher returns to give something back when their decisions go bad?

Cypriot citizens, as members of the EU, had the choice to put their deposits in any EU bank. Even after paying the taxes that had been proposed in the bailout, long-term depositors would have made more money by keeping their savings in the high yielding Cypriot banks than low yielding German banks. So what kind of sadistic Rubicon are we crossing?

The predominating fear internationally was not that mom and pop Cypriots would have trouble making ends meet, or that Russian mobsters would have lost any of their questionable fortunes, but that a run on banks in Cyprus would lead to similar panics in Greece, Spain, and then the world at large. As a result, the troubles of an insignificant economy are seen to threaten the entire global financial edifice. This is just the latest sign that our current system rests upon nothing but confidence...which in the end can be ephemeral.

Despite the surmounting mathematical challenges faced by the overly indebted countries, investors have confidence that central banks will be able to engineer a return to sustainable economic growth without creating runaway inflation or triggering a renewed recession through premature tightening. This would be a tall order in even the best of circumstances. But if a small issue like Cyprus can shake that confidence...how strong can it be? Read how this confidence in central bank support has been the driving force in stock market rally.

Interestingly, the troubles in Cyprus have encouraged many to boast about the comparative health of American banking institutions and the superior sanctity of our own depositor protections. Both of these strengths are illusory, and as a result, what happens in Cyprus will not necessarily stay in Cyprus.

This month the Federal Reserve released the results of "stress tests" that it conducted on the major U.S. banks. While the media heralded the overwhelming success, in which 14 of 16 institutions received gold stars, they did not mention how the tests failed to test how the banks would perform if interest rates were to return to their historic norms.

Currently, the ultra-low rates provided by the Federal Reserve, which provide a low cost of capital and sustain profits on highly leveraged bond and mortgage portfolios, are a key element keeping banks in the black. All of that would be threatened in a rising rate environment. And while the tests did assume that rates would rise from the current 1.9% on the 10 year Treasury, there were no considerations for yields surpassing 4%. They assume that interest rates will stay near historic lows, no matter how bad (or good) the economy gets, how high inflation rises, or how much money the government borrows.

The Fed saw yields rising to 4% (by the end of 2015) only under their most optimistic forecast. In the scenarios involving economic deterioration, they predicted yields would come down dramatically from current levels. At no point did researchers ask the most fundamental questions: What if all the money that has been created over the past few years leads to an increase in inflation that forces interest rates past 4% even if the economy remains weak -- do they not remember the stagflation of the 1970s? Or what if the continued fiscal cowardice in Washington leads to a diminishment of bond investors' enthusiasm?

Given our past experience with bursting bubbles, would it not have been wise for the Fed to consider whether banks could withstand the bursting of the Treasury bond bubble, which many suggest is the biggest bubble of them all? But since the Fed did not recognize the smaller bubbles until after they burst, it is not surprising that they are equally blind to this one? The Fed, after all, does not have a history of learning from its mistakes. However, I believe the oversight is no accident. The Fed knows that major banks would fail if the bond market crashed, but it does not want to shake the confidence that is essential to the current economy.

This episode also puts into starker focus the inadequacy of deposit insurance. By offering the illusion of systemic safety in bank deposits, government guarantees encourage recklessness by banks and depositors. They provide the same incentives that federal flood insurance does in convincing homeowners to build on flood zones. Consumer choice and risk aversion are powerful forces that could bring needed discipline to banking. The FDIC in the U.S. is in the same situation as insurance giant AIG before the crash of 2008.

While the FDIC currently has about $25 billion available to bail out failing banks in the event of isolated events (mainly held in U.S. treasuries that would need to be sold), it insures more than $10 trillion in deposits. Clearly it lacks the resources to cover major losses in a systemic failure. A failure of just one of the nation's forty largest banks could swamp the resources of the FDIC. I believe that a significant spike in Treasury yields, to say 6%, would result in the failure of several major banks. Bank of America and Citibank for example each have over $1 trillion in deposits. Where would the FDIC get the money to make the depositors whole in such a situation? The government would be unlikely to pass a major tax increase to fund an FDIC bailout. More likely the Fed would print the money. In that event, depositors may not lose their money, but their money will lose much of its purchasing power. In the end, honest losses could prove to be much smaller.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Ben's Balance Sheet Blues

europac admin — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 21:12:09 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Friday, March 1, 2013

During his testimony before Congress this week, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke made it a priority to dampen the growing concern that the unprecedented growth of the Fed's balance sheet presents great risks to the economy. There has been a heightened sense even among normally complacent members of Congress that the Fed could spark a precipitous decline in the economy and the financial markets if and when it seeks to "withdraw liquidity" by selling even a minor portion of its bond portfolio (which is projected to swell to $4 trillion by year end). This is a valid concern that I have been discussing for years.

Gentle Ben soothed these fears by his novel assertion that the Fed doesn't actually need to sell bonds to neutralize previously injected stimulus. Instead, the Fed could simply allow its bonds to mature, thereby achieving a more natural, and potentially less disruptive unwinding of its gargantuan portfolio. Although his explanation seemed to satisfy many of the Congressman (and the vast majority of the journalists who slavishly dote on Bernanke's assurances), the idea is completely absurd.

As a result of its previous efforts during "Operation Twist" (which was conducted in order to push down long-term interest rates), the Fed has already swapped hundreds of billions of dollars of short-term securities for Treasury bonds with maturities of ten years or longer. Only a small portion of the Fed's portfolio, then, becomes due at any given time. The average maturity of the entire portfolio is now over 10 years. There may well come a time when inflation or asset bubbles become so pronounced that aggressive withdrawal of stimulus is needed. Forceful action will only be possible through active selling, not simply by passive maturation.

However, either approach will be insufficient to tighten policy without a simultaneous cessation of buying of newly issued Treasury bonds. After all, to shrink the size of its balance sheet the Fed must stop adding to it...or at least add less than it is subtracting. Even if the Fed had the luxury of holding its bonds to maturity, such a stance would not prevent a collapse in the bond market. The Treasury does not have the cash needed to retire maturing bonds if the Fed stops rolling them over. As the government will have to sell the new bonds to other buyers, one way or another additional supply is going to hit the market.

The Federal government is projected to run trillion dollar deficits for years to come. To cover that gap, the Treasury will need to continuously sell new bonds. This need will persist regardless of the Fed's policy priorities. For the last few years the Fed has been by far the biggest buyer of Treasuries, in recent times sucking up more than 60 percent of the total issuance. According to some reports, the Fed is expected to buy up to 90 percent of Treasuries in 2013. The only other significant buyers are foreign central banks (who buy for political reasons) and nimble hedge funds. Who does Bernanke expect will fill his shoes when he stops shopping?

To answer that question you must consider the economic environment that would compel the Fed to tighten in the first place. Presumably a period of accelerating economic growth, surging inflation, or rising interest rates would trigger asset sales. In such a situation, who in the world would want to buy low-yielding, long-term government paper while inflation is surging, the dollar is falling, and interest rates are rising? With the Fed on the sidelines, such an investment would be a guaranteed loser. Bernanke claims that the financial conditions will be soothed by an aggressive communications campaign that would let market participants know, in advance, precisely how the Fed intended to dispose of its assets. The cardinal rule in investing is that big players never telegraph their intentions. Fed "transparency" will simply mean that the hedge funds now making money by getting in front of the buying will be making even more money by getting in front of the selling! There will be no cavalry of new buyers riding to the rescue.

This means that any attempt to tighten, no matter how passive, will result in a significant drop in the price of U.S. Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities. Not only would this inflict massive losses to the value of the Fed's balance sheet but it would exert enormous upward pressure on interest and mortgage rates that the Fed will be unable to control.

In addition to his absurd "let them mature" gambit, Bernanke also announced other novel policy tools that will supposedly help him orchestrate a successful exit strategy, most notably raising the rates paid on funds held at the Federal Reserve. Such a move is expected to deter banks from lending into a surging economy or to invest in risky assets by enticing them to park cash at the Fed. But how high must these rates go, and how much would it cost the Fed (in reality U.S. taxpayers) to do this effectively? Given how high I believe inflation will become, these payments could be truly staggering. The net result will be a substitution of large operating losses for large portfolio losses (which would have come from bond sales).

As I have said many times before, the Fed has no credible exit strategy. Its portfolio is far too large, and the economy, the housing market, the banks, and the government, are far too dependent on ultra-low interest rates to allow Bernanke any real options. In truth, his only exit strategy is to just talk about an exit strategy. Bernanke's contention that the Fed need not sell any of its bonds is the closest thing yet to an official admission of this fact. Not too long ago Bernanke made the absurd claim that his intention to sell the bonds on the Fed's balance sheet meant that he was not monetizing debt. How times have changed.

Bernanke is banking on the hope that his policies will jump start the economy which will then be able to motor along on its own. However, the current era of cheap money and fiscal stimulus will never create an economy that is capable of standing on its own legs. Instead, it is propping up a parasitic economy that is completely dependent on the very supports the Fed believes it can one day remove. But if the Fed does not remove them on its own, the markets eventually will.

Bernanke also defended himself against some members of Congress, particularly economically savvy New Jersey representative Scott Garrett, who pointed out the hypocrisy of Bernanke's claims that Fed policies are responsible for the recent rise in home prices (while simultaneously absolving the Fed of any responsibility for rising home prices during the real estate bubble). To justify this claim, Bernanke made the self-serving distinction that while the Fed is currently purchasing mortgage-backed securities (in order to lower mortgages rates and boost home prices), no such actions existed prior to the 2008 financial crisis. As a result, he claims the Fed could not have been responsible for the bubble. On this point he is dead wrong.

Fed policy during the mid-years of the last decade had an enormous effect on mortgage rates and home prices. By holding short-term rates too low for too long, the Fed was responsible for the proliferation of Adjustable Rate Mortgages and the popularity of the ultra-low teaser rates without which the housing bubble never could have been inflated so large in the first place.

In other words, the Fed broke it then, but it sure can't fix it now.

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The Pound Gets Pounded

europac admin — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 16:57:26 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

As the global currency war intensifies, the majority of attention has been paid to the 17% fall of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar over the past few months. The implosion has given cover to the sad performance of another once mighty currency: the British Pound Sterling. But in many ways the travails of the pound is far more instructive to those pondering the fate of the U.S. currency.

