Public Diplomacy Blog http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_main A blog by public diplomacy professionals, theorists and practitioners, published by the USC Center on Public Diplomacy en USC Center on Public Diplomacy Copyright 2008 2008-10-01T21:51:01-08:00 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/http://uscpublicdiplomacy.orghttp://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/favicon.icoUSC Center on Public Diplomacy My brother and I, accompanied by his brother-in-law, were driving to the posh and overpriced Dynasty Chinese restaurant in Islamabad’s Marriott hotel recently. Yet the tightwad in me convinced them that we could enjoy ourselves just as much by going to one of the many cheaper Chinese local restaurants. Soon after we heard the Marriott explosion a few miles away, it became clear we had saved more than money. According to some reports, the 1,500 lbs. or more in explosives may have been retrieved from mines left behind by the Soviets when American-funded jihadists drove them from Afghanistan. If they came from such a source, it would represent a perfect -- and perfectly awful -- symmetry. Many ordinary Pakistanis and wealthy and intellectual elites alike believe that their nation’s cooperation with the United States in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan has left it bankrupt and bloodied. A new poll from the BBC shows that Pakistanis, among the citizenries of 23 Eastern and Western nations surveyed, give the highest rate of approval for Al Qaeda. And Pakistan is one of only two nations, alongside Egypt, to give a more positive than negative appraisal of Al Qaeda. Overrun by Afghan refugees, and squeezed between its mortal enemy India and a pro-Indian Afghan regime, Pakistan is never sure whether it should trust the West or trust the jihadists who are willing to hold its regional rivals at bay. Given Pakistanis’ tolerance for the West’s most famous current enemy, seven years into the war on terror, the West must make a choice – either to use more hard power in Pakistan, or to use more soft power. It’s similar to Machiavelli’s advice that threatening figures must either be crushed or cajoled. Either approach would be more effective than the current regimen of military aid accompanied by condescending lectures. At the public diplomacy level, it seems we are overdue to make an effort to understand (and then honestly address) its hopes and grievances for the first time. Two images or narratives define Pakistanis' relations with the West: First, hell hath no fury like a scorned ally. Pakistanis feel they gained nothing for aligning with America during the Cold War while India aligned with the Soviets. Today Washington seeks nuclear cooperation with India; yet Pakistanis remember the damaging sanctions that Washington imposed on Pakistan in recent years for merely seeking to match India's nuclear capacity. Being rejected as a lover is one thing; being jilted for your greatest rival is more than ordinary countries can take. Second, Pakistanis see the West as the plush, gated community adjacent to Pakistan’s barrio. Some dramatic break-ins from barrio residents compel the gated residents to demand that the barrio clean itself up immediately. The barrio residents wearily argue that they cannot fix matters so easily – and besides, they are more exposed, daily, to the threat of their own worst citizens than are their neighbors in the gated community. Pakistanis wince when told that their country has misspent a “whopping” $10 billion that the U.S. has given it since 9/11 to fight terror. Washington has paid KBR, the erstwhile Halliburton subsidiary, some $20 billion to support the war effort in Iraq, as part of the overall half-trillion dollar effort there. While Pakistan starves, its government and citizenry shrug off accusations that some American military aid was funneled into other areas. As one Pakistani telecommunications executive (who spent many years as an executive in California and Texas) observed, China is quite visible in that nation as a sponsor of dams and roads that benefit ordinary citizens; the U.S. and the larger West are not. When you punch the militants – even “half-heartedly” – they punch back wholeheartedly; the Marriott bombing, called by some “Pakistan's 9/11,” is evidence. Indeed, Pakistan’s military has already lost 1,000 lives fighting jihadists, in a campaign that has reportedly driven 300,000 angry tribal area residents off to Pakistani city centers, where they impose their anger upon fellow Pakistanis. Pakistanis also glower when told that their military is allowing jihadists to freely move across the Pak-Afghan border. When a powerful United States cannot police its own southern border, they ask, how can Pakistan be expected to police a far more anarchic area that lacks fencing or natural obstacles? If the border is so easy to manage, Pakistanis say that they are doing nothing to keep NATO forces from policing it from the other side. U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama infuriates many Pakistanis with his tougher-than-though threats to increase the U.S. raids which accidentally kill many civilians in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier and which outrage the greater populace. Yet at least he and running mate Joe Biden have acknowledged that more soft power is needed, including real economic aid. “Most Pakistanis wouldn't care if America went up in smoke,” declared one wealthy Pakistani with substantial business ties in England and the West. It reminds us that the anti-Western sentiment of Pakistan is both real and growing, which means that any further investment of Western time and money would be wasted under our current approach. Again, to be blunt, we may need to decide either to bomb them into dust… or to begin to listen to them and engage them at the level of their own urgent concerns. At present, we in the West are merely a half-baked mess, neither tough nor tender. Let us hope that we can begin to practice soft power and other forms of public diplomacy well enough that trust can be built to find an effective partnership to confront the angry tribesmen who now menace that nation and the world. Listening to Pakistan: The West’s Premier PD Challenge http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/PublicDiplomacyBlog/~3/311314430/ Rob_Asghar, South Asia
According to some reports, the 1,500 lbs. or more in explosives may have been retrieved from mines left behind by the Soviets when American-funded jihadists drove them from Afghanistan.

If they came from such a source, it would represent a perfect -- and perfectly awful -- symmetry. Many ordinary Pakistanis and wealthy and intellectual elites alike believe that their nation’s cooperation with the United States in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan has left it bankrupt and bloodied.

A new poll from the BBC shows that Pakistanis, among the citizenries of 23 Eastern and Western nations surveyed, give the highest rate of approval for Al Qaeda. And Pakistan is one of only two nations, alongside Egypt, to give a more positive than negative appraisal of Al Qaeda.

Overrun by Afghan refugees, and squeezed between its mortal enemy India and a pro-Indian Afghan regime, Pakistan is never sure whether it should trust the West or trust the jihadists who are willing to hold its regional rivals at bay.

Given Pakistanis’ tolerance for the West’s most famous current enemy, seven years into the war on terror, the West must make a choice – either to use more hard power in Pakistan, or to use more soft power. It’s similar to Machiavelli’s advice that threatening figures must either be crushed or cajoled. Either approach would be more effective than the current regimen of military aid accompanied by condescending lectures. At the public diplomacy level, it seems we are overdue to make an effort to understand (and then honestly address) its hopes and grievances for the first time.

Two images or narratives define Pakistanis' relations with the West:

First, hell hath no fury like a scorned ally. Pakistanis feel they gained nothing for aligning with America during the Cold War while India aligned with the Soviets. Today Washington seeks nuclear cooperation with India; yet Pakistanis remember the damaging sanctions that Washington imposed on Pakistan in recent years for merely seeking to match India's nuclear capacity. Being rejected as a lover is one thing; being jilted for your greatest rival is more than ordinary countries can take.

Second, Pakistanis see the West as the plush, gated community adjacent to Pakistan’s barrio. Some dramatic break-ins from barrio residents compel the gated residents to demand that the barrio clean itself up immediately. The barrio residents wearily argue that they cannot fix matters so easily – and besides, they are more exposed, daily, to the threat of their own worst citizens than are their neighbors in the gated community.

Pakistanis wince when told that their country has misspent a “whopping” $10 billion that the U.S. has given it since 9/11 to fight terror. Washington has paid KBR, the erstwhile Halliburton subsidiary, some $20 billion to support the war effort in Iraq, as part of the overall half-trillion dollar effort there. While Pakistan starves, its government and citizenry shrug off accusations that some American military aid was funneled into other areas. As one Pakistani telecommunications executive (who spent many years as an executive in California and Texas) observed, China is quite visible in that nation as a sponsor of dams and roads that benefit ordinary citizens; the U.S. and the larger West are not.

When you punch the militants – even “half-heartedly” – they punch back wholeheartedly; the Marriott bombing, called by some “Pakistan's 9/11,” is evidence. Indeed, Pakistan’s military has already lost 1,000 lives fighting jihadists, in a campaign that has reportedly driven 300,000 angry tribal area residents off to Pakistani city centers, where they impose their anger upon fellow Pakistanis.

Pakistanis also glower when told that their military is allowing jihadists to freely move across the Pak-Afghan border. When a powerful United States cannot police its own southern border, they ask, how can Pakistan be expected to police a far more anarchic area that lacks fencing or natural obstacles? If the border is so easy to manage, Pakistanis say that they are doing nothing to keep NATO forces from policing it from the other side.

U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama infuriates many Pakistanis with his tougher-than-though threats to increase the U.S. raids which accidentally kill many civilians in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier and which outrage the greater populace. Yet at least he and running mate Joe Biden have acknowledged that more soft power is needed, including real economic aid.

“Most Pakistanis wouldn't care if America went up in smoke,” declared one wealthy Pakistani with substantial business ties in England and the West.

It reminds us that the anti-Western sentiment of Pakistan is both real and growing, which means that any further investment of Western time and money would be wasted under our current approach. Again, to be blunt, we may need to decide either to bomb them into dust… or to begin to listen to them and engage them at the level of their own urgent concerns. At present, we in the West are merely a half-baked mess, neither tough nor tender.

Let us hope that we can begin to practice soft power and other forms of public diplomacy well enough that trust can be built to find an effective partnership to confront the angry tribesmen who now menace that nation and the world.
]]> 2008-10-01T20:51:01-08:00 http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/ It's been great to get such thoughtful comments on our International Relations Spectrum. One way for me to understand other perspectives would be to take a piece of our work at the British Council and look at how we could frame it. Here's a case study to take views on what it could be for – in terms of intentions - and how we could/should describe it and deliver it to maximize its impact. I'll deliberately exaggerate for effect, but let's imagine you can take a J.M.W. Turner exhibition to China in three different guises: A cultural diplomacy (CD) guise; a public diplomacy (PD) guise; a cultural relations (CR) guise. If you take it in an extreme CD guise, you could be trying to say that our country/civilization is far more advanced than yours; we've had Arts and Crafts for hundreds of years; we are more virile and our world view will prevail. That perhaps is what you might have had in the Cold War in some of the things that were done between East and West in sport and culture and science. An extreme PD way of doing it, might be to claim (rather spuriously, I think) that Turner was the first climate change painter, because you would only have had Turner's incredible skies with the smog of the industrial revolution. There is a claim that his skies are not hyper-real; however, they are actually what he was seeing because of the “pea-soup” of pollution that was floating over London. So if you were taking Turner in a PD guise you could say, "Here, China, you are on the way to being one of the world's biggest polluters, what are you doing to tackle climate change?" In taking Turner in a CR guise, I think you could conduct a much richer “shared” conversation about what was being painted in China during Turner's time, what role the landscape has in China's cultural heritage, what is happening to our collective environment here and there etc. You would be having a much richer set of conversations because you would not necessarily tend towards “boasting”, which is the extreme CD frame or “shouting/telling” which is the extreme PD one. I'd be interested to hear about other real world examples - of how a piece of work can be delivered - with different intentions: CD, PD or CR and how that affects impact and engagement in other practitioners' experience. Taking Turner to China http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/PublicDiplomacyBlog/~3/311314430/ John_Worne, Europe comments on our International Relations Spectrum. One way for me to understand other perspectives would be to take a piece of our work at the British Council and look at how we could frame it. Here's a case study to take views on what it could be for – in terms of intentions - and how we could/should describe it and deliver it to maximize its impact.

