Raamin's Class Notes

IIPE Notes ALL

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Mon, 20 Oct 2008 14:45:00 +0000

IIPE NOTES 9-9

open v. closed economy

(exports - imports)/(exports + imports)

part
of the reason for the welfare state in europe is that their economies
were much more open (more exposed to vagaries in international
economics), so there's an outcry for a "buffer". large closed economies
(US, for example) don't have a similar outcry, so there's no welfare
state- because the fact that they're closed insulates them to some
extent

some of the thinkers that we'll talk about in this class

smith

kindleberger

polany

smith

ricardo

marx

strange

gilpin

lukes

nye

keynes

hayek

ideas:

-sovereignty

steven lukes

-the three faces of power

-this is joseph nye's language

-1st power-> Hard power (i can force you to do what i want you to do)

-2nd power-> soft power (i can give you incentive to do what i want
you to do, but still an option of refusal, everything but the threat of
force)

-3rd power-> structural power (so
calls it susan strange)-> i want you do do this, but i'm gonig to
set up structural incentives so that you want to do it yourself without
me even prompting you to

Markets
are human arrangements that depend on norms that PEOPLE bring to the
table, not an abstract set of arrangements that spring out of nowhere

-geographic and cultural differences MATTER

-you have to figure out what's immutable and what's just brought to the table as a result of prejudices or whatever

MERCANTILISM

the idea that state power and economics should coexist

-any sort of policy that weakens the economic power of the state is bad by construction

-it's a ZERO SUM (as opposed to positive sum) game

a legal system is extremely important for making these markets work

-there is an APPROPRIATE role for the state in economics

-between enforcing contracts and state sovereignty on one end and actually choosing economic winners on the other

HEGEMONY in world order

-it could be that markets alone are not enough, but you need a dominant state to force other country's economies open

monopsony-> Dominant buyers-> can force suppliers to change prices

IIPE NOTES 9-11

Gramsci- 3rd face of power by Lukes

-intellectual hegemony

-STRUCTURAL POWER

Paul Pierson (Path dependency)

-a decision maker isn't free to explore all paths at any given time

-once you get on a certain path, you're "locked in"

-lock in effects are considerable

-choices made earlier to point zero define subsequent choices

-QWERTY keyboard

-so, in IPE, HISTORY MATTERS

Putnam 2 level bargaining

-when we have an international agreement, we have to ratify it domestically

-this means that if you have a divided domestic constituency, you STRENGTHEN the bargainer's advantage

-basically it means that you can go off and say "my constituency
won't sign off on this, you have to give me a better deal!"

Rational Choice - Public Choice (olson)

-distribution of benefits and costs, and their diffusion is a key element in why certain things get done or not

-example is a 3cent tariff on auto parts

-hurts everybody by 3 cents, but benefits auto manufacturers tremendously

-critics talk about it as a theory- they talk about it being tautological

Wendt - Constructivism

-explains everything?

Feminist Critique

Dependency/Dependent Development (Peter Evans)

-the core has economic incentives to maintain the outer areas in the state they are

-outer areas are dependent on the core

-periphery doesn't industrialize, the CORE does

-it's difficult to maintain the relationship just by default, you have to have people running this maintenance

-generally there's some buy-in from the local elites as well

american vs british school

-positivism vs historicism

-positivism) we can test everything, can come up with answers that are statistically significan

-causal way to do things

-american school

-british school rejects this

-'social science needs to be more fluid, historically aware'

-rejects idea that scientific laws will come forward to explain behavior

what would marx say about mortgage market meltdown?

-part of the evolution of the market economy

-capitalism as a system is ultimately bad for the capitalist as well

-marx sees capitalism as a negative sum game

IIPE NOTES 9-16

Floating market e-rates

speculation

not money

gold standard

-failed after WWI

-countries failed to abide by the regulations that went along with the gold standard

capital controls

bretton woods

compromise of embedded liberalism

closing of the gold window

petrodollars

eurodollars

stagflation

opportunity cost

law of comparative advantage

MFN

washington consensus

strategic trade policies

dumping

export subsidies

NTB

carousel trade sanctions

free trade/fair trade

dispute settlement panels

engagement v. sanctions

LEHMAN BROS

they declare bankruptcy

-management gets fired, so does EVERYBODY ELSE

-the courts sell off all of their assets, pay off their creditors in some sort of order

IIPE Notes 9-18

home bias
soverign wealth funds
hipcs
baker plan
brady plan (+bonds)
S+L crisis- resolution trust corp
structural adjustment policies
liquidity
balance of payments
credibility - confidence
IMF conditionality
capital flight
pegged currency
NAFTA
contagion- thailand - malaysia, indonesia, SK
crony capitalism v. arms length
asian financial crisis
argentine financial crisis
russian financial crisis

IIPE Notes 9/25

Millenium Challenge Acct

-US pledged to double this by 2006 and again by 2010

-one of the reasons the US is against foreign aid in general is that we feel it's SQUANDERED

-replaced by trade, economics, tied aid (aid with strings attached)

-millenium challenge has strings attached to it

-countries that receive this aid get judged on freedom (political and economic)

-other liberal qualities

-so millenium challenge aid is targeted to countries that are 'poor, but on the way up'

-to encourage democratic accountability

-so basically, money isn't going to the 'failed states'

-money doesnt go to corrupt and failed governments.. which is good but also bad

Failed States

-not just as a political/humanitarian problem anymore

-now it's a realist problem as well

-dynamite is cheap, they blow us up

-they're important!!

-no arms control

-porous borders

-no mafia/organized crime control

-not, by and large, linked into the international political economy

ISI

-import substitution policy

-instead of importing a car from the most efficient country, they make it entirely themselves

-give subsidies to domestic producers, put tariffs on foreign producers

-this means that you don't need to have currency conversion, you also gain high-skilled jobs, etc

-problem 1) CORRUPTION- subsidies bring corruption

-problem 2) NO INNOVATION- no competition, no incentive for innovation, really really poor quality

corruption

-LOTS OF IT

-especially with import substitution

transparency

-washington consensus cares about this

accountability

-washington consensus cares about this

peace through patronage

-a construct for aid

-we pay people not to attack us

-basically it's cause we're assuming he can keep the domestic peace

-nooooot necessarily a good assumption

paradox of plenty (resource curse)

-you would expect that countries like saudi arabia would be happygolucky

-they have RESOURCES

-government isnt poor

-this isn't necessarily the case

-when your money comes from selling shit, your profits BOUNCE

1) rev. volatility

2) excess borrowing

3) corruption

4) lack of diversification

-they borrow, but don't diversify with the borrowed funds

-there's a killing the goose that laid the golden egg metaphor in here somewhere

-the problem is that the country has to be sure that the staple will REMAIN valuable

-this is the East Asian Miracle

-east asian rulers sat down and ACTUALLY DIVERSIFIED and grew their economies

-they were interested in their countries' advancement rather than JUST personal gain

5) conflict

-you see lots of seperatist movements where there are natural resources to fight over

-so there's a real reason to fight- RESOURCES

6) lack of taxation - corruption

-if you're resource-rich, you don't tax your people

-so the people have NO VESTED INTEREST in the country

7) human resources

-the best and the brightest go to where the money is

dutch disease - resource boom - e-rate up - x up - capital + labor away from man. + ag. sectors - raising -

has something to do with what the resource boom has to do with the exchange rate

-you're suddenly

production costs

J-curve - insulate reformers politically

-problem is that the initial impact of reform is negative

-it's only after a while that the reforms are good for the economy

-if people are voting at the bottom of the j-curve, they'll kick the reformers out

microfinance

-a $20 loan goes a loooong way, but means next to nothing to a bank

network externalities

-talks about how it's possible that becomes more valuable as more people join

-as opposed to the tragedy of the commons

-also responsible for geographic economic effects

-clustering of businesses (like silicon valley, etc)

IIPE Notes 9-30

subcontracting

-companies would subcontract to mom-and-pop shops

-they absorbed most of the pain of unemployment

-you can't fire lifetime workers, so you lay off the mom-and-pop subcontractors

distribution systems

-the mom-and-pop shops were all part of this elaborate, inefficient system

-instead of having one big store that sells everything, it's all spread out

-higher wages for trucks driving in one direction, etc

-basically a means to employment

-all highly regulated, so it's hard to change

-this worked as a huge barrier to international products making their way into the market

lifetime employment

-you get low wages!

postal savings bank

MITI (now METI)

-ministry of something

-trade and investment

late developer (gerschentron)

-theory was that capitalism grew organically in britain, it's not so easy afterwards

-the later you are a developing economy, the more state intervention in the economy is necessary for capitalism to grow

-japan, germany, etc

-japan is the QUINTESSENTIAL late developer

-between 1965 and 1985, japan grew at an average rate of 8.5%, which is HUGE

-it went from being a backwater defeated country to an industrial powerhouse

lack of resources

free ride - security umbrella

market share v. profitability

-japan's downfall

-no real market control until 1996 in the financial big bang of 1996

-no company was really thinking about profitability, which was a PROBLEM

-they never had to pay real rates of return until 1996

-financial big bang (1996)

zaibatsu now keiretsu

-before the war, zaibatsu were large industrial conglomerates that were supposed to be broken up

-they turned out to be hugely efficient, so they stuck around as keiretsu

-what they were were family groups of organizations

-each
had a bank, import/export trading arm, industrial network, each had a
hard manufacturing component, did business with each other, were
organized as huge industrial holdings

-companies would do business only within the family whenever possible

-so they company could make subsidies available to struggling parts of the business

-so not "pure" capitalism

uncommon democracy

-japan is a sort of "managed democracy" or "managed capitalism"

-japan's been under effective 1-party rule for like 50 years?

"corporatism without labor"

-this is japan

-even though japan technically had labor unions, they were EXTREMELY weak

-wages were able to be kept relatively low relative to what they might have been in an open system

-basically the tradeoff for lifetime employment was low pay

international balance of payments deficit

1970 -> gov't management

int rate subsidies

asset-price bubble (1989)

-people started investing in real estate (just like in america)

-lots of successful small businesses started doing this too

-bubble was both in the stock market and real estate market

-same as what happened here

-banks hold all of these assets, and nobody knows what they're actually worth

-the Bank of Japan decided that it was too risky to let all of these banks fold

-especially because there's no real welfare system in japan

-BoJ just said to keep everybody in business and pump the country full of currency

fiscal stimulus package-> >$1 trillion after 10 years

-their idea was to pump money into the economy to force people to spend money

-there's negative real interest rates in japan

-I-rates are like 0.5%

-this still didn't work, because despite all these efforts, it was too little too late

-people were still hesitant, still saving

-now, in the last few years, it's been getting a little better, but for a loooong time nothing worked

artificially high- dollar low

-high dollar policy

-artificially boosts purchasing power

-keeps the currency's worth high

-was able to keep out foreign investments, also have booming trade

-as of 1992, the government stopped fixing the yen, it's devalued since then

"catch up" hypothesis

-if you're going off a small base, it's easy to show a lot of double digit growth year after year

-also because you're able to see what you're aiming at- using known variables, essentially

THESE ARE THINGS THE STATE DID IN JAPAN

-wage equality

-hierarchical promotion

-within a firm there was a certain amount of promotion that was to be had

-no matter the merit of the person, you get promoted at the same rate as everybody else (at least to start)

-hurts incentives to work hard

-real meritocracy (until recently)

-people would take entrance exams to college which would determine where they went

-people who went to the best colleges got ministry jobs, so they were well-run

-amakudari-> older workers got parachuted down into lesser positions, so young people transitioned seamlessly

large scale retail store law 2000

-this was a way to get around the distribution network problem that prevented foreign companies from selling goods

IIPE NOTES 10-2

Little Dragons

-asian countries that end up going towards japanese model

Lucky timing

-an explanation that looks at the fact that little dragons
were starting to develop at a time where consumer goods were in HUGE
demand

US Security umbrella

-they didn't have to spend their money on national defense, because the US covers them

external threats

-presence of external threats had a way of unifying the country against a common enemy

-CHINA

destruction of old order

-happened as a result of WWII

-because the elite class was wiped out

-collaboration with japanese, kicked out and exiled, whatever

nationalism- no ethnic conflict

-ethnically homogenous countries, for the most part (except malaysia and indonesia)

-'we're all in it together' mentality

-sharing of productivity growth

policy learning/ex of japan/ex colony exp

-being colonized by japan gave ex-colonies a familiarity with japanese institutions

-helped them be more comfortable adopting progressive institutions

confucianism

-religion that promotes collective work together

WORLD BANK REPORT

macroeconomic stability

-world bank says that this is the main reason for the little dragons' success

-macro stability was never in question

-meddling by the state never threw into question the stability

-inflation was ~1/2 what it was in other developing countries

openness to international economy

-singapore was HUGELY open

low taxes

-it's better to set a realistic tax rate that people will comply with rather than an unrealistic one that people will evade

-gotta be something easy to comply with because there's no huge bureaucracy to enforce

-so you see low taxes but really high compliance rate

state allocation of resources

-through the same mechanisms a japan

-artificially repressing consumption by the people

-as the standard of living could have grown, they just suppressed consumption

-people didnt start consuming to their potential until much labor

-they deliberately targeted industries in which they did NOT have a comparative advantage

high savings rate

-a result of no-welfare-state

-families take care of elderly parents, people save for retirement

-basically there is no state unemployment, no state disability, no state retirement

-incentivizes savings

equality-income ratio

-extremely equal spread of income

education/infrastructure

-the kinds of literacy rates that were achieved by the little dragons are incredible

-even after the crash, these countries have some of the highest literacy rates

exchange rate manipulation

no politics of left (eg min wage)

-no min wage, no welfare state, reduced consumption, forced savings
authoritarian governments forced savings

-all of ^ comes with this territory

-govts need legitimacy

-lots of different ways to get this

-authoritarian govts got legitimacy by creating favorable socioeconomic conditions

-this is not DEMOCRATIC legitimacy

land reform

-it was possible because of the absence of entrenched interests

-the war having taken off the japanese occupation

-leaves an 'open field', opportunity for the govt to redistribute land equally

bureaucratic competence/honesty

-why didn't the elites do what every other elite class did- become corrupt?

-nobody really knows

-people look at nationalism and confucianism to explain it, but eh...

strong business/government ties

countries that count as little dragons?

-singapore, hong kong, taiwan, korea

-they got started about 10 years earlier than this next group

   -malaysia, thailand, indonesia, vietnam, NEVER burma or phillipines

IIPE NOTES 10-7

EU

Free Trade Area
    -trade within your country without borders
NAFTA
Customs Union
    -can't have different tariffs at points of entry in your market
Economic and Monetary Union
    -all member states (except UK and Denmark) are required to join monetary union and Euro
        -this means UNIFIED monetary policy
    -ECB makes decisions based on EUROZONE data, not specific country data
        -ECB members arent supposed to vote on national basis, but on EURO basis
        -but things dont usually happen except by consensus
            -so ECB is MUCH LESS RESPONSIVE than Fed
   -also, ECB ONLY has a mandate to fight inflation, not to promote growth (like the fed)
    -what are the benefits?
        -economics of scale
            -HUGE market opened up
       -smaller countries are insulated to some degree from the world economy
EFTA
    -European Free Trade Area
        -basically an alternative club that didn't want the political implications of the EU
   -problem was that EFTA provided no large trading partners to trade with
        -so UK and them just joined the EU
CAP
Euro

Trade Diversion - redirected trade
    -basically this means that production is redistributed
        -factories relocate, all that good stuff
            -it's "costly" to certain nations to redistribute production

revolutions from above (negotiated) poland, hungary, ussr/russia
revolutions from below (radicals in the street) germany, czecholsovakia, rumania
J-curve

Comecon Countries
    -equivalent of western europe integration for countries that were trading with USSR (Russia)
    -all of these economies had complete redirection of trade towards the soviet economy
        -not diversified at all
        -they just made a certain thing for USSR and that was pretty much it
    -problem was that if you don't have prices, you have no indicators of efficiency
        -basically people knew their product was gonna be bought, so no reason to innovate/make more efficient, etc
        -so basically these countries were just feeders into some portion of the soviet economy

IIPE NOTES 10-9

Voucher Privatization

oligarchs

shock therapy

j-curve

information cascades

poland roundtable

breznev doctrine 1968

gorbachev doctrine 1989

"sinatra doctrine"

solidarity 1980

lech walesa

speed of transitions

initial condition

Pans Club/IMF conditionality

IIPE NOTES 10-14

QUESTION TIMES

Prof

-Thurs Oct 16, 4-5pm RTBA

Rasim

-Fri Oct 17 4-5pm RTBA

Office Hours

HER

-Tues/Thurs 1-2pm Greenhouse 210

Rasim

-Wed 9-11 466 Merg

EXAM

-blue book exam

-1 section of IDs

-1 paragraph or less, what it is and why it's important

-~3 essays

NOTES

Demand v. Supply

Decentralized Network Economies

Can companies be responsible?

Why don't states cooperation on transnational crime?

Opaque Numbers

Recordkeeping

Problems with Legal Migration?

-the US doesn't put criteria based on skills or anything like that

-something like a lottery?

-canada DOES, however

-we need nurses, for example

-one of the reasons why europe regulates migration so much is because of their huge welfare state

-it's EXPENSIVE to take these people

Brain Drain

-problem with legal migration

-problem is that the migrants use up scarce university resources in other countries and pulling them to canada or the EU

-this is a problem in the EU

-don't want to create a brain drain, so there are some sorts of labor restrictions

Assimilation

Diaspora

-it's a large ethnic group that is actually outside the country

-people from the same country 'helping each other out'

-it actually becomes an economic argument

-CHINATOWN, for example

Remittances

-people come to america for the sole purpose of working and sending money back home

Human Trafficking

-slaves and shit

-labor trafficking is the most common

-dude who employs mexican day laborers, for example

-also bonded labor

-involuntary servitude

-people are kept as laborers for fear that if they escape, their family will be killed (for example)

Debt Bondage

-human trafficking

-you 'pay' someone to take you across borders to a different country

-you work off your debt in service

Forced Child Labor

Child Soldiers

-lots of them in africa and also the middle east

-300,000 children are child soldiers today

-fight for whatever group captures them

IIPE NOTES 10-16

Gilpin: "Every economic system rests on a particular political order, its nature cannot be understood aside from poltics."

Cox: "Theory is always FOR someone and FOR some purpose"

what do liberals want the government to do?

-TRANSPARENCY

-act as officiator

-guarantee contracts, etc

-milton friedmanite- LOWER TAXES, CUT SPENDING

-keynes- shoulda regulated to start with, now just SPEND TO GET OUT OF RECESSION

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Sun, 14 Oct 2007 04:00:00 +0000

GPH NOTES 10-10

I. Innovation as a system
PROCESS innovation is really the most crucial form of innovation
-makes things affordable and available to the masses
-it's produced as a SYSTEM
-the system involves public health institutions (world bank, for examples)
-also ngos, doctors without borders
-also public investment (NIH)
-also private investment (pharmaceuticals)
1980 to present, there's been NGO pressure to develop drugs
-doctors without borders, for instance
also, private companies are important in this regard
-they actually do a lot of innovation for profit. woot free markets

innovation systems tend to be more national than international
-so now we're talking about Europe and the US
-japan hasn't really been a big producer of breakthrough medicines

dk

II. The public component
-look at the public component
-in Europe, the public component is much broader than it is in the US
-this is because for the most part, universities and research centers are PUBLIC in europe
-until the 1940s, europe was the place to go for research universities (especially germany)
-hopkins was actually built on the german model
-germany was competing with the UK and france, but neither of these countries were really even close with regards to medicinal research and science
-while all this was happening, the US was starting an entirely different system
-US system was extremely different
-extremely complex by world standards
-community colleges, four year colleges, 2 year colleges, technical schools, etc etc
-while other countries decided they couldn't afford to educate everybody in this way, the US decided to just get it done with
-it was expensive, but the costs were spread and hidden all over the place so there was less sticker shock
-after WWII, the US put more money into science and engineering than any other country could afford
-not only did it put massive amounts of money in, it also decentralized the system with peer review
-there was a boom in spending, and so huge increases in state colleges
-schools are open to innovation coming in
-after the war, the germans had driven out lots of their best scientists, left them weak, but strengthened the US
-the US had supplanted europe as the leaders in technological innovation
-now, there's competition between state universities
-this promotes innovation, which is good

III. The non-profit component

this includes things like rockefellers and the gates foundations
-these are awesome!
-teaching hospitals are really important
-why is this under non-profits?

IV. The private component
are these things like teaching hospitals
-what the FUCK is going on?
-what does this have to do with anything???
oh sweet monkey jesus what is going on

V. The links and vulnerabilities

3 sets of institutions are very linked
-in the US, the boundaries between them are very loose
-lots of times people would bounce back and forth between industries
-ceos would be former university professors or whatever
-this means that in biotech, the US shot ahead of the curve
-close personal links between private and public research, this was good

what are the implications and risks?
-public funding could be cut
-if there's controversy, or even if there's just budget tightening, the funding goes downhill
what the fuck is he talking about now. jesus

VI. Trade-offs in the system

dk

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Sun, 14 Oct 2007 03:59:00 +0000

GPH NOTES 10-8

1) Essay
1 page outline due week of october 22nd
do NOT write a book report
do NOT write a book review
write a 7-9 page ESSAY that jumps off from the book, develops your own ideas, and presents them to the audience in a clear and coherent way
-1, 2, or 3 ideas, no more
-oy vey
-use these ideas as a platform and go from there
use the universal outline for essays
-what is he talking about?
-go like THIS!!
-awesome, he's a senile old man
submit a first draft of the essay on the week of october 29th
-he's gonna get angry
-oy vey
-don't write for the professor, don't write an 'insider essay', write it for the general reader
late papers get molested
-no such thing as a writing block
-HE'S GONNA KILL US ALL
-HE'S GONNA KILL ME
-omgomgomg
-i think he just threatened to kill us all

2) Questions about resistance
what the fuck is he talking about?
i think his opthamologist exploded
when did this start?
-starts with introduction of new antibiotics
-doctors were really really really happy that they could effectively treat internal malaises
-they just started pumping antibiotics into people
-so much so that they would actually refuse vaccines because they could treat pneumonia

3)When did this start?
-baaaaaaad idea
-treatment is more important than prevention?
-resistance is not a problem?
-FALSE
-what the fuck?
-in the 1940s, the FDA did NOT require drugs to actually be effective to be on the market
-it was left to the doctors to distinguish between solvent and insolvent medicines
-there was no concentrated campaign against resistance

4) When did resistance become threatening?

late, in the 1950s, 60s, fda required that drugs be effective
-AND safe!
3 developments really changed the way medicine was done
-1) discovery about biochemistry, now made possible to target diseases through enzyme inhibition
-2) molecular genetics, changed knowledge of bacteria, large molecule drugs, etc
-3) the ability to actually SEE viruses with the electron microscope, and the ability to self-culture vaccines and viruses
now, we can develop a much better understanding about resistance
-but we didn't at first
-it moved really slowly
first in-depth analysis of antibiotic use and resistance was published in 1987!
-wtf? took 4 decades to get this going
-why did it take so long, go so slow?
-even as late as the late 1980s, the professional response was skeptical
-for the most part, the problem was ignored in the late 1980s
-professionals were convinced the problem was overstated
-this was extremely important because this meant congress didn't end up caring
-this was basically because the doctors (their advisers) told them not to care
from the 1980s on, there have been many reports and such about this problem
-still, shit is moving SLOOWWWWLLLYYY
-why?
-probably because antibiotics are so easy to come by
-bacterias develop resistances much more easily
-another problem- widespread use of anti-microbials in livestock food supply
-still don't know what the full effects of this are
-another problem rises from wanting to provide healthcare for all
-now, we send people home after surgery very quickly
-just give them prescriptions, they should be good
-they've still got drains in them!
-now, people don't actually follow the medicinal regimens
-this also helps resistance
the WHO declared in 2001 that resistance is one of the three top health problems in the world
-as of 2003, we've still done nothing about it
there are lots of problems with resistance
-it's expensive to deal with!
-you need new, expensive drugs!
-holy shit it's expensive! much cheaper to just ignore it!
-when a country is only spending $1/year on healthcare per person, they're not gonna deal with resistance

one of the problems- problems are not developed evenly around the world
-scandinavia, for instance, there's tight central control of prescriptions, so not as much overuse of antibiotics
the fight for control of general medical practice is still being waged
-the doctors want MASSIVE AUTONOMY
-they're extremely well organized
-they fight vigorously to oppose any change to the system that doesn't benefit them
the doctor's problem
-liability!!!!!!
-they overprescribe to cover their asses
-even though 80% of pinkeye cases may be viral, the lawsuit comes from the 20%, so they'll prescribe antibiotics just in case
-resistance is in the future, lawsuits and insurance payments are right now
-even the doctors themselves have issues
-washing hands doesnt occur nearly as often as it should
-a higher percentage of people will wash their hands if there's someone else in the bathroom with them
-did you know soap doesn't matter when you wash hands? haha
we're now in a 'flat period' in innovation
-the professions are confident that there'll be a burst of innovation soon
-this idea works against doing shit at all

5) What can be done about it?
LOTS of institutional support
-cdc, nih, who, etc
-NGOs are working against resistance as well
why the FUCK is he talking about gazelles and cheetahs!!
-arms race? what the fuck?

