Congress: Democracy Today - In Political Philosophy and Theory

3 - 6 November 2010 - Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal

Today western democracies confront social, cultural and political challenges, which call for a reevaluation of our state affairs, our system of practices and our system of discourses. In contemporary pluralist and multicultural societies, there is an increased gap between citizens and political establishments. Traditional approaches of politics of recognition or redistribution, used to translate claims into the public sphere, seem no longer sufficient in this new paradigm of an increased globalized world and trans-national politics. Under this light, the meaning(s) we generally tend to attribute to the concept of democracy need to be re-evaluated and ultimately redefined.

This will be the First International Congress on ‘Democracy Today’ which will take place at Universidade do Minho, Braga. Having as starting point the assumption that the concept of democracy needs to be revised, we intent, during this congress, to accomplish two main tasks: on the one hand, to provide an account of the multiplicity of meanings of ‘democracy’ and its conceptual nuances. On the other hand, to account for the different instantiations of democracy and its intrinsic practices. Under this light we propose four days of reflection, discussion and dialogue, specially under the scope of political philosophy and political theory.

These are some of the questions we expect to explore:

•               different conceptualizations of democracy - democracy, republicanism and liberalism, its relationship, tensions and articulations.

•               relationship between representation and democracy.

•               representation and political equality.

•               citizenship and civic virtue.

•               examples of democratic representation in different countries.

•               participation, abstention, representation and exclusion.

•               workplace democracy.

These are just a few topics we will approach. The first day will be dedicated to a theoretical discussion, aiming at clarifying the roots and transformations that the concept of democracy has suffered. The second day will be dedicated to the practical component, looking at concrete democratic realities of different countries. Third and fourth days will be dedicated to a workshop about workplace democracy.

We count with the special participation of Professor Lawrence Hamilton (South Africa) and David Plotke (USA).

Scientific Committee: Marta Nunes da Costa (Universidade do Minho), João Cardoso Rosas (Universidade do Minho), Acílio Rocha (Universidade do Minho), Axel Gosseries (Universidade de Louvain), Inigo Gonzalez (Universidade de Barcelona), Roberto Merrill (Universidade do Minho)

To apply to participate, before May 15 2010, send the following: (1) Your name, (2) title, (3) department and institution, (4) an abstract of your work (no more than 250 words), (5) five “key words” about your work and (6) email address.

Our email address: nunesdacosta@yahoo.com

Via Eva Kittay:

The Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute (PIKSI) is designed to encourage undergraduate students from underrepresented groups to consider future study in the field of philosophy. PIKSI, held 25 July to 1 August, emphasizes both traditional and nontraditional philosophical scholarship, such as feminist philosophy, critical race theory, and disability studies. All undergraduate student participants are fully funded by PIKSI.

PIKSI is a project of the Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory (FEAST) and is supported the Rock Ethics Institute and the College of the Liberal Arts at Penn State, as well as a number of graduate programs which have funded their graduate students to serve as Graduate Student Assistant.

The deadline for applications is 10 March for graduate students and 15 April for undergraduates. For more information on the summer institute, institutional co-sponsorship, and the Iris Marion Young Diversity Scholars fund please visit the PIKSI website.

The Newcastle Ethics, Legal and Political Philosophy Research Group are holding a conference in honour of Professor Peter Jones. The topic of the conference is “The Value and Limits of Rights.” The conference will be held at the Devonshire Building (G21 & G22) at Newcastle from 25-26 February. The programme is as follows:

Thursday, 25 February
1:30-2:00pm: Registration and Welcome Address
2:00-3:15pm: Albert Weale (UCL)
3:30-4:45pm: Simon Caney (Oxford)

Friday, 26 February
9:30-10:45am: Richard Bellamy (UCL)
10:45-11:00am: Tea/coffee
11:00am-12:15pm: John Horton (Keele)
12:15-1:00pm: Buffet lunch
1:00-2:15pm: Susan Mendus (York)
2:15-3:30pm: David Miller (Oxford)
3:30-3:45pm: Tea/coffee
3:45-5:00pm: Hillel Steiner (Manchester)

All are welcome to attend although there is a registration fee of £10 to cover the cost of the refreshments and buffet lunch. Payments can be made online here. Please address any questions to Dr Ian O’Flynn.

Here’s what I have in mind. Liberal political thought, to this point, has largely ignored a set of concerns that were central to many Labor movements, which might be called concerns over “workplace democracy” or what is sometimes called “democratic corporatism.”  With some notable exceptions (Pateman, Gould, Mansbridge), frequently offered by those operating in a Marxist framework, political philosophers have instead focused on issues of distribution or issues of legitimacy in terms of public reasons or political dialogue.  Relatively little attention has been paid to whether a society with profound inequalities in wealth, where corporations are dominant players in the political landscape, can be meaningfully democratic. There are a number of reasons for this omission, I think, including the assumptions that (1) if distribution problems are taken care of the rest will take care of itself or (2) the ideal society will have stringent campaign finance laws, public election financing, or some other way of insulating the political sphere from the economic sphere.  Given the economic and, following the Supreme Court Ruling, political-legal realities in the US for the indefinite future, I no longer believe that such assumptions will do.