I'll deliberately exaggerate for effect, but let's imagine you can take a J.M.W. Turner exhibition to China in three different guises:

A cultural diplomacy (CD) guise; a public diplomacy (PD) guise; a cultural relations (CR) guise.

If you take it in an extreme CD guise, you could be trying to say that our country/civilization is far more advanced than yours; we've had Arts and Crafts for hundreds of years; we are more virile and our world view will prevail. That perhaps is what you might have had in the Cold War in some of the things that were done between East and West in sport and culture and science.

An extreme PD way of doing it, might be to claim (rather spuriously, I think) that Turner was the first climate change painter, because you would only have had Turner's incredible skies with the smog of the industrial revolution. There is a claim that his skies are not hyper-real; however, they are actually what he was seeing because of the “pea-soup” of pollution that was floating over London. So if you were taking Turner in a PD guise you could say, "Here, China, you are on the way to being one of the world's biggest polluters, what are you doing to tackle climate change?"

In taking Turner in a CR guise, I think you could conduct a much richer “shared” conversation about what was being painted in China during Turner's time, what role the landscape has in China's cultural heritage, what is happening to our collective environment here and there etc. You would be having a much richer set of conversations because you would not necessarily tend towards “boasting”, which is the extreme CD frame or “shouting/telling” which is the extreme PD one.

I'd be interested to hear about other real world examples - of how a piece of work can be delivered - with different intentions: CD, PD or CR and how that affects impact and engagement in other practitioners' experience.
]]> 2008-10-01T20:38:04-08:00 http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/ John Worne’s International Relations Positioning Spectrum (IRPS), and Nick Cull’s response provide interesting perspectives on the Cultural Relations / Public Diplomacy ‘divide’ and how work in the field is to be articulated. The IRPS appears a useful tool at the national level to help mediate in interdepartmental turf wars. However, the IRPS contains national peculiarities, specifically the difficulty the British Council faces in articulating its position, making it unlikely to become transferable internationally. This is best divided into two sections, first discussing the spectrum itself and second how this reflects the difficulty of articulating the position of the British Council. The IRPS The spectrum between aid and power, as Nick Cull has already commented is very closely analogous to the carrot and stick metaphor. This effectively means that the business of influence is something that is done to other people. It remains in the ‘power over’ school of thought, leaving little room for empowerment; providing the means through which others have the ‘power to’. As the British Council has been heavily engaged in education, along with providing assistance to non-violent elements of the anti-apartheid movement, it would be odd if the spectrum lacked elements which could be considered empowerment. Mutuality, listening, and facilitation do appear on the IRPS, but in the middle. Conceptually this means that the process of exchange is placed between being the recipient of messages and the recipient of financial aid. While this means engagement is observed, the emphasis is clearly placed on different methods of projection. As Nick Cull commented a more appropriate spectrum would run: Listening - facilitation - exchange - cultural diplomacy - broadcasting – advocacy. This spectrum frames the relationship with foreign publics from at one extreme an emphasis on projection to, at the other extreme, an emphasis on reception. Genuine exchange, reciprocity and mutuality logically sit at the midpoint between listening and telling. Other variations in emphasis can then exist in relation to these points. Fundamentally this approach drives at expanding the thinking about Public Diplomacy beyond telling the ‘other’ what they should be doing (or advocating a particular policy). It argues for a consideration of a full range of options; this has the potential to create engagement that empowers both sides to find new approaches to the challenges that face them, while maintaining the recognition that in some situations projection / advocacy is the required response. The IRPS engages with many of these points but in a way that buries the relationship with the ‘other’ and gives primacy to considering the actions of the producer. This creates a centralised approach in which the Public Diplomacy actor decides what will happen and only then engages with the outside world. This is reminiscent of Eric Raymond’s ‘Cathedral.’ I’ve discussed elsewhere the importance of the alternative open-source approach and the value of considering dispersed networks, but suffice it to write here, the future of Public Diplomacy will be in considering all the approaches, and selecting the appropriate option for the given context rather than creating a bias toward projection before analysing the environment. The IRPS effectively swamps the value of the work the British Council (particularly empowerment) in the middle of the various methods of projection pursued by UK government departments. It puts the relationship with government ahead of the clear articulation of purpose. Articulating the British Council position This leads to the second problem; that of drawing attention to the difficulty the British Council has in articulating its position in relation to the UK government. Many of these points have already been raised by Nick Cull’s response to the IRPS. There are perhaps three positions here: Position 1, Cultural Relations is independent from government; in discussing mutuality, Martin Rose and Nick Wadham-Smith draw that distinction between Cultural Relations and Public Diplomacy. They argue Public Diplomacy, “is the direct contact of governments with other peoples”, “is an explicitly governmental activity” and “when the British Council does public diplomacy, it is acting as an agent of government”. In contrast they argue “It is useful to reserve the term ‘cultural relations’ for (a) non-governmental voice”. This explicitly makes Public Diplomacy government to people communication and Cultural Relations a non-governmental activity. Position 2, Cultural Relations is part of Public Diplomacy; as highlighted by Nick Cull this is the position of the Wilton Review, (Annex A of the Carter Report) that “The British Council work on the basis that all of its activity falls under the heading of cultural relations and is therefore a part of public diplomacy”. I’m yet to see an unequivocal public statement that explicitly changes this position. In 2005 this position was reiterated when then-Director General, David Green, argued in evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select committee; “We work to FCO strategic priorities because the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is our sponsoring department”. The 2007 UK Government spending review announced that the money granted to the British Council, “will enable them to continue their vital public diplomacy work”. The money received as a grant in aid from the UK government as a result of the spending review is over £180 million, today’s exchange rate puts that at over $334 million (US). So for those that say the British Council doesn’t do Public Diplomacy, or variations of this argument including Public Diplomacy is government, Cultural Relations is independent and the British Council is independent, all I ask is that we have our annual payment of £180 million back, as the public documents from the Spending Review identify that public money as being granted for Public Diplomacy. Position 3, presented in the IRPS, is that Cultural Relations and Public Diplomacy overlap. This is a compromise intended to combine the desire to maintain an image of independence from government while keeping the funding and privileges. The structure of the IRPS means that this compromise is buried in the middle of the work of other UK Government Departments, with Ministry of Defence (MOD), Department for International Development (DFID) and FCO enveloping the ‘non-public diplomacy’ element of the British Council. To be fair, as an internal articulation of the way Whitehall departments relate to each other, and the British Council’s contribution to that activity, the IRPS sorts out the melee of competing departmental interests in a way that can make sense within the process of government. Through the IRPS, points of overlap can be identified and the way different departmental roles relate to each other can be established; in doing so it brings some much needed clarity to the process. Difficulty, however, still exists around the Cultural Relations / Public Diplomacy overlap. Can a government / non-government divide between Public Diplomacy and Cultural Relations be pursued by a single organisation? An organisation with employees that hold Diplomatic status and access to the civil service pension scheme? In effect, if the conceptual divide were accepted, how would the divide / compromise work in practise? If you were to write to the British Council in the US you would use the British Embassy address, were you to talk to the British Council Director in Canada, you’d be talking to the Cultural Counsellor of the British High Commission. You could go to two events on the same day, in one the British Council would be acting as a government agent, the next it would be non-governmental, while potentially holding both events within an Embassy or High Commission. How does an organisation temporarily undo the status, privilege, and funding (including position in an Embassy / High Commission) that come from the government grant-in-aid for Public Diplomacy? Can it be turned off while cultural relations work is conducted, only to be reactivated when the work falls back inside the overlap? I suggest this is implausible and the reason for the longevity of the discussion about whether others understand the position of the British Council. A Clearer Articulation? Using a spectrum that articulates the changing power relationship between the actor and foreign population, (listening to advocacy) would allow the British Council to define what it does in relation to the public with which it wants to engage, rather than in relation to Whitehall. In doing so it could make use of CPD’s broader conception of Public Diplomacy “as it pertains to a wide range of institutions and governments around the globe”. Nick Cull’s suggested use of ‘international actor’, rather than government, in his definition provides further support for an approach that considers Public Diplomacy beyond the confines of national government. Once the relationship with foreign publics have been defined, if others believe likewise and wish to contribute to achieving that goal (whether MOD, DFID, FCO, the EU, private philanthropic foundations or multinational companies) there’s no shame in that. So long as your stated vision is clear, is one in which you believe and is based on your beliefs rather than the potential to get funding, any relationship to government can be clearly articulated. Yes, it is in the national interest for strong links to exist between cultures; no, that doesn’t mean policy advocacy must be part of it. Back in 1936, the British Council argued “Modern defence consists not only in arms but in removing misunderstanding and promoting understanding”. Perhaps today an alternative to ‘modern defence’ may be preferred. However, the interminable introspective debates about CR / PD division might be avoided if the relationship with the audience, rather than the relation with government were the focal point of discussion. Publics can be credited with the ability to distinguish between an organisation that advocates specific government policies and one which organises exchanges or provides educational opportunities - if the organisation maintains that distinction clearly, articulates their rationale and doesn’t take government privileges while expecting to be seen as independent. Without these things, the government / non-government distinction is almost impossible to pursue when real life demands that the different corporate functions are delivered by the same individuals and offices. As a result the IRPS is a valuable tool for clarifying interdepartmental relationships in Whitehall, but is too deeply embedded in the specific UK context to have wider application. The process, however, of developing various national positioning spectrums could well be one which other organisations may wish to trial to clarify their own interdepartmental rivalries. A final closing point - while in the UK there can be a suspicion of academics in ‘ivory towers’ and of practitioners doing their own thing largely isolated from wider understandings developed by practitioners and academic study elsewhere, it is great to see a senior practitioner from the UK engaging (in the spirit of the CPD blog) and better still, writing his own material! The Spectrum of Spectrums: A Review of the International Relations Positioning Spectrum http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/PublicDiplomacyBlog/~3/311314430/ Ali_Fisher, Europe John Worne’s International Relations Positioning Spectrum (IRPS), and Nick Cull’s response provide interesting perspectives on the Cultural Relations / Public Diplomacy ‘divide’ and how work in the field is to be articulated. The IRPS appears a useful tool at the national level to help mediate in interdepartmental turf wars. However, the IRPS contains national peculiarities, specifically the difficulty the British Council faces in articulating its position, making it unlikely to become transferable internationally. This is best divided into two sections, first discussing the spectrum itself and second how this reflects the difficulty of articulating the position of the British Council.