6) Will this work?

dd

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Sun, 14 Oct 2007 03:58:00 +0000

GPH NOTES 10-3

1. Brief history of the IMF
Growth was pretty positive over the 80s and 90s, in most places
-asia was growing, good stuff like that
-life expectancy was declining in africa and eastern europe, however
-there was some improvement though, just not as general or as marked as in previous years
So classical economists say that in the event of recession or depression, the right course of action is to 'wait it out'
-basically, shit will fix itself
-Keynes disagreed (i think?)
-his thing was that even though in the long run shit might fix itself, in the long run we're all dead
-the GOVERNMENT needs to step in to fix shit
-to shield the people from the vicissitudes of the market
-the IMF was conceived in this vein
IMF was concerned with macroeconomic stability
-distinct from the World Bank- which dealt with structural issues
-IMF is headed in the US
-pretty much dominated by western developed countries (like WB)
-its head is traditionally a european
In 1981, the bank introduced a new financial instrument- structural adjustment loans (SAL)
-they would provide finance to a country for a certain number of years, while requiring the countries to make certain reforms that were thought to be beneficial to growth

2. The Washington Consensus

The idea of coordinated intervention in the economies of nations failing economically came to be called the "washington consensus"
-loans tend to be advanced to countries that follow the tenets set forth by the world bank/imf
-many of these ideas came out of the experience that the IMF had with latin america in the 1980s
-by the early 80s, the good growth experienced in the 50s and 60s was faltering
-the IMF's directives to cut spending, cut deficits, increase savings, open markets, etc, worked pretty decently for a while, but then failed long term

Planks of the washington consensus include vvvvv

3. Fiscal austerity, privatization, liberalization
One of the planks of the washington consensus was privatization
-governments just aren't that great at certain things- private industry is better
-this is not always necessarily true, however
-in smaller, less developed countries, there often isn't enough competition to provide a true market economy
-local monopolies are created, create even GREATER inefficiencies
-for the market structure to work in the first place, you have to have certain preconditions
-roads, availability of loans, etc
-less developed countries just don't have this
Fiscal austerity is another plank of the washington consensus
-don't have budget deficits
-the US doesn't really do this, which is understandable
-for a less-developed nation to do this, it either has to raise taxes or cut spending
-raising taxes is not really effective, especially with less developed countries
-they end up cutting spending
-this is baaaaaad, cause they cut social services and shit
-user fees are one way that countries cut spending (they reduce availability of services to the poorest)
-while this may be good fiscal policy, is it good development policy?
Trade Liberalization, liberalization of capital markets
-opening up to world trade is a good thing, generally
-this is not always a good thing all at once, though
-even the US shielded its weaker industries from the world market, at least initially, until they were able to compete on their own
-there is glaring inequality here, especially in the fields of agriculture and textiles, where the US and EU still practice protectionism
Capital market liberalization
-free capital flows have always been seen as more problematic than trade flows
-financial markets can be very fragile
-once capital markets get liberalized, you very easily get speculative flows, which is a problem
-when huge amounts of capital flow in and out rapidly, it can screw a country's economy

4. Evaluation
Overall, what does the record look like?
-over the period of time where SALs were effective, the most active african countries took out over 200 loans
-their per capita growth rate was uniformly negative, inflation was high
-in eastern europe, the per capita growth rate was -1%, inflation was ~85%
-latin america- while the markets were becoming freer, the growth rates were also low or negative
this can be looked at as kind of a chicken and egg issue
-maybe these problems were underlying, and if the IMF hadn't stepped in it would have been even worse
-but this can be looked at statistically as well, and evaluated
-Easterly managed to do statistical analysis, found that the SALs failed to help in any way
many countries did not follow the washington consensus
-east asia, for instance
-high savings, massive promotion of exports, very gradual liberalization
-it happened to work...
-even china and india are by no means market economies
-relatively loose fiscal policies
-rather extensive industrial policies
-large amounts of protectionism
-etc, etc

5. Future Prospects

The Washington Consensus is DEAD
-what will replace it?
perhaps a lesson has been learned by the world bank
-there's more humility, interest in selective and modest reforms as opposed to massive, sweeping ones
the IMF?
-the institution is looking towards paying greater attention to input from developing nations, etc
-but it doesn't really know what's going on itself
-it's at a 'crossroads'

what do we do now?
-should we make a fresh start? ditch our current institutions and start anew?
-over the 20 year period we're looking at, the IMF/WB had a 'grand plan.' in what ways is the 'grand plan' similar to the UN millennium goals?

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Sun, 14 Oct 2007 03:58:00 +0000

GPH NOTES 10-1

THE INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS IN GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH

I. Good news and a cautionary aside for those planning a career
you'll hurt people in your career trying to help people
whoopdy fucking doo

II. The World Health Organization
an agency of the UN created in the late 1940s
-the news in the last few years about the UN has been pretty negative
-ex.- Oil for Food program was massively corrupt
-charges of nepotism that involved Kofi Anan's son making money off of Oil for Food programs
-concern that the UN hasn't moved fast enough to prevent genocide in Darfur
in the last 5-10 years, the WHO has thrived
-marvelously strong public image, as a contrast to the UN
-headquartered in Europe
-the WHO has had some successes and problems as well
-remember the MEP- malaria eradication program
-all the research was not done on the spray they used to kill mosquitoes
-turned out that it actually killed people
-oops
-so it still acts as a bureaucracy sometimes, so it's not that great
-instead of the spraying, they moved to giving people pills, which actually did work
issues
-WHO's task is much narrower than Sachs' proposal
-the WHO is a narrowly defined institution
-it has several mandates, but it keeps a relatively tight focus
-its' major task is to prevent and treat infectious diseases
-this is surprising- large-scale organizations that are successful tend to outgrow their mandates, broaden out too much
-WHO works for everybody, as long as they're UN member states
-now, more and more of its money (now up to 1/2) comes from voluntary contributions
-WHO focuses most of its money on preventive medicine
-this is different from US
-US is interesting, huge amounts of money is spent on people in the last few months of their lives
-relatively very little money is spent on preventative medicine
-the WHO spends huge amounts of money on vaccination

III. The Smallpox Campaign
one of the WHOs great successes
what problems did the WHO face?
-denial
-doctors just dont care about smallpox
-wouldn't use the vaccine
-this doesn't make any sense (his pneumonia analogy)
-smallpox was considered a 'lower class disease'
-this resulted a lack of statistics
-we don't know what's out there, and what is out there is underreported
-WHO estimated there were 10-15 million cases in this certain timespan, but national data represented only 1 million
-WHO was also at a loss because their reputation was shot after the malaria fiasco
-when the USSR proposed an eradication plan worldwide, they were slow at first
-there was a lack of funding to the WHO
-countries wouldn't give money
-WHO couldn't do this centrally
-did not have the funds, equipment, or manpower to do this
-they had to convince national bodies to do it themselves
-it had to be done very uniformly
-there weren't enough vaccines of high enough quality to give to everybody
-they needed to improve equipment, labs, etc
-they even needed to train technicians to work in labs to produce vaccines
measles got added to smallpox as a target of eradication
-they decided to persist
-they created an alliance and network structure with the CDC and other organization
-they managed to get a successful campaign going, against all odds
-they managed to get 47 million people vaccinated in one year
IV. The Results
it worked, essentially
-they let the CDC run almost all of the operations in Africa on the ground
-CDC let the WHO run the programs on the ground in Zaire
-WHO and CDC were effective most of the time in working with national governments
-WHO worked with partners in latin america and asia to get programs that they didnt have the funding for themselves
-as the program got underway, they started publishing statistics
-massive transparency took effect
-this was NOT something that the governments wanted published
-there was then OFFICIAL denial
-the governments didn't want to be associated with the statistics
-they started improving their own statistics
after the successes here
-the WHO was able to get more and more donations and support for its programs
-the WHO ended up broadening the program slightly by working on containing the disease when it did break out
This is a good example of decentralization
-in each country, the program ran in a slightly different way
-centralized programs achieve efficiency by working the same way everywhere
-decentralized programs promote innovation and flexibility
-decentralization took place under certain restrictions
-clean labs, good medicine, good science, etc
-there was still a great deal of bending and twisting to get shit done on the ground
-the WHO actually encouraged them to work out their own problems
-there was also almost no emphasis on paperwork
-this is HUGE
interestingly, the cold war context had very little impact on the campaign
-one of the labs was in moscow
-once they convinced the soviets that they weren't CIA, the program went great

the campaign lasted for 12 years, and at the end of the program, smallpox was eradicated
-last recorded case was in 1977
-this even shows up in life expectancy trends
less obvious results
-changed host country health services
-demonstrated what could be done if you went out into the field with this sort of campaign
-gave them up-to-date information
-gave more training, more experience
-changed how the WHO worked
-from massive horizontal campaigns (general health to everybody) to vertical campaign (eliminate smallpox everywhere)
-most of the rest of the campaigns end up being vertical
-an example- EPI- aimed to provide all of the children in the world 6 vaccines
-BCG- treatment for tuberculosis
-DPT- diptheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus
-Polio
-measles
-complication in this campaign
-some of the vaccines have to be refrigerated
-while this is easy in the US, this is EXTREMELY difficult in africa, for instance
-but, it worked
-by 1993, 77% of kids had been vaccinated
-by 2003- 80%
-this is HUGE
-another campaign- campaign against diarrheal diseases
-kills millions of kids every year

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Sun, 14 Oct 2007 03:57:00 +0000

GPH NOTES 9-26

1. The links between globalization, income, and income equality
The economic arguments that globalization is good for health
look at the link between globalization and income, and then the link between income and health
Globalization -> income -> health -> income

sachs makes the argument that extremes of poverty are less than they were 50 years ago
-globalization is responsible for this
however, when you look at globalization's effect on income equality, it's not so nice
-so take a line of perfect equality when mapping % income to % population
-the curve that marks actual statistics is called the lorentz curve
-the ratio of the area between the curve and the line and the area of the triangle formed by the line and the y-axis is called the genie coefficient
-this is basically a measure of income inequality

2. Does income affect health, and if so, how?
in general, increase life expectancy and you increase gdp per capita, especially as you cross a threshold for gdp per capita
-for the poorer countries, even a small rise in gdp per capita results in a huge increase in gdp per capita
-income actually explains quite a bit of the variation we see in child mortality outcomes
-there are both direct and indirect links
-direct- higher income leads to better nutrition, higher income means more infrastructure, etc
-indirect- higher income leads to better education, education changes peoples' behavior in general, they take better care of their health, increase demand for health services

3. Growth and health outcomes
So when you look at gdp growth and life expectancy around the world over time, you see definite trends
-asia and to some degree the middle east have strong growth
-however, subsaharan africa shows stagnation, and then actual decrease in both life expectancy and in gdp
overall growth has been positive in the last fifty years, life expectancy has increased in teh last fifty years, but there's no one-to-one correlation

4. Inequality in income and inequality in health outcomes
look at std dev from average gdp per capita * life expectancy
-bigger it is, the worse the situation (the less equal)
-if you look at unweighted measure, inequality is increasing
-if you look at the weighted measure (corrects for population, basically shows inequality across PEOPLE), then inequality is DECREASING
-the obvious reason for this is china and india- relatively poor countries with huge populations that are skewing the numbers
look at std dev for life expectancy
-kind of stagnating, maybe increasing a tiny bit because of hiv/aids, for instance

5. Complications
globalization has independent effects on health
-travel's faster, plagues spread real quick
-look at sars
-also there are good things about globalization, like transmission of information
-LOL INTERNET
-pretty much knowledge is being transferred from the first to the third world, but it might go the other way in the future, as the third world moves up

to sum shit up
-world income has increased while poverty has fallen
-no strong relationship between growth and inequality
j

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Sun, 14 Oct 2007 03:54:00 +0000

GPH SINCE WWII NOTES 9-24

1. Economists, health, and globalization
Economists downplay the way social and cultural institutions affect behavior, etc
-academic economists look at the world more broadly than most people
-i.e. economists like markets, but they do recognize situations where markets fail to provide even efficiency, where the government needs to step in
-economists talk about globalization, and about health, but usually not together
when economists talk about globalization they mean
-increase in services, goods, etc across national boundaries
-necessitates closer international ties between nations
-look at it in different ways, eg global trade between countries, etc
-in some ways, it's like creating a global market
-why are markets so wonderful?

2. What markets are good at
markets are good at getting efficiency up
-efficiency means maximizing output per given input
-markets do this well because they use profits as their regulatory system
'each market is related to every other market'
-if televisions come under increased demand, EVERYBODY gets richer, from the TV companies to the glass company that makes the fronting for them
dynamic efficiency
-prices are not just information, they also create incentives for risk-taking and innovation
-when energy prices go up, for example, entrepreneurs are incentivized to create new, more efficient forms of energy production
-another example, under artificial price fixing by the soviet union, there was little technological innovation, they couldn't keep up on the innovation scale
there's lots of freedom in a market economy
-milton friedman
-'private ownership of resources is fundamental to the operation of a market economy'
-it also guarantees a gap between economic and political power
-despite all the caveats there (people can move back and forth between economic and political sources of power), the concentration of economic/political power is much less than in other solutions

3. Some Qualifications
what is the rationale for the government to step into the economy?
-most economists agree that for a market to operate well there must be certain regulations
-i.e. rules, regulations, LAWS that require contracts to be followed, etc
-consumer regulations to protect consumers from unsafe products
-workplace regulations to protect workers from unsafe workplaces
-another problem is basically the business cycle- macroeconomic instability
-economists for a long time just said that they should let the market self-correct
-in the middle of the great depression, classical economists made this same argument
-to cut a long story short, that didn't happen
-basically, now economists believe that some responsibility lies with the government to cushion the macroeconomic blows to the economy
-there are some places where the market just doesn't operate efficiently
-one is where social and private costs diverge
-environmental issues, for example
-if a firm pollutes a river, it's using and not paying for a public resource
-economists would say that if the firm pays for the cleanup costs, this rights itself
-healthcare market, for example
-if people are healthy, there are benefits beyond their own health
-if people are allowed to buy or not buy their own health care, efficiency in the system would be lower than would be optimal
-another are public goods that the market doesn't do well
-public goods mean that they are non-rival and non-excludable
-non-rival means that my use of the product has no bearing on your use of it
-non-excludable means that once put into place, it's very hard to prevent everybody from using it
-examples of this are roads, fire and police protection, knowledge of a vaccine
-a third is the fact that the market creates inequality
-there are always winners and losers
-some bill gates and some joe schmoes
-government now bails people out when there's bankruptcy, for instance
-the argument in favor of that is that when you keep these incentives in place and lower the risks (bankruptcy law), the 'pie gets bigger for everybody'
-everybody's made better off by helping the little guy, for example
-also, if the gap between winners and losers gets too wide, there is a basic concern for the stability of the system as a whole

4. Global markets
different countries behave differently around the world
-for example, europeans place more emphasis on public equity (socialized healthcare, education)
-asian countries rely much less on privately owned companies (more publicly owned companies)
in the past 20 years, though, there's a big move towards market forces as fixing public issues
-even in france, they're telling people to actually work- and the french are lazy!
globalization has allowed us to think of the world as a global marketplace
-look at the developing countries that have grown most rapidly- they're the ones who have opened their economies to the world most rapidly
-allows them to use resources MUCH more efficiently, import technology and resources
-export-led growth has propelled asian countries to prominence in the global system
globalization PROMOTES GROWTH
-sure, there are winners and losers, but everybody gets a piece of the bigger pie
-the link to health comes as an indirect one- through income, for instance
we've already seen, though, that markets aren't the only solution to economic problems
-there are issues in developing countries that require government involvement
-you need strong contract and patent law, for instance
-consumer regulations so that consumers will buy goods, workplace regulations so people will go to work
-the list goes on, there are some important public prerequisites
-we need government regulation and organizations to provide public goods, like roads or even prevention of global warming
-and there are winners and losers in any market economy
-pensions and healthcare are two really good examples of useful safety nets for the losers

but what's the alternative to the market?
-not really much to do
-the trick is to minimize the negatives while maximizing the positives
-economists are not necessarily TOTALLY free-market whores
-they look to the free market as one part of the solution, but you need mitigating solutions as well

dk

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Sun, 14 Oct 2007 03:53:00 +0000

GPH NOTES 9-19

The World Bank Under Siege

I. 1994: The Celebration
1994 was the 50 year anniversary of the World Bank
-at the 25th year, they published the history of the bank thus far
-they decided to publish another 'scholarly account' of the world bank thus far
-2 volumes that are both huge
-1 volume on 'history' and one on 'something perspectives' -basically what's left over
-done by the Brookings Institution
-hahahahaha, the 2 volumes were released three years late

II. The Attack from the Left

the WHO (world health organization) was a UN organization that was formed to provide the world a new international health authority
-objective- 'to turn society away from the science of destruction to life-saving science'
-one thing they did was attempt to eradicate malaria
-they thought they could do this using DDT
-the guy who invented DDT won a Nobel Prize for it
-the WHO was not in washington, but in Geneva, to emphasize their non-affiliated orientation
-they started spraying DDT everywhere
-they started a program of standardization, because they didn't want to allow for resistance to form
-the idea was to kill all the mosquito vectors so the disease would just die out
-there was already evidence that DDT was a bit dangerous...
-killed birds, fish, helpful insects...
-these problems were ignored
-problems started to form in the 1960s
-when spraying worked, the gov'ts started cutting back on spending, perceiving that the crisis was over
-this is baaaad
-when DDT proved to be dangerous to the people they tried to protect, there were serious problems as well

Unfortunately, the World Bank ignored the problems with the Malaria Eradication Program and pushed ahead with its own shit
-MacNamara himself said that tension between development and the environment was 'not as serious as some would maintain'
-just forged ahead
-the solutions to these problems were: research, high-powered, precise analysis, and decisive day-to-day action
-environmental watchdogs in the bank set guidelines for construction and new projects
-unfortunately, the watchdogs were pretty much marginalized
-MacNamara wanted the money moved out the door NOW, not after it met some environmental standards
-as soon as MacNamara leaves, the World Bank comes under assault by environmental groups as an agent of globalization and capitalism
-this was especially true as the Bank failed to deal with the food crisis of the 1970s and the debt crisis that followed it
The Bank is under attack by the left here for failing with these crises

III. The Attack from the Right

Reagan was elected in 1980, which indicated a swing towards the right in American Politics
-a swing towards the use of market forces, rather than international regulatory agencies, to spur development
-conservatives rejected population control (one of MacNamara's programs)
-conservatives rejected the Bank's emphasis on PUBLIC rather than PRIVATE investment
-conservatives rejected the Bank's lack of transparency (where's the money going? how much goes to Swiss bank accounts?)
-basically, the Bank's form of international liberalism was under assault by the Right
-under attack on both ideological and practical grounds

The Bank wasn't the only organization under attack
-the UN and the IMF were both under withering assault
-the entire international development structure was under attack (even the WHO)
-this was not just a national movement in the United States, the UK had swung sharply to the right even sooner than the US
-basically, the whole world was shifting towards market forces rather than government enterprises
-fall of soviet communism symbolizes this

IV. The Counter-Attack

The Bank didn't just sit there and take it or quit, it counterattacks
How?
-starts to compromise
-changes policy a little bit
-shifts money to the private sector
-starts to buy stocks and bonds in private companies to spur growth (international finance corporation- IFC)
-if the money isn't used well, the companies will just go bankrupt, the market will provide ultimate accountability
-they compromise even more on the environmental front
-these means delay or cancellation of large projects that displace large amounts of people
-whereas these massive programs were implemented without question in the 60s and 70s, in the 80s and 90s, they're looked at with more scrutiny
-they start "talking to people" more
-more conferences with people who disagree, actually listen to suggestions
-this was extremely difficult for the Bank, but they were trying
-at the same time, the Bank begins putting forward a more aggressive approach to the media
-they start pumping money into media campaigns
-started putting out more information about their successes
-emphasizes things like the eradication of river blindness
-they saved over 600,000 people from blindness for only 58 cents/pill
-wow
-unfortunately, this publicity pulls the Bank towards these sorts of public health programs and away from the old infrastructure programs
-in the past, Bank programs were BANK PROGRAMS
-now, the Bank had to cooperate with other NGOs
-now, the engineers and lawyers and accountants and economists had NO expertise in this area
-they need people with public health and development expertise
-they begin to form relationships with institutions that had ties to global public health
-the Bank becomes heavily involved in fighting TB in China
-they figured that the existing program wasn't working (400 MILLION people had TB... holy fucking shit)
-they started to implement a new program, with the WHO and the chinese government
-began to implement a village-based program- DOTS- direct observation of treatment something
-the current estimate is that it costs <$100 per person
-and it WORKS- reduces TB by ~35% in the populations in question

V. The Resolution

60 years later, the Bank is still struggling to solve the development program
-so is everybody else, though
what're the results?
-the institutional framework has changed very rapidly
-60 years is not long, from a historian's standpoint
-you have to think about RIGHT NOW, not 60 years from now
-there have been massive mistakes in the course of the Bank's history, but also breakthroughs
-the institutional structure that we created after WWII is still there
-they're struggling, but they're still there
-what are some alternatives to the international development structure?
-well, you could eliminate the whole structure
-the failures and costs outweigh the benefits by far
-you could improve it
-there are lots of specific ways to do that
-you could invite steve sachs? what the fuck are you talking about, big guy?

