By Dr Nick Stevenson

Remain lost the vote. It was of course going to be difficult to over turn the impact of the popular press and the nationalist Right. The layers of cultural meaning and resentment that have been implanted over decades were always going to be hard to dislodge. At first I did think the arguments on the economy would persuade many voters who fear another recession. Here there is a powerful case for favoring the status quo in a world of insecure employment, and in a campaign supported by most of the political class this might have been expected to have produced a positive result. Indeed at the start of the campaign, according to the polls, many voters seemed undecided. This could be taken to mean that for large parts of the electorate the nationalistic arguments had simply failed to persuade them. Indeed when I watched news programmes at the beginning of the EU campaign the voice I most often heard was the desire for more information. The public at this point sounded a bit like children cross with their parents for burdening them with such a big choice when really they just wanted to go on their summer holidays. Yet from the beginning the campaign to Remain lacked a politics of the street. Instead ‘committed’ politics seemed to belong to the Brexit campaign, whose arguments about the regulation of immigration, the national ‘shame’ of not being able to control our borders and of ‘taking back control’ seemed to resonate with the broader population. However we also saw just how easily the street can turn into the gutter. Wild claims about Turkey’s future membership of the EU, Nigel Farage’s anti-immigrant poster and complaints about the distant nature of the European parliament all seemed to strike a chord in an increasingly angry debate. This came home to me one Saturday morning when I met a Brexit campaigner who explained that the EU was a fascist institution. When pressed on this it quickly became totalitarian and then after a while authoritarian. Such was the hatred and the anger the words did not matter. After a fairly heated exchange (and apologies to my embarrassed daughter) I walked home thinking that in a politics driven by anger what matters is outcomes. That institutions are shut down, immigration stopped and the political class blamed. I could not help but think that there was more than an echo of the European politics of the 1930s in all this. The contempt felt for common institutions and the dismissal of the decadence of democracy oversaw the rise of extremist politics within Europe. Having been in many grass-roots campaigns myself over the years I am used to hearing excitable language but this time it seemed different. The closest that I had previously come to this was as a young Labour activist in the 1980s. During this period I came across many people who became involved with Militant Tendency. Many of the people I met in Militant were really likeable and yet some of their arguments and programmes struck me as wild and I was not surprised when Labour sought to root them out. Yet as I got to know them personally I understood that the source of their anger was often the same as mine, having come from poor families who could not get a job in the labour market. I admired their energy and passion, and yet could not understand how a programme of nationalising the top hundred companies operated as a feasible form of politics. If anything the politics of the 1930s teaches us of the importance of the constitutional state, human rights and the law and their restraining effect on more radical political proposals. Not surprising then that radical social movements have concentrated upon changing perceptions and more cultural forms of politics that stop well short of smashing the state. A radical politics of citizenship is still possible but needs to be careful of destructive and hateful language. This does not cancel a politics that seeks to question representative democracy as there are other forms of engagement, but ultimately progressive politics needs to strengthen democratic institutions and not undermine them. Yet such was the hatred held by many of the Brexitiers for Europe that this is what many of them seemed to want to do. The spectacle of Farage a few weeks ago at the EU telling elected representatives to get a ‘proper job’ was deeply uncomfortable. Especially given the possibility that Europe has (just like the nation-state) the capacity to further democratise itself and to protect the rights of the vulnerable. However this politics in the immediate future will have to go on without the UK.

My own frustration came not simply out of the simplistic thinking that came out of this exchange, but the growing sense in the campaign that the language we use should not be something we need to think carefully about. If Remain sought to utilise economic utilitarian arguments then Brexit were culpable of not only a return to an aggressive nationalism, but for a series of claims they clearly felt would not be scrutinised by the media or public. The most telling moment here came when the Brexit campaign issued a short manifesto as if they were a government in waiting. This was clearly absurd as this was a referendum and not a general election. However this move mostly went without comment. At the time many of those commenting on the campaign compared it to the rise of Trump in the U.S. through the idea of ‘post-fact’ politics. This claim is probably half wrong. The ability to mobilise the population clearly depends in a mass democracy on a form of symbolic politics that are not directly determined by facts. Yet amongst the wild and excited talk of the campaign there was clearly a sense of promises being made that would never be delivered upon. The clearest example of this was the NHS ad by the Brexit campaign. This offered a brutal contrast between the NHS now and after Brexit. The images showed what looked to be poor working class people being cared for by the NHS after we had left the EU. Yet the sense was, after the ‘liberated’ society that was to emerge after Brexit, these statements would soon be forgotten. As if politics is a huge exciting spectacle making claims about bright new tomorrows and what mattered was strategic advantage and not truthfulness. The Remain campaign in this respect merely offered the status quo whereas it was Brexit that offered people a more exciting language of social transformation and change. After the vote many commentators have argued that it was the losers of economic globalisation (the working-class population) who were the people most likely to be attracted by this sense of possibility. If within our global world many have been left scrambling to survive, Brexit offered the possibility of radical change. Further that unlike the educated middle-classes, many people did not feel themselves to be European and had a growing sense that their more place-specific identities were under threat in a world of migration and change. I don’t think there can be any doubt that these were important features in the outcome. Here I have felt uncomfortable at what often sound like a condescending attitude which argues that people who voted Brexit were simply not informed enough and should accept they made the wrong choice. This, despite the many of us who felt a deep attachment to the EU project, is simply undemocratic and needs to be rejected.

