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      <title>Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</title>
      <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R</link>
      <description>Table of Contents for Philosophy Compass. List of articles from both the latest and EarlyView issues.</description>
      <language>en-US</language>
      <copyright>© John Wiley &amp; Sons Ltd</copyright>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 07:45:41 +0000</pubDate>
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      <dc:title>Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</dc:title>
      <dc:publisher>Wiley</dc:publisher>
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         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70098?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 20:40:03 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-02T08:40:03-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>Basic Income—A Transformative Policy for Sustainable Welfare? Part 1: Four Arguments for Basic Income as an Eco‐Social Tool</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
Is basic income (BI) a powerful tool for the green transformation of advanced welfare states? Since the early steps of green ideology formation, basic income‐oriented policies have been widely embraced by environmentally concerned thinkers, and key actors of the green movement. But even though discursive patterns that link basic income to ecological values are prominent and consistent over time, such claims often take the form of general suggestions rather than rigorously developed arguments. This paper—part 1 of 2—will reconstruct and clarify key arguments expressed or implied in normative theory and policy discourse that relates BI to eco‐social objectives. I distinguish four lines of argument for why BI might have unique advantages over conditional forms of income support in terms of sustainable welfare.
</dc:description>
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&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Is basic income (BI) a powerful tool for the green transformation of advanced welfare states? Since the early steps of green ideology formation, basic income-oriented policies have been widely embraced by environmentally concerned thinkers, and key actors of the green movement. But even though discursive patterns that link basic income to ecological values are prominent and consistent over time, such claims often take the form of general suggestions rather than rigorously developed arguments. This paper—part 1 of 2—will reconstruct and clarify key arguments expressed or implied in normative theory and policy discourse that relates BI to eco-social objectives. I distinguish four lines of argument for why BI might have unique advantages over conditional forms of income support in terms of sustainable welfare.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Simon Birnbaum
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Basic Income—A Transformative Policy for Sustainable Welfare? Part 1: Four Arguments for Basic Income as an Eco‐Social Tool</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70098</dc:identifier>
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         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70098</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70098?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70102?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 10:09:07 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-01T10:09:07-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
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         <title>Basic Income—A Transformative Policy for Sustainable Welfare? Part 2: Four Paradoxes in the Eco‐Social Case for Basic Income</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
There are compelling arguments for why basic income may be a powerful, transformative eco‐social policy tool in advanced welfare states. However, closer scrutiny reveals that the relationship between BI's ecological and social objectives is also marked by deep tensions. This second part of the article—Part 2 of 2—identifies and explores four paradoxes that seriously complicate the green case for basic income. These paradoxes help explain why the ecological and social goals expressed in post‐growth BI discourse often conflict more deeply than green BI proponents may admit. They also suggest that common claims of BI as a radically transformative, green policy are overstated. Still, the tensions exposed are paradoxes, not fatal contradictions. Rather than undermining the eco‐social case for BI, they can be addressed constructively and used to guide the formulation of BI's precise role and value in the green transformation of welfare states.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are compelling arguments for why basic income may be a powerful, transformative eco-social policy tool in advanced welfare states. However, closer scrutiny reveals that the relationship between BI's ecological and social objectives is also marked by deep tensions. This second part of the article—Part 2 of 2—identifies and explores four paradoxes that seriously complicate the green case for basic income. These paradoxes help explain why the ecological and social goals expressed in post-growth BI discourse often conflict more deeply than green BI proponents may admit. They also suggest that common claims of BI as a radically transformative, green policy are overstated. Still, the tensions exposed are paradoxes, not fatal contradictions. Rather than undermining the eco-social case for BI, they can be addressed constructively and used to guide the formulation of BI's precise role and value in the green transformation of welfare states.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Simon Birnbaum
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Basic Income—A Transformative Policy for Sustainable Welfare? Part 2: Four Paradoxes in the Eco‐Social Case for Basic Income</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70102</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Philosophy Compass</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70102</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70102?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
