CPD Blog http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_main A blog by public diplomacy professionals, theorists and practitioners, published by the USC Center on Public Diplomacy en USC Center on Public Diplomacy Copyright 2009 2009-11-06T18:49:00-08:00 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/http://uscpublicdiplomacy.orghttp://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/favicon.icoUSC Center on Public Diplomacy More stuff, really. Stuff Guest_Bloggers, Middle East ]]> 2009-11-06T17:49:00-08:00 Twitter has had a phenomenological influence on the international news media in the post-Iranian elections period in June 2009 onwards. Through the continuous 24 hour- cycle of tweets, the micro-blogging site was challenging the censorship applied by the Iranian government on all news media covering the confrontations following the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad . After years of state monopoly and censorship twitter and other social media sites and applications are making governments more concerned over news. Social media is placing more power in the hands of citizens in this region. For that reason, I believe that regional governments from now on will have to take a pro-active approach in conducting their public diplomacy campaigns and efforts. Learning from the business world, they have to be PREPARED before crises happen and have their plans in place. One good example of indirect and productive public diplomacy efforts in this region is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s (KSA) prestigious project, the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology(KAUST). KAUST is meant to be a leading research university and has been received very well in the foreign media, bringing very good publicity to the country in the international press. The promising project of the Saudi King has been a significant source of controversy in the Saudi media since its inauguration on the Saudi National Day on September 23, just a few weeks ago. Many of the Arab leaders were present at the inauguration ceremony, to mark the significance of the project to the Arab world at large including the Syrian and Yemeni presidents and the Lebanese prime minister, Senyourah, among others. The King presented this university as the realization of a 25 year-long dream, allocating about 12 billion US $ to its endowment. Much of the domestic criticism of this project has related to the way in which social life on campus is planned. Unlike all other educational institutes in Saudi Arabia, new rules have been applied to this university. The university is not administered by the Ministry of Education and is dealt with as an independent entity in order to circumvent the ministry’s rules. KAUST has a non segregated campus in which men and women freely move around, use and interact in the same spaces, classrooms and offices. Moreover, on campus women are allowed to drive, a privilege they are not allowed elsewhere. Following the inauguration of KAUST, Sheikh al-Shatri, a member of the KSA’s higher religious council, issued a fatwa (an advisory opinion) stating that the lack of segregation in KAUST is haram -- forbidden in Islam. The sheikh, according to many, was asked by the King to resign and he was out of office very soon after announcing his fatwa on Al- Majd TV. Many considered the KAUST story as part of the ongoing conflict between the kingdom’s conservatives and liberals. Both the supporters of King Abdullah over KAUST (or, the liberals) and the conservative opponents have been using social media to bring about more support for their stance on this issue. Many groups were created on Facebook in support of Sheikh Shatri, and according to The National, many of the videos featuring him reciting Quranic verses and giving religious talks were downloaded on YouTube after his resignation. The campaign in support of KAUST is very active online too, as many of the students have created their own pages and groups. The university itself has clearly incorporated a social media policy;if you visit the university’s multimedia homepage, it will take you to its pages on Flickr, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, in addition to embedded mini-videos of several university professors and employees praising the University. KAUST has a channel of its own on YouTube displaying videos of conferences, symposiums and campus life and community. The strategic goal of this use of social media is to appeal to an international audience. By depicting a new image compatible with the appreciation of scientific research and scholarship, it can move away from the international context within which the country has been viewed in the post 9/11 period and its identification with conflict and terrorism. KAUST and Social Networking: the New Face of Saudi Arabia Abeer_Al_Najjar, Middle East
One good example of indirect and productive public diplomacy efforts in this region is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s (KSA) prestigious project, the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology(KAUST). KAUST is meant to be a leading research university and has been received very well in the foreign media, bringing very good publicity to the country in the international press. The promising project of the Saudi King has been a significant source of controversy in the Saudi media since its inauguration on the Saudi National Day on September 23, just a few weeks ago. Many of the Arab leaders were present at the inauguration ceremony, to mark the significance of the project to the Arab world at large including the Syrian and Yemeni presidents and the Lebanese prime minister, Senyourah, among others. The King presented this university as the realization of a 25 year-long dream, allocating about 12 billion US $ to its endowment.

Much of the domestic criticism of this project has related to the way in which social life on campus is planned. Unlike all other educational institutes in Saudi Arabia, new rules have been applied to this university. The university is not administered by the Ministry of Education and is dealt with as an independent entity in order to circumvent the ministry’s rules. KAUST has a non segregated campus in which men and women freely move around, use and interact in the same spaces, classrooms and offices. Moreover, on campus women are allowed to drive, a privilege they are not allowed elsewhere. Following the inauguration of KAUST, Sheikh al-Shatri, a member of the KSA’s higher religious council, issued a fatwa (an advisory opinion) stating that the lack of segregation in KAUST is haram -- forbidden in Islam. The sheikh, according to many, was asked by the King to resign and he was out of office very soon after announcing his fatwa on Al- Majd TV. Many considered the KAUST story as part of the ongoing conflict between the kingdom’s conservatives and liberals. Both the supporters of King Abdullah over KAUST (or, the liberals) and the conservative opponents have been using social media to bring about more support for their stance on this issue. Many groups were created on Facebook in support of Sheikh Shatri, and according to The National, many of the videos featuring him reciting Quranic verses and giving religious talks were downloaded on YouTube after his resignation.