There was however a moment in the campaign that could have been transformative. Until her tragic death Jo Cox was a little known MP. Fairly new to parliament she had mainly campaigned on the rights of refugees, the war on Syria and for people with autism. After her death I looked on her Facebook page to find a record of fairly unremarkable gatherings that Jo had attended. What became evident in her posts was her ‘ordinariness’. She visited schools, local libraries, met refugees and attended openings and fund-raisers, mostly in her constituency in Batley. At first it was hard to see why she would become the target of a fascist attack. Yet her evident belief that politics is local, national and cosmopolitan made her a potential object of hatred. After the shock of her death I was left feeling puzzled as to why her death did not have a greater impact.

What then did Jo Cox stand for, and what of my argument that her death failed to change the nature of the debate? If there was something ‘ordinary’ about her politics and daily activity there were other meanings at work as well. There were the images of Jo Cox as a mother often pictured with her family and her husband. Notable by its absence were images of her meeting the rich, powerful or indeed celebrity supporters. Her speeches in parliament were not short on passion and engagement, but there was something to the point and modest about them. In one of her final pieces of writing for the Times newspaper she writes about the war in Syria and yet her concerns seem to be overwhelmingly humanitarian. She also supported the Dubs amendment that aimed to persuade the UK government to take in 3000 child refugees who had escaped Syria mostly without their parents. She estimated in April this year that 95,000 such children currently exist within Europe and that her proposal was that the UK takes in 3 per cent. It seems it was supporting these causes that turned Jo Cox into a target for hatred that eventually led to her death. The Europe that Jo Cox seemed to stand for was pluralistic, concerned about inequality but one where compassion and humanistic concern found expression across national borders. It was this in the end perhaps that became the focus of an uncivil politics.

Within the Britain that Jo Cox has left behind these fairly modest ideas and proposals become unmentionable. Lost in the anxieties about immigration, national borders and what it means to be patriotic was an idea about a different Europe that almost never found expression in the campaign. This was not a neoliberal Europe or one based upon more radical forms of transformation. The Europe of Jo Cox aimed at social justice, pluralism and human rights. The debate on Europe had taken such a Rightist turn that even these concerns seem to be too much. Yet in the end I think the ‘too much’ was that she was prepared to apply these principles across borders. This then offers an interesting paradox if we can agree that within a global and interconnected age images, resources, bodies and identities become stretched across borders but that any recognition of this becomes somehow unacceptable. I noted that the Remain campaign very rarely mentioned ideas around globalisation, let alone the role that the EU might play in this world. Instead both Remain and Leave were stuck at the level of the national interest, or as David Cameron reminded us several times, there were patriots on both sides of the argument. Here what became unmentionable was that we can have identities other than our national identity. The phrase ‘take back control’ was clearly meant to apply to national sovereignty. As if the rightful place of identity and citizenship is the nation-state. This of course abolishes any more complex account of identity as well as other versions of citizenship that might have included global, European or indeed local concerns. Here I waited (in vain) for someone to say where is our identity when we oppose, say, fracking? The attempt to prevent new forms of carbon-based energy being opened up in a world threatened by climate change is at once local, national and of course global. Every activist I have met who works on these questions, while often emphasising local risks, knows that they are part of a much bigger global, social and cultural struggle. Where indeed is ‘our’ identity when we oppose racism which we know does not neatly fit into the borders of national frontiers? Yet in the campaign national identity remained ‘the’ identity.

Both Leave and Remain offered excessively cleaned-up and tidy arguments. Like many people I tried to watch the ‘big TV’ debates. These were presented as gladiatorial contests between slick politicians hungry for power and prestige. Mostly these resembled a sporting event where the viewers were invited to cheer for the home team while deriding their rivals. Online I noticed a basic lack of civility between ‘opponents’ as people tore into one another. This became apparent when, after a discussion with someone I didn’t know, they seemed taken aback when I thanked them for their time and helping me understand the Brexit case better than I had done previously. Instead the campaign was an exercise in finger wagging, accusations of project fear and of course the exciting language of calling someone a liar. Within another exchange I was called ‘delusional’ for suggesting that human rights and the welfare state set humane standards for our society. The effect of this was inevitably to squeeze out subtle and more complex arguments. In a television-dominated campaign voters were invited to make up their minds as they watched the top personalities slug it out. There were of course all too few spaces for alternative intellectuals or even people who simply wished to offer more complex narratives. On television there were also vox-pop moments when ‘ordinary’ members of the public were asked their opinion which usually began with which camp do you belong to or which side are you on? Not surprising that the charged atmosphere of national patriotism has opened the door to enhanced everyday forms of racist aggression. As many people have pointed out the heightened expectations and raw emotions that came along with the campaign not only gave a new legitimacy to racist sentiments but created a sense of ‘us versus them’.

In the weeks ahead the fairly modest politics of Jo Cox is likely to come under threat. Will social democracy survive the assault from the Right as UKIP seek to target Labour sets in the North of England and the Brexit Conservative government moves to the Right in a world of rising unemployment, failing pensions and welfare cuts? What will happen to more civic understandings of nationhood as politicians seek to cash in on a ‘reborn’ Brexit nationalism? If the UK withdraw from the European convention on human rights and adopt an Australian-style points system, will we also see the emergence of Australian style refugee camps? This is less the inclusive agenda represented by Jo Cox, but more like what Agamben called ‘bare life’. Agamben reminds us that before Europe came under the grip of the concentration camp citizens had to be stripped of their rights. Already in neoliberal UK we have seen how humanity becomes treated when it is deemed to be ‘surplus to requirements’ no longer required by the labour market having to rely upon food banks, young people with mental health problems being referred to charities or indeed refugees scrambling to survive. What then begins to happen to this ‘surplus population’ if the Brexit government removes their rights? Of course we are not in this world yet although it is more than a remote possibility. This is not the world that Jo Cox stood for and it is for this reason amongst others we need to carefully attend to her loving and generous nature by keeping her memory and her modest (and sometimes radical) politics alive.