The IRPS

The spectrum between aid and power, as Nick Cull has already commented is very closely analogous to the carrot and stick metaphor. This effectively means that the business of influence is something that is done to other people. It remains in the ‘power over’ school of thought, leaving little room for empowerment; providing the means through which others have the ‘power to’. As the British Council has been heavily engaged in education, along with providing assistance to non-violent elements of the anti-apartheid movement, it would be odd if the spectrum lacked elements which could be considered empowerment.

Mutuality, listening, and facilitation do appear on the IRPS, but in the middle. Conceptually this means that the process of exchange is placed between being the recipient of messages and the recipient of financial aid. While this means engagement is observed, the emphasis is clearly placed on different methods of projection.

As Nick Cull commented a more appropriate spectrum would run:

Listening - facilitation - exchange - cultural diplomacy - broadcasting – advocacy.

This spectrum frames the relationship with foreign publics from at one extreme an emphasis on projection to, at the other extreme, an emphasis on reception. Genuine exchange, reciprocity and mutuality logically sit at the midpoint between listening and telling. Other variations in emphasis can then exist in relation to these points.

Fundamentally this approach drives at expanding the thinking about Public Diplomacy beyond telling the ‘other’ what they should be doing (or advocating a particular policy). It argues for a consideration of a full range of options; this has the potential to create engagement that empowers both sides to find new approaches to the challenges that face them, while maintaining the recognition that in some situations projection / advocacy is the required response.

The IRPS engages with many of these points but in a way that buries the relationship with the ‘other’ and gives primacy to considering the actions of the producer. This creates a centralised approach in which the Public Diplomacy actor decides what will happen and only then engages with the outside world. This is reminiscent of Eric Raymond’s ‘Cathedral.’ I’ve discussed elsewhere the importance of the alternative open-source approach and the value of considering dispersed networks, but suffice it to write here, the future of Public Diplomacy will be in considering all the approaches, and selecting the appropriate option for the given context rather than creating a bias toward projection before analysing the environment.

The IRPS effectively swamps the value of the work the British Council (particularly empowerment) in the middle of the various methods of projection pursued by UK government departments. It puts the relationship with government ahead of the clear articulation of purpose.

Articulating the British Council position

This leads to the second problem; that of drawing attention to the difficulty the British Council has in articulating its position in relation to the UK government. Many of these points have already been raised by Nick Cull’s response to the IRPS.

There are perhaps three positions here:

Position 1, Cultural Relations is independent from government; in discussing mutuality, Martin Rose and Nick Wadham-Smith draw that distinction between Cultural Relations and Public Diplomacy. They argue Public Diplomacy, “is the direct contact of governments with other peoples”, “is an explicitly governmental activity” and “when the British Council does public diplomacy, it is acting as an agent of government”. In contrast they argue “It is useful to reserve the term ‘cultural relations’ for (a) non-governmental voice”. This explicitly makes Public Diplomacy government to people communication and Cultural Relations a non-governmental activity.

Position 2, Cultural Relations is part of Public Diplomacy; as highlighted by Nick Cull this is the position of the Wilton Review, (Annex A of the Carter Report) that “The British Council work on the basis that all of its activity falls under the heading of cultural relations and is therefore a part of public diplomacy”. I’m yet to see an unequivocal public statement that explicitly changes this position.

In 2005 this position was reiterated when then-Director General, David Green, argued in evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select committee; “We work to FCO strategic priorities because the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is our sponsoring department”.

The 2007 UK Government spending review announced that the money granted to the British Council, “will enable them to continue their vital public diplomacy work”. The money received as a grant in aid from the UK government as a result of the spending review is over £180 million, today’s exchange rate puts that at over $334 million (US).

So for those that say the British Council doesn’t do Public Diplomacy, or variations of this argument including Public Diplomacy is government, Cultural Relations is independent and the British Council is independent, all I ask is that we have our annual payment of £180 million back, as the public documents from the Spending Review identify that public money as being granted for Public Diplomacy.

Position 3, presented in the IRPS, is that Cultural Relations and Public Diplomacy overlap. This is a compromise intended to combine the desire to maintain an image of independence from government while keeping the funding and privileges. The structure of the IRPS means that this compromise is buried in the middle of the work of other UK Government Departments, with Ministry of Defence (MOD), Department for International Development (DFID) and FCO enveloping the ‘non-public diplomacy’ element of the British Council.

To be fair, as an internal articulation of the way Whitehall departments relate to each other, and the British Council’s contribution to that activity, the IRPS sorts out the melee of competing departmental interests in a way that can make sense within the process of government. Through the IRPS, points of overlap can be identified and the way different departmental roles relate to each other can be established; in doing so it brings some much needed clarity to the process.

Difficulty, however, still exists around the Cultural Relations / Public Diplomacy overlap. Can a government / non-government divide between Public Diplomacy and Cultural Relations be pursued by a single organisation? An organisation with employees that hold Diplomatic status and access to the civil service pension scheme? In effect, if the conceptual divide were accepted, how would the divide / compromise work in practise?

If you were to write to the British Council in the US you would use the British Embassy address, were you to talk to the British Council Director in Canada, you’d be talking to the Cultural Counsellor of the British High Commission. You could go to two events on the same day, in one the British Council would be acting as a government agent, the next it would be non-governmental, while potentially holding both events within an Embassy or High Commission.

How does an organisation temporarily undo the status, privilege, and funding (including position in an Embassy / High Commission) that come from the government grant-in-aid for Public Diplomacy? Can it be turned off while cultural relations work is conducted, only to be reactivated when the work falls back inside the overlap? I suggest this is implausible and the reason for the longevity of the discussion about whether others understand the position of the British Council.

A Clearer Articulation?

Using a spectrum that articulates the changing power relationship between the actor and foreign population, (listening to advocacy) would allow the British Council to define what it does in relation to the public with which it wants to engage, rather than in relation to Whitehall. In doing so it could make use of CPD’s broader conception of Public Diplomacy “as it pertains to a wide range of institutions and governments around the globe”. Nick Cull’s suggested use of ‘international actor’, rather than government, in his definition provides further support for an approach that considers Public Diplomacy beyond the confines of national government.

Once the relationship with foreign publics have been defined, if others believe likewise and wish to contribute to achieving that goal (whether MOD, DFID, FCO, the EU, private philanthropic foundations or multinational companies) there’s no shame in that. So long as your stated vision is clear, is one in which you believe and is based on your beliefs rather than the potential to get funding, any relationship to government can be clearly articulated. Yes, it is in the national interest for strong links to exist between cultures; no, that doesn’t mean policy advocacy must be part of it.

Back in 1936, the British Council argued “Modern defence consists not only in arms but in removing misunderstanding and promoting understanding”. Perhaps today an alternative to ‘modern defence’ may be preferred. However, the interminable introspective debates about CR / PD division might be avoided if the relationship with the audience, rather than the relation with government were the focal point of discussion.

Publics can be credited with the ability to distinguish between an organisation that advocates specific government policies and one which organises exchanges or provides educational opportunities - if the organisation maintains that distinction clearly, articulates their rationale and doesn’t take government privileges while expecting to be seen as independent. Without these things, the government / non-government distinction is almost impossible to pursue when real life demands that the different corporate functions are delivered by the same individuals and offices.

As a result the IRPS is a valuable tool for clarifying interdepartmental relationships in Whitehall, but is too deeply embedded in the specific UK context to have wider application. The process, however, of developing various national positioning spectrums could well be one which other organisations may wish to trial to clarify their own interdepartmental rivalries.

A final closing point - while in the UK there can be a suspicion of academics in ‘ivory towers’ and of practitioners doing their own thing largely isolated from wider understandings developed by practitioners and academic study elsewhere, it is great to see a senior practitioner from the UK engaging (in the spirit of the CPD blog) and better still, writing his own material!
]]> 2008-09-26T17:34:00-08:00 http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/ At the British Council – the UK’s international cultural and educational body – we’ve been thinking about what we call the International Relations Positioning Spectrum. It draws on work by Nick Cull and work done by Ali Fisher and Counterpoint, our cultural relations think tank on ‘'Options for Influence’. The spectrum sets out in broad terms what we think a nation can do in the world and how what we do – cultural relations - fits into it. Schools, Hospitals or Cultural Relations? http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/PublicDiplomacyBlog/~3/311314430/ John_Worne, Europe British Council – the UK’s international cultural and educational body – we’ve been thinking about what we call the International Relations Positioning Spectrum. It draws on work by Nick Cull and work done by Ali Fisher and Counterpoint, our cultural relations think tank on ‘'Options for Influence’. The spectrum sets out in broad terms what we think a nation can do in the world and how what we do – cultural relations - fits into it.


People who have seen it so far have said - although there is a lot of information in this diagram - they find it helpful to see the spectrum and where we fit on it. Other people have said to me that they feel uneasy about seeing what we do on the same page as military action – this does not feel right to them.

My personal view – and it is a personal view – is that for the part of our funding which comes from my taxes, there are clear alternative uses for that money – particularly in a credit crunch and global recession. Public spending is finite and there are always tough choices, but I would like to have local schools that were better for my children to go to. I would like to see continued investment in my local health services which are generally good these days but struggle to keep pace with growing demand. Set against this do I really want significant funding raised through general taxation (including some of my money) spent on cultural relations instead of schools and hospitals?

I think to answer this challenge we have to be really confident that what we do is a key part of the UK’s contribution to the world and is a real alternative to other foreign policy choices. I accept that the UK needs armed forces and that my taxes pay for them – not everyone does, but I do. I accept that we have a moral responsibility to respond to poverty and humanitarian disasters with food and other aid. Put simply I can understand and appreciate that in a crowded and at times dangerous world some of my money has to go on guns and food parcels instead of local schools and hospitals. But why does it have to go to cultural relations?

I think the answer is that strong, effective cultural relations mean ultimately we will need less guns and fewer food parcels. Why? Because sharing knowledge and ideas between people worldwide is among the best antidotes to armed conflict and giving people access to skills, languages, jobs and opportunities can help map a path out of poverty. It also does far more beautiful things, like opening minds and opportunities for peoples’ creativity and development.

The crude version of the International Relations Positioning Spectrum is ‘giving, helping, sharing, boasting, shouting, fighting’. We do ‘helping and sharing’ and maybe a bit of ‘boasting’ from time to time - although when we showcase the UK I believe in the main we try to do it with sharing and mutual appreciation in mind.