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Sun, 14 Oct 2007 03:52:00 +0000

GPH NOTES 9/17

OUTLINE

I. What is the World Bank?
-not an actual bank
-can't take a loan out from it
-loans money only to governments
-initial defined function was to loan money for reconstruction after WWII
-planners were looking backwards, to the lessons learned by WWII
-the world bank would loan money at cheaper than market rates
-where would this money come from?
-the capital of the bank
-basically the only place this money could come from was the US
-the world bank could borrow money by selling bonds
-certificates of indebtedness
-expanded its lending capacity
-special provision, however
-to get a loan, you had to be a member of the bank
-the contribution you had to make was rated according to your economic capacity
-however, your votes in the bank were determined by your capital contribution
-this means that the US has the biggest not only capital share but also voting block
-US is massively dominant in the World Bank
II. The First Incarnation
-still today, every president of the Bank has been American
-also, the Bank has a particular ideology
-"a sort of watered down liberalism"
-their mission was to change the world
-viewed men by their professions, not their personality
-bank's liberalism was watered down because it wasn't tightly focused on particular reforms, but on general change
-bank was limited to public action
-immediately there was a schism
-communist nations decided not to join
-the Bank was a capitalistic structure, not good for Commies
-bank's job was made easier by the massive success of the Marshall Plan
-again, focused on the democratic capitalist nations of the world, not on the commies
-Bank gets a little boost there
-first group of projects taken on by the Bank were easy projects- infrastructure
-easy to base estimates on, easy to invest in, easy to calculate returns on
-this necessitated massive influx of engineers into the WB
-engineers became basically the guiding force behind the bank's decision making
-once they approved a project, it was almost certain that the project would get done
-the Bank was fairly certain that all of their loans would be repaid
-this was not because of military might or anything like that, but rather because they would refuse future loans to anyone who didnt pay back
-every loan was repaid

III. The Second Incarnation
-after post-war recovery, the Bank needed something else to do
-after recovery ended, the Bank became the world's largest development bank
-basically, it's function is to pull nations out of poverty
-there wasn't much data to base shit off of, so some of the shit that got done was kinda retarded...
-for example, they looked to the Industrial Revolution for inspiration
-the British started with textile industries, so they built infrastructure and government-funded textile industries
-they thought that this would spur sustainable growth
-most of the time, this just didn't happen

IV. The Third Incarnation and the poverty problem

-the Bank then decided that it was not enough just to loan money, but also to teach
-it was difficult for poor nations to implement programs of growth because of the relatively poor human capital
-because of this, they started an economic development program that basically imported professionals to the US to teach them what they need to know to spur growth
-they created the WORLD BANK GROUP
-created an institution that would provide a thrust for private ventures
-international finance corporation (IFC)
-never really got going, because there was a cultural ideology against private and towards public growth and development

V. The Fourth Incarnation of the World Bank Group and the problems of public health

-eventually they realized that private industry and growth could be useful as well
-IFC becomes very important here
-Walt Whitman Rostow think sthat "countries need to make heavier investments in infrastructure and would have to develop at least 2 or 3 manufacturing industries in order to get productivity increases that happened during the industrial revolution"
-once the productivity increases, the takeoff starts
-once the takeoff starts, the economy will continue to be driven ahead unless something interferes with it
-Rostow has examples of this
-the big question that wasn't exactly clear in Rostow's writing was what moved nations from one stage to the other
-what convinces nations to put more money in these sectors?
-never really answered
-despite this, Rostow becomes the best-known international economist, becomes one of the best and brightest in the Kennedy administration
-WB is inspired by Rostow, takes his shit and runs with it until around 1968

-1968- Robert MacNamara becomes the president of the WB, reorients the Bank entirely (third incarnation)
-shifts it from engineering to economics
-he makes poverty, not just development, it's main concern
-he makes programs, focuses on educations as a step to sustainable growth
-public health enters the picture now
-malaria eradication
-kills the black flies that cause river blindness through spraying campaigns
-population control
-population control essentially leads to efficiency gains

from 1968 to 1981, MacNamara and his economists worked to increase the lending capacity of the bank, it worked
-from less than $1 Billion to >$13 Billion
-macnamara was tremendously successful
-refocused the bank from bricks and mortar to people
-gotten around some of the problems of corrupt governments, etc
-this brought about the fourth incarnation of the Bank
-starts in 1990

4th incarnation
-focused on a massive global public health campaign
-interesting focus on HIV/AIDS
-the Bank initially stated that the third world "could not afford antiretrovirals"
-the bank then changed its mind about the HIV stuff
-starts getting more involved in public health directly
-this CHANGES THE BANK ON A MASSIVE SCALE
-now the Bank changes its focus on general economic development or the general elimination of poverty to more focused programs
-starts directly funding HIV/AIDS research, programs, etc
-IDA becomes massively important
-this sparks huge internal struggle within the Bank
-was kind of necessary, though
-with the collapse of communism and move away from state-owned enterprise, the Bank has to change radically
-the Bank becomes more involved in private enterprise

VI. Upward! Onward!

The Bank has a litany of failures, but also of successes
-China, India were both big borrowers, the Bank can claim some credit for that
-however, it and everybody else have failed in Sub-Saharan Africa
-the Bank is still extremely controversial, but it's still pressing on

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Sun, 14 Oct 2007 03:52:00 +0000

GPH Notes 9/12

Who are these people we're reading the writings of?

Jeffery Sachs
-economist by profession
-seems to be pretty successful
puts emphasis on two subjects
-development as a product of the first industrial revolution
-underdevelopment as a product of the 2nd and 3rd industrial revolutions

with the advent of steam power (rather than water power, because steam power is transferable)
-you get significant increases in production AND in productivity
-productivity- the efficiency of the system, not just the output
-for the same input, you get greater output
mid 19th century-20th century- second industrial revolution
-advances in electricity, chemicals, electrochemicals, standardized assembly line production
adam smith does one of the first real analyses of economic conditions and reasons behind them

Brown's method-
-immunize kids
-not really dedicated to getting rid of poverty, fixes the symptoms
Gates' method-
-massively supportive of public health initiatives
-also not really dedicated to ending poverty, persay
-just wants to fix the symptoms (which are also really causes)
Sachs-
-end POVERTY first, the symptoms will follow
-adequate sewage systems
-waste removal
-etc

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Mon, 07 May 2007 06:11:00 +0000

Part 1: Short Answer ID Questions

Long Telegram
George Kennan
LONG TELEGRAM, FEB 1946
argued that the sources of soviet foreign policy lay deep within the system itself
-at the bottom of the reasoning laid a deep sense of insecurity
-both external and internal
-insecure in relation to foreign powers, what they might do to it
-also insecure in relation to its own people, not sure if they ACTUALLY own the soviet people
-post-war soviet foreign policy would be a mix of Tzarist expansionism and the soviet sense of mission
-Tzarist expansionism- own Poland, establish a 'warm water port'
-soviet sense of mission- "fig leaf"- they said they acted on the same principles as America- peace for all, etc- but this was actually a front for establishing totalitarianism
Kennan thought a confrontation between US and USSR was inevitable
-Kennan was a realist
-2 views- Universalistic (liberal) or Particularized (realist)
-thought that US should go with the particularized view, because otherwise the US would be forced to maintain their universalistic rule of law around the world, can't afford to do that
Thought that the US should draw a line
-what are the areas we CANNOT allow to fall under soviet control?
-for kennan
-atlantic community
-med. community through Iran
-japan & philippines
-found 5 essential power structures in the world
-US, UK, Germany, Japan, USSR
-US has control of the spectrum to start, can't allow the three in the middle to turn to soviet aims
Was NOT afraid of soviet invasion
-was afraid of soviet communism subverting those nations, cause germany and japan are already demoralized
3 plans by Kennan to win the cold war
-Self-Confidence
-Exploiting internal tension
-USSR's children will destroy it
-in the future, nationalistic strains of communism will compete with the soviet strain, cause more tensions
-modification of soviet mindset
3 criteria for whether we should intervene
-is assistance justified?
-not just anyone non-communists
-not backing non-communist dictatorships
-is american security at stake?
-cost vs benefits
-is it in america's interests to do so? would it be too expensive to?
-if a state on its own initiative votes in a free election for a communist govt, the US should NOT intervene
battle of 'hearts and minds'
-he'd prefer if the defeat of the USSR came slowly by diplomatic means, rather than it coming quickly by military means
-he was actually correct, war with the USSR was NOT necessary, it fell from within
Truman Doctrine
'support free peoples against armed minorities or outside pressures'
-asks for aid to help turkey and greece
-america in order to prevent internal subversion of states, needs to address the issues of poverty, misery, and want
-the secret to success from then on during the cold war was to convince the US that the opponent was either communist or allied with moscow
-this brought US into war on their side
-US commits $400 million to greece and turkey
-FIRST TIME US has gone outside self-imposed restriction of the monroe doctrine during peacetime

Encompassed within it the MARSHALL PLAN, DOMINO THEORY
announces marshall plan on June 5, 1947
-trick in maintaining democracy against communist subversion was to reestablish a strong economy in affected countries
Domino Theory
The idea was that if one country fell to communism in a region, then the whole region would be destabilized
-applied in Greece to great effect
-Korea to lesser effect
-Vietnam to pretty much failure
-Afghanistan was good, though
-one of main justifications for the marshall plan
-western europe needed to be IMPENETRABLE to soviet advance

NSC-68
document released about how to proceed in asia
-firmly rejects isolationism
-explicit declaration of the US recognizing soviet objectives, rejecting them
-US will protect and defend the 'free world'
-'free world' is ANYONE not communist
-endorsed containment by all means short of war
-tried to foster seeds of destruction within the soviet system
-if the soviets will try to undermine our values, we'll do the same to them
-problem is that US is in a state of 'relative decline'
-US is more powerful than ever, but USSR is gaining strength faster than they are, so they're in 'relative decline'
-US HAS to win the cold war, regardless of any domestic taxes, spending, etc
-'a defeat anywhere in the free world is a defeat everywhere'

Douglas MacArthur
Commander of US forces in Korea during the Korean War
strong personality, disagreed with truman often
truman's guiding motive was to prevent a third world war
-macarthur did not accept this reasoning
-he believed the americans couldn't limit themselves and still win the war
-US was still massively eurocentric
-US sends troops into western europe even during the war
-asia is a 'holding operation'
-it's at this point that the US allows for germany to rearm
-does so to reinforce their capacities in europe
-macarthur calls administration 'europhiles'
-'it is ASIA that is the real test of containment'
-if asia falls, europe stands no chance
-his plan was to step up the bombing campaign to include mainland china (particularly airbases and industry)
-impose a naval blockade on china
-intensify US operations in Korea (the troops being sent to europe should have been sent to Korea)
-introduce nationalist chinese forces to the korean front
-this was the last straw
-April 11, 1951- truman fires macarthur
-scared that macarthur's comments would bring soviets into the war
-truman says that he didnt fire macarthur because he was a bastard, he fired him because he wasnt following orders

Dean Acheson
Secretary of state in 1950
-definitively declares what the US sphere of interest was in asia
-states that the US will NOT engage in hostilities in mainland asia
-contributes to the whole misinformation causes problems thing
-because of this, N. Korea thinks that they can invade S. Korea without US intervention
-they are WRONG
-leads to korean war. haha. noobs.

Containment
theory proposed in the "X Article" in 1947
-US policy should be one of FIRM CONTAINMENT (this is important) at every point with counter-force
-allow soviet domination within its sphere of influence
-HOWEVER, be prepared for all-out war if the soviets break out of their defined sphere
-this is the guiding light of US-Soviet relations for much of the cold war
-Strongpoint defense is the name of the game here
-defend certain key 'strongpoints' that can be held against soviet assault
-use them as strategic outposts
-make sure they're located on key geopolitical points
-US needs to distinguish 2 sets of interests- vital and peripheral
-vital
-Europe, Middle East, Japan
-peripheral
-Mainland Asia
-determinants of vital interests
-strategic location (chokepoints, trade or communication)
-military/industrial capacity (if it has high military/industrial capacity, it can contribute to the war effort)
-raw materials (OIL most importantly)
-lines of communication (don't let france become communist, cause that would cut off west germany, for example)
-use an asymmetric response to respond to threats in these area (any means necessary, overwhelming force, anything that works, etc)
-difference between US and Soviet policy was that USSR looks for control, US looks for denial of Soviet control, just influence

Rollback
Theory formulated in opposition to Containment
-MacArthur was a big proponent of this
-the US needs to start actively attacking soviet and soviet-affiliated interests
-for example, US goal in Korea was just to bring the stalemate point back to the pre-war border
-macarthur advocated total korean reunification, taking the border back up to the Yalu river
-this really came to prominence under Eisenhower
Eisenhower attacks the truman administration
-especially attacks CONTAINMENT
-abandons millions to live under the terrible rule of communism
-new plan- ROLLBACK
Three precepts:
Massive Retaliation
Liberation
Asymmetric Response
Asymmetric Response
One of the precepts of Eisenhower's "New Look" at foreign policy

Old (Liberal) idea was that International system is ruled by LAW, soviets and communism operate OUTSIDE the law
-Eisenhower is more realist
-american need to ensure at MINIMUM free trade
-communism harms free trade, must be destroyed
the asymmetric response meant to meet force with OVERWHELMING force
-reply to aggression in ways calculated to play to american strengths, not on the enemy terms

Eisenhower pointed out the limits of massive retaliation
-one problem was SUBVERSION
-there's no countering military force there
-long term 'liberation can only come by peaceful means'
Deterrence was KEY for Dulles' strategy
-communists have to believe that the US will be willing to use every available option to counter, including nuclear
Brinksmanship

'the ability to go to the verge without moving into war'
-the system only works if BOTH SIDES are willing to move up to the very edge
-deterrence is ensured in this way
-eisenhower is big on this
-ended korean war in this way, at least partially
-threatened to use nukes, we win gg noobs

Massive Retaliation
Part of Asymmetric Response
-whoop the shit out of any challengers with overwhelming force
-will eventually become part of the Powell Doctrine

Dien Bien Phu
final redoubt for french forces in indochina
-they begged the US to intervene
-french are losing pretty bad, pinned down at Dien Bien Phu
-eisenhower was considering dropping 3 tactical nukes around the fortress to kill the communist forces, rejects the idea
-eisenhower was aware that if ANY American forces were committed to indochina, then they would HAVE TO WIN
-american prestige is at stake at that point
-then, french collapse at Dien Bien Phu, they lose the war
-indochina's split into cambodia, laos, and vietnam
-north and south vietnam split apart
-north becomes communist, south is not
-US immediately begins funneling money and military advisors into south vietnam
-idea was to set up a proxy state in s.vietnam
-hopefully they'd make another south korea
Quemoy and Matsu
Two islands off the coast of china
real issue is still china
-nationalists are still holed up in taiwan
-at these two islands, the nationalists decided to make a stand
-daring the commies to take the islands back
-jan 24, 1955 eisenhower asks congress for permission to deploy forces to defend taiwan and taiwanese interests
-was afraid that if he went through the whole congressional process in the event of chinese aggression, it'd be too late
-congress agrees, gives the presidency a blank check for the first time
-this is just a nod to the fact that diplomacy and military strategy unfolds too fast for congress
-this was the CLOSEST the US came to launch a preemptive war
-problem here was that the only real method of defending the islands was to use nuclear weapons
administration has done everything possible to strip away the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons
-there are issues with this, however
-applicability
-who's gonna be happy with the US if they go around killing mass numbers of people?
-feasibility (NUTS- nuclear utilization and target selection)
-is it actually possible to fight a nuclear war without it becoming a full scale war?
Operation Ajax
Operation took place in Iran
Huge success for the CIA
spheres of influence were established in middle east
-russians and british
-british basically were there for oil
Mossadegh took power in Iran 1951
-agenda was nationalization
-wanted to take over the british oilfields
-british appealed the the US for aid
CIA begins a huge disinformation campaign
-paints mossadegh as an agent for communist expansion
-not true, was an iranian nationalist
-iranians HATE russia. idiots
-US policy was shifted on the basis of suspected communist ties on the part of Mossadegh
-restored power to the Shah

Operation Success
CIA Operation in Guatemala
another huge success for the CIA
1951- Arbenz took office
-most of guatemala was controlled by foreign corporations
-big one was 'united fruit co'
-guatemala begins nationalizing land throughout guatemala, redistributing it to peasants
-trying to become self-sufficient
CIA goes in
-media campaign, painting Arbenz as a communist
-CIA takes a former coup leader and introduces him to the area
-brought all sorts of rebels and military elements to surrounding countries
-cut off guatemala from US aid
-actually invaded by proxy troops

Missile Gap
Americans were concerned that the US was losing relative advantage to the soviets
1957
-august- first ICBM
-oct- sputnik
american concept of isolation from outside enemies is shot
Gaither Report
november 1957
-recommendations for US security
-develop ICBMs, SLBMs
-IRBMs in Europe
-disperse bases, early warning, harden bases
-create fallout shelters
-every family's entitled to a fallout shelter

eisenhower refused to endorse the entire package
-this would involve a MASSIVE amount of spending
-was satisfied with 'sufficiency'
-americans have just enough nukes to ensure deterrence
-ended up in the right
-massive soviet ramp up of nuclear production was essentially a bluff, they didnt have the resources to do so
repairing the missile gap was one of the top issues for US policymakers
-US was actually far far ahead of the soviets
-khruschev's only hope for equalizing the missile gap in soviet favor was to deploy MRBMs and IRBMs within range of US, in cuba

Bay of Pigs
One of JFK's first acts was to authorize the bay of pigs invasion
-plan to land cuban exiles in the bay of pigs, spark revolution
-kennedy withheld US air support
-plan FAILED miserably, was a fiasco
other sorts of pressure were undertaken, economic especially
-total US embargo to cuba
Operation Anadyr
this was the OFFICIAL name of the Soviet nuclear deployment to cuba
-funny thing was, if soviets put a tiny armed detachment of soviet troops in cuba, same goals would have been achieved
-same deterrence
-instead, nukes were deployed
over 50,000 troops and personnel were to be deployed
-this had to be SECRET
-85 ships were used, some with round trips
-only had 4 months for this to take effect

Adlai Stevenson
US Ambassador to the UN under Kennedy
(Taken from Wikipedia)
His most famous moment came on October 25, 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, when he gave a presentation at an emergency session of the Security Council. He forcefully asked the Soviet representative, Valerian Zorin, if his country was installing missiles in Cuba, punctuated with the famous demand "Don't wait for the translation, answer 'yes' or 'no'!" in demanding an immediate answer. Following Zorin's refusal to answer the abrupt question, Stevenson retorted, "I am prepared to wait for my answer until Hell freezes over." In a diplomatic coup, Stevenson then showed photographs that proved the existence of missiles in Cuba, just after the Soviet ambassador had said they did not exist.

Ho Chi Minh Trail
Logistical system used by the North Vietnamese during the War
-the big thing was that it ran through Laos and Cambodia, so the US was reluctant to make strikes on it

Tonkin Gulf Resolution
Passed by congress in response to relatively minor attacks by Vietnamese forces on US naval assets in the Tonkin Gulc

empowered the president to protect against ANY attack on US or SEATO forces
-SEATO- southeast asia treaty organization
-essentially a blank check for force
-SEATO is NEATO (props to evan)

Tet Offensive
VC offensive
-full-scale assault on the lunar new year
-attacked 30 vietnamese cities
-actually controlled one of them for 25 days
-most poignant image was that the US embassy at saigon was actually breeched for a time
-there was a huge loss of confidence and credibility for the johnson administration
irony here was that the Tet Offensive was basically a failure
-the south vietnamese weren't willing to rise up as the VC had expected
-the VietCong was basically wiped out
-N.Vietnamese regular army forces had to bear the brunt of the fighting
-N.Vietnamese are actually LOSING
-the american people didn't perceive it that way, though
-THATS why the US was losing
Vietnamization
Part of Nixon's "peace with honor" program
-the idea was to buy time for the s. vietnamese
-US would stave off the VC attacks while they armed and equipped indigenous S. vietnamese forces to do their own fighting
-became a cornerstone of the 'nixon doctrine'
Vietnam Syndrome
The idea that the US people would be extremely against entering other wars because of the chaos and failure associated with the Vietnam War
-kind of was true
-US didn't engage in any other full-scale wars during the Cold War
-was said to be finished with the 1st gulf war
-'the ghosts of vietnam have been put to rest beneath the sands of the arabian desert'
-not really
-mogadishu's the best example
-clinton RAN from that place after US soldiers were killed
-extremely reluctant to commit troops in Rwanda or Bosnia, too

Nixon Doctrine
Vietnamization expressed on a large scale
Unless on state came into threat from nukes, US is is going to expect the problem will be handled by Asian nations themselves. Allys take burden of own defense, and has a right to expect this (what? baia...)

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

Shanghai Communique
Communique issued by Nixon, stating that it was in both of their interests to normalize relations
-US affirmed their own version of the one china policy
-pledged to reduce arms installations in taiwan
-also agreed that NO POWER should establish hegemony over the Asia-Pacific region
-this part warned the USSR against an invasion of china
-it basically moved china from an enemy in isolation to a de facto ally in less than 4 years
-flanked the USSR with NATO and China

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Signed by Nixon in 1972, between US and USSR
-limited/prohibited the development of anti-ballistic missiles
-these would form a sort of 'missile shield' around the US
-problem was that they were imperfect, also prone to being overwhelmed
-ABMs could actually PRECIPITATE war, rather than prevent it
-ABMs were replaced by MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction)
Brezhnev Doctrine
-if any country had gone socialist or entered the soviet bloc, soviets claim the right to intervene to put down counter-insurgencies
oooooo dang
-basically countered US influence around the world
-kind of a monroe doctrine for politically aligned nations, rather than geographically aligned nations

Carter Doctrine
a 'new, fresh approach to foreign policy'
Human Rights
-made 'decency and optimism' guiding lights of foreign policy
-human rights come to the forefront here
-hoped to promote human rights in the soviet union while maintaining detente
-essentially does exactly the wrong thing
-SENDS MIXED SIGNALS
-geopolitical arena turns right against us, lowest point of american prestige was in 1979
-there was the second oil shock in the decade during the iranian revolution
-sets off a spiral of stagflation
-this was the 'malaise' period of american history

NSDD 75
there are some problems now
-seems like containment had failed
-soviet union is expanding throughout the 3rd world
-there's little possibility for expansion of confrontation to the nuclear level, because they're proxy wars
-reagan doctrine therefore says essentially, we'll help you, under three conditions

these conditions are:
1) indigenous democratic resistance
2) against a 'soviet client state'
3) with a population denied representation within its own government (illegitimate government)
under those criteria, reagan doctrine will be applied

now, the reagan doctrine's being used to rebut soviet moves in afghanistan
-policy of ROLLBACK
-3 main groups of people with regards to roll back
-advocates
-wooooo rollback
-pragmatists
-evaluate on a case-by-case basis, make sure we can win every single time
-opponents
-only use it in the face of overt soviet aggression

Contras
resistance movement fighting the Sandinista rule in Nicaragua
-subject of the Iran-Contra scandal
-US was illegally funneling them funds gained from arms dealings with Iran

Strategic Defense Initiative
Strategic Defense Initiative
-plans to protect america from the nuclear threat
-this was a problem for our allies
-if the US and Soviet Union both had their own SDI, any nuclear war would just destroy the rest of the world
-Soviets were like oh shit
-started the policy of SWARMING or MIRVing
-just shoot more missiles than the US can shoot down
-this, however is EXTREMELY expensive
-if SDI ever worked out, the balance of power was decisively shifted in the USs favor
-most effective point of the SDI was the psychological war being waged
-Soviets were so frightened that the US could get this then they'd just flip out
-soviets realized they couldn't build one
-americans actually couldn't build on either, but they succeeded in shanking the soviets
-lol hax. noobs.