Instead, I believe that if corporations are going to be dominant players in the political landscape for the indefnite future, more work needs to be done to consider whether such organizations need to be more democratic.  Are CEOs or Boards of Directors the “free speakers” for corporations, at liberty to use corporate money to influence election outcomes and policy debates?  Do campaign contributions require the approval of the majority of shareholders?  Do they require the approval of employees? There are of course reasons to favor discretionary decision making by executives - taking a vote for all decisions may leave firms unable to respond efficiently to market demands. Nonetheless, there are also substantial reasons to provide protections for workers or stockholders from what may be arbitrary or self-servingly indefensible decisions made by a board of directors. Also, the need for such rapid, discretionary decision-making with regard to political contributions is far from clear.  Treating corporations, in theory or in practice, as individuals with a right to free speech completely ignores these issues.

Later in his career Rawls himself more clearly distinguishes a property-owning democracy from the idea of a welfare state. A recent symposium in the Journal of Social Philosophy considers the implications of this distinction, in a way that is frequently relevant to the issue at hand. Given Citizens v. FEC, however, I believe that more work on the moral and political implications of corporate involvement in contemporary politics, and the ways in which workplace democracy can further democratic equality without unduly sacrificing market competitiveness, is necessary.  It is no longer plausible (if it ever was) in the American context, to believe that campaign finance law will insulate the political sphere from the economic sphere, such that inequalities in one need not entail inequalities in the other.

Any thoughts?

Drawing on John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice many have suggested that the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction is akin to the full/partial compliance distinction. In creating his ideal theory, Rawls assumes that people will comply (almost) perfectly with the requirements of justice. He then uses his original position argument to conclude that his first principle of justice should have priority over his second. Next, Rawls weakens his ideal theory assumptions, adding the constraint that people may not abide by the requirements of justice. He concludes that we should only embrace his general conception of justice in non-ideal theory.

Unfortunately, the canonical examples of ideal and non-ideal theories cannot be fully characterized as full and partial compliance theories respectively. As Simmons and others note, even Rawls says ideal theory requires more than perfect compliance. In creating his ideal theory he assumes, for instance, that the circumstances do not prevent justice from being secured. Furthermore, others have more recently provided ideal and non-ideal theories that are not full and partial compliance theories (respectively). The main thing that distinguishes Allen Buchanan’s and Michael Blake’s non-ideal theories from their ideal theories, for instance, is that their non-ideal theories assume that there will be states and consider what we should do given that we are confined to a statist system. Similarly, the main thing that distinguishes Ronald Dworkin’s non-ideal theory from his ideal theory is that he assumes that people only have different talents and disabilities in his ideal theory. Blake’s, Buchanan’s, and Dworkin’s ideal theories do not require perfect compliance. Assuming that there is something to the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction and these authors are not just using the terms in completely different ways, the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction cannot just be the full/partial compliance distinction.

Reflecting on the many ways people seem to use the terms, one might despair at the thought of trying to unify such disparate ideal and non-ideal theories. In the draft of his book manuscript Michael Blake suggests, for instance, that the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction is not that useful because it can mean many different things. He implores others to be careful to explain just what assumptions they are making in advancing any theory. Perhaps this is part of what drives Simmons and others to argue for one or another of these ways of thinking about the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction.

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The proposal strikes me as a very bad idea in a number of ways. I don’t see how the law liberates women from whatever social pressure there exists to wear a veil. Will wearing a balaclava in public be illegal too? If not, then won’t the law just force a change of attire? Nussbaum has some discussion of this general issue in her Liberty of Conscience, pp. 346-53, invoking the ability of Chicagoans (and the Dutch, and presumably the French) to conduct normal social interactions with their faces covered in winter.

What if feminists who believe that make-up is just a manifestation of the objectification of women in patriarchy, and hence symbolic of repression and degradation, are right? Is there a way to support the veil ban, but not think that this claim about make-up would justify a make-up ban?* How about t-shirts with sexist imagery and messages? Quite apart from dress codes, we can recognise prostitution as degrading, and hence contrary to the values of an egalitarian republic, without thinking it should be illegal, primarily because making it illegal may very well just make the lives of those women, so degraded, even worse.

So, a question: can anything be said in support of this proposal (from ideally a feminist perspective), that does not run into these and other problems?

*[I should add I think having to wear a burqa is worse than feeling compelled to wear make-up.]

