Now, Puryear Law has taken that to the next level, providing clients with an App for their Android-powered phone or tablet. The Puryear Law App allows clients to contact Attorney Eric D. Puryear, get directions to the Puryear Law office, view our free legal guides, request an appointment with Attorney Eric D. Puryear, and much more.  There is no charge for the Puryear Law P.C. App, and it may be downloaded by clicking here or through the Market on your Android-powered phone or tablet.

Below are a couple screenshots of the Puryear Law Android App:

Note: Click here for the iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch version of the Puryear Law App.

Now, Puryear Law has taken that to the next level, providing clients with an App for their iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch. The Puryear Law App allows clients to contact Attorney Eric D. Puryear, get directions to the Puryear Law office, view our free legal guides, send photographic evidence to Attorney Eric D. Puryear, and much more.  There is no charge for the Puryear Law P.C. App, and it may be downloaded by clicking here or through the App Store on your iPhone, iPod Touch, or iPad.

Below are a few screenshots of the Puryear Law iPhone, iPod Touch, and iPad App:

Note: Click here for the Android Version of the Puryear Law App.

If you are pulled over by the police, learn what to say and when vehicle searches are legal.

If you are pulled over by the police, you will be in a much better position to challenge your ticket in court if you take a few simple steps.  Here are some suggestions.

1. When You See the Police Car

If a police car is following you with its siren blaring or emergency lights flashing, pull over to the right safely and quickly. Pull over in a way that will be most likely to calm down an angry or annoyed traffic officer. Use your turn signal to indicate any lane changes from left to right, and slow down fairly quickly, but not so quickly that the officer will have to brake to avoid hitting you. Pull over as far to the right as possible so that, when the officer comes up to your widow, he or she won’t have to worry about being clipped by vehicles in the right lane.

By stopping as soon as you can, you’ll have a better chance of figuring out exactly where the officer says you committed a violation. You may want to return to that area later to make sure the officer was telling the truth about how he or she judged your speed, saw your turn, or witnessed any other violation.

2. Right After You Stop

After you’ve pulled over to a safe spot, you might want to show the officer a few other token courtesies. At this point, you have little to lose and perhaps something to gain.

First off, roll down your window all the way. You may also want to turn off the engine, place your hands on the steering wheel, and, if it’s dark, turn on your interior light. This will tend to allay any fears the officer may have. (After all, police officers are killed every day in such “ordinary” traffic-stop situations, and the officer’s approach to the vehicle is the potentially most dangerous.)

Don’t start rummaging through your back pocket for your wallet and license, or in your glove compartment for your registration, until the officer asks you for them. For all the officer knows, you could be reaching for a gun.

If you are at all concerned that the person who stopped you is not actually a police officer (for example, if the car that pulled you over is unmarked), you should ask to see the officer’s photo identification along with his badge. If you still have doubts, you can ask that the officer to call a supervisor to the scene or you can request that you be allowed to follow the officer to a police station.

3. Avoid Giving the Officer an Excuse to Search

A police officer is normally not allowed to search your vehicle. However, there are several exceptions to this. An officer who observes you trying to either hide something under the seat or throw something out the window may legally search your car. Once cops are on your rear bumper with his spotlight silhouetting your every move, they’re watching for any sort of furtive movement. A sudden lowering of one or both shoulders will tip them off that you’re attempting to hide something under the seat.

If the officer has a reasonable suspicion you are armed and dangerous, he or she can frisk you (pat you down). Similarly, if the officer reasonably suspects that you are involved in criminal activity he or she can also perform a pat down, and if police officers have probable cause — a reasonable basis or justification to believe that you or your passengers are involved in criminal activity — they can search your car and objects belonging to passengers.

Even if the officer doesn’t have reasonable suspicion or probable cause, once you are stopped, a police officer may seize any illegal objects in your car that are in “plain view.” Once they see the object, such as open beer or wine bottles or drug paraphernalia, they can open the car door to reach in and get it. After that, they may come across other objects that are in plain view and shouldn’t be in your car, and they can seize these, too.

Lastly, your car may also be searched if you or any occupant is arrested. Also, if you’re arrested and your car is towed, the police may make an “inventory search” afterward, even if they have no reason to suspect there is anything illegal inside.

4. Should You Get Out of Your Car?

An officer who stops you for an alleged traffic violation has the right to insist that you and your passengers get out of your car. You should do so if asked. Also, getting out of your car may make it easier for you to check road conditions, the weather, and the place the violation supposedly occurred.

However, many police officers prefer that you stay in your car and will tell you to stay there if you start to get out. If this happens, obviously you should cooperate. If you get out of the car against the officer’s orders, don’t be surprised to see a gun pointing at you. Cops are trained to expect the worst. When you get out of your car, they may assume you’re about to pull a weapon or attempt to flee.