Manuel Noriega
dictator of panama
-graduate of 'school of the americas'
-essentially a CIA training camp
-was on teh CIA payroll
-was a participant in the war with the contras
-was protected from US wrath by the reagan administration
Bush HAS to deal with this
-when he doesn't deal with him, it gives rise to the 'wimp factor'
the reason that the US had to dispose of noriega was not because he was a dictator
-this isn't really that much of a problem, as long as he's a US puppet
-the problem was that he was becoming irrational
-irrationality CANNOT be tolerated around the panama canal
Operation Just Cause
originally operation 'blue spoon', they didnt think that this'd be macho enough
-essentially the US rolled over noriega
-beat the living FUCK out of his regime, installed a legit government in its place
-UN 'deplored' the action, passed toothless resolutions against it
Powell Doctrine
Colin Powell- chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
-powell didn't want to send troops to yugoslavia, bosnia, or somalia
-however, wanted to send troops into europe LESS
-thought it was more dangerous
powell doctrine, you have to satisfy 3 criteria
-sufficient force, defined mission
-clear rules of engagement (you HAVE to express any limitations)
-clearly defined exit strategy
these applied in desert storm, powell thought they applied in somalia as well
other people didn't think so
-national security council had problems with the plan
-once the US forces are committed, nothing indigenous would develop to ensure their own security
-US mission would have to expand
-this is called MISSION CREEP
Kosovo Liberation Army

Sarajevo -> Srebrenica
key components of serb ethnic cleansing were the siege of sarajevo and taking of srebrenica
-srebrenica had its security GUARANTEED by international forces
-serbs just beat the shit out of the forces, slaughtered all the men
Kosovo
Croats finally regrouped, fucked up the serbs
-US uses a private firm to rebuild the croat military
-MPRI, a company made up of former US generals and officers
-croats launch OPERATION STORM, fuck up the serb army
once the serbs made the mistake of shelling a marketplace, the US could get into the war too
-US-led NATO forces begin a strategic bombing campaign that runs from August 30-September 20
-bombed the serbs to the negotiating table
-negotiated in Dayton, Ohio (Dayton Accords)
-signed in december
still problematic- KOSOVO
-over 90% ethnic albanians, even though its part of serbia
-the serbs keep repressing the albanians
-KLA forms- Kosovo Liberation Army
-this puts pressure on the western powers to resolve the issue

Defense Planning Guidance Declaration
NO IDEA WHATSOEVER

Project for a New American Century
Part of the "Vulcan" subset of neoconservatism
-vulcans
-took the name from the roman gold vulcan, god of the forge
-aaaaand he made a star trek reference. critiquing the name of the vulcan race. holy god.
-firmly entrenched in the Dept of Defense, VP's office, and in the private sector at the time of Bush's administration
-NSA Condi Rice, DefenseSec Rumsfeld, Dept DefSec Wolfowitz, VP Cheney
-questioned validity of deterrence and containment
-promoted aggressive actions on international scale
-attacked multilateral agreements
-most active proponents of expanding the war on terror to encompass states, terrorism is an issue of foreign policy/int'l relations
-evangelical interpretation of internationalism- power = a moralizing force
-only if it's consistent with american interests
-'project for a new american century' (PNAC)
-vehicle for advancing the NeoReaganite policies
-cochaired by Bill Kristol and Donald Keagan

2002 National Security Strategy
-National security statement, 2002
-US CANNOT USE DEFENSIVE POSTURE
-terrorists now use weapons of mass destruction, so any act they take will be devastating
-US must take anticipatory action to defend itself, EVEN IF UNCERTAINTY REMAINS in the time and place
-preemptive action's benefits beat out any possible costs that may be incurred
-containment and deterrence have gone out the window
-deterrence based solely on retaliation doesnt even work against rogue states, because they dont really care what happens to them
-no way in HELL it's gonna work against non-state actors
-now america is going out and looking for 'monsters to destroy'
-the view is that america asked for what happened on sept 11, because it wasn't proactive enough
-'liberal, humanitarianist imperialism' has worked in the balkans, it'll work in the middle east as well
-US needs to respond with asymmetric response to terrorist action
-massive retaliation is the way to go
-appeasement is what's been happening essentially with terrorists so far
-we had the chance to eliminate saddam in gulf war 1
-abandoning iraq in gulf war I was 'as shameful as abandoning south vietnam in 1975'
-taking out saddam hussein is justified as an expression of american national defense and self interest
-we need to impose 'effective imperial oversight' in the middle east
-'if we have to go it alone, we'll go it alone, but i'd rather not'
-in the end, war in iraq happened essentially alone, without UNSC resolution
-tenacious multilateralism still applies to the US and US actions, but not as much as it used to
-both US and Israel have signaled that they'd be willing to take unilateral, preemptive action against agressorsdkd

Washington Consensus
democratic socialization parts (3 specific goals of the washington consensus)
-Democracy
-Open Markets
-state downsizing
-Free Trade
this is called GEOECONOMICS

clinton embraces 'enlargement of the democratic community'
-the policy of democratic enlargement (labeled as the clinton doctrine)
-containment has served its purpose
-now we move to a new model
-counter the aggression, expand democracy aggressively

The consensus included ten broad sets of recommendations:

Fiscal policy discipline;
Redirection of public spending from indiscriminate (and often regressive) subsidies toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like education, health and infrastructure investment;
Tax reform – broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates;
Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms;
Competitive exchange rates;
Trade liberalization – liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, etc.); any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs;
Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment;
Privatization of state enterprises;
Deregulation – abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudent oversight of financial institutions; and,
Legal security for property rights.

Imperial Overstrech
not quite sure what this is, but i can guess...

Part 2: Essay Questions

dkdkdkdkdkd
1. Provide a brief outline of the key factors responsible for the US decision to contain Soviet expansion after World War Two. Was the confrontation between the two superpowers inevitable or could it have been avoided?
The US has dealt w/ material threats before from Britain, Germany, & Japan and ideological threats such as Catholicism, but the US has never had to deal with both materials and ideological threats at once.
The USSR was the first time US had to deal with both material threat and ideological threat of Communism.
In the Yalta meeting in 1944 in Crimea, USSR; US was prepared to make compromises with the USSR but Stalin laid down non negotiable terms for the settlement of war. There was the issue of Poland that raised the question of honor and security.
Franklin D. Roosevelt repaired the League of Nations with United Nations and Stalin was willing to agree to the security council concept. The UN provided the USSR with a permanent seat and VETO power to have them join.
US had a stake in Europe because US had liberated Western Europe from Germany. US documented this time as massive retaliation.
George Kennan issued the Long Telegram in 1946-a blueprint of how US should deal with the USSR and a document of Containment.
USSR foreign policy stemmed from insecurity. USSR communist applied American idea of spreading their values, but where US actually believed in their values, the USSR didn't, they wanted to solely dictate, and it was a way to disguise their true objectives.
There was two approaches to US maintaining the BoP: universalitic with a community of nations through the UN solving differences through the root of law or the particularized approach, through interactions of state. In the Universalitic approach, USSR would cheat because their personality was different and they were hostile.
Kennan says US could not afford for the powers in between-UK, Germany, Japan-to go to the USSR.
The confrontation of these 2 powers were inevitable because there systems were irreconcilable and would only end at one expense of another. US had issue of security dilemma, and US and USSR was in international system driven by fear. US was status quo power while USSR was revisionists.
2. How did the proposed guidelines for US Cold War policy in NSC-68 differ from the concept of containment as originally defined by George Kennan? What explains this evolution in strategic thinking?
Kennan wanted US to maintain BoP through an Particularized approach through the interactions of state and the state system. It was more than defending US borders, US must look at those parts of the world that they can not do without and make their stand there but there raises the question of where should that line be drawn. Kennan saw this included Atlantic Community, eventually NATO, the Mediterranean and Middle East up to and including Iran, and in Asia, Japan, and the Philippines. Kennan saw five global power centers: US, UK, Germany, Japan and the USSR. He saw US at one end and the USSR at the other end. They could not afford for the powers in between to go to the USSR. Russian political power was threatening the US, not their military power. He worried about socialist subversion and indoctrination to more countries join the soviet system. He recommended a return to BoP through instilling self-confidence, exploiting tensions especially through USSR's relations with China and how their communism went in different directions, and the modification of the Soviet mindset as in to bring them closer to the Western perspective on the international system. Kennan drew up 3 criterias to those states deserving US aid to prevent them from being gobbled up: justified assistance, security, and costs vs. benefit ratio.
In Kennan's "X" Article 1947, his policy of firm containment was designed to confront USSR at every point, as a counter force. US was not restricted in any sense but full scale. He wanted to set up a perimeter around the Soviet Union periphery-an issue of defending threat. His position evolved after it was published. He said to apply strong point defense, to defend only the key regions around the borders because all the borders is out of US's ability. There was a need to distinguish two sense of interest: Vital and Peripheral. Vital interest goes back to Europe, Middle East, and Japan. It was strategic location, control of military/industrial capacity, raw materials, lines of communication. Peripheral was of mainland Asia.

At the wake of Communist success, there was second guessing to the policy of containment. When President Truman reviewed it, he realized US failed to adequately implement containment and there was a "relative decline" of US compared to USSR after building up military power and expansion. The Soviets were building its military force and making gains. The NSC-68, National Security Council 1950, was a doctrine responding to this that began with rejecting isolationism, to bring free world under dominion and anything non-communist. It endorsed containment seek by all means short of war to block further extension of soviet power. It aimed at exposing the falsity of USSR's intensions, and to foster a seed of destruction within the soviet system. It identified USSR trying to subvert the US's powers and US was going to do the same to them. A defeat anywhere is a defeat everywhere, any victory they make is a victory everywhere. They had to defend every state region against the Soviet. It was a switch from assymetric response of Kennan to one of flexible response to the treat. The doctrine is tested by outbreak of war. This response emphasized more on military action over diplomatic.

3. How was US intervention in the Korean conflict shaped by its wider commitment to the Cold War? what unique challenges did this present to US policy makers?
US was not prepared for peripheral war, and it came about with the the 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea. Korea had been occupied by Japan during WWII. After Japan's defeat, Korea was simultaneously occupied by US and USSR and its sphere was drawn on the 38th parallel latitude with north as communist and south as non-communist. While General MacArthur and SoS Acheson were discussing full scale war with USSR, Truman and US was focused on break war in Europe as their main focus, because Korea was outside of US defense perimeter and a limited war. There was fear that since US failed to stand up to Hitler, Czecholvokia was taken over by German, that if US initially didn't take care of it, it will downfall. US got Truman support and UN approval for attack because the USSR was not there to veto, they had boycotted the security council. The resolution was passed to intervene in Korea. US found themselves in a limited war with no doctrine in defense of distant count
ry with no strategic interest, there was an issue of improvised conflict and policy makers were making it up as they went along. Truman wanted to bring Asian pacific region to wider circle of war and made key commitments but problem of how would Mao interpret these actions as defensive or tightening the loose around China and were these actions hostility towards China.
General MacArthur advocated for US to not just preserve South Korea but to bring North back, to "rollback" communism. MacArthur thought if Asia fell, Europe had no chance, and the real threat was in Asia.
There was the issue of mission creep, where US objective in Korea was a policy of repelling aggression and Truman had changed it to a policy of unification. Truman wanted to prevent third world war, didn't want a nuclear war, but MacArthur didn't accept this, he wanted to isolate war and wanted to win with whatever means necessary.
US learned from Korea war that never again will US attempt by force to free communist state and US can't furnish all components to solve the problem, the other party must act on its half as well.
4. The evolving nature of the U.S. intervention in the Korean conflict is an example of "mission creep" in U.S. foreign policy- cite other instances of "mission creep," describe the forces responsible, and explain why they have been so difficult to counteract.
The term “mission creep” refers to the deviation from original goals; usually refers to a military operation. An example of “mission creep” is the Korean War. The Korean War began because of the US goal of protecting South Korea from North Korean aggression. Though the US was initially successful, they deviated from the original goals in the Korean peninsula and sought to reunite the two Koreas; however, this proved to be unattainable and the war ended with a retreat through North Korea following an intervention by the Chinese. A more recent example of mission creep is US intervention in Somalia. Intervention in Somalia began in 1992 with a U.S. humanitarian mission, but later expanded into a UN mission called “Operation Hope,” dedicated to sending food to the starving Somali people. However, Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid stopped the foodstuffs from being delivered to the Somalis, causing widespread famine and what would later be determined as genocide. The U.S. humanitarian mission quickly dissolved into a military operation to oust Aidid instill order and democracy in Somalia. This was done through the support of the UN, whose Secretary General Butros Butros-Ghali, felt personal antipathy towards Aidid. In mid-1993, the United States, under President Clinton, sent Army Rangers and Delta Force to Mogadishu where, in October, they launched an unsuccessful raid on Aidid’s headquarters to try to capture the vicious warlord. The operation, later known as the Battle of Mogadishu, was a complete failure, resulting in the loss of over 18 US soldiers and countless Somali civilians. The failure of the operation led to a withdrawal of both US and UN troops by 1995.

5. What lessons did US policy makers take from the intervention in the Korean conflict? How successfully have they been applied to subsequent interventions?
The lessons learned from the Korean War are that there are offensive and defensive limitations to US strength and capability, that wars beginning with the outbreak of the Cold War would be far more expensive than previously believed, and that the increase of the military, though dreaded and unwanted, was inevitable. The lesson from offensive limitations of the United States is that the US would never again try to free a communist state through overt force. In terms of defensive limitations, Secretary of State Dean Acheson delineated and expanded the US security perimeter in the Pacific Ring, declaring “American assistance can be effective when it is the missing component in a situation that might otherwise be solved…we cannot furnish will, desire, courage.” In terms of expenses, Final congressional authorization for expenditures was $48.2 billion, they originally thought that it would be $13.5 billion, an indication that the US military expenditures would unavoidably expand due to the changing international arena and rules of engagement in war. Lastly, new bases around the world increased the US military by 50%. By engaging in Vietnam, Truman permanently embedded the United States in an institutionalized cold war posture. Unfortunately, the lessons learned in North Korea have not been applied to subsequent US interventions, most notably in Vietnam. The lesson not learned and applied in Vietnam is the mistake of trying to free a communist state through overt force. The US went into Vietnam, a proxy war, to protect a non-communist south from an aggressive communist north. Like Eisenhower, President Kennedy saw Southeast Asia as a vital location to take a stand against communism. He saw all the communist countries in that area as cronies of the Kremlin, and saw to it that it was the United States’ responsibility to protect the liberty of South Vietnam; if the US failed to do this, our prestige would be damaged. However, unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy saw Vietnam as a political, not a military issue and considered Vietnam a limited war wherein nuclear deterrence would not be successful. Though Eisenhower began sending military advisers to South Vietnam in the 1950s, Kennedy increased the number of advisers and troops levels in Vietnam, a move that, under Johnson, would cause major escalations, immense fatalities, and result in one of the most damaging wars in US history.

6. What were the limitations of the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" approach to containment?
The “New Look” approach to containment involved two major factors: massive retaliation and liberation. The US would respond asymmetrically, meeting force with overwhelming force. The US would react to the communist challenge, and fight the war on its own terms. However, there were four major limitations/criticisms of this policy.

One, there was excessive reliance on nuclear deterrence. There was a fear that the US would become a garrison state, and high spending might lead to deficits, inflation, and social costs. However, Eisenhower kept spending low and actually shrank the size of the military. Instead, through NSC 162/2, he decided that nuclear weapons would be used in convention warfare. It was said in 1955 that 171 nukes would have to be dropped in a potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Eisenhower had “brinkmanship,” meaning he would be willing to go to the brink of war, having tough skin. In 1955, Eisenhower sought and got Congressional approval to get involved in Vietnam in an aggressive attempt to prevent the Domino Theory, and stop the communists. This strategy was seen as bad, since it seems foolish to destroying an entire nation with nukes to stop the communists.

A second short fall of the policy was the resulting Third World Revolutions. With decolonization, new, independent states formed. The Administration, with the CIA, practiced psychological operations to bring new leaders on board with the US. There were CIA-coordinated coups, assassination attempts, international spying, and domestic infiltration of social groups. The CIA saw success in a number of cases, including Iran in 1951 with Operation Ajax and Guatemala with Operation Success. The policy’s dependence on these practices was heavily criticized.

The third shortfall of “New Look” was the Missile Gap. In 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik and demonstrated their capabilities to launch long-range missiles that could strike the US. America was no long isolated or protected by the oceans and in November 1957, the Gaither Report recommended an acceleration of ICBM/SLBM progress. However, Eisenhower failed to implement all the recommendations. In the end, the Soviet buildup turned out to be a bluff.

The final shortfall of the policy was Failed Negotiations. The US failed to negotiate with the Soviets, and Eisenhower’s agenda kept changing. Also, the administration failed to split China from Russia.

7. In your opinion, have US covert operations to destabilize foreign governments worked to promote the interests of the US? Cite at least three examples.

FAILURES

Three instances of the United States staging covert operations to destabilize foreign governments are in Cuba in the 1960s (The Bay of Pigs in 1961), Chile in 1970, and the Iran-Contra Affair in the 1980s under President Reagan. All three operations were unsuccessful in their attempts to promote US interests abroad, evidence that covert operations may not be the greatest alternative to open diplomacy.

SUCCESSES

operation ajax- mossadegh in iran, operation success- Guatemala, operation condor and the lead up to in in Chile

8. What did the Soviets hope to achieve by a policy of stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba? In your view, was this policy viable?

In 1962, the Soviet Union began deploying MRBMs and IRBMs to missile sites in Cuba, almost undetected by the United States. In doing so, the Soviets hoped to repair the missile gap between the United States and the rest of the world, to defend Cuba from any United States threat or invasion (like the Bay of Pigs), and as a response to the United States placing Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Essentially, the Soviets tried to pose a threat to the United States in Cold War Zero-Sum fashion. This was intended to strengthen a communist country within reach of the United States, and to cause panic within America. The deployment of missiles to Cuba was known as Operation Anadyr, (led by Khruschev’s crony Issa Pliyev) and was secret, fast-paced, and involved over 50,000 personnel. The Soviets had intended to announce it publicly to the UN in November 1962; by mid-July the first boast had left the USSR. The weapons deployed to Cuba included ballistic missiles capable of hitting any target in the United States, as well as rigged bombers, MIGs fixed with cruise missiles, tactical missiles, and submarines. On October 13, 1962, U2 reconnaissance planes detect and confirm Soviet nuclear deployment in Cuba; President Kennedy learns of this on October 16. President Kennedy’s response was that he will “do whatever must be done to defend security,” as any type of offensive is not tolerated by the United States. For the next thirteen days, the world stood at the brink of nuclear war, and practiced Brinkmanship. Although there were supporters of an air strike among Kennedy’s advisers, Kennedy chose the alternative of a quarantine of Cuba, which ended up to be successful. The Soviets lost this battle of the Cold War, as well as a significant amount of legitimacy at the UN. The policy was not viable; the Soviet Union did not anticipate the reaction of the United States. The USSR’s lack of foresight and inability to accurately calculate the repercussions of entering an arms race with the United States led to its demise.

9. To what extent can the near-catastrophic outcome of the confrontation over the Soviet deployment of a nuclear deterrent in Cuba be ascribed to failure in communication between the key players in the crisis?

The issues here is mirror-imaging. Leaders were assuming that their counterparts were operating under the same assumptions as they were. They failed to anticipate the actions and reactions of others. One example of this that precipitated the event was Operation Quick Kick. This was a training exercise that practiced amphibious invasions. Khruschev perceived these as practice for invading Cuba. The issue was the Soviet intelligence that if the US made a full invasion of Cuba, the Cuban army could last about a week. So, Khruschev determined that they needed nuclear deterrence. After the US put Jupiter ICBMs in Turkey, Khruschev wanted to put the nukes in Cuba so they could trade and take nukes out of both places. Operation Anadyr somewhat subtly moved troops and tactical and strategic nukes to Cuba. An example of mirror-imaging here is that Khruschev thought this would force the US to balance by having him take nukes out of Cuba and the US take nukes out of Turkey; he did not consider the US’s long-standing geopolitical advantage of being far away. He saw the American reaction as panicking, but really this was the first time America was really threatened. Another example is that when the Americans were dropping practice depth-charges at Soviet submarines, they didn’t know the subs were equipped with nukes; had the commander panicked and launched a nuke, it could’ve started a war.

10. Intervention in the conflict in Southeast Asia has been described as a "necessary war" from a US perspective. Summarize the justifications for this point of view and discuss whether you agree or disagree.
Interventions in Southeast Asia weren’t necessary. When Kennedy was made president, he declared that any threats to liberty would be protected with force. Kennedy saw Vietnam as a political issue, not just a military issue, so he felt that in order for the US to keep their prestige they had to stop communist aggression; they couldn’t afford to appear to be weak. Once America was committed, they could not just back out because of the risk of losing reputation and prestige in the global village. Also, there was the issue of credibility. The rest of the world evaluated how valuable the United States was as an ally against communism. “These places were not contested because they were important. They were important because they were contested.” Once it started, Vietnam was important; the United States could not even appear to lose because that would be unacceptable. Intervention in Southeast Asia was deemed necessary because it started, it existed.

I disagree, because although hindsight is 20/20, it was easy to predict that the US army couldn’t successfully fight in Vietnam without the help of the SVA. Economically and politically it didn’t make sense because the US was supporting an authoritarian, military government that was not supported by its people. They were just supporting a nominal war against communism instead of promoting an actual war for democracy.

11. Given the strategic parameters of the Cold War, was it ever possible for the US to win the kind of war it hoped to fight in Southeast Asia?

No. See above.

12. Why was the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia so protracted? Why did the Nixon administration feel constrained to adopt the policy of "Vietnamization" and how successful was it?

Nixon wanted to get out of Vietnam, but he also wanted “Peace with Honor.” Initially, the US believed that they could win in Vietnam, and made continued attempts at defeating the North Vietnamese even though it was apparent that winning was next to impossible. The US strategy of “search and destroy” didn’t work against the guerilla warfare. Continued bombing raids and movements of the front line served to draw out the war. Nixon, through his policy towards détente, began to view the struggle against the communists through a much larger scope, and saw Vietnam as only a small part of the greater policy. However, he still wanted to leave with honor. Increasing pressure both abroad and at home finally led Nixon to pull out the troops. Nixon wanted to begin diplomatic peace talks with the Soviets and ally with China, so he decided to implement “Vietnamization” as a way to get out of Vietnam on peaceful and somewhat respectful grounds. Vietnamization was not successful in the sense that it didn’t help South Vietnam hold back the North Vietnamese. However, the nation as whole united in the end, which contributed to the overall détente and power balance Nixon sought.

13. What did Richard Nixon hope to achieve by opening diplomatic relations with China? Were his goals realized?

The Nixon Doctrine called for its allies to take care of their own defense so that the US could focus on protecting its own interests. Nixon believed the US should have an international relations policy focused on ensuring a balance of power in the global system. He believed that China was vital to America’s foreign policy. He also saw China as an opportunity to counter Soviet expansion. In 1969, there was a USSR-China border dispute in Siberia. Nixon warned that the US would not remain neutral, and would not tolerate a Soviet invasion of China. In 1972, Nixon went to China to open formal dialogue. In February, 1972, Nixon, Kissinger and Chinese officials meet in person to lay out the Shanghai Communiqué. China promised they would not interfere in Indo-China, agreed to not ally with USSR, and promised to stand with the US against any state’s attempt at Asian or World domination – a direct alliance against the USSR. Nixon’s goals were realized because the Soviets were forced to come to agreement with the US and become more of a “status-quo” state. In May, 1972, agreements were signed between Nixon and Moscow, including the ABMT. The basic principles of the agreement and of Nixon’s goals were to avoid confrontation, have mutual restraint, avoid unilateral advantages, and have the willingness to coexist peacefully in the long term.

14. How did the era of detente mark a break with the established US approach to international relations? Why did this break occur?
The era of détente marked a break with the established approach because it took the exemplarist position. Through the Nixon Doctrine, American expected its allies to take care of their own defenses because otherwise, the US would never be able to take care of themselves. He sought to move the world system to one of multi-polarity to take pressure off the United States. This era stood in stark contrast to the aggressive US foreign policy of decades before, which stipulated that the US would do anything and everything to stop its enemies in their tracks. Throughout the Cold War, the US was heavily involved in the politics and protection of other nations, including numerous economic and CIA operations. This break occurred because the US was desperate to get out of Vietnam, realizing it could not win. Nixon sought to relieve pressure on the United States’ economy and military. He believed that through negotiations and soft-politics, American would be able to maintain its dominate position in the world sphere, but do so while ensuring the protection of its interests.

15. In your view, were US-Soviet relations under detente conditions a viable long-term proposition? If not, what issues were responsible for undermining detente?

No, Détente began to unravel in 1979 due to a series of events. The Iranian Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis embarrassed the United States and led much of the American public to believe their nation had lost its international power and prestige.

Also : Brezhnev Doctrine: to intervene whenever "external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist system." This was used to justify the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Thus America seemed to be a in a weak geopolitical state towards the end of détente. Humiliation in Iran + soviet victory (at the time) of Afghanistan meant US could no longer stand by.

Also thousands of ICBMs still pointed at each other. The annihilation of one side by the other was only a button away.

Conflicts in the third world still raged during détente. America supported coups in Latin America towards the right.

16. What was distinctive about the foreign policy agenda Ronald Reagan brought to the presidency when he took office? How successful was he in fulfilling this agenda?
Reagan had "instincts included an unshakable belief in democracy and capitalism, and abhorrence of communism, an impatience with compromise in what he regarded as a contest between good and evil, and a deep fearfear that the Cold War might end in a nuclear holocaust" – Gaddis p. 350

Reagan had"optimism: faith in the ability of the US to compete succcessfuly within the international system" – Gaddis

"he was unusual in that he rejected the legacies of earlier administrations as well, including those of his fellow Republicans Nixon and Ford."

-Rejected Containment because it seemed to be failing…

Replaced with rollback/Reagan Doctrine. Engaged USSR overtly/covertly and rhetorically. Called USSR an "evil empire"

-MAD had to go

"Reagan's objective was…to prepare the way for a new kind of soviet leader by pushing the old Soviet system to the breaking point" – Gaddis

Wanted to outspend the soviets. – SDI and ABMs

Rejected SALT as legitimation of MAD.

17. What were the key objectives of the Reagan Doctrine? How effective was it in practice?
1. A Direct Confrontation by Arms buildup
2. Proxy war in 3rd world

3. Assertion of moral superiority in the war of ideas.

The War of Ideas - reagan didn't think communism was viable. He said something was going on behind the iron curtain that we were ignoring. Our foreign policy should be to show by example the greatness of our system. "Exemplarist" position. He argued that we will not contain communism but we will transcend communism. This will be accomplished by challenging and not acknowledging the soviet position. Whereas détente tried to legitimize USSR, reagan tried to change this.

i. US should impose what the marshal group called cost-imposing strategy. In other words Détente was in favor of USSR. Instead US should increase pressure to expose these cracks. Wherever USSR had commitments, US should increase pressure. Marshal group was winning by means of attrition. Individual battles did no matter that much such as proxy wars. But the big picture was important. Victory by attrition. US was bigger and more powerful, she could afford to fight longer than the USSR. This won the favor of reagon.

ii. Every aspect of bureaucracy funding had to be justified in terms of how it would make the soviets to increase their own spending.

iii. In absence of clear cut victory there would come a time where soviets could simply not keep up. They would arrive at a tipping point twhere the whole system would unravel.

Highly effective: Afghanistan became USSR's Afghanistan. SDI further strained an economy that was spending 1/3 GDP on defense. And rhetoric made soviet leaders cower and challenged the legitimacy of USSR. Dissidents within the empire were roused and encouraged to challenge soviet rule.

However, Gorbachev played just as big if not bigger part in ending the cold war as Reagan. So credit has to go out to both rather than just Reagan doctrine.

18. How significant a role did the Strategic Defense Initiative play in ending the Cold War?

"The psychological success of SDI was truly remarkable, perhaps even a stroke of political genius. As Reagan said, "SDI wasn't conceived by scientist^.""

"There is no way of measuring how much SDI contributed to the Soviet Union's fall. But SDI did contribute, and the Cold War did end, peacefully, though, as Velikhov remarked, "at times we were getting

very close to open conflict.""

SDI pushed the right buttons. Soviets were weakest at microelectronics and computers, SDI exploited just that. In addition, USSR was already spending close to 1/3 of their GDP on defense. Their fear of the US developing a SDI and forever changing the balance of power made them spend even more on defense. SDI was part of many problems for the USSR that lead to its collapse.

More notable for the psychological effects than military potential.

19. Was the US able to implement a coherent foreign policy agenda after the fall of the Soviet Union? Outline the nature of US intervention in at least four international crises during the period 1989-2001 to support your argument?

20. How does the US benefit from its participation in multilateral relationships with other states? Do these benefits outweigh the risks to US autonomy outlined by the New Sovereigntists?

21. Describe the key differences between the US foreign policy programs of the "vulcans" and "guardians"- which group was able to seize the agenda after September 11, and why?

-neocons split into two groups
-vulcans
-took the name from the roman gold vulcan, god of the forge
-aaaaand he made a star trek reference. critiquing the name of the vulcan race. holy god.
-firmly entrenched in the Dept of Defense, VP's office, and in the private sector at the time of Bush's administration
-NSA Condi Rice, DefenseSec Rumsfeld, DepDefSec Wolfowitz, VP Cheney
-questioned validity of deterrence and containment
-promoted aggressive actions on international scale
-attacked multilateral agreements
-most active proponents of expanding the war on terror to encompass states, terrorism is an issue of foreign policy/int'l relations
-evangelical interpretation of internationalism- power = a moralizing force
-only if it's consistent with american interests
-'project for a new american century' (PNAC)
-vehicle for advancing the NeoReaganite policies
-cochaired by Bill Kristol and Donald Keagan
-guardians
-contrast to vulcans
-'reluctant warriors'
-occupied StateDept, and served with bill clinton as well
-SecState Powell, DepSecState Armitage, Director of StateDept Planning Staff Haas
-huge divergence of opinion between StateDept and DoD, also dichotomy between NSA and CIA
-guardians are highly resistant to engagements where use of force is the first option
-diplomatic, economic maneuvering to contain states
-even police actions are better options
-pays attention to balancing US power with other states
-NOT LOOKING FOR HEGEMONY
-even just preeminence among like-minded states
-two groups of neocons have been fighting for control since Bush I
-wolfowitz with cheney and libby wrote a memo detailing how to deal with the fall of the soviet union
-US should INCREASE defense spending
-assert itself as the sole superpower to quash the rise of regional powers that take advantage of the fall of the soviet union
-first use of the term 'coalitions of the willing'
-US cannot bring on board all multilateral structures, but bring whoever we can convince
-even if we can't, we'll bring on board whoever we can
-and we'll take action ourselves in 'defense of our interests
-first time preventive and preemptive war were brought into discussion
-bush I told them to sanitize the paper, remove all preemptive or unilateral action
-guardians win this round
-vulcans then start arguing that containment has failed
-new strategy is necessary to remove saddam hussein from power
-when bush II takes office, CHINA is the vulcan's plan of action
-advocates action NOW rather than later, while the balance of power was still on their side
-Sept. 11, 2001 happened
-turns out that all along, international terrorist organizations are now the biggest problem
-on SEPT 12, rumsfeld asked about attacking iraq as well as al-qaeda
-vulcans still looking to move up
-powell avoided striking iraq
-said that US should attack Al-Qaeda first
-right then, american people were looking to get back at Osama and Al-Qaeda
-over powell's objection, Bush called the attacks more than acts of terror, but ACTS OF WAR
-vulcans win here, it's the start of a WAR between states and non-states
-terrorism is the new threat to meet American power
-bush quote- we will pursue terrorists wherever they hide and hut anyone that helps them
-'you are with us or against us'
-THATS THE BUSH DOCTRINE RIGHT THERE ^^
-now vulcans support 'regime change' in iraq
-state of the union in 2002, bush puts iraq in the 'axis of evil'
-presented as a prime threat to the US
-June 2002- bush says that the marine corps must be ready to strike at a moment's notice anywhere in the world
-states that the US must be ready to take preemptive military action to ensure security
-same thing said in the state of the union- identifying threats and eliminating them BEFORE THEY HAPPEN

22. What lessons can be learned from the US record in its efforts at international nation-building historically and how do these lessons apply to Iraq today?

Two main examples are Somalia and the Philippines. Can sub in Vietnam instead. In Somalia and the Philippines, readings are Judis and Halberstam. General concepts can be found in Hook article and Kirkpatrick reading, as well as lecture. In Somalia: in this case, Sheppard is asking about nation-building in the context of democracy promotion. Somalia is a negative example, what you should not do. (part of nation-building is democracy promotion). Halberstam notes that Somalia was a non-state, meaning there is no central authority; it was ruled by warlords and clan leaders. Iraq is an artificial state formed by the British, not a real consolidated nation-state. Issue: consider the structure of the state before you intervene. Issue 2: Mission creep or policy drift. The UN wanted to politically transform Somalia; the US initial mission was as a humanitarian mission; establish enough security to distribute food. It became deposing Aidid, disarming clans, building a government. Apply this to Iraq. The initial justification for invading Iraq was WMD, but mission creep/policy drift led to nation-building/democracy promotion. The issue of public supporting both Somalia and Iraq is important. The Somalia public support was very shallow; driven by images of starving children on CNN, stopped by images of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. In Iraq, public support has fallen. Is it shallow or durable? The public support was durable, as the majority was in favor of it for about two years (51% supporting American action in Iraq). Somalia: shallow, Iraq: durable, but not durable enough to take on a mission that might last 10 years. In Somalia, there were personal issues involved—a relationship between UN Secretary General Butros-Ghali and Aidid. Butros-Ghali hated Aidid and his perception of the situation in Somalia was driven by his personal feelings of Aidid. Counterintuitively, had it been someone else, the UN wouldn’t have pushed as hard. Admiral Howe was insulted by Aidid, and drove him to push for a Somali intervention. In Iraq, Bush has the ties of his father’s experiences in the Middle East. Some might argue that Bush has a complex of trying to outdo his father and has a vendetta against Hussein b/c he tried to kill Bush, Sr. In other words, don’t let personal issues dictate policy. Both Aidid and Hussein were demonized and became evil in the eyes of the Americans. Bureaucratic conflict (Somalia): Ambassador Albright supported nation-building agenda. SoD Aspen wanted to pull out US troops as quickly as possible. Clinton, Lake, and Christopher all were absent, so no one really minded the store. In Iraq, there were significant and prolonged disagreements between the State and Defense departments. Nationalism: in Somalia we had the phenomenon wehre the more intrusive the US and UN become, the more the Somalis became negative towards them (against nation-building efforts; they were almost neo-colonial). In Iraq, the Iraqis were initially happy we ousted Saddam, however the mood changed. In Iraq, there’s multiple nationalisms divided by religion and location. Sunni insurgents wanted to oppose US, Kurds wanted independence. Democracy promotion: Somalia was part of mission creep and towards the end a rhetoric of democracy was used to drum up support. In regards to Iraq, the rhetoric of democracy is also used to gain support. Hook: nation-building and democratization.

23. Has the US consistently supported the extension of democracy internationally? If not, what issues complicate this agenda?

No; the issue of democratization (domestic politics, ideas conflict with interests—economic and security interests, difficult/implausible—there are certain things that need to be in place in order to promote democracy, i.e. cultural cohesion, equal distribution of wealth, pluralistic civil culture, labor unions that mediate between society and state, American political tradition—isolationism would undermine goal, as well as exemplarism, empirical/real world—it’s difficult to have your interests and ideas of democracy be consistent with each other). Hendrickson and Tucker article.

24. Why has US unipolar hegemony persisted since the end of the Cold War?

a. Wohlforth (3)

1. US unipolarity is real and absolute (unambiguous)

-US is military, economic, and technological leader

-Costs of balancing against the US are too great (other nations will bandwagon with US)

2. US unipolarity is large and prone to peace

-Secondary states will bandwagon with US

-US doesn’t exert power as a hegemon most of time, instead choosing to engage in multilateralism

3. Durability

-Potential rivals are more challenged by each other than the US

- E.U. and China have their own reasons for failing to challenge US (in question 25)

b. Wilkinson (2)

1. US can avoid imperial overstretch because of technology

2. US unipolarity w/o hegemony brings stability to the system

c. Lane (3) (Why no one balances US)

1. Duality of US power (Use of multilateralism AND military action)

2. Lack of balancers (who have their own internal problems)

3. Balancing an existing hegemon is far more difficult than challenging a rising hegemon (US found itself in a unique position with sudden collapse of Soviet Union)

*Soft balancing is another reason: includes economic prebalancing and leash-slipping as types of balancing available to other nations (these are slower than hard balancing using military strength).

25. What challenges will US unipolar hegemony face in the future? Make plausible arguments depicting the rise of at least two potential rivals to the US in your answer.

European Union

Arguments For:

-Integration of the great European powers has harnessed the size and economic might of Europe into a single power. (Unification of Germany is key)

-Adopted a common identity, flag, currency etc. Leads to a sense of European nationalism (same characteristics as United States).

Arguments Against:

-Population of Europe is aging

-Integration of Eastern Europe is proving difficult (adding poorer nations to the EU will weaken its strength, draining it financially)

-No centralized/strong military

-Immigration from Turkey and Middle East

China

Arguments For:

-China’s imperialistic past has shown its potential

-Communist Authoritarian Government

-Demographics (surplus of males)

-Largest Military (personnel)

-Growing Demand for Resources (raw materials from neighboring nations)

-Rising Sense of Nationalism

Arguments Against:

-China has never displayed a global ambition to spread its idealism

-Secular State (shares US interests against such issues as Islamic Terrorism)

-Liberalized Economy

-Tendency to settle conflicts peacefully (through multilateralism)

-Regional Hatred (neighboring nations dislike China (Japan))

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Mon, 07 May 2007 06:11:00 +0000

1) Why, according to Moe and Howell, does the Constitution encourage Presidents to pursue their policy goals through unilateral actions?
Unilateral action makes life waaaaay easier for presidents
-if bilateral action is taken (aka action between both executive and legislative), shit takes longer
-institutional obstacles are put in the way of legislative action
-if the president wants to get shit done, he has to go through the entire legislative bureaucracy
-much easier to take action himself first
-only time that this doesn't work is when appropriations are required
-if the president acts first, he gets what he wants immediately
-congress is then forced into a reactionary role
-institutionally, congress is predisposed towards inaction
-this means that most of the time, the president gets what he wants
-it's much easier to mobilize a small but determined opposition to opposing presidential action than it is to mobilize a majority supporting it
-do first, ask permission afterwards
-even if he does get repudiated, presidents most often get whatever they wanted in the meantime
-plus, any reactionary policies enacted are then under the purview of the executive to enforce
-this applies especially to the supreme court
-the Court's another case entirely
-they're also likely to uphold presidential power, but not consistently
-because they're concerned with the prestige of their institution, they're likely to reject when rejection is popular and uphold when it's not
-not always, though
-also, they're appointed by presidents who presumably have screened them for ideological concerns such as these
-they have a little bit more freedom of action in this regard, though, since the 'contracts' they entered into when they were appointed are unenforceable

TAKEN FROM Moe & Howell "Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory"

2) How according to Moe and Howell, does the veto power enhance presidential power when dealing with Congress?
Veto power can either push the equilibrium political situation towards where the president wants it to go or away
-because the president only needs 1/3 + 1 of the legislature to support him to push his priorities on congress, equilibrium shifts to his side if it wasn't already
-it's more valuable for individual legislators to be the 'veto pivot'
-'veto pivot'- the determining vote in overriding a veto
-on the flip side, if the president had more than 2/3 of the congress already on his side, it pushes politics away from his preferred equilibrium point
-again, it's more valuable to be the veto pivot than just a party member
-more legislators will shift away from the president in an effort to increase their personal power
-most of the time it pushes it towards- it's not often that the president commands the loyalty of 2/3 of the congress, even in unitary government
-and even when he does, the amount that the political equilibrium is pushed away from him is less than the amount that it would be pushed towards him

TAKEN FROM Moe & Howell "Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory"

3) Why are presidential veto threats more frequent during divided government?
ummm, this seems kinda obvious
veto threats are more frequent because presidents have to push their agenda through congress, and in divided government the congress is trying to push their own
-if the congress' agenda is unpalatable to the president, he's gonna have to veto more
-ALSO, as he vetoes and threatens to veto, the political equilibrium point moves closer and closer to his side
-yay works better
HOWEVER, this does not necessarily mean that deadlock is the outcome in these situation
-both president and congress have to moderate their rhetoric
-equilibrium point moves towards the veto pivot
-this could be good for everybody
-congress likes it because equilibrium doesn't get shifted as far towards the presidency as it could have been
-presidency is happy because it gets shifted at all, which is good! yay!

TAKEN FROM Moe & Howell "Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory", also a teeny bit from Quirk and Nesmith, "Divided Government and Policymaking"

4) How does Neustadt's view of unilateral presidential action differ from that of Moe and Howell?

Moe & Howell

-institutional approach- institutions surrounding president allow him to expand power

-definition of power- formal capacity to carry out unilateral action

-sources of power- Constitution (i.e. veto power & take-care clause)

-Congress

-Supreme Court

-criticism- varying degrees of success even in the presence of the same formal powers

-no account of the public’s involvement in checking the President

Neustadt

-individual approach- better presidents have different personal characteristics

-all presidents share the same potential to use institutions

-definition of power- ability to persuade

-sources of power- reputation- perception among politicians within the Washington community

-prestige- public approval

-institutions constrain presidential power but are still necessary (i.e. the are bad if used as a crutch)

-personality also important to presidential power (may be Greenstein’s theory rather than Neustadt’s)

-criticism- does not give enough credit to the power presidents take from institutions

-The Washington community, or those who observe the president, is made up of all policymakers or others directly affected by the presidential agenda.

-Presidential influence over Washingtonians is reliant upon their perception of him, and his anticipation of their reactions.

-Presidential power is driven by expectation.

-Washingtonians anticipate what a president will be able to do and use the advantages the bargaining advantages that he has.

-Forecasting presidential success is difficult, which both helps and harms presidents.

-Helps: Hard to predict, therefore past cannot be used to judge future performance.

-However, if the president fails multiple times, the success of future endeavors will be automatically discounted.

-Washingtonian opinion is never unanimous: some know more than others, and dismiss the common tone for their own opinions.

-However some insiders may need to alter their opinions according to the populous’ view (Senators)

-Presidents who desire power need only to develop a certain tenacity and skill early on to leave a lasting impression on Washingtonians.

-If a president cannot convince his constituency of victory, he must intimidate, but not frighten.

-Presidential professional reputation is formed by the man himself.

-President takes both risk and advantage from forming his own reputation

-Reputation sometimes depends on those around him, as their mistakes can reflect on him.

-President can also use those around him as cover, or take credit for their achievements.

5) What are the two key components of presidential persuasion according to Neustadt?

-reputation- perception among politicians within the Washington community

-if Congress sees President as inept, they it is less likely to go along with President’s policies

-prestige- public approval
-factors of prestige

-personality is a factor, but not a very dynamic one

-once the people perceive the president one way, that view is not likely to change quickly

-image of the OFFICE is the dynamic factor in presidential prestige

-qualities associated with presidential performance can change willy nilly

-the question "do you approve of the way 'incumbent' is handling himself as president" has wildly varying responses

-while the random fluctuations can be ignored, the shift of change cannot

-however, this is not always predictable- the public has a ridiculous capability to ignore

-also, personality doesn't really matter all that much, but it can cushion or worsen the blow

-"the moving factor in prestige is what people outside Washington see happening to themselves."

-presidents have to be EDUCATORS

-they need to make the people believe that what they're doing is necessary for their own well-being

-this increases their prestige

-actions speak louder than words

-if public approval is low, Congress will not likely go along with President for fear of the public associating them with the President they don’t like (i.e. fear of not getting re-elected)

-essence of a President’s persuasive task is to convince men that share authority but do not gain or lose his job based on the President’s whim that what the White House wants of them is for their own sake and authority

-authority and status- vital aspects of presidential persuasion

-in negotiations with the president, a secretary must take into account the fact that the president has some authority over him in other aspects of his job

-president has continuous relationships of mutual dependence with many people so both parties must cooperate with the other to one day receive something of benefit to himself

-“the probabilities of power do not derive from the literary theory of the Constitution”

-politicians and people in power act as they feel they must in their own interests, given their own responsibilities, not as they would like

6) How might Neustadt explain the Bush administration's failure to secure Social Security reform in 2005?

-Bush had lack of prestige among public

-that’s all I’ve got

-figure out your own argument from Neustadt’s argument seen above

7) What features of the modern presidency explain the importance of cognitive style for presidential performance?

Greenstein question

Cognitive style - polite way of saying how smart you are and in what kind of category your intelligence falls into.

i.e. Carter's mindset and intelligence good for negotiations, but not for creating administrative direction

i.e. Nixon was strategic and methodical. Allowed him to accomplish all of his goals in first term (balance USSR, Open relations with china, move beyond Vietnam involvement)

Ie. Truman and Reagan - called stupid by Greenstein. Used as examples that intelligence is not the be all and end all barometer of success, as these two accomplished a lot in their tenure.

8) How might a president's cognitive style shape their organizational capacity?

Greenstein question

Cognitive style - how president thinks.

Organizational capacity:

Forging a team out of his administration

Minimizing yes men

his proficiency at creating effective institutional arrangements

These things directly reflect how alumni of the administration speak of their boss

Draw a distinction between Eisenhower and FDR.

FDR free flowing in structure. Staff in competition, etc. clinton kinda of the same way. Bad soccer playing analogy of no position. Eisenhower was methodical. Formulized chief of staff position. Made a bureaucratic structure.

9) Why has emotional intelligence taken on such importance in today's personalized presidency-centered political system?

Greenstein reading

Emotional intelligence affects governance. (BIG BIG BIG IMPORTANT)

LBJ - vesuvian personality - scared people and created yes-men - lead to Vietnam problems

Nixon - bat shit crazy - could be seen as a reason he was so politically creative, but Greenstein thinks that this does not justify him being emotionally a tortured soul (especially a crazy paranoid guy in charge of a immensely powerful military structure)

To the point of the question - people see the president as important and central to the political structure. If they see him as unstable its bad. If the Washington insiders see him as unstable and leak it, its bad for the pres.

10) How have rising public expectations made vision an important leadership trait for modern presidents?

Greenstein question

Vision -

1. Capacity to inspire - Kennedy, FDR, Reagan all good examples

-all of these guys were 'rhetorically gifted'

-vision helps inspire the people, mobilize them behind the presidency

2. Preoccupation with the content of policies, an ability to assess their feasibility, and the possession of a set of overarching goals - Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan

-the overarching goal thing is really important

3. Consistency of viewpoint

If vision is not there, The costs of vision-free leadership include internally contradictory programs, policies that have unintended consequences, and sheer drift.

11) Why, according to Skowronek, is it easier (or harder) for some presidents to manage the conflicting impulses or desires to affirm basic principles, break with the past, and create a lasting legacy?
So politics are determined with relation to two things- president's political identity (opposed or affiliated) and previously established commitments (vulnerable or resilient)
-presidents come in with their political identity
-the established commitments come in either vulnerable or resilient
-this could potentially lead to problems
-affiliated leaders have it particularly rough
-affirming basic principles is incredibly difficult for presidents
-according to skowronek, the way presidents gain their power (the legacy thing) is by undermining the status quo ante
-this is inherently reconstructive
-the more generations removed an affiliated president is from the introduction of the original orthodoxy, the harder it is to maintain it
-opposed presidents also can face a similar problem
-woodrow wilson is a great example of this
-he was an opposed president when the existing regime was resilient
-he attempted to overthrow the existing orthodoxy, was essentially stripped of power because of it
-the key is to be affiliated when the previously established commitments are strong, and opposed when they're weak
-every president wants to create a lasting legacy
-they do this in large part by aggregating power
-again, the aggregation of power is an inherently reconstructive action
-presidents gain power by challenging the status quo
-e.g. taking action and daring congress to stop them

12) Why was the politics of reconstruction more difficult for Reagan than Jefferson, but the politics of disjunction easier for Carter than John Adams?
Politics of reconstruction have as a prerequisite a president opposed to existing hierarchy and vulnerable previously established commitments
-Both Reagan and Jefferson had these
-Jefferson had it MUCH easier, however
-when jefferson showed up on the scene, there was hardly any entrenched executive bureaucracy
-the nation was barely formed, the institutions were still malleable
-he was able to push and pull the institutions and the appointments at will
-there was also no entrenched opposition to change at that point
-adams was the only previous affiliated president, and he wasn't exactly the most effective of all people
-Reagan enjoyed NONE of these advantages
-thats why they say that reagan's revolution was a rhetorical, rather than institutional one
-institutions are deeply entrenched
-there's a massive constituency with a vested interest in opposing change
-he can't mess with appointments as much as jefferson could, jefferson was given much more free reign
Politics of disjunction have as a prerequisite a president affiliated with existing hierarchy, but still vulnerable previously established commitments
-Carter was essentially able to ride the wave
-he was pretty ineffectual- his presidency is characterized by failure
-even so, he was better off than adams because he had at least some institutions that he could rely on
-was able to rely on the institutions built up by his democratic predecessors to keep his presidency moving in some part
-Adams was not able to do this
-there were next to no established, entrenched institutions
-there was no entrenched opposition to change to take advantage of
-there were actually forces working actively to delegitimize his presidency- HAMILTON
-he was just screwed over

TAKEN FROM Skowronek

13) Other than Skowronek's formulation, what kinds of political context might shape presidential leadership capacities?