Japan has a unique economic and demographic profile which makes it a poor stalking horse. Newly elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the Bank of Japan have clearly and forcefully committed Japan to a policy of inflation at any cost. Even in a world of serial money printers their plans stand out as exceptional. Britain, on the other hand, is charting a more conventional course to the same destination.

The UK government, under conservative Prime Minister David Cameron and Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, has succeeded in bringing marginal discipline to their budgetary imbalances. From 2009 to 2012, British government expenditures rose a total of just 1.6%, which was far below the official pace of inflation. (In contrast, U.S. federal spending grew by 7.9% over that time period). Since 2009 the British have kept their debt-to-GDP ratio lower than America's and have cut into that metric at a faster rate. But while the British are conservative when compared to their American cousins, they are hardly austere when compared to Germany (which continues to have a nearly balanced budget and extremely low debt to GDP). Paul Krugman blames Britain's lackluster economic performance on their misguided experiment with austerity.

The monetary side of the equation also puts the UK within the spectrum of its peers. Ever since the Great Recession began in 2008 the Bank of England, led by outgoing Governor Mervyn King, has been far more stimulative than the European Central Bankers in Frankfurt (but not quite as much as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of Japan). In contrast to the permanent and ongoing bond-buying quantitative easing programs underway in the U.S. and Japan, the Bank of England has engaged in such measures only selectively.

Given the relatively moderate approach pursued by the British, the poor performance of their currency may be hard to fathom. The deciding factor may be that the pound sterling is not nearly as vital to investors, or as integrated into the global economy, as the U.S. dollar or the euro. The greenback, being the world's reserve currency, has always benefited from demand that is independent of its economic fundamentals. The euro benefits from the size of the euro zone and the legacy of German banking discipline. The pound enjoys no such privileges and as a result foreign central banks do not feel as pressured to prop it up. As a result, over the past few years the pound has been... pounded. Since July 2008, the currency is down 26.7% against the U.S. dollar, and in recent months it has started falling faster than all other developed currencies except for the Abe-pummeled yen. Since October 1, 2012 the pound has fallen by 4% against the dollar and 8% against the euro.

The pound's health is made more suspect by the extreme challenges faced by the Bank of England as it tries to stimulate the most admittedly inflation prone economy among the major Western nations. Unlike the Federal Reserve, which is tasked by statute to combat both inflation and unemployment, the BofE has only a single mandate: to keep inflation contained. On that score it has been failing habitually. Inflation in the UK has been north of its 2% target for the past five years (the current official rate is 2.7%). In its most recent inflation projections, Mr. King admitted that it will stay that way for years to come, and that it may exceed 3% this year and next. With its currency weakening and inflation accelerating, the mandate of the BofE would clearly indicate that the time has come for monetary tightening.

However, like all central bankers, Mr. King, and his successor, the Canadian Mark Carney, will not be bound by such triflings as statutory mandates and past promises. In his press conference last week, Mr. King spoke of "looking past" current inflation figures to a time when he expects inflation will moderate. When the choice is between inflation and the political pain of economic contraction, bankers (at least those who don't speak German) will choose inflation every time.

While the American media has poked fun at the Bank of England's backtracking, they somehow do not understand that the Federal Reserve would be doing the same if not for the advantages given to us by the dollar's reserve status. Our ability to monetize the vast majority of the annual government deficit while exporting our inflation through half trillion dollar trade deficits and the overseas sale of hundreds of billions of Treasury bonds annually means that we do not yet face the pressures bearing down on the Bank of England.

For now at least Cameron is sticking to his guns and making the politically difficult case to voters that today's hard choices will yield benefits down the road. This puts all the pressure on the Bank of England to satisfy the calls for stimulus. The Federal Reserve is fortunate in that the Obama Administration shares none of Cameron's fiscal determination.

But already the Fed has done plenty of backing off from its prior promises. Just a few months ago Ben Bernanke announced specific inflation and unemployment triggers that would apparently put monetary policy on automatic pilot. But just last week, Fed Vice Chairman Janet Yellen announced that those goalposts (6.5% unemployment and 2.5% inflation) should not be considered "triggers" but as thresholds past which the Fed "may consider" tightening. When U.S. prices start to rise in earnest, look for the denials and rationalizations to come in torrents. The Fed will never acknowledge high inflation no matter what the data, nor will it ever take any steps to combat it. The simple reason is that it will be unable to do so without bringing on the economic contraction that is so terrifying to the British.

However, as British inflation accelerates, the pressure on the Bank of England to change course will intensify. As monetary stimulus continues to take its toll on the pound, price pressures will mount, even as the economy continues to stagnate. In other words, it is charting a course to stagflation. Perversely, this will put even more pressure on the BofE to ease. However, more cheap money will not stimulate the economy but merely cripple it further by fueling the inflationary fire.

At some point the British will have to admit that stimulus doesn't work. To break the inflationary spiral and rescue the ailing pound, the BofE will be forced to aggressively raise rates, at which point the British government will have no choice but to slash spending more deeply than would have been the case had they taken their medicine sooner. However, if the BofE refuses to tighten even in the face of much higher official inflation, the pound may deteriorate further and the UK might be left with the embarrassing choice of adopting the euro.

As far as the United States is concerned, the U.K. is the canary in the coal mine. What they are going through now, and what they may be about to go through, we will surely experience in the years ahead. The only difference is that the leeway afforded to us by our special status simply gives us more rope to hang ourselves. When the noose finally tightens, the fall will be that much more painful.

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Messing with the Bull

europac admin — Fri, 08 Feb 2013 20:38:32 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Friday, February 8, 2013

With the announcement this week of its massive $5 billion lawsuit against ratings agency Standard & Poor's, the Federal Government took a bold step to squelch any remaining independence of thought or action in the financial services industry. Given the circumstances and timing of the suit, can there be little doubt that S&P is paying the price for the August 2011 removal of its AAA rating on U.S. Treasury debt? In retaliation for the unpardonable sin of questioning the U.S. Treasury's credit worthiness, the Obama Administration is sending a loud and clear message to Wall Street: mess with the bull and get the horns. Shockingly, the blatant selectivity of the prosecution, however, has failed to ignite a backlash. But as the move violates both the spirit of the Constitution and the letter of the law in so many ways, I can't help but look at it as a sea change in the nature of our governance. Call it Lincoln with a heavy dose of Putin.

Given the nature of the U.S. economy during the housing mania of the last decade, charging S&P with fraud is like handing out a speeding ticket at the Indy 500. Like nearly every other mainstream financial firm in the world at the time, S&P believed that the U.S. economy rested on a solid foundation of accumulated housing wealth. By 2006, the housing market was closing out one of its best decades in memory. Developers, speculators, financiers, real estate agents, bankers and even ordinary Americans had become charmed by the easy wealth of serial home purchases. The party had been orchestrated by a cadre of politicians and regulators who wanted to keep the party going and take credit for the good times.

To a degree that few Americans understand even to this day, it was not irresponsible lending, bad ratings, or excess greed that finally doomed the mortgage market, it was the simple fact that national home prices started falling. As long as prices stayed high, refinancing would have been open to borrowers, and defaults would have been manageable. Among the hordes of analysts, academics, and reporters who covered the market there were few if any standing who believed that national home prices could fall of a cliff. I know this to be true because I spent many years trying, unsuccessfully, to warn them.

From 2005 to 2008, I made scores of appearances on national television and at investment conferences around the country in which I stated that national home prices were set to decline by at least 30% and that the resulting mortgage defaults would devastate the financial sector and bring down the economy. I may have just as well been arguing that pink unicorns were about to resurrect the Soviet Union. At the 2006 Western Regional Mortgage Bankers conference I told attendees that many highly rated mortgage-backed securities, including some rated AAA, would become worthless. My debate opponent claimed that such predictions only come to pass if "an atomic bomb landed on either Los Angeles, Chicago, or New York!"

The idea that home prices could decline at all, let alone by 30% was considered beyond serious consideration. The models used by the banks, investors, government agencies, academics, and rating agencies predicted that national home prices would continue to rise, or at least stay stable. They were ALL wrong. Calls for even a 5% decline would have put S&P in the extreme minority. I know because I WAS that extreme minority and would have noticed any company joining me. Absent such opinions, the analyses put out by S&P, Moody's, and Fitch were justifiable. So why pick on S&P? Perhaps because the other two agencies never downgraded U.S. government debt.

As proof of S&P's institutional culpability, the Justice Department provided a few e-mails sent by S&P analysts during the final stages of the housing bubble. The messages contain cynical awareness that the mortgage market was built on a house of cards. So what? To avoid guilt would S&P have to prove 100% agreement among all employees? The company readily admits that it reached its opinions through a consensus and that feelings within the firm varied. Opinions are, by definition, nuanced and varied. During the years before the crash I received emails from many people who agreed with me but who said that their friends and co-workers believed that they "were nuts" for harboring such fears. I lost count of how many people told me that I was nuts. Many of these e-mails could have come from S&P analysts.

At most, S&P was guilty of a culture of complacency and group think. Ironically that spirit was engendered by the bizarre regulatory environment created for ratings agencies by the government itself. In 1973, in order to "protect" investors from unregulated markets, the SEC designated certain ratings firms as "Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations." Thereafter, only bonds rated by sanctioned firms could be purchased by pension funds and federally insured banks. Before that time the ratings agencies were paid for their advice by bond investors. As the rule change limited the abilities of investors to choose who to ask, the ratings firms began charging bond issuers instead. This arrangement meant that interests of investors would be subordinated. In any event, the law may have mandated who could perform ratings, but it did not require anyone to take them seriously. Any decent portfolio manager recognized this conflict of interest and performed their own due diligence.

The problem was when it came to housing mortgage bond buyers who were just as clueless as the ratings agencies. In fact, even those few buyers who knew the party would end badly, decided for themselves to keep dancing until the music stopped. It's completely hypocritical to sue the band after-the fact. Given that the SEC required investors to use these ratings agencies, should not the Justice Department be suing them instead?

The 2011 downgrade came as the government passed a weak and inconclusive patch to the debt ceiling crisis. Now, a year and a half later, we see that they have slithered out of that poorly constructed straight jacket. With the new debt piling up faster than ever, and the government showing itself to be blatantly incapable of making hard choices, it should be clear to anyone with a half semester of accounting that the Treasury debt should be downgraded. Yes the government has a printing press, but that only means that the value of the bonds will disappear through inflation rather than default. S&P was far too lenient.