If an officer has any reason to believe that you might be dangerous, he or she has a right to conduct a quick “pat-down” search of your outer clothing while standing next to you, to make sure you don’t have a concealed knife or gun. If the officer feels any weapon-sized object during the pat-down search, he or she can reach in and get it. Also, the officer’s good faith belief that you may be dangerous justifies a search of the passenger compartment of your car for weapons.

5. Talking to the Officer

Many people stopped by an officer make the mistake of saying the wrong thing to him or her and failing to say the right things, and a case can be won or lost depending on what you say — or don’t say — to the officer.

Don’t speak first. Especially don’t start off with a defensive or hostile “What’s the problem?” or similar words. Let the officer start talking. He or she will probably ask to see your license and vehicle registration. Many people make the mistake of insisting the officer tell them why they were stopped before they’ll comply. Don’t make that mistake. Reply “okay” or “sure,” then hand over the documents.

One of the first things traffic cops learn in the police academy is to decide, before leaving their vehicle, whether they’re going to give a ticket or just a warning. They may act as though they still haven’t made up their minds and are going to let you off only if you’ll cooperate. Don’t fall for this. The hesitating officer may be trying to appear open-minded in order to extract admissions out of you, to use them against you in court if necessary. The strategy is to try to get you to admit either that you committed a violation or that you were so careless, inattentive, or negligent that you don’t know whether you did or not.

The officer might start by asking you the sort of question whose lack of a definite answer would imply guilt, like, “Do you know why I stopped you?” Or, he or she might ask, “Do you know how fast you were going?” Your answers, if any, should be non-committal and brief, like a simple “No” to the first question or a very confident, “Yes, I do,” to the second. If the officer then tells you how fast he or she thinks you were going or what he or she thinks you did, don’t argue. Give a noncommittal answer, like, “I see,” or no answer at all. Silence is not an admission of guilt and cannot be used against you in court.

Criminal intent — also called “mens rea” — is an element of some, but not all, crimes.

What makes a crime a crime? In most cases, an act is a crime because the person committing it intended to do something that the state legislature or Congress has determined is wrong, also known as criminal intent. This mental state is generally referred to as “mens rea,” Latin for “guilty mind.”

The “mens rea” concept is based on a belief that people should be punished only when they have acted in a way that makes them morally blameworthy. In the legal system’s eyes, people who intentionally engage in the behavior prohibited by a law are morally blameworthy.

Careless Behavior

“Ordinary” carelessness is not a crime. For example, careless (“negligent”) drivers are not usually criminally prosecuted if they cause an accident, though they may have to pay civil damages to those harmed by their negligence.

However, more-than-ordinary carelessness (“recklessness” or “criminal negligence”) can amount to mens rea. In general, carelessness can be a crime when a person “recklessly disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk.” It’s up to judges and juries to evaluate a person’s conduct according to community standards and decide whether the carelessness is serious enough to demonstrate mens rea.

Unintentional vs. Intentional Conduct

People who unintentionally engage in illegal conduct may be morally innocent; this is known as making a “mistake of fact.” Someone who breaks the law because he or she honestly misperceives reality lacks mens rea and should not be charged with or convicted of a crime. For example, if Paul Smith hits Jonas Sack because he reasonably but mistakenly thought Sack was about to hit him, Smith would not have mens rea.

While a “mistake of fact” can negate mens rea, a “mistake of law” usually cannot. Even when people don’t realize what they are doing is illegal, if they intentionally commit the act, they are almost always guilty. For example, if Jo sells cocaine believing that it is sugar, Jo has made a mistake of fact and lacks mens rea. However, if Jo sells cocaine in the honest but mistaken belief that it is legal to do so, Jo will have mens rea since she intentionally committed the act. Perhaps the best explanation for the difference is that if a “mistake of law” allowed people to escape punishment, the legal system would encourage people to remain ignorant of legal rules.

Crimes Requiring “Knowing” Engagement in Criminal Conduct

Some laws punish only violators who “knowingly” engage in illegal conduct. What a person has to “know” to be guilty of a crime depends on the behavior that a law makes illegal. For example:

• A drug law makes it illegal for a person to “knowingly” import an illegal drug into the United States. To convict a defendant of this crime, the prosecution would have to prove that a defendant knew that what he brought into the United States was an illegal drug.
• Another drug law makes it illegal to furnish drug paraphernalia with “knowledge” that it will be used to cultivate or ingest an illegal drug. To convict a defendant of this crime, the prosecution would have to prove that a defendant who sold or supplied drug paraphernalia knew about the improper purposes to which the paraphernalia would be put.

