Pondering the Preponderance

Get acquainted with predicate logic in one sitting

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sun, 02 Oct 2011 23:01:00 +0000

The Logic Ninja

Thank you, Professor Baber, for teaching me the basics of predicate logic in one sitting.

Losing my marbles over Mawson

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sat, 01 Oct 2011 20:45:00 +0000

Mawson introduces philosophy of religion with nuance and style, and with plenty of his own authentic recipes. However, I can't make heads or tails of this passage:

"God might have chosen not to create a world but rather have remained the sole existent thing, in which case he would not have had the property of being creator, although strictly speaking, he would still have created everything other than himself."

Mawson, T.J. Belief in God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Clarendon Press, 2005. 81.

I am assuming he means, "could still have created everything other than himself." Let's take "could" and "might have" as synonyms for "true in at least one (logically) possible world."

God might have chosen not to create a world. But even a for creationless reality it holds that God could have chosen to create everything other than himself.

The fog hasn't lifted yet though, since "everything other than himself" picks out different items in different worlds (perhaps God only creates sea monkeys in some world). Mawson is probably referring to the contents of the actual world when he says "everything other than himself." But this led me to some interesting conclusions, which I'm have likely been mapped out and explored in more detail in advanced logical systems.

My general conclusion: it is necessarily true that p is true in some W so long as p is possibly true or necessarily true.

More specifically:
(1) Possibly, God has the property of being creator.
(2) Necessarily, it's possible that God has the property of being creator.

Any statement expressing a possible-world indexed proposition, like (1), will itself give rise to a statement that expresses a necessary truth. On the other hand, if (1) is false then it would be false in all possible worlds. Why is this? Here is my unprofessional attempt at finding out:

(3) It will snow in June next year
(4) It will snow in some month next year

If (3) is true, then obviously (4) is true. More generally, as long as at least one month has snow, then (4) is true. On the other hand, it must (*actually*) snow in June for (3) to be true. This example isn't perfect, but it helps me see why we should affirm this:

(5) If p is true in some possible world, then that p is true in some possible world is necessarily true.

Let's see if we can stretch it even further here.

(6) p is true in this world (the actual world)
(7) therefore, p is true in some possible world
(8) that p is true in some possible world is true in all possible worlds

So perhaps Mawson is trying to say something very precise here (I'm switching from possible words back to good ol' fashioned possible here just to make the sentences less awkward)

(6') in this world, God created something
Therefore
(7') it is possible that God created something
(8) necessarily, it is possible that God created something

Moral of the story: even in worlds where (6') is false, (7') is true

"God might have chosen not to create a world ... [but] ... he could still have created everything other than himself."

Am I stretching this too far? Probably so. But at least I didn't completely waste my morning on a typo.

Corn-fed cattle

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sat, 01 Oct 2011 12:18:00 +0000

- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad

Physicists are drama queens

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Mon, 26 Sep 2011 03:21:00 +0000

Scientists at CERN, the world's largest physics lab near Geneva, stunned the world of science on Thursday night by announcing they had observed tiny particles known as neutrinos travelling slightly faster than light.

Wouldn't "recorded" be a little less misleading than "observed?"

Brian Cox, the TV presenter and physicist, told BBC Radio 6 Music: "If it is confirmed it will be the most important discovery in physics in at least the past 100 years.
"It is a very big deal, it requires a complete rewriting of our understanding of the universe ... it is such an extraordinary claim that it is difficult to believe."

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence!

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/8785366/Science-world-in-shock-after-Cern-light-speed-claim.html

Mapping the Conceptual Terrain

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Mon, 12 Sep 2011 00:30:00 +0000

A recurring theme in philosophy is something like this: philosopher x proposes some properties that constitute concept C (more specifically I guess we'd say that the possession of said properties is individually necessary and jointly sufficient to constitute C). Ahh yes, but philosopher y has an example that shows that our intuitions about C go further; philosopher x's account leaves something important out!

This came to mind while watching an episode of The Twilight Zone this evening. The inmate's robot has all the qualities that (we think) a mental life comprises: rationality, learning abilities, emotions, qualitative conscious experiences like perception, pain and hunger. So does the robot have a mind? Well, perhaps some will disqualify the robot on account of lacking a soul. Regardless, if you feel the chill at the conclusion of the episode, ask yourself why.