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      <item>
         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70097?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 20:15:36 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-27T08:15:36-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
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         <title>Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: Plant Cognition: A Primer</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Aditya Ponkshe, 
Miguel Segundo‐Ortin, 
Jonny Lee, 
Paco Calvo
</dc:creator>
         <category>TEACHING AND LEARNING GUIDE</category>
         <dc:title>Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: Plant Cognition: A Primer</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70097</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Philosophy Compass</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70097</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70097?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>TEACHING AND LEARNING GUIDE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70096?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 20:50:46 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-26T08:50:46-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/phc3.70096</guid>
         <title>Climate Migration</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
Climate migration raises difficult normative challenges for political philosophy. Existing scholarship largely applies theories of international rights and distributive justice to climate‐induced mobility, focusing on refugee status and how the international community should allocate responsibility. We argue that although these approaches answer many important questions, they are also limited by their reliance on the constitutive norms of the current state‐based international order. After reviewing rights‐based frameworks, we highlight emerging debates that question how climate migration disrupts foundational ideals of territorial sovereignty and national self‐determination. These debates underscore the need for normative analysis attentive to power hierarchies, cultural loss, and community‐led adaptation practices. We conclude by discussing methodological innovations through “engaged” or “grounded” theorizing, which incorporates the perspectives of affected communities and addresses fragmented arenas of practice. This approach aims to guide more context‐sensitive normative responses to climate migration.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Climate migration raises difficult normative challenges for political philosophy. Existing scholarship largely applies theories of international rights and distributive justice to climate-induced mobility, focusing on refugee status and how the international community should allocate responsibility. We argue that although these approaches answer many important questions, they are also limited by their reliance on the constitutive norms of the current state-based international order. After reviewing rights-based frameworks, we highlight emerging debates that question how climate migration disrupts foundational ideals of territorial sovereignty and national self-determination. These debates underscore the need for normative analysis attentive to power hierarchies, cultural loss, and community-led adaptation practices. We conclude by discussing methodological innovations through “engaged” or “grounded” theorizing, which incorporates the perspectives of affected communities and addresses fragmented arenas of practice. This approach aims to guide more context-sensitive normative responses to climate migration.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Terry Macdonald, 
Stephanie Collins, 
Luara Ferracioli
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Climate Migration</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70096</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Philosophy Compass</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70096</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70096?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70099?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 20:48:46 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-26T08:48:46-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/phc3.70099</guid>
         <title>Decolonizing the Foundations of Lacanian Schools Through Edward Said's Notion of “Beginnings”</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
This essay examines the institutional ethics of Jacques Lacan's 1964 “Founding Act” through the critical lens of Edward Said's framework in Beginnings: Intention and Method (1975). I argue that the survival and vitality of psychoanalysis depend on the institution functioning as a beginning, a secular, humanly produced, and continuously reexamined project, rather than a mythical origin rooted in paternal authority and sacred lineage. By analyzing structural innovations such as the Cartel, the Plus One, and the principle of rotation, this essay demonstrates how Lacan utilized adjacency to rupture the dynastic logic and hierarchical descent prevalent in traditional psychoanalytic movements. Furthermore, the text offers a decolonial critique of Lacan's “reconquest” metaphor, proposing a praxis of learned ignorance (PLI). This praxis rejects Eurocentric notions of purity in favor of an Other logic that accounts for singularity and the irreducible difference of the unconscious. Drawing on the philosophy of Giambattista Vico and Hannah Arendt's distinction between work and labor, the essay concludes that the Lacanian School is an institutionalization of the perpetual beginner, where authority is not an inherited property but a dynamic desire authorized anew through the ongoing production of psychoanalytic know‐how.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This essay examines the institutional ethics of Jacques Lacan's 1964 “Founding Act” through the critical lens of Edward Said's framework in &lt;i&gt;Beginnings: Intention and Method&lt;/i&gt; (1975). I argue that the survival and vitality of psychoanalysis depend on the institution functioning as a beginning, a secular, humanly produced, and continuously reexamined project, rather than a mythical origin rooted in paternal authority and sacred lineage. By analyzing structural innovations such as the Cartel, the Plus One, and the principle of rotation, this essay demonstrates how Lacan utilized adjacency to rupture the dynastic logic and hierarchical descent prevalent in traditional psychoanalytic movements. Furthermore, the text offers a decolonial critique of Lacan's “reconquest” metaphor, proposing a praxis of learned ignorance (PLI). This praxis rejects Eurocentric notions of purity in favor of an Other logic that accounts for singularity and the irreducible difference of the unconscious. Drawing on the philosophy of Giambattista Vico and Hannah Arendt's distinction between work and labor, the essay concludes that the Lacanian School is an institutionalization of the perpetual beginner, where authority is not an inherited property but a dynamic desire authorized anew through the ongoing production of psychoanalytic know-how.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Robert K. Beshara
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Decolonizing the Foundations of Lacanian Schools Through Edward Said's Notion of “Beginnings”</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70099</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Philosophy Compass</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70099</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70099?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70100?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 24 May 2026 09:39:16 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-24T09:39:16-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/phc3.70100</guid>
         <title>Institutional Accountability</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
Institutional accountability is central to democratic governance, yet philosophical inquiry still lacks a conceptually refined and comprehensive map to appreciate its boundaries and defining features. This article offers such a map from a human‐centered view of institutional action. Institutions are not merely systems of rules and procedures; they are enacted through officeholders' interdependent and relatively discretionary conduct‐in‐role. Accountability, therefore, must be understood not only as a mechanism but also as a lived practice internal to office‐based action. The article develops a three‐tier taxonomy. First, it distinguishes the agents of institutional accountability—individual officeholders or institutional collectives—showing how this axis intersects, without collapsing, into vertical and horizontal relations. Second, it delineates two different but potentially integrated modes of institutional accountability: “answerability,” grounded in oversight, assessment, and potential sanctions, and “addressability,” grounded in reciprocal reason‐giving, mutuality, and co‐authorship. Third, it identifies the implications of accountability for institutional functioning, distinguishing between practices of correction and those cultivating cooperation. The resulting framework offers both an analytical vocabulary for accountability studies and a conceptual refinement of accountability suited to humanly enacted institutions.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Institutional accountability is central to democratic governance, yet philosophical inquiry still lacks a conceptually refined and comprehensive map to appreciate its boundaries and defining features. This article offers such a map from a human-centered view of institutional action. Institutions are not merely systems of rules and procedures; they are enacted through officeholders' interdependent and relatively discretionary conduct-in-role. Accountability, therefore, must be understood not only as a mechanism but also as a lived practice internal to office-based action. The article develops a three-tier taxonomy. First, it distinguishes the agents of institutional accountability—individual officeholders or institutional collectives—showing how this axis intersects, without collapsing, into vertical and horizontal relations. Second, it delineates two different but potentially integrated modes of institutional accountability: “answerability,” grounded in oversight, assessment, and potential sanctions, and “addressability,” grounded in reciprocal reason-giving, mutuality, and co-authorship. Third, it identifies the implications of accountability for institutional functioning, distinguishing between practices of correction and those cultivating cooperation. The resulting framework offers both an analytical vocabulary for accountability studies and a conceptual refinement of accountability suited to humanly enacted institutions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Emanuela Ceva
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Institutional Accountability</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70100</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Philosophy Compass</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70100</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70100?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70094?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 20:51:26 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-20T08:51:26-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/phc3.70094</guid>
         <title>Eldridge Cleaver Unthought</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
Eldridge Cleaver's era‐defining work Soul on Ice was published nearly 60 years ago, but despite being the subject of scholarly attention in a variety of disciplines, Cleaver's life and works remain misunderstood. This critical examination of six decades of Cleaver scholarship demonstrates that our understanding of Cleaver has been impeded by the hegemony of various orthodoxies and a lack of available primary sources. Bringing together scholarship from Philosophy, History, English, and area studies, I show that Cleaver scholarship changed radically following the archival turn of the last 20 years. Although the archival turn has done much to improve the state of Cleaver scholarship, we have a long way to go before we are freed from the limitations of unwarranted orthodoxies. Until that time, Eldridge Cleaver remains unthought.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Eldridge Cleaver's era-defining work &lt;i&gt;Soul on Ice&lt;/i&gt; was published nearly 60 years ago, but despite being the subject of scholarly attention in a variety of disciplines, Cleaver's life and works remain misunderstood. This critical examination of six decades of Cleaver scholarship demonstrates that our understanding of Cleaver has been impeded by the hegemony of various orthodoxies and a lack of available primary sources. Bringing together scholarship from Philosophy, History, English, and area studies, I show that Cleaver scholarship changed radically following the archival turn of the last 20 years. Although the archival turn has done much to improve the state of Cleaver scholarship, we have a long way to go before we are freed from the limitations of unwarranted orthodoxies. Until that time, Eldridge Cleaver remains unthought.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Patrick D. Anderson
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Eldridge Cleaver Unthought</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70094</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Philosophy Compass</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70094</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70094?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70089?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2026 21:09:32 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-19T09:09:32-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/phc3.70089</guid>
         <title>Black Childhood and Sexual Assault in Cuban Slave Society: The Case of Juan Francisco Manzano</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
Extensive historical documentation from Brazil and some limited, but compelling primary sources from the United States and the Caribbean, describe the rape of enslaved adolescent males. Manzano's adolescent experience—as detailed in his autobiography—is no exception to the rule. I contend that Manzano's presence within the big house should not be read as the conferral of racial privilege—as is often the tendency among scholars—but rather be examined as false intimacy, which was weaponized to his detriment. I submit that the second mistress raped the young Manzano by proxy to obstruct his intellectual development and prevent the psychological maturation and physical threat associated with manhood. Juan Francisco did not labor in the sugar cane fields in Matanzas so his domestic labor was not critical to the island's largest export crop. As such, he represented a superfluous and dangerous presence in the big house. Cuban slave society reduced him to what Tommy Curry calls a “phobic entity” marked for extermination (The Man Not, 147). Manzano's autobiography is an account of personal calamities and—as I have argued elsewhere—a camouflaged portrayal of his Catholic and African transculturated belief structure (See Cuban Literature in the Age of Black insurrection: Manzano, Plácido and Afro‐Latino Religion by Matthew Pettway and “En honor a Elegguá: Máscaras y trampas trazando los caminos de Juan Francisco Manzano” a dissertation by Carmen Luz Cosme Puntiel.). But it is also a humane portrait of African‐descended male personhood where the author engages ambiguity, subtlety, and misdirection to divulge that shameful secret even while shielding himself from the voyeuristic gaze of his white readership.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Extensive historical documentation from Brazil and some limited, but compelling primary sources from the United States and the Caribbean, describe the rape of enslaved adolescent males. Manzano's adolescent experience—as detailed in his autobiography—is no exception to the rule. I contend that Manzano's presence within the big house should not be read as the conferral of racial privilege—as is often the tendency among scholars—but rather be examined as false intimacy, which was weaponized to his detriment. I submit that the second mistress raped the young Manzano by proxy to obstruct his intellectual development and prevent the psychological maturation and physical threat associated with manhood. Juan Francisco did not labor in the sugar cane fields in Matanzas so his domestic labor was not critical to the island's largest export crop. As such, he represented a superfluous and dangerous presence in the big house. Cuban slave society reduced him to what Tommy Curry calls a “phobic entity” marked for extermination (&lt;i&gt;The Man Not&lt;/i&gt;, 147). Manzano's autobiography is an account of personal calamities and—as I have argued elsewhere—a camouflaged portrayal of his Catholic and African transculturated belief structure (See &lt;i&gt;Cuban Literature in the Age of Black insurrection: Manzano, Plácido and Afro-Latino Religion&lt;/i&gt; by Matthew Pettway and “En honor a Elegguá: Máscaras y trampas trazando los caminos de Juan Francisco Manzano” a dissertation by Carmen Luz Cosme Puntiel.). But it is also a humane portrait of African-descended male personhood where the author engages ambiguity, subtlety, and misdirection to divulge that shameful secret even while shielding himself from the voyeuristic gaze of his white readership.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Matthew Pettway
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Black Childhood and Sexual Assault in Cuban Slave Society: The Case of Juan Francisco Manzano</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70089</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Philosophy Compass</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70089</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70089?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70079?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 07:59:26 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-05T07:59:26-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/phc3.70079</guid>
         <title>The Dorsal‐Ventral Account of Picture Perception</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