Crimes Requiring “Malicious” or “Willful” Behavior

In everyday usage people often use the term “malicious” to mean “spiteful” or “wicked.” In most criminal statutes, however, “malicious” is synonymous with “intentional” and “knowing.” As a result, the term “maliciously” usually adds nothing to the general mens rea requirement.

As used in murder statutes, however, the term “malice” is often interpreted as meaning the defendant had a “man-endangering” state of mind when the act was committed, which is enough to justify at least a second degree murder charge.

As with “maliciously,” the term “willfully” usually adds nothing to the general mens rea requirement. At times, however, the term “willfully” in a statute has been interpreted to require the government to prove not only that a person acted intentionally, but also that the person intended to break the law. (This is an unusual instance in which “ignorance of the law” actually is an excuse!) For example, in one case a federal law made it illegal to willfully bring in to the country more than $10,000 in cash without declaring it to customs officials. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that to convict a person of violating this law, the government had to prove that the person knew the law’s requirements. (Ratzlaf v. U.S., 510 U.S. 135 (1994).)

“Specific Intent” Crimes

“Specific intent” laws require the government to do more than show that a defendant acted “knowingly.” Specific intent laws require the government to prove that a defendant had a particular purpose in mind when engaging in illegal conduct.

For example, many theft laws require the government to prove that a defendant took property “with the intent to permanently deprive a person of the property.” To convict a defendant of theft, the government has to prove that a thief’s plan was to forever part a victim from his or her property. For example, a culprit who drives off in another’s car without permission and returns it a few hours later might be convicted only of “joyriding.” However, the same culprit who drives off in another’s car without permission and takes it across the country probably demonstrates a specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the car and would be guilty of the more serious crime of car theft.

The Role of “Motive” in Criminal Law

“Motive” generally refers to the reason behind an illegal act. For example, a person’s need to raise money quickly to pay off a bookie may be the motive for a robbery, while revenge for a personal affront may be the motive for a physical attack. Prosecutors often offer motive evidence as circumstantial evidence that a defendant acted intentionally or knowingly. Judges and jurors are more likely to believe that a defendant had mens rea if they know that the defendant had a motive to commit an illegal act. By the same token, defendants may offer evidence showing that they had no motive to commit a crime and then argue that the lack of a motive demonstrates reasonable doubt of guilt.

Crimes That Don’t Require Mens Rea

Laws that don’t require mens rea — that is, laws that punish people who may be morally innocent — are called “strict liability laws.” The usual justification for a strict liability law is that the social benefits of stringent enforcement outweigh the harm of punishing a person who may be morally blameless. Examples of strict liability laws include:

• “Statutory rape” laws, which in some states make it illegal to have sexual intercourse with a minor, even if the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that the sexual partner was old enough to consent legally to sexual intercourse.
• “Sale of alcohol to minors” laws, which in many states punish store clerks who sell alcohol to minors even if the clerks reasonably believe that the minors are old enough to buy liquor.

Strict liability laws like these punish defendants who make honest mistakes and therefore may be morally innocent.

A convicted defendant’s punishment need not include prison.

A sentence may involve one or more different elements, including incarceration (prison, jail), probation, restitution (victim compensation), and community service.

Prison Sentences

Some state laws require the judges to impose what are called “determinate” prison sentences. A determinate sentence is a fixed-term sentence pronounced by a judge. For example, a defendant sentenced to “30 days in county jail” or “five years in state prison” has received a determinate sentence.

Other state laws require judges to give “indeterminate sentences.” Indeterminate sentences are those in which the legislature sets a minimum and/or maximum time of incarceration but leaves the decision as to when to release an inmate to prison officials. As a general rule, indeterminate sentences are only imposed on people who are sentenced to state prison after being convicted of a felony.

Suspended Sentences and Probation

Sometimes a defendant’s prison sentence is “suspended.” A suspended sentence is jail or prison time that is put on hold if the defendant complies with certain other obligations, for example, the conditions of probation or the completion of a drug treatment program.

Under a suspended sentence, if the prosecution or probation department can convince a judge that the defendant violated the condition that led to the sentence being suspended in the first place, the judge has authority to order the defendant to serve the original sentence. The probationer is not entitled to a full-blown trial when the question is only whether the defendant violated probation, though the prosecution can choose to also file charges on the incident.

Most states limit when and under what circumstances a court may impose probation on a criminal defendant. For instance, some states do not allow a judge to impose probation on defendants who have a prior conviction for cocaine sales.