The campaign in support of KAUST is very active online too, as many of the students have created their own pages and groups. The university itself has clearly incorporated a social media policy;if you visit the university’s multimedia homepage, it will take you to its pages on Flickr, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, in addition to embedded mini-videos of several university professors and employees praising the University. KAUST has a channel of its own on YouTube displaying videos of conferences, symposiums and campus life and community. The strategic goal of this use of social media is to appeal to an international audience. By depicting a new image compatible with the appreciation of scientific research and scholarship, it can move away from the international context within which the country has been viewed in the post 9/11 period and its identification with conflict and terrorism.
]]> 2009-11-02T19:03:00-08:00 This post was originally presented as a speech to the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei, Taiwan, on October 29, 2009, and is reproduced here with the permission of the author. For those interested in the evolution of the practice and the profession of public diplomacy, we have arrived at an interesting moment in its history, a moment of innovation and adaptation. I wish to point to two trends in this global evolution, and then underscore several challenges they pose to the future of the field. One trend occurs at the global level, where several universal conditions are worth noting. The second trend is unfolding within the United States with the advent of the administration of President Barack Obama, which manifests some of the global trends but also presents unique elements worth noting.* Global Trends in Public Diplomacy The three trends I identify below are of relatively recent occurrence, and have not always been a part of the long history of the field. First, prime ministers, presidents and other high level government leaders across a wide variety of states increasingly have come to recognize that public diplomacy (PD) is a useful element of statecraft, along with traditional elements like war fighting, standard diplomacy or the exercise of economic leverage. No longer restricted to states like France or the Nordic nations in the global North, senior government officials around the world believe that they can advance their national interests through the judicious use of PD. Second, over the past several years many governments’ leaders have actually acted on this recognition by allocating money and manpower to design, organize and implement PD. They have created new directorates within their ministries of foreign affairs as well as entirely new free standing agencies, staffing them with senior officials and allocating government funds to support them. For example, in June I met with a senior government official in India whose public diplomacy department has a fascinating portfolio that includes informing domestic audiences of the importance of India’s international PD, reaching out to its increasingly powerful diaspora, and using its popular film culture to leverage national interests. Similar departments have been created in Canada, Germany and other nations. The MPD program at USC Annenberg is attracting a growing number of students from around the world, including mid-career professionals, who come seeking the most relevant individual skills and the ‘best practices’ for their organizations back home. Canada and Germany have created and funded separate units for PD, as have Mexico and Brazil. The People’s Republic of China is also beefing up the organizational and budgetary capacities of its PD agencies. USC Annenberg has been invited by several states in the Gulf to offer customized courses on strategic communications and public diplomacy. Third, a wide variety of non-governmental interest groups are learning the language of “public diplomacy”. Business associations, civic groups and human rights movements are increasingly incorporating PD language and tactics into their relations with like-minded groups around the world (this is also true for public units below the national levels, as cities and states vie for greater visibility and appeal in a globalizing world.) Non-governmental groups are also using the language of PD to try to influence their own governments to pursue policies in the international arena that support their own values and views of what is important. PD Trends in the Obama Administration Some of these same trends are visible in Washington, but to varying degrees and influenced by other trends that are unique to a superpower and unique to American culture. For example, one can see the global trend toward more dialogue with civil society groups in Obama’s greater reliance on two-way conversation with non-governmental organizations (and with governments) than in the preceding administration of George W. Bush. President Obama’s speech to the Muslim world delivered in Cairo is one example. This administration’s visible movement toward greater diplomacy, whether public or private, is running into the imperatives and expectations of a dominant super power which possesses unparalleled military and intelligence assets. From the Middle East to Europe, from trade to terrorism, the still-young administration is trying to calibrate its use of military power and diplomacy, its balance of hard power and soft. The current Secretary of State and her immediate team are on record in favor of reaching beyond traditional government parameters to engage women’s organizations and local self-help bodies, and her senior policy advisor in the Policy Planning office (Anne-Marie Slaughter) has written persuasively in Foreign Affairs and other outlets about the need to engage all segments of society in a ‘global network’ of mutually beneficial ties in order to modernize foreign policy – not just governments, but companies, NGOs and knowledge centers. But for some problems like terrorism, and some nations like Afghanistan and Pakistan, PD’s appeal and utility is limited. But most importantly, and most obviously, America’s reliance on more public diplomacy has an obvious asset in the person of President Obama. As the first American president with the heritage of rising from a despised minority, he has judiciously but consistently called on his minority status – and his experience living abroad in a Muslim society – as an important basis for his global appeal to people in other socially-difficult conditions around the world, going over the heads of their governments to claim unique understanding and sympathy for the excluded and the impoverished. Translating this personal charisma into sustainable policies and organizational reforms will be more challenging, which leads me to the final section on the remaining challenges confronting all those who are interested in institutionalizing and expanding the reach and impact of public diplomacy. Remaining Global Challenges in the Design and Conduct of Public Diplomacy Despite the impressive spread of public diplomacy as an important instrument to achieve one’s international purposes, critical challenges remain. Let me identify challenges which are internal to PD, external, technological and political. Internal challenges. Within the domain of public diplomacy, how should governments (and significant NGOs) combine the multiple constituent elements of PD into one organic whole so they are mutually reinforcing and not pulling in different directions toward chaos and failure? (cf Nicholas J. Cull on this issue) PD consists of the pursuit of quite distinct purposes that employ quite different instruments. International broadcasting, citizen exchanges, cultural diplomacy and policy promotion are used to achieve different goals, and governments confuse them at the risk of weakening the impact of all. The daily briefing from the president’s office, and the attendant ‘strategic communication’ message imposed across all government agencies should not try to achieve purposes of exchanges which take a generation to bear fruit. External challenges. How should government leaders find the correct balance between its soft power instruments of conversation and persuasion on the one hand, and the hard power instruments of armies and coercion on the other? All governments by definition have armies and police forces, and they sometimes use threats and coercion to achieve their international purposes. What individuals in a country, and what institutions, have the breadth of understanding necessary to design ‘smart power’ through the integration of the ingredients of ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’? Public diplomacy and soft power are not ends in themselves; they should be seen as ingredients of 'smart power.' Technological challenges. What is one to make of the new communications and information technologies like the Internet and its equally-radical modern updates, known as social media? NGOs from health organizations to terrorist cells are better at deploying these assets than governments, and these technological changes have proved profoundly disruptive to government’s plans to conduct ‘public diplomacy’. The tension between access and control has proved unsettling, and will remain so for some time. Political challenges – who really cares about public diplomacy? In a world where other instruments of state power have influential lobbies, who stands up for PD? International trade has its powerful trade associations and lobbyists. The military establishment is powerful everywhere, whether current and retired generals or arms makers and sellers. Will domestic coalitions emerge that learn to press government consistently and insistently to do more PD? And how will governments respond – by heeding calls for more PD from civil society groups, or will they try to co-opt or crush them? Do NGOs run the risk of becoming mere tools of state power? Will government PD agencies become the captive of the loudest PD advocate? These challenges are not open to easy or immediate resolution. But for those who care about the long term health of global international affairs, they do constitute the next steps in enhancing the design and implementation of global and national public diplomacy. Meeting these four challenges requires hard work, immediately, to start reforming the institutions and training the PD experts of tomorrow. Creating the public diplomacy field of the future is an important task for all of us. *These observations flow from my work as a member of the team at the Center on Public Diplomacy and a lecturer in the Master of Public Diplomacy degree program at the University of Southern California, and recent conversations in India, China, Taiwan. I also served on the Presidential Transition Team of President Obama, with responsibilities in the area of public diplomacy. Innovations in Global Public Diplomacy: The Implications for Foreign Policy and National Security Ernest_J_Wilson_III, Americas, Asia Pacific This post was originally presented as a speech to the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei, Taiwan, on October 29, 2009, and is reproduced here with the permission of the author.

For those interested in the evolution of the practice and the profession of public diplomacy, we have arrived at an interesting moment in its history, a moment of innovation and adaptation. I wish to point to two trends in this global evolution, and then underscore several challenges they pose to the future of the field. One trend occurs at the global level, where several universal conditions are worth noting. The second trend is unfolding within the United States with the advent of the administration of President Barack Obama, which manifests some of the global trends but also presents unique elements worth noting.*

Global Trends in Public Diplomacy

The three trends I identify below are of relatively recent occurrence, and have not always been a part of the long history of the field. First, prime ministers, presidents and other high level government leaders across a wide variety of states increasingly have come to recognize that public diplomacy (PD) is a useful element of statecraft, along with traditional elements like war fighting, standard diplomacy or the exercise of economic leverage. No longer restricted to states like France or the Nordic nations in the global North, senior government officials around the world believe that they can advance their national interests through the judicious use of PD.