There are of course reasons to be optimistic as well as fearful and I say this as someone who was optimistic about the potential of Remain. Labour are somewhat predictably in crisis and there are indeed genuine fears it may split. Before anyone tells you this is a good idea let me say that as someone who lived through the 1980s when Thatcher was kept in power by a split between SDP and Labour that it is not. There are voices at the moment suggesting that a radical anti-austerity alliance needs to be formed and that Labour needs to give up on the idea it can govern alone. This is likely to be difficult for Labour to accept although there are progressive possibilities here as well. We are already seeing other radical campaigns post-Brexit beginning. In my home city of Nottingham over the past week I have seen invitations for public meetings from social movements opposing racism, militarism (after Chilcot) and fracking. It is, as Jo Cox would probably have reminded us, too soon to give up hope where a better world remains a permanent possibility.

However while I currently think the prospects are not good for those on the Left things can indeed change quickly. Another group of people I spent my time talking to during the campaign could be described as Lexit. For them any possibility of an authentic socialist future was cancelled by the EU, given its commitment to neoliberal politics most recently dramatised by the crisis in Greece. While I also felt more positive about the EU before the humiliation of Greece through a politics of progressive privatisation I remain unconvinced by this set of arguments. Here questions of politics become about a technical choice. The EU remains as capable of reform as any other institution. Recently we have commemorated the Battle of the Somme when soldiers were sent off to die by European states that were barely democratic and had not developed a fuller language of citizenship. Indeed scepticism about war and the militaristic aims of the state has been one of the more progressive developments within more recent European history, and likely to get a shot in the arm after Chilcot.  The Lexit case is that without the EU we are now closer to a more authentic form of socialism. This entirely misses the cosmopolitan case that institutions like the United Nations, Europe and the court of human rights can act as barriers to state aggression and the mistreatment of their citizens. This history of European socialism is such that what was once called actually existed socialism was a miserable failure when it came to preserving the ethical core of human freedom. Indeed at present the main beneficiaries of the current crisis are likely to be the nationalist and aggressively neoliberal Right.

One of the reasons as a young man I was attracted to Europe (the others being travel and the electronic music of Kraftwerk and Neu) was it seemed to be a place where ideas mattered. In my imagination Europe was the place of Adorno, Simone de Beauvoir and Kafka. Another towering figure who belongs to this stable is Elias Cannetti. One of Cannetti’s most repeated refrains was that we simply don’t live long enough to ever make up our minds. We are the victims of relatively limited life-spans never having truly understood something unless we have lived it. Well in my own limited life span (now well over 50 years) the period I am most often thinking about is the mood in the country after the Falklands War. Thatcher had just beaten Michael Foot to gain a second term riding a wave of nationalist celebration and this proved to be a devastating period for progressive politics. What followed was the bitter violence of the Miners’ strike and a renewed period of intense class conflict. There will be those who say that the current situation has enormous potential for radical politics, but I seriously doubt this is true. However in the coming months as the new post-Brexit world begins to take shape I hope we will take the opportunity as Hannah Arendt might have said to use our language carefully, to be civic-minded, accept responsibility for the public domain and to stubbornly refuse the invitation to invest our hopes in charismatic politicians rather than more careful forms of thoughtful and respectful argument about the possibilities of our own times. If many complained that the 1990s ushered in a period of post-citizenship where relatively affluent consumerist societies allowed many to switch off we no longer live in such luxurious times. Instead we need to recall the spirit of people like Jo Cox and ensure we remember the need for compassion and moral complexity.

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The decision by British voters to leave the EU has been described as an act of defiance against political elites by disenfranchised working classes. Gary Younge has referred to this as a ‘piercing cry of alienation’ and Owen Jones calls it a working class revolt. There is little doubt that Brexit reflects the desire for change among those who feel powerless and marginalised. That anomie or a sense of unfairness has mobilized many to act is evident from the fact that the referendum achieved a higher turnout (72%) than has been recorded since 1992. Voters who haven’t been inside a polling booth since Thatcher have voted Leave in a bid to stick two fingers to the political clout of Europe. This is not an insignificant development given anxieties around a democratic deficit in the wake of falling electoral engagement in western democracies in recent decades. However, what this means for restoring the lost legitimacy of politics is less obvious.

The fact that resistance has been expressed through a mode of action called for by former public school boys Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, and supported by global media magnates like Rupert Murdoch, is equally noteworthy and revealing. It has almost become a cliche now to explain social phenomena with reference to the highly contested term neoliberalism, which tends to either subsume all other explanations or be dismissed as a catchall that means very little. Yet it is difficult to ignore the effects of neoliberalism in the preceding decades when you try to reconcile the scale on which governments have been slashing welfare and social security with the fact that those who are worst affected by these changes have largely responded by withdrawing from the political sphere. This paradox points to the normalisation of neoliberal ideals of individualism, competition and economic self-sufficiency that have occluded social and collective goals as the basis of citizenship. In establishing economic progress as the core function of contemporary governance, neoliberal rationality has managed to undermine the ideals of welfare and inhibit dissent by casting it as a destabilizing threat to industry and business.

Against the relative passivity of the British public in the face of biting austerity cuts, compared to their European counterparts, the Leave vote may be seen as a revolt of sorts but it is hardly a sign of radical politics intent upon changing the balance of power. In many respects, though not entirely, it is a reflection of the cultural politics of a neoliberal state that has reduced welfare and hollowed out democracy but sought to deflect responsibility for consequential social failures onto external factors like immigrants and the EU. While only a minority of MPs rallied for the Leave campaign, Remain politicians who scrambled to stop the horse that had bolted from under their noses have never been known for their great love of immigration or Europe. Politicians from both the main parties have been lamenting out of control immigration and the excessive interference of the EU in domestic decisions for decades. It was not so long ago that Cameron was telling the public that the EU was not working for Britain and making promises to curb immigration. So now that the electorate has swallowed this rhetoric and acted accordingly why is it any surprise? Defiant it may be but the Leave vote is also a warning sign and not simply that the working classes are enraged. This is because it is not just one class of voters that supported Brexit and neither are the reasons for wanting to leave by any means uniform or unequivocal. Rather it indicates that political subjectivities that are cultivated in the interests of power can also be subversive and have unexpected consequences.

