See the full document here

The Governor’s Office of Planning and Research is pleased to solicit your input on a revised draft of proposed additions to the Guidelines for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA Guidelines”).  This proposal reflects the direction in SB 226 (Simitian, 2011) to prepare additions to the CEQA Guidelines setting forth a streamlined review process for infill projects.  This proposal also contains the performance standards that will be used to determine an infill project’s eligibility for that streamlined review.

OPR released a preliminary draft of the proposal in January for a thirty day public review period.  To solicit feedback on the proposal, OPR also conducted three public workshops in Sacramento, Fresno and Los Angeles, participated in several conferences and expert convening’s, and met with various stakeholders.  By late February, over fifty individuals, organizations, and local and regional governments submitted written comments.  (Prior drafts of the proposal, as well as written comments on those drafts, are provided in the Resources section below.)

OPR has updated the proposal in response to that public input and invites additional comment on its revisions.  The key documents in this revised package include:

A Summary of Changes and Responses to Comments (May 1, 2012)
Revised Proposed New Section 15183.3 (Streamlining for Infill Projects) (May 1, 2012)
Revised Proposed New Appendix M (Performance Standards) (May 1, 2012)
Revised Proposed New Appendix N (Infill Environmental Checklist Form) (May 1, 2012)

To assist the review of the proposal package, OPR has also prepared a Flow Chart and Presentation to illustrate the review process and application of performance standards for infill projects.  Please note, however, that these documents are not proposed to be included in the regulatory text of the CEQA Guidelines.

We request your written comments on the revised proposal no later than June 1, 2012.  We encourage electronic submission of your comments, which may be e-mailed to CEQA.Guidelines@ceres.ca.gov.  Comments may also be mailed or hand delivered to:

CEQA Guidelines Update
c/o Christopher Calfee
1400 Tenth Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Jamieson v. City Council of City of Carpinteria [Second District Court of Appeal No. B232348, filed 2/28/12, certified for publication 3/28/12]

By Andrea A. Matarazzo

Landowner Lee Jamieson filed a petition for administrative mandamus challenging the City of Carpinteria’s denial of his request for a permit to enlarge a condominium patio on beachfront property.  The trial court denied his petition and he appealed, claiming a vested right to expand the patio as well as asserting that the City’s permit denial was not supported by substantial evidence.  In rejecting both claims, the Court of Appeal took note of the trial court’s “excellent statement of decision” and its statement of facts.

In 1974, after several years of litigation, owners of beachfront property (including Jamieson’s predecessor in interest, the City, and the State of California) agreed to settle a dispute by a stipulated judgment.  The judgment determined a “judgment line” that divided the area into two sections – the public beach seaward of the judgment line and the private beach landward of the judgment line.  The judgment prohibited property owners from building “any structures of any kind or nature over, on or across the Private Beach” except for “the installation and maintenance of flat, surfaced patios and appropriate landscaping.”

In 2002, Jamieson’s predecessor applied to the California Coastal Commission to convert the then-apartments into condominiums.  The Commission granted the permit, but required that the private peach “be left untouched so that existing vegetation may be allowed to stabilize the dunes.”

In 2003, the City adopted a coastal land use plan which it began imposing a “string-line” standard to limit beachfront development.  This would require a property owner to “run an imaginary line between the farthest extension of existing structures of the two properties on either side of the proposed development in order to establish the farthest extent of permissible construction.”

Also in 2003, Jamieson, as owner of one of the condominium units, sought a permit from the City to allow him to replace an existing 150 square foot concrete patio with a new 295 square foot patio on the private beach side of the judgment line.  The City approved the permit but limited it to 257 square feet based on the string-line standard.

In 2005, Jamieson purchase a second condominium unit in the same building.  He combined his two condominiums with an approved City permit.  He combined his two patios, which gave him a total of approximately 517 square feet.  Three years later, Jamieson submitted an application for a permit to add an additional 548 square feet to his patio landward of the judgment line.  The City advised Jamieson that he would need a coastal permit and that his expansion was not consistent with the string-line standard.  Based on this response, Jamieson filed suit, asking the court to (1) declare the rights and responsibilities of the City and Jamieson as parties to the 1974 judgment and (2) issue a writ of mandate reversing the City Council’s decision to deny the project and instructing the City to issue a coastal development permit for construction of the 548 square foot patio expansion.  The trial court rejected Jamieson’s claims on the “grounds that no vested right was involved and substantial evidence supported the City’s denial of the permit.”