Some of these words are better than others. ‘Exchanging’ is perhaps a more accurate term than ‘sharing’ as it is more actively mutual and more purposeful. ‘Telling’ is perhaps fairer than ‘shouting’ to encapsulate diplomacy and campaigning. In many cases the same activity could be ‘telling, boasting or sharing’. The intent behind it and the way it is done make the difference.

I find it easier to forgo a better school for my son and daughter, when I remind myself that at its best, cultural relations means more ‘helping and sharing’, less ‘shouting and fighting’ and maybe one day a less urgent need to ‘give’. It helps me to think that the engagement and trust we build through cultural relations reduces the costs of failing to engage or help improve the world – the cost of guns and food parcels – at the same time as enriching people’s lives.
]]> 2008-09-24T06:59:00-08:00 http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/ In the aftermath of the Beijing Olympics, there's been much discussion about an increase in China's soft power, not least by Joseph Nye, the originator of the concept. [Link] Nye and others (this writer included) have evaluated China's film industry and U.S.-Chinese co-productions as a strategic asset for the Middle Kingdom. I was discussing the subject recently with a U.S. motion picture industry executive, who agreed that Hollywood production in China is an important soft power issue. Still, she told me, at least as important is that Hollywood is betting with its Asian production investments not primarily on China, but on the other regional behemoth: India. Sounding a bit like Hal Holbrook's Deep Throat in All the President's Men, she admonished me, "Follow the Money." And indeed, the money trail tells the tale. VarietyAsia reported in August 2008 that Hollywood's investment in China "is substantially smaller than once envisioned: Sony has scaled back, Warner's joint venture with state-owned China Film Group is not the force it set out to be and, after several years, Disney has recently greenlit only its second Chinese movie." [Link] In contrast, Hollywood studios are sharply increasing film production in India [Link], including an announcement by Twentieth Century Fox on 10 September 2008 that it's establishing a studio in Mumbai. [Link] Moreover, Indian business concerns are investing substantially in Hollywood itself, with the same eye on boosting the American studios' production presence in India. [Link] The stakes are great from a cultural diplomacy perspective between these two fiercely competitive nations. Both China and India are looking to reap soft power advantages from their cinema sectors. The American film industry possesses unique technical and marketing prowess. Thus, large-scale Hollywood production partnerships are likely to provide India with significant global image-enhancing benefits, even if the films themselves are aimed primarily, for now, at an Indian audience. So what's going on? Both India and China are fast-growing emerging economies, with burgeoning urban middle classes still dwarfed by a billion souls in each country living in rural poverty. Yet there is a key difference at the heart of Hollywood's investment tilt in Asia: India is a democracy—flawed, perhaps, but well-established and functioning; while China is a dictatorship, even if Chinese citizens have more personal liberty than at any time since the 1949 revolution that brought the communists to power there. I asked my film industry executive whether it would be accurate that Hollywood is betting on democracy over dictatorship. Her response, after a moment's reflection, was "Yes—but you didn't hear it from me." (Which is why she remains anonymous in this piece and in anything else I'll write on the subject, although I duly tip my hat to her for raising the issue in the first place). Now make no mistake, the U.S. entertainment industry's motivation is not a pious devotion to human or civil rights, although there are many individual industry players who are laudably high-minded. Hollywood is a business, as ruthlessly focused on The Bottom Line as any other multinational sector. To the extent that there is profit to be made in dealing with autocracies, Hollywood studios will seek it, as they've repeatedly done over the past three-quarters of a century. But it's precisely bottom-line considerations that are driving Hollywood's Asian investment strategies, and democracy versus dictatorship looms large in the cost-benefit calculus. Several interrelated areas in this regard are the comparative states of India's versus China's film production and movie-going cultures; the entertainment sector's degree of independence from government control; and dependable policies and the rule of law concerning censorship, including the right to appeal. India has long been the world's biggest film-producing country, when measured by the sheer number of films made: "Bollywood" has pumped out some 800-1000 movies per year in recent times, at least three times the U.S. average—although Hollywood films are far more expensive to make, and hold far greater box office potential, than Bollywood's productions. The industry is dynamic, free-standing, and wildly popular with the Indian public, the world's most avid filmgoers. [Link] Bollywood has also become internationally influential both through its own output, which has gained a steadily growing overseas fan base, and its stylistic influence on American and other countries' popular culture (see for example Baz Luhrmann's 2001 film musical Moulin Rouge and Britney Spears' 2004 video "Toxic"). In June 2008 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh confidently declared, "Cultural relations, India's film industry, Bollywood...I find wherever I go in the Middle East, in Africa, people talk about Indian films," a quote pointedly noted by China's official news service. [Link] China's once-vibrant commercial movie industry was decimated with the triumph of the communists, who turned Chinese film production into a blatant propaganda tool. Worse, during the low point Cultural Revolution years of 1966-72, not a single film was produced in the Peoples Republic of China. [Link] The industry only began to rebuild and re-assume a market orientation with the advent of the post-Mao era in the late 1970s. It's no surprise that the Chinese public virtually lost their movie-going habit and have only gradually regained it to a modest extent—at about one-twentieth the rate of Indian theater attendance. [Link] (Most Chinese view pirated DVDs, a particular sore spot with U.S. studios.) Today, in contrast to India, China's film industry is still very much under the thumb of the government, which sees film production as part of an overall strategic effort to "enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country." [Link] While some Chinese films have done well in the international market (most notably Zhang Yimou's 2002 Hero), the need to serve Beijing's propaganda goals always risks hampering Chinese films' commercial viability, especially overseas. Both India and China engage in official censorship on moral and political grounds. Both countries' governments can be capricious in their application of censorship codes. But Indian producers and directors have recourse to their vigorous court system, where they have often successfully appealed government censorship edicts. [Link] In China, on the other hand, censorship is by fiat, and the appeals process is effectively nonexistent (technically it exists, but let's not forget what happened to those poor folks who registered to protest during the Beijing Olympics and were hustled off to re-education camps). SARFT (the Chinese State Administration of Radio, Film and Television) recently drove home the unappealable caprice of Beijing's censorship policies by refusing, without explanation, to permit the filming of "Shanghai," an American-made thriller set in China during the World War II-era Japanese occupation. There have been unsubstantiated claims on blogs that what bothered SARFT was a Japanese officer's evincing remorse over massacring Chinese civilians several years earlier—the censors evidently want their Japanese irredeemably evil. [Link] The producers, who had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on pre-production in China before SARFT pulled the plug on them, ultimately moved the project over to Bangkok, where shooting continues as of this writing. While everyone connected with the production was careful to avoid saying anything critical about China's leadership [Link], the U.S. film industry added the incident to a growing list of costly "sovereign risk" run-ins with Beijing, such as a sudden three-month ban—never officially announced, and in fact officially denied—on U.S. film imports into China imposed in December 2007. [Link] The net result as the U.S. entertainment sector contrasts the film industries and policy environment of the two Asian giants is that "China is no longer on top of the Hollywood studios' priority list" [Link]; while "it's India that comes out on top when attracting coin from financial investors and industry alike." [Link] As a matter of ideology, Hollywood could care less about democratic values or the lack thereof in its overseas dealings. But as a practical matter, Hollywood is betting big on the virtues of democracy over dictatorial control. Given the U.S. motion picture industry's role as one of the world's most formidable soft power transmitters, India has reason to be pleased and China to be concerned about where Hollywood is placing its wager. Hollywood’s Investment Bet on India Over China: Democracy Matters http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/PublicDiplomacyBlog/~3/311314430/ Neal_Rosendorf, Asia Pacific, South Asia Joseph Nye, the originator of the concept. [Link] Nye and others (this writer included) have evaluated China's film industry and U.S.-Chinese co-productions as a strategic asset for the Middle Kingdom. I was discussing the subject recently with a U.S. motion picture industry executive, who agreed that Hollywood production in China is an important soft power issue. Still, she told me, at least as important is that Hollywood is betting with its Asian production investments not primarily on China, but on the other regional behemoth: India. Sounding a bit like Hal Holbrook's Deep Throat in All the President's Men, she admonished me, "Follow the Money."

And indeed, the money trail tells the tale. VarietyAsia reported in August 2008 that Hollywood's investment in China "is substantially smaller than once envisioned: Sony has scaled back, Warner's joint venture with state-owned China Film Group is not the force it set out to be and, after several years, Disney has recently greenlit only its second Chinese movie." [Link] In contrast, Hollywood studios are sharply increasing film production in India [Link], including an announcement by Twentieth Century Fox on 10 September 2008 that it's establishing a studio in Mumbai. [Link] Moreover, Indian business concerns are investing substantially in Hollywood itself, with the same eye on boosting the American studios' production presence in India. [Link]

The stakes are great from a cultural diplomacy perspective between these two fiercely competitive nations. Both China and India are looking to reap soft power advantages from their cinema sectors. The American film industry possesses unique technical and marketing prowess. Thus, large-scale Hollywood production partnerships are likely to provide India with significant global image-enhancing benefits, even if the films themselves are aimed primarily, for now, at an Indian audience.

So what's going on? Both India and China are fast-growing emerging economies, with burgeoning urban middle classes still dwarfed by a billion souls in each country living in rural poverty. Yet there is a key difference at the heart of Hollywood's investment tilt in Asia: India is a democracy—flawed, perhaps, but well-established and functioning; while China is a dictatorship, even if Chinese citizens have more personal liberty than at any time since the 1949 revolution that brought the communists to power there.

I asked my film industry executive whether it would be accurate that Hollywood is betting on democracy over dictatorship. Her response, after a moment's reflection, was "Yes—but you didn't hear it from me." (Which is why she remains anonymous in this piece and in anything else I'll write on the subject, although I duly tip my hat to her for raising the issue in the first place).

Now make no mistake, the U.S. entertainment industry's motivation is not a pious devotion to human or civil rights, although there are many individual industry players who are laudably high-minded. Hollywood is a business, as ruthlessly focused on The Bottom Line as any other multinational sector. To the extent that there is profit to be made in dealing with autocracies, Hollywood studios will seek it, as they've repeatedly done over the past three-quarters of a century.

But it's precisely bottom-line considerations that are driving Hollywood's Asian investment strategies, and democracy versus dictatorship looms large in the cost-benefit calculus. Several interrelated areas in this regard are the comparative states of India's versus China's film production and movie-going cultures; the entertainment sector's degree of independence from government control; and dependable policies and the rule of law concerning censorship, including the right to appeal.

India has long been the world's biggest film-producing country, when measured by the sheer number of films made: "Bollywood" has pumped out some 800-1000 movies per year in recent times, at least three times the U.S. average—although Hollywood films are far more expensive to make, and hold far greater box office potential, than Bollywood's productions. The industry is dynamic, free-standing, and wildly popular with the Indian public, the world's most avid filmgoers. [Link]

Bollywood has also become internationally influential both through its own output, which has gained a steadily growing overseas fan base, and its stylistic influence on American and other countries' popular culture (see for example Baz Luhrmann's 2001 film musical Moulin Rouge and Britney Spears' 2004 video "Toxic"). In June 2008 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh confidently declared, "Cultural relations, India's film industry, Bollywood...I find wherever I go in the Middle East, in Africa, people talk about Indian films," a quote pointedly noted by China's official news service. [Link]

China's once-vibrant commercial movie industry was decimated with the triumph of the communists, who turned Chinese film production into a blatant propaganda tool. Worse, during the low point Cultural Revolution years of 1966-72, not a single film was produced in the Peoples Republic of China. [Link] The industry only began to rebuild and re-assume a market orientation with the advent of the post-Mao era in the late 1970s. It's no surprise that the Chinese public virtually lost their movie-going habit and have only gradually regained it to a modest extent—at about one-twentieth the rate of Indian theater attendance. [Link] (Most Chinese view pirated DVDs, a particular sore spot with U.S. studios.)

Today, in contrast to India, China's film industry is still very much under the thumb of the government, which sees film production as part of an overall strategic effort to "enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country." [Link] While some Chinese films have done well in the international market (most notably Zhang Yimou's 2002 Hero), the need to serve Beijing's propaganda goals always risks hampering Chinese films' commercial viability, especially overseas.

Both India and China engage in official censorship on moral and political grounds. Both countries' governments can be capricious in their application of censorship codes. But Indian producers and directors have recourse to their vigorous court system, where they have often successfully appealed government censorship edicts. [Link] In China, on the other hand, censorship is by fiat, and the appeals process is effectively nonexistent (technically it exists, but let's not forget what happened to those poor folks who registered to protest during the Beijing Olympics and were hustled off to re-education camps).

SARFT (the Chinese State Administration of Radio, Film and Television) recently drove home the unappealable caprice of Beijing's censorship policies by refusing, without explanation, to permit the filming of "Shanghai," an American-made thriller set in China during the World War II-era Japanese occupation. There have been unsubstantiated claims on blogs that what bothered SARFT was a Japanese officer's evincing remorse over massacring Chinese civilians several years earlier—the censors evidently want their Japanese irredeemably evil. [Link] The producers, who had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on pre-production in China before SARFT pulled the plug on them, ultimately moved the project over to Bangkok, where shooting continues as of this writing. While everyone connected with the production was careful to avoid saying anything critical about China's leadership [Link], the U.S. film industry added the incident to a growing list of costly "sovereign risk" run-ins with Beijing, such as a sudden three-month ban—never officially announced, and in fact officially denied—on U.S. film imports into China imposed in December 2007. [Link]

The net result as the U.S. entertainment sector contrasts the film industries and policy environment of the two Asian giants is that "China is no longer on top of the Hollywood studios' priority list" [Link]; while "it's India that comes out on top when attracting coin from financial investors and industry alike." [Link]

As a matter of ideology, Hollywood could care less about democratic values or the lack thereof in its overseas dealings. But as a practical matter, Hollywood is betting big on the virtues of democracy over dictatorial control. Given the U.S. motion picture industry's role as one of the world's most formidable soft power transmitters, India has reason to be pleased and China to be concerned about where Hollywood is placing its wager.
]]> 2008-09-17T18:03:00-08:00 http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/ It is about time that the Al-Jazeera Network received some good news from America. Having been accused by the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld of inciting terrorism and assisting Iraqi insurgents, and then allegedly considered as a potential target of a U.S.-led military strike, Al-Jazeera has not exactly felt welcome here in the United States since the beginning of the war in Iraq. When Americans hear the words "Al-Jazeera", many immediately associate it with Osama bin Laden, the world's most recognized face of terrorism. It is thus easy to see why Al-Jazeera English has had trouble finding room in the U.S. cable market. The arguments levied against Al-Jazeera -- most typically "that it is a mouthpiece for terrorists" -- have carried significant weight in discussions in the U.S. A 2006 poll commissioned by Accuracy in Media (AIM) found that 53 percent of Americans were opposed to having the channel available via cable in the U.S., and that 38 percent were "adamantly against the channel." Of course, AIM conducted the poll prior to the broadcaster's launch, and thus none of the respondents had ever actually seen Al-Jazeera English's award winning programming. What the poll does illustrate, however, is that there is a widely held bias against the Al-Jazeera brand, an organization whose image has been thoroughly denigrated in America. Launched in November 2006, Al-Jazeera English represents the largest rollout of an English-language news broadcaster ever. Some speculate that over $1 billion was invested in the launch. Al-Jazeera English features four primary broadcasting bureaus in Doha, Kuala Lumpur, London and Washington, D.C., each of which are independently responsible for programming for a designated period of time each day. In addition, the Al-Jazeera Network features over 50 bureaus worldwide, with more "indigenous journalists" than either of its main competitors, the BBC World and CNN International. Al-Jazeera English stands apart from its Arabic sister, with an entirely different audience and news agenda. Over the past year, its exclusive interviews with the Burmese Junta, on-the ground coverage of protests in Malaysia and live coverage of the Hamas takeover from inside Gaza, have each been praised for being much more thorough than those of its competitors and for relying on local journalists with deep familiarity with the countries and cultures being covered. So far, its somewhat clichéd mission statement of providing a voice to the voiceless has, to a certain extent, been fulfilled. Yet, here in the U.S., Al-Jazeera English's voice -- or, more importantly, the voices its broadcasting represents -- have been systematically stifled. Al-Jazeera English is available in the U.S. via four public media systems: Buckeye Cable in Toledo, Ohio; Burlington Telecom in Burlington, Vermont; via the Internet on Youtube and JumpTV; and in the Pentagon. It is, somewhat ironically, the top choice for news for many active U.S. soldiers. This May, Burlington Telecom's (BT) General Manager, Chris Burns, decided to drop the channel from the municipally owned telecommunications company in response to what he described as "dozens" of complaints from angry subscribers. Because the broadcaster is publicly owned and financed, Mayor Bob Kiss intervened and called for a broader public discussion regarding the merits of removing Al-Jazeera English from BT. In a hopeful display of democratic deliberation, two separate forums were organized where citizens and advocacy groups could argue their case for or against keeping Al-Jazeera English on the air. On May 27, 2008 around 100 people attended the first meeting. Of the 28 residents that spoke, three-to-one were in favor of keeping the broadcaster on air. At the second forum, which took place on June 11, the Al-Jazeera English Managing Director, Tony Burman, and the leading American-based correspondent, Josh Rushing, joined the discussion to answer the Burlingtonians' questions. The public discussions resulted in an intelligent give-and-take on the role of news media in informing public opinion. Supporters argued that the channel offers the citizens of Burlington a better opportunity to learn about Muslim society and culture. Others pointed out that the quality of news provided is far superior to that offered on other cable news channels such as MSNBC and Fox News. Yet, the critics were fervent, arguing that carrying the channel was "an insult to any patriotic American," as well as to the local Jewish community. Supporters responded by pointing out that Al-Jazeera English is so popular in Israel that it recently replaced the BBC World and CNN International on the two top Israeli cable systems. While many different perspectives were heard, the vast majority of opinions expressed were in favor of keeping Al-Jazeera English available on Burlington Telecom. On June 25, BT's two oversight committees voted unanimously to continue to air Al-Jazeera English. The committees found "no consistent or widespread agreement or evidence from respected sources that confirmed that Al-Jazeera English supports terrorism, anti-Semitism and promotes the destruction of the State of Israel." What the Burlington debates show is that there is hope, and not just for Al-Jazeera English, but for informed discussion about Arab culture and Muslim religion. Stereotypes about Arab culture and Islam are pervasive in the United States. Congress' refusal to allow an Arab company to control American ports is a telling example of just how powerfully and deeply anti-Arab stereotypes are embedded in American culture and political discourse. These stereotypes are, to a certain extent, responsible for much of the American public's fear of Al-Jazeera English. The Burlington debates offer a compelling demonstration of how unwarranted stereotypes can be scrutinized, one by one, with informed, intelligent and public argument. While this may be a small victory for Al-Jazeera English, it is a much larger symbolic victory for American civic discourse. One can only hope that similar conversations -- both about Al-Jazeera English, as well as about Arab culture and Muslim faith -- continue here in the U.S., and produce similarly productive dialogue. Bravo, Burlington. Shawn Powers is a Research Associate at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy where he is currently conducting a study of Al-Jazeera English. Bravo, Burlington: A Small Victory for Al-Jazeera English, A Symbolic Victory for the United States http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/PublicDiplomacyBlog/~3/311314430/ Shawn_Powers, Americas, Middle East accused by the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld of inciting terrorism and assisting Iraqi insurgents, and then allegedly considered as a potential target of a U.S.-led military strike, Al-Jazeera has not exactly felt welcome here in the United States since the beginning of the war in Iraq. When Americans hear the words "Al-Jazeera", many immediately associate it with Osama bin Laden, the world's most recognized face of terrorism. It is thus easy to see why Al-Jazeera English has had trouble finding room in the U.S. cable market.

The arguments levied against Al-Jazeera -- most typically "that it is a mouthpiece for terrorists" -- have carried significant weight in discussions in the U.S. A 2006 poll commissioned by Accuracy in Media (AIM) found that 53 percent of Americans were opposed to having the channel available via cable in the U.S., and that 38 percent were "adamantly against the channel." Of course, AIM conducted the poll prior to the broadcaster's launch, and thus none of the respondents had ever actually seen Al-Jazeera English's award winning programming. What the poll does illustrate, however, is that there is a widely held bias against the Al-Jazeera brand, an organization whose image has been thoroughly denigrated in America.

Launched in November 2006, Al-Jazeera English represents the largest rollout of an English-language news broadcaster ever. Some speculate that over $1 billion was invested in the launch. Al-Jazeera English features four primary broadcasting bureaus in Doha, Kuala Lumpur, London and Washington, D.C., each of which are independently responsible for programming for a designated period of time each day. In addition, the Al-Jazeera Network features over 50 bureaus worldwide, with more "indigenous journalists" than either of its main competitors, the BBC World and CNN International.

Al-Jazeera English stands apart from its Arabic sister, with an entirely different audience and news agenda. Over the past year, its exclusive interviews with the Burmese Junta, on-the ground coverage of protests in Malaysia and live coverage of the Hamas takeover from inside Gaza, have each been praised for being much more thorough than those of its competitors and for relying on local journalists with deep familiarity with the countries and cultures being covered. So far, its somewhat clichéd mission statement of providing a voice to the voiceless has, to a certain extent, been fulfilled.

Yet, here in the U.S., Al-Jazeera English's voice -- or, more importantly, the voices its broadcasting represents -- have been systematically stifled. Al-Jazeera English is available in the U.S. via four public media systems: Buckeye Cable in Toledo, Ohio; Burlington Telecom in Burlington, Vermont; via the Internet on Youtube and JumpTV; and in the Pentagon. It is, somewhat ironically, the top choice for news for many active U.S. soldiers.

This May, Burlington Telecom's (BT) General Manager, Chris Burns, decided to drop the channel from the municipally owned telecommunications company in response to what he described as "dozens" of complaints from angry subscribers. Because the broadcaster is publicly owned and financed, Mayor Bob Kiss intervened and called for a broader public discussion regarding the merits of removing Al-Jazeera English from BT. In a hopeful display of democratic deliberation, two separate forums were organized where citizens and advocacy groups could argue their case for or against keeping Al-Jazeera English on the air. On May 27, 2008 around 100 people attended the first meeting. Of the 28 residents that spoke, three-to-one were in favor of keeping the broadcaster on air. At the second forum, which took place on June 11, the Al-Jazeera English Managing Director, Tony Burman, and the leading American-based correspondent, Josh Rushing, joined the discussion to answer the Burlingtonians' questions.

The public discussions resulted in an intelligent give-and-take on the role of news media in informing public opinion. Supporters argued that the channel offers the citizens of Burlington a better opportunity to learn about Muslim society and culture. Others pointed out that the quality of news provided is far superior to that offered on other cable news channels such as MSNBC and Fox News. Yet, the critics were fervent, arguing that carrying the channel was "an insult to any patriotic American," as well as to the local Jewish community. Supporters responded by pointing out that Al-Jazeera English is so popular in Israel that it recently replaced the BBC World and CNN International on the two top Israeli cable systems. While many different perspectives were heard, the vast majority of opinions expressed were in favor of keeping Al-Jazeera English available on Burlington Telecom.

On June 25, BT's two oversight committees voted unanimously to continue to air Al-Jazeera English. The committees found "no consistent or widespread agreement or evidence from respected sources that confirmed that Al-Jazeera English supports terrorism, anti-Semitism and promotes the destruction of the State of Israel."

What the Burlington debates show is that there is hope, and not just for Al-Jazeera English, but for informed discussion about Arab culture and Muslim religion. Stereotypes about Arab culture and Islam are pervasive in the United States. Congress' refusal to allow an Arab company to control American ports is a telling example of just how powerfully and deeply anti-Arab stereotypes are embedded in American culture and political discourse. These stereotypes are, to a certain extent, responsible for much of the American public's fear of Al-Jazeera English. The Burlington debates offer a compelling demonstration of how unwarranted stereotypes can be scrutinized, one by one, with informed, intelligent and public argument. While this may be a small victory for Al-Jazeera English, it is a much larger symbolic victory for American civic discourse. One can only hope that similar conversations -- both about Al-Jazeera English, as well as about Arab culture and Muslim faith -- continue here in the U.S., and produce similarly productive dialogue. Bravo, Burlington.

Shawn Powers is a Research Associate at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy where he is currently conducting a study of Al-Jazeera English.
]]> 2008-06-27T21:14:00-08:00 http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/ I have to admit I did not expect to be writing what could be deemed a defense of Al-Hurra -- the U.S.-sponsored Arabic language television station beamed across the Arab world. Al-Hurra (which means "the free one" in Arabic) has come under scrutiny over the past few years for its potential impact on U.S. public diplomacy objectives. Yet the recent story by CBS News on the failings of Al-Hurra and coverage by The Washington Post, necessitates a critical response. The following blog entry provides two critiques -- first of the oddly framed arguments in CBS's coverage of Al-Hurra, and second of the government's rejoinder. Basically, while the CBS report brings up important organizational and strategic deficiencies surrounding Al-Hurra and its 'mission' -- its criticism only highlights the fact that Al-Hurra has been conferred conflicting (and perhaps contradictory) objectives and lacks a political constituency in the government. The U.S. government's response amounts to claims that Al-Hurra's numbers are improving and that the government is essentially "doing something" to promote its perspective in the competitive Arab media market. This controversy reveals the enduring problems of contemporary U.S. international broadcasting -- its weakness in the face of domestic political opposition, haphazard implementation of conflicting foreign policy imperatives, and perhaps a strategic misrecognition of the real communication landscape. In the wake of these observations, I suggest that a revitalized Al-Hurra would resolve its mandate issues, and embrace the relevance of participatory media in its target market. CBS criticizes Al-Hurra What is frustrating about the CBS piece (produced in conjunction with the non-profit investigative news organization ProPublica) is that it down-plays serious critiques of how the station is managed (including what gets covered and how stories make it to broadcast) and its viability in the crowded Arab media market, in favor of an oblique argument insinuating that Al-Hurra is an outlet for terrorism. By citing disparate incidents taken out of context, the report suggests that Al-Hurra has become an outlet for terrorists, because it broadcast a speech by Hassan Nasrallah (the leader of Hezbollah), and offered poor coverage of the Iranian conference on the Holocaust (coverage which seemed to be uncritical of the absurd suggestions of Holocaust deniers). CBS recounts a history of controversy surrounding Al-Hurra in interviews of Al-Hurra personnel. CBS rightly interviews Larry Register, who had been hired to bring some credibility to the station -- only to be let go as the channel became increasingly politicized (as Marc Lynch has previously noted). Register tells the CBS interviewer Scott Pelley that "credibility" means: "Not just picking and choosing what you might want to cover because it's favorable for your side versus their side. Cover all of it. Tell the whole story. Part of the idea is Al- Hurra is the free one. The name is 'The Free One.'" And yet, the CBS story continues to focus on how the few instances of coverage unsupportive of U.S. and Israeli positions constitute a failure to the American taxpayer and to the objectives of public diplomacy. Even Brian Conniff, the station's top executive, tries to explain that these instances were not representative of the station's programming content, and should not be used to judge its effectiveness. If we interpret the story as I believe it was intended to be framed, Al-Hurra is a station beset with managerial problems, which have resulted in it becoming a mouthpiece for terrorist interests. These implications are severe, and echo similar arguments made in 2001 in the U.S. Congress about how VOA Afghanistan was a mouthpiece for terror by allowing the Taliban to share air-time with other voices on U.S. programming. I am still curious about this kind of argument -- especially when the principles of journalistic freedom (a cornerstone of American democratic governance), invoked to justify spending on these programs, are obviated by editorializing content that doesn't align with the U.S. government's positions. Which perspective should govern how the U.S. designs and implements its international broadcasting strategy? And, does airing an alternative perspective (even if it is morally onerous or contrary to the U.S.'s own declared values) constitute advocacy? Seriously -- should I as a teacher be censored if I show Leni Reifenstahl's "Triumph of the Will" to my students to illustrate the terrifying potential of propaganda -- because I've given voice to fascists? Perhaps airing the voices of those opposed to the U.S. alongside the arguments made by Americans could highlight the strengths of American discourse, and show the shallow, instrumental nature of some of the anti-American diatribe circulating in Arab media. Arguing to censor the anti-American rants suggests that they are too powerful and too strong a message to consider competing with, even if it entails sacrificing American journalistic values. If anything, the editorial policies of Al-Hurra present a glaring contrast between declaring ambitions of journalistic freedom and actually demonstrating democratic pluralism. Put another way, Al-Hurra seems to conflate what public diplomacy scholar Nicholas Cull has identified as two 'traditions' of U.S. public diplomacy -- advocacy and international broadcasting. Implemented as policy, these two traditions yield different expectations and likely, different standards of measurement for effectiveness. As Marc Lynch observed, if the political pressure on Al-Hurra continues to its logical conclusion, we'll likely end up with another TV Marti -- a waste of taxpayers' money in international broadcasting with limited reach and impact. It is one thing to provide a media platform for the U.S. perspective; it is another to offer what aims to be a reliable international news service. Of course, is it the obligation of Al-Hurra to provide differing perspectives (even from its enemies)? Surely, Arab audiences can get a heavy dose of news framing considered contrary to American policy objectives if they tuned into other channels. Yet, Al-Hurra was initially conceived as a "news" outlet, as much a corrective to the message provided by Al-Jazeera as it was a model for reliable, objective journalism in the Western tradition. Continuing to balance this declared mission with that of providing a positive view of American policies seems increasingly difficult, if not contradictory. One mission is journalism, the other is public relations. Honestly embracing one of these perspectives might do the channel some good -- especially since many Arab audiences are well acquainted with the historically partisan role of Arab journalism. Perhaps the credibility of the U.S. could be helped along by openly acknowledging what the rest of the Arab world already knows -- instead of trying to assert a moral authority and an editorial "firewall" with its claims of objectivity. Public relations (let alone advocacy) is also an American tradition -- why hide from it? Alternatively (and perhaps more constructively) the U.S. might learn something about the democratic reasons why stations like Al-Jazeera are so successful in the first place. Responding to CBS The Broadcast Board of Governors issued a statement on June 22 defending Al-Hurra. The defense was, in many respects, a decent response to the "pattern" of evidence offered by CBS. Yet, it was also indicative of the station's problems. First, it offered different polling numbers to show that it did have a growing audience in the Arab world, with increasing levels of "credibility". It then, rightly, pointed out that the CBS investigation took evidence out of context to reach its conclusions about what gets broadcast on Al-Hurra. Yet, the response leaves some lingering questions. Do the numbers mean anything? And what really constitutes success for a news station "competing" for viewers and already saddled with questionable credibility? Al-Hurra is not the BBC (nor, for that matter, is it the VOA). So what should its mission be? When you factor in the increasingly diverse Arab satellite and regional media sphere that Al-Hurra must compete within, a fresh look at Al-Hurra seems urgent. Specifically -- what should the U.S. expect from Al-Hurra? Should it attempt to be popular like Al-Jazeera? Should it try to embody and model Western style journalism as a foundational aspect of democratic culture? Should it be a democratic (read: participatory) forum for advocating and debating the controversial aspects of U.S. policies, values, and intentions? The Washington Post coverage of Al-Hurra offers some instructive observations about the challenges facing Al-Hurra in its "target" market -- and they have little to do with its level of anti-American content. The article's interviews with Arab viewers reflect the changing culture of media access in the region. The crowded media market, in particular, puts distinct pressure on Al-Hurra to provide compelling content. These are developments important for any television producer to recognize, let alone an international broadcaster. As the Post article indicates, Al-Hurra is not just American; it's potentially irrelevant and boring. What can we learn from Al-Jazeera? As The Washington Post article suggests, if Al-Hurra is to be considered a compelling news channel in the region, it must provide interesting, distinctive content that is relevant to its audience: "Salameh Nematt, a Jordanian journalist based in Washington, said that Al-Hurra, like many of its competitors, has ignored controversial issues such as financial corruption involving Arab leaders and the use of torture by security forces… Al-Hurra would have been the number one station in the Arab world had they done one-quarter of what they should have covered." But to follow this path suggests an emphasis on news over the imperatives of providing a distinctly U.S. message. Nematt's comment highlights the role that news outlets play for audiences facing real information needs. Al-Jazeera, for example, offers some helpful lessons about the relationship of audiences to news media. While the U.S. continues to argue for spreading democracy in the region, evangelizing universal values to the benighted -- those who had suffered so long without a voice -- it seems to overlook the value of performing democratic principles. What do I mean by this, and how might this be linked to the incredible popularity of Al-Jazeera? International media scholars Shawn Powers and Eytan Gilboa have shown that Al-Jazeera enjoys incredible audience loyalty. They cite research indicating that large segments of Al-Jazeera's audience not only faithfully watch the channel, but believe that it speaks for them. In other words, they identify with the channel, believe in its mission, and thus give it tremendous credibility. This kind of loyalty would be hard to cultivate by any U.S. news channels domestically, let alone in the Middle East. There are numerous historical reasons why Al-Jazeera became so popular, especially given the history of regional and pan-Arab journalism. But for the moment, let us focus on how the station offers a modicum of democratic participation. I am certainly not the first to note that Al-Jazeera provides a voice to its viewers, especially in its talk-shows. It also provides multiple perspectives on controversial issues (often-times at odds with various regional governments). Though perhaps some of Al-Jazeera's tone has shifted to accommodate the rising popularity of its competitor Al-Arabiya -- Al-Jazeera remains a seemingly independent voice that foregrounds its obligation to its cultivated pan-Arab audience. But is Al-Jazeera democratic? As Marc Lynch has noted -- perhaps so in the sense that it is pluralistic. But this is a crucial step in the process of building a democratic culture. "Democracy" is performed in steps that foster acceptance of democratic practices, of sharing opinions, and recognizing the legitimacy of other opinions. Marwan Kraidy observed in his study of Arab reality television that the call-in and text-message voting segments of these programs constitute a mediated site of social transformation towards a participatory political culture. What I am getting at here is that while the U.S. continues to dither over how its broadcast voice in the Middle East may or may not be serving the interests of opposing perspectives (i.e. a monolithic notion of "terrorists"), the robust and dynamic satellite news environment is already forging ahead as a protean space for a changing political culture. When we consider the increasing importance of mobile phone and social networking technology as a tool for political activism in the Arab world -- arguing about Al-Hurra's supposed level of terrorist content seems out of touch. Consider the following statement in CBS's reporting about Arab perception of Al-Hurra: "'The Free One' is seen by most Arabs as the U.S. government station, "The Cheney Channel" as some have called it, and that perception is limiting in a region where people tend to look a gift horse in the mouth." Leave aside for the moment the essentializing "gift horse in the mouth" comment. If the U.S. is, as former BBG chairman Norman Pattiz claims, in a 'media war' -- then the complex terrain of this war needs to be re-assessed. The instruments of international broadcasting should be updated to the ways in which audiences are consuming, evaluating, and incorporating media content and media platforms into the everyday communicative process of sense-making. U.S. communications research left behind simplistic notions of news functioning like "magic bullets" decades ago, and we should not expect such dynamics in the Arab media ecology. So what would make Al-Hurra more relevant, or useful, to U.S. objectives? Kim Andrew Elliott, in my opinion, makes the most succinct summation of the predicament facing Al-Hurra. First, if Al-Hurra aims to be a legitimate international broadcasting entity -- it must provide a considerable amount of 24-7 content. Much of this will involve voices and perspectives that might reflect U.S. interests, but work to establish Al-Hurra's credibility as a legitimate news provider. Yet, even the occasional bits of anti-U.S. opinion make Al-Hurra an easy target for those who would see it as something other than international broadcasting in the traditional sense. Second, it is clear from the current controversy that Al-Hurra is beset by conflicting obligations. If Al-Hurra is expected to "promote a positive image, win over hearts and minds, or influence people over the airwaves", it loses its credibility as an international broadcaster. In its current incarnation, it loses on both fronts. But, can Al-Hurra be a proving ground for a 'new' kind of international broadcasting -- an amalgam of advocacy and journalistic intent that still retains its credibility? The increasing convergence of media technology, interactivity, and news outlets (something outlets like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya have already embraced) suggest some interesting possibilities. Regardless, if Al-Hurra is so disregarded in the landscape of Arab news alternatives then it needs a 2.0 reboot where its mission is clear. Once the mission is settled (an upfront arm for providing news from an American perspective, or, perhaps, a platform for demonstrating democratic journalistic values) then the range of American media expertise and technologies can be implemented with more realistic (and perhaps measurable) expectations. And of course, perhaps Al-Hurra can get the kind of managerial oversight and attention that it apparently needs. For now, however, Al-Hurra remains a kind of political target for skeptics of public diplomacy and the capacity of truly democratic media to constructively engage public opinion in any sort of contest of ideas. A Constructive Look at Al-Hurra and its Critics http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/PublicDiplomacyBlog/~3/311314430/ Craig_Hayden, Americas, Middle East The Washington Post, necessitates a critical response. The following blog entry provides two critiques -- first of the oddly framed arguments in CBS's coverage of Al-Hurra, and second of the government's rejoinder. Basically, while the CBS report brings up important organizational and strategic deficiencies surrounding Al-Hurra and its 'mission' -- its criticism only highlights the fact that Al-Hurra has been conferred conflicting (and perhaps contradictory) objectives and lacks a political constituency in the government. The U.S. government's response amounts to claims that Al-Hurra's numbers are improving and that the government is essentially "doing something" to promote its perspective in the competitive Arab media market. This controversy reveals the enduring problems of contemporary U.S. international broadcasting -- its weakness in the face of domestic political opposition, haphazard implementation of conflicting foreign policy imperatives, and perhaps a strategic misrecognition of the real communication landscape. In the wake of these observations, I suggest that a revitalized Al-Hurra would resolve its mandate issues, and embrace the relevance of participatory media in its target market.

CBS criticizes Al-Hurra

What is frustrating about the CBS piece (produced in conjunction with the non-profit investigative news organization ProPublica) is that it down-plays serious critiques of how the station is managed (including what gets covered and how stories make it to broadcast) and its viability in the crowded Arab media market, in favor of an oblique argument insinuating that Al-Hurra is an outlet for terrorism. By citing disparate incidents taken out of context, the report suggests that Al-Hurra has become an outlet for terrorists, because it broadcast a speech by Hassan Nasrallah (the leader of Hezbollah), and offered poor coverage of the Iranian conference on the Holocaust (coverage which seemed to be uncritical of the absurd suggestions of Holocaust deniers).

CBS recounts a history of controversy surrounding Al-Hurra in interviews of Al-Hurra personnel. CBS rightly interviews Larry Register, who had been hired to bring some credibility to the station -- only to be let go as the channel became increasingly politicized (as Marc Lynch has previously noted). Register tells the CBS interviewer Scott Pelley that "credibility" means:

"Not just picking and choosing what you might want to cover because it's favorable for your side versus their side. Cover all of it. Tell the whole story. Part of the idea is Al- Hurra is the free one. The name is 'The Free One.'"


And yet, the CBS story continues to focus on how the few instances of coverage unsupportive of U.S. and Israeli positions constitute a failure to the American taxpayer and to the objectives of public diplomacy. Even Brian Conniff, the station's top executive, tries to explain that these instances were not representative of the station's programming content, and should not be used to judge its effectiveness.

If we interpret the story as I believe it was intended to be framed, Al-Hurra is a station beset with managerial problems, which have resulted in it becoming a mouthpiece for terrorist interests. These implications are severe, and echo similar arguments made in 2001 in the U.S. Congress about how VOA Afghanistan was a mouthpiece for terror by allowing the Taliban to share air-time with other voices on U.S. programming.

I am still curious about this kind of argument -- especially when the principles of journalistic freedom (a cornerstone of American democratic governance), invoked to justify spending on these programs, are obviated by editorializing content that doesn't align with the U.S. government's positions. Which perspective should govern how the U.S. designs and implements its international broadcasting strategy? And, does airing an alternative perspective (even if it is morally onerous or contrary to the U.S.'s own declared values) constitute advocacy? Seriously -- should I as a teacher be censored if I show Leni Reifenstahl's "Triumph of the Will" to my students to illustrate the terrifying potential of propaganda -- because I've given voice to fascists? Perhaps airing the voices of those opposed to the U.S. alongside the arguments made by Americans could highlight the strengths of American discourse, and show the shallow, instrumental nature of some of the anti-American diatribe circulating in Arab media. Arguing to censor the anti-American rants suggests that they are too powerful and too strong a message to consider competing with, even if it entails sacrificing American journalistic values.

If anything, the editorial policies of Al-Hurra present a glaring contrast between declaring ambitions of journalistic freedom and actually demonstrating democratic pluralism. Put another way, Al-Hurra seems to conflate what public diplomacy scholar Nicholas Cull has identified as two 'traditions' of U.S. public diplomacy -- advocacy and international broadcasting. Implemented as policy, these two traditions yield different expectations and likely, different standards of measurement for effectiveness. As Marc Lynch observed, if the political pressure on Al-Hurra continues to its logical conclusion, we'll likely end up with another TV Marti -- a waste of taxpayers' money in international broadcasting with limited reach and impact. It is one thing to provide a media platform for the U.S. perspective; it is another to offer what aims to be a reliable international news service.

Of course, is it the obligation of Al-Hurra to provide differing perspectives (even from its enemies)? Surely, Arab audiences can get a heavy dose of news framing considered contrary to American policy objectives if they tuned into other channels. Yet, Al-Hurra was initially conceived as a "news" outlet, as much a corrective to the message provided by Al-Jazeera as it was a model for reliable, objective journalism in the Western tradition. Continuing to balance this declared mission with that of providing a positive view of American policies seems increasingly difficult, if not contradictory. One mission is journalism, the other is public relations. Honestly embracing one of these perspectives might do the channel some good -- especially since many Arab audiences are well acquainted with the historically partisan role of Arab journalism. Perhaps the credibility of the U.S. could be helped along by openly acknowledging what the rest of the Arab world already knows -- instead of trying to assert a moral authority and an editorial "firewall" with its claims of objectivity. Public relations (let alone advocacy) is also an American tradition -- why hide from it? Alternatively (and perhaps more constructively) the U.S. might learn something about the democratic reasons why stations like Al-Jazeera are so successful in the first place.

