A Look at Internalism: Twin-Earths, Swampmen, Brains, and Cream Cheese

One of the biggest fights in philosophy to date is between Internalism where beliefs are justified within the mind of people rather than justified by purely external means, as in Externalism. It is true, that there seems to a binary relationship between Internalism and Externalism, but the truth lays somewhere in between, since for Internalism there has to be some form of external evidence taken into account in order to justify a belief about an external artifact. For Externalism, one must at least have some mental processes that rely on beliefs that are clearly embedded in the mind in order to justify knowledge about the external world. A philosophical tug-of-war has ensued over which is correct. Philosophers, by their very nature, need to come as close as possible to the absolute truth in things, so these tug-of-wars rarely settle in a place of compromise.
When settling down on a stronger theory, I feel that the internalist point of view takes a much more accurate stance about the amount of external facts needed in order to justify beliefs. The closest I have found to a middle ground would be more of an evidentialist take on internalism.
Anthony Brueckner illustrates this relationship in his article defending internalism, “Justification, Internalism, and Cream Cheese”. He specifically takes on an argument brought up by John Gibbons, an externalist. Externalism exists in binary contrast to Internalism. They take the stance that justification of beliefs lay within the evidence experienced in the external world. In other words, a tree in the garden is known to be a tree a tree in the garden because it is a tree that is experienced in the garden, it is seen as a tree, it is seen in the garden and it would not be known to be a tree in the garden if the if the tree were absent the garden. For the externalist, there is the tree and there is the garden, both artifacts of the external world. The internalist, however, knows what a tree is, and when confronted with a tree in the garden, there is the thought process that recognizes a tree for being a tree, and also recognizes the garden that the tree is in so there can be a complete thought of the tree in the garden. Both externalist and internalist agree on one thing, the experience happens through perception. One of the most compelling, but also troublesome thought experiments is called the Brain in the Vat, which is also known as the New Evil Demon. In Brain in the Vat there are two beings. These beings must be identical internally in every way. One being is in the real world, his name is Brian, the second being is named Brain, and is a fully functional brain that is in a vat, hooked up to a computer that sends everything that Brian perceives into the brain in the vat, making the brain experience everything just as if it was Brian, thus Brian and Brain are totally identical internally, but have different external values. Everything that Brian experiences is true, he is justified in his experiences, Brain on the other hand experiences everything and is justified in believing what he sees, yet the experiences are simulated. Brain and Brian are experiencing the same thing, thus internally, they are justified. This thought comes from the rule that internalists go by as Anthony Brueckner wrote in his article:
justification supervenes upon introspectively accessible properties of the believer. That is, the internalist about justification holds that necessarily, if believer A and believer B are indistinguishable in respect of their ‘internal’, introspectively accessible properties, then they are indistinguishable in respect of the justification they have for the beliefs they hold. (Brueckner, 13).