Following the trial court’s decision, Jamieson filed a claim for a vested rights exemption with the Coastal Commission, claiming that he could extend the patio pursuant to the stipulated judgment.  The Commission denied his claim. Jamieson did not appeal the Coastal Commission’s decision.  Jamieson then filed an application for a coastal development permit with the City.  The City denied the permit application, finding that the proposed patio expansion was not in conformity with the City’s coastal use plan, including the string-line standard.

On appeal, Jamieson admitted that his failure to appeal the Commission’s denial of his vested rights claim precluded him from claiming a vested right under the Coastal Act.  He argued that his failure to appeal the Commission’s decision does not deprive the court from determining whether the stipulated judgment confers a vested right.  He further argued that even if there was no vested right pursuant to the stipulated judgment, the trial court erred in determining the City’s denial of his application for a coastal permit was supported by substantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that Jamieson’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing the Commission’s decision precluded judicial review of his vested rights claim based on the stipulated judgment.  Further, the court reasoned, “[e]ven if we are not precluded from reviewing the stipulated judgment because Jamieson failed to appeal the Commission’s vested rights determination, we agree with the trial court that it does not confer a vested right to expand the patio free from the application of later-enacted laws that restrict such development,” finding that the terms of the agreement limited the owner’s property rights, including the right to install patios or fences unless properly permitted.  “Had the parties intended the judgment to grant the owners an unrestricted right to install patios and fencing over the entire private beach area, they would have said so.”

Because the court had concluded that no vested right was involved, it then reviewed the City’s decision to deny the development permit by applying the substantial evidence test.  According to the court, the City’s administrative review process had been extensive, at the conclusion of which the City determined that the proposed patio extension did not conform to the policies in the City’s coastal land use plan.  The City’s findings denying the requested permit were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, and the appellate court therefore upheld them.

Authored by:

Andrea A. Matarazzo

(916) 496-8500

(916) 737-5838 (Direct)

andrea@pioneerlawgroup.net

DISCLAIMER

This website is made available by the lawyer or law firm publisher for educational and/or advertising purposes only, not to provide legal advice.  By using this site you understand that there is no attorney client relationship between you and the website publisher.  The website should not be used as a substitute for legal advice from a licensed attorney in your state.

Jamulians Against the Casino v. Iwasaki [Third District Court of Appeal No. C067138, filed 3/29/12; pub. & mod. order 4/26/12]

By Andrea A. Matarazzo

Jamulians Against the Casino (“JAC”) and various individuals who are primarily JAC members filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging defendant Randell Iwasaki’s execution of an April 2009 settlement agreement — in his capacity as Director of Caltrans — with real party in interest and respondent Jamul Indian Village (“Tribe”). The settlement agreement had resolved federal litigation between those parties over application of the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) to the Tribe’s efforts to upgrade its interchange on State Route 94 to allow for access to a proposed casino. JAC alleged the agreement itself was subject to CEQA review before Caltrans could execute it. JAC premised this theory on an argument that Caltrans had committed itself in the agreement to granting a permit for the interchange upgrade.

After JAC served the Tribe with the petition for writ of mandate, the Tribe made a special appearance to quash the summons, asserting sovereign immunity and seeking to dismiss the action. The Tribe argued it was an indispensible party without whom the action could not proceed. In addition, Caltrans demurred, arguing that the settlement agreement did not constitute a “project” subject to CEQA and did not commit the agency to granting a permit. The trial court sustained the demurrer on this basis and dismissed the action. It declined to rule on the Tribe’s motions in light of its ruling on the demurrer.

On appeal, JAC initially reiterated its argument on the merits — that its allegations had adequately established the need for CEQA review before Caltrans could execute the settlement agreement. The appellate court invited supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the trial court exceeded the proper scope of judicial notice in taking provisions of the settlement agreement into account that were not among the allegations of the petition (which neither incorporated the agreement by reference nor attached it as an exhibit). JAC then agreed that the trial court judgment should be reversed on that basis, and the Court of Appeal found that “Caltrans [did] not present any cogent authority to the contrary.”