The positive spin being given to Brexit by the Left is that free from the EU’s unbridled neoliberalism Britain may create more space for left and socialist politics to flourish. This underestimates the pernicious and enduring effects of neoliberal ideologies that often function invisibly through what is socially deemed to be possible and imaginable. Current limits on the debate are evident in the lack of imagination to even contemplate that a reserved, unassuming and straight-talking socialist politician like Jeremy Corbyn can ever win an election in this country. There is no doubt Brexit offers transformative opportunities but any hope of overturning decades of neoliberal hegemony lies in some kind of organised alternative to the existing status quo, which appears to be largely absent. The mini-revolution within the Labour Party which saw the surprise election of Corbyn as its leader represents a glimmer of hope to some, but even this faltering attempt to produce a grassroots movement faces serious obstacles both from within and outside, not least of all a hostile and contemptuous media.

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by Dr Simon Roberts and Prof Bruce Stafford

Now that Boris Johnson has joined Nigel Farage and others in the out camp and the campaign to remain within or leave the European Union has begun in earnest (PM attacks Johnson over Brexit, 23 February) it would be helpful for voters to know what “out” actually means. While this may appear to be a straightforward question it is not. At present the UK is a member of the 28-country European Union (EU) and the 31-country European Economic Area (EEA). The EEA is comprised of three of the four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). The fourth EFTA state Switzerland has access to the single market through a set of bilateral agreements. Do Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage et al want to be out of both the EU and the EEA, or out of the EU but in the EEA? The two situations are very different. Statements by those campaigning for ‘out’ are confusing as to whether they wish a ‘leave’ vote to mean leaving the EEA as well as the EU.

Out of the EU but in the EEA would give access to the single market – much desired according to some campaigning for out because of the benefits it confers for growth and jobs.  However, membership of the EEA includes the free movement of workers and citizens and with it EU-migrants’ access to benefits. The EFTA website clearly states: “The free movement of persons is one of the core rights guaranteed in the European Economic Area”. Given that free movement has so far been the main concern of both the out campaign and the British public – an Ipsos Mori poll reported in the Guardian on 9 October 2015 found that 58 per cent of respondents think there should be further restrictions on free movement of EU citizens and a further 14 per cent said that free movement between EU countries should be stopped altogether” (Ipsos Mori on 9 October 2015) – membership of the EEA would appear to be contrary to the sentiments of those who are likely to vote to leave the EU.  Membership of the EEA but not the EU would also mean no seat at the European Council which sets the agenda and Council of the European Union which adopts laws and coordinates policies for the single market. This would be a serious loss of British sovereignty.

Out of both the EU and the EEA would release the UK from any commitment to the free movement of workers and citizens, but would mean the UK facing tariffs and other barriers when trading with those 31 countries and it will not be part of trading agreements signed by the EU with countries and regions beyond Europe. Tariff-free access to the single market would require the UK to negotiate a new trade agreement with the EU.  However, if this is the outers’ intention, they would be wrong to assume that this would be easy to achieve. Negotiations are likely to be long and difficult – Canada took seven years and effectively re-joining the EEA would presumably require another referendum (or do the out campaigners plan to take the UK back into the EEA without asking the British public?).

Voters need to know what voting to leave will involve.  Those campaigning for ‘out’ need to be explicit about whether it entails also leaving the EEA (which their anti-migrant and no loss of sovereignty arguments imply) so that voters can judge whether what might be a considerable delay in regaining access to the single market is a worthwhile trade-off.

Image courtesy of Yanni Koutsomitis

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by Professor Ian Shaw

Since the implementation of the NHS and Social Care Act 2012, the size of the planning area or `footprint’ have largely been decided by the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). This was part of Lansley’s plan to devolve commissioning to groups of GPs. In reality the planning footprints for CCGs have generally been around the local  District General hospital (DGH), with one of the CCGs acting as `lead commissioner’ for the rest. However, as the challenges of balancing budgets gets harder within the context of fixed and dwindling resources and cost improvement requirements this planning footprint was seen as unsustainable.

A requirement for new `Sustainability and Transformational Planning Footprints’ (STP) have been imposed by NHS England. Local Health and social care services have been required to identify the best footprint for them to `scale up’ planning in order to become more sustainable. The credibility of the STP footprint and the footprint plan that emerges will be crucial in accessing new transformation funds coming from the Department of Health. Monitor has also been `chipping in’ with a discussion document `Considerations for determining local health and care economies’ . The picture for Derbyshire for example looks like becoming a single footprint across Derbyshire and Derby City.

I wrote in November last year that the 2012 health reforms were themselves being reformed . This development supports and reinforces that view.  The need to go back to bigger planning structures to remain sustainable also means that the CCGs are becoming less relevant and that their clinical freedoms curtailed. The changing footprint will need a degree of `policing’ and performance management – anticipate the reintroduction of the Strategic Health Authority (though it won’t be called that). The bureaucratic structures in the NHS are now multiple and the lines of accountability are confusing as the 2012 structures remain in place though the new structures take over the planning function.

The other `footprint’ on the horizon is devolution. The NHS budgets are set to be devolved to Local Authorities in `Power House’ planning areas – such as a single footprint for Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire.