Second, over the past several years many governments’ leaders have actually acted on this recognition by allocating money and manpower to design, organize and implement PD. They have created new directorates within their ministries of foreign affairs as well as entirely new free standing agencies, staffing them with senior officials and allocating government funds to support them.

For example, in June I met with a senior government official in India whose public diplomacy department has a fascinating portfolio that includes informing domestic audiences of the importance of India’s international PD, reaching out to its increasingly powerful diaspora, and using its popular film culture to leverage national interests. Similar departments have been created in Canada, Germany and other nations. The MPD program at USC Annenberg is attracting a growing number of students from around the world, including mid-career professionals, who come seeking the most relevant individual skills and the ‘best practices’ for their organizations back home. Canada and Germany have created and funded separate units for PD, as have Mexico and Brazil. The People’s Republic of China is also beefing up the organizational and budgetary capacities of its PD agencies. USC Annenberg has been invited by several states in the Gulf to offer customized courses on strategic communications and public diplomacy.

Third, a wide variety of non-governmental interest groups are learning the language of “public diplomacy”. Business associations, civic groups and human rights movements are increasingly incorporating PD language and tactics into their relations with like-minded groups around the world (this is also true for public units below the national levels, as cities and states vie for greater visibility and appeal in a globalizing world.) Non-governmental groups are also using the language of PD to try to influence their own governments to pursue policies in the international arena that support their own values and views of what is important.

PD Trends in the Obama Administration

Some of these same trends are visible in Washington, but to varying degrees and influenced by other trends that are unique to a superpower and unique to American culture. For example, one can see the global trend toward more dialogue with civil society groups in Obama’s greater reliance on two-way conversation with non-governmental organizations (and with governments) than in the preceding administration of George W. Bush. President Obama’s speech to the Muslim world delivered in Cairo is one example.

This administration’s visible movement toward greater diplomacy, whether public or private, is running into the imperatives and expectations of a dominant super power which possesses unparalleled military and intelligence assets. From the Middle East to Europe, from trade to terrorism, the still-young administration is trying to calibrate its use of military power and diplomacy, its balance of hard power and soft. The current Secretary of State and her immediate team are on record in favor of reaching beyond traditional government parameters to engage women’s organizations and local self-help bodies, and her senior policy advisor in the Policy Planning office (Anne-Marie Slaughter) has written persuasively in Foreign Affairs and other outlets about the need to engage all segments of society in a ‘global network’ of mutually beneficial ties in order to modernize foreign policy – not just governments, but companies, NGOs and knowledge centers. But for some problems like terrorism, and some nations like Afghanistan and Pakistan, PD’s appeal and utility is limited.

But most importantly, and most obviously, America’s reliance on more public diplomacy has an obvious asset in the person of President Obama. As the first American president with the heritage of rising from a despised minority, he has judiciously but consistently called on his minority status – and his experience living abroad in a Muslim society – as an important basis for his global appeal to people in other socially-difficult conditions around the world, going over the heads of their governments to claim unique understanding and sympathy for the excluded and the impoverished. Translating this personal charisma into sustainable policies and organizational reforms will be more challenging, which leads me to the final section on the remaining challenges confronting all those who are interested in institutionalizing and expanding the reach and impact of public diplomacy.

Remaining Global Challenges in the Design and Conduct of Public Diplomacy

Despite the impressive spread of public diplomacy as an important instrument to achieve one’s international purposes, critical challenges remain. Let me identify challenges which are internal to PD, external, technological and political.


Internal challenges. Within the domain of public diplomacy, how should governments (and significant NGOs) combine the multiple constituent elements of PD into one organic whole so they are mutually reinforcing and not pulling in different directions toward chaos and failure? (cf Nicholas J. Cull on this issue) PD consists of the pursuit of quite distinct purposes that employ quite different instruments. International broadcasting, citizen exchanges, cultural diplomacy and policy promotion are used to achieve different goals, and governments confuse them at the risk of weakening the impact of all. The daily briefing from the president’s office, and the attendant ‘strategic communication’ message imposed across all government agencies should not try to achieve purposes of exchanges which take a generation to bear fruit.

External challenges. How should government leaders find the correct balance between its soft power instruments of conversation and persuasion on the one hand, and the hard power instruments of armies and coercion on the other? All governments by definition have armies and police forces, and they sometimes use threats and coercion to achieve their international purposes. What individuals in a country, and what institutions, have the breadth of understanding necessary to design ‘smart power’ through the integration of the ingredients of ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’? Public diplomacy and soft power are not ends in themselves; they should be seen as ingredients of 'smart power.'

Technological challenges. What is one to make of the new communications and information technologies like the Internet and its equally-radical modern updates, known as social media? NGOs from health organizations to terrorist cells are better at deploying these assets than governments, and these technological changes have proved profoundly disruptive to government’s plans to conduct ‘public diplomacy’. The tension between access and control has proved unsettling, and will remain so for some time.

Political challenges – who really cares about public diplomacy? In a world where other instruments of state power have influential lobbies, who stands up for PD? International trade has its powerful trade associations and lobbyists. The military establishment is powerful everywhere, whether current and retired generals or arms makers and sellers. Will domestic coalitions emerge that learn to press government consistently and insistently to do more PD? And how will governments respond – by heeding calls for more PD from civil society groups, or will they try to co-opt or crush them? Do NGOs run the risk of becoming mere tools of state power? Will government PD agencies become the captive of the loudest PD advocate?

These challenges are not open to easy or immediate resolution. But for those who care about the long term health of global international affairs, they do constitute the next steps in enhancing the design and implementation of global and national public diplomacy. Meeting these four challenges requires hard work, immediately, to start reforming the institutions and training the PD experts of tomorrow. Creating the public diplomacy field of the future is an important task for all of us.


*These observations flow from my work as a member of the team at the Center on Public Diplomacy and a lecturer in the Master of Public Diplomacy degree program at the University of Southern California, and recent conversations in India, China, Taiwan. I also served on the Presidential Transition Team of President Obama, with responsibilities in the area of public diplomacy.