Offenders who are put on probation are typically required to adhere to a number of “conditions of probation,” including:

• Obey all laws (even petty laws like jaywalking have been known to land a probationer back in jail).
• Abide by any court orders, such as an order to pay a fine or restitution.
• Report regularly to the probation officer.
• Report any change of employment or address to the probation officer.
• Abstain from the excessive use of alcohol or the use of any drugs.
• Submit to regular alcohol or drug testing.
• Refrain from travel outside of the jurisdiction without prior permission of the probation officer.
• Avoid certain people and places.

If a probation violation is discovered and reported, it is likely that the court will conduct a probation revocation hearing.

Fines

Fines are a common punishment for a variety of crimes, especially less serious offenses committed by first-time offenders. Offenses that are typically punished by a fine include minor drug possession (of a small amount of marijuana, for example), fish and game violations, shoplifting, traffic violations, and first-time drunk driving cases. In more serious offenses or where the defendant has a criminal record, many judges combine a fine with other punishments, such as incarceration, community service, and probation.

Restitution

While fines go to the state (or federal or local government prosecuting the crime), restitution is money paid by the defendant to the victim or to a state restitution fund. Offenders may be required to return or replace stolen or damaged property, to compensate victims for physical injuries or for medical and psychological treatment costs, or to pay funeral and other costs where a victim dies.

In some cases, the “victim” is society, such as in welfare and Medicare fraud schemes, where defendants may be sentenced to pay the state back the money defrauded. Typically, the defendant will be ordered to pay restitution as just one part of the sentence, in addition to prison, community service, and/or probation.

Community Service

Judges can sentence defendants to perform unpaid community work called “community service” to repay a debt to society for having committed the offense. The defendant may be required to perform community service in addition to receiving some other form of punishment, such as probation, a fine, or restitution.

Miscellaneous “Alternative Sentences”

There are many different types of “alternative sentences,” which can include fairly innovative punishments. Offenders have been required to:

• install breathalyzer devices in their cars so that their cars will not start unless the offender has “clean” breath
• give lectures or teach classes about the dangers of criminal behavior
• attend lectures given by crime victims
• complete a drug or alcohol treatment program
• do weekend jail time, or
• stay at home under “house arrest.”

Diversion

Some cases can be “diverted” out of the criminal justice system. Criminal charges are normally dropped when a defendant successfully completes a diversion program. Diversion gives defendants a chance to escape the stigma of a criminal conviction.

Defendants whose cases are diverted typically have to participate in a treatment or rehabilitation program. Diversion programs are most often available to defendants charged with misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies involving drugs or alcohol. In some jurisdictions, diversion may be available to defendants charged with domestic violence, child abuse or neglect, traffic-related offenses, or even writing bad checks.

Prosecutors sometimes voluntarily offer diversion to defendants who are clearly eligible under a community’s guidelines. Defense counsel may also suggest diversion to prosecutors, sometimes even before formal charges are filed.

The Bill of Rights promises fair treatment and constitutional rights for criminal defendants.

There are two fundamental aspects of the U.S. criminal justice system: The presumption that the defendant is innocent, and the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But criminal defendants have other rights, too, including the rights to:

• remain silent
• confront witnesses
• have a public trial
• have a jury trial
• have a speedy trial
• be represented by an attorney
• receive adequate representation
• not be tried twice for the same offense (“double jeopardy”).

Here we explore some of the other hallmarks of basic criminal procedure.

Right to Remain Silent

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that a defendant cannot “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In short, the defendant cannot be forced to speak. If the defendant chooses to remain silent, the prosecutor cannot call the defendant as a witness, nor can a judge or defense attorney force the defendant to testify. (A defendant may, however, be forced to testify as a witness in a civil case.)

Right to Confront Witnesses

The “confrontation clause” of the Sixth Amendment gives defendants the right to “be confronted by the witnesses against” them. This gives defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses — that is, the right to require the witnesses to come to court, “look the defendant in the eye,” and subject themselves to questioning by the defense. The Sixth Amendment forbids prosecutors from proving a defendant’s guilt with written statements from absent witnesses, except for limited exceptions.

Right to a Public Trial

The Sixth Amendment guarantees public trials in criminal cases. This is an important right, because the presence in courtrooms of a defendant’s family and friends, ordinary citizens, and the press can help ensure that the government observes important rights associated with trials.

In a few situations — normally involving children — the court will close the court to the public. For example, judges can bar the public from attending cases when defendants are charged with sexual assaults against children. Also, the judge may exclude witnesses from the courtroom in order to prevent a witness from influencing the subsequent testimony of another.

Right to a Jury Trial

The Sixth Amendment gives a person accused of a crime the right to be tried by a jury, except for petty offenses carrying a sentence of six months or less of jail time. This right has traditionally been interpreted to mean a 12-person jury. However, a jury can constitutionally consist of as few as six persons, but defendants tried by six-person juries can be convicted only if the jury is unanimous in favor of guilt.