Responding to CBS

The Broadcast Board of Governors issued a statement on June 22 defending Al-Hurra. The defense was, in many respects, a decent response to the "pattern" of evidence offered by CBS. Yet, it was also indicative of the station's problems. First, it offered different polling numbers to show that it did have a growing audience in the Arab world, with increasing levels of "credibility". It then, rightly, pointed out that the CBS investigation took evidence out of context to reach its conclusions about what gets broadcast on Al-Hurra.

Yet, the response leaves some lingering questions. Do the numbers mean anything? And what really constitutes success for a news station "competing" for viewers and already saddled with questionable credibility? Al-Hurra is not the BBC (nor, for that matter, is it the VOA). So what should its mission be? When you factor in the increasingly diverse Arab satellite and regional media sphere that Al-Hurra must compete within, a fresh look at Al-Hurra seems urgent. Specifically -- what should the U.S. expect from Al-Hurra? Should it attempt to be popular like Al-Jazeera? Should it try to embody and model Western style journalism as a foundational aspect of democratic culture? Should it be a democratic (read: participatory) forum for advocating and debating the controversial aspects of U.S. policies, values, and intentions?

The Washington Post coverage of Al-Hurra offers some instructive observations about the challenges facing Al-Hurra in its "target" market -- and they have little to do with its level of anti-American content. The article's interviews with Arab viewers reflect the changing culture of media access in the region. The crowded media market, in particular, puts distinct pressure on Al-Hurra to provide compelling content. These are developments important for any television producer to recognize, let alone an international broadcaster. As the Post article indicates, Al-Hurra is not just American; it's potentially irrelevant and boring.

What can we learn from Al-Jazeera?

As The Washington Post article suggests, if Al-Hurra is to be considered a compelling news channel in the region, it must provide interesting, distinctive content that is relevant to its audience:

"Salameh Nematt, a Jordanian journalist based in Washington, said that Al-Hurra, like many of its competitors, has ignored controversial issues such as financial corruption involving Arab leaders and the use of torture by security forces… Al-Hurra would have been the number one station in the Arab world had they done one-quarter of what they should have covered."


But to follow this path suggests an emphasis on news over the imperatives of providing a distinctly U.S. message. Nematt's comment highlights the role that news outlets play for audiences facing real information needs. Al-Jazeera, for example, offers some helpful lessons about the relationship of audiences to news media. While the U.S. continues to argue for spreading democracy in the region, evangelizing universal values to the benighted -- those who had suffered so long without a voice -- it seems to overlook the value of performing democratic principles. What do I mean by this, and how might this be linked to the incredible popularity of Al-Jazeera?

International media scholars Shawn Powers and Eytan Gilboa have shown that Al-Jazeera enjoys incredible audience loyalty. They cite research indicating that large segments of Al-Jazeera's audience not only faithfully watch the channel, but believe that it speaks for them. In other words, they identify with the channel, believe in its mission, and thus give it tremendous credibility. This kind of loyalty would be hard to cultivate by any U.S. news channels domestically, let alone in the Middle East.

There are numerous historical reasons why Al-Jazeera became so popular, especially given the history of regional and pan-Arab journalism. But for the moment, let us focus on how the station offers a modicum of democratic participation. I am certainly not the first to note that Al-Jazeera provides a voice to its viewers, especially in its talk-shows. It also provides multiple perspectives on controversial issues (often-times at odds with various regional governments). Though perhaps some of Al-Jazeera's tone has shifted to accommodate the rising popularity of its competitor Al-Arabiya -- Al-Jazeera remains a seemingly independent voice that foregrounds its obligation to its cultivated pan-Arab audience.

But is Al-Jazeera democratic? As Marc Lynch has noted -- perhaps so in the sense that it is pluralistic. But this is a crucial step in the process of building a democratic culture. "Democracy" is performed in steps that foster acceptance of democratic practices, of sharing opinions, and recognizing the legitimacy of other opinions. Marwan Kraidy observed in his study of Arab reality television that the call-in and text-message voting segments of these programs constitute a mediated site of social transformation towards a participatory political culture.

What I am getting at here is that while the U.S. continues to dither over how its broadcast voice in the Middle East may or may not be serving the interests of opposing perspectives (i.e. a monolithic notion of "terrorists"), the robust and dynamic satellite news environment is already forging ahead as a protean space for a changing political culture. When we consider the increasing importance of mobile phone and social networking technology as a tool for political activism in the Arab world -- arguing about Al-Hurra's supposed level of terrorist content seems out of touch.
Consider the following statement in CBS's reporting about Arab perception of Al-Hurra:

"'The Free One' is seen by most Arabs as the U.S. government station, "The Cheney Channel" as some have called it, and that perception is limiting in a region where people tend to look a gift horse in the mouth."


Leave aside for the moment the essentializing "gift horse in the mouth" comment. If the U.S. is, as former BBG chairman Norman Pattiz claims, in a 'media war' -- then the complex terrain of this war needs to be re-assessed. The instruments of international broadcasting should be updated to the ways in which audiences are consuming, evaluating, and incorporating media content and media platforms into the everyday communicative process of sense-making. U.S. communications research left behind simplistic notions of news functioning like "magic bullets" decades ago, and we should not expect such dynamics in the Arab media ecology. So what would make Al-Hurra more relevant, or useful, to U.S. objectives?

Kim Andrew Elliott, in my opinion, makes the most succinct summation of the predicament facing Al-Hurra. First, if Al-Hurra aims to be a legitimate international broadcasting entity -- it must provide a considerable amount of 24-7 content. Much of this will involve voices and perspectives that might reflect U.S. interests, but work to establish Al-Hurra's credibility as a legitimate news provider. Yet, even the occasional bits of anti-U.S. opinion make Al-Hurra an easy target for those who would see it as something other than international broadcasting in the traditional sense. Second, it is clear from the current controversy that Al-Hurra is beset by conflicting obligations. If Al-Hurra is expected to "promote a positive image, win over hearts and minds, or influence people over the airwaves", it loses its credibility as an international broadcaster. In its current incarnation, it loses on both fronts.

But, can Al-Hurra be a proving ground for a 'new' kind of international broadcasting -- an amalgam of advocacy and journalistic intent that still retains its credibility? The increasing convergence of media technology, interactivity, and news outlets (something outlets like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya have already embraced) suggest some interesting possibilities.

Regardless, if Al-Hurra is so disregarded in the landscape of Arab news alternatives then it needs a 2.0 reboot where its mission is clear. Once the mission is settled (an upfront arm for providing news from an American perspective, or, perhaps, a platform for demonstrating democratic journalistic values) then the range of American media expertise and technologies can be implemented with more realistic (and perhaps measurable) expectations. And of course, perhaps Al-Hurra can get the kind of managerial oversight and attention that it apparently needs. For now, however, Al-Hurra remains a kind of political target for skeptics of public diplomacy and the capacity of truly democratic media to constructively engage public opinion in any sort of contest of ideas.
]]> 2008-06-24T23:35:00-08:00 http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/ Globalization is contributing to a growing international divide -- political, economic, cultural, and digital. This gap, characterized by the polarization of wealth and resources and the breakdown of shared goals and identity, has contributed to heightened instability and the generation of conflict. Terrorism and holy war have been among the reactions. Unfortunately, the West's organizational tools, policy instruments and military doctrine, mired still in Cold War era thinking, appear incapable of responding adequately. Foreign ministries and departments of defense tend to be rigid, compartmentalized and hierarchic; they aren't designed or equipped to connect with populations, forge partnerships with civil society, use the new and conventional media strategically, generate granular intelligence, or communicate cross-culturally. Few diplomats or military officers have the requisite background, training, skills or experience. Moreover, the prevalence of an adversarial world view predicated on an "us versus them" mentality and a tendency to militarize international policy responses has imposed a continuing focus on out-moded objectives such as technological/weapons superiority; controlling territory and retooling command bureaucracies. In the face of an agile, smart, networked and distributed threat -- global insurgency which uses religion to motivate violent extremism -- new approaches are imperative. Those who theorize war and political-military relations these days have little choice but ponder counterinsurgency (or COIN, in the language of the trade). It just happens to be what many NATO governments are attempting to do in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq -- and, it must be added, without great success. Conventionally trained armies are struggling with asymmetrical confrontations because they are organized, doctrinally, culturally and materially, for contesting the larger-scale and more structured types of conflict which they would like to fight, rather than the jagged, complex, shadowy conflicts in which they find themselves enmeshed. Traditionally formed diplomats, for their part, are running into difficulty because they are equipped primarily to deal with the representatives of other states, and are most comfortable operating in metropolitan centers where much time is spent interacting with others of their ilk. How can insurgency be successfully countered? Not easily. From Roman times to the Third Reich, and including the so-called Indian wars in the western USA and the Boer War in southern Africa, some combination of harsh measures, retaliation wreaked upon civilians in a manner way out of proportion to your own losses, and extreme brutality could usually be counted on to dampen the enthusiasm of the population for rebellion. Another tried and true technique is massive occupation -- say, one soldier for something between every twenty and every one hundred persons occupied, depending upon the ferocity of the resistance. That means heavy casualties for the occupier, and consequent political challenges on the home front. With widespread sensitivity and concern over human rights, mass media coverage, and limited public tolerance for casualties, neither of these standard approaches is realistically possible. So what remains? You can try to hand over control to a friendly local regime and allow them to deal with the backwash, but, as has been shown with the Karzai (Afghanistan) and al-Maliki (Iraq) governments, that is a tall order. It is very difficult to find credible, legitimate, and effective partners. In a striking example of the post-Cold War de-territorialization of political space, it is the population, not the place that has become the strategic center of gravity. That puts a premium on political persuasion, convincing people that your intentions are noble and constructive and that your efforts deserve support. Yet this is rarely attempted. Instead of reaching out to populations through dialogue and partnership, a variety of alternative objectives have been substituted: break, take, hold, repair the damage. Variations on the theme of "shock and awe," which combines speed, advanced technology and overwhelming force to establish "full spectrum dominance" might work for regime change, but are highly counter-productive in the aftermath. In the counterinsurgency type of conflict, as was so clearly the case in Vietnam, tactical victory is next to irrelevant. If you are winning every battle but still losing the war, then something is clearly out of kilter. Modern insurgency is in large part a function of underdevelopment, and will best respond if treated accordingly. If all efforts are not directed ultimately toward locally sourced good governance, the rule of law, the provision of services and political participation, and the construction of representative institutions, then neither development nor security can be anticipated. Distracted by terrorism and confounded by the jihadist political ideologies associated with Islamism, it seems fair to say that the main currents of strategic thinking in Western countries have not fully adapted to the sweeping implications of the globalization age. Specifically, the costs of the failure to come to terms with the political and developmental pre-requisites of security are adding up, and now demand a fundamental change in direction. How to begin to bridge this gap, especially, in the case of armed conflict, at the sharp, pointy end of the diplomatic spectrum? Here something quite unprecedented seems to be happening. Two str