We live in `interesting times’ for health services and NHS planning is set to get more interesting still…

Image courtesy of Tony Roberts 

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by Jodie Pennacchia

The University of Nottingham conference What’s New About ‘Blue-Collar Conservatism’?  The First 100 Days of Cameron’s Majority Conservative Government was a thought-provoking start to the new academic year.  For those of us with an interest in education policy it provided an opportunity to explore what is unfolding and what we might expect for our schools over the forthcoming months.  It enabled us to do so against a backdrop of the wider ideological sway of Cameron’s government, sensitising us to some of the continuities between educational policies and discourses, and those affecting the wider set of public and welfare services.

My research concerns academy schools, and in particular the original and ever-present strand of this policy that focuses on changing the fortunes of historically ‘under performing’ schools and communities.  In the build-up to the General Election a couple of things emerged as particularly noteworthy in the Conservative government’s take on this area of policy.  First we were told that the focus on so-called ‘failing’ schools would continue but with a renewed zeal.  We were reminded that academy status is the main route to solving the problem of school failure, therefore under a Conservative government the ‘academisation process’  would be  called upon more often and implemented more quickly in order to ‘transform’ more schools into high achieving institutions.  Second, that celebrated figures from the academy movement would be parachuted into these ‘failing’ schools so that those who have made academy status work can share their wisdom with less successful schools.

The first of these policies has materialised.  The Education and Care Bill has indeed reinvigorated the long-standing link between academisation and the turnaround of ‘failing’ schools.  The key change here is that the democratic processes through which school staff, pupils, parents and members of the community can challenge academisation can now be bypassed.  The rationale for this, Nicky Morgan argues, is that these processes are slowing down the saving of schools, which means children spend longer being educated in ‘failing’ institutions.  These democratic processes are therefore getting in the way of the social justice that academisation aims to bring about.  Democracy is, in this version, repositioned as bureaucratic, as red tape, as a stifler of social justice.

The second of the proposals – to parachute academy super-heads and super-teachers into failing schools – has not yet materialised.  However, if we look at the number of individuals who have emerged as educational heroes through the academies programme, it is a fair assumption that this is a policy that may resurface at some point over the course of this government.

Both of these policy tweaks suggest that what we have seen in the first 100 days of Cameron’s majority government amounts to a continuation of a particular narrative about academies.  This emotively framed narrative pivots around the idea of a ‘turnaround’ or ‘transformation’ of  ‘failing’ schools.  By focusing on failing schools, more likely to be positioned in economically challenged areas of the country, the government ascribes academy status with the power to fight educational inequality.   Through this the Conservative government has captured and reframed the discourse of social justice in education. What schools in these areas need, we are told, is the freedom to do what it takes to shift stubborn cultures of low aspiration that plague them and their surrounding communities.  Through this policy schools will take greater responsibility for transforming the fate of young people in some of the most disadvantaged communities in the country.

Shifts in the first 100 days of Cameron’s government  – both in actual policies and in discourses about policies – have continued this particular narrative about schools in areas of deprivation that aren’t reaching bench mark standards.  What the discussions at the conference illuminated for me was the symmetries between education policies and discourses – academies being a pertinent example – and the assumptions that underpin a range of other stories that are flourishing under a Conservative administration across public and welfare services.

Here I am talking about stories that position those living in poverty, and the services that work to support them, as ‘lacking’.  These stories are underpinned by an ideology that is tough on what it perceives to be ‘failure’, which has amounted to being tough on people living in poverty.   Across them we see a demand, for people who are struggling, to take greater responsibility for themselves and for their fortunes.  It echoes the Broken Britain discourse which, although not directly referred to anymore, bubbles away as the underpinning thesis of Conservative public sector and welfare reforms.

For those of us interested in education policy, this reminds us that our analysis should not remove schools from the wider political and social contexts in which they operate.  Instead, schools are intimately linked with the wider set of stories that are told about social policies, and those affected by them.  It reminds analysts of social policy to step back from time to time from their focused areas of study to consider how these relate to wider ideologies, and the narratives that sustain them.  In shifting the level of analysis we take, we can open up new ideas and lines of argument in our work.  In understanding the way different policy areas speak to and across one another, we can create more opportunities to question and challenge in more coherent and joined-up ways, the stories that are told about the most vulnerable people in our societies, and those who work to support them.

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by  Elena Genova, PhD candidate at the School of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Nottingham

The session on Welfare Reform at the 100 Days conference of Cameron’s Majority Government, organised by the International Centre for Public and Social Policy at the School of Sociology was far from a quiet, timid one. Indeed, the compelling presentations by Professor Bruce Stafford and Dr Jenni Cauvain on welfare cuts and housing respectively, were followed by a passionate debate. The latter sparked off with an audience member’s comment that the welfare system, designed in the 1940s is outdated and dysfunctional. The crux of his argument was that the system is not designed to recognise contribution, which makes it unequal as it is not the hard-working people of Britain who benefit from it.  Needless to say that the young man, who admitted to  being a Tory supporter, found himself in a predominantly left leaning crowd that directly targeted his argument.

However, what was interesting about this debate was not the obvious clash between two opposing positions but rather the language used in arguments provided by both sides, based on the term ‘contribution’. Sitting there and listening to the debate, I pondered over the meaning of ‘contribution’. I remembered a story of a few days ago when I posted on Facebook about having recently moved house. One of my very good friends, and an ardent Tory supporter with whom whilst being good friends we nonetheless clash on matters of equality and European mobility, asked me what my plan was after the move. “Well, I need to finally finish my thesis”, I replied. His response made me chuckle: “About time you finish it and start contributing to society”. In line with our constant banter and without thinking too much about it, I said: “I thought I already was!”