There's no answer to this with readings, since it says "other than Skowronek...", so here's some BS to fill it up
-Skowronek's formulation basically talks about static possibilities
-weak vs strong existing hierarchies, or affiliated vs opposed presidencies
-does NOT take into account dynamism on either part, or unexpected events
-presidents can change from one policy to another, this could be useful to them
-for example, practicing the politics of articulation when the existing policies are strong, but politics of reconstruction when they're not
-also, unexpected events have huge impacts on presidential leadership, suddenly shifting the existing establishment from strong to vulnerable, or the other way around
-for example, sept. 11 changed the political landscape around 180 degrees
-whereas before, Bush was pretty ineffectual, with low approval ratings, in the time immediately afterwards he rebounded to a ridiculous degree
-was able to ride the wave of political opinion pretty effectively

14) How does the impeachment of Bill Clinton illustrate the politics of preemption and therefore resemble other presidents situated in similar political time?
The impeachment of Bill Clinton illustrates the politics of preemption because it showed the general course of political time for a preemptive president. As happened to John Tyler, Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Woodrow Wilson, Clinton’s aggressive politics drew an impeachment from the resilient opposition he was battling against. Especially after his various victories, more notably with the crime bill of 1994, Clinton was seen as a threat the Republican interests. The Monica Lewinsky scandal gave Clinton’s opposition the opportunity they needed to drive him back from the political frontline. Unlike presidents in politics of articulation, preemptive presidents either triumph, or are harshly beaten back. The opposition’s most effective tool for forced retreat is the power of impeachment, as exemplified by the preemptive presidents who came before Clinton. Military metaphors courtesy of Jack. You’re welcome. (Skowronek. The Politics Presidents Make).

15) How does the impeachment of Bill Clinton, and his ultimate survival, illustrate secular trends in presidential development?
Secular time- the historical medium through which power structures have evolved
-essentially how the power of the presidency has evolved, changed, and become institutionalized over time
impeachment of bill clinton is just another manifestation of recurring political struggles
-same old same old, just political parties vying for power
-his impeachment robbed him of much of his personal credibility
-can't play the integrity card any longer
HOWEVER
-the fact that he was still effective in office after the impeachment means that the institutions of the presidency are durable enough to withstand this blow
-even though much of his personal power was lost to him, he was able to maintain effective leadership through INSTITUTIONAL power
-presidential development has evolved immensely from its patrician roots at the beginning, when Washington and the founding fathers relied almost exclusively on their personal power to run the country.

16) How does George W. Bush's pursuit of a troop surge and his resistance to a withdrawal illustrate the presidential advantages derived from unilateral action?
George W. Bush’s push for a troop surge in Iraq, and his refusal to set a timetable for withdrawal, illustrate the unbridled power that presidents wield when they choose to act unilaterally. In the end, it all ties back to constitutional ambiguity, which presidents have learned to use to their advantage. Heightened public expectations of the president drive him to more and more radical unilateral action that he hopes will satisfy the public. Militarily, the constitution leaves a gaping loophole for the president. His position as commander in chief allows him to send troops to a region of the world without Congressional approval, In the case of the Iraq war, President Bush has a special advantage that other leaders haven’t had in the past: Congress initially supported the war, and is therefore terrified of forcefully calling for troop withdrawal. The mentality of “finish what we’ve started” permeates the entirety of the government, and creates just enough uncertainty for Bush to bull through. Unilateral troop surges are now unavoidable, because Bush is constitutionally allowed to increase the troop levels, and Congress’ cowardice means that they will stay deployed until Bush sees fit. The advantage of unilateral action, in short, is that the president can pursue individual goals with no repercussions, and the Congress, unless absolutely united, cannot combat him. I am absolutely NOT a Liberal…cough. Yay Communism. (Moe and Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory)

17) How might George W. Bush's cognitive style help explain some of the difficulties his administration has faced in dealing with the deteriorating situation in Iraq?

dkd

18) How does the rise and decline of public approval of George W. Bush illustrate the perils of the modern presidency?
–Modern presidency has high expectations.

-Media focused on every move of the administration.

-White House press corps only has the White House to focus on.

-News outlets selectively report news to create more sensational stories: drama sells.

-Public has very basic perception of administrations agenda.

-Certain demographics focus on specific issues.

-If the president doesn’t work for their issues, he loses their support.

-Public approval very unstable because of this.

-President has obligations to campaign promises

-Reneging on these promises loses that support.

19) How has partisan polarization shaped the Bush presidency, especially in its dealings with Congress?
–“The administration’s emphasis on the maintenance of its supporting coalition spawned partisan polarization in Congress and the electorate”.

-Bush’s aggressive, partisan stance has made his dealings with Congress difficult.

-He has been able to get his legislation through Congress because of the Republican majority.

-Any legislation that Bush has gotten through congress has passed narrowly.

-Bush also supports an ideologically conservative agenda, which has further polarized the political parties in Congress and in the populous.

-As a result, members of Congress vote almost exclusively with their parties because of the threat of not being reelected.

-Bush has campaign promises to conservative groups and is therefore held to his agenda.

-With a Democratic Congress, Bush is crippled by the partisan polarization he initiated.

-also, imposes a cap on approval ratings
-because the president is so polarized politically, the ONLY people that legit support him are of his party
-this automatically means that his approval ratings are tied to the rise and fall of its party
BOTH 18 AND 19 CAN BE FOUND IN SCHIER’S ARTICLE

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Tue, 24 Apr 2007 17:44:00 +0000

AP FINAL EXAM INFO

Friday, May 4
2PM in regular room

format of the exam is a bit different

4 questions, like the midterm
-also one longer essay question
-oh shit

review sheet distributed in DISCUSSION SECTIONS
-why the FUCK did i even come to class. dammit.

what's it on?
-predominantly on the last third of the course
-however, it's 'implicitly a cumulative exam'
-will probably contain some of the stuff from the rest of the course

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Tue, 24 Apr 2007 02:52:00 +0000

OCC CIV QUIZ ANSWERS 4/23
two days early. i'm retarded, i know

1) How have Europeans' expectations of the state's role in their lives changed between 1789 and 1991?

European state has increased in presence and efficacy greatly since 1789

-1789 it was essentially a tool of the rulers

-lots of revolutions happened, not least of which was the french revolution

-woah there the people are actually getting what they want

-now, the people are pretty much in control of things

-SOCIALIZED STATE SYSTEM

-sort of pseudo-socialism has taken hold

-lots of state intervention all over the place

-state support systems that just didnt exist before have popped up as a safety net of sorts

-whereas before the poor were essentially left to fend for themselves, now they expect the state to fight for them

2 Given the importance of memory, what problems do you see in the integration of Eastern Europe into the EU?

Eastern Europe has historically been pretty separate from western europe

-different culturally, socially, ethnically (?)

-western europeans have always kind of looked down on them

-since WWII this problem has only been exacerbated

-Eastern europe has become further isolated from the west because of the soviet union's control over the region

-not only that, but the germans also treated them as an inferior group of people

-because of all of this, the eastern europeans have an extremely distinct cultural history- they were never the oppressors, always the oppressed

Economically also, eastern europe is extremely distinct

-german and then soviet oppression again

-legacy of nazism/communism is brutal exploitation of resources and people

-this is baaaad for them

-essentially they're left underdeveloped and divided arbitrarily

-leads to lots of strife

3) How has the concept of Europe changed since 1789?

Europe has become much more centralized
-today, europe is still a bit decentralized
-europeans still dont all consider themselves as such, but rather as their nationality
-it's moving towards centralization, however
-the EU is a strong driving force
-starting with teh coal and steel community, then its evolutions, europe has been uniting more and more
-NATO is its collective security arrangement
-europe now has been compared to the US in 1861
-still prone to breakup, but with the beginnings of real conglomeration forming
in 1789, it was totally different
-the states were still vying for domination of eachother
-now, the inter-state tensions have been quelled, for the most part
-no more striving for domination by all of the parties

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Mon, 23 Apr 2007 19:45:00 +0000

AFP LECTURE NOTES 4/23

Lecture 24

A) The Global System
There's no question, US is the world's unipolar power
Hegemony

Unipolarity
US Hegemony is REAL & ABSOLUTE
-also PRONE TO PEACE
-why?
-there's no more competition among second-tier states for security reasons
-now there's no reason to vie for status as client states
-security dilemma is just about gone
-client states are more likely to bandwagon WITH the US rather than join up AGAINST it
-evidence proves this-
-most of the wars since fall of USSR have been INTRA-state wars, not INTER-state wars

neorealists posit that bipolarity is prone to peace
-because of less borders, fewer enemies
-therefore, unipolarity is the MOST peaceful

Hegemony is based on FORCE PROJECTION around the world
-US is the sole state with the force projection capability to be considered for hegemony
-HOWEVER, while the US has unipolar authority, it does NOT intervene enough to be considered hegemonic

US Unipolarity and 'hegemony' is different from other hegemonies
-US expresses itself through technological and commercial control, rather than physical control
-US didn't come to power by trampling other states, it came to power by default when the USSR suddenly collapsed

THESE vv are other potential world systems
Bipolarity
another state rises up to challenge the US
Tripolarity
TWO other states rise up to challenge
Multipolarity
LOTS of other states rise up, but the US remains there enough for its structures and institutions to prevent war
Anarchy
US withdraws from the international scene entirely, organizations and institutions collapse, war?

one theory is that if the US was attacked by a massive international terrorist organization, other states would willingly subordinate themselves to US hegemony
-this was theorized BEFORE 9/11
-other states would be willing to subordinate themselves to combat the terrorist threat
-this was on track to happen with Afghanistan, kind of derailed with Iraq
-US has shown with Iraq (vietnam, somalia, etc) that indigenous resisters and non-state actors are able to successfully resist and bog down the US hegemonic process

Hegemony has different manifestations
-military
-force projection capabilities, etc
-economic
-economic domination of the world engenders dependence on the hegemon
-resources
-hegemon wants to dominate resources
-all of this tends to international HIERARCHY

Neorealists didn't believe that US unipolarity was durable
-it ended up being so
-nobody rose up to challenge the US because it was more cost-efficient NOT to
-other nations would rather bandwagon WITH the US, not against it
-it's just cheaper
-it's much harder to balance against an existing hegemon, rather than against a rising one
-US is working to maintain its hegemony
-permanent troop bases in Western Europe, Eastern Asia, Middle East
-works to maintain regional stability, also works to prevent rise of potential rivals

B) International Responses

Bandwagoning
most prominent response so far
-essentially, roll over and take it
Hard Balancing
balancing toe-to-toe with military power HAS NOT HAPPENED
-too expensive, too difficult, too easy to cut down in the early stages
Soft Balancing
easier to balance this way
-use diplomacy, international institutions, international law
-IRONY!!!
-US is the reason that intl institutions and law even exist in the first place
-US is committed to upholding these, even if they work to contain it
Economic Prebalancing
countries work on closing the economic and technological gap between them and the US
-so that if the necessity ever arises, they'd have the capability to move to hard balancing
Leash-Slipping
states call america's bluff
-essentially build up own military power, pursue own foreign policy
-ignore US as the hegemon, bank on the fact that the US is committed to international stability, will have to tolerate you
C) Potential Rivals
traditionally, the hegemon has to continue to expand in order to keep from stagnating and dying out
-this used to be done by territorial expansion, this isn't the case anymore
-now economic, social?
the next biggest issue in foreign policy is MANAGING the return to multipolarity
-US CAN'T keep fighting off rivals, where will they come from?
-EURASIA

possible rivals?
The EU
damn ungrateful europeans again

during the cold war, the US and EU were essentially a single pole
-it was beneficial for both sides
-kept USSR out of europe, good for europeans AND americans
-now that the cold war is over, the gap has started to emerge again
-this is unprecedented for europe
-since the fall of the roman empire, europe has been DEFINED by inter-state conflict
-spanish, french, british, then germans
-germany is still the dominant european power, despite WWII
-now that a collective european identity has started to emerge, they can now work as a world power

european policymakers established institutions to drive europe together
-the EURO
-european parliament
-closer integration of economic relations
now, europeans have passed several thresholds necessary for conglomeration
-europeans are starting to identify themselves as such
-over 70% of poles agree with the idea of a collective security agreement for europe

there are still some problems
-institutions are still weak and very bureaucratic
-expansion east is diluting the uniformity and integration of the EU
-demographics are a real issue
-people are getting OLDER, dying off, putting strain on the social structures
-relatively weak militarily
-europeans have been trying to fix this
-1948, 52, 54 they tried to create uniquely european security structures, they didn't work
-people were willing to chill under NATO and allow the US to shoulder the burden
-now they're starting this up again
-ESDP, rapid response force established 1999
-US reacts to this negatively, of course
-now, EU is really working towards integration
China
last 25 years, skyrocketing into world status
-greatest short-term regional transformation in world history
-o dang...

china's had some real problems to overcome
-foreign invasions, problems (1839-1945)
-internal problems (whenever-1976)
-now that mao is gone, more pragmatic rulers chill out there now
-china has always been a real imperial power, though
-this might be a problem to overcome

in the 1980s, japan was seen as the rising economic power to challenge the US
-this died out real quick
-china took over that role
-they're buying every single raw material they can get their hands on

is china on the course to confront the US?
some problems with that
-there has never been any sort of drive for international hegemony in china
-chinese just don't care about the rest of the world, never really has
-military weakness
-chinese military intervention has always been rejected by all, welcomed by none
-chinese neighbors are far more likely to balance AGAINST china than bandwagon WITH it

there are no civilians in a democracy...
-the choices made by a democracy are made at the ballot box, everyone is accountable

o dang. what an incredible class

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Tue, 17 Apr 2007 19:47:00 +0000

AFP NOTES 4/17

Lecture 22 Contd

A) The Limits of Nation Building
many times, democratization doesnt work in the third world
-this is because lots of times there is an extremely small elite subclass who owns the economy and political process
-for democracy to work, you need a broad base for voting pool
-you need a 'third force' between the elites and the peasants
-labor unions, church groups, academia/media, etc

why has Iraq been so unsuccessful while Japan, Italy, and Germany were more successful after WWII?
-all three of the WWII states were afraid of communism
-the three all had 'nation-state' aspects
-iraq lacks this, basically
-there were 'italians', 'germans', 'japanese', but no real 'iraqi' people, more like 'shia' or 'sunni' or 'kurd'
-iraq was never a 'nation-state' but more like a conglomeration of ethnicity
-the sunnis happened to win, impose their will on the two other groups up until the US invasion

exemplarist position is getting swept under the rug
-freedom through force- reagan doctrine
Lecture 23: Democratization and US Foreign Policy: Practice
democratization is a PROCESS, not a stage-based concept
-made of 3 sub-processes
these three are:
-instances of political liberalization
-toleration of opposition
-democratic transition
-goes beyond 'the electoralist fallacy'
-signifies more than a competitive election
-elections do not a democracy make
-elections are a necessary condition, but more important is agreement among the political actors about what shape the institutions will take
-democratic consolidation
-when democracy has become 'the only game in town'
-democracy is deeply internalized in social, institutional, and psychological life
-democratic institutions are the only venue for gaining/maintaining power
-this is a really high standard, not even the US fulfills it, persay

US is promoting US-style democracy
-so the US is shaping debates about democratic governments
-during the cold war, US didn't really promote democratization in latin america

A) Latin America
the problem with democracies nowadays is that the bush administration meddles too much?
-wait what?

wow this guest lecturer is a fucking TOOLBAG
-if i'm looking for analysis, i'll ask the PROFESSOR, not this grad student douche
-'the bush administration has shown a tolerance for extraconstitutional action' in meddling in foreign affairs
Venezuela: Hugo Chavez

oh thank god he's gone. time to listen again. wow that guy was a douchebag

B) The Middle East

Egypt- Hosni Mubarak- Muslim Brotherhood
Condi Rice called off a visit to Cairo after Mubarak arrested a dissident leader
-unusual move
-american 'change in policy'
-'for 60 years, my country pursued stability at the expense of democracy, and we achieved neither'
-now they're moving towards democracy
-first ever grants given to egyptian pro-democracy groups
-this is a HUGE change in policy with regards to egypt

Saudi Arabia
'golden list'
-not quite sure what this is

Iran
another stumbling block in the region
-one of the most democratic state in the region
-ahmedinijad was elected 'democratically' by the iranian people
-bush denounces this as 'undemocratic'
-says that iran is a state sponsor of terror, works to eliminate israel
-while these are true, they don't explain why iran is undemocratic

C) Lebanon
2005, in reaction to the assassination of a former prime minister
-generally blamed on syria
The Cedar Revolution
the big winner from this action was HEZBOLLAH
Hezbollah
integrated social networks
-put it into a massively strong position to take advantage of the electoral process
-got elected to a large block of seats in the lebanese parliament
-was able to make demands on the lebanese government through parliament, cabinet
-this meant that hezbollah was classified as a 'resistance movement' rather than a terrorist organization, was allowed to keep its arms
D) Palestine

Fatah
another example of democratization gone wrong
-used to be the dominant party in palestine
Hamas
seized control in the election
-took advantage of social integration, organization
-problem was that the political arm of Hamas was intimately tied to the guerilla arm of hamas

this means that the US has to actually fight back democracies in the middle east... ooops...
-why are extremists winning elections all over the place (when they're even held)?
-this is not working out as it should
-now israel and US have to work together to fight democracies that they've helped set up

god damn whats going on now

kddk

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Mon, 16 Apr 2007 19:53:00 +0000

AFP NOTES 4/16

Final Exam SATURDAY MAY 5
HODSON 110
10-1130 AM
Review Session next Tuesday

Lecture 22: Democratization & US Foreign Policy Theory
1st of two modules on democratization and its significance for foreign policy
A) The first September 11
first september 11th was actually in CHILE
-only effectively viable american-style democracy in south america
Salvador Allende
Marxist political candidate
-CIA was concerned that he was getting too much popular support
-in 1970, allende was the top ranked contender in the election
-36.3% of the vote?
-promised to nationalize foreign companies in chile
-most importantly the COPPER industry
-US constituencies demanded that the US step up covert involvement in chile
2 tracks
-Track 1
-effort to block Allende's ascension to office through legal means
-this failed
-Track 2
-covert means of removing him from office
-Kissinger- i dont see why we have to sit and watch a country go communist due to the ineptitude of its own people
-covert involvement is stepped up
-US administration starts cutting off aid, loans, credit
-cuts off income to the chilean government/economy
-starts funneling money to opposition parties and newspapers
-this culminates on September 11, 1973
Augusto Pinochet
Military leader
-stages a coup on sept.11, 1973
-military dictatorship established
-lasted through the 80s

this shows the real dichotomy between US long-term goals of democratization and short-term goals of security

2 basic types of order-building strategies
-realist response to rise of soviet power in the cold war
-we've discussed this before
-restoring stable and open relations among the major democracies
-chief objective of US Liberal Grand Strategy
B) Liberal Grand Strategy
restoring stable and open relations among the major democracies
-democracy is an integral component of stable world society
-america's gift to the world is to give the international system the traits that have served it so well at home
-basic content:
-free trade + prosperity + democracy = peace
-in that order
-trade promotes economic growth promotes democracy promotes peace
-this is DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY
-democracies do NOT go to war with eachother
this was articulated as early as 1909
-norman angell
-"the great illusion" (1909)
-economic interdependence fosters peace
-war's economic disruption costs more than any territorial gains could pay off
-this was written just a few years before WWI.. hehe, oops
people promoting democracy seem like they may be idealists
-this is not seen as idealism any longer, seen as fulfilling LEGITIMATE SECURITY GOALS

Washington Consensus

democratic socialization parts (3 specific goals of the washington consensus)
-Democracy
-Open Markets
-state downsizing
-Free Trade
this is called GEOECONOMICS

clinton embraces 'enlargement of the democratic community'
-the policy of democratic enlargement (labeled as the clinton doctrine)
-containment has served its purpose
-now we move to a new model
-counter the aggression, expand democracy aggressively

US Agency for International Development
components
-'Conditionalities' imposed for US aid by
-world bank
-imf
-oecd

as governments liberalize their regimes and economic apparatus, they receive more and more aid
-the reverse, however, is also true

promotion of democracy becomes a PRIMARY OBJECTIVE of US foreign policy
-this becomes a security goal, as well as an ideological goal

1995- 41% of poll respondents said that the US should mind its own business and let other countries survive best they can on their own
-real isolationism is coming back
-this is ironic
-US aid has actually DROPPED since 1991
-$11.6 billion in 1991, $7 billion in 1999
-the majority of the funding cuts came in the 3rd world, south america and africa

Engagement
while the cold war was being waged
-when security aspects conflicted with ideological aspects, security won out every time
-now they actually coincide
-this is true EXCEPT possibly in the middle east
-security interest here is essentially that we NEED oil, so we dont care who's in charge, as long as they provide a stable flow of oil

american democracy was always distinct from an 'electocracy'
-US democracy is LIMITED
-federal constitutional republic
-there are checks and balances here
-ultimate power lies in the CONSTITUTION
-problem with american democratization is that it's not working as well as it did in the US
-actually promoting chaos and disunity around the world
-what's going on here?
-pushing too hard with the democratization is actually harmful to US security interests

C) Realpolitik

realists are arguing against some of the points of the washington consensus
-free trade and open markets may actually be harmful to democracies
-realist policy is as follows
-1st- overriding national interest
-2nd- stability of the international system as a whole (reflection of the US status as a status quo power)
-ends justify the means argument
-defeat of communism was a MORAL OUTCOME in and of itself
-even if the US undertook actions that were against its stated policy, the outcome was just
-we should note the difference between 'reversible non-democratic regimes' and 'non-reversible communist regimes'
-we can re-overthrow right-wing non-communist regimes, we can't do the same so easily with communist states
-ideological relativism was the name of the game
-Raphael Trujillo
-dictator of the dominican republic
-finally got assassinated during kennedy regime
-his statement
-3 outcomes, in order of preferredness
-democracy
-aim at this first
-continuation of the status quo under another dictator
-don't denounce this one until we're SURE that castro-ization is impossible
-castro-ization
-this is REALLY BAD
-carter is the term where most of the realist theorists jumped ship to the republican side
-made morality the cornerstone of US foreign policy
-this just didn't work
-was accused of 'naive idealism'
-carter 'lost' iran, nicaragua, etc
-he has 3 key mistakes
-faith in democratic alternative to encumbent government
-belief that the status quo was not possible
-belief that any change from the status quo (INCLUDING marxist regimes) was preferable
-he's just WRONG on these points
-democracy is ONLY viable when the conditions are right
-3 conditions that JS Mill put up
-people should be willing to receive
-people should be willing and able to preserve
-people should be willing and able to discharge the duties
-carter administration failed not because of lack of good intentions, but because of lack of REALISM

realists were willing to support autocracies around the world because they thought that the alternative was rise of MARXIST regimes
-US would tolerate 'pet tyrants'
-now that the soviet union's gone, there's no reason to tolerate them anymore
-Disengagement was now the name of the game
-but who do we withdraw from?
-great deal of SUBJECTIVITY
-we have to decide whether the autocracy is 'rising' (china) or 'decadent' (USSR)
-decide if they're strategic (middle east-esp pakistan, 1979, for instance) or irrelevant (pakistan after the USSR pulls out of afghanistan)
-popular vs unpopular
-viable vs undesirable alternative
-plebiscitary vs opaque (form of citizen consensus and participation)
-external vs internal (rogue states vs pariah states)

Key parts of democratization (NATIONBUILDING)
-separation of powers, separation of church and state, 1 person 1 vote, etc are taken for granted
-phillipines is the key example here

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Wed, 11 Apr 2007 15:35:00 +0000

Raamin Mostaghimi
4/11/07
AFP Section Writing

Ambrose and Brinkley's "Bush and the Gulf War"

What I found interesting about this reading was the comparison of Bush I's pre-war actions to those of Truman and Johnson. Bush's command of the situation seemed much more impressive than Truman's or Johnson's, if only because he learned from their mistakes. He didn't make the mistakes of incremental escalation or micromanagement of the war effort like Johnson in Vietnam, nor did he make the mistake of not garnering any international support like Truman in Korea. Instead, he managed to get a UN-based coalition force to help fight and pay for the war, he went to Congress for authorization beforehand, and he let the generals do the fighting based on the Powell doctrine, which essentially annihilated the Iraqi army.
Although comparing the success of this war to the modern-day Iraq war may be interesting, I think it's more interesting to discuss the aftermath of the 1st Gulf War. As Ambrose and Brinkley say, the American people overwhelmingly supported President Bush during and immediately after the conflict, but after the honeymoon period was over his approval dropped so precipitously that he actually failed to be reelected. The idea of the USA as the world's policeman is an appealing one, but the implications are not necessarily so nice-sounding. One of the criticisms leveled against Bush after the 1st Gulf War was that the US didn't stay and finish the job, which emphasized a new style of American warmaking- quick entrance with massive and overwhelming force, then exit as soon as stated limited objectives are complete. Critics lambasted the American war machine for this policy and for not staying to rebuild the affected states (both in Iraq and in Panama, 1989), but I don't have too much of a problem with the policy myself. What I do have a problem with is selected enforcement of US police powers on moral grounds. If the true reason that the US didn't intervene in Yugoslavia but did intervene in Iraq was because of US oil interests in the region, then this is a legitimate display of power politics, and I don't have a problem with that. But if the US decides to elevate itself to the moral high ground in the conflict to 'punish aggression,' then it should do so consistently and to the best of its ability, and this is an extremely dangerous route for it to take. Better to stick with power politics, in my opinion.

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Tue, 10 Apr 2007 19:52:00 +0000

AFP NOTES 4/10

dammit, no outline written up there today, this will be a problem
Lecture 21: Neoconservatism & the Bush Doctrine

Bush comes to office, warring factions within his administration
-neocons are prominent
-multilateralism starts to die out
-there is NO balancing power against the US, it's just a hegemony
-this is puzzling
A) George W. Bush (2001- )

Bretton Woods, GATT, NATO, UN
these are part of the reason that there's no real challenge to the US
-multilateral economic and security agreements
-originally was to bring other countries on board with American framework and interests
-other countries get in on them for the alliance-based security system in Europe

Multilateralism
america joins these, flying in the face of Washington's farewell address
-does them in order to ensure certain things
-wants to make sure that up and coming industrial powers are american-style
-also works to establish moral norms for the regimes
they still exist now, even when they're irrelevant
-NATO is the prime example of this
-there's no reason for it to exist- ussr is gone- but it's still there
-still attractive for states to join, because of the security benefits
-no real reason for it to break apart
now, the number of multilateral agreements has increased by 2/3 in recent times
-US is becoming more and more a part of these agreements
-roughly 150 multilateral treaties involving US in 1950
-400 in 1980
-by 2000, approx. 600
International Court of Justice
even though the US is part of these agreements, it doesn't really have to abide by them
-Nicaraguans take the US to court over the contra scandal
-nicaraguans win
-US just rescinds court's jurisdiction over the US
-same sort of thing happens, when US is fined in a non-binding resolution by the UN
-US just ignores it unilaterally
New Sovereigntists
Unilateral dissolution of multilateral agreements are AOK

On the left, economic autonomy is seen to be threatened
-NAFTA, CAFTA, etc are said to be destroying US economic autonomy

On the right, political autonomy is seen to be threatened
-arms control, use of force, etc agreements are said to be threatening political autonomy
'because the US is fully sovereign, it can determine for itself what to follow'
-the constitution says that sovereignty is paramount
-the ONLY obligations that the US has are internal, NO EXTERNAL OBLIGATIONS

3 criticisms by the New Sovereigntists
-International regimes and legal structures are broad and without legitimacy
-they're so broad and such because they're trying to incorporate as many states as possible, lose legitimacy that wya
-international regimes are unaccountable
-US political system is accountable to the voters
-international regimes have no such accountability
-constitutional duty
-US autonomy is primary
-ONLY US OBLIGATION IS TO THE CONSTITUTION
-there is no reason at all for the US to follow international law, etc, besides good will
-US can opt out of any of them at any time

examples of US failures to commit (or stay committed to) multilateral agreements during Clinton administration
-Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty
-land mines convention
-international criminal court
-kyoto protocol
-convention on the rights of the child
during Bush admin
-biological weapons convention
-small and light arms convention
-withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty, June 2002

'when it comes to our security, we really don't need anybody's permission'
-bush doctine

charles krauthammer called it the 'new unilateralism'
-new unilateralism seeks to strengthen american power and deploy it to international ends
-clears away 'web of constraining international agreements'

formation of three factions within the republican party
-paleo-conservatives
-heirs of the old republican isolationists/exemplarists
-now that the cold war's over, American duty to the world is done, we should go back to isolationism
-neo-conservatives
-internationalists/vindicationists
-america's duty is NOT finished
-world is still full of threats, still monsters to destroy
-neocons split into two groups
-vulcans
-took the name from the roman gold vulcan, god of the forge
-aaaaand he made a star trek reference. critiquing the name of the vulcan race. holy god.
-firmly entrenched in the Dept of Defense, VP's office, and in the private sector at the time of Bush's administration
-NSA Condi Rice, DefenseSec Rumsfeld, Dept DefSec Wolfowitz, VP Cheney
-questioned validity of deterrence and containment
-promoted aggressive actions on international scale
-attacked multilateral agreements
-most active proponents of expanding the war on terror to encompass states, terrorism is an issue of foreign policy/int'l relations
-evangelical interpretation of internationalism- power = a moralizing force
-only if it's consistent with american interests
-'project for a new american century' (PNAC)
-vehicle for advancing the NeoReaganite policies
-cochaired by Bill Kristol and Donald Keagan
-guardians
-contrast to vulcans
-'reluctant warriors'
-occupied StateDept, and served with bill clinton as well
-SecState Powell, DepSecState Armitage, Director of StateDept Planning Staff Haas
-huge divergence of opinion between StateDept and DoD, also dichotomy between NSA and CIA
-guardians are highly resistant to engagements where use of force is the first option
-diplomatic, economic maneuvering to contain states
-even police actions are better options
-pays attention to balancing US power with other states
-NOT LOOKING FOR HEGEMONY
-even just preeminence among like-minded states
-two groups of neocons have been fighting for control since Bush I
-wolfowitz with cheney and libby wrote a memo detailing how to deal with the fall of the soviet union
-US should INCREASE defense spending
-assert itself as the sole superpower to quash the rise of regional powers that take advantage of the fall of the soviet union
-first use of the term 'coalitions of the willing'
-US cannot bring on board all multilateral structures, but bring whoever we can convince
-even if we can't, we'll bring on board whoever we can
-and we'll take action ourselves in 'defense of our interests
-first time preventive and preemptive war were brought into discussion
-bush I told them to sanitize the paper, remove all preemptive or unilateral action
-guardians win this round
-vulcans then start arguing that containment has failed
-new strategy is necessary to remove saddam hussein from power
-when bush II takes office, CHINA is the vulcan's plan of action
-advocates action NOW rather than later, while the balance of power was still on their side
-Sept. 11, 2001 happened
-turns out that all along, international terrorist organizations are now the biggest problem
-on SEPT 12, rumsfeld asked about attacking iraq as well as al-qaeda
-vulcans still looking to move up
-powell avoided striking iraq
-said that US should attack Al-Qaeda first
-right then, american people were looking to get back at Osama and Al-Qaeda
-over powell's objection, Bush called the attacks more than acts of terror, but ACTS OF WAR
-vulcans win here, it's the start of a WAR between states and non-states
-terrorism is the new threat to meet American power
-bush quote- we will pursue terrorists wherever they hide and hut anyone that helps them
-'you are with us or against us'
-THATS THE BUSH DOCTRINE RIGHT THERE ^^
-now vulcans support 'regime change' in iraq
-state of the union in 2002, bush puts iraq in the 'axis of evil'
-presented as a prime threat to the US
-June 2002- bush says that the marine corps must be ready to strike at a moment's notice anywhere in the world
-states that the US must be ready to take preemptive military action to ensure security
-same thing said in the state of the union- identifying threats and eliminating them BEFORE THEY HAPPEN
-National security statement, 2002
-US CANNOT USE DEFENSIVE POSTURE
-terrorists now use weapons of mass destruction, so any act they take will be devastating
-US must take anticipatory action to defend itself, EVEN IF UNCERTAINTY REMAINS in the time and place
-preemptive action's benefits beat out any possible costs that may be incurred
-containment and deterrence have gone out the window
-deterrence based solely on retaliation doesnt even work against rogue states, because they dont really care what happens to them
-no way in HELL it's gonna work against non-state actors
-now america is going out and looking for 'monsters to destroy'
-the view is that america asked for what happened on sept 11, because it wasn't proactive enough
-'liberal, humanitarianist imperialism' has worked in the balkans, it'll work in the middle east as well
-US needs to respond with asymmetric response to terrorist action
-massive retaliation is the way to go
-appeasement is what's been happening essentially with terrorists so far
-we had the chance to eliminate saddam in gulf war 1
-abandoning iraq in gulf war I was 'as shameful as abandoning south vietnam in 1975'
-taking out saddam hussein is justified as an expression of american national defense and self interest
-we need to impose 'effective imperial oversight' in the middle east
-'if we have to go it alone, we'll go it alone, but i'd rather not'
-in the end, war in iraq happened essentially alone, without UNSC resolution
-tenacious multilateralism still applies to the US and US actions, but not as much as it used to
-both US and Israel have signaled that they'd be willing to take unilateral, preemptive action against agressors

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Mon, 09 Apr 2007 19:55:00 +0000

AFP NOTES 4/9

FINAL EXAM
SATURDAY, MAY 5
10:00-11:30 am
HODSON 110

Lecture 20: Unipolar Foreign Policy

A) The End of History?
collapse of USSR was so unexpected, people were calling it the 'end of history'
-francis fukuyama wrote the book
-'events would continue to happen, but debates, arguments, etc, had ceased to evolve'
-there is no alternative, evolutionary go-to point after US-style capitalism

america has emerged through bipolarity and multipolarity as the SOLE pole- unipolarity
-unipolarity isn't really as unprecedented as you'd think
-america had been the unipolar figure within the western hemisphere for some time
-there was NO BALANCING against the united states in the western hemisphere for some time

Pax Americana
America gets to police the 'pax americana'
-america has essentially a massive opportunity for 'muscle flexing' on the international stage

Hegemony
america was the hegemon OF THE WORLD
-NOBODY could fight against him
Vietnam Syndrome
no more little shitty wars in the third world
-american people just wouldn't have it
-people thought that america had escaped from vietnam syndrome after 1st gulf war, but it hadnt

instead, the people of the US just became SQUEAMISH
-massive dissatisfaction with government actions, expectations of success shoot through the roof
-Americans wish that wars could be won without the loss of a single US life
-now, instead of external balancing forces from other countries, there is internal dissatisfaction acting as an INTERNAL balancer

B) Cold War Legacies

Now, america can actually act on its moral grounds
-no longer does the US have to tolerate local warlords because they occupy key strategic choke points
-most importantly manuel noriega, saddam hussein
another priority is cutting off support to US proxy states
-no longer has to keep its proxy states in the game to fight the soviet union
-soviet union collapsed, their proxies collapse as well
-most obviously- Yugoslavia
-yugoslavia tore itself apart
-US client states included
-afghanistan, liberia, somalia
-now they're basically cut off
-these states degenerate into basically anarchy
-eventually the US moves to fix some of the problems in somalia and yugoslavia
-however, ignores afghanistan and liberia
-we see now, ignoring afghanistan was a problem- we're feeling BLOWBACK

final priority- dealing with humanitarian crises around the world
-now that the USSR was gone, their veto with it, the US thought that they could actually deal with humanitarian crises around the world
-however, this seems to fail
-two major crises- haiti, rwanda
-in NEITHER of them did the UN do anything of consequence
-whyyy???

US is essentially devoid of any sort of coherent foreign policy around the world
-this is a REAL PROBLEM
-international system becomes more anarchic now, rather than more stable

George H.W. Bush (1989-93)
first post-cold war president
-first issue- PANAMA, manuel noriega
Manuel Noriega
dictator of panama
-graduate of 'school of the americas'
-essentially a CIA training camp
-was on teh CIA payroll
-was a participant in the war with the contras
-was protected from US wrath by the reagan administration
Bush HAS to deal with this
-when he doesn't deal with him, it gives rise to the 'wimp factor'
the reason that the US had to dispose of noriega was not because he was a dictator
-this isn't really that much of a problem, as long as he's a US puppet
-the problem was that he was becoming irrational
-irrationality CANNOT be tolerated around the panama canal
Operation Just Cause
originally operation 'blue spoon', they didnt think that this'd be macho enough
-essentially the US rolled over noriega
-beat the living FUCK out of his regime, installed a legit government in its place
-UN 'deplored' the action, passed toothless resolutions against it
Saddam Hussein
Douchebag dictator
Jimmy carter made several things clear about the middle east
-energy dependence on the middle east was established, called the gulf a 'US security interest'
-any aggression into the persian gulf would be seen as an assault on US interests
-this was clearly to be applied to the soviet union
-extended to apply to even indigenous militias and armies
first war in the region was the iran/iraq war
-1980-88
-one of the bloodiest wars post-wwii
-iraqi forces under saddam decided to invade iran in an imperialistic war
-launched against the revolutionary islamic iranian government
-iran fucks up the iraqis (FUCK YOU, IRAQI BITCHES, DONT MESS WITH IRAN), launches a counter-invasion
-reagan decided that iran's revolutionary doctrine could not be spread across the middle east
-decided to support the Iraqis in the war
-supplied them with everything short of guns
-even turned a blind eye to iraqi poison gas use
-when the Iranians decided to attack oil tankers leaving the gulf, the US provided escort ships
-Operation Praying Mantis essentially immobilized the entire persian navy
-US goals were achieved- stalemate in the middle east
problem here
-saddam interpreted this action by the US as a tacit approval of Iraqi actions
-decides to invade kuwait as a measure to recoup his losses
-doesn't realize that the US won't tolerate iraqi domination of the region any more than iranian
Operation Desert Storm
bush goes to the security council, gets a resolution
-biggest victory for collective security
-DOESNT make the mistakes truman, johnson, nixon, etc did
-not symmetric response, not micromanagement
-MASSIVE RESPONSE, let the generals do the fighting
-huge victory for the US
-end of the vietnam syndrome?
Mohammed Farah Aidid
NOPE
aidid was the local warlord
huge humanitarian crisis, US needs to intervene?
-now US foreign policy isn't driven by security interests anymore
-US security is assured, now humanitarian needs are driving policy
-baaaad idea
-terrible because US interests here didn't actually run very deep
-the public forgets why it cares very quickly
Powell Doctrine
Colin Powell- chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
-powell didn't want to send troops to yugoslavia, bosnia, or somalia
-however, wanted to send troops into europe LESS
-thought it was more dangerous
powell doctrine, you have to satisfy 3 criteria
-sufficient force, defined mission
-clear rules of engagement (you HAVE to express any limitations)
-clearly defined exit strategy
these applied in desert storm, powell thought they applied in somalia as well
other people didn't think so
-national security council had problems with the plan
-once the US forces are committed, nothing indigenous would develop to ensure their own security
-US mission would have to expand
-this is called MISSION CREEP
Mission Creep
this actually happened
-Handover from US to UN forces took much longer than expected, because of exactly those concerns
-one of the problems was that the UN SecGen had other agendas as well
-nation-building was one of his objectives
-this was NOT one of america's initial goals
-this is a PROBLEM
-nothing was working in the nation-building process

once US helicopter gunships attacked the headquarters of Aidid, somalian forces mobilized against the US
-this was ANOTHER PROBLEM
-mission creep is leading to open-ended commitment

october 3, 1993
-Black Hawk Down happened
-even though this was essentially just a tiny skirmish, it was blown way out of proportion
-PICTURES were being shown
-where before, the pictures were of starving somalis, they changed to pictures of jeering crowds dragging american bodies through the streets
-US policymakers reacted real quick, got the fuck out
-'multilateralism DIED on the streets of Mogadishu'

now, america's overriding goal is to avoid these sorts of multilateral operations that involve mission creep
C) Bill Clinton

Rwanda
April-July 1994
-in about 100 days, 800,000 people (mostly Tutsis) were slaughtered by ethnic Hutus
-many by machete
-in the wake of the Somalian debacle, there is NO PUSHING FOR US INTERVENTION
-this was deliberately suppressed by the administration, because clinton didn't want to reject plans because there was NO DOMESTIC SUPPORT
-UN tried to get troops there, but it was far too late
-US held up deliveries of APCs to the UN, etc
-Clinton administration blacklisted the word 'genocide', because if it was 'genocide' then the US had treaty obligations to fulfill

the conflict spread to nearby Congo, sparked the 1st and 2nd congolese wars
-more than 3.8 million people were killed
-essentially NO MEDIA COVERAGE of this, no intervention

Jean-Bertrand Aristid
1st elected president of Haiti
-took office Feb 1991
-overthrown by a coup in september 1991
-another warlord, military junta establishes itself in Haiti
people are trying to escape haiti, fleeing to the United States
-Clinton administration was forced to act, it's within the monroe doctrine
-aborted an invasion at the last second because of diplomatic initiatives by jimmy carter
-even so, it still hasn't quieted down in Haiti, still in a destructive cycle
Slobodan Milosevic
Yugoslavia was a bigass problem
-split into serbia and croatia, both of which wanted bosnia
milosevic was the president of Serbia
-pushed for a bigger serbia
-serb nationalists within bosnia and croatia commit themselves to 'ethnic cleansing'
-decided to kill off all the croats

Sarajevo -> Srebrenica
key components of serb ethnic cleansing were the siege of sarajevo and taking of srebrenica
-srebrenica had its security GUARANTEED by international forces
-serbs just beat the shit out of the forces, slaughtered all the men
Kosovo
Croats finally regrouped, fucked up the serbs
-US uses a private firm to rebuild the croat military
-MPRI, a company made up of former US generals and officers
-croats launch OPERATION STORM, fuck up the serb army
once the serbs made the mistake of shelling a marketplace, the US could get into the war too
-US-led NATO forces begin a strategic bombing campaign that runs from August 30-September 20
-bombed the serbs to the negotiating table
-negotiated in Dayton, Ohio (Dayton Accords)
-signed in december
still problematic- KOSOVO
-over 90% ethnic albanians, even though its part of serbia
-the serbs keep repressing the albanians
-KLA forms- Kosovo Liberation Army
-this puts pressure on the western powers to resolve the issue

Rambouillet Accords
proposed in 1989 by american, UK delegations
-NATO peacekeeping in the region
-NATO peacekeeping of Kosovo especially
-unhindered access by NATO forces to serbia
-immunity from the local law for NATO forces

Milosevic rejects them, hopes that Russia will intervene on his behalf, like russia traditionally has
-rejected on 24 march
-bombing campaign begins 11 June
-OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
-this was NOT approved by the UNSC
-even though NATO is supposed to be a DEFENSIVE alliance, the US was using NATO to advance offensive policy interests

there were even more PROBLEMS
-not enough aircraft to launch bombing runs
-MASSIVE opposition from every NATO capital against sending ground troops in
-General Wesley Clark felt that he was being denied support, etc
-was reduced to 'tank plinking'- attacking ONLY explicitly military targets instead of power plants, industrial plants, etc
-NATO was finally authorized to take the fight to belgrade (capital of serbia)
-smart weapons fucked the shit out of belgrade, even though they missed a couple times (destroyed chinese embassy)
-over $480 million spent on bringing in apache helicopters, then when 2 crashed in training they recalled them all

even though this was a massive success, not a single soldier lost, the US people were still dissatisfied with US performance for some reason.

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Wed, 04 Apr 2007 16:12:00 +0000

Raamin Mostaghimi
AFP Section Writing
April 4, 2007

Henry Kissinger's "Vietnam: The Extrication"

I've never before read any real analysis on the process of withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, so what I read here was extremely interesting to me. I had always just assume that Nixon was elected to get America out of Vietnam and that's essentially what he did. Kissinger's depiction of the massive intransigence of the Vietnamese negotiators and their eventual acceptance of American Capitulation was quite telling. I think I'd fallen into the same trap that Kissinger writes the American people had fallen into- seeing the North Vietnamese as a traditional enemy. It's just not the same when the enemy can rely on the fact that deadlock, although not bringing them victory directly, will affect your domestic political dynamic in such a way so as to bring them eventual victory. The North Vietnamese strategists were extremely intelligent in this regard, and their strategy clearly paid off in the end.
The other thing which I had never even considered was Nixon's supposed nobility in the prosecution of the Vietnam War. Although I assume that this is colored in large part by Kissinger's personal affiliation with Nixon, it still seems like the facts are at least a little in Nixon's favor. His shouldering of the burden of the war was an interesting choice for an American Executive, especially at this period in American history where the rest of the political machine was concentrating on short-term victories against the other branches. Nixon decided to bite the harm of Vietnamization rather than passing the buck to Congress supposedly because he felt that the executive was responsible for assuring American security, whether the people liked it or not.

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Tue, 03 Apr 2007 19:50:00 +0000

AFP NOTES 4/3
sorry, missed the last lecture. lets see if baia, lazer, and danielle can put some halfway decent notes together for us...
Lecture 19: The End of the Cold War

A) Carter, 1977-81
a 'new, fresh approach to foreign policy'
Human Rights
-made 'decency and optimism' guiding lights of foreign policy
-human rights come to the forefront here
-hoped to promote human rights in the soviet union while maintaining detente
-essentially does exactly the wrong thing
-SENDS MIXED SIGNALS
-geopolitical arena turns right against us, lowest point of american prestige was in 1979
-there was the second oil shock in the decade during the iranian revolution
-sets off a spiral of stagflation
-this was the 'malaise' period of american history

"Crisis of Confidence"
-that's essentially what this time was
-nicaraguan rebels take control against US will and wish
The Hostage Crisis
-november, iranians seize american embassy in tehran
Afghanistan
-december, soviets invade afghanistan
-this is the FIRST overt soviet expansion in 30 years
-july 1979, americans start funding afghan rebels
-END of detente
-immediately placed sanctions on USSR, withdrew from the olympics in moscow
-most importantly, starts funding the mujaheddin fighters in afghanistan
-not surprisingly, carter loses the election
B) Reagan, 1981-89
-not seen as any sort of significant figure
-people were underestimating him his entire political career, he played on this
-when he took office, soviet union was on a roll
-however, beneath the facade it was essentially a paper tiger
-extremely fragile, people realized this
-for many reasons, people were DELIBERATELY overestimating the soviet threat
-people like the CIA, 'committee on the present danger' (a private anti-soviet group), etc
-lots of pressure of the US to take on the soviets
-however, some people such as the marshall group realized that the soviets were faltering
-soviet command economy was failing due to fall of oil prices (1982 essentially), subsidization of satellite states, etc
-as much as 1/3 of soviet GDP was being spent on military expenditures, this is NOT SUSTAINABLE
-even under reagan, with massive defense spending, US doesnt spend more than 6%
-CIA overestimates soviet industrial capacity by 90% in the 70s, and 200% in 1980-85
-strategy now became 'cost imposing strategy'
-now, instead of backing off with detente, US has to press EVERYWHERE
-individual victories and defeats are IRRELEVANT
-this is a war of attrition now
-the plan is to out-spend the soviet union
-we can afford to fight war longer than the soviets
-eventually, the soviets would arrive at a tipping point and lose

3-pronged of the Reagan strategy
-direct confrontation
-massive arms buildup
-proxy war in the 3rd world
-win the wars there, force engagement around the world
-war of ideas
-maintain moral superiority, win the hearts and minds
Arms Race

The Brezhnev Doctrine
-if any country had gone socialist or entered the soviet bloc, soviets claim the right to intervene to put down counter-insurgencies
The Reagan Doctrine
-US asserts its right to intervene to help ANY nation win its freedom which wants to
Solidarity
-trade movement arises in poland, wants freedom here
-soviets CRUSH these poor fuckers
-US can do nothing about it, because it's clearly in the soviet bloc in europe
-the real war is being fought in the third world
-much more flexibility here

'the soviet union is behind all the unrest around the world' - reagan
-reagan says that the soviet union is the source of 'all the evil around the world'
-this is the source of the label 'evil empire'
NSDD 75
there are some problems now
-seems like containment had failed
-soviet union is expanding throughout the 3rd world
-there's little possibility for expansion of confrontation to the nuclear level, because they're proxy wars
-reagan doctrine therefore says essentially, we'll help you, under three conditions

these conditions are:
1) indigenous democratic resistance
2) against a 'soviet client state'
3) with a population denied representation within its own government (illegitimate government)
under those criteria, reagan doctrine will be applied

now, the reagan doctrine's being used to rebut soviet moves in afghanistan
-policy of ROLLBACK
-3 main groups of people with regards to roll back
-advocates
-wooooo rollback
-pragmatists
-evaluate on a case-by-case basis, make sure we can win every single time
-opponents
-only use it in the face of overt soviet aggression

Contras
resistance movement fighting the Sandinista rule in Nicaragua
Boland Amendment
-places a band on military support to the contras in 1984
-private sector begins secretly providing funds
-allows the CIA to covertly provide funds to the contras
-says that they're the moral equivalent to our revolution
-uses the funds gained from this to try and pay the iranians for giving back the hostages
the only real time that the reagan doctrine won out was afghanistan
-however, people believed the soviet empire was a 'house of cards'
-win one, and they all fall down
-there was a broad support in congress for the mujaheddin resistance
-97-3 in senate, 100% in the house
Stinger Missiles
this one technology became decisive in the war
-no longer could the soviets dominate by use of helicopter and low-level bombing
-high-level bombing is essentially useless against the guerillas
-US aid goes up to $650 million in 1987
-back down to $350 million in 1988
-essentially, the stinger missiles broke the back of the soviet invasion
-feb 1988, soviets announced they were withdrawing from afghanistan
C) "Star Wars"
Reagan rejected the balance of power theory
-Mutually Assured Destruction was bullshit to him
-also thought that SALT was BS, all it did was institutionalize MAD
-his long-term objective is the REDUCTION of nuclear arms
-force the soviet union into economic collapse by overspending, force them to reduce their arms themselves

START

SDI
Strategic Defense Initiative
-plans to protect america from the nuclear threat
-this was a problem for our allies
-if the US and Soviet Union both had their own SDI, any nuclear war would just destroy the rest of the world
-Soviets were like oh shit
-started the policy of SWARMING or MIRVing
-just shoot more missiles than the US can shoot down
-this, however is EXTREMELY expensive
-if SDI ever worked out, the balance of power was decisively shifted in the USs favor
-most effective point of the SDI was the psychological war being waged
-Soviets were so frightened that the US could get this then they'd just flip out
-soviets realized they couldn't build one
-americans actually couldn't build on either, but they succeeded in shanking the soviets
-lol hax. noobs.

reagan believed that the strategy of detente had failed
-soviets could be taken down if its population turned against it
-there was a strategy for making this happen
-challenging legitimacy
-superiority over parity
-fight the war from a position of superiority
-capitalizing on human rights rather than compromising
-no more mr. nice guy
-work with liberalizing, nationalist forces

Reykjavik
what is he doing with this lecture? fuck you, outline!

D) The War of Ideas

Mikhail Gorbachev
gorbachev wants to REFORM communism
-throw off the old shackles of stalinism
-starts two main reforms, perestroika and glastnost
-he and reagan hit it off right away
-gorbachev realizes that the Soviet Union could not afford to fight the arms race
-they kept one-upping eachother during negotiations so much that they actually considered disarming eachother ENTIRELY
-another aspect was that the Soviets could NOT keep funding all of these satellite states
-so he just stopped
-berlin falls, third world and all the proxy states collapse
-problem with Gorbachev's reforms was that the Soviet Union just couldn't handle it
-USSR collapses
-gorbachev sincerely believed that they could compete, but the system just wouldnt take it
-soviet union collapses
Perestroika

Glasnost

GG, SOVIET NOOBS!!

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Tue, 03 Apr 2007 19:43:00 +0000

AFP NOTES 4/2

big thanks to baia for these

Richard nixon, 1969-71

Nsa - SoS of henry kissinger

Vietnamization

Le duc tho

Easter offensive

Linebacker (may 9th->october 23, 1972)

Nguyen van thieu

Linebacker II (december 18-29, 1972)

Paris peace accords (jan 27, 1973)

Nixon boctrine

Shanhai doctine

Linkage

Anti balistic missile treaty

Salt I

Basic principles

Paris peace accords, drag out for months. Essentially meaningless

Back channel negotiations between kissinger and tho.

Secret bombings in 1969

Incursion in 1970

Pitiful helpless giant concept

Khmer rouge, 195 pol pot

Communist marxism

Annihilation of 1/5 of the country

Oct 8th, 1972 - DMZ on the border

B-52s

Nixon doctrine

Unless on state came into threat from nukes, US is is going to expect the problem will be handled by Asian nations themselves. Allys take burden of own defense, and has a right to expect this

Bi polarity and a world of hierarchy into a world of multi-polarity

Recognition of the process of relative decline since 2nd world war

US, USSR, western Europe, japan, china

Conceptual coherecnce

Centralization of power

Balance of powe "even balance"

Mutual interest" a relaist accomadation of conflicting interests

Improving cyno-american relations key to US v. USSR relations

Only nixon could go to china?

Cant leave china forever outside the family of nations

Warning soviet union US would not remain neutral of a USSR invasion of china

Flew to china in 1972

Moved china from enemy in isolation to defacto alliance against USSR in less than 4 years

Flanked by NATO and China

Soviet union sought relaxation of tension with the US

Cost benefit relation to nixon's actions was overwhelming in US benefits

A triumph of pure politics over ideology

Linkage - cooperation of one area linking with change in another

Used the help as leverage against soviet policy

Salt - freezes ICBM's at 1972 level

ABM treat - MAD concept - mutually assured destruction

Terms have changed

US dominance til relative parady with soviet union

Consciousness of our limits is a recognition of the necessity of peace

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Mon, 02 Apr 2007 05:03:00 +0000

AMERICAN PRESIDENCY REVIEW SHEET FOR MIDTERM 2

woot. thanks chris for the help. i bet you can tell which ones are hiiiiis... hahahahha
1) How did changes in the nominating process diminish the role of parties in the selection of major party candidates?

-Heyday of party selection of presidential candidates- 1800-1824 (King Caucus)
-caucus of congressmen from the party would select presidential candidates
-led to the rise of CABINET GOVERNMENT
-problem here was weak, indecisive presidency
-governors, senators dominate the field
-party is EXTREMELY influential
-Rise of jacksonian democracy
-control of presidential candidacy given to state parties rather than the national organization
-party nominating convention becomes king
-presidency was no longer cabinet-dominated
-problem here was that corruption ran rampant
-a few hundred men were all that held actual control over the entire process
-what the party wants is not a good president but a good candidate
-governors and senators continue to dominate the field
-party is still extremely influential, however state parties have much more control and influence now
-Primary and caucus system goes into effect
-much more direct representation of the electorate
-party no longer can be effectively controlled by 'bosses'
-now direct appeals to the people are necessary
-after McGovern-Fraser act, parties are required to either hold primaries or open caucuses
-electorate now sends candidates to the nation, rather than political bosses
-now, politicians can run for president without the support of a single party politician
-direct appeals to the people now allow for 'outsider' candidates
-this is an extremely effective strategy, btw
-this system disadvantages cabinet secretaries from running, as well as senators for some reason
-less people with cemented, vested interests in the party are now in the playing field
-essentially, gives the party apparatus less control over the selection of candidates
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power

2) How does the front-loading of presidential primaries affect the nominating process?

-Candidates are forced through a massive, grueling nominating process
-makes nominating and campaign seasons even longer than they were before
-skews candidate selection economically
-advantages candidates with the ability to raise huge amounts of money extremely quickly
-skews candidate selection demographically
-iowa and new hampshire are predominantly white, while the rest of the country isn't
-the iowa and NH primary and caucus are populated by people more radical than the rest of the population
-people who vote in the primaries are more ideologically charged than the rest of the population
GET MORE ON THIS QUESTION
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power"

3) How does the switch to primaries and caucuses changed the type of candidates who frequently win the nomination?

-demographic change
-the people who vote in primaries are much more radical than rank-and-file party member
-appeal to electorate
-now, emphasis is on good CANDIDATE, not necessarily good PRESIDENT
-key example here is John Kerry, who people chose because they wanted to have somebody, anybody, who could beat Bush
-play to outsider appeal
-maniuplate popular resentment against washington
-being the 'political outisder' really works
-promotes individualistic, media-centered approach to presidential politics
-less substantive debate, campaigning, more 'personal' politics
-candidates' personal lives come to the forefront
-voters vote for the 'likeable' candidate, rather than the one with more governing experience
-promotes candidates with less political experience
-no more political 'peer review' by experienced members of the party who know the candidate
MORE HERE AGAIN
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power"

4) How have weaker state parties and stronger national parties changed the opportunities for Presidents to function as party leaders?

-Reasons for weaker state parties:
-PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES
-this is the big one
-means that the party doesn't choose any more, the PEOPLE choose
-whether primary or caucus, now at least some of the people are selecting the presidential candidates
-CORRUPTION, people fed up with it
-McGovern-Fraser act
-Consequences
-now, state parties and leaders thereof are effectively marginalized
-you can't win with just the support of the state parties any more
-in fact, you can win WIHTOUT their explicit support
-opportunities created-
-direct appeals to the people
-ascension to the candidacy through simply strong turnout at election time
-stronger national parties mean massively modernized methods of electioneering
-parties now have to be much, much more organized
-presidents are less indebted to the party structure
-sets the stage for a split between the presidency and the party
-candidates who don't see themselves as elected by the party don't feel indebted to it in any way
-no party constraint on presidential leadership
MORE?
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power"

5) What is partisan polarization and how might it shape presidential party leadership in Congreess

-partisan polarization- less ideological division within parties

-more ideological division and less overlap between parties

-more ideologically homogeneous and coherent parties

-in unified government, president only must appeal to own party

-in divided government, president can either adopt a cross-partisan or bipartisan plan

-Congressman of opposite party, if own electoral constituency same as president’s, more likely to vote for president’s plan

MOST LIKELY CHAPTER 13

6) what is divided government and how might it shape presidential strategies for pursuing a legislative agenda?

-Divided Government
-when one party controls the legislative and the other controls the executive
-how does it shape presidential strategies for pursuing political agenda
-divided control does not necessarily force deadlock on political action, but it can if the president isn't careful
-president has to work not to be excessively partisan
-more compromise is necessary
-negotiation rises to the forefront as the driving force behind government
-president caters more to moderates of the opposite party
-would be more inclined to make concessions to get pivotal legislation passed
-more attention is paid to bargaining power and bounded efficiency
-bargaining power- the ability and cost incurred for a party to simply end negotiations
-the party with the most bargaining power is more effective at the table
-bounded efficiency- within bounds, agreements can be made that make BOTH parties better off
-this is NOT true of electoral issues, when one party gains, the other loses
-president must pick more 'crosscutting' issues - issues that affect both parties and demand response
-pushes governmental policy and execution to the moderate middle of the spectrum

TAKEN FROM Quirk and Nesmith, "Divided Government and Policymaking"

7) What difference, if any, does unified or divided government matter for legislation?

-it DOES make a difference, but not necessarily in the way people think
-the argument made by Quirk and Nesmith is that although deadlock is possible in divided gov't, it's not a necessity
-cross-cutting issues, negotiation, and collective zero-sum bargaining (all the politicians want to be re-elected) mean that action will most likely be taken
-differences are more subtle
-unified government can tend toward imperial presidency, no check on presidential authority
-presidential legislative prerogative is respected
-president is 'leader of the party' afterall
-unified government also responds to minor swings in public opinion
-divided government is not so responsive
-example, welfare reform was largely untouched by minor shifts in public opinions because of this
-relatively minor shifts in public opinion sparked major gun reform legislation during unified clinton years
-even divided gov't responds to relatively major shifts in public sentiment
-energy price ceilings in 2001 by Bush
-divided government simply means legisltive agenda becomes much more centrist
-important legislation is not necessarily quashed because of divided government
-in fact, unified and divided government have nearly identical rates of passage of important legislation
-compromise, bargaining move to the forefront
-the issues which inspire deadlock are only the most ideologically charged issues
-problems emerge when crosscutting issues are linked to ideologically charged issues
-linking deficit reduction to tax hikes, for example

TAKEN FROM Quirk and Nesmith, "Divided Government and Policymaking"

8) Why do the production demands of the press often produce news coverage of presidential policy initiatives that is negative or adversarial?

-short answer- presidential media blitzes are BAD
-when presidents try to shape news coverage, they almost always fail miserably
-example- clinton health care initiatives
-administration tries to flood the press with their point of view, their sources
-press requires fair and balanced look at the news
-as a result, they bring in more opposing experts to balance out the president's people
-economic competition creates incentives to produce 'big' or attention-getting stories
-conflict generates just this
-when the president says more, it dutifully gets reported on, but opposing experts have to get reported on too
-also, when the nature of the story is partisan, the press tends to duck it
-press tends to stay away from partisan normative evaluation
-therefore, when this sort of story presents itself, they become process stories
-process stories inspire apathy and cynicism
-now, strategy becomes the story, and presidents are derided for political maneuvering
-another reason for the failure of presidential media blitzes is their inability to sustain them
-there's no way the executive can sustain a concerted media blitz for the kind of time necessary
-years, in some cases, to get all the legislation through committee and onto the floor into debate

TAKEN FROM Jacobs, "The Presidency and the Press"

9) Why do presidential efforts to shape press coverage often paradoxically result in more negative press coverage and/or adversarial press relations?

SAME AS ABOVE

-short answer- presidential media blitzes are BAD
-when presidents try to shape news coverage, they almost always fail miserably
-example- clinton health care initiatives
-administration tries to flood the press with their point of view, their sources
-press requires fair and balanced look at the news
-as a result, they bring in more opposing experts to balance out the president's people
-economic competition creates incentives to produce 'big' or attention-getting stories
-conflict generates just this
-when the president says more, it dutifully gets reported on, but opposing experts have to get reported on too
-also, when the nature of the story is partisan, the press tends to duck it
-press tends to stay away from partisan normative evaluation
-therefore, when this sort of story presents itself, they become process stories
-process stories inspire apathy and cynicism
-now, strategy becomes the story, and presidents are derided for political maneuvering
-another reason for the failure of presidential media blitzes is their inability to sustain them
-there's no way the executive can sustain a concerted media blitz for the kind of time necessary
-years, in some cases, to get all the legislation through committee and onto the floor into debate

TAKEN FROM Jacobs, "The Presidency and the Press"

10) Why have formal presidential press conferences declined in relation to other kinds of public appearances by presidents?

fuck knows
i remember something in lecture?
-presidents prefer controlled circumstances to promote their agendas, rather than the adversarial media
-media isn't as nice as it was before
-better to control and regiment the information given out to the press

–press conferences cannot be pre-planned
-public appearances allow for more control over what president says and the situation as a whole

+Jacobs Ch. 5

11) How have changes in the media, such as the rise of cable, made presidential communication strategies mroe difficult?
HOLY SHIT WHAT?

12) How is OMB an important tool fo the institutional presidency?
-Office of Management and Budget

-created in 1970 under Nixon

-involved in budget making and regulatory review

-regulatory review –

-budget- allows president to decide where money is specifically spent

-regulation- allows president to oversee and control what happens within the bureaucracy

-President penetrates bureaucracy with appointees to oversee it

-regulatory review expands presidential power

+Mayer & Welco reading

13) What are some of the congressional disadvantages in dealing with the Executive Branch?
-information gap- Congress does not know all the information the president knows

-Congressmen as individuals do not always care about collective power of Congress

-President has first move advantage

-if constitution is ambiguous, president can exercise residual power rights

+Mayer & Welco reading

14) How has control over regulatory policy enabled presidents to pursue policy goals that might otherwise be frustrated by Congress?
-expanding WHS has allowed president to expand administrative power

-president can surround himself with loyalists making it so they will act in his favor

-president penetrates bureaucracy deeper

-extends oversight capacity

-can leave behind a legacy

+Mayer & Welco reading

15) How has the appointments process enabled presidents to enhance their control over the operation of Executive agencies and departments?

-shift from essentially party patronage
-used to be that the party dictated to the president who got what appointment
-starting at the very beginning with Truman, then with Kennedy/Johnson and so forth, Presidents took a much larger role in the appointments process
-allows presidents to fill the departments with people who are loyal to HIM rather than to his party
-this was a problem for nixon and reagan, but hey, whatever
-every president has done this or been forced to do this since Kennedy, or face a major crisis of lack of executive authority
-Nixon and Carter tried to do without this personalized executive
-carter especially tried to move away from the presidential appointments process, and back to the old-style system
-huuuuuge mistake
-by leaving department and cabinet heads to appoint their own people, he decentralized the presidency far too much
-appointees were loyal to the people who appointed them, not to the president or even to the president's plans
-executive authority was diluted so much that staffers were making bargains on their own behalf in congress and the like
-this was simply unacceptable
-even carter, who ran on an anti-nixon, anti-consolidation of presidential authority platform, was forced to reevaluate his policy, and change it to make it more orthodox

TAKEN FROM Mayer and Weko, "The Institutionalization of Power"

16) Why has conflict over appointments to lower Federal Courts (District and Appeals Courts) increased in recent years?
-increase in partisan polarization

-president wants to appoint loyalists to lower courts because judges have life terms

-decrease in senatorial courtesy

-appointment may be filibustered by opposition party

-court hierarchy- lower court judges have tendency to rise through federal court ranks

+Ch. 8

17) Why are judicial appointments an attractive way for presidents to create a legacy that lives on after they leave office?
this one's just common sense

-judicial appointees serve 'in good behavior'
-supreme court justices are good examples of this
-supreme court justices serve for life
-if the president gets an SC justice nominated and confirmed, he can appoint someone who is ideologically similar to him
-this means essentially that his policies are living on after his term
-even if the appointee ends up not serving for life, the term they serve is still longer than the given president will be in office
-legacy lives on

not much else to it...

18) Why is the Supreme Court usually reluctant to limit presidential prerogatives in foreign policy?

-so three possible cases for executive/legislative conflict
-explicit authorization, acquiescence, or direct conflict
-explicit authorization- where the executive has enumerated constitutional authority to do what it did
-acquiescence- where congress, although the president has no enumerated authority, has acquiesced to his actions implicitly
-direct conflict- where both executive and legislative have legitimate complaints and bases for their claims
-in the first two cases, the Court defers to the president nearly all the time, and in the third, congress has to do the pushing
-the Court won't fight Congress's battles for it
-Here's why
-even when the Congress has a legitimate claim against the Executive, they have to fight for that claim
-example- treaty termination
-congress could have necessitated its support for termination of a treaty in the terms, but it didn't
-therefore, when it started bitching about presidential authority getting out of control when carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan, the court cut it no slack
-you actually have to FIGHT for your rights
-if, on the other hand, congress actually starts fighting
-example- to invoke the war powers resolution it would have to declare hostilities in iraq extant, then pass a resolution expressing their disapproval and requesting the troops be brought home, THEN they'd go to the court and challenge the president if he didnt
-if they did this, then the court has explicitly stated that they'd be in the right
-however, the court is reluctant to fight the battles of the congress for it
-there's a reason the presidency has so much power
-it was delegated massive amounts of authority during the cold war
-these broad delegations, however inadvisable they may have been in retrospect, form the basis of precedent for the court
-the court WILL NOT make normative judgments in this arena
-it HAS TO support these laws, constitutionally, and so any broad delegation of power to the president by congress is taken into consideration as precedent-worthy

TAKEN FROM Silverstein, "Judicial Enhancements of Executive Power"

19) How might the War Powers Resolution enhance the president's powers as Commander in Chief rather than limit them?

-the War Powers Resolution can be interpreted as giving the President a 'blank check' for hostilities for 60 days, essentially
-ONLY after 60 days can congress do anything at all about the conflict
-president's been given essentially unlimited authority for those first 2 months, however
-and EVEN THEN, congress has to declare hostilities opened in the area
-THEN the clock has to run out
-THEN congress has to pass a joint resolution requiring the president to bring the troops back
-THEN the court has to uphold it (most likely)
-so here, not only is an expansion of the president's commander in chief powers explicitly given, but it's given as a result of structural problems with the system itself as well

TAKEN FROM Silverstein, "Judicial Enhancements of Executive Power"

20) How has the development of a large standing army significantly weakened congressional checks on presidential war powers?
um. no idea.

noreply@blogger.com (shadowed.hero) — Wed, 28 Mar 2007 15:47:00 +0000

Raamin Mostaghimi

3/28/07

AFP Section Writing

Kissinger’s "Vietnam: On the Road to Despair”

Kissinger’s analysis here has, contrary to your comments last section, captivated me once again. He looks at a completely different strategy that I found interesting- using Laos as a defense point for Southern Vietnam rather than South Vietnam itself. He makes the point that the Communists were treating the whole of Indochina as a single theater of war, while the Americans for some reason had separated them along the lines arbitrarily drawn to divide them into countries. Any strategic aim that Kennedy and Johnson were looking to accomplish would have been served equally well by fighting the North Vietnamese (and especially the Viet Cong) in Laos as in South Vietnam.

That the Kennedy administration was unwilling to sacrifice the ideological component of the war in this way for a purely strategic end really illustrates a point that Kissinger has been making throughout his analysis- that the United States has fought every war post-WWII with a handicap- ideology. The North Vietnamese could have been stopped and South Vietnam possibly secured without having to pit the US military against irregular guerilla forces with which it was not prepared to deal, but US prestige was at stake as soon as Johnson was sent over to the country. Had the US not fought with ideology and prestige on the line but rather as a soldier fights- like Eisenhower had suggested- it’s possible that the quagmire that Vietnam became could have been avoided entirely.