In most cases, a unanimous verdict is required to convict a defendant. In most states, a lack of unanimity is called a “hung jury,” and the defendant will go free unless the prosecutor decides to retry the case. In Oregon and Louisiana, however, juries may convict or acquit a defendant on a vote of ten to two. And the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld a state law providing for less-than-unanimous verdicts by 12-person juries in non-death penalty cases.

Potential jurors must be selected randomly from the community, and the actual jury must be selected by a process that allows the judge and lawyers to screen out biased jurors. In addition, a lawyer may eliminate several potential jurors simply because he feels that these people would not be sympathetic to his side — but these decisions (called “peremptory challenges”) may not be based on the juror’s personal characteristics such as race, sex, religion, or national origin.

Right to a Speedy Trial

The Sixth Amendment gives defendants a right to a “speedy trial.” However, it does not specify exact time limits. Thus, judges often have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a defendant’s trial has been so delayed that the case should be thrown out. In making this decision, judges look at the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether the delay has prejudiced (harmed) the defendant’s position.

Every jurisdiction has enacted statutes that set time limits for moving cases from the filing of the initial charge to trial. While these statutes are very strict in their wording, most defendants cannot get their convictions reversed on the ground that these statutes were violated.

Right to Be Represented by an Attorney

The Sixth Amendment provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” If a defendant cannot afford an attorney (is “indigent”), a judge must appoint an attorney at government expense, but only if the defendant might be actually imprisoned for a period of more than six months for the crime. As a practical matter, judges routinely appoint attorneys for indigents in nearly all cases in which a jail sentence is a possibility. Otherwise, the judge would be locked into giving an unrepresented defendant a nonjail sentence or a shorter sentence than he or she might think appropriate after hearing the evidence.

Right to Adequate Representation

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that both indigent defendants who are represented by appointed counsel and defendants who hire their own attorneys are entitled to adequate representation — that is, to have a lawyer who does a reasonably good job at defending the defendant.

However, adequate representation is by no means perfect representation. Here are examples of claims that defendants have made to get their guilty verdicts thrown out but that appellate courts have rejected:

• the attorney failed to call favorable witnesses at trial
• the attorney failed to object to a judge’s mistaken instructions to jurors concerning the burden of proof
• the attorney repeatedly advised a defendant who claimed innocence to plead guilty
• the attorney used cocaine during the time the representation took place, and
• the attorney represented the defendant while being suspended from the practice of law for failure to pay state bar dues.

On the other hand, circumstances can be sufficiently shocking to justify throwing out a guilty verdict based on an attorney’s incompetence. Judges have ruled that the following claims justify a reversal of a guilty verdict:

• the attorney put a law student intern in charge of the defense and left the courtroom while the case was going on
• during closing arguments, the attorney acknowledged that the defendant was guilty of a lesser crime without first securing the defendant’s approval of this tactic, and
• during voir dire (questioning of the jury), the attorney failed to challenge two potential jurors who said they would be bothered by the defendant’s failure to testify.

Right Not to Be Placed in Double Jeopardy

Among the clauses of the Fifth Amendment is this well-known provision: “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” This provision, known as the double jeopardy clause, protects defendants from harassment by preventing them from being put on trial more than once for the same offense. Double jeopardy problems are unusual, because prosecutors usually want to wrap up all their charges at one time in the same case.

One important exception to the rule against double jeopardy is that defendants can properly be charged for the same conduct by different sovereigns. For example, a defendant may face charges in both federal and state court for the same conduct if some aspects of that conduct violated federal laws while other elements ran afoul of the laws of the state.

Furthermore, the double jeopardy clause forbids more than one criminal prosecution growing out of the same conduct. A defendant can be brought once to criminal court (by the government) and once to civil court (by members of the public) for the same offense.

Chief Judge, Bobbi M Alpers

Judge Alpers, Davenport, was appointed to the bench in 1992 and named as chief judge in 2006. Born in Vinton, Iowa, she received her bachelor’s degree at the University of Dubuque in 1973. She earned her masters in 1975 and her law degree in 1983 from the University of Iowa. After graduation, she clerked for the Seventh Judicial District, served as assistant Scott County attorney, and practiced law as a sole practitioner. From 1987 to 1992 she served as a Scott County magistrate. Judge Alpers is a member of the Scott County and Iowa State Bar Associations, as well as the Iowa Judges Association, National Association for Women Judges, the American Judicature Society and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.