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy

Fourth Annual Conference: May 20-22, 2010

Keynote Addresses: Elizabeth Anderson and Christine Korsgaard

Submission Guidelines: The deadline is February 15, 2010.  We welcome submissions from faculty and graduate students, as some sessions will be reserved for student presentations.  Please submit an essay of approximately 4000 words and an abstract of at most 150 words.  Essay topics in all areas of ethical theory and political philosophy will be considered, although some priority will be given to essays that take up themes from the works of Anderson and Korsgaard, such as value theory, philosophy and economics, democratic theory, constructivism, practical reason, personal identity, and the moral status of animals.  Essays and abstracts should be prepared for blind review in .doc, .rtf, or .pdf format.  Graduate submissions should be sent by e-mail to leegoldsmith2012@u.northwestern.edu and faculty submissions should be sent by e-mail to garthoff@northwestern.edu.  Notices of acceptance will be sent by March 31, 2010.  For more information, please contact Jon Garthoff at the e-mail address above or visit our website:

http://www.philosophy.northwestern.edu/conferences/moralpolitical/

ARTICLES

William Sin, ‘Trivial Sacrifices, Great Demands’, pp. 3-15

Lina Papadaki, ‘What is Objectification?’ pp. 16-36

M. B. E. Smith, ‘Does Humanity Share a Common Moral Faculty?’ pp. 37-53

Jonathan Seglow, ‘Associative Duties and Global Justice’, pp. 54-73

Miriam Ronzoni, ‘Constructivism and Practical Reason: On Intersubjectivity, Abstraction, and Judgment’, pp. 74-104

Kenneth R. Westphal, ‘From “Convention” to “Ethical Life”: Hume’s Theory of Justice in Post-Kantian Perspective’, pp. 105-32

REVIEW ARTICLE

Wim de Muijnck, ‘Thinking about Normativity: Ralph Wedgwood on “Ought”‘, pp. 133-44

BOOK REVIEWS

Clare Chambers on Gender, Class, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory, pp. 145-47

Anca Gheaus on Disadvantage, pp. 148-50

Paul Bou-Habib on Climate Change, Justice, and Future Generations, pp. 151-53

All issues of the Journal of Moral Philosophy are available on Swetswise here and IngentaConnect here.

Subscription information can be found on our Brill website here.

Please direct all enquiries regarding article or discussion submissions to the Editor, Thom Brooks (Newcastle).

Please direct all enquiries regarding review articles and books for review to the Reviews Editor, Christian Miller (Wake Forest).

Volume 6, Number 4 (2009)ARTICLES

Ty Landrum, ‘Persons as Objects of Love’, pp. 417-39

Elizabeth Tropman, ‘Renewing Moral Intuitionism’, pp. 440-63

David Alm, ‘Deontological Restrictions and the Good/Bad Asymmetry’, pp. 464-81

Carl Knight, ‘Egalitarian Justice and Valuational Judgment’, pp. 482-98

Geoffrey Scarre, ‘The “Banality of Good”?’ pp. 499-519

REVIEW ARTICLE

Sean Coyle, ‘The Ideality of Law’, pp. 521-34

BOOK REVIEWS

Stefan Bird-Pollan on The Founding Act of Modern Ethical Life: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy by Ideo Geiger, pp. 535-37

Justin Jeffrey on A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good by R. M. Adams, pp. 538-40

Adam Rawlings on Reasons and the Good by Roger Crisp, pp. 541-43

BOOKS RECEIVED

REFEREES FOR VOLUME 6

All issues of the Journal of Moral Philosophy are available on Swetswise here and IngentaConnect here.

Subscription information can be found on our Brill website here: http://www.brill.nl/jmp

Please direct all enquiries regarding article or discussion submissions to the Editor, Thom Brooks (Newcastle).

Please direct all enquiries regarding review articles and books for review to the Reviews Editor, Fabian Freyenhagen (Essex).

I post here in pdf format a paper of mine in which I argue, well, that Rawls’s theory of justice implies the justification of slavery and genocide and is therefore an abysmal failure as far as reflective equilibrium is concerned. Comments are highly welcome

All the best, Uwe  Unsavory Implications of A Theory of Justice and The Law of Peoples

Via Gillian Brock, a CFP for an issue of the Monist on cosmopolitanism due out in 2011:

According to cosmopolitanism, every person has global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal respect and consideration no matter what her citizenship status or other affiliations happen to be. This issue of The Monist is intended as a forum for debates about the pros and cons of cosmopolitanism. It will address questions such as: What does cosmopolitanism require by way of obligations of justice to all? What kinds of reforms to our global and local institutions do cosmopolitan concerns require? Are these requirements feasible? In addition to our obligations to everyone, do we have further, more demanding, obligations to compatriots or to family members? Do non-cosmopolitan theories provide a better account of our obligations and allow us a more useful framework for mediating the interests of compatriots and non-compatriots?

Inquiries should be directed to Gillian at gbrock [at] auckland.ac.nz

Moving up to the top because the deadline is soon — SCM.

The 2010 Society for Applied Philosophy annual conference will be held at St. Anne’s College from 2-4 July 2010. It will be an open themed applied philosophy conference (papers will be considered from the full range of topics in applied philosophy). Plenary speakers include Professor Thomas Pogge (Yale), Professor Judith Lichtenberg (Georgetown), Professor Catherine Lu (McGill), and Professor Ingmar Persson (Gothenburg).

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The deadline for this conference has now been extended to 18 January 2010 — SCM.

The Committee for the Graduate Conference in Political Theory at Princeton University welcomes papers concerning any period, methodological approach or topic in political theory, political philosophy, or the history of political thought. Approximately eight papers will be accepted.

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Reed College, Portland, Oregon, October 21-23, 2010

Proposals Due February 20, 2010

The Association for Political Theory welcomes paper proposals, panel proposals, and proposals for roundtable discussions from all approaches and on all topics in political theory, political philosophy, and the history of political thought. Faculty, advanced PhD candidates, and independent scholars are eligible to apply. We also encourage faculty to volunteer to serve as chairs and/or discussants.

Individual and co-authored paper proposals: To propose a paper, you must submit an abstract of 300-400 words and a copy of your CV via the appropriate link on the APT website. Please note the pre-circulation requirement, explained below, and please note that you should limit the length of your paper to 30 pages of text so that discussants may provide suitable feedback.

Panel proposals: To propose a partial or full panel, you must submit a proposal for the panel as well as proposals for each paper that it includes. In other words, each paper on a panel must be proposed individually (with abstract and CV as described above), and all must also be listed on the separate form for panel proposals (on the APT website).

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The European Science Foundation (ESF), in partnership with LFiU is organising a conference on the “Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice” to be held at the Scandic Hotel Linköping Väst, Linköping, Sweden, from 8-12 June 2010. The conference chair is Prof. Andre Nollkaemper, of the Amsterdam Center for International Law, University of Amsterdam.

The closing date for application is the 8 March, 2010. This conference is part of the 2010 ESF Research Conferences Programme and is accessible at its website.

Veniamin Zatsepin

University of Melbourne, Faculty of Education

Table of Contents - Part 2:

Personality types as the elements of anthroposystem

What is human nature?

Where is the concept of evil human nature from?

Afterword

Acknowledgments

References

Personality types as elements of the anthroposystem

The anthroposystem and the social system are two aspects of the same developed human society. Both of them represent humankind as a single whole and both of them are organized and structured. But their structural and organizational elements, and consequently the objects of their attention, are different. The social system’s constructive elements are social institutions, each performing their specific functions of maintaining and regulating economic, political, legal, moral and other relations. The anthroposystem’s “cells”, the “points of references”, are informal social-psychological groups of personality types. The anthroposystem and social system are closely tangled, so these two systems influence each other, but at the same time they still remain relatively independent.

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Veniamin Zatsepin

University of Melbourne, Faculty of Education

Table of Contents - Part 1:

Preface

Creation of the concept of the social system

The social system in Marxist philosophy

Post-Marxist concepts of the social systems

Testing the social system theories

Into the fabric of social institutes

The basic personality types

Psychopath (sociopath)

Authoritarian personality

Machiavellian personality

“Technocratic”, “practical” or “hoarding” personality

Amiable, friendly or agreeable personality

Altruistic personality

Creative personality

Part 2:

Personality types as the elements of anthroposystem

What is human nature?

Where is the concept of evil human nature from?

Afterword

Acknowledgments

References

Preface

It has always made me feel uneasy reading or hearing someone trying to explain people’s inhumane acts, and even brutish violence, by recourse to the concept of “human nature”. On this explanation, there are really only two possibilities: either one is a criminal (or at least a potential criminal) or one is simply not a human being. At the same time, I still find it bewildering that our primeval ancestors, the illiterate people of the stone and bronze ages (and our contemporaries, the Aborigines of Australia and the Americas), while poorly versed in the theory of nature’s laws, knew and expressed in their everyday lives closer kinship with nature than do even the most educated of us today. Their attitude to each and every part of nature was more humane and respectful than that of the majority of our contemporaries, despite the fact that these people burned trees for fire and killed animals for food. So what has happened to modern people, to society? Does civilization, indeed, spoil us? Why have we been breaking our contracts or mutual understanding with the animate natural world? What has been pitting us against each other and why do we degrade and eliminate other people? Is it true that mankind is a malignant tumor of the body that is earth? Are we, human beings, indeed evil from our very childhood? And who and what exactly are ‘we’?

These are the questions that the following discussion is concerned with.

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