]]> 2009-10-30T18:45:00-08:00 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is spending a few days in Pakistan, ostensibly to build up trust. It should be of great concern to the Obama administration, however, that one prominent Pakistani greeted her with a Daily Beast column headlined, “Hillary, Go Home.” That column was penned by Fatima Bhutto, the young and progressive journalist and poet who just happens to be the niece of the late Benazir Bhutto. Fatima’s concerns include this: Clinton, who has fondly reminisced about her decades-long friendship with President Zardari, dating back to the time when they were both first spouses, promised when she landed in Islamabad today to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with Pakistan in its fight against terrorism. Hillary, I think we’re standing close enough as it is. This government, feted by Clinton as a much ballyhooed ally, doesn’t have a very solid handle on what’s what. President Zardari’s party, the PPP, is run more like a corporation, negotiating billion-dollar aid packages for Pakistan from anyone who’s willing to foot the bill. Bear in mind that Fatima has been a vocal critic of her own dynastic family. She and many Pakistanis believe that Zardari and Benazir may have shared responsibility for the politically motivated murder of her father. Even while a resurgent Benazir was the toast of Westerners who hoped for renewed democracy in Pakistan, Fatima spoke out bitingly in a Los Angeles Times op-ed about her aunt’s alleged corruption, hypocrisy and unfitness to govern. So it is no surprise that she would view almost anything that Benazir’s widower Zardari does as opportunism. Then again, I believe any reasonable person would agree with her. That leads to another complaint from her this week, which should be even more concerning for Washington: Pakistan’s sovereignty was signed over to Hillary and Barack some time ago. With a government willing to use U.S. drone technology against its own people, bomb various parts of its country when directed to, and allow a revolving-door policy for American officials, it’s no wonder Washington is hell bent on supporting the disastrous Zardari government. Many Pakistani nationalists and traditionalists, prone to conspiracy theories, believe that Washington is taking over Pakistan, as I wrote in a previous post. But Fatima represents a supple, modernized and fully progressive Pakistani spirit. If Secretary Clinton is to have any meaningful effect on American diplomacy and public diplomacy in the region, she will need to begin by winning over the hearts and minds of people like her. Allow me to make one final observation on the occasion of Hillary’s visit. I’d been a staunch critic of President Bush’s policies in his war on terror and had been given new hope by Obama’s demonstrated willingness to understand and address root causes of anger. Bush’s aggressiveness seemed to unleash a Hydra effect, occupying a nation to kill five terrorists while inciting ten others to join the cause against the occupation. Obama seems to be operating the same way—openly in Afghanistan and by military proxy in Pakistan. As both military strategy and public diplomacy, his approach has been unfruitful so far. That’s Not A Red Carpet in Pakistan - That’s A Blood-Stain Rob_Asghar, South Asia spending a few days in Pakistan, ostensibly to build up trust. It should be of great concern to the Obama administration, however, that one prominent Pakistani greeted her with a Daily Beast column headlined, “Hillary, Go Home.” That column was penned by Fatima Bhutto, the young and progressive journalist and poet who just happens to be the niece of the late Benazir Bhutto. Fatima’s concerns include this:


Clinton, who has fondly reminisced about her decades-long friendship with President Zardari, dating back to the time when they were both first spouses, promised when she landed in Islamabad today to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with Pakistan in its fight against terrorism.

Hillary, I think we’re standing close enough as it is. This government, feted by Clinton as a much ballyhooed ally, doesn’t have a very solid handle on what’s what. President Zardari’s party, the PPP, is run more like a corporation, negotiating billion-dollar aid packages for Pakistan from anyone who’s willing to foot the bill.

Bear in mind that Fatima has been a vocal critic of her own dynastic family. She and many Pakistanis believe that Zardari and Benazir may have shared responsibility for the politically motivated murder of her father. Even while a resurgent Benazir was the toast of Westerners who hoped for renewed democracy in Pakistan, Fatima spoke out bitingly in a Los Angeles Times op-ed about her aunt’s alleged corruption, hypocrisy and unfitness to govern.

So it is no surprise that she would view almost anything that Benazir’s widower Zardari does as opportunism. Then again, I believe any reasonable person would agree with her. That leads to another complaint from her this week, which should be even more concerning for Washington:


Pakistan’s sovereignty was signed over to Hillary and Barack some time ago. With a government willing to use U.S. drone technology against its own people, bomb various parts of its country when directed to, and allow a revolving-door policy for American officials, it’s no wonder Washington is hell bent on supporting the disastrous Zardari government.

Many Pakistani nationalists and traditionalists, prone to conspiracy theories, believe that Washington is taking over Pakistan, as I wrote in a previous post. But Fatima represents a supple, modernized and fully progressive Pakistani spirit. If Secretary Clinton is to have any meaningful effect on American diplomacy and public diplomacy in the region, she will need to begin by winning over the hearts and minds of people like her.

Allow me to make one final observation on the occasion of Hillary’s visit. I’d been a staunch critic of President Bush’s policies in his war on terror and had been given new hope by Obama’s demonstrated willingness to understand and address root causes of anger. Bush’s aggressiveness seemed to unleash a Hydra effect, occupying a nation to kill five terrorists while inciting ten others to join the cause against the occupation. Obama seems to be operating the same way—openly in Afghanistan and by military proxy in Pakistan.

As both military strategy and public diplomacy, his approach has been unfruitful so far.


]]> 2009-10-30T18:20:00-08:00 Undersecretary of State Judith McHale's October 15 speech to the 2009 global Public Affairs Officers conference provides some useful insights into PAOs' concerns and Secretary McHale's thinking. McHale remains optimistic, citing what she perceives as "a genuine wish to see a revival of American leadership…grounded in partnership and respect." That is probably true, at least among people around the world who recognize that a leadership vacuum will likely be filled by chaos, and with the United States taking the lead at least they will be able to deal with "the devil we know." Based on McHale's comments, the PAOs had apparently informed her that if they are to be successful they must emerge from within the fortresses in which they work and engage more frequently and directly with foreign publics. McHale indicated that proposals for American Centers are gaining traction. Related to this was the PAOs' recommendation that offering English language instruction is a sure way to connect with people throughout the world. McHale also noted with approval the PAOs' endorsement of using American science and technology to reach even those people who dislike many aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Whether this apparent meeting of the minds translates into substantive policy remains to be seen, but at least McHale seems to appreciate the value of listening to the women and men who are actually doing diplomacy. Judith McHale and the PAOs Philip_Seib, Americas October 15 speech to the 2009 global Public Affairs Officers conference provides some useful insights into PAOs' concerns and Secretary McHale's thinking.

McHale remains optimistic, citing what she perceives as "a genuine wish to see a revival of American leadership…grounded in partnership and respect." That is probably true, at least among people around the world who recognize that a leadership vacuum will likely be filled by chaos, and with the United States taking the lead at least they will be able to deal with "the devil we know."

Based on McHale's comments, the PAOs had apparently informed her that if they are to be successful they must emerge from within the fortresses in which they work and engage more frequently and directly with foreign publics. McHale indicated that proposals for American Centers are gaining traction. Related to this was the PAOs' recommendation that offering English language instruction is a sure way to connect with people throughout the world. McHale also noted with approval the PAOs' endorsement of using American science and technology to reach even those people who dislike many aspect of U.S. foreign policy.

Whether this apparent meeting of the minds translates into substantive policy remains to be seen, but at least McHale seems to appreciate the value of listening to the women and men who are actually doing diplomacy.
]]> 2009-10-28T18:20:00-08:00 The U.S. and Europe both value multilateral action, “contrary to public perceptions,” but American and European governments have different motivations and goals. That was the message from Liechtenstein’s Ambassador to the United States, Claudia Fritsche, who delivered an address on truth and transparency at USC on Tuesday. Much of Ambassador Fritsche’s address focused on the role of her country and its prominent financial sector in the global economy and in diplomacy. But her analysis of multilateralism and its differing practices on the different shores of the Atlantic was intriguing: “Some foreign policy experts have argued in the past that there is a transatlantic divide over the utility of international organizations – and diplomacy more generally,” she noted. But then she argued that this was not entirely correct: “Contrary to public perceptions, however, this divide is not because the United States has acted on occasions in a unilateral way and Europeans prefer more the multilateral approach,” she said. “The actual difference is more about the process than the outcome. For Americans, multilateralism is often a means to an end; for Europeans, multilateralism is an end in itself.” Ambassador Fritsche traced this to Europe’s history – perhaps especially acute from the perspective of a country she described as “small -- the size of Washington DC -- as well in size as in population -- 36,000.” And she predicted that the U.S. and Europe are on a path to increasingly shared approaches to multilateralism: “I doubt however that this divergence over multilateralism will continue to persist,” she said. “The long-term distribution of power, the medium-term distribution of threats and the shared sense of social purpose will make us all realize that cooperation on all levels will be the most beneficial approach.” U.S., Europe Both Value Multilateral Action, but With Different Motivations and for Different Goals Adam_Clayton_Powell_III, Eurasia
That was the message from Liechtenstein’s Ambassador to the United States, Claudia Fritsche, who delivered an address on truth and transparency at USC on Tuesday.

Much of Ambassador Fritsche’s address focused on the role of her country and its prominent financial sector in the global economy and in diplomacy. But her analysis of multilateralism and its differing practices on the different shores of the Atlantic was intriguing:

“Some foreign policy experts have argued in the past that there is a transatlantic divide over the utility of international organizations – and diplomacy more generally,” she noted. But then she argued that this was not entirely correct:

“Contrary to public perceptions, however, this divide is not because the United States has acted on occasions in a unilateral way and Europeans prefer more the multilateral approach,” she said. “The actual difference is more about the process than the outcome. For Americans, multilateralism is often a means to an end; for Europeans, multilateralism is an end in itself.”

Ambassador Fritsche traced this to Europe’s history – perhaps especially acute from the perspective of a country she described as “small -- the size of Washington DC -- as well in size as in population -- 36,000.” And she predicted that the U.S. and Europe are on a path to increasingly shared approaches to multilateralism:

“I doubt however that this divergence over multilateralism will continue to persist,” she said. “The long-term distribution of power, the medium-term distribution of threats and the shared sense of social purpose will make us all realize that cooperation on all levels will be the most beneficial approach.”
]]> 2009-10-26T16:51:00-08:00 It was a strange feeling to wake this morning to news of President Obama's Nobel Prize on the radio. For an instant I really thought I might still be dreaming. My first reaction to the news was that it is extremely premature, as if they had given him the Nobel Prize for Literature for Dreams of My Father. On reflection I think it is a powerful illustration of the hope embodied by President Obama, especially in contrast to the despair which we Europeans felt when we looked at the Bush administration with its wars and taste for unilateral foreign policy. It is also a reminder to the world just how remarkable it is to see a major nation choose a president from a once ostracized and still disadvantaged minority. In a world where so much conflict comes from racial divides, Obama is a great symbol of peace. But while this -- like the recent rise of the US to the top of the Anholt nation brand index -- is a great shot in the arm for US public diplomacy, it has its limits. It is wonderful to know that Europe loves Obama and identifies him with peace; but the reality is that he is still running two wars, and some of his choices reflect continuity with Bush policy. I wonder what the reaction to this news will be in Pakistan, where well over a thousand civilians have been killed in drone attacks? Much as I admire the president, the trick for American diplomacy is now to fulfill the promise of its leader and deliver policies to match the promise. Obama’s Nobel Prize Nicholas_J_Cull, Americas It was a strange feeling to wake this morning to news of President Obama's Nobel Prize on the radio. For an instant I really thought I might still be dreaming. My first reaction to the news was that it is extremely premature, as if they had given him the Nobel Prize for Literature for Dreams of My Father. On reflection I think it is a powerful illustration of the hope embodied by President Obama, especially in contrast to the despair which we Europeans felt when we looked at the Bush administration with its wars and taste for unilateral foreign policy. It is also a reminder to the world just how remarkable it is to see a major nation choose a president from a once ostracized and still disadvantaged minority. In a world where so much conflict comes from racial divides, Obama is a great symbol of peace. But while this -- like the recent rise of the US to the top of the Anholt nation brand index -- is a great shot in the arm for US public diplomacy, it has its limits. It is wonderful to know that Europe loves Obama and identifies him with peace; but the reality is that he is still running two wars, and some of his choices reflect continuity with Bush policy. I wonder what the reaction to this news will be in Pakistan, where well over a thousand civilians have been killed in drone attacks?

Much as I admire the president, the trick for American diplomacy is now to fulfill the promise of its leader and deliver policies to match the promise.
]]> 2009-10-09T16:52:00-08:00 Throughout the week Washington and the media have been buzzing about the relationship between President Obama and General McChrystal. McChrystal, who is leading the United States and United Nation efforts in Afghanistan, recently proposed a shift in strategy that involves more engagement within the region along with more U.S. troops to fulfill this mission. According to the New York Times, “The strategy General McChrystal has promoted is based on the one unveiled by Mr. Obama in March, concentrating on protecting the Afghan population, training Afghan security forces and building economic opportunity and better governance”. Without visiting or personally knowing the countries of Afghanistan or Pakistan, it is difficult to assess what smart strategy should be. However, it is impossible to see how the military will succeed in this strategy without fundamentally changing the way the United States is viewed in these areas and in effect, engaging in public diplomacy. Over the summer I have been especially struck by a handful of reports documenting the Taliban in the Pashtun region from GlobalPost Executive Editor Charles Sennott who has been reporting on the Afghanistan and Pakistan region since 1995. Sennott has recently put together a special report on the Taliban. In an NPR Fresh Air report he explains that one of the problems the U.S. military is having while trying to establish relationships of trust with local Afghan leaders is the U.S. staying power. Referencing an earlier interview with a former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, Owen Sears, Sennott explains that the Taliban understand if they can convince the local village leaders they will outlast the US military and are therefore the better side with which to align, they will maintain their stronghold. Sennott explains they are “making the message more convincing through a climate of fear, through burning girl’s schools, through going after anyone who cooperates with the U.S. military or coalition.” So, how can the military make the argument that they deserve faith and trust, and that the United States will continue to support and defend those who help them, even when the military presence is gone? Furthermore is there a role for the common U.S. citizen to play in support of stabilizing the region and building relationships? Greg Mortenson, founder of the Central Asian Institute and co-author of Three Cups of Tea is an extreme, yet powerful example of the potential impact citizen involvement can make. His goal has been to “promote and support community-based education, especially for girls, in remote regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan.” He came to this goal after living in the region and determining that increasing the number of literate women in this region was one of the most influential ways to improve the standard of living. Recently, Hillary Clinton spoke on Oprah about supporting girls as a national security issue. She said, “Those who stand against us, stand against the rights of women, so we do have to integrate this into our national security… We have to invest in girls and women around the world.” Dialogue even among elites is changing to include the education and protection of women as one of the pressing issues in the 21st century. I specifically target girls as a way to connect cultures and positively influence stability in the region based on positive research from the Girl Effect that systematically makes the case why improving the lives of girls significantly improves society. According to a report the war torn areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan have some of the highest female illiteracy rates in the world. An astounding half of the girls do not have opportunities to attend school or become educated. Additionally, educating girls will have long-term effects as they mature to become mothers raising both boys and girls and pass the gift of education along with their new-found worldview along. Based on the idea that the United States values and supports educated women and that this value is shared by Muslims as stated in the Qur’an, while opposed by the Taliban, I conclude with three questions: 1) What is the U.S. strategy to continue to support the education of girls despite bullying from the Taliban? 2) Could this effort have a significant impact on stabilizing the region and diminishing extremist Taliban control? 3) And is there an opportunity for U.S. citizens to participate through donations and partnerships? Considering the “Girl Effect” in Strategic Military Operations Tori_Horton, South Asia New York Times, “The strategy General McChrystal has promoted is based on the one unveiled by Mr. Obama in March, concentrating on protecting the Afghan population, training Afghan security forces and building economic opportunity and better governance”. Without visiting or personally knowing the countries of Afghanistan or Pakistan, it is difficult to assess what smart strategy should be. However, it is impossible to see how the military will succeed in this strategy without fundamentally changing the way the United States is viewed in these areas and in effect, engaging in public diplomacy.