Smaller ratings agency Egan Jones (which never had the official sanction of S&P) issued harsher reports about government debt, and they have also been duly punished for their candor. In 2011 the other major ratings agency, Moody's, argued that the fiscal cliff deal agreed to by Congress and the President improved the country's fiscal position and forestalled any need to downgrade Treasury debt. However, since we never actually went over that conveniently erected fiscal cliff, why has Moody's not responded with a downgrade? Perhaps they want to stay out of court?

Let's hope that it is still possible to get a fair hearing in a U.S. court of law, even when squaring off against the biggest and most powerful opponent the world has ever known. But even if S&P wins, we have all already lost. If it survives it will only do so after incurring huge legal bills and seeing its share price slashed. It's a foregone conclusion that no more downgrades will be coming.

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The Biggest Loser

europac admin — Fri, 01 Feb 2013 19:12:55 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Friday, February 1, 2013

In Switzerland, it's not just the clocks that are cuckoo. Over the past four years Swiss politicians and central bankers have gone on an unprecedented buying spree of foreign exchange reserves. In 2012, their cache swelled to as much as $420 billion worth of various currencies, primarily the euro. This figure is a seven-fold increase since 2008 and equates to 70% of the country's annual GDP. The sum translates to $200,000 per family of four, enough to keep the Swiss in clocks, chocolates, and fondue for many years to come. The Swiss leadership will claim the money has been "invested" with an eye to the future, but what they've done is impoverished themselves in the present. Although such a decision seems perverse, it makes perfect sense when seen through the lens of today's presiding economic thinking.

For the past few generations Switzerland has enjoyed some of the strongest economic fundamentals in the world. The country boasts a high savings rate, low taxes, strong exports, low debt-to-GDP, balanced government budgets, and prior to a few years ago one of the most responsible monetary policies in the world. These attributes made the Swiss franc one of the world's "safe haven" currencies. But in today's global economy, no good deed goes unpunished.

Central bankers around the world, particularly in Washington, Frankfurt and Tokyo, have been engaged in a massive and coordinated campaign of currency debasement to combat the recession. But for years the Swiss refused to join in the printing parade. As a result, investors around the world wisely decided to park their savings in the reliable Swiss franc. From December of 2008 to August 2011 the franc appreciated an astounding 59% against the U.S. dollar and approximately 30% against the Japanese yen. More importantly, the franc gained 42% against the euro. As the Eurozone completely surrounds Switzerland, its trade with those countries represents the vast majority of its international transactions.

During this massive run up in its currency, the Swiss economy continued to prosper. Wages and purchasing power increased and GDP grew consistently faster than other countries in Western Europe. Despite generally positive export statistics, some Swiss exporters noticed that at times the strong franc put them at a disadvantage against foreign competitors. In addition, the strengthening currency helped keep a lid on consumer prices, giving Switzerland a consistently low inflation rate with occasional bouts of actual deflation. Despite the fact that Switzerland was an island of economic health amidst a sea of problems, the reigning economic orthodoxy convinced Swiss leaders that their strong currency was a burden rather than a blessing. More pointedly, the rise in the franc was seen as a repudiation of the expansionary policies occurring in other countries. And so the Swiss government decided to join the currency killing party.

In early August 2011, the Swiss National Bank took a series of steps to reverse the fortunes of the franc. In the simplest terms, they sold francs and bought foreign currencies, most notably the euro. The announcement included a promise to buy unlimited quantities of foreign exchange to maintain a floor of 1.20 francs per euro. In so doing, the Swiss essentially outsourced their monetary policy to the Eurozone. Any moves taken by the European Central Bank would need to be matched by the Swiss. Ironically, it was fear of this outcome that kept the Swiss from adopting the euro in the first place. Despite the former bias toward independence, the Swiss have de facto adopted the euro anyway. Since that time, the franc has fallen 16% against the dollar, Swiss foreign exchange reserves have skyrocketed, and investors who bought francs as a means to escape debasement have been betrayed.

Productive nations generate excess goods and services that can be sold abroad and their growth and stability attract investment funds from abroad. These conditions will tend to increase demand for the nation's currency, thereby pushing up its price. A strong currency keeps capital and raw materials costs low, enabling more productive workers to earn higher real wages. But according to most economists, a strong currency will bring down an economy because it destroys international competitiveness and can even lead to lower prices (deflation) which they see as economic quicksand. These fears have ignited a "global currency war" in which countries are expending huge amounts of national savings in order to ensure that their currencies stay cheap. In today's economic logic we must fail in order to succeed.

But it is very easy to have a weak currency. All that is needed is an unlimited willingness to print. A strong currency requires real fiscal discipline and actual production. Yet, like the weight loss TV show, economists believe that the winner of a currency war is the biggest loser. You win not by killing your competitors, but by killing yourself! It's like a student convincing his parents that an "F" is a better grade than an "A." And if a straight "F" report card results in parental accolades rather than anger, the students will lack any incentive to improve performance. Similarly, as nations like Switzerland strive to reduce their own grades, the failing nations have a reduced incentive to change their study habits. Without outside support, nations with collapsing currencies would see huge increases in consumer prices. The resulting fall in living stands would force productive reform.

I take the minority position that just as it is better to be rich than poor, a strong currency is better than a weak one. Although much more credentialed economists may try to muddle the arguments, the truth may be seen when a particular position is taken to its logical extreme. If a weaker currency is preferable to a stronger one, then logic would dictate that a currency of no value will be preferable to one with an infinite value. But how would economies with these drastically different currencies operate?

It is true that the country with the zero value currency will tend to see full employment and strong exports. The relative low cost of labor will mean that the locals could be easily employed in even the most marginal activity. But since holders of other currencies will be able to outbid the domestic population for all of their production, everything produced will be exported. Imports will be zero as the local population would be unable to afford anything produced in countries with more valuable currencies. As a result, actual consumption would be extremely low. In essence this economy would be analogous to impoverished, subsistence level economies such as Bolivia, Zimbabwe, and Haiti.

In contrast, a country with an infinitely valuable currency would see the best of all possible worlds. Even the smallest amount of money would allow citizens to buy huge amounts of goods from abroad. An evening's babysitting money would deliver more purchasing power than months of hard labor in poorer countries. The strong currency would mean that consumption would soar even while hours worked fell. Savings would increase in value, and people would have more ability to travel and pursue leisure activities. In essence, we are describing a rich economy.

Placed in such a context, it's easy to see the preferred option. Those who believe in the benefits of weak currencies do not specify when a falling currency becomes a bad thing. Clearly there must be a tipping point where lost purchasing power overcomes supposed gains in growth. Yet they are silent on that point. My position is that a rising currency is always good. No magic tipping point needs to be identified.

The problem is that economists now believe that the goal of an economy is to provide employment, not goods and services. They see a job as an end in and of itself, rather than as a means for people to get the things they really want. But if we can get all that we want without having to work, who needs to bother? A strong currency takes us closer to this goal. It is a testament to how far the "science" of economics has fallen that this goal has been utterly forgotten.

But this junk science is killing real growth. As long as this "black is white" ideology remains in place, the biggest printers will continue to be the biggest actual losers.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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The Trillion Dollar Trick

europac admin — Tue, 15 Jan 2013 21:47:30 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

The birth, and the apparent death, of the trillion dollar platinum coin idea may one day be recalled as a mere footnote in the current debt crisis drama. The ultimate rejection of the idea (which was to use a loophole in commemorative coinage law to mint a platinum coin of any denomination) by both the President and the Federal Reserve seems to offer some relief that our economic policy is not being run by out-of-touch academics and irresponsible congressmen. In reality, our government has been creating more than one trillion dollars out of thin air every year for the past five. The only difference is that the blatant dishonesty of a trillion-dollar platinum coin is so easy to understand that the public simply couldn't be expected to swallow it. The American people are more than willing to be fooled, but they won't tolerate so simple a ruse.

People have a long and intimate history with coins. Some of us collected them as kids, and we all touch and see them every day. Unlike currency bills, we know intuitively that a coin's value is supposed to come from its metal content. That's why quarters are bigger than dimes. As a result, most people have viscerally rejected the platinum coin idea. To assign an arbitrary, sky high, valuation to a small piece of metal strikes most people as a deceitful, desperate act. They are right.

However, the same people have no problem with images of thousands of crisp paper notes flying off the printing presses. The acceptance is not impacted by how many zeroes the bills contain. People simply believe that paper money derives value from the numbers, not the paper. This was not always so. Paper money originally entered the public awareness as promissory notes to pay different amounts of gold. Once people got used to the paper, few really cared when the gold backing was finally removed. As a result, the public would likely have been much more accepting of the Fed printing a trillion dollar bill than the government minting a trillion dollar coin. But there was no legal pathway for the Fed to simply give that money to the government.

The government, not the Fed, mints coins, so they did not have to rely on the Fed to create value out of thin air. That is why the platinum coin idea was so seductive, if ultimately unsellable.

But the Fed does the exact same thing all the time using sophisticated accounting and state of the art computing. The Fed "expands its balance sheet" by buying government bonds from private banks. In exchange for these securities, the Fed credits the banks with funds it creates out of thin air. The banks then pass the funds to the general public through loans. But it's important to realize that the Fed does not have any money to actually buy the bonds in the first place. The funds are "created" by a Fed computer. The process is easier (and equally duplicitous) than minting a trillion dollar coin (which at least requires the production of something other than computer code). The only difference is the lack of window dressing. It's a shame that the platinum coin episode did not result in a wider recognition of this brutal truth.

A similarly silly and meaningless distinction is being made with respect to raising the debt ceiling. In his press conference yesterday, President Obama said the Republican reluctance to raise the debt limit was the equivalent of a diner who had ordered and enjoyed a meal who then decides to leave the restaurant without paying the bill. The President is actually arguing that if the diner had no cash on hand, it would be much more responsible to simply use a credit card. In taking this moral high ground, the President ignores the fact that the diner (who has indebted himself through habitual restaurant meals) intends to pay his credit card bill with another card, and then repeat the process until he runs out of cards. So in the end, it's not the restaurateur who gets stiffed, but the issuer of the last card the diner is able to acquire. As with the platinum coin, this is a distinction without a difference.

Currently the Federal Government counts more than $16 trillion in funded obligations. Over the next 10 years we are expected to add another $10 trillion or more. At no point in the foreseeable future are we expected to approach balance in our annual budget. All of our future bills are expected to be paid by future borrowing on a massive scale. Anyone with an ounce of integrity would have to plan for the possibility that an ever increasing debt rollover is a limited prospect. Such an understanding will mean that eventually someone will get stuck with the bill. How is this any more responsible than dining and ditching?