Reliablists, a branch of externalism denies that justification supervenes upon introspective accessible properties. A reliablist would want to see if there was a reliable process that forms beliefs. If one is looking at a tree in the garden, then they would say that the ratio of the tree being in the garden every time they looked into the garden is high enough to be called reliable evidence, thus would be justified. The reliablist premises are simple:
i. S knows P if and only if P is true
ii. and S justifies P through a reliable process
iii. there is a reliable process present
————————————————————-
iv. S is justified in believing P
Reliablists assert that all the factors within the truth-ratio concerning the tree in the garden are totally outside the control of any internal factors, therefore this mode of justification must deny internalism. It can be pointed out that reliablists have a problem when thinking about how they do not always understand the process that happens when calculating the truth-ratio. If one were to be aware of this, then it would be internalism, reliablists maintain that in many cases, the exact process is not known, hence not knowing, or having access to the evidence at hand is not a problem for reliablists, in fact, it is a point they champion over internalism since they are stating that the reliable process is not entirely within the mind, but is dependent on the external values instead. For the Brain in the Vat, or BIV scenario, the reliablists would have to assume that the brain might not be justified because despite the internal relationship to perception, the simple fact is that it is a computer simulating these experiences and is not regarded as reliable, since the perceptions are not true.
I feel that reliablism, as opposed to internalism may have some merit, but one cannot really adhere to the reliablist view strongly because if the BIV scenario did exist, then one would not know they are a BIV. This line of reasoning can be reinforced by internalism:
BIV=Brain in a vat
a. S is either a BIV or S is not a BIV
b. When S says, “I am not a BIV,” and is not a BIV, then what S says is true
c. When S says “I am not a BIV,” and S is a BIV, then because S does not perceive the vat, and is internally identical to the S that is not a BIV, then what S says is true
————————————-
d. When S says, “I am not a BIV” it is true.
This is a strong argument since the brain in the vat is not actually sensing that it is a brain in the vat, it perceives that it is not in a vat, but in the real world, there are simply no defeaters to bring the BIV into question. Since Brian has no defeaters to his knowledge, and his knowledge is true, the identical perception in Brain then has the identical perception that there are no defeaters. I feel that this is a strong enough counter argument to defeat the reliablists need for a truth-heavy ratio prerequisite for justification.
John Gibbons says that the presence or absence of external evidence is the key to breaking the internalist view. Gibbons is quoted in Brueckner’s essay:
“If you can have two people who are the same on the inside, in the relevant sense of that expression, but different on the outside where, intuitively, one of them is justified but the other is not, then internalism about justification is false. If internalism is false, externalism is true. No matter how important the inside is, some of the stuff on the outside matters as well. The presence or absence of an external fact, all by itself, is directly relevant to justification.(20-1)” (Brueckner, Gibbons).
Gibbons uses an example revolving around some yummy cream cheese, an external artifact, also, he brings into play another factor into the scenario, note cards. Bob and Steve are roomates. They both completely adore cream cheese, it is the reason for much of the pleasure in their lives. They have agreed to let each other know if there is not cream cheese in the fridge by leaving a note on the fridge that is easily seen. Gibbons says that if Bob were to want to make mushroom, Jalepeno, and cream cheese omelet in the morning, and Steve rarely eats breakfast, then he would have a reasonable belief that he could have this awesome omelet. It is early, so he groggily opens up the fridge and finds that there is no cream cheese. He then, after he closes the fridge, notices the note saying “buy cream cheese dammit” and thinks, “I didn’t notice the note, but I should have.” Now in a second case, there is no note on the fridge, but there is a box of yummy cream cheese awaiting his pleasure. Bob still has belief that he is including cream cheese in his yummy breakfast and it is based on the same grounds as the case that contained a note.
Here Gibbons would say that in the second case, the lack of a note is enough to justify that there is no cream cheese in the fridge. He says that the lack of the note would change the ability to justify whether there is cream cheese in the fridge or not. He would say that even though Bob and Steve are identical by way of using notes and loving cream cheese, the different circumstances would prove that external factors are what is important.
Brueckner defends Internalism by bringing epistemic responsibility into play. In the example of the cream cheese in the fridge, where P is that there is cream cheese in the fridge, it is the epistemic responsibility for Bob who wants to have cream cheese to make sure that evidence is provided for the absence of cream cheese. Without that evidence (a note saying, ‘buy cream cheese’), which would effectively be ~JP (not justified that P), then it is logical to believe that there will be P (cream cheese in the fridge). This process stems from reflection rather than an outside source, since it operates on the responsibility of Bob who wants cream cheese to leave a note on the fridge indicating the need to buy more, which means that there would be no cream cheese in the fridge. The leaving of the notes is an established convention within the household, the result of Bob and Steve’s reflection on the continued stock of the all-important cream cheese. While the note is an artifact, thus external, it is formed by the epistemic responsibility based on the belief structures within Bob’s mind. This means that Steve, Bob’s roommate can also operate by this method, since he too abides within the epistemic responsibility to provide ~JP.
I find that having epistemic responsibility is key to making sure that conventions are followed, and then this makes the conventions useful. It is proven that conventions like these exist, so it is not hard to imagine then linking this with the thought that these conventions are borne of internal reflection in order to organize a way to keep things running smooth. This would be totally internal, and would have nothing to do with the external, other than to use external artifacts as part of the internalist convention.
This is most plausible because this form of internalism does not forgo all forms of external evidence. Anyone coming from the purely internal stance is going to be easily defeated because they would not be able to even manipulate any external evidence in order to back up their claims that they know anything at all. By coming to a more or less middle ground yet in favor of internalism, access internalism can make use of external evidence but by using them in creative ways that are undeniably internalist.
Internalists would still want to go further and say that external values have no bearing on justification. The BIV thought experiment, internalists say, puts two beings in a situation where one’s actual external surroundings are irrelevant, because the brain in the vat world is not actually perceived; all perception comes from Brian’s world. One could say that that BIV is unjustified because they are false, but they are not false, since they are perceiving everything that is justifiable.
Another example that is commonly looked at is the Twin Earth example. There are two people on two different worlds. They are twins insofar as much as they can be totally identical twins. The two worlds will be called Earth, in which Bob lives, and Twin-Earth, in which Tbob lives. The two worlds are identical, save for one property: water. The water on Earth is made up of H2O. The water on Twin-Earth is made up of XYZ. Earth’s H2O is called water, and Twin-Earth’s XYZ is also called water, but for our purposes will be called Twater. Both Twater and water are exactly alike, except for the molecular makeup. Internalists would say that both Bob and Tbob would be justified when they perceive their native waters. What happens then when Bob comes over to Twin-Earth? He would still see water. Internally, everything he sees matches his beliefs that what he is seeing is H2O water. Likewise if Tbob were to go to earth and be confronted with a large pool of water, he would be justified in believing that what he is seeing is indeed XYZ water. This is because they have identical internal beliefs, and are having identical visual perceptions, making the identical connections to said beliefs about their experience.
Externalists would say that Bob on Twin-Earth is not justified because he is not seeing the same type of water that exists on his world. The mere fact that the evidence is different is enough to call Bob’s view of Twater to be false.
Internalists would counter this argument with the fact that both H2O and XYZ are identical in every way other than the molecular make up. This would mean that it would function in every way as well. XYZ would function exactly like H2O, it would metabolize in the body identically, it has the same boiling point, everything is the same. Bob or Tbob, with their natural means cannot identify that the liquids are either XYZ or H2O. When they examine the liquids with their eyesight, taste, touch, and test them against their established beliefs, the water/twater will pass the all tests against these beliefs, hence being justified.
Bringing this another step would be if Bob and Tbob were to go to another world entirely, and find that this world was exactly alike to their world in every way. The only difference is that the water is made up of ABC instead of H2O or XYZ, but is identical in every other aspect. Bob and Tbob when they come across this water on this new world are justified in believing that this ABC water is in fact water, because they don’t perceive the water to be anything other than what signifies to them as their water. Bob never sees anything but was he perceives as H2O, Tbob never sees anything but what he sees as XYZ, so water then is in fact the signified water respectively to each individual. Each individual shares the same internal beliefs about what they use as a signifier for water. This is a clear case of justification supervening upon introspective properties of both believers.
This case is a compelling argument for internalism. I feel that it proves that internalism does not actually need external values for justification. This is shown when both Bob and Tbob are on the new world. According to externalists they would not be able to know what the ‘water’ is, since it would be a new entity that just has the seeming of water. Reliablists would also have problems because each different case of water would be a different set of truth-ratio processes, thus each other-worldly evidence would have to start a new truth-ratio process and would fail to recognize that each of the waters are indeed water at first glance. Bob and Tbob do recognize the waters, no matter which world they are on as water on first glance, showing that reliablism fails as a method for justification in this case.
When looking at this case from the evidential internalist view, where evidence can be used to change the justification because of established internal conventions, the Twin-Earth thought experiment does not show a need for any epistemic responsibility. Bob or Tbob do not have an epistemic responsibility to check the water for its molecular makeup. They only have their natural means and internal beliefs that are set up by those natural means to form their judgments of what they perceive.
A functionalist would say that Bob and Tbob are then functioning as they were meant to, since they are operating within the natural parameters of their design. Looking at the premises of the functionalist view can help see how the function would view this:
S’s belief B is justified iff
(i) S does not take B to be defeated and
(ii) the cognitive faculties producing B are
(a) functioning properly,
(b) truth-aimed and
(c) reliable in the environments for which they were ‘designed’