Over the summer I have been especially struck by a handful of reports documenting the Taliban in the Pashtun region from GlobalPost Executive Editor Charles Sennott who has been reporting on the Afghanistan and Pakistan region since 1995. Sennott has recently put together a special report on the Taliban.

In an NPR Fresh Air report he explains that one of the problems the U.S. military is having while trying to establish relationships of trust with local Afghan leaders is the U.S. staying power. Referencing an earlier interview with a former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, Owen Sears, Sennott explains that the Taliban understand if they can convince the local village leaders they will outlast the US military and are therefore the better side with which to align, they will maintain their stronghold. Sennott explains they are “making the message more convincing through a climate of fear, through burning girl’s schools, through going after anyone who cooperates with the U.S. military or coalition.”

So, how can the military make the argument that they deserve faith and trust, and that the United States will continue to support and defend those who help them, even when the military presence is gone? Furthermore is there a role for the common U.S. citizen to play in support of stabilizing the region and building relationships?

Greg Mortenson, founder of the Central Asian Institute and co-author of Three Cups of Tea is an extreme, yet powerful example of the potential impact citizen involvement can make. His goal has been to “promote and support community-based education, especially for girls, in remote regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan.” He came to this goal after living in the region and determining that increasing the number of literate women in this region was one of the most influential ways to improve the standard of living.

Recently, Hillary Clinton spoke on Oprah about supporting girls as a national security issue. She said, “Those who stand against us, stand against the rights of women, so we do have to integrate this into our national security… We have to invest in girls and women around the world.” Dialogue even among elites is changing to include the education and protection of women as one of the pressing issues in the 21st century.

I specifically target girls as a way to connect cultures and positively influence stability in the region based on positive research from the Girl Effect that systematically makes the case why improving the lives of girls significantly improves society. According to a report the war torn areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan have some of the highest female illiteracy rates in the world. An astounding half of the girls do not have opportunities to attend school or become educated. Additionally, educating girls will have long-term effects as they mature to become mothers raising both boys and girls and pass the gift of education along with their new-found worldview along.

Based on the idea that the United States values and supports educated women and that this value is shared by Muslims as stated in the Qur’an, while opposed by the Taliban, I conclude with three questions:

1) What is the U.S. strategy to continue to support the education of girls despite bullying from the Taliban?
2) Could this effort have a significant impact on stabilizing the region and diminishing extremist Taliban control?
3) And is there an opportunity for U.S. citizens to participate through donations and partnerships?
]]> 2009-10-09T16:28:00-08:00 If public diplomacy (PD) is understudied as a discipline, then even less is known about PD as practiced - or not - by less developed countries (LDCs) and their representatives abroad. In constructing the research base upon which the argumentation presented in Guerrilla Diplomacy rests, I noted that the literature is largely silent on the thinking of developing country foreign ministries, diplomats or academics about PD per se. There is little data on their PD objectives, resources and performance. Not enough is known about how - and if - the tools and techniques of public diplomacy are being used, or could be adapted to meet the strategic needs and capacities of LDCs, particularly as regards their activities in major metropolitan centers where effective practice could make a demonstrable difference. New knowledge about the diplomatic practices and priorities of resident envoys from developing areas would benefit not only LDC practitioners, but also the operations of foreign ministries in OECD countries and states everywhere. In our wired - and wireless - world, most if not all diplomacy eventually becomes public. And, in a world of insecurity, diplomacy, which is dedicated to the non-violent resolution of differences, does matter. It can play a critical role in the achievement of both development and security. But diplomacy is not only a neglected, almost obscure area within contemporary academic research; it has been relegated to the sidelines by many governments. Its practice has not adapted well to the challenge of globalization, or to the continuing militarization of international policy. A panoply of grave threats and challenges, many rooted in science and driven by technology, have been left to fester, or have been addressed by other means, mainly involving armed force. Assessing and bridging that diplomatic performance gap, and identifying ways to retool diplomats as globalization managers are becoming central preoccupations for all governments and their foreign ministries. As a serving diplomat and foreign service executive, I frequently noticed that the representatives of developing countries seemed in large part unaware of PD, and tended both to pursue, and to be more comfortable with the traditional, state-to-state model. A thumbnail survey of the dominant image and reputation, or nation brand of major LDCs in North America, provides at least notional evidence of chronic PD under-achievement. China, for example, has opened some 130 Confucius Institutes world-wide and is credited with putting on a dazzling display at the Beijing Olympics, yet their “charm offensives” in Asia, Latin America and Africa have raised hackles, and attempts by Chinese corporations to make acquisitions in the USA and Canada routinely raise suspicions and are sometimes blocked. India has just announced plans to open more cultural centers, and makes much of its credentials as the world’s largest democracy and a cost-competitive, English language back office and software incubator. But there was significant opposition in the USA to the normalization of nuclear relations, and caste and communal difficulties often figure prominently in media coverage. Indeed, China and India, which together represent almost half of the world’s population, are generally viewed uneasily, with human rights violations and military threat dimensions often surpassing any appreciation of burgeoning economic and political opportunities. Brazil is perceived as a country with enormous, but perpetually unattainable potential; Rio's successful Olympic bid notwithstanding, relative to its size and resources, Brazil's near-invisibility and apparent lack of influence on the world stage must be considered a weakness. Indonesia, a nascent democracy and the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, is also largely unknown - except for recurrent overtones of Islamic extremism and political violence. Egypt is widely perceived as troubled and unstable, a breeding ground and training academy for potential terrorists. Nigeria’s image has never recovered from the Biafran civil war and famine, the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, and various campaigns highlighting the eco-devastation wrought by big oil in the Niger delta. Turkey is viewed as a fair-weather NATO ally, clearly not up to the standards required for EU entry. Yes, these are caricatures, but they are certainly out there and in a world in which perception is reality, it would be unwise to ignore them. Other examples, at a higher level of analysis, abound. Considerable thought, for instance, has been devoted to analyzing how PD might better be harnessed in service of developed country objectives such as conflict resolution and the promotion of democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of law. Far less attention, however, has been devoted to the transformational dimension, that is, a consideration of how PD might be used to achieve not only particular national goals, but also to address some of the root causes of underdevelopment and insecurity. These include issues related to inequalities in the terms of trade and the distribution of wealth and resources, environmental degradation and the international education deficit. By tapping into the global political economy of knowledge, perhaps especially as regards the role of science and technology in development, the net result of this kind of improved diplomatic practice could be to increase the resilience and reduce the vulnerability of developing countries in face of both capacity constraints and the challenges imposed by globalization. All of this suggests that for developing countries, which must not only manage their own reputations but also engage with effect on big issues such as climate change, world order and the structure of international organizations, there is considerable PD work to be done. Clearly this is an area in need of much further research. In the meantime, however, I wonder if PD - and, for that matter, soft/smart power - is not by nature somewhat culturally or ethno-centric? PD, after all, has been defined, developed and practiced almost exclusively in, and by, individuals and institutions associated with advanced countries. I will return to these themes in future posts. Is Public Diplomacy for Everyone? Daryl_Copeland, Africa, Americas, Asia Pacific, South Asia, Middle East
In constructing the research base upon which the argumentation presented in Guerrilla Diplomacy rests, I noted that the literature is largely silent on the thinking of developing country foreign ministries, diplomats or academics about PD per se. There is little data on their PD objectives, resources and performance. Not enough is known about how - and if - the tools and techniques of public diplomacy are being used, or could be adapted to meet the strategic needs and capacities of LDCs, particularly as regards their activities in major metropolitan centers where effective practice could make a demonstrable difference.