In truth, a failure to raise the debt ceiling is not a commitment to renege on obligations. It is simply a decision to stop borrowing. The government could still meet obligations by cutting spending, raising taxes, or making reforms to entitlements. But it chooses not to take this difficult step.

More important than that is the message America is sending its creditors. By informing them that the United States will not use its taxing power to repay its debts, but will only rely on its ability to borrow more (ironically from the same creditors), it effectively admits to running the world's largest Ponzi scheme. It's a shame that more people can't seem to grasp these very simple truths.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Inflation Propaganda Exposed

europac admin — Thu, 10 Jan 2013 15:29:12 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Thursday, January 10, 2013

Economists who hold the popular view that expanding the money supply will provide the best medicine for our ailing economy dismiss the inflationary concerns of monetary hawks, like me, by pointing to the supposedly low inflation that has occurred during the current period of rampant Fed activism. In a recent blog post aimed specifically at me, Paul Krugman noted that the sub 2.5% increases in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the past few years are all that is needed to prove me wrong. In fact, Krugman and others have even suggested that the CPI itself overstates inflation and that the Fed would be better able to help the economy if less strict methodologies were used. However, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the CPI is essentially meaningless as it woefully under reports rising prices.

Magazines and newspapers provide a good case in point. The truth has not been exposed through the economic reporting that these outlets provide, but in the prices that are permanently fixed to their covers. For instance, from 1999 to 2012 the Bureau of Labor Statistic's (BLS) "Newspaper and Magazine Index" (a component of the CPI) increased by 37.1%. But a perusal of the cover prices of the 10 most popular newspapers and magazines (WSJ, Washington Post, Time, Sports Illustrated, U.S. News & World Report, Newsweek, People, NY Times, USA Today, and the LA Times) over the same time frame showed an average cover price increase of 131.5% (3.5 times faster than the BLS' stats). This is not even in the same ballpark.

Some defenders of the BLS may conclude that prices were held down by the availability of free online news content or the convenience of digital delivery. But that is beside the point. Prior to the digital age, the BLS could have claimed that newspaper costs were held down by public libraries that provided free access. It's also true that online publications deliver less value on some fronts. Not only do many people enjoy the tactile process of reading physical newspapers or magazines, but they offer the secondary value in helping to kindle fires, housebreak puppies, pack dishes, and line birdcages.

Another stunning example is found in health insurance costs, which is a major line item for most families. According to the BLS we can all breathe easy on that front because their "Health Insurance Index" increased a mere 4.3% (total) in the four years between 2008 and 2012. Interestingly, over the same time, the Kaiser Survey of Employer Sponsored Health Insurance showed that the cost of family health insurance rose 24.2% (5.5 times faster). But even if the BLS had reported higher costs, it wouldn't have made much of a difference in the CPI itself. Believe it or not, health insurance costs are assigned a weighting of less than one percent of the overall CPI. In contrast, the Kaiser Survey revealed that in 2012 the average total cost for family health insurance coverage was $15,745, or almost one third of the median family income.

If the BLS could be so blatantly wrong in reporting the prices of newspapers and health insurance, should we believe that they are more accurate on all other sectors? If the inaccuracy of these two components were consistent with the rest of the CPI's components, inflation could now be reported in double-digits!

Even more egregious than the manner in which prices are currently reported is the way that CPI methods have been changed over the years to insure that most increases are factored out. Since the 1970's, the CPI formula has changed so thoroughly that it bears scant resemblance to the one used during the "malaise days" of the Carter years. Main stream economists dismiss criticism of the changes as tin hat conspiracy theories. But given the huge stakes involved, it's hard to believe that institutional bias plays no role. Government statisticians are responsible for coming up with the formulas, and their bosses catch huge breaks if the inflation numbers come in low. Human behavior is always influenced by such incentives.

The newer CPI methodologies are designed to report not just on price movements, but on spending patterns, consumer choices, substitution bias, and product changes. In other words, the metrics have been altered to track not so much the cost of things, but the cost of living (or more accurately, the cost of surviving). But if you simply focus on price, especially on those staple commodity goods and services that haven't radically changed in quality over the years, the under reporting of inflation becomes more apparent.

As reported in our Global Investor Newsletter, we selected BLS price changes for twenty everyday goods and services over two separate ten-year periods, and then compared those changes to the reported changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the same period. (The twenty items we selected are: eggs, new cars, milk, gasoline, bread, rent of primary residence, coffee, dental services, potatoes, electricity, sugar, airline tickets, butter, store bought beer, apples, public transportation, cereal, tires, beef, and prescription drugs.)

We know that people do not spend equal amounts on the above items, and we know their share of income devoted to them has changed over the decades. But as we are only interested in how these prices have changed relative to the CPI, those issues don't really matter. We chose to look at the period between 1970 and 1980 and then again between 2002 and 2012, because these time frames both had big deficits and loose monetary policy, and they straddle the time in which the most significant changes to the CPI methodology took effect. And while the CPI rose much faster in the 1970's, the degree to which the prices of our 20 items outpaced the CPI was much higher more recently.

Between 1970 and 1980 the officially reported CPI rose a whopping 112%, and prices of our basket of goods and services rose by 117%, just 5% faster. In contrast between 2002 and 2012 the CPI rose just 27.5%, but our basket increased by 44.3%, a rate that was 61% faster. And remember, this is using the BLS' own price data, which we have already shown can grossly under-estimate the true rate of increase. The difference can be explained by how CPI is weighted and mixed. The formula used in the 1970's effectively captured the price movements of our twenty everyday products. But in the last ten years it has been quite a different story.

If these price changes in our experiments had been fully captured, CPI could currently be high enough to severely restrict Fed action to stimulate the economy. Instead, the Fed is operating as if inflation is extremely low. As a result, they are making a huge policy mistake that will come back to haunt us. During the last decade the Fed spent many years denying the existence of a housing bubble, even as a mountain of evidence piled up to the contrary. That error caused the Fed to hold interest rates too low for too long, blowing more air into the bubble and imposing enormous negative consequences on the economy. The Fed, now similarly blind to the inflation threat, is repeating its mistake, only this time the negative consequences will be even more dire.

Apart from the statistical problems that hide inflation, there are also macroeconomic factors that have helped keep prices down despite the quantitative easing. Massive U.S. trade deficits and foreign central bank dollar accumulation mean that much of the printed money winds up in foreign bank vaults, not U.S. shopping centers. As foreign consumer goods flow in, and dollars flow out, a lid is kept on domestic prices. In effect, our inflation is exported as foreign central banks monetize our deficits and recycle their surpluses into U.S. Treasuries. The demand has pushed down bond yields which has allowed the U.S. government to borrow inexpensively. Of course, when the flows reverse, bond prices will fall, yields will climb, and a tidal wave of dollars will wash up on American shores, drowning consumers in a sea of inflation.

Unlike Krugman and the Keynesians, I would argue that it is impossible to create something from nothing. I believe that printing a dollar diminishes the value of all existing dollars by an aggregate amount equal to the purchasing power of the new dollar. The other side takes the position that the new money creates tangible economic growth and that real economic value can therefore be created by putting zeroes onto a piece of paper. I think that those making such absurd claims should bear the burden of proof. For more on the interesting topic of hidden inflation, see my video that I just posted.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Congress Avoids the Cliff by Selling Us Down the River

europac admin — Thu, 03 Jan 2013 19:06:47 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Thursday, January 3, 2013

With the possible exception of the New York Times’ editorial board (and the cast of The Jersey Shore), everyone on the planet understood that the United States Government needs to cut spending, increase taxes, or both. Instead, after months of political posturing and hand wringing, the Federal Government has just delivered the exact opposite, a deal that increases spending and decreases taxes. The move lays bare the emptiness of budget legislation, which can be dismantled far easier than it can be constructed.

One question that should be now asked is whether Moody’s Research will finally join S&P in downgrading the Treasury debt of the United States. After the Budget Control Act of 2011 (which resulted from the Debt Ceiling drama) Moody’s extended its Aaa rating, saying in an August 8 statement:

“…last week’s Budget Control Act was positive for the credit of the United States…. We expect the economic recovery will continue and additional budget deficit reduction initiatives will be put in place by 2013. The political parties now appear to share similar deficit reduction objectives.”

Now that Moody’s has been proven wrong, and the straight jacket that Congress designed for itself has been shown to be illusory (as I always claimed it was), will the rating agency revisit its decision and downgrade the United States? Given the political backlash that greeted S&P’s downgrade in 2011, I doubt that such a move is forthcoming.

For now, the real budget negotiations have been supposedly pushed later into 2013, when the debt ceiling will be confronted anew. But who can really expect anything of substance? The latest deal emerged from a Congress that is nearly two years removed from the next election. As a result, Congressmen were as insulated from political pressures as they could ever expect to be. Nevertheless, they still chose political expediency over sound policy. If Congressional leadership (an oxymoron that should join the ranks of “jumbo shrimp” and “definite maybe”) could not put the national interest in front of political interests now, why would anyone expect them to do so later? They will continue to ignore our fiscal problems until a currency crisis forces their hand. I expect deficits to approach $2 trillion annually before Obama leaves office. Unfortunately, at that point the solutions would be far more draconian than anything economists and politicians are currently considering.

In light of the extensions of the popular middle class tax rates, the loudly trumpeted tax increases on those individuals making more than $400,000 (and couples making more than $450,000) will not be enough to translate into higher tax revenues. Instead they will result in perhaps $60 billion per year in new revenue to the Federal government that will be more than offset by the new spending announced in the agreement. In fact, with the likely passage of the $60 billion Hurricane Sandy aid package, it will have taken Congress less than one week to spend all of the projected revenue.

But the tax increases will push many individuals in high tax states like California and New York into paying more than 50% of their income in taxes. While many economists are cautioning that higher taxes on the wealthy will take a bite out of spending, in my opinion it is more likely to result in lower business investment, which is far more detrimental to the economy. When faced with diminishing discretionary income, most rich people would sooner cut back on savings and investment than they would on health care, education, home improvements and vacations.

But it should be clear that the rate increases are just the opening crescendo in a symphony of tax hikes on the nation’s entrepreneurial class. President Obama has recently stated that he will consider needed cuts in spending and entitlement programs only if they are coupled with additional tax increases on the wealthy. In other words, as far as the President is concerned, the hikes included in the budget agreement that was just passed didn’t count for anything.

It cannot, or should not, be denied that Washington’s latest fig leaf will have a major impact on the markets. The New Year’s “relief rally” is understandable given the clear implications that the government will simply print its way out of trouble for as long as it can. In the past, fiscal profligacy was held in check by investors who would sell bonds and push interest rates higher whenever it appeared that the government was not serious about national solvency. But with the Federal Reserve now buying the vast majority of U.S. government debt, no such roadblock exists. With monetary and fiscal stimulus pushing up stock and bond prices, and no immediate fear of a rally-killing spike in interest rates, there is no reason to stay on the sidelines. Markets are now driven by stimulus, not fundamentals, and the stimulus is firmly at the wheel. (For more on this – see the article in the January edition of Euro Pacific’s Global Investment Newsletter). But it is important to look at the nature of the rally. Most significantly we would bring investors’ attention to the increase in gold and oil and other assets that are expected to outperform in an inflationary economy. Our new Newsletter edition also includes an analysis of some of the more promising overseas markets.

But by taking the nominal risk out of investing, the government is insuring that the risks to the U.S. economy will grow exponentially. We are now – and will remain – a debt-fueled economy for as long as the rest of the world permits this to continue. But this is no way to create real, sustainable economic growth. On the contrary, it will simply permit the growth of government, the depletion of economic vitality, and ultimately the collapse of the U.S. dollar.

In the meantime, President Obama and Congressional leaders will take credit for a tax cut that is in reality a huge tax increase in disguise. Government spending is the real source of taxpayers’ pain and it is only a matter of time before the bill comes due in the form of inflation. See our Newsletter for fresh analysis as to why inflation may already be higher than you think. Because the deficits will grow even larger, more purchasing power will be lost in this manner than would have been lost had all the Bush tax cuts been allowed to expire. In addition, though entitlement cuts were taken off the table, the real value of benefits could be slashed, as cost of living adjustments fail to keep up with skyrocketing consumer prices. That’s a Fiscal Cliff that will not be so easy to avoid.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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No Way Out

europac admin — Fri, 14 Dec 2012 18:20:18 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Friday, December 14, 2012

By upping the ante once again in its gamble to revive the lethargic economy through monetary action, the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee is now compelling the rest of us to buy into a game that we may not be able to afford. At his press conference this week, Fed Chairman Bernanke explained how the easiest policy stance in Fed history has just gotten that much easier. First it gave us zero interest rates, then QEs I and II, Operation Twist, and finally "unlimited" QE3.

Now that those moves have failed to deliver economic health, the Fed has doubled the size of its open-ended money printing and has announced a program of data flexibility that virtually insures that they will never bump into limitations, until it's too late. Although their new policies will create numerous long-term challenges for the economy, the biggest near-term challenge for the Fed will be how to keep the momentum going by upping the ante even higher their next meeting.

The big news is that the Fed is now doubling the amount of money it is printing. In addition to its ongoing $40 billion per month of mortgage backed securities (to stimulate housing), it will now buy $45 billion per month of Treasury debt. The latter program replaces Operation Twist, which had used proceeds from the sales of short-term treasuries to finance the purchase of longer yielding paper. The problem is the Fed has already blown through its short-term inventory, so the new buying will be pure balance sheet expansion.

To cloak these shockingly accommodative moves in the garb of moderation, the Fed announced that future policy decisions will be put on automatic pilot by pegging liquidity withdrawal to two sets of economic data. By committing to tightening policy if either unemployment falls below 6.5% or if inflation goes higher than 2.5%, Bernanke is likely looking to silence fears that the Fed will stay too loose for too long. While these statistical benchmarks would be too accommodative even if they were rigidly enforced, the goalposts have been specifically designed to be completely movable, and hence essentially meaningless.

Bernanke said that in order to identify signs of true economic health, the Fed will discount unemployment declines that result from diminishing labor participation rates. It is widely known that a good portion of unemployment declines since 2009 have resulted from the many millions of formerly employed Americans who have dropped out of the workforce. But like many other economists, Bernanke failed to identify where he thinks "real" employment is now after factoring out these workers. So how far down will the unemployment number have to drift before the Fed's triggering mechanism is tripped? No one knows, and that is exactly how the Fed wants it.

A similarly loose criterion exists for the Fed's other goalpost - inflation. Bernanke stated that he will look past current inflation statistics and look primarily at "core inflation expectations." In other words, he is not interested in data that can be demonstrably shown but on much more amorphous forecasts of other economists who have drunk the Fed's Kool-Aid. He also made clear that rising food or energy prices will never fall into the Fed's radar screen of inflation dangers.

For as long as I can remember (and I can remember for quite some time) the Fed has stripped out "volatile" increases in food and energy, preferring the "core" inflation readings. But in the overwhelming majority of cases, the headline numbers are significantly higher than the core. In other words, Bernanke simply prefers to look at lower numbers. In his press conference, he made it clear that the Fed will avoid looking at price changes in "globally traded commodities," that are all highly influenced by inflation.

These subjective and attenuated criteria give Fed officials far too much leeway to ignore the guidelines that they are putting into place. If the Fed will not react to what inflation is, but rather to what it expects it to be, what will happen if their expectations turn out to be wrong? After all, their track record in forecasting the events of the last decade has been anything but stellar.

The Fed officials repeatedly assured us that there was no housing bubble, even after it burst. Then they assured us the problem was contained to subprime mortgages. Then they assured us that a slowdown in housing would not impact the broader economy. I could go on, but my point is if the Fed is as spectacularly wrong about inflation as it has been about almost everything else, will they be able to slam on the brakes in time to prevent inflation from running out of control? And if so, at what cost to the overall economy?

The Fed is committing to more than a $1 trillion annual expansion in its balance sheet, an amount greater than the total size of its balance sheet as late as 2008. Most forecasters believe that the Fed will have $4 trillion worth of assets on its books by the end of 2013, and perhaps more than $5 trillion by the end of 2014. If conditions arise that require the Fed to withdraw liquidity, the size of the sales that would be required will be massive. Who exactly does the Fed believe will have pockets deep enough to take the other side of the trade?

As the biggest buyer of treasuries, it is impossible for the Fed to sell without chances of collapsing the market. Surely any other holders of treasuries would want to front-run the Fed, and what buyer would be foolish enough to get in front of the Fed freight train? The bottom line is that it is impossible for the Fed to fight inflation, which is precisely why it will never acknowledge the existence of any inflation to fight.

But perhaps the most absurd statement in Bernanke's press conference was his contention that the Fed is not engaged in debt monetization because it intends to sell the debt once the economy improves. This is like a thief claiming that he is not stealing your car, because he intends to return it when he no longer needs it. To make the analogy more accurate, there could not be any other cars on the road for him to steal.

Without the Fed's buying, it would be impossible for the Treasury to finances its debts at rates it can afford. That is precisely why the Fed has chosen to monetize the debt. Of course, officially acknowledging that fact would make the Fed's job that much harder. Without the monetization safety valve, the government would have to make massive immediate cuts in all entitlements and national defense, plus big tax increases on the middle class.

As I wrote when the Fed first embarked on this ill-fated journey, it has no exit strategy. The Fed adopted what amounts to "the roach motel" of monetary policy. If the Fed actually raised rates as a result of one of its movable goal posts being hit, the result could be a much greater financial crisis than the one we lived through in 2008. The bond bubble would burst, interest rates and unemployment would soar, housing prices would collapse, banks would fail, borrowers would default, budget deficits would swell, and there would be no way to finance another round of bailouts for anyone, including the Federal Government itself.

In order to generate phony economic growth and to "pay" our country's debts in the most dishonest manner possible, the Federal Reserve is 100% committed to the destruction of the dollar. Anyone with wealth in the U.S. dollar should be concerned that economic leadership is firmly in the hands of irresponsible bureaucrats who are committed to an ivory tower version of reality that bears no resemblance to the world as it really is.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Doing Away with Debt Ceiling Drama

europac admin — Mon, 03 Dec 2012 22:08:34 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Monday, December 3, 2012

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner made news last week by proposing to transfer the Congressional prerogative to raise the debt ceiling to the President. The change would essentially do away with the meaningless debt ceiling debates that have become ritual kabuki in Washington over the past few generations. Most Republicans have dismissed the proposal as a blatant executive power grab that will significantly weaken both the Congress and the minority party. While this is certainly true, Congress will only lose a power that it has never shown the slightest courage to actually use. But in truth, the proposal has the merit of refreshing honesty. By telling U.S. taxpayers, and the world in general, that the U.S. government has no intention of ever balancing its budget or limiting its accumulation of unsustainable debt, then perhaps we can begin to have an honest discussion about our economic future.

Congress has always decided how much money the U.S. government will spend and how it will tax the citizenry to meet those obligations. Geithner’s proposal will change none of that. The debt ceiling debates have been simply to authorize the U.S. Treasury to issue debt to cover the ever widening gap between what Congress spends and what it taxes. As a result, these debates have become nothing more than exercises in feigned outrage. If Congress wants to control the debt, let them do so. If they don’t care, just continue on the current path. Dropping the pretense is at least more honest.

The move will also help blunt the ridiculous assertions made by those in favor of lifting the debt ceiling that doing so somehow means that the United States is taking the prudent and moral step of “paying its bills.” In a press conference this week, Obama Administration Press Secretary Jay Carney claimed that by raising the ceiling, U.S. creditors will know that our government will meet its obligations. That is taking Orwellian doublethink to new heights of absurdity.

It is impossible to “pay” one’s bills by borrowing more. Taking out new loans to retire existing debt may replace old creditors with newer, larger, creditors, but it can never be described as a real pay down. It’s like paying off your Visa card with a Master Card. Paying one’s bills requires that outstanding debt be diminished. In direct opposition to Carney’s and Geithner’s statements, the only way to force the government to actually pay its bills is to not raise the debt ceiling. But a fictitious debt limit is worse because it allows Congress to pretend that its atrocious budgeting decisions are not to blame.

Both Congress and the President readily admit that without an increase in the debt ceiling, the government will default on its obligations. This is tantamount to an admission that we lack the capacity or political will to actually repay what we have borrowed. Yet despite this, our creditors continue to loan us more money. As existing Treasury Bonds mature, we not only borrow the money necessary to redeem them, but we borrow it from the very people cashing them in. So it’s not really like paying our Visa bill with our MasterCard, it’s like paying our Visa with our Visa.

The debt ceiling itself is both an ill-conceived compromise and a relic of past governmental integrity. For its first 128 years as a republic, the United States was able to function without a debt ceiling. This was possible for the simple reason that U.S. government had no central bank and could not borrow beyond its ability to repay through taxation. And since the ability to tax is always limited by taxpayers’ assets (and their extreme hostility to those who want to take them), legal gimmicks were not needed to prevent Congress from spending too freely. But the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913 gave the Federal Government a potential means to borrow indefinitely by having the new bank buy its debt. Sensing this danger, the original Federal Reserve Act of 1913 prohibited the Fed from buying or holding government debt.

But just four years later the United States needed a means to raise money quickly to pay for its efforts in the First World War. The government passed an amendment to the charter to allow the Fed to purchase Treasury Bonds. Fearing (correctly) that this would create a mechanism for perpetual debt expansion, conservative lawmakers insisted that the amendment include a “debt ceiling” provision that would cap the amount that the government could borrow.

What these otherwise forward looking politicians somehow failed to grasp was that such a statutory limit was wholly meaningless, as it could be perpetually raised by future legislative action. This is exactly what has happened. The debt ceiling has been raised, with varying degrees of fanfare, every time it has been hit. This renders the law completely meaningless.

Now of course, under the pretense of fiscal responsibility, the President wants to do the most fiscally irresponsible thing imaginable — eliminate the ceiling entirely. He hopes that doing so will send a clear and unequivocal message that America will never default on its debts. However, the message may not resonate the way the President hopes. What our creditors may actually hear is that nothing will stand in the way of America’s accumulation of more debt. Such a development may be the shock therapy our creditors need to finally cut us off for good. If that occurs, interest rates in the United States could finally rise to more rational levels. A significant increase in the cost of borrowing will create the mother of all fiscal cliffs. It’s too bad that Tim Geithner can’t see that one coming.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Patriotic Millionaires Unmasked

europac admin — Tue, 20 Nov 2012 22:09:03 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

Despite the breathless post-election “think pieces” that have drawn sweeping and deeply considered conclusions about the political drift of the country, at its core President Obama’s re-election is easy to understand. He essentially promised millions of middle and working class voters that if he were to be re-elected, they would receive benefits paid for by the rich. You don’t need to read a Time Magazine cover story to untangle this political strategy. Now that he has been given a second term, Obama needs to deliver the goods by raising taxes on the rich and only the rich. He will be “asking” them to pay their “fair share,” (as if “asking” and “fairness” have anything to do with it). In reality the wealthy already pay taxes at a much higher rate than average Americans and in many cases will now have to pay more than half of their income in federal, state, and local taxes.

While most people would assume that the wealthy would chafe at such a heavy burden, some affluent individuals have apparently organized spontaneously to express their willingness to help the country. In interviews and articles, these self described “Patriotic Millionaires” have implored Congress and the President to raise their taxes. They claim they can easily afford to pay a little more to save the nation from fiscal insolvency.

Conservative economists believe that an economy is most vibrant when as much money as possible is left in the private sector where it can be used for business investment and job growth. Left wing economists believe that government spending, which they term “investment,” does more good. Through this lens, it’s tempting to see the Patriotic Millionaires as well meaning Americans who have simply subscribed to a misguided economic philosophy. However, the reality may be far more sinister.

Daniel Berger, a spokesperson for the group, joined me last week on my radio show. Based on that highly charged and polarized discussion, it would be logical to conclude that the group is simply comprised of Democrat shills masquerading as patriots. Time and again Mr. Berger regurgitated Democratic talking points without the slightest ability to critically analyze his own positions. His goal was to simply create the impression that paying high taxes is patriotic. His hypocrisy was not hard to uncover.

He admitted on the show that he used an accountant to prepare his own taxes primarily to ensure that all the forms were filled out properly. Mr. Berger is a highly successful attorney purportedly earning over one million dollars per year. But apparently even that level of expertise does not qualify him to confidently fill out a 1040. Of course, the real reason he hires an accountant is to minimize his taxes. He, like every other American with an ounce of honesty, wants to make sure that he pays as little tax as the law allows. He hires an accountant to make sure no deductions or loopholes go unexploited. Under normal circumstances, there would be nothing wrong with that. But when you publicly claim that it’s your patriotic duty to pay more taxes, it’s hypocritical to simultaneous pay an accountant to make sure that you actually pay as little tax as legally permissible!

He revealed to me that it wasn’t so much his own taxes that concerned him but other millionaires that he is convinced unfairly pay a lower rate than he does. As a lawyer, his income comes in the form of fees. Therefore he pays most of his federal taxes at the 35% rate (plus Medicare). However he seemed disturbed that other millionaires, who may rely on dividends and capital gains for much of their income, pay only 15%. When I explained that corporate stockholders have already paid a 35% tax on their share of corporate income before they received any personal dividends or capital gains, he claimed that corporate income taxes have no impact on either dividends or share prices. Really?

I suppose being a high powered lawyer and tax-loving patriot doesn’t necessarily involve a basic understanding of finance or accounting. A corporation’s stock price and its ability to pay dividends are a function of its after-tax earnings. The higher the tax rate, the less the company is worth and the lower the dividend it can pay. So gains and dividends have already been significantly diminished by corporate taxes before the millionaires ever receive them. The shareholder ultimately bears the full burden of these taxes.

In his analysis of these issues, Mr. Berger sounded more like an Occupy Wall Street protestor than a patriot or an accomplished lawyer. Given the simplicity of his message and his dogged repetition of talking points, I had to conclude that his group was created by professional political forces as a facet of a much wider presidential campaign.

The elevation of taxpaying into an act of patriotism seems a stretch for most Americans. After all, the original patriots fought a revolution over their desire not to pay what by modern standards amounted to a trivial amount of taxes. To me, a true patriot wants to keep as much of his hard earned money as possible. America is supposed to be, after all, the land of the free. The more taxes we pay, the less freedom we enjoy. Plus, the income that is retained by those who earn it will lead to more wealth creation and, ultimately, to higher living standards for all Americans.

Unaddressed by Mr. Berger is the likelihood that higher tax rates on the rich may actually reduce tax revenue. Higher taxes will mean that the rich have less money to save and invest, a greater incentive to avoid taxes, and a reduced incentive to work or take risk. As a result, growth and job creation will suffer and the government will not only lose tax revenue from the rich, but also from the newly unemployed middle class workers that they no longer employ.

The best thing the government can do for the nation is to slash spending and free up resources for more productive private sector use. Government spending is not “investment” as Mr. Berger suggests but is simply wealth redistribution that creates political rather than economic benefits.

If spending is not reduced, raising taxes on everyone is better than only raising them on the rich. Taxing the middle class is largely a means to substitute public for private consumption. On the other hand, taxing the rich typically converts savings and investment into government spending. Such an exchange actually inflicts more damage. That may be a nearly impossible point to make politically, but sometimes the truth is not pretty. If middle-class voters realize that they will likely have to pay for all the free stuff promised by government, they may decide that they no longer want it.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Extend and Pretend

europac admin — Fri, 09 Nov 2012 22:15:30 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Friday, November 9, 2012

Now that President Obama has been re-elected, the media is finally free to focus on something besides the clueless undecided voters in Ohio, Florida, and Colorado. The brightest and shiniest object that has attracted its attention is the "fiscal cliff" that we are expected to drive over at the end of the year unless Congress and the President can agree to turn the wheel or apply the brakes.

Fresh from his victory, the President took time today to let the nation know how he proposes to avoid the cliff: to raise taxes on those Americans who make more than $250,000 per year. He made clear that no one making less than that will be asked to pay any more. The two percent of taxpayers that the President is targeting earn 24.1% of all income and pay 43.6% (as of 2008) of all personal federal income taxes. Sounds like a fair share to me. But the four or five percent tax increases on those earners that are being proposed would only yield around $30 to $40 billion per year in added revenue, a drop in the federal bucket. Even if they were to double the amount that they pay our deficit would only be cut by about one third (even if those increases did not trigger an economic slowdown).

So what exactly is this looming menace, and why is it so dangerous? Stripped of its rhetorically charged language the fiscal cliff is simply a legal trigger that will trim the deficit in 2013 by automatically implementing spending cuts and tax increases. In other words, the government will spend less, and more of what it does spend will be paid for with taxes rather than debt. Isn't this exactly what both parties, and the public, more or less want? The fiscal cliff means that the federal budget deficit will be immediately cut in half, shrinking to approximately $641 billion in 2013 from the approximately $1.1 trillion in 2012. What is so terrible about that? I would argue that there is a greater danger in avoiding the cliff than driving over it.

If you recall, the cliff was created by a deal last year when Congress couldn't find ways to trim the deficit in exchange for raising the debt ceiling. When they failed to reach an agreement, Congress knew they had to raise the debt ceiling anyway. The resulting Budget Control Act of 2011, signed in August of that year, offered the pretense that they were dealing with our long-term fiscal crisis and not simply raising the debt ceiling with no strings attached. This was done not only to appease some House Republicans, who had threatened to vote against a debt ceiling increase, but to satisfy the bond rating agencies that had threatened a down-grade if Congress failed to act.

Now the focus turns to how Congress will dismantle the structure it created just 16 months ago. There can be little doubt that they will as economists are assuring politicians that driving over the fiscal cliff will immediately bring on a recession. The expiration of the Bush era tax cuts for all taxpayers will cost Americans an estimated $423 billion in 2013 alone. Hundreds of billions of across the board spending cuts, including the military, have been delineated. No politician would allow that to happen.

It is amazing that members of Congress can keep a straight face as they claim to want to address our long-term deficit problem while simultaneously working to avoid any substantive action. No doubt an agreement will be reached that will replace the looming fiscal cliff with another one farther down the road (which they can easily dismantle before we actually reach the precipice). Will the rating agencies buy this bill of goods a second time? If we lack the political courage to go over this fiscal cliff, why should anyone think we will be able to stomach going over the next one? Especially since each time we delay going over the cliff, we simply increase its future size, making it that much harder to actually go over it.

Many currently believe last year's S&P downgrade resulted from the same congressional dysfunction that resulted in the fiscal cliff agreement. The truth is that the downgrade would probably have been much greater, and more rating agencies would have likely joined S&P in taking action, had it not been for the fiscal cliff agreement. If further downgrades fail to be issued when the lame duck Congress inevitably comes up with another can kicking deal, then the agencies themselves could lose any remaining credibility. In my opinion, the only explanation for inaction by the rating agencies would be for fear of regulatory retaliation by a vindictive U.S government.

I do not think it is a coincidence that while the banks are suffering a regulatory backlash as a result of their perceived culpability for the mortgage crisis, the credit rating agencies have been relatively untouched. But the credit agencies played a key role in catalyzing the mortgage crisis by giving questionable ratings to the mortgage backed securities. My guess is the government simply does not want to open up that can of worms as similar mistakes are being made with respect to the agencies' ratings of government debt.

The truth is that regardless of what you call it, going over the fiscal cliff is not the problem, it is part of the solution. Our leaders should construct a cliff that is actually large enough to restore fiscal balance before a real disaster occurs. That disaster will take the form of a dollar and/or sovereign debt crisis that will make this fiscal cliff look like an ant hill.

To order your copy of Peter Schiff's latest book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country, click here.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Lessons from Black Monday

europac admin — Mon, 22 Oct 2012 21:47:33 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Monday, October 22, 2012

25 years ago, on another Monday in late October, the financial world seemed to disintegrate in a heartbeat. Though the 205 point drop in the Dow last Friday (the technical anniversary of the '87 Crash) was somewhat reminiscent of its 108-point drop on Friday, October 16, 1987, the real action in '87 was on the Monday that followed. And while this Monday is not nearly as black, it is important that we use the opportunity to recall the circumstances that nearly sent the stock market into cardiac arrest.

While there were technical reasons that allowed the snowball to gather so much mass, it was major economic problems that started it rolling. Those issues remain to this day, but have grown much, much larger. But while they terrified the market 25 years ago, they don't rate a second look today. Whether investors have gotten wise, or merely oblivious, is the question we should be asking.

Though most simply remember the 1987 Crash as one panicked selling day, Black Monday was just the largest drop in a string of bad days. On the Wednesday before, the Dow sold off 95 points (then a record) and dropped another 58 points on the Thursday. On Friday the selling got worse, with the Dow setting another record with a 108 point drop. After thinking about it over the weekend, investors decided to preserve what remained of their gains by selling on Monday. Unfortunately, everyone got the same idea at the same time.

It is true that the Crash was in some ways a technical phenomenon. As of August of 1987, stocks had surged 75% from January 1986, and 40% from January 1987. After such an upswing, it was inevitable that investors were on edge. Rather than taking profits, many on Wall Street instead hedged their positions using the new, and largely untested, trading programs that were designed to put a floor under losses if the markets turned south. But when the selling came in waves, the machines went into overdrive. Selling begat selling and an automated rout ensued. When the dust settled, the Dow was down 22% in a single day.

If that was all there was to the story, we would be left with a neat cautionary tale about the folly of placing too much faith in machines. But that is a distracting sideshow. In truth, the market was spooked by concerns over international trade and government debt, which then became known as the "twin deficits." After widening earlier in the 80's, investors had hoped that these gaps would come under control. But as Ronald Reagan's second term wore on, those hopes faded.

From 1982 to 1986, the U.S. trade deficit had expanded 475% from $24 billion to $138 billion. Most economists blamed the trend on the dollar gains in the early 1980's, which had apparently made U.S. products uncompetitive. As it was assumed that a weakened dollar would solve the problem, in 1985 the leading western democracies and Japan announced the Plaza Accords to systematically push down the dollar against the Japanese yen and the Deutsche mark. By 1987, the plan had "succeeded" devaluing the dollar 51% against the yen. But by the second half of that year it became apparent that the Plaza Accord had failed in its real mission to cut down on the U.S. trade deficit. Despite the plunging dollar, the deficit expanded that year by another 10% to $152 billion.

At around that time, the U.S. government budget deficits also became a major concern. Everyone remembers Ronald Reagan as a small government champion, but many conveniently forget that he presided over a significant expansion in government spending. Federal deficits rose 199% from 1980 ($74 billion) to 1986 ($221 billion). Although the deficit came down to $150 billion in 1987, many were frustrated that it remained stubbornly high by historic standards.

As early as August of 1987, concern over the twin deficits, which together accounted for 6.4% of the nation's $4.76 trillion GDP became critical. Given the prior run up in stocks, this was enough to convince many investors to head towards the exits. Before Black Monday (October 19), the Dow had already declined 18% from its August peak.

When we look back at those events from the current perspective, it almost seems comical. Government deficits now approach $1.5 trillion annually and annual trade deficits exceed $500 billion. Today's twin deficits now add up to more than 13% of current GDP (twice the level of 1987). But today's investors are largely untroubled. Oftentimes news of a falling dollar and wider deficits will spark a stock rally, and the issues barely rate a mention in a presidential debate.

Are investors today simply more sophisticated than they were then? Have they lost an irrational fear of deficits? To the contrary, I believe that we have arrived at a point where money printing and government stimulus has replaced manufacturing and private sector productivity as the foundation of our economy (see my lead commentary in the October 2012 edition of the Euro Pacific Global Investor Newsletter for more on this). As a result, most investors are now blind to the dangers of deficits. But that does not mean that they don't exist.

When America's creditors wake up, particularly those foreign governments now shouldering the lion's share of the burden, concerns over our twin deficits will return with a vengeance. As the problems now loom larger than ever, so too will the economic and market implications when the issues come to a head. Interest rates will surge and the dollar will fall. But the U.S. economy is not nearly as well equipped as in 1987 to withstand the stresses. Given the relative size of our imbalances, the manner in which they are being financed, and the diminished state of our manufacturing sector, higher interest rates and a weaker dollar will exact a much greater toll.

Despite this, I do not believe that the stock market is as vulnerable to another Black Monday. With the Federal Reserve so committed to its current course of quantitative easing, it seems to me unlikely that they will allow such a steep one-day drop. Also, with bond yields so low, domestic investors are currently presented with fewer attractive options. If anything, the next Black Monday is more likely to occur in the currency and/or bond markets, with safe haven flows moving into gold not treasuries.

Peter Schiff's new book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country is now available. Order your copy today.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Inflation: Washington is Blind to Main Street’s Biggest Concern

europac admin — Mon, 15 Oct 2012 21:39:26 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Monday, October 15, 2012

Journalists, politicians and economists all seem to agree that the biggest economic issue currently worrying voters is unemployment. It follows then that most believe that the deciding factor in the presidential race will be the ability of each candidate to convince the public that his policies will create jobs. It seems that everyone got this memo…except the voters.

According to the results of a Fox News poll released last week (a random telephone sample of more than 1,200 registered voters) 41 % identified “inflation” as “the biggest economic problem they faced.” This is nearly double the 24% that named “unemployment” as their chief concern. For further comparison, 19% identified “taxes” and 7% “the housing market” as their primary concern. A full 44% of women, who often do more of the household shopping and would therefore be more sensitive to prices changes, identified rising prices as their primary concern.

My most recent video blog addresses this topic in detail.

While these statistics do not surprise me, they should shock the hell out of the establishment. According to the Federal Reserve, inflation is not a concern at all. Time after time, in front of Congress and the press, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has said that inflation is contained and that it is below the Fed’s “mandated” rate of inflation (whatever that may be). The Bureau of Labor Statistics is saying the same thing. The measures they use to monitor inflation, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE), show annual inflation well below 2%. In fact, the GDP price deflator used by the Commerce Department to calculate the second quarter’s 1.3% annual growth rate assumed annual inflation was running at just 1.6%.

In fact, Bernanke thinks inflation is so low that he is actually worried about deflation, which he believes is a more dangerous issue. As a result, he is recommending policies that look to raise the inflation rate, not just to combat the phantom menace of deflation but to boost the housing market and reduce unemployment. He mistakenly believes these problems are the ones that concern Americans the most.

If inflation really is as subdued as the government claims, how is it that so many people are concerned? It’s not as if the media or political candidates are fanning the fears of rising prices. In fact, given the media’s preoccupation with the housing market, the fact that nearly seven times as many Americans worry more about rising food prices than falling home prices shows just how large the inflation problem must be. Yet most economic observers continue to swallow the government’s inflation propaganda hook, line and sinker. In fact, although the Fox poll came out last week, I did not read or hear a single story on this topic, even from Fox news itself, which appears to not have noticed the significance of its own data.

For years my critics have always attempted to discredit my inflation fears by pointing to government statistics showing low rates. However, I have long maintained that such statistics underreport inflation, and the results of this poll seem to confirm my suspicion. There are only two possible ways to explain the disconnect. Either the government is correct and consumers are worried about a non-existent problem, or the consumers’ concerns are real and the government’s statistics are not. From my perspective, it seems that it is far more likely that consumers are in the right. If so, we are in a lot of trouble.

If annual inflation is actually higher than 3%, which would certainly be the case if consumers are so worried about it, then we are already in recession. Had government used a 3% inflation deflator (rather than the 1.6% that they actually used) to calculate 2nd quarter GDP, then growth would have been reported at negative .1% rather than the positive 1.3%. I believe that if the government used more accurate inflation data over the past several years, it is possible that we would have seen no statistical recovery from the recession that began in the fourth quarter of 2007. This would help explain why the “recovery” has failed to create jobs or lift personal incomes.

The Fed’s zero percent interest rate policy is predicated on the assumption that there is currently no inflation. If this is not accurate, then they are making a major policy mistake. The Fed is easing when it should be tightening. If inflation is such a major concern now, imagine how much bigger the problem will become once the Fed achieves its goal of pushing the rate higher. More importantly, how much tighter will future monetary policy have to be to put the inflation genie back in her bottle? If inflation becomes so virulent before the Fed realizes its mistake, then it may be forced to raise interest rates significantly. U.S. national debt is projected to reach $20 trillion within a few years. As a result, a 10% interest rate (which would be needed to combat 1970’s style inflation) will require the U.S. government to pay about $2 trillion per year in interest on the national debt. This will absolutely upend all economic projections.

Since 10% interest rates will likely crush the economy, not to mention the banks and the real estate market, tax revenues will plunge and non-interest government expenditures will go through the roof. Assuming we try to borrow the difference, annual budget deficits could go much, much higher from the already ridiculously high levels that they have reached during President Obama’s term. Annual deficits of $2 trillion, $3 trillion, or even $4 trillion, would result in a sovereign debt crisis that would force the Federal Government to either default on its obligations or inflate them away. Given the tendency for politicians to prefer the latter, voters who think rising prices are a problem now should just wait until they see what is waiting down the road!