“(i.)” is pretty straightforward. The belief cannot be defeated in order for the rest of the analysis to take place. If someone’s belief in unicorns is defeated an expert at disproving the existence of unicorns, then the belief ought not be sustained in unicorns.
“(ii.)” looks at the cognitive faculties in a more objectified outlook than the very subjective outlook of internalists. Using a thermometer as an analogy for cognitive processes it must follow a, b, and c: “(a.)” demands the thermometer be in good repair and be functioning the way it is intended, then as “(b.)” necessitates that the thermometer must be designed to be truthful, which is also a part of the thermometer’s proper function, and finally “(c.)” allows for the thermometer to function in the environment that it was designed, which would need a definition of what is the proper environment. The thermometer is not designed to be able to truthfully report the surface temperature of the sun, it would melt. Yet, in regular air that is well within the temperature parameters then the thermometer would report the temperature properly.
Functionalists would then say that Bob and Tbob were both functioning properly, and that their natural means of perception are truth-aimed. There may be some speculation as to whether operating in environments not their own could affect their reliability. Since both environments are identical then their reliability would not in question. The main aspect of functionalism is that the ‘design’ allows for knowledge to be justified even though the processes are not within the cognitive awareness of Bob and Tbob.
There are problems with the functionalist view, since it is very hard to really pin down what the human ‘design’ is, and what the actual functions are. Of course, it is easy to understand that the eyes are designed to see, but the problem of understanding the exact parameters of what the eyes can perceive and what the extent of the capabilities of the eyes are is uncertain. The rest can be said about the other organs of the body, and as such, the brain, and what the extent of its abilities to form beliefs. Going even further, since not everyone is the same, then everyone would have their own design, making it impossible to ever gauge what functioning properly could ever mean, or even if the design is meant to be aimed at reporting the truth.
Internalists use the Swampman argument to defeat functionalism:
1.) If Proper Functionalism is true, then Swampman is not justified in his beliefs.
2.) Swampman is justified in his beliefs.
————————————————–
3.) Therefore, proper functionalism is not true.