New knowledge about the diplomatic practices and priorities of resident envoys from developing areas would benefit not only LDC practitioners, but also the operations of foreign ministries in OECD countries and states everywhere.

In our wired - and wireless - world, most if not all diplomacy eventually becomes public. And, in a world of insecurity, diplomacy, which is dedicated to the non-violent resolution of differences, does matter. It can play a critical role in the achievement of both development and security. But diplomacy is not only a neglected, almost obscure area within contemporary academic research; it has been relegated to the sidelines by many governments. Its practice has not adapted well to the challenge of globalization, or to the continuing militarization of international policy. A panoply of grave threats and challenges, many rooted in science and driven by technology, have been left to fester, or have been addressed by other means, mainly involving armed force.

Assessing and bridging that diplomatic performance gap, and identifying ways to retool diplomats as globalization managers are becoming central preoccupations for all governments and their foreign ministries.

As a serving diplomat and foreign service executive, I frequently noticed that the representatives of developing countries seemed in large part unaware of PD, and tended both to pursue, and to be more comfortable with the traditional, state-to-state model. A thumbnail survey of the dominant image and reputation, or nation brand of major LDCs in North America, provides at least notional evidence of chronic PD under-achievement. China, for example, has opened some 130 Confucius Institutes world-wide and is credited with putting on a dazzling display at the Beijing Olympics, yet their “charm offensives” in Asia, Latin America and Africa have raised hackles, and attempts by Chinese corporations to make acquisitions in the USA and Canada routinely raise suspicions and are sometimes blocked. India has just announced plans to open more cultural centers, and makes much of its credentials as the world’s largest democracy and a cost-competitive, English language back office and software incubator. But there was significant opposition in the USA to the normalization of nuclear relations, and caste and communal difficulties often figure prominently in media coverage. Indeed, China and India, which together represent almost half of the world’s population, are generally viewed uneasily, with human rights violations and military threat dimensions often surpassing any appreciation of burgeoning economic and political opportunities.

Brazil is perceived as a country with enormous, but perpetually unattainable potential; Rio's successful Olympic bid notwithstanding, relative to its size and resources, Brazil's near-invisibility and apparent lack of influence on the world stage must be considered a weakness. Indonesia, a nascent democracy and the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, is also largely unknown - except for recurrent overtones of Islamic extremism and political violence. Egypt is widely perceived as troubled and unstable, a breeding ground and training academy for potential terrorists. Nigeria’s image has never recovered from the Biafran civil war and famine, the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, and various campaigns highlighting the eco-devastation wrought by big oil in the Niger delta. Turkey is viewed as a fair-weather NATO ally, clearly not up to the standards required for EU entry.

Yes, these are caricatures, but they are certainly out there and in a world in which perception is reality, it would be unwise to ignore them.

Other examples, at a higher level of analysis, abound. Considerable thought, for instance, has been devoted to analyzing how PD might better be harnessed in service of developed country objectives such as conflict resolution and the promotion of democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of law. Far less attention, however, has been devoted to the transformational dimension, that is, a consideration of how PD might be used to achieve not only particular national goals, but also to address some of the root causes of underdevelopment and insecurity. These include issues related to inequalities in the terms of trade and the distribution of wealth and resources, environmental degradation and the international education deficit. By tapping into the global political economy of knowledge, perhaps especially as regards the role of science and technology in development, the net result of this kind of improved diplomatic practice could be to increase the resilience and reduce the vulnerability of developing countries in face of both capacity constraints and the challenges imposed by globalization.

All of this suggests that for developing countries, which must not only manage their own reputations but also engage with effect on big issues such as climate change, world order and the structure of international organizations, there is considerable PD work to be done.

Clearly this is an area in need of much further research. In the meantime, however, I wonder if PD - and, for that matter, soft/smart power - is not by nature somewhat culturally or ethno-centric? PD, after all, has been defined, developed and practiced almost exclusively in, and by, individuals and institutions associated with advanced countries.