District Court Judge, Mark D. Cleve

Judge Cleve, Davenport, was appointed to the bench in 1998. He was born in Davenport, Iowa. He received both his undergraduate and law education from the University of Iowa. After graduating from law school in 1981, he served as Assistant County Attorney for Black Hawk County. He was in private practice in Davenport, from 1984-1998. Judge Cleve is a member of the Scott County and Iowa Bar Associations, the Iowa Judges Association, and the Dillon Inn of Court.

District Court Judge, J. Hobart Darbyshire

Judge Darbyshire, Davenport, was originally appointed to the bench in 1979, and served until 1985. After returning to private practice, he was again appointed as a District Judge in 1995. Born in Lake City, Iowa, he earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from Morningside College in 1964. He attended the University of Iowa College of Law, and received his Juris Doctor degree in 1967. Following law school, he served as a Law Clerk for the Honorable Clay LeGrand, Iowa Supreme Court Justice, from 1967-68; practiced law in Rockwell City, Mapleton, and Davenport; and served as a part-time U.S. magistrate for the Southern District of Iowa from 1972-79. Judge Darbyshire is a member of the Iowa State Bar Association and the Iowa Judges’ Association. He is married, with three children and four grandchildren.

District Court Judge, Marlita A. Greve

Judge Greve, Bettendorf, was appointed to the bench in 2006. She received her undergraduate degree from Upper Iowa University Magna Cum Laude and her law degree from the University Of Iowa College Of Law in 1992 with High Distinction. After graduation from law school, she was in private practice from 1992-2006. Judge Greve is a member of the Scott County Bar Association, the Iowa State Bar Association, and the Iowa Judges Association.  She is married and has one child.

District Court Judge, Mary E. Howes

Judge Howes, Davenport, was appointed to the district court bench in September, 2006. She served as Associate Court Judge for Scott County from January 2000 until her appointment to district court. She served as a Scott County Magistrate from 1993 to 2000. Judge Howes also was an Assistant County Attorney for seven years. She received her undergraduate degree from Drake University in 1979, and her law degree from the University of Iowa in 1982.

District Court Judge, James E. Kelley

Judge Kelley, Bettendorf, was appointed to the bench in August, 1981. He was born in Des Moines, Iowa. He earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Notre Dame in 1963, his Juris Doctor degree from the University of Iowa College of Law in 1966 (graduating Order of the Coif), and a Masters in Judicial Studies from the University of Nevada-Reno and National Judicial College in 1993. After earning his law degree, he went into the private practice of law with a law firm in Davenport for 15 years prior to his appointment to the bench. Judge Kelley is a member of the Iowa Judges Association (President 1996-97); the American Bar Association, Judicial Division; the Conference of state Trial Court Judges (Jury Standards Committee and Jury Management Committee, 1994-97); and the Iowa Judicial Council Subcommittee on Records Management and Retention (chair). Judge Kelley is married with two adult children.

District Court Judge, Paul L. Macek

Judge Macek was appointed to the bench in 2008.

District Court Judge, Gary D. McKenrick

Judge McKenrick, Bettendorf, was appointed to the bench in 1993. He was appointed as District Court Judge in 1999. Born in DeWitt, Iowa, Judge McKenrick received his bachelor’s degree from Cornell College in 1979 and his law degree from University of Iowa in 1982. He then clerked for the Seventh Judicial District for a year, before going into private practice from 1983 to 1993. He is married and has two children.

District Court Judge, Charles H. Pelton

Judge Pelton, Clinton, was appointed to the bench in 1974. He was born in Clinton, Iowa, and attended the University of Iowa. He earned his bachelor’s degree in 1962 and his law degree in 1966. In addition to practicing law, he served in the Iowa House of Representatives from 1966-1972 and chaired the OSHA Review Commission for one year. Judge Pelton is a member of the American Bar Association, the American Law Institute, and sat on the board of directors at the National Center for State Courts. Judge Pelton is married and has five children.

District Court Judge, David H. Sivright, Jr.

Judge Sivright, Clinton, was appointed to the bench in 1992. He was born in Gary, Indiana, and received his bachelor’s degree from the University of Kansas in 1966. In 1969 he earned his law degree from the same institution. He practiced law with a private firm in Clinton, Iowa. Judge Sivright belongs to the Clinton County, Iowa State, and American Bar Associations. He serves on the Judicial Ethics and Courts and Community Committees of the Iowa Judges Association. He was awarded the key to the City of Clinton in 1989 and the Reeves Gold Key Award from the Clinton Community School District in 1990. He is married with two children.

District Court Judge, Mark J. Smith

Judge Smith, LeClaire, was appointed to the bench in 1997. Born in Davenport, Iowa, he earned his bachelor’s degree from St. Ambrose University in 1972 and his law degree from St. Louis University in 1975. He has experience with real estate and personal injury cases, as well as trial work as both a prosecutor and criminal defense attorney.