Let’s say that Bob is walking around in a forest that contains a swamp. A freak bolt of lightning hits Bob, and also spreads into the ground, the charge seeps into the swamp. This energy then manifests itself into a copy of Bob, but made out of the materials readily available in the swamp. This is Swampman. Swampman has the same thought processes as Bob does. When Swampman looks at the forest, he is justified in believing that what he sees is in fact what he sees, and can be counted as knowledge. Functionalists would say that he is not justified because Bob and Swampman are different. The bodies are different, and there is no real design that is made for Swampman. Even though the bodies are different, the internal belief systems are identical, hence if Bob is justified in what he knows about the forest, Swampman is too justified.
The functionalist response would say that the Swampman is not a good example, since it is so improbable that the Swampman scenario could exist, that it is simply a world too far away from our own to really glean any real useful truths from the world that could create Swampman that would operate the same in our word. Also, if Swampman is indeed a copy, but made out of different materials, then the design of Leroy would be copied, and justified beliefs forming from the copy of Leroy’s processes are acceptable, since the beliefs are being formed by the copy of a properly functioning design of Leroy. A steel ball will roll just as good as a stone ball, even though they are made of different materials, just as Swampman would be made of different materials, the functioning forms would be the same.
I feel that functionalism is defeated by the argument of the internalists. As for there being epistemic responsibilities attached to any of the processes, there are no apparent responsibilities needed at the time. I feel that after all of the examples dealing with different types of external justification that internalism is the best form of justification for knowledge.
Epistemic responsibilities are not always necessary. I feel that internalism, by itself can be the best way to justify knowledge. Knowledge does not ever need any external evidence in order to justify it, the internal beliefs are what justify the knowledge. I do believe that Anthony Bruekner does have a good point when saying that certain external artifacts can be used as part of a convention set up to increase the general understanding of justification, by communicating with others within the accepted convention through artifact use, but in no way is this an external value that is justifying the knowledge, it is an internal introspection of the evidence communicated through external means. This is as close to the gray area between internalism and externalism as one could get and still have justifiable knowledge.

Works Cited

Brueckner, Anthony. “Justification, Internalism, and Cream Cheese.” Philosophical Papers (2009): 13-20. PDF.

note: All other premises and information were either gained from my notes, or extracted from the arguments used in class.

How I feel after the Epistemology Final

Not sure if we have to do a Weekly 200 this week.  If we do, here’s mine.
Great Class!  Have a great summer everyone!

After reading through Robert Adams’s “Must God Create the Best?”

(P): If a perfectly good moral agent created any world at all, it would have to be the very best world that he could create.

1. The best world that an omnipotent God could create is the best of all logically possible worlds.

2. The world is good, but is it not the best of all possible worlds that God could have made.

3. (P) will depend on what we believe are the requirements for perfect goodness.

4. God could create a world which wouldn’t wrong any of the creatures in it and would have the following characteristics:

(a) None of the individual creatures in it would exist in the best of all possible worlds.

(b) None of the creatures in it has a life which is so miserable on the whole that it would   be better for that creature if it had never existed.

(c) Every individual creature in the world is at least as happy on the while as it would        have been in any other possible world in which it could have existed

5. There is a different “perfect” world for everyone/everything, therefore there is not a best among all possible worlds

I will write a possible explanation for each premise. Afterwards I’ve decided to write a possible argument to agree with his premises, but then I also took my own stance on this possible agreement. My opinion both agrees and disagrees with the possible defending argument.

Next, I’m going to present John Rasmussen’s “Creating Worlds Without Evil – Given Divine Counterfactual Knowledge,” as well as Klaas Kraay and Luke Gelinas presenting Bruce Langtry’s “God, the Best, and Evil,“  and lastly the Devine Freedom argument made by William Rowe; all three mainly reject Adams’s argument by attacking certain premises. Then, in my essay I explain my opinion with these arguments that disagree with Adams’s theory.

“Other things being equal, a world in which free beings exist is morally preferable to a world in which free beings do not exist (the ‘value thesis’).”

He then goes on to defy this argument, stating that the value thesis is not relevant to any sort of intuition about morality. I believe that Himma makes a strong point here, and I plan to defend the fact that the value thesis itself does not satisfy the problem of evil regarding God’s intentions. He addresses two theological problems that arise through the problem of evil:

1) Evil is not logically consistent with the existence of an all-perfect God

2) There is far too much evil in the world than is necessary to justify some greater good. This reflects badly upon God, because the evil would be gratuitous and therefore not aloud by an all-perfect God.

In an attempt to solve the problem of evil, many theologians have come up with theories that support the co-existence of an all-perfect God and evil. However, to support their arguments, they state that the moral value brought to the world by free beings is a possible justification for the presence of both an all-perfect God and evil. The paper goes on to approach the free will argument (FWA) from several different standpoints, and the author states that there is not enough evidence to prove that free-thinking humans improve the morality of the world.

Since this topic is one that we never really talked about in class, with the exception of the Problem of Evil, I would like to know what you all think. My specific argument will be in defense of Himma, because I agree that it is very hard to measure how a free-thinking individual could be morally advantageous to a population as opposed to an individual whose actions are controlled by God, or even the lack of that individual.

The main objections brought up in response to this paper are:

1) The existence of beings capable of loving God adds moral value to any world in which they exist.

2) The existence of free will to love God adds value to that love, because the individual is choosing to do so.

3) Human beings with free-will have intrinsic value

In response to these objections, I would say that it is not intuitively clear that the existence of free beings, by itself, makes the universe morally better than it would otherwise have been. The paper I am focusing on clearly has a lot of different topics included within it, so I have not gone into extreme detail, but I just want to know what you guys think/any newfound arguments you would use to object to my argument.

So if this could be possible in Heaven, could it also be possible in Hell?  If not everyone goes to Heaven, then do those who go to Hell get their own personal Hells?  Just some thoughts on how Hell could be  if not everyone goes to Heaven.

I know we talked about a bunch of possible theories in class, but I came up with a list of assumptions we are making with this problem and the theories we created. I was wondering what you guys think about possibly rejecting any of these assumptions. They are as follows:
1) God is a o-o-o being
2) All componants of God have all the divine properties
3) Jesus was fully divine on Earth

The author of the journal states that he thinks that there is a way that God can be all-good, yet still have an understanding of evil, thus saving his title of “all-knowing.”  The author states that an all-powerful divine being can use his power to observe the minds of imperfect beings, in observation God would be able to reflect upon the feelings of evil (and fear) that are present, and understand them.

Secondly, the author argues that god would be able to understand the feelings and emotions that combine to make evil desires, fear and desperation; therefore, by knowing what makes up these feelings, he can know these feelings as well.

A third point, (one which i am having a little trouble understanding) is that God could know these feelings through false memory traces; i believe that the author is trying to say that by being all-knowing, he must have experienced everything, and in experiencing everything, god could understand the emotions by looking to his memories and understanding from there. Either that, or the author is saying that there is some sort of association that God would be able to use to his advantage. for example, we people associate pain with the color red, therefore, when we see red, we think of pain, when we aren’t actually feeling any. Such ability could lead god to understand pain, fear, and evil desires.

1) To hold that what is to be blamed in anger, jealousy, and contempt is not an involuntary state but the pattern of involuntary behavior of which the state is apt to be manifested.

Adams states that on this view humans are not accountable for a motive unless a person has voluntarily consented it by acting upon it. For this, Adams used an example explaining that sometimes two different people can sin the same amount, one with voluntary actions (hitting, insulting, etc.) and one with involuntary actions, mainly self-righteousness. Basically, Adams is stating that if a person feels like they are better than another person, and is willing to forgo helping the other person become better also just to simply be the better person, then this sort of involuntary sin should be punishable.

2) A state of mind is not involuntary, but directly or inherently voluntary.

Adams explains that a state of mind can be directly voluntary based on a person’s will. Adams states that emotions and desires are not directly in a person’s voluntary control in the sense that they are not cases of “trying, meaning, or choosing.” By this, Adams means that if he simply desired something, he would not necessarily try or choose to do it. Adams also points out that emotions and desires are not something you choose to have, it’s just something that your mind does involuntarily. Adams does make the point that not being able to totally control your desires and emotions is not a bad thing; otherwise there would be a lack of authenticity in what you were feeling at the time. Adams believes that although our emotions and desires are involuntary, the adherently play a role in something we can control. Mainly, inner conflict. It is not the act of having irrational desires or emotions, it is the fact that these desires and emotions keep manifesting until they ultimately compromise the moral integrity of our choices, our internal conflicts, and our moral character.

3) Although a state of mind in not directly within our voluntary control, there are actions that may be taken for a state of mind to be indirectly within our voluntary control.

One of Adams’ main points in this section is that people ought not to try to have good motives, they simply ought to have good motives and states of minds. For example, Adams states that the only reason a person would act ungrateful to a person who has done a lot for them is simply because they felt ungrateful beforehand. By Adams’ second point, you should not be blamed for feeling this on instinct, since you have no control over your feelings, but Adams believes that you should then focus on weeding out the ingratitude, therefore it won’t manifest into other bad states of mind. By letting the ungratefulness manifest, Adams states that you are basically consenting the bad state of mind, and therefore it is punishable.

These are the main points Adams’ makes in his article, “Involuntary Sins.” What do you guys think?

Wielenberg’s view is non-natural in that it implies that these independent ethical facts cannot be reduced to natural facts and properties (I’m assuming this means these facts are immaterial). His view is also non-theistic because it implies that objective morality does not require a theistic foundation or even an external foundation at all. Erik Wielenberg believes that this non-theistic portion is compatible with both theism and atheism. Regardless he does commit to his conclusion that there are objective ethical facts (even without a God).

Wielenberg discusses the possibility of these metaphysically necessary “brute” facts which he calls basic ethical facts. He believes that the existence of these facts are fundamental features to the universe, like some would consider a God. Wielenberg claims that these facts “come from nowhere and nothing external to themselves grounds their existence.”

Why would Wielenberg even want to defend this without using God as the sole reason for morality and necessary facts?

Does arguing against Wielenberg’s claims using a theistic approach cause any serious problems for his argument?

Additionally, the reason that it escapes our human understanding is because we do not yet have a cognitive schema to fully understand the metaphysics of what the Trinity is. Anderson goes on to say that if we follow the doctrine of Divine Incomprehensibility, which says that we will never fully know God as well as he knows himself (due to differences between creator and creation), how could we possibly expect to understand “every metaphysical nicety required to formulate the truth about God’s transcendent nature in an unambiguously consistent manner”?

Basically, in my paper I will be referencing Anderson and Tuggy and talking about how the “mystery” fits into the Trinity.