I will return to these themes in future posts.
]]> 2009-10-07T17:35:00-08:00 Alex Rodriguez recently wrote an excellent page-one piece in the Los Angeles Times, examining broad distrust among Pakistanis regarding the United States’ plans to expand its well-fortified embassy in Islamabad. The Obama Administration coolly states that such an expansion—involving the acquisition of 18 acres nearby and a sharp increase in long-term embassy staffing—is necessary to administer a tripling of nonmilitary aid to Pakistan, to the tune of $1.5 billion annually. Those on the Pakistani street and in the halls of power aren’t buying it. "That just doesn't sound plausible," former army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg told the Times. "People can see the game that's being played." In my previous CPD piece, I discussed a certain theatrical aspect of discourse in Pakistan, which I called a “drama queen” tendency. (Yes, yes, that was rude - but I study public diplomacy, I don’t claim to practice it.) Fittingly, I received some loud rebuttals from fellow Pakistanis, one from a person who argued that the embassy expansion signaled America’s commitment to “invading and occupying” Pakistan. The Times article demonstrates that some top Obama Administration officials “get” many of the dynamics underlying Pakistani suspicion of the U.S. "One of the reasons that the Pakistanis have concerns about us is that we walked away from them twice," the article quoted Defense Secretary Robert Gates as saying. "I think it's going to take us some time to rebuild confidence with the Pakistani people that we are a long-term friend and ally of Pakistan." Yet delivering aid in this manner is in effect like telling an abuse victim that the abuser, in order to make amends, is moving next door. Granted, many Pakistanis are exaggerating America’s past missteps in Pakistan while ignoring America’s past generosity. Nevertheless, their actual perception is genuinely that of an abuse victim relative to America. Unless that perception is addressed more effectively, U.S. aid efforts will only blow up in our face. The U.S. should go so far as to reconsider its aid expansion within the current climate. The increase in economic aid is quite generous, especially in an economic downturn. But it is hardly enough to turn a beleaguered, ethnically divided, poverty-stricken and corruption-riddled nation of 175 million into live-and-let live Sweden. Such aid would only be effective if it can actually convince Pakistanis that the U.S. has changed its ways. As Rodriquez’s article shows, that’s not the case yet. This is a difficult matter for the administration to handle. A colleague in the State Department mentioned to me that a long line of Pakistani officials routinely come to the administration, imploring them to provide material support. Such Pakistani officials insist that additional investment will both build Pakistan’s infrastructure and prove to Pakistanis that the U.S. is a true friend. Not quite. I was surprised when USAID officials in Washington told me recently that they must conceal their worthiest projects from ordinary Pakistanis, lest our aid workers become targets. Given how the aid-related expansion of the American embassy is arousing the ire of not just extremists but everyday Pakistanis, we can see how complicated it is to help someone without triggering new problems. At a practical level, U.S. officials need to work with a cross-section of Pakistani political, civic and media leaders to address - if the aid is given - how to administer it in a way that doesn’t increase animosity. Is there some other way to administer the aid without an embassy expansion that makes many Pakistanis feel so “invaded”? Are key media figures there willing to spotlight American assistance in a way that makes such assistance worthwhile—or at least in a way that doesn’t make our assistance look like a conspiracy against them? Since two-thirds of Pakistanis see America as an “enemy,” might it be better for us to disappear from the public scene there altogether rather than continuing to aggravate Pakistanis even while spending lavishly on them? And among those who want America to get out, is there an element of bluffing going on? In other words, would they be even angrier if America engaged closely with Kabul and with Delhi while not engaging with Islamabad? Until those sorts of issues are addressed more meaningfully, the U.S. may as well hang on to its wallet. And given that my first post for CPD argued that the U.S. should consider dismantling its embassy there altogether, I certainly have my doubts about a physical expansion at this time. Should I Stay or Should I Go: Making Sense of an American “Invasion” Rob_Asghar, South Asia piece in the Los Angeles Times, examining broad distrust among Pakistanis regarding the United States’ plans to expand its well-fortified embassy in Islamabad.

The Obama Administration coolly states that such an expansion—involving the acquisition of 18 acres nearby and a sharp increase in long-term embassy staffing—is necessary to administer a tripling of nonmilitary aid to Pakistan, to the tune of $1.5 billion annually.

Those on the Pakistani street and in the halls of power aren’t buying it. "That just doesn't sound plausible," former army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg told the Times. "People can see the game that's being played."

In my previous CPD piece, I discussed a certain theatrical aspect of discourse in Pakistan, which I called a “drama queen” tendency. (Yes, yes, that was rude - but I study public diplomacy, I don’t claim to practice it.) Fittingly, I received some loud rebuttals from fellow Pakistanis, one from a person who argued that the embassy expansion signaled America’s commitment to “invading and occupying” Pakistan.

The Times article demonstrates that some top Obama Administration officials “get” many of the dynamics underlying Pakistani suspicion of the U.S. "One of the reasons that the Pakistanis have concerns about us is that we walked away from them twice," the article quoted Defense Secretary Robert Gates as saying. "I think it's going to take us some time to rebuild confidence with the Pakistani people that we are a long-term friend and ally of Pakistan."

Yet delivering aid in this manner is in effect like telling an abuse victim that the abuser, in order to make amends, is moving next door.

Granted, many Pakistanis are exaggerating America’s past missteps in Pakistan while ignoring America’s past generosity. Nevertheless, their actual perception is genuinely that of an abuse victim relative to America. Unless that perception is addressed more effectively, U.S. aid efforts will only blow up in our face.

The U.S. should go so far as to reconsider its aid expansion within the current climate. The increase in economic aid is quite generous, especially in an economic downturn. But it is hardly enough to turn a beleaguered, ethnically divided, poverty-stricken and corruption-riddled nation of 175 million into live-and-let live Sweden. Such aid would only be effective if it can actually convince Pakistanis that the U.S. has changed its ways. As Rodriquez’s article shows, that’s not the case yet.

This is a difficult matter for the administration to handle. A colleague in the State Department mentioned to me that a long line of Pakistani officials routinely come to the administration, imploring them to provide material support. Such Pakistani officials insist that additional investment will both build Pakistan’s infrastructure and prove to Pakistanis that the U.S. is a true friend.

Not quite. I was surprised when USAID officials in Washington told me recently that they must conceal their worthiest projects from ordinary Pakistanis, lest our aid workers become targets. Given how the aid-related expansion of the American embassy is arousing the ire of not just extremists but everyday Pakistanis, we can see how complicated it is to help someone without triggering new problems.

At a practical level, U.S. officials need to work with a cross-section of Pakistani political, civic and media leaders to address - if the aid is given - how to administer it in a way that doesn’t increase animosity.

Is there some other way to administer the aid without an embassy expansion that makes many Pakistanis feel so “invaded”? Are key media figures there willing to spotlight American assistance in a way that makes such assistance worthwhile—or at least in a way that doesn’t make our assistance look like a conspiracy against them?

Since two-thirds of Pakistanis see America as an “enemy,” might it be better for us to disappear from the public scene there altogether rather than continuing to aggravate Pakistanis even while spending lavishly on them?

And among those who want America to get out, is there an element of bluffing going on? In other words, would they be even angrier if America engaged closely with Kabul and with Delhi while not engaging with Islamabad?

Until those sorts of issues are addressed more meaningfully, the U.S. may as well hang on to its wallet. And given that my first post for CPD argued that the U.S. should consider dismantling its embassy there altogether, I certainly have my doubts about a physical expansion at this time.
]]> 2009-10-07T16:37:00-08:00