A few days later, sitting in that room at the conference this conversation came back to me. ‘Contribution’— what does it mean ‘to contribute’? How is ‘contribution’ measured? Who deserves to be recognised as contributing? Both the young Tory supporter at the conference and his opponents seemed to agree that ‘contribution’ was based on the number of years worked: while the first claimed that pensioners are most deserving, a representative of the latter pointed out that he was on Employment and Support Allowance and he has contributed by working for 15 years. Is it then measured by the impact of that contribution?

We live in a society under increasing pressure to measure and assess the ‘impact’ of ‘contribution’.  While in academia it has more to do with the quality of research produced, in everyday life this would be the quality of one’s membership in a society which determines their entitlement to welfare. Our obsession with measuring ‘contribution’ and ‘impact’ essentially draw a firm divisive line, categorising people into deserving and undeserving. Like many, I wondered whether we can fairly decide who is and who is not deserving. Being in the final year of my PhD, I thought of the young people in my position: while we have spent the last 7 to 10 years in education and attempting to contribute to knowledge, many of us will graduate and will face the situation of looking for a job with little or no work experience. Are we entitled to welfare? What about the many young people from underprivileged families and regions in the country who simply do not have access to any resources and opportunities? What about migrants and refugees? However, these questions, unfortunately fall in the trap of measuring ‘contribution’ on the basis of which the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ are determined.

By focusing on this, the welfare debate essentially shifts away from what really matters— namely, how we tackle inequality. Indeed, Baroness Lister of Burtersett made the very important point that we need to be careful with the language that we use. As sociologists we know very well that language results in discourses that produce and reproduce power relationships. The welfare debate is one such discourse that traps us into talking about measuring contribution, which in turn leads to privileging certain groups of society and stigmatising others. Baroness Lister instead suggested to talk about ‘social security’— a term that not only re-focuses the debate but a term that also suggests that the protection and the integrity of individuals and social groups come first. Indeed, I may not be sure how we measure contribution and I am not convinced we should solely focus on it, but I am certain that by talking about social security we have a better chance at assessing the causes of inequality and directly tackling the problem— a problem whose consequences go well beyond the 100 days of any Government.

Image courtesy of  Simon Cunningham

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by Jenni Cauvain and Bruce Stafford

This session, chaired by Simon Roberts, considered two policy areas that are central to the Conservative Party’s blue collar political messaging. Emphasis in the Conservative’s narrative on welfare and housing reforms has been about “making work pay” and “being on the side of working people”, which suggests that welfare cuts and policies such as Right to Buy have been thought to strike a chord with blue collar voters. Analyses by Bruce Stafford and Jenni Cauvain however suggest that behind the political rhetoric, another picture emerges which questions the extent to which these policies indeed support ‘working people’. Instead, different parts of the population stand to gain from blue collar conservatism: pensioners and existing homeowners, in effect, the asset-owning class. The session concluded with a useful reminder of the use of language in public policy, and that we should be mindful of using politically loaded terms such as “welfare” which emphasise an individualistic rather than collectivist approach to social protection.

Bruce Stafford outlined how the first ‘true blue’ budget of July 2015 had changed since the coalition government’s budget of March 2015. Office of Budget Responsibility figures revealed that the all-conservative government is cutting deeper into the welfare budget than the coalition government had proposed, by tightening the welfare cap[1] by an extra £13.1bn by 2019/20 (from £129.8bn in March to £113.5bn in July 2015). Bruce’s argument, based on an analysis of the composition of ‘capped’ and ‘upcapped’ elements of the welfare budget, was that more than 95% of the cuts will come from benefits to the working age population as illustrated in Figure 1.

(Data: OBR 2015, Table 4.20)

The reasons behind protecting pensioners are less than clear. What is more obvious is that as all major political parties have committed to the ‘triple lock’ of raising pensions in line with earnings, inflation or 2.5 per cent per annum, whichever is highest, the electoral advantage of the policy is reduced relative to other parties. Also, as long as the governing party is signed up to the austerity agenda as well as the protection of pensions, it is difficult to imagine a different kind of distribution in the burden of welfare cuts regardless of who is in government.

Jenni Cauvain argued that the Conservative’s vowed “passion for homeownership” is a misleading strapline, as their current approach to housing and welfare is overseeing a steady rise in private renting, both as a share of the overall tenure mix, and as a share of Housing Benefit (HB) clients relative to social renting, the latter trend depicted in Figure 2.

Apparently wooing blue collar votes, the Conservatives extended the Right to Buy (RTB) to Housing Association tenants in May 2015. The RTB replacement rates are pitiful despite promises to the contrary, so the social rented sector continues to decline. These trends are fuelling a change Housing Association’s business model: the benefit cap[1] and other cuts will tempt many social landlords to abandon their social purpose in favour of market rents and commercialisation. An increasing share of HB clients in the private rented sector is a ‘vicious cycle’; most private rents are higher than social rents (see Figure 3), HB costs will rise, cue calls for further austerity.

Jenni argued that the rationale behind the extension of RTB and prevalence of private renting is the ‘financialisation’ of the UK economy; our economic growth model relies excessively on house price inflation and private debt. Thus an increasing share of ‘working people’ needs to be funnelled into servicing private mortgage debt through either direct mortgage payments or rent.

The lively discussion focused on the purpose and role of so-called “welfare” in Britain and who is entitled to it. The take home message by Baroness Ruth Lister was that “welfare” is a divisive and loaded term aimed at social separation into “strivers” and “skivers”.

[1] Relating to the overall benefit and personal tax credit budget.