What is the nature of our perception of pictures? Philosophers intrigued by this question, and adopting a naturalistic perspective, have turned to findings from visual neuroscience to answer it. This perspective seeks to address the question within the framework of the Two Visual Systems Model, which provides a specific anatomo‐functional description of how our visual system operates. According to this model, the visual cortex hosts a specific hodological division between a ventral stream, responsible for visual recognition, and a dorsal stream, responsible for the visual guidance of action. A philosophical account of picture perception based on this model is therefore referred to as the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception. Since its inception, this account has evolved in parallel with the advancements in the Two Visual Systems Model itself. This paper surveys the various interpretations under the different formulations of this account and traces their development within the literature of empirically informed philosophy of cognitive science.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What is the nature of our perception of pictures? Philosophers intrigued by this question, and adopting a naturalistic perspective, have turned to findings from visual neuroscience to answer it. This perspective seeks to address the question within the framework of the &lt;i&gt;Two Visual Systems Model&lt;/i&gt;, which provides a specific anatomo-functional description of how our visual system operates. According to this model, the visual cortex hosts a specific hodological division between a ventral stream, responsible for visual recognition, and a dorsal stream, responsible for the visual guidance of action. A philosophical account of picture perception based on this model is therefore referred to as the &lt;i&gt;dorsal/ventral account of picture perception&lt;/i&gt;. Since its inception, this account has evolved in parallel with the advancements in the &lt;i&gt;Two Visual Systems Model&lt;/i&gt; itself. This paper surveys the various interpretations under the different formulations of this account and traces their development within the literature of empirically informed philosophy of cognitive science.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Gabriele Ferretti
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The Dorsal‐Ventral Account of Picture Perception</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70079</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Philosophy Compass</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70079</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70079?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70091?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2026 20:47:30 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-04T08:47:30-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/phc3.70091</guid>
         <title>Studying the Zhuangzi: An Institutional Approach</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
Comparative political philosophy has recently grown in prominence, but most attention focuses on Confucians such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi. Daoists, particularly Zhuangzi, have long been neglected. This paper proposes an “institutional approach” to Zhuangzi's philosophy, examining what institutions can create a social environment that enables ordinary people to achieve “wandering” (you). Wandering means openness to diverse perspectives and adaptability to change. Achieving this state requires the cultivation of de, which involves recognizing diverse forms of the good life and developing virtues such as open‐mindedness and tolerance. Zhuangzist sages, who already possess de, are generally able to wander regardless of circumstance. However, ordinary individuals face numerous obstacles that hinder their cultivation of de. Therefore, supportive institutions, such as civil liberties, are crucial for removing these barriers and enabling people to cultivate de, and thus pursue the kind of flourishing and exploratory life endorsed by Zhuangzi.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Comparative political philosophy has recently grown in prominence, but most attention focuses on Confucians such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi. Daoists, particularly Zhuangzi, have long been neglected. This paper proposes an “institutional approach” to Zhuangzi's philosophy, examining what institutions can create a social environment that enables ordinary people to achieve “wandering” (&lt;i&gt;you&lt;/i&gt;). Wandering means openness to diverse perspectives and adaptability to change. Achieving this state requires the cultivation of de, which involves recognizing diverse forms of the good life and developing virtues such as open-mindedness and tolerance. Zhuangzist sages, who already possess de, are generally able to wander regardless of circumstance. However, ordinary individuals face numerous obstacles that hinder their cultivation of de. Therefore, supportive institutions, such as civil liberties, are crucial for removing these barriers and enabling people to cultivate de, and thus pursue the kind of flourishing and exploratory life endorsed by Zhuangzi.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Baldwin Wong
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Studying the Zhuangzi: An Institutional Approach</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70091</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Philosophy Compass</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70091</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70091?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70090?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2026 20:43:58 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-04T08:43:58-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991?af=R">Wiley: Philosophy Compass: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/phc3.70090</guid>
         <title>Issue Information</title>
         <description>Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 3, May/June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
No abstract is available for this article.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;No abstract is available for this article.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator/>
         <category>ISSUE INFORMATION</category>
         <dc:title>Issue Information</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/phc3.70090</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Philosophy Compass</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/phc3.70090</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.70090?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ISSUE INFORMATION</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
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