Naturalism and the scientific spirit

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Wed, 07 Sep 2011 01:12:00 +0000

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/what-is-naturalism/

Dreaming of the Will to Live

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sun, 07 Aug 2011 17:13:00 +0000

A slight headache from too many dark beers rolled me out of bed this morning. On the way to the kitchen cabinet, I rehearsed the dream which had just abruptly ended. This dream was powerful and affected my emotional status the rest of the day.

Dream scenery is often not shocking until recalled during waking hours. Walking down a busy street inside your high school, cars cruising by while you head to your locker. This is pretty normal--and seems normal--in a dream. Incidentally, I've developed a habit of recalling dreams in the morning to better retain them. This habit came out of a fascination with lucid dreaming, inspired by The Waking Life.

Now, about last night's dream: it manages to bring together some powerful subjective elements into the same scene. I found myself sitting on stage in a large church, playing the piano. Looking around, there were friends from past and present. Some of them looked to be behind the stage in a choir. Others were in the audience. A dozen well-adorned couples marched in an elated progression down the center aisle. Was this a wedding? If so, it was quite a rowdy one. This video comes pretty close to capturing it:

(The scene of this dream may very well have been supplemented my memory of this video, who knows). All my friends are in this big church with me onstage playing music. Believe it or not, I cannot remember who was walking down the aisle! I only remember observing how happy we all were on this occasion.

Weddings always bring out a sentimental side: friends and family from all stages of life gravitating around the imminent married couple. Celebration and nostalgia. Vicariously watching our lives unfold in a communal moment. Chairs of people bowed out in neat little rows, pointed at the front center-stage. Why do we like ceremonial entrances so much? Probably because they grant us permission to drift into abstraction. To ponder our way past a marriage into the deepness of marriage.

So, I am on stage at this crazy ceremony, what to do next? Make something musical happen! Thinking to myself, "The intensity needs to escalate here so it settles at the appropriate time," I began clapping and the whole room joined right in. What a rush of energy! Here we are in this happy moment, and we are all thinking about the transition to adulthood. We are nostalgic and hopeful. Much life is still ahead.

Just when the sweetness of this scenery had enveloped me, a strange thought dislodged my attention: "How could this all truly end?" "How can there be an end to this?" "Will this really just fade away?" My dream-self tried imagining a dark, empty void. Perhaps to see what it would be like to be permanently unconscious. Could I discover any communicability between the wonderful scene and the dark, empty void? Not at all. The idea of a truly empty void was simply not available for me to compare. No matter how hard my mind focused: there was still a spark, a soft whisper of existence. And yet this unimaginable void was so terrible, issuing anger within me towards its possible but inconceivable finality. How deeply unjust to think that all sentient creatures will pass away. Rage, rage against the dying of the light.

That was my dream. Hoping to think about it more this week.

Wilson on Witch Trials

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Tue, 26 Jul 2011 02:12:00 +0000

What do you think of the Salem Witch Trials from Canon Wired on Vimeo.

“Are there Good Reasons for Abortion?” Wendy Savage and Madeleine Flannagan Debate on Unbelievable?

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sun, 24 Jul 2011 15:11:00 +0000

“Are there Good Reasons for Abortion?” Wendy Savage and Madeleine Flannagan Debate on Unbelievable?

Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology: A Contemporary Introduction

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sat, 23 Jul 2011 13:51:00 +0000

Paul Manata has written a full-length introduction to the topic of free will and moral responsibility from a Reformed perspective.

New iTunesU Course available

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Fri, 22 Jul 2011 01:11:00 +0000

Exploring Philosophy - Audio

by The Open University

Description

Have you ever considered what being conscious actually means? By choosing to live in a particular state are you consenting to be subject to all its laws? For some there’s an assumption that philosophy might not be relevant to modern life but Dr. Nigel Warburton, senior lecturer in Philosophy at the Open University argues that many of us today are faced with philosophical questions such as these as we live our lives in the twenty first century. In this collection we ask academics to discuss these questions in addition to other important philosophical issues and concepts such as the morality of abortions and the reconciling a world with evil and a good God. This material forms part of the Open University course A222 Exploring philosophy.

Website
Direct iTunes Store Link

Libertarians should not use the continual punishment thesis!

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sun, 17 Jul 2011 20:48:00 +0000

Well, now it's gone from just pure speculation to organized rambling. I cleaned up my original version of the argument and have posted it here.

Having a big vocabulary is like having a big truck...

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sun, 17 Jul 2011 00:22:00 +0000

...everyone assumes that you're just overcompensating! Or maybe they will just call you pretentious. Why? Because they despise your intellectual hard work? No. Because deep inside, they wish they weren't such a lazy ass. They don't want to be a foolish mocker.

http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2011/07/word-of-the-day-pot-valiant.html

What have the Romans ever done for us?

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sun, 17 Jul 2011 00:07:00 +0000

The benefit of taking philosophy courses

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sat, 16 Jul 2011 00:00:00 +0000

I have never set foot inside a college classroom to study philosophy (technology, business, and jazz piano were my subjects). Over the last year my free moments have mostly gone towards studying philosophy. (A 'free moment' is the hour before work when my wife is still tucked into bed.) My understanding of the subject seems to be moving along nicely, but my belief is that studying philosophy in the academy admits of some considerable benefits.

Guidance while wading through obscure passages and authors. For instance: elusive German philosophers whose names begin with 'H' (Husserl, Heidegger, and Hegel).
Feedback on writing skills, weak points, and general grasp of the topic at hand.
Question/answer with the professor.
Generally you would expect the professor to give an overview of relevant themes, historical contexts, trends, important versus non-important aspect, etc.

Now an objection: given the wealth of materials available to any earnest student, surely classroom learning is commensurate with solitary study. Of course, the ceteris paribus here is the effort put forth by the student to master the subject. But commensurate with respect to what? An isolated student can achieve the same quality education as the collegiate student, but probably not in the same amount of time. You pay to progress at a more efficient rate. And that might persuade someone to pay tuition. It has even tempted me a few times.

But this only applies to undergraduate courses. I have no idea what the average grad course in philosophy is like. But this I do know: my chances are slim for acceptance into an upper level philosophy program without an undergrad degree.

House of Caiaphas Ossuary is Authentic

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Fri, 01 Jul 2011 16:52:00 +0000

Israeli scholars have confirmed the authenticity of a 2,000-year-old burial ossuary bearing the name of a relative of the high priest Caiaphas, who is well known to Christians as a rival of Jesus. The ossuary – a stone chest for storing bones – bears an inscription with the name "Miriam daughter of Yeshua son of Caiapha, priest of Ma’azya from Beit Imri."

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/145297

Matt Flannagan reviews The Christian Delusion

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sat, 25 Jun 2011 13:34:00 +0000

Here. The author (John Loftus) has made an appearance in the combox.

Long before the universal Turing machine

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sat, 11 Jun 2011 23:24:00 +0000

"...for while reason is a universal instrument that is alike available on every occasion, these organs, on the contrary, need a particular arrangement for each particular action; whence it must be morally impossible that there should exist in any machine a diversity of organs sufficient to enable it to act in all the occurrences of life, in the way which our reason enables us to act." (Descartes, DMM, p. 43)

Why Descartes values truth

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Fri, 10 Jun 2011 11:32:00 +0000

"...I have always had a most earnest desire to know how to distinguish the true from the false, in order that I might be able clearly to discriminate the right path in life, and proceed in it with confidence." - DMM, p. 9

How much we know about the brain....

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Thu, 09 Jun 2011 11:17:00 +0000

Not as much as you might think!

Free eBook - Reading for Philosophical Inquiry

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sun, 05 Jun 2011 13:51:00 +0000

Reading for Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction to Philosophical Thinking by John G. Archie (html) (pdf)

The eye of the beholder

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Tue, 31 May 2011 02:49:00 +0000

This review of Grand Miracle by C.S. Lewis knocked me out of my chair with laughter.

God is not cool because He's not seen as God. He's not seen as incredible and yet always near. The Grand Miracle knocks the wall down and helps the reader to think of God as the most astounding and needed being you will ever encounter--and there's not a bit of academic bilge anywhere in this book. Pour a cup of tea and read till you're crying.

The Moorean Shift

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sun, 29 May 2011 11:21:00 +0000

G.E. Moore

If I don't know* I'm dreaming, then I don't know if I'm standing up.

Skeptic:
I don't know I'm dreaming.
Therefore, I don't know if I'm standing up

Moorean Shift:
I know that I'm standing up.
Therefore, I know that I'm not dreaming.

"I agree, therefore, with that part of the argument which asserts that if I don't know that I'm not dreaming, it follows that I don't know that I'm standing up, even if I both actually am and think that I am. But this first part of the argument is a consideration which cuts both ways. For, if it is true, it follows that it is also true that if I do know that I am standing up, it follows that I do know that I'm not dreaming. I can therefore just as well argue: since I do know that I'm standing up, it follows that I do know that I'm not dreaming; as my opponent can argue: since you don't that you're not dreaming, it follows that you don't know that you're standing up. The one argument is just as good as the other, unless my opponent can give better reasons for asserting that I don't know that I'm not dreaming, than I can give for asserting that I do know that I'm standing up." (Moore, G.E. 1959. Philosophical Papers. p. 247)

* "to know" for Moore is synonymous with "to be certain"

Reading philosophy

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Sat, 28 May 2011 14:30:00 +0000

“Preface to Philosophy,” by Mark B. Woodhouse

Steven Carr on EAAN

noreply@blogger.com (David Parker) — Thu, 26 May 2011 03:56:00 +0000

Steven Carr gave a tongue-in-cheek response to a post of mine regarding Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism:

Evolution could have designed us to move our limbs away from dangerous situations without pain being involved. We could have evolved the belief that fire was nice and warming and move our hands out of a fire because of a belief that that was the best way to get them warm.

There is no reason to think that evolution would give the true belief that pain is unpleasant, when we could have evolved to have all the benefits of pain-avoidance behaviour without experiencing pain. After all, a belief that pain is unpleasant is not something that is selected for.

The underlying claim seems to amount to this: humans wouldn't have evolved pain-avoidance behaviors without the feeling of pain or the belief that pain is unpleasant.

No doubt, feeling a pain confers many evolutionary advantages to an organism, and we needn't dispute that. The EAAN is concerned with beliefs, and more importantly how the content of beliefs relate to relevant behaviors. Given this fact, it should be obvious that only the second part of Carr's claim is even remotely relevant to the EAAN. Now how might a "belief that pain is unpleasant" help produce adaptive behaviors? Well that's easy: if the belief that pain is unpleasant causes one to pull his hand away from the fire, then we can easily fill in the story and conclude that this belief has indeed been selected for by evolution. The man who believes this will remain ambidextrous and thus more likely to survive.

But ... and this is a big old but ... it can't simply be granted that beliefs (whatever beliefs are) are related to behaviors in the way we have just assumed. In Plantinga's article, he cites four prominent views on the belief-behavior relationship, and shows how the probability of reliable cognitive faculties is low on each of them (conjoined with naturalism and contemporary evolutionary theory). In response to the common sense view which Steven Carr assumed in his comment, Plantinga has this to say:

For any given adaptive action, there will be many belief-desire combinations that could produce that action; and very many of those belief-desire combinations will be such that the belief involved is false.

Carr's own example illustrates this well: "We could have evolved the belief that fire was nice and warming and move our hands out of a fire because of a belief that that was the best way to get them warm."

And we can of course imagine just this scene: we have the desire to enjoy the nice, warming fire with an accompanying belief that pulling our hands away from the fire is the best way to do so. Evolution would inadvertently favor this belief by selecting for fire-avoidance behavior. Here is the kicker: evolution would select for a great number of false beliefs so long as they result in the same fire-avoidance behavior. This is Plantinga's reason for assigning a lower probability.

So I'm not sure why Carr has such an incredulous tone. Given the set of belief-desire combinations of which any member could produce the same adaptive behavior, Carr needs to come up with a reason to think this set is smaller than Plantinga has argued. 1 Right now it looks like he's just kicking up dust.

1 - Of course, many philosophers are engaged with this argument. One fine example being Steven Law.