[2] Relating to the maximum that each household can receive in state benefits, £23k pa in London and £20k pa elsewhere in the country

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by: Mark Jago 

We all want a fair society. But fairness is an inherently contested concept. What one person deems fair is sure to be seen as unfair to others. The high-earner may find it unfair that her income is reduced through top-rate taxation; the willing but unemployed worker finds it unfair that the system doesn’t afford her the opportunity to work for her living. It is hard to build a political philosophy upon a foundation of fairness, precisely because there’s so much disagreement on what’s fair.

Inequality is a much easier concept to work with. Although it has many facets – inequality of income, of wealth, of opportunity – each can be measured in a (relatively) objective way. This allows us to place communities or nations on an inequality scale, for each of those aspects of inequality. But unlike the case of fairness, which is an inherently moral concept, it is not so clear how we can draw moral conclusions from inequality data. It isn’t so easy to argue, purely on philosophical grounds, that inequality (of income, say) is a morally bad thing. Indeed, philosophers from David Hume and Adam Smith to Robert Nozick have all argued that material inequality arises naturally in society, and hence that inequality can be avoided only by severely limiting our freedoms. To make matters more complicated, perfect inequality in one dimension (say, income) may be possible only at the cost of severe inequality on some other (say, freedom of expression or of opportunity, as witnessed in Pol Pot’s Cambodia).

A key turning point in the debate over inequality is the empirical evidence, which shows clearly how  greater inequality in a society leads to a huge range of socially undesirable outcomes. Much of this research is collated in Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett’s The Spirit Level, presented in abbreviated form at the 100 Days of Cameron conference by Wilkinson. The data shows a strong correlation between greater income inequality within a society, on the one hand, and more obesity, more mental illness, more violence, higher incarceration rates, less social mobility, degraded social relations, and poorer educational performance, on the other.

Now, correlation is not the same as causation. In general, correlated variables could have a further underlying cause. But in the case of inequality, the data does not support this hypothesis. The socially bad outcomes are not correlated with average income or GDP, indicating that these are not the common cause. Could it be that the societal problems cause inequality? That would be plausible if those problems occurred most amongst the poorest members of society. But the data shows they are found within all income bands and, for the same income level, are worse in less equal countries. This indicates that inequality is the cause of these societal problems, and not vice versa.

It’s hard to deny that these outcomes are pragmatically bad for society. If we agree (as many do) that we have a moral duty to avoid them as far as possible, and if we avoid the bad outcomes only by reducing inequality, then we have a moral duty to reduce inequality. How far are we obliged to reduce that inequality? As far as this argument is concerned, only as far as it will reduce the socially bad outcomes. If we were to reach a level of inequality at which further reduction would bring negligible societal benefits then, as far as this argument goes, we should not feel obliged to reduce inequality further. But as a society, we are currently a long, long way from that point, and heading in the wrong direction.

image courtesy of Michael Coghlan

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By Rupal Patel & Elena Genova

The International Centre for Public and Social Policy organised a conference on the 4^th of September at the University of Nottingham entitled ‘What’s New About ‘Blue-Collar Conservatism’? The First 100 Days of Cameron’s Majority Conservative Government’.

Dr Simon Roberts’ welcome stressed the fact that ever since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal— a series of very important laws passed in his first 3 months of office in the midst of the Great Depression— the first 100 days of a government in office are taken as a measure that sets out the agenda at a time of any cabinet’s highest support. With this in mind, the aim of the conference was to scrutinise the indicators of the envisaged Tory agenda for the next 5 years, while at the same time looking at the ideology behind policies of the first conservative majority government since John Major. Speakers and roundtable members included Natalie Bennett— Leader of the Green Party, Andrew Slaughter— Shadow Minister for Justice,  Baroness Ruth Lister of Burtersett and Emeritus Professor Richard Wilkinson.

The conference started off with Emeritus Professor Richard Wilkinson, discussing inequalities by exploring the relationship between life expectancy and income in various countries. Through visual graphs and statistics Professor Wilkinson exhibited that greater equality benefits all social classes and not only the really poor. In his words, current inequality presents us with different perceptions of  class and ‘in a society where some people are seen as hugely important and others are nothing at all, we all become more neurotic about how we are seen’. We live in a society that is fixated on status anxiety and thus inequality is no longer merely about poverty and unfair material belonging but, has real implications for our well-being. Thus, we need to move our attention away from dominance, subordination and power, and focus on people’s quality of life. Richard Wilkinson argued there needs to be a prime focus on well-being and happiness that is primarily integrated with social networks and not solely economic means.

The subsequent speaker, Natalie Bennett, started her talk by providing an opinion on the labour leader election and said Jeremy Corbyn is ‘the start of the end of neoliberal, neo-Thatcherite economy’. Her presentation titled ‘100 days of backpedalling: the energy policies of the Cameron Tory government’ explored the lack of attention energy policies have been getting by the conservative government. Providing some context, Natalie Bennett put forward that on 14^th February 2015, Cameron, Clegg and Miliband signed a letter, promising to take climate change seriously but it is utterly amazing how the government has backpedalled on environmental and social policies. However, Natalie Bennett remains positive about what to do next and by using Germany as an example where 50% of renewable energy is owned by communities; there is hope for Britain. She argues that the core problem is that the financial sector is too large and by growing the sector of renewable sources, Britain may begin to see a more balanced society that can overcome the economic and social crisis. Therefore, Natalie Bennett ends optimistically and advocates ‘we are supposed to live in a democracy, YOU are the democracy! Let’s make it happen! Let’s make a change!’

The last guest speaker to take the stage was Andrew Slaughter, Labour Shadow Minister for Justice discussing conservative justice and human rights policy. He began with the question of whether governments have a plan prior to being in office and put forward that that unfortunately is not the case  and in a talk that examined justice and human rights approaches and policies of consecutive governments gave the conference illuminating insights to how governments work while crafting pen-pictures of some well known public figures.