Peter Schiff's new book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country is now available. Order your copy today.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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The Fed Plays All Its Cards

europac admin — Tue, 02 Oct 2012 22:22:01 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

There never really could be much doubt that the current experiment in competitive global currency debasement would end in anything less than a total war. There was always a chance that one or more of the principal players would snap out of it, change course and save their citizenry from a never ending cycle of devaluation. But developments since September 13, when the U.S. Federal Reserve finally laid all its cards on the table and went "all in" on permanent quantitative easing, indicate that the brainwashing is widely established and will be difficult to break. The vast majority of the world's leading central bankers seem content to walk in lock step down the path of money creation as a means to economic salvation. Never mind that the path will prevent real growth and may ultimately lead off a cliff. The herd is moving. And if it can't be turned, the only thing that one can do is attempt to get out of its way.

The details of the Fed's new plan (which I christened Operation Screw in last week's commentary) are not nearly as important as the philosophy it reveals. The Federal Reserve has already unleashed two huge waves of quantitative easing (purchases of either government securities or mortgage-backed securities) in order to stimulate consumer spending and ignite business activity. But the economy has not responded as hoped. GDP growth has languished below trend, the unemployment rate has stayed north of 8%, and the labor participation rate has fallen to all-time lows. In the meantime, America's fiscal position has grown significantly worse with government debt climbing to unimaginable territory. Despite the lack of results, the conclusion at the Federal Reserve is that the programs were too small and too incremental to be effective. They have determined that something larger, and potentially permanent, would be more likely to do the trick.

However, in making its new plan public, the Fed made a startling admission. At his press conference, Ben Bernanke backed away from previous assertions that printed money would be effective in directly pushing up business activity. Instead he explained how the new stimulus would be focused directly at the housing market through purchases of mortgage backed securities. He made clear that this strategy is intended to spark a surge in home prices that will in turn pull up the broader economy. Such a belief requires a dangerous amnesia to the events of the last decade. Despite the calamity that followed the bursting of our last housing bubble, economists feel this to be a wise strategy, proving that a poor memory is a prerequisite for the profession.

But now that the Fed is thus committed, the focus has shifted to foreign capitals. Not surprisingly, the dollar came under immediate pressure as soon as the plan was announced. In the 24 hours following the announcement, the Greenback was down 2.2% against the euro, 1.6% against the Australian Dollar, and 1.1% against the Canadian Dollar. A week after the Fed's move, the Mexican Peso had appreciated 2.7% against the US dollar. Many currency watchers noted that more dollar declines would be likely if foreign central banks failed to match the Fed in their commitments to print money. On cue, the foreign bankers responded.

It is seen as gospel in our current "through the looking glass" economic world that a weak currency is something to be desired and a strong currency is something to be disdained. Weak currencies are supposed to offer advantages to exporters and are seen as an easy way to boost GDP. In reality, weak currencies simply create the illusion of growth while eroding real purchasing power. Strong currencies confer greater wealth and potency to an economy. But in today's world,no central banker is prepared to stand idly by while their currency appreciates. As a result, foreign central banks are rolling out their own heavy artillery to combat the Fed.

Perhaps anticipating the Fed's actions, on September 6th the European Central Bank announced its own plan of unlimited buying of debt of troubled EU nations (however, the plan did come with important concessions to the German point of view - see John Browne's commentary). On September 17th, the Brazilian central bank auctioned $2.17 billion of reverse swap contracts to help push down the Brazilian Real. The next day, Peru and Turkey cut rates more than expected. On September 19th, the Bank of Japan increased its asset purchase program from 70 trillion yen to 80 trillion and extended the program by six months. It's clear we are seeing a central banking domino effect that is not likely to end in the foreseeable future.

Although the Fed is directing its fire towards the housing market, the needle they are actually hoping to move is not home prices, but the unemployment rate. Until that rate falls to the desired levels (some at the Fed have suggested 5.5%), then we can be fairly certain that these injections will continue. This will place permanent pressure on banks around the world to follow suit.

All of this simultaneous money creation will likely be a boon for nominal stock and real estate prices. But in real terms such gains will likely not keep pace with dollar depreciation. Inflation pushes up prices for just about everything, so stocks and real estate are not likely to prove to be exceptions. Even bond prices can rise in the short term, but their real values are the most vulnerable to decline. In fact, even nominal bond prices will ultimately fall, as inflation eventually sends interest rates climbing. But prices for hard assets, precious metals, commodities, and even those few remaining relatively hard currencies should be on the leading edge of the upward trend in prices.

While I believe the Fed's plan will be a disaster for the economy, the silver lining is that it provides investors with a road map. As the policy of the Fed is to debase the currency, those holding dollar based assets may seek alternatives in hard assets and in the currencies of the few remaining countries whose bankers have not drunken so freely from the Keynesian Kool-Aid. We believe that such opportunities do exist. Some broad ideas are outlined in the latest edition of my Global Investor Newsletter, which became available for download this week. I encourage those looking for ways to distance their wealth from the policies of Ben Bernanke to start their search today.

Peter Schiff's new book, The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy – How to Save Yourself and Your Country is now available. Order your copy today.

For in-depth analysis of this and other investment topics, subscribe to Peter Schiff's Global Investor newsletter. CLICK HERE for your free subscription.

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Operation Screw

europac admin — Fri, 14 Sep 2012 20:37:58 +0000

By:

Peter Schiff

Friday, September 14, 2012

With yesterday's Fed decision and press conference, Chairman Ben Bernanke finally and decisively laid his cards on the table. And confirming what I have been saying for many years, all he was holding was more of the same snake oil and bluster. Going further than he has ever gone before, he made it clear that he will be permanently binding the American economy to a losing strategy. As a result, September 13, 2012 may one day be regarded as the day America finally threw in the economic towel.

Here is the outline of the Fed's plan: buy hundreds of billions of home mortgages annually in order to push down mortgage rates and push up home prices, thereby encouraging people to build and buy homes and spend the extracted equity on consumer goods. Furthermore, the Fed hopes that ultra-cheap money will push up stock prices so that Wall Street and stock investors feel wealthier and begin to spend more freely. He won't admit this directly, but rather than building an economy on increased productivity, production, and wealth accumulation, he is trying to build one on confidence, increased leverage, and rising asset prices. In other words, the Fed prefers the illusion of growth to the restructuring needed to allow for real growth.

The problem that went unnoticed by the reporters at the Fed's press conference (and those who have written about it subsequently) is that we already tried this strategy and it ended in disaster. Loose monetary policy created the housing and stock bubbles of the last decade, the bursting of which almost blew up the economy. Apparently for Bernanke and his cohorts, almost isn't good enough. They are coming back to finish the job. But this time, they are packing weaponry of a much higher caliber. Not only are they pushing mortgage rates down to historical lows but now they are buying all the loans!

Last year, the Fed launched the so-called "Operation Twist," which was designed to lower long-term interest rates and flatten the yield curve. Without creating any real benefits for the economy, the move exposed US taxpayers and holders of dollar-based assets to the dangers of shortening the maturity on $16 trillion of outstanding government debt. Such a repositioning exposes the Treasury to much faster and more painful consequences if interest rates rise. Still, the set of policies announced yesterday will do so much more damage than "Operation Twist," they should be dubbed "Operation Screw." Because make no mistake, anyone holding US dollars, Treasury bonds, or living on a fixed income will have their purchasing power stolen by these actions.

Prior injections of quantitative easing have done little to revive our economy or set us on a path for real recovery. We are now in more debt, have more people out of work, and have deeper fiscal problems than we had before the Fed began down this path. All the supporters can say is things would have been worse absent the stimulus. While counterfactual arguments are hard to prove, I do not doubt that things would have been worse in the short-term if we had simply allowed the imbalances of the old economy to work themselves out. But in exchange for that pain, I believe that we would be on the road to a real recovery. Instead, we have artificially sustained a borrow-and-spend model that puts us farther away from solid ground.

Because the initials of quantitative easing - QE - have brought to mind the famous Queen Elizabeth cruise ships, many have likened these Fed moves as giant vessels that are loaded up and sent out to sea. But based on their newly announced plans, the analogy no longer applies. As the new commitments are open-ended, quantitative easing will now be delivered via a non-stop conveyor belt that dumps cheap money on the economy. The only variable is how fast the belt moves.

Fortunately, the crude limitations of the Fed's only policy tool have become more apparent to the markets. If you must stick with the nautical metaphors, QE3 has sunk before it has even left port. The move was explicitly designed to push down long-term interest rates, but interest rates spiked significantly in the immediate aftermath of the announcement. Traders realize that an open-ended commitment to buying bonds means that inflation and dollar weakness will likely destroy any nominal gains in the bonds themselves. To underscore this point, the Fed announcement also caused a sharp selloff in Treasuries and the dollar and a strong rally in commodities, especially precious metals.

Given that 30-year fixed mortgages are already at historic lows, there can be little confidence that the new plan will succeed in pushing them much lower, especially given the upward spike that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the announcement. Instead, Bernanke is likely trying to provide the confidence home owners need to exchange fixed-rate mortgages for lower adjustable rate loans - which would free up more cash for current consumer spending. He is looking for homeowners to do their own twist. If he succeeds, more homeowners will be vulnerable to increasing rates, which will further limit the Fed's future ability to increase rates to fight rising prices.

The goal of the plan is to create consumer purchasing power by raising home and stock prices. No one seems to be considering the likelihood that unending QE will fail to lift bond, stock, or home prices, but will instead bleed straight through to higher prices for food, energy, and other consumer staples. If that occurs, consumers will have less purchasing power as a result of Bernanke's efforts, not more.

The Fed decision comes at the same time as the situation in Europe is finally moving out of urgent crisis mode. While I do not think the ECB's decision to underwrite more sovereign debt from troubled EU members will work out well in the long term, at least those moves have come with some German strings attached [For more on this, see John Browne's article from earlier this week]. As a result, I feel that the attention of currency traders may now shift to the poor fundamentals of the US dollar, rather than the potential for a breakup of the euro.

In the meantime, the implications for American investors should be clear. The Fed will try to conjure a recovery on the backs of currency debasement. It will not stop or alter from this course. If the economy fails to respond to the drugs, Bernanke will simply up the dosage. In fact, he is so convinced we will remain dependent on quantitative easing that he explicitly said he won't turn off the spigots even if things noticeably improve. In other words, the dollar is screwed.

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