District Court Judge, Nancy S. Tabor

Judge Tabor was appointed an associate juvenile judge in 1994 and named district court judge in 1999. Born in Morristown, New Jersey, she earned her undergraduate degree from William Paterson College of New Jersey in 1982 and her law degree in 1986 from the University of Wyoming, College of Law. Judge Tabor served as assistant city attorney in Cheyenne, Wyoming and as assistant Clinton county attorney. She was in private practice from 1987-1989 in Wyoming and later in Iowa until 1999. She served on the Supreme Court Task Force for Juvenile Court Improvement Project. She is a member of the Wyoming Bar Association, the Iowa Bar Association and an ISBA mediator. She is married and has two children.

District Associate Judge, John G. Mullen

Judge Mullen, Davenport, was appointed to the bench in 1986. He was born in Tucson, Arizona, and received his bachelor’s degree from the University of Illinois in 1971. He then attended Drake University Law School and graduated in 1974. He worked for the Iowa Attorney General’s Office until 1978. Judge Mullen went into private practice from 1978 to 1986. He is a member of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.

District Associate Judge, Gary P. Strausser

Judge Strausser was appointed to the bench in 2005. He earned his bachelor’s degree from Towson State University and his Law Degree from Drake University Law School. He also earned his Master’s Degree from the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at Drake University. After graduating from Law School he served as an Assistant Clinton County Attorney from 1992 to 2005 and was First Assistant from 1999 until 2005. Judge Strausser is married and has one son.

District Associate Judge, Christine Dalton Ploof

Christine Dalton Ploof, Davenport, was appointed to the bench in November 2006. She received her bachelor’s degree from Coe College in 1986, and her law degree from the University of Iowa College of Law in 1989. Prior to her appointment to the bench, she worked at the State Public Defender’s Muscatine Office; at the Muscatine County Attorney’s office; and as a staff attorney at Muscatine Legal Services. Memberships include the Iowa State Bar Association, the Muscatine County Bar Association, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Iowa Public Defenders’ Association.

District Associate Judge, Thomas H. Preacher:

Judge Preacher was appointed to the bench in 2008.

District Associate Judge, Phillip J. Tabor

Judge Tabor was appointed to the bench in 2008.

Senior District Associate Judge, Douglas McDonald

Judge McDonald, Bettendorf, was appointed to the bench in 1988, and served until his retirement on November 6, 2007. He was then appointed by the Iowa Supreme Court as Senior Judge for a two-year term, effective November 6, 2007. He earned his bachelor’s degree from the University of Colorado and his law degree from Drake University.

Senior District Associate Judge, Arlen J. Van Zee

Judge Van Zee was appointed to the bench in 1975. He earned his bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Central College in Pella, Iowa, in 1970 and his law degree from the University of Iowa, College of Law, graduating with Distinction in 1973. He is a member of the Clinton County Bar Association, Iowa State Bar Association, and Iowa Judges Association and serves on the Juvenile Laws Committee in the Judges Association and also the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Juvenile Procedure. He is married with three children and five grandchildren. After retiring in October of 2008 he continues to serve the judiciary as a senior judge and also his community through volunteer work.

Magistrate Neva Rettig Baker

Magistrate Neva Rettig Baker, Muscatine, was appointed to serve Muscatine County in 1997. She went to the University of Iowa where she earned her bachelor’s degree in 1984 and her law degree in 1987. She was executive director for Muscatine Legal Services, a judicial hospitalization referee, and is a sole practitioner. She is a member of the Muscatine County and Iowa State Bar Associations, the Ethics Committee, Kiwanis, Muscatine County Board of Health and a board member for Cross Roads, Inc. She and her husband have two children.

Magistrate Ronald J. Besch

Magistrate Ronald J. Besch was appointed to serve Jackson County in 1976.

Magistrate G. David Binegar

Magistrate G. David Binegar, Davenport, was appointed to serve Scott County in 1993. He earned his bachelor’s degree from Iowa State University in 1976 and his law degree from the University of Iowa in 1979. He has been in private practice since 1980 and is married with three children.

Magistrate Carrie E. Coyle

Magistrate Carrie E. Coyle, Blue Grass, was appointed to serve Scott County in November, 2007.

Magistrate Mark R. Lawson

Magistrate Mark R. Lawson was appointed to serve Jackson County in January 2010.