In finding that the trial court had exceeded the proper scope of judicial notice in sustaining the demurrer, the appellate court focused not on the sufficiency of the pleading itself but rather “on the procedural propriety of the trial court’s foray outside the ‘four corners’ of the pleading through the vehicle of judicial notice.”

In its order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action, the trial court stated, “[the Agreement] does not include or reference plans for a casino project that are sufficiently defined or specific to allow meaningful rather than merely speculative review of potential impacts. Nor does [the Agreement] bind [Caltrans] to any particular casino design or action in support of a casino project, effectively preclude alternatives or mitigation measures appropriate for consideration under CEQA, or foreclose a ‘no project’ alternative . . . . [Citation.] [¶] . . . Section [3.A.] of [the Agreement] requires [the Tribe] to follow [Caltrans’s] processes for the creation of [a] . . . project scoping document (‘PSD’) and environmental documentation (‘ED’), ‘which is subject to final approval and adoption by [Caltrans], in order to analyze all reasonably feasible alternatives for access to the Project’ [(Agreement, § 3.A.4.), and] to conduct a traffic study [(Agreement, § 3.A.5.)] . . . . [¶] Section [3.B. of the Agreement] requires [Caltrans] to . . . process [the Tribe’s] completed . . . permit application [diligently] . . . and to issue [a] . . . permit once mitigation measures are approved and the permit process is completed. Contrary to the allegations of the petition and complaint, section [3.B. of the Agreement] does not commit [Caltrans] to approving the project regardless of the adequacy of the project design, environmental impact analysis and identified mitigation measures. Read in context and reasonably interpreted, the terms of section [3.B. of the Agreement] require [Caltrans] to issue [a] . . . permit only after determining that [the Tribe] has complied with CEQA . . . . [Caltrans] retain[s] discretion under section [3.B.] to reject [the Tribe’s] permit application upon a determination that [the Tribe] has not complied with CEQA requirements.” (Italics added.)

The Court of Appeal found that the trial court thus had exceeded the proper scope of judicial notice in sustaining Caltrans’ demurrer. “A demurrer tests the pleading alone; a court cannot sustain a demurrer on the basis of extrinsic matter not appearing on the face of the pleading except for matters subject to judicial notice. [Citation omitted.] A court can properly take judicial notice of the existence of a document, but can take judicial notice only of the truth of the contents of documents such as findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders, and judgments.” The agreement as a whole was not properly before the trial court. The trial court therefore erred in considering and interpreting its terms. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the action, with directions to overrule the demurrer and to consider the hybrid motion of the Tribe to quash-dismiss on its merits.

Authored by:

Andrea A. Matarazzo

(916) 496-8500

(916) 737-5838 (Direct)

andrea@pioneerlawgroup.net

DISCLAIMER

This website is made available by the lawyer or law firm publisher for educational and/or advertising purposes only, not to provide legal advice. By using this site you understand that there is no attorney client relationship between you and the website publisher. The website should not be used as a substitute for legal advice from a licensed attorney in your state.

Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency [U.S. Supreme Court No. 10-1062, decided March 21, 2012]

By Andrea A. Matarazzo

Michael and Chantell Sackett purchased residential property in Bonner County, Idaho.  Their property lies near Priest Lake, but is separated from the lake by several lots with permanent structures.  The Sacketts wanted to build a house on their property and filled half an acre with dirt and rock to prepare for construction.  Months later, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) served them with a compliance order stating that their property was subject to the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and that they were in violation by filling in that half acre.  The EPA stated the lot contained “navigable waters” and that the construction project violated the CWA.  The CWA states, “the discharge of any pollutant by any person … without a permit, into ‘navigable waters,’” is  prohibited.  The civil penalty may not exceed $37,500 per day for each violation.  This amount doubles when the EPA prevails against a person who has been issued a compliance order but has failed to comply.  The Sacketts requested a hearing from the EPA but were denied.

The Sacketts filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in Federal District Court on the basis that the compliance order was “arbitrary [and] capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and that they were deprived constitutional due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  The District Court dismissed the Sacketts’ claims for want of subject matter jurisdiction, and they appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling, indicating that the CWA “precluded pre-enforcement judicial review of compliance orders and that such preclusion did not violate due process.”  The Sacketts sought relief in the U.S. Supreme Court under Chapter 7 of the APA, which provides for review of “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”

The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the Sacketts could bring a civil action under the APA to challenge the EPA’s compliance order.  In so doing, the Court considered whether the compliance order was the EPA’s final agency action.  Pursuant to the compliance order, the Sacketts were to restore their property, there was the possibility of double penalties in future proceedings, and they could not obtain a permit for their fill from the Army Corps of Engineers.  When the Sacketts unsuccessfully requested an EPA hearing, the findings that the compliance order contained were not subject to further agency review.

The APA’s judicial review provision requires that the individual seeking APA review of final agency action have “no other adequate remedy in a court.”  In CWA enforcement cases, judicial review is by way of a civil action by the EPA.  The Sacketts could not initiate that process and each day that they waited for the EPA to file suit, they accrued an additional $75,000 in liability.

In ruling that the Sacketts were entitled to a remedy, the Court noted that nothing in the CWA expressly precludes judicial review under the APA or otherwise, and concluded as follows:

The APA’s presumption of judicial review is a repudiation of the principle that efficiency of regulation conquers all.  And there is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into “voluntary compliance” without the opportunity for judicial review—even judicial review of the question whether the regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction.  Compliance orders will remain an effective means of securing prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is no substantial basis to question their validity.

We conclude that the compliance order in this case is final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy other than APA review, and that the Clean Water Act does not preclude that review. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Authored by:

Andrea A. Matarazzo

(916) 496-8500

(916) 737-5838 (Direct)

andrea@pioneerlawgroup.net

DISCLAIMER

This website is made available by the lawyer or law firm publisher for educational and/or advertising purposes only, not to provide legal advice.  By using this site you understand that there is no attorney client relationship between you and the website publisher.  The website should not be used as a substitute for legal advice from a licensed attorney in your state.

By HalldinPR

See the complete story here

SACRAMENTO, CA. – The Powerhouse Science Center in Sacramento today announced that Mindstorm Creative, Inc. has joined the campaign to build the premier science learning center serving Northern California.

As a founding partner, Mindstorm Creative, Inc. joins other regional leaders and organizations in a cooperative effort to support the development of this vital new community asset, and will lend their digital media production expertise to visually present the project.

“We are very excited about the creative possibilities of visually presenting this worthwhile project to the Sacramento community,” said Ron Kendall owner/creative director for Mindstorm Creative Inc.

Mindstorm joins the regional effort to create a home for a high-tech, hands-on science museum for the Greater Sacramento region that will immerse children in science, technology, engineering, and math. The Powerhouse Science Center will play a key role in inspiring young people to become the future engineers and scientists that California and our nation desperately need.

“We are extremely pleased to welcome aboard Mindstorm Creative, Inc. as one of our founding partners,” said Michele Wong, Interim Executive Director for the Powerhouse Science Center. “Mindstorm shares our goal of transforming a historic Sacramento landmark into a cutting edge educational center, featuring a museum, planetarium, restaurant, and conference center. The Powerhouse Science Center is a tremendous collaborative effort between many dedicated groups and individuals that are all playing a significant role in making this vision of a premier science education center become a reality.”

EPA Issues Rules for New Coal Plants 

Marin County Board of Supervisors Had No Power to Approve or Disapprove Redwood Landfill and Could Not Hear Plaintiffs’ CEQA Appeal  

No Wetlands Landfill Expansion v. County of Marin [First District Court of Appeal No. A131651, filed March 20, 2012]

By Andrea A. Matarazzo

Redwood Landfill is located on a 420-acre site and handles the majority of Marin County’s solid waste.  Real Party Redwood Landfill, Inc. operates the landfill based on a solid waste facilities (SWF) permit issued pursuant to the Integrated Waste Management Act (Waste Act).  Solid waste management is a shared responsibility between both state and local governments.  (Pub. Resources Code, § 40001, subd. (a).)  The California Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery (CalRecycle) generally enforces the Waste Act, but may certify a local government agency as the enforcement agency in a given community.  In 1992, CalRecycle certified Marin County Environmental Health Services (Marin EHS) as the local enforcement agency for Marin County.  Marin EHS issued the SWF permit to Redwood Landfill, which filed an application with Marin EHS to revise the permit.  The application requested operational changes and expansion of the capacity of the landfill.  Redwood Landfill also has a use permit for operation of the landfill with no expiration date that was issued by Marin County in 1958.

Under CEQA, Marin EHS, was the lead agency for the revised SWF permit, and the agency completed a Final EIR in 2005.  The Final EIR was twice amended and finally certified by Marin EHS in 2008.  An association of local residents and environmental groups appealed Marin EHS’s certification of the Final EIR to the Marin County Board of Supervisors.  The Marin County Counsel advised the plaintiffs that Marin EHS was CalRecycle’s designated representative, and no appeal to the Board of Supervisors was available.

Marin EHS found that the revised SWF permit was consistent with state standards, and provided a copy to CalRecycle.  In November 2008, plaintiffs petitioned Marin EHS for an administrative review hearing under the Waste Act challenging the recommended issuance of the SWF permit.  Marin EHS scheduled a hearing and after public hearing and deliberations, CalRecycle concurred in issuance of the revised SWF permit.  Marin EHS issued the requested permit in December 2008.

Plaintiffs sued Marin County, the Board of Supervisors, and Marin County agencies, including Marin EHS and one of its officers.  In their opening brief, plaintiffs “relied upon a CEQA provision stating that, ‘[i]f a nonelected decisionmaking body of a local lead agency certifies an environmental impact report … that certification … may be appealed to the agency’s elected decisionmaking body, if any.’  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21151, subd. (c).) Plaintiffs asserted that the Board of Supervisors was Marin EHS’s elected decisionmaking body and, therefore, should review Marin EHS’s EIR certification.

Respondents countered that there was no appeal to the Board of Supervisors because Marin EHS was acting as the CalRecycle representative under the Waste Act.  Marin EHS is an entity separate from the County of Marin and does not have an elected decisionmaking body to hear an appeal.

In October 2010, the trial court issued an order granting Plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate on the cause of action alleging a CEQA violation for refusing appeal of the EIR certification to the Board of Supervisors.  The trial court ordered Respondents to vacate certification of the EIR and issuance of the SWF permit.  Respondents appealed, and the First District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment.

According to the appellate court:

The question presented on appeal is a narrow one: is Marin EHS’s certification of an EIR for issuance of an SWF permit appealable to the Board of Supervisors?  The answer is no.  The source of the answer lies in the regulatory structure created by the Waste Act and the Waste Act’s intersection with CEQA.  That regulatory structure reveals that approval of an SWF permit, and certification of the EIR for that approval, is a power vested in Marin EHS as a distinct local enforcement agency and is not a power vested in the county itself.

. . .

Marin EHS is the local enforcement agency under the Waste Act and the lead agency under CEQA.  Marin EHS is a separate and distinct legal entity from Marin County.  Marin EHS’s decisionmaking body is its deputy director.  Marin EHS has no elected decisionmaking body.  While the Board of Supervisors is an elected governing body, it is not a decisionmaking body of Marin EHS.  As noted above CEQA provides: “If a nonelected decisionmaking body of a local lead agency certifies an environmental impact report … that certification … may be appealed to the agency’s elected decisionmaking body, if any.” (Citations omitted.)  CEQA regulations define a decisionmaking body as “any person or group of people within a public agency permitted by law to approve or disapprove the project at issue.” (Guidelines, § 15356.)  The Board of Supervisors has no power to approve or disapprove the project at issue and thus is not an elected decisionmaking body empowered to hear plaintiffs’ appeal.

The trial court thus erred in directing the County’s Board of Supervisors to hear an administrative appeal of the Marin EHS’s EIR certification.

Authored by:

Andrea A. Matarazzo

(916) 496-8500

(916) 737-5838 (Direct)

andrea@pioneerlawgroup.net

DISCLAIMER

This website is made available by the lawyer or law firm publisher for educational and/or advertising purposes only, not to provide legal advice.  By using this site you understand that there is no attorney client relationship between you and the website publisher.  The website should not be used as a substitute for legal advice from a licensed attorney in your state.

By Jeffrey Weidel

See the complete story here

The Powerhouse Science Center in Sacramento announced recently that Wildlands has joined the campaign to build the premier science learning center serving Northern California.

As a founding partner, Wildlands joins other regional leaders and organizations in a cooperative effort to support the development of this vital new community asset.

Located on the scenic banks of the Sacramento River, Powerhouse will function as a model for 21st century experiential STEM education (science, math, technology, engineering, space) and environmental stewardship. The design will be an exemplary “green” building that serves as an environmental teaching lab.

“We are so pleased to partner with the Powerhouse Science Center to continue raising awareness of the importance of science, math and engineering,” project director Brian Monaghan said. “These are all disciplines we employ every day at Wildlands. The Powerhouse Science Center can help be a breeding ground for future conservationists, scientists and engineers who can contribute to the overall environmental health and well-being of our region.”

Based in Rocklin, Wildlands joins the regional effort to create a home for a high-tech, hands-on science museum for the Sacramento region that will immerse children in science, technology, engineering, and math. It will play a key role in inspiring young people to become the future engineers and scientists that California and our nation desperately need.

“We are extremely pleased to welcome aboard Wildlands as one of our founding partners,” Powerhouse Science Center interim executive director Michele Wong said. “Wildlands brings unique environmental expertise necessary to our goal of transforming a historic Sacramento landmark into a cutting-edge educational center, featuring a museum, planetarium, restaurant and conference center.”

Powerhouse supporters include business and civic leaders, clubs and organizations, individuals and the city of Sacramento. Mayor Kevin Johnson recognizes this project as a top priority for Sacramento’s future.

The center, which will cost an estimated $50 million, has nearly completed its pre-construction phase. The 61-year old Discovery Museum Science & Space Center on Auburn Boulevard is scheduled to move from its current location and become the Powerhouse Science Center in 2014.

For more information on the Powerhouse Science Center, including how to become a Founding Partner, visit www.powerhousesciencecenter.org, email info@PowerhouseScienceCenter.org, or contact Beth Callahan, Director of Marketing and Community Relations, at 916 853-0343.

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar [Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 11-35670, 11-35661 [filed March 14, 2012]

By Andrea A. Matarazzo

Environmental groups sued seeking to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) from implementing section 1713 of the 2011 Appropriations Act, which ordered the Secretary to remove a portion of a distinct population of gray wolves in the northern Rocky Mountains from the protections of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).  Section 1713 effectively reversed an earlier district court decision finding that such an action by the government – a “partial delisting” – would violate the ESA.  Plaintiffs challenged implementation of the statute, claiming that it violated the separation of powers doctrine.  The district court disagreed, and concluded that Congress had acted within its constitutional authority to change the laws applicable to pending litigation.  Relying primarily on the precedent in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

In Robertson, Congress replaced the environmental laws applicable to spotted owl litigation with new provisions and effectively directed the agency to comply with the new provisions.  The appellate court in the present case reasoned that here, as in Robertson, Congress directed an agency to take particular action challenged in pending litigation (i.e., it directed the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [“FWS”] to adopt a rule partially delisting the Gray Wolf and removing a distinct population of the species from the protections of the ESA) by changing the law applicable to that case.  Congress had directed the FWS to issue a rule partially delisting the gray wolf “without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule.”  Accordingly, the court explained, Congress had amended the law applicable to pending litigation to permit partial delisting in this instance.  The legislation did not direct the court to make any findings or to make any particular application of law to facts.  Rather, the statute changed the governing substantive law, and as such, it did not violate the constitutional separation of powers.

Authored by:

Andrea A. Matarazzo

(916) 496-8500

(916) 737-5838 (Direct)

andrea@pioneerlawgroup.net

DISCLAIMER

This website is made available by the lawyer or law firm publisher for educational and/or advertising purposes only, not to provide legal advice.  By using this site you understand that there is no attorney client relationship between you and the website publisher.  The website should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a licensed attorney in your state.