After such interesting and wide ranging presentations in the morning, the afternoon saw a split of six breakout sessions focusing on Cameron’s Philosophy, Crime and Justice, Education, Health, Local Government and Welfare Reform. We attended the latter two sessions, both of which saw the compelling account of the presenters and lively debates. For example, in the session on Welfare Reform, Head of School Professor Bruce Stafford compared the March and July budgets. As he pointed out, even though only 112 days apart the budgets changed dramatically with the election being the main ‘game-changer’.  Bruce Stafford, stressed that George Osborne has pledge a further 12 billion cut on top of the already planned 40 billion cuts. Moreover, he went on to investigate where those cuts would come from, demonstrating that Osborne’s budget, in fact, envisages a 13.1 billion cut on welfare with 12.5 billion outside the welfare cap. In the meantime, while the major parties have committed to the triple lock, Professor Stafford’s prediction is that none of the parties will be able to sustain the triple lock as long as they are committed to austerity measures. This was followed by Dr Jenni Cauvain who explored Tory welfare and housing policies. She noted that the private rented sector is expanding and more and more people in the receipt of housing benefits are moved to that sector.     Questioned by the audience, however, Dr Cauvain predicted that if the housing bubble exploded, it would be localised. The session on Health – The Quiet Revolution: ditching the health and social care act was equally interesting.

Professor Ian Shaw began the session ‘Discussing Reforming the Reforms’, scrutinising the NHS 5-year forward view.  He outlined that the government have backed a plan to reform the NHS to deliver within a cost envelope by drawing on PACS and MSPS models. However, delivery is lacking with hospital productiveness being only 0.5% up and it took a £822 million overspend. Ian Shaw put forward that he did not think services would deliver during the Tory government. Chris Locke, chief executive and secretary of Nottinghamshire Local Medical committee, continued with exploring the challenge for GPs. With the restructuring of the NHS and the introduction of clinical commissioning groups, GP’s have much more responsibility. He argued that we face a GP crisis and many will feel forced to leave their positions due to difficulties in managing practices. The NHS model needs to move from competition to collaboration if it is to prove to be successful. Is the five-year forward plan likely to deliver? The room remained sceptical to say the least about the future of the NHS.

After the simultaneous vigorous debates in the breakout sessions, the day continued with a roundtable that aimed at bringing all topics together. The roundtable was chaired by Professor Bruce Stafford and it featured responses on key topics from Natalie Bennett, Baroness Professor Ruth Lister of Burtersett and Andrew Slaughter MP. The main topics raised during the roundtable involved the participants’ opinion on the hot topics of the day—namely, on the Labour leadership battle and the so called Corbyn-mania; on the fairness of the electoral system and whether or not voting should be made mandatory; on the refugee crisis and many others. Natalie Bennett retained her optimism in all her responses, while Andrew Slaughter admitted to being more pessimistic. A more balanced view was expressed by Baroness Lister, who once again, pleaded for paying attention to the way we frame political discourses.

We thought that the conference was very interesting and inspiring. We also think it opened up many new areas of debate, so we invite and look forward to any comments and opinions.

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by Professor Ian Shaw

In my blog back in May  I predicted that 7 day working for GPs would not happen and outlined the reasons why.  The Government have since come up with its `New Deal’ for GPs who agree to 7 day working  in which they offer some incentive payments for GPs who agree to the scheme.  Let me tell you why I remain unconvinced that this will happen on the scale the Government wants…

1. 7 day working is not evidence based. If you want to persuade GPs to do anything that doesn’t involve significant incentive payments then they have to be convinced that the reform is worth doing from a patient perspective. In other words that there is a firm evidence base that this is the right thing to do. GPs remain unconvinced that this is the correct way forward. This was the question raised by Dr Chaand Nagpaul, the GP leader of the BMA, when he suggested that the Government would be better “supporting practices during the day” . The reason he said this is that on average patients see their GP 5 times a year, but this increases to 15 times a year for under 5s and over 20 times a year for patients over the age of 75. So the largest demand comes from groups who usually have little problem presenting themselves to the doctor during the day. Those practices that have tried 7 day working report that demand is very low, particularly on Sundays. It’s certainly true that GPs need to see more patients if the pressure on A&E and other hospital services is to be reduced, but that can be achieved during current working hours rather than by extending hours, with additional support staff and with `leaner’ working practices.
2. The Government doesn’t understand the nature of the GP workforce, which has become increasingly feminised, particularly over the last decade, and has seen large increases in part time working. Indeed when GP payments were increased as part of the 2004 GP contract, many GPs saw it as an opportunity to work less for the same money rather than as an incentive to work more hours…
3. As an aside I think it’s interesting that the Government is arguing that there is a `crisis of leadership’ in the NHS . I think in part that’s because doctors won’t go along with the Department of Health’s plans and that’s in turn because they are either perceived as not evidenced based or because doctors are so `reform fatigued’ that they prefer to concentrate on the day job and have switched off to calls for yet more reforms in their practice. GPs in particular are retiring faster than they can be recruited, and are reportedly struggling to meet current demands, let alone engage in reforms.
4. The `golden handshake’ for GPs to work in deprived areas is welcome – but then it’s not a new initiative. PCTs had the power to do this pre 2012 but there were often few takers. GPs working in deprived areas have far different pressures than GPs working in the leafy suburbs but the quality of working life is often less – refer back to point 2.

So overall I still don’t think this will happen in the way the Government wants it to, and the government may be better dropping the idea for more primary care support around existing models – linking to the Five year Forward View which has enough challenges facing it without building in 7 day GP working 

Image courtesy of Jasleen _ Kaur

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