Magistrate Dennis D. Jasper

Magistrate Dennis Jasper was appointed to serve Scott County in 2005. He earned his B.D.A. Degree from the University of Iowa in 1971, and his law degree from the University of South Carolina in 1974. He has been in law practice since 1974 with the firm of Stafne, Lewis and Jasper. Dennis Jasper is a member of the Scott County and Iowa State Bar Associations. He has served as Secretary of the Scott County Bar Association since 1988 and as a member of its Executive Council for five years. He has also served as a participant at the Young Lawyers’ Luncheon, a volunteer participant for Mock Trials, a Davenport Civil Rights Commission Volunteer, volunteer legal counsel representing defendants in domestic violence actions, a participant in the Scott County Bar Association’s Lawyer Referral Service and a participating attorney in the Pro Bono Program co-sponsored by HELP Legal Assistance and the Scott County Bar Association.

Magistrate Michael M. Judge

Magistrate Michael M. Judge, Clinton, was appointed to serve Clinton County in 1993. He earned his undergraduate degree from Coe College in 1976 and his law degree from Drake University in 1988. Judge served as a juvenile court referee from 1990 to 1993 and is a member of the Clinton County and Iowa State Bar Associations. He is married with three children.

Magistrate Thomas G. Reidel

Magistrate Thomas G. Reidel was appointed to serve Muscatine County in 2009. He received his undergraduate degree from Iowa State University in 1989 and his law degree from the University of Iowa in 1992 with High Distinction. After graduation from law school, he entered private practice in Muscatine, Iowa. He is currently a sole practitioner with Conway & Reidel, P.C. He is a member of the Muscatine County Bar Association, where he serves as Secretary and as a member of the executive committee, and the Iowa State Bar Association. He is a past recipient of the Iowa Golden Seal Award for his dedication to ending domestic violence. He has a long history of being active in his community and is a past board member of multiple non-profit organizations and the past Chairman of the Muscatine County Civil Service Commission. He lives in Muscatine with his wife and their two sons.

Magistrate Teresa J. Seeberger

Magistrate Teresa J. Seeberger was appointed to serve Cedar County in 2009. She graduated from Grinnell College in 1984 and from the University of Iowa College of Law in 1988. She served as assistant Linn County Attorney and as Benton County Attorney during the 1990′s. She has either worked as a full-time assistant state public defender or has concentrated her practice by contracting with the State of Iowa to represent indigent defendants since 2003. She lives in West Branch, Iowa.

Magistrate Cynthia Zamora Taylor

Magistrate Cynthia Zamora Taylor was appointed to serve Scott County in 1998. She received her undergraduate degree from St. Ambrose College in 1981, and her law degree from the University of Iowa in 1986. Taylor has been in private practice since 1988.

Magistrate Bert Watson

Magistrate Bert Watson, Dewitt, was appointed to serve Clinton County in 1981. He earned his bachelor’s degree from the University of Northern Iowa in 1972 and his law degree from the University of Iowa in 1976. He worked for Clinton County Legal Aid until 1981 and has since been engaged in the private practice of law. Watson is a member of the Clinton County, Iowa State, and American Bar Associations, and serves on the board for the Southside Development Corporation and Dewitt Community Hospital Foundation. He is married.

Magistrate Richard D. Wells

Magistrate Richard D. Wells was appointed to serve Scott County in 1989.

Magistrate Stuart P. Werling

Magistrate Stuart Werling was appointed to serve Cedar County in 1986. He earned his bachelor’s degree from the University of Iowa in 1978 and his law degree from the University of Arkansas in 1980. He has practiced law in Tipton since 1981. Stuart Werling is a member of the Cedar County and Iowa State Bar Associations and has served as president of the Cedar County Bar and a Governor of the Iowa State Bar. Mr. Werling serves the Iowa State Bar Association on the Section Council of the General Practice section and is a member of the Real Estate, Tax and Family Law sections of the Bar. He is a director of the Iowa Association of Magistrate Judges and a member of the American Bar Association, American Trial Lawyers Association, the Iowa Association of Trial Lawyers and the Dillon Inn of Court. He is the recipient of the first Meritorious Service Award from the Judicial Department presented in 2004. Mr. Werling is married with two children.

Magistrate Stephen P. Wing

Magistrate Stephen P. Wing was appointed to serve Scott County in 2009.

Magistrate Thomas J. Yeggy

Magistrate Thomas Yeggy was appointed to serve Scott County in 2009.

Chief Judge
Val Gunnarsson
Ogle County Courthouse
106 South Fifth Street, Suite 306A
Oregon, IL 61061
Phone: (815)732-1197
Fax: (815)732-1198

Circuit Judges:

Associate Judges:



Chief Judge
Jeffrey W. O’Connor
Rock Island County Courthouse
210 Fifteenth Street, Room 408
Rock Island, IL 61201
Phone: (309)558-3289
Fax: (309)558-3263

Circuit Judges:

Associate Judges: