Rain Aviation Blog

TSB Report on Sept 2010 Cirrus SR22 Accident that killed 3

2012-01-15T09:58:00.000-05:00

Source: Calgary Sun

The Transportation Safety Board has released its report on the fatal accident that occurred in September 2010 involving a Cirrus SR22 Accident that killed 3.

The cause of the accident is not known, however the investigators determined that the plane stalled, recovered and entered a spiral dive that was not recovered from before impacting the ground - the pilot did not deployed the airplane parachute system.

Read the full TSB report here.
Read more reports from the Transportation Safety Board

Excerpts from the report:

Synopsis

The privately operated Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 (registration C-FGLA, serial number 1681) was on a round robin, visual flight rules flight from the Calgary/Springbank Airport to the area of Sundre, Alberta, with 3 persons on board. About 5 nautical miles northwest of Sundre, the aircraft entered a steep turning descent from about 1600 feet above the ground, striking the ground in a field at 1347, Mountain Daylight Time. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a severe post-impact fire. No emergency locator transmitter signal was received. The 3 occupants were fatally injured.

Analysis

The deceleration of C-FGLA after the turn to the southwest, accompanied by a slight descent, is consistent with the engine operating at a reduced power setting, and with the pilot attempting to maintain a more or less constant altitude. The slight loss of altitude and variation in heading suggests that the autopilot was disengaged.

Source: Global News

The airspeed deteriorated to the point of aerodynamic stall, which was followed by entry to a spin to the right with a heading change of 90°. The aircraft behaviour in the continued descent indicates an over-recovery into a spiral dive in the opposite direction which featured rapid rotation, speed build-up and increasing positive vertical g loading. Insufficient altitude remained for recovery. The debris field and ground scars indicate that most of the rotation was stopped and a pull-up had begun immediately before the aircraft struck the ground at high speed in a nose down, slight left wing down attitude.
The investigation considered several factors to explain the reason for the reduction in power and the subsequent loss of control. Weather conditions and aircraft performance were not considered to have been factors.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors

For undetermined reasons, the aircraft decelerated to the point of aerodynamic stall, followed by entry into a spin.
The aircraft recovered from the initial spin entry and entered a spiral dive from which recovery was not accomplished before ground impact.
For undetermined reasons, the Cirrus Aircraft Parachute System was not activated after the aircraft departed controlled flight.

2012-01-14T06:56:00.002-05:00

Transportation Safety Board of Canada Releases Factual Information About Crash at North Spirit Lake

(Gatineau, Quebec, January 13, 2012) - Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigators have released new factual information regarding the crash of a Keystone Air Service Piper PA-31 (Navajo) aircraft near North Spirit Lake, Ontario, on 10 January, 2012.

What we know

Keystone Air Service Ltd. Flight 213, a Piper PA-31 Navajo was on a flight from Winnipeg, Manitoba to North Spirit Lake, Ontario. It crashed on a lake about 1.1 nautical miles from the runway at approximately 10:05 Central Standard Time (CST). There was a post-crash fire and 4 of the 5 people on board were fatally injured. The survivor was airlifted to a care facility by an air ambulance at approximately 13:00 CST.

The wreckage path is approximately 106 meters long.
The orientation of the wreckage path is approximately 140 degrees.
The wreckage is located about 1.1 nautical miles northwest of the beginning of runway 13.
The team has found indications that the landing gear was down and the flaps were partially extended.
Aircraft parts (glass, panels, cargo, wing parts) were found early on the wreckage trail.
The team found heavy fire damage in the fuselage and the right wing area.

TSB Photo

Transportation Safety Board Update - First Air Crash in Resolute Bay Nunavut

2012-01-08T11:33:00.000-05:00

Ottawa - January 5, 2012

The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) has released an update on the investigation into the cause of the crash of a First Air Boeing 737 at Resolute Bay Nunavut on August 20 2011 that killed 8 passengers and 4 crew.

The TSB is calling the crash controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and the investigation is focused on trying to understand why the airplane flew into a hill 1 mile east of the runway during a go around.

Read previous posts on the First Air Crash in Resolute Bay Nunavut
Read more reports from the Transportation Safety Board

Here is the full text of the TSB Report:

First Air Flight 6560, Boeing 737 Accident, 20 August 2011, Resolute Bay (A11H0002)

On 20 August 2011, a First Air Boeing 737-210C aircraft (registration C-GNWN, serial number 21067) was being flown as a charter flight from Yellowknife, North West Territories, to Resolute Bay, Nunavut. As is often the case for aircraft operating in the arctic, the cabin was partitioned to allow a combination of cargo and passengers, this configuration is known as a combi.

At 1142 Central Daylight Time, during the approach to Runway 35T, First Air Flight 6560 impacted a hill at 396 feet above sea level (asl) and about 1 nautical mile east of the midpoint of the Resolute Bay Airport runway which, itself, is at 215 feet asl. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and an ensuing post-crash fire. Eight passengers and the four crew members suffered fatal injuries. Three passengers suffered serious injuries and were rescued by Canadian military personnel who were in Resolute Bay as part of a military exercise.

Investigation Team Work

The investigation team is led by the Investigator-in-Charge, Brian MacDonald. Mr. MacDonald has 31 years of aviation experience; 23 years as a pilot in the Royal Canadian Air Force and eight years with the TSB. He has been an air accident investigator for the past 15 years. Mr. MacDonald is assisted in this investigation by experts in flight operations, air traffic services, weather, aircraft structures, aircraft systems, aircraft engines, and human performance.

Some of these experts come from within the TSB, but assistance is also being provided by the following organizations: Bradley Air Services Limited (First Air), Transport Canada, NAV CANADA, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of National Defence, The Boeing Company, Pratt and Whitney (engines), and the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board. This is a normal part of any investigation, as these experts play a key role in helping the team uncover and understand all of the underlying factors which may have contributed to the accident.

The investigation team continues its work which is in Phase 2 of this 3-phase investigation. The three phases of every investigation include: the Field Phase, the Post-Field Phase and the Report Production Phase. While continuing to gather the information it needs, the team has now begun the work of analyzing the considerable amount of data in order to determine what happened, why it happened and, what can be learned to help ensure it does not happen again.

Work Completed to Date

A significant amount of work has been completed so far, but much remains to be done. Dozens of interviews have been conducted. Hundreds of technical and operational documents, weather reports, air traffic control communications, studies and research papers have been gathered, and the analysis of this material is well underway.

A detailed survey of the accident site was completed and a comprehensive plot of the aircraft components constructed. The TSB completed an extensive study of the wreckage and removed some of the components for further laboratory analysis.

The flight recorders were located on the first day and shipped to the TSB lab for data download and analysis. The recorders contain much needed data and will assist investigators in the understanding of what happened during the approach phase of the flight.

What We Know

In the hours before the accident, the weather in Resolute Bay was variable with fluctuations in visibility and cloud ceiling. Forty minutes before the accident, the visibility was 10 miles in light drizzle with an overcast ceiling at 700 feet above ground level (agl). A weather observation taken shortly after the accident, reported visibility of 5 miles in light drizzle and mist with an overcast ceiling of 300 feet agl.

The weather conditions required the crew to conduct an instrument approach using the aircraft flight and navigation instruments. The crew planned to conduct an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 35T. This instrument approach provides guidance down to weather minimums of ¹⁄₂ mile visibility and a ceiling of 200 feet agl.

The crew initiated a go-around 2 seconds before impact. At this time, the flaps were set to position 40, the landing gear was down and locked, the speed was 157 knots and the final landing checklist was complete.

Another aircraft successfully completed an ILS approach to Runway 35T approximately 20 minutes after the accident. NAV CANADA conducted a flight check of the ground based ILS equipment on 22 August 2011; it was reported as serviceable.

The Resolute Bay Airport is normally an uncontrolled airport (no Air Traffic Controllers). A temporary military control zone had been established to accommodate the increase in air traffic resulting from Operation Nanook, a military exercise taking place at the time. Information from the military radars that had been installed for the exercise was retrieved for TSB analysis.

The technical examination of the aircraft at the accident site revealed no pre-impact problems. Analysis of the flight data recorder information and examination of the engines at the site indicate the engines were operating and developing considerable power at the time of the accident. Analysis of the aircraft flight and navigational instruments is ongoing.

Currently, the TSB is classifying this occurrence as a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident. CFIT occurs when an airworthy aircraft under the control of the flight crew is flown unintentionally into terrain, obstacles or water, usually with no prior awareness by the crew. CFIT is one of the issues identified in the TSB Watchlist.

Investigation Activities in Progress

The TSB is proceeding with several concurrent avenues of investigation in order to understand why the aircraft struck terrain 1 nautical mile east of the runway. Aircraft navigation in the final phase of flight is certainly a key area that the investigation team is pursuing. To that end, the TSB Engineering Laboratory, assisted by specialists of the aircraft and components manufacturers, is conducting exhaustive testing on the aircraft's navigational equipment.

As with any accident investigation, investigators are looking at all aspects of training and procedures to determine if this can shed light on what may have transpired during the approach phase of the flight. Additionally, the team is studying the establishment of the temporary control zone and the coordination and operation of the airspace between civilian and military control agencies.

Communication of Safety Deficiencies

Should the investigation team uncover a safety deficiency that represents an immediate risk to aviation, the Board will communicate without delay so it may be addressed quickly and the aviation system made safer.

The Families

The TSB investigation team is mindful of the survivors and the families who lost loved ones on Flight 6560 and of their desire for answers. As we continue our work, our hope is that it will lead to the prevention of similar accidents and a safer transportation system for all Canadians.

The information posted is factual in nature and does not contain any analysis. Analysis of the accident, along with the Findings of the Board will become available when the final report is released. The investigation is ongoing.

Canadian Government to Mandate TAWS

2011-12-04T18:13:00.001-05:00

The Government of Canada takes action to enhance air safety

No. H120/11
For release - December 2, 2011

OTTAWA — The Honourable Denis Lebel, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, today announced proposed new regulations to enhance the safety of Canadian aviation. These regulations would require private and commercial airplanes with six or more passenger seats to be equipped with an alert system known as the "terrain awareness and warning system" (TAWS).

“Our government will continue strengthening aviation safety for Canadians,” said Minister Lebel. “Using TAWS will significantly reduce the risk of airplane crashes with land, water or obstacles.”

TAWS provides acoustic and visual alerts to flight crews when the path of their aircraft is predicted to collide with terrain, water or obstacles — a situation that can occur when visibility is low or the weather is poor. This gives the flight crew sufficient time to take evasive action.

These types of accidents often happen when pilots are unaware of the danger until it is too late. The risk is even greater for small aircraft, which fly further into remote wilderness or mountainous areas but are not currently required to have the same proximity warning equipment as large airliners.

The proposed regulations comply with the International Civil Aviation Organization's standards and help harmonize Canadian regulations more closely with those of other aviation authorities, including those in the United States and European Union. Canada's Transportation Safety Board also recommends the wider use of TAWS to help pilots assess their proximity to terrain.

Former Snowbird Patrick Gobeil Appointed CF-18 Demo Team Pilot

2011-12-04T18:07:00.001-05:00

Former Snowbird Patrick Gobeil Appointed 2012 CF-18 Demo Team Pilot

1CdnAirDiv NR 11.11.30 - December 2, 2011

WINNIPEG – On behalf of Major-General Alain Parent, Commander 1 Canadian Air Division, the Canadian Forces CF-18 National Demonstration Team is thrilled to announce the appointment of former Canadian Forces Snowbird Captain Patrick “Paco” Gobeil of 3 Wing Bagotville as the 2012 Demo Pilot.

In 2003, Captain Gobeil was selected to fly with the Canadian Forces Snowbirds, and from 2004 to 2006 he flew as Snowbird 6 traveling with his teammates across North America to demonstrate the skills, professionalism and teamwork inherent in the Canadian Forces. In 2007, he completed his fighter lead-in training on the CT-155 Hawk at 4 Wing in Cold Lake, Alberta.

After completion of CF-18 Hornet training at 4 Wing’s 410 Squadron, Captain Gobeil was posted to 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron, Les Alouettes, in Bagotville, Quebec in early 2009. While at 425 Squadron, Capt Gobeil participated in multiple domestic exercises in support of the Army High Readiness Training and NORAD missions. In 2010, Captain Gobeil was posted to 3 Wing Operations where he currently serves.

Captain Gobeil has flown over 4,000 hours in different types of civilian and military airplanes, of which nearly 3,000 hours have been flown in high performance military aircraft.
"Coming back home to fly Hornets was a special moment and I enjoy it every day that I have the chance to fly. Having the opportunity to represent the RCAF, 3 Wing, 425 Squadron and the people of my native town as the 2012 demo pilot is a true privilege and I am looking forward to a great summer."

Each year, the CF-18 Demonstration Team features a different theme; for the 2012 season the theme will be “The True North, Strong and Free.” The Demo Hornet will feature tail art – designed by 410 Squadron’s veteran Design Director, Jim Belliveau - to embody this theme.

During the first week of May 2012 Captain Gobeil will be seen ripping up the skies over Comox, BC, where the team conducts its annual training before launching its 2012 air show season. "I know how much work is involved in organizing air shows, and our team will do what it takes to make a positive and lasting impression," he said.

TSB Report on Cargojet Runway Excursion

2011-12-04T18:01:00.001-05:00

Summary

On 24 March 2010, at 0120 Atlantic Daylight Time, a Boeing 727-225 aircraft (registration C‑GCJZ, serial number 21854) operated as Cargojet flight 620, departed Hamilton/John Munro International Airport, Ontario, on a scheduled cargo flight to the Greater Moncton International Airport, New Brunswick, with 3 crew members on board. An Instrument Landing System approach was carried out and at 0307, the aircraft touched down on the 6150 foot long Runway 06. Following touchdown, the flight crew were unable to stop the aircraft prior to the end of the runway. The aircraft came to rest in deep mud, the nose wheel approximately 340 feet beyond the runway end and 140 feet beyond the edge of the paved runway end strip. A local fire department responded and arrived on-scene approximately 20 minutes after the aircraft departed the runway. The flight crew exited the aircraft using a ladder provided by the fire fighters. There were no injuries and the aircraft had minor damage.

Read the full report here.

Read more reports from the Transportation Safety Board

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors

The aircraft touched down between 2000 and 2500 feet from the threshold and at a higher than required airspeed, which significantly increased the required runway length to safely stop the aircraft.
The presence of standing water on the runway caused the aircraft to hydroplane, which led to a loss of directional control and braking ability, significantly increasing the required stopping distance.
The reduction of reverse thrust following touchdown to realign with the runway centreline, in accordance with the manufacturer's recommended practice, increased the aircraft's required stopping distance.
The decision to carry out a pilot-flown-approach, rather than a pilot-monitored-approach, at night, in heavy rain, likely contributed to the aircraft's higher than required airspeed that was maintained until touchdown.
The combination of delayed touchdown point, higher than required touchdown speed, and standing water on the runway prevented the aircraft from stopping within the available landing distance. As a result, the aircraft overran the runway, coming to rest in deep mud.

Pilot Fined in January 2011 Crash

2011-11-12T07:28:00.001-05:00

Pilot Fined in January 2011 Crash

The pilot of a Cessna 172 from the Regina Flying Club was fined $750 for a crash that happened in January 2011 for violating the Canadian Aviation Regulations.

Transport Canada released this statement:

A commercial pilot operating a Cessna 172 on a VFR flight in uncontrolled airspace encountered deteriorating weather conditions below VFR limits. The pilot decided to continue the flight to the destination aerodrome in less than ideal weather conditions when he subsequently lost visual reference with the ground that resulted in a controlled crash. The pilot was sanctioned with a $750.00 monetary penalty. CAR 602.115 (Minimum Visual Meteorological Conditions for VFR Flight in Uncontrolled Airspace)

January 6, 2011 - The Regina Flying Club Cessna 172RG was returning to Regina, Saskatchewan from Assiniboine when the aircraft encountered deteriorating weather conditions. The pilot requested special VFR flight clearance into Regina, but the weather was below limits. The pilot requested a diversion to Moose Jaw, but the runway was closed. The pilot turned towards a private airstrip located near Lumsden and at low altitude lost visual reference with the ground. The aircraft struck the ground in a level attitude and bounced back into the air. The engine began to run rough and the pilot elected to land in a snow covered field ahead. The pilot extended the landing gear and flaps and upon touchdown the nose gear collapsed. The pilot escaped uninjured; however, the aircraft's propeller and nose gear were damaged. A subsequent examination of the aircraft revealed that the nose gear may have failed to extend due to gear door damage caused by the initial contact with the ground.

2011-11-11T07:55:00.001-05:00

I read an interesting accident report from the Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) Ireland about an Avid Flyer kit aircraft - where the owner installed a 1.8 liter Subaru engine. During a flight the radiator cooling system burst and sprayed the cabin with coolant and fumes, the pilot successfully landed the plane, but it sustained significant damage.

Avid Mk. 4 Flyer EI-HAM

The ensuing investigation revealed that the thermostat was leaking causing the cooling system to over-cool the engine during previous flights, in an attempt to rectify the problem, the pilot covered the back side of the radiator with duct tape to reduce cooling. During the accident flight, the cooling system over heated, burst and filled the cockpit with coolant and fumes obscuring the instruments and the pilots vision.

Luckily both occupants survived, albeit with serious injuries. The AAIU made the following recommendation based on their investigation:

The Irish Light Aviation Society advise its members of the risks associated with carrying out unauthorised modifications to aircraft operating under a Flight Permit. (IRLD2011010)

Read the AAIU report here.

NASA Image of the Day

2011-11-08T19:01:00.000-05:00

I thought this was a great picture - re-posted from NASA's Picture of the Day site.

McCandless Orbits in Jetpack

On Feb. 12, 1984, astronaut Bruce McCandless, ventured further away from the confines and safety of his ship than any previous astronaut had ever been. This space first was made possible by a nitrogen jet propelled backpack, previously known at NASA as the Manned Manuevering Unit or MMU.

After a series of test maneuvers inside and above Challenger's payload bay, McCandless went "free-flying" to a distance of 320 feet away from the Orbiter. This stunning orbital panorama view shows McCandless out there amongst the black and blue of Earth and space.

Image Credit: NASA

Mounties point to Suncor site

2011-11-06T09:05:00.001-05:00

Good story from the Edmonton Sun below addressing the issue of people pointing lasers at aircraft following an incident in Fort Mackay Sask.

Transport Canada Report on the incident:

C-GWKO from Jetphotos.net

C-GWKO, a Cessna Caravan operated by McMurray Aviation, was en route VFR from Fort Chipewyan to Fort McMurray at 3,500 feet ASL when the aircraft was targeted by a green laser 3 miles west of the Fort Mackay/Firebag airport. The pilot reported that the laser temporarily disoriented him and it appeared to come from a camp west of the airstrip. The laser followed the aircraft for about 15 seconds.

Laser strikes continue to be an ongoing problem - read more here.

Re-post from Edmonton Sun - http://www.edmontonsun.com/2011/11/04/mounties-point-to-suncor

By Jeff Cummings ,Edmonton Sun

First posted: Friday, November 04, 2011 06:08 PM MDT | Updated: Friday, November 04, 2011 06:23 PM MDT

Pointing lasers at aircraft is no laughing matter, say Mounties after someone pointed a laser from Suncor’s operations near Fort McKay at an airplane Thursday night.

Wood Buffalo RCMP say a witness onboard a small commuter plane traveling from Fort Chipewyan to Fort McMurray noticed a green laser that was pointed at the aircraft sometime around 8:15 p.m.

Mounties say the laser came from Suncor property as it flew 6.5 km west of the Firebag Airstrip -- a private airstrip used to fly in workers for the area’s booming oilsands operations.

“The police made a number of patrols and spoke to a number of persons at Suncor, however, we are kind of at a dead end because we don’t have any further information about this,” said Const. Christina Wilkins, a spokeswoman with the Wood Buffalo RCMP.

“If anybody else has any information about this, we are asking them to please come forward as this is a very serious offence.”

Transport Canada warns that aiming bright light sources into cockpits of an aircraft is a federal offence because it jeopardizes aviation safety.

It could also have consequences for pilots as the strong lights could distract them, or it could cause temporary flash blindness -- something that will affect their ability to safely fly the aircraft, Transport Canada says.

Wilkins says offenders can also face numerous charges under Canada’s criminal code and a conviction could result in a five-year prison sentence or a maximum fine of $100,000.

“This is something where the general public might misconceive this to be just a joke, but this is a very huge deal,” said Wilkins.

A Lacombe man was fined $500 last February for unintentionally shining a laser beam at Edmonton’s Air-1 while testing his son’s laser on some tree leaves.

Alvin Bautista, 38, was found guilty of creating a hazard to aviation under the Federal Aeronautics Act, but was acquitted of a more serious charge of endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight by projecting a bright light.

Qantas locks out employees - grounds all aircraft.

2011-10-29T09:28:00.000-04:00

Qantas locks out employees - grounds all aircraft.

Sydney, 29 October 2011

Qantas Boeing 747-400

Qantas today announced that on Monday 31 October 2011, it will lock out all employees who will be covered by the industrial agreements currently being negotiated with the Australian Licenced Engineers Union, the Transport Workers Union and the Australian and International Pilots Union.

This step is being taken under the provisions of the Fair Work Act in response to industrial action taken by these unions. The financial impact of action taken to date has reached $68 million and the action is costing Qantas approximately $15 million per week in lost revenue. Approximately 70,000 passengers have been affected and more than 600 flights cancelled.
Pilots, licenced engineers and baggage, ground and catering staff are essential to Qantas operations and the lock-out will therefore make it necessary for all Qantas aircraft to be grounded. For precautionary reasons, this will take place immediately (as at 5pm AEDT, Saturday 29 October 2011).

Aircraft currently in the air will complete the sectors they are operating. However, there will be no further Qantas domestic departures or international departures anywhere in the world. This will have an estimated financial impact on Qantas of $20 million per day.

Transport Canada Suspends Missinippi Airways’ Air Operator Certificate

2011-10-24T19:45:00.000-04:00

October 24, 2011 - Winnipeg - Transport Canada Suspends Missinippi Airways’ Air Operator Certificate

Missinippi Airways Cessna Caravan C-FMCB

Transport Canada issued a statement saying they were suspending Missinippi Airways' Air Operator Certificate, effective October 21, 2011. Without an Air Operator Certificate, a company cannot provide commercial air services in Canada.

Missinippi Airways was involved in a fatal accident in July 2011 when a Cessna Caravan 208 ran off the end of a runway injuring 8 and killing 1 person on board.

The Transport Canada statement said the action is based on safety concerns due to deficiencies with the company's Operational Control System identified during Transport Canada's inspection earlier this week. This inspection was scheduled to confirm that corrective actions put in place following a previous suspension in July are working effectively.

This is the second suspension this year, following a suspension in July. Transport Canada has taken this action in the interest of public safety. Transport Canada consulted with Missinippi Airways throughout the period leading up to the suspension. This suspension does not rule out further regulatory action.

Transport Canada will continue to work with Missinippi Airways. The company must demonstrate that it meets all applicable safety regulations before Transport Canada will reissue its Air Operator Certificate.

First 787 Dreamliner Delivery

2011-09-27T08:46:00.000-04:00

September . 26, 2011 - Boeing celebrated the delivery of the first 787 Dreamliner today to launch customer ANA (Nippon Airways) during a ceremony adjacent to the factory where the airplane was assembled. More than 500 employees representing the 787 program walked alongside the all-new jetliner to present it to ANA executives as a crowd of thousands looked on.

Boeing 787 Dreamliner delivery to Nippon Airways

"Today we celebrate a significant moment in the history of flight," said Jim McNerney, Boeing chairman, president and CEO. "The 787 Dreamliner is the biggest innovation in commercial aviation since the Boeing 707 introduced the world to passenger jet travel more than 50 years ago. I want to thank ANA and all the employees of Boeing and our partner companies for the talent, technology and teamwork that have brought this game-changing airplane to life."

Boeing 787 Dreamliner Interior

During the ceremony, Boeing Commercial Airplanes President and CEO Jim Albaugh presented a ceremonial key to Shinichiro Ito, president and CEO of ANA.

"It's not often that we have the chance to make history, do something big and bold that will change the world in untold ways and endure long after we are gone," said Albaugh. "That's what the 787 Dreamliner is and what ANA and Boeing have done together – build what truly is the first new airplane of the 21st century."

Boeing 787 Dreamliner

"We are delighted to be taking delivery finally of our first 787. ANA is extremely proud to be the launch customer for the Dreamliner and to have helped Boeing so closely in the development of this state-of-the-art aircraft," said Ito. "The Dreamliner will enable us to offer unrivalled standards of service and comfort to our passengers and will play a key part in ANA's plans for international expansion."

Boeing 787 Dreamliner

Made from composite materials, the Boeing 787 Dreamliner is the first mid-size airplane capable of flying long-range routes and will allow airlines to open new, non-stop routes preferred by the traveling public. In addition to providing airlines with unprecedented fuel economy and low operating costs, the 787 features a host of new technologies that greatly enhance the passenger experience.

"Aerodrome" Deemed Obsolete

2011-08-29T20:41:00.000-04:00

August 26 - Its a sad day for aviation - Collins Dictionary has deemed the word AERODROME to be obsolete and will remove it from its smaller dictionaries.

Dr Ruth O'Donovan, asset development manager at Collins Language Division in Glasgow, said: ‘We track words using a very large database of language which is a very large collection of various texts from spoken and written language, including books, newspapers and magazines so we can track language change over time.

‘We track new words but we can also track for the frequency of existing words and when they get below a certain threshold we see them as being obsolete, though they may be used in very specialist circumstances.

FAA Approves Production of Boeing 787 Dreamliner

2011-08-28T23:16:00.000-04:00

EVERETT, WA – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Randy Babbitt today announced that the FAA has approved production of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.

At an event at Boeing’s facility in Everett, Washington, Administrator Babbitt presented Boeing executives with two certificates for the design and production of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner with Rolls-Royce engines. The first, a Type Certificate, is for the FAA’s approval of the airplane’s design. The second, a Production Certificate, allows Boeing to manufacture the 787 following a rigorous review by FAA inspectors of Boeing’s quality system, production tooling, manufacturing processes and controls, inspection methods, and supplier control procedures.

“The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is an incredible technological achievement – one that sets a new standard for innovation,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “The new engine technology is fuel-efficient and reduces noise, minimizing the impact on the environment. Those are key to meeting our NextGen goals.”

“Today’s achievement could not have been possible without the professionalism and dedication of the FAA team involved in the certification,” said Administrator Babbitt. “The engineers, inspectors and flight test pilots all worked diligently to ensure our high safety standards were met.”

Boeing made its initial application to the FAA on March 28, 2003 and the program was launched in April 2004. The first 787 rollout ceremony was on July 8, 2007 at Boeing’s Everett assembly factory. The airplane first flew on Dec. 15, 2009, and the six flight test airplanes have since accumulated more than 4,645 flight hours, with approximately 25 percent of those hours flown by FAA flight test crews. More than 200,000 hours were logged by FAA technical experts who were involved in the type certification of the 787.

The Boeing 787 is a medium-size commercial transport airplane. It’s the world's first major airliner to use composite materials for most of its construction, more than 50 percent by weight. The airplane will use 20 percent less fuel and produce less noise compared to similarly sized airplanes. It was designed and manufactured by suppliers and partners around the world and integrated at final assembly. The 787 incorporates many capabilities of the nation’s Next Generation Air Transportation System, or NextGen.

Government needs to show leadership on floatplane safety

2011-08-28T12:57:00.000-04:00

Below is a reprint of a very good article written by Johnathan Seymour of the Transportation Safety Board - in the article he talks very frankly about the need for action on floatplane safety. There have been numerous floatplane tragedies that may have had different outcomes should some of the TSB recommendation be put into effect.
Lyall Harbour Beaver Crash
Common sense fixes will make floatplane travel safer, says TSB

Government needs to show leadership on floatplane safety

By Jonathan Seymour, Transportation Safety Board of Canada

It's summer, and more and more Canadians are seeking holiday adventures off the beaten path. Forget about road trips, these intrepid adventurers are boarding commercial floatplanes in Quebec, British Columbia, and a hundred places in between—venturing into the remotest parts of the country to experience the beauty of Canada's wilderness.

But you don't have to be in the middle of nowhere to find trouble.

On a blustery November day afternoon in 2009, a floatplane took off from Lyall Harbour on Saturna Island, in British Columbia's southern Gulf Islands. Moments later, the plane lost lift and crashed into the chilly waters below. All eight occupants survived the initial impact, but six—including a mother clutching her infant daughter—drowned because they never got out.

When the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) released its investigation report into the crash earlier this year, we made two recommendations: First, that all new and existing commercial floatplanes be fitted with regular and emergency exits that allow rapid escape following a crash. Second, occupants must be required to wear a device that provides personal flotation once they're in the water.

These mirror the two most common risks we find time and again in our investigations, namely:

If you don't get out, you will drown.
Even if you do get out, without personal flotation, you might still drown.

Harsh truths? You bet, and they're backed up by even harsher statistics: In floatplane accidents, 70% of fatalities are from drowning. 50% of occupants don't escape. Of those who do, less than 10% take their personal floatation devices (PFDs) with them.

That's why the TSB made its first recommendation on the wearing of PFDs back in 1994. And, even though we've spent many years drawing attention to the need for ease of egress from a downed floatplane, only recently have we started to make headway: The two associations representing most of the commercial floatplane operators in B.C. have recently endorsed our recommendations, and one manufacturer now supplies doors with improved handles and pop-out windows.

That fix, however, covers less than 10% of the country's registered floatplanes. What about elsewhere—the gang of fishing buddies on a weekend excursion to Labrador, or the family of four on summer holiday in northern Ontario? They face the same risks, and they deserve the same protection.

It seems obvious that what's needed is a nationwide solution, yet this is also where the problem lies—because whenever it comes to discussing mandatory measures, industry raises several objections. The first concern, that a PFD might be accidentally inflated prior to exit, seems unfounded, and difficult to prove when the vast majority of passengers—more than 90%—either don't wear one or else leave it behind during egress. Moreover, a 20-year search of the TSB database failed to reveal even a single verifiable incidence where PFDs hampered passenger movements or prevented an occupant's escape.

The second complaint—bulky life vests that were once uncomfortable or didn't fit well over business clothing and heavy coats—has been resolved by advances in technology. In the marine industry, for example, "horseshoe collars" with manually triggered compressed-air inflation are now common. Alternatively, some manufacturers offer a "fanny pack" that is worn around the waist and can be inflated as needed.

The solution—or at least the starting point—is well-known. Following the Lyall Harbour crash, both of the TSB's recommendations were formally presented to Transport Canada. However, despite significant work raising public and industry awareness, TC's official response fails to commit to a clear strategy that will fix these problems. According to the Minister of Transport, an industry focus group is scheduled to meet in August 2011. Whatever conclusions it reaches will be presented to the Canadian Aviation Advisory Council in the spring of 2012, which will then be the basis for any future amendments to the existing rules.

That's progress? A consultative process leading to a consultative process which will then be the basis for lawmakers to do more consulting?

Let's get realistic. Even if all that talk leads to some agreement on what needs to be done, there have been plenty of instances where TSB recommendations have been accepted "in principle," only for meaningful action to languish for fifteen years and longer. That's not because lawmakers can't tell what's safe and what's not, but because opposing interests often have a financial stake in delaying or watering down any new regulations.

Well, now is the time to show leadership. It's time to move the stumbling blocks out of the way and expedite progress. We know these safety issues exist. We've been studying them for years and, if we needed yet another reminder, there was no harsher lesson than the Lyall Harbour accident. Today we have a perfect opportunity to improve floatplane safety for all Canadians. Let's not waste it.

Pilot Error / Strong Winds Cause ATR-72 Crash in Ireland

2011-08-28T11:14:00.002-04:00

Aug 23, 2011 - The Air Accident Investigation Unit of the Irish Department of Transport ahs released its report on a July 2011 crash of an ATR-72 at Shannon Airport.
The report points to pilot error and strong wind as the cause of the crash, an abbreviated version of the report is below, the complete report can be found here.

On the morning of 17 July 2011, the aircraft, operating as Flight No. EI3601 and Call sign REA61MA, departed Manchester Airport (EGCC) with a Shannon-based flight crew. The aircraft arrived at a point 15 nautical miles northeast of Shannon Airport (EINN) around 09:00 hrs and self-positioned for an Instrument Landing System approach to Runway 24. The Shannon Approach Charts include a caution which states; “Caution: Turbulence and/or wind-shear may be experienced on approach to RWY 24 when wind direction lies in the sector from 260° - 320° (clockwise) with wind speeds > 15 kts”. This caution was applicable given the prevailing weather conditions.

After the aircraft was transferred from Shannon Approach to Shannon Tower, the Tower cautioned the aircraft regarding turbulence in accordance with Air Traffic Control Standard Operating Procedures. The Captain, who was the Pilot Flying elected to aim for a touch-down at the end of the RWY 24 Touch-down Zone. This was to avoid possible turbulence during the final stages of the approach/landing. The PF considered, given the length of RWY 24 (10,000 ft) and the landing performance of the ATR 72, that the remaining runway length available was sufficient to achieve a safe landing.

The Flight Data Recorder data indicates that the aircraft experienced an extended landing flare. Engine torque was increased during the initial flare and then progressively reduced in stages. The Pilot Flying subsequently stated that difficulty was experienced in getting the aircraft to settle on the runway during this time. The PF became increasingly concerned about the remaining length of runway available and decided to positively land the aircraft by applying a forward input on the control column. This is confirmed by the FDR. At the same time engine torque reduced. This was followed by a nose-wheel contact with the runway, at an FDR-recorded pitch angle of 8° nose-down. The aircraft immediately bounced back into the air. The Pilot Flying applied power and initiated a go-around. During the go-around the undercarriage was retracted and normal cockpit indications were observed by the flight crew. No warning tones sounded during this landing and go-around.

The aircraft was then vectored by ATC for another ILS approach to RWY 24. The aircraft was established on this approach at the 6 mile point.

This time the Pilot Flying elected to aim for the middle of the Touch-down Zone. The FDR indicates a number of bounces which are also visible on poor quality CCTV. The final touch-down occurred at a pitch angle of 8° nose down and a G-spike of 2.3G. At this point the Blue hydraulic system lost pressure.

On the final touch-down the aircraft with the nose wheel collapsed and the nose scraped along the runway. Smoke/steam was observed emanating from the nose area. The aircraft continued along the runway, initially on the centreline. It gradually veered to the left and exited the runway surface onto the grass to the left of the runway, as it approached Taxiway Alpha. The left propeller struck a runway sign, demolishing it and damaging one propeller blade. The aircraft continued to turn to the left and came to a stop at the left edge of Taxiway Alpha, in line with the taxiway heading. The final stopping point was 1,200 metres from the initial impact marks on the runway.

The flight crew had no directional control of the aircraft from the initial runway impact to the final stopping point, as the nose wheel steering was inoperative due to the collapsed nose wheel and the rudder was jammed in the mid position. The flight crew were also unable to shut down the engines by retarding the condition levers, as the levers would not retard to the aft position. The flight crew therefore decided to stop the engines by pulling the fire handles.

The flight crew decided not to perform an emergency evacuation as they had not detected any evidence of fire or smoke. However the cabin crew subsequently detected a smell of burning and initiated an evacuation. Four passengers evacuated the aircraft via the rear (left) air-stairs before the airport fire services arrived on scene approximately 1 min 40 sec after the aircraft came to a stop.

METARS FOR SHANNON AIRPORT

EINN 171000Z 30023G35KT 9999 FEW010 SCT013 BKN017 14/11 Q1000 NOSIG

EINN 170930Z 30023KT 9999 -DZ FEW010 SCT014 BKN018 14/11 Q1000 NOSIG

EINN 170900Z 31020G32KT 9999 FEW010 SCT014 BKN018 14/11 Q0999 NOSIG

EINN 170830Z 31023G33KT 9999 FEW010 SCT013 BKN017 14/12 Q0999 NOSIG

EINN 170800Z 30020KT 9999 FEW010 BKN013 BKN018 14/12 Q0999 NOSIG

EINN 170730Z 30021G33KT 9999 SCT012 BKN015 OVC018 14/11 Q0999 NOSIG

EINN 170700Z 30022G32KT 9999 FEW010 BKN015 OVC018 13/11 Q0999 NOSIG

Media Photo's of the crash:

TSB Report: Inflight Fire and Precautionary Landing - Sundance Balloon

2011-08-26T08:09:00.000-04:00

Transportation Safety Board Report: Inflight Fire and Precautionary Landing - Sundance Balloon

The hot air balloon (registration C-GDCG) operated by Sundance Balloons (2008) Ltd., launched at approximately 19:25 Eastern Daylight Time from Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, for a local flight.
On board were the pilot and 12 passengers. While over the city at approximately 700 feet above ground level the balloon encountered turbulence. The pilot initiated a descent with the intention of executing a precautionary landing. The balloon's rate of descent increased unexpectedly, and the pilot had to light all 3 burners to arrest the descent. During this time the lower portion of the balloon's envelope collapsed into the path of the burner flame. Some of the lower envelope panels caught fire, but self-extinguished once the flame was removed. The balloon's basket struck the tops of some trees, and then the balloon climbed to approximately 1000 feet. The pilot then executed another descent to land. The balloon struck trees during the landing, and subsequently came to rest in a residential area of Ottawa at about 20:00.

Sundance Balloons (2008) Ltd. operates over 25 balloons nationwide. The occurrence balloon was registered and operated by Sundance Balloons (2008) Ltd. The company was authorized to carry fare-paying passengers by Transport Canada (TC) by way of a Special Flight Operations Certificate (SFOC).

Although the SFOC states that it certifies that the balloon operator is adequately equipped and able to conduct a safe balloon operation carrying fare-paying passengers, there is no oversight program in place to assure that standards are maintained once the SFOC is issued. Balloon operators are not regulated under Part VII (Commercial Air Services) of the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs). Unlike most air operators carrying fare-paying passengers in Canada, balloon operators will not be subject to TC's requirement for Safety Management Systems (SMS).

Records indicate that the hot air balloon was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures. The analysis focuses on the weather, the pilot's decision making, and company procedures and regulations.

The forecast obtained by the pilot that afternoon indicated suitable weather for the planned flight. Prior to take-off, the pilot discussed the cloud conditions with another pilot and was satisfied that the flight would be conducted in favourable weather conditions. The 1900 hourly weather indicated towering cumulus in the vicinity. It is likely that the turbulence that prompted the pilot to initiate a precautionary landing was associated with these clouds.

A high sink rate developed during the initial landing attempt, requiring the pilot to use maximum available power to arrest the descent. During this descent, the bottom of the balloon envelope came into contact with the burner flame, igniting some of the panels. The balloon contacted trees just as the influx of hot air took effect and the balloon rapidly ascended. The pilot turned the burners off during the ascent and the balloon material self-extinguished.

During the second landing attempt, the pilot was concerned about controlling the balloon in the turbulence as well as the condition of the balloon envelope. This influenced the decision to land in the residential area rather than prolong the flight to a more suitable site.

As the balloon was in its second descent for landing, the passengers were advised to assume the position described during the pre-flight briefing. This position was consistent with the company operations manual (COM); however, it was not suited for this specific landing emergency. There is no current requirement under CARs for balloon operators to produce a COM; if the operator chooses to provide one as a best practice, such a COM would benefit from specific procedures for emergency landings. There is a risk that passengers may be injured because they are not properly prepared.

It was only during the second landing attempt that the pilot advised ATS of his situation and intentions. The pilot declined emergency assistance when it was offered by ATS because he saw the emergency response vehicles on the ground following the balloon. Had these vehicles been dispatched for another event, then the emergency response to the balloon would have been delayed.

After the balloon landed on a lawn in a residential area, a conflict arose between local emergency services and the pilot as to the procedure and time to evacuate the passengers. Without adequate information, emergency response units may not take appropriate steps to safeguard passengers, the public and property.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors

The flight encountered localized turbulence that prompted the pilot to initiate a precautionary landing. A high sink rate developed during this initial landing attempt requiring the pilot to use maximum available power to arrest the sink rate.
During this descent, the bottom of the balloon envelope came into contact with the burner flame, igniting some of the panels. As the balloon climbed in response to the influx of hot air, the pilot turned the burners off which allowed the balloon envelope material to self-extinguish.
During the second landing attempt, the pilot was concerned about controlling the balloon in the turbulence and the condition of the balloon envelope. This influenced the decision to land in the residential area rather than prolong the flight to a more suitable site.

Ottawa Citizen Photo

Chris Ziraldo Photo

Jonathon Kuhn Photo

Ottawa Citizen Photo

The TSB Releases Detail on Investigation into First Air Crash in Nunavut

2011-08-26T07:39:00.002-04:00

The Transportation Safety Board Releases Detail on Investigation into First Air Crash in Nunavut

First Air Accident, Resolute Bay, Nunavut, 20 August 2011

On August 20, 2011, First Air Boeing 737-210C combi aircraft was being flown from Yellowknife, NWT to Resolute Bay, NU. During the approach to runway 35T, the aircraft struck a hill about 1 nautical mile east of the midpoint of the Resolute Bay airport runway. There were 4 crew members and 11 passengers on board the aircraft. The crew members and eight passengers were fatally injured. Three passengers survived the accident and were recovered from the site by Canadian military personnel who were in Resolute Bay for Exercise Operation Nanook. The aircraft was destroyed and there was a post-impact fire.

Brian MacDonald, Investigator-in-Charge

Brian MacDonald has been an investigator with the Air Investigation Branch of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada for 8 years. Prior to that, Mr. MacDonald served in the Canadian Forces as a helicopter pilot for various operational units including Search and Rescue. Mr. MacDonald also spent 7 years as an accident investigator with the Royal Canadian Air Force. He has investigated numerous accidents as Investigator-in-Charge. He has experience investigating a variety of accidents involving numerous aircraft types, up to and including Boeing 747s.

TSB Investigation Process

There are 3 phases to a TSB investigation: the Field Phase, the Post-Field Phase and the Report Production Phase. During the Field Phase, a team of investigators examine the occurrence site and wreckage, interview witnesses and collect pertinent information.

In the Post-Field Phase, the TSB will review pertinent records, test components of the wreckage in the lab, determine the sequence of events and identify safety deficiencies. When safety deficiencies are suspected or confirmed, the TSB advises the appropriate authority without waiting until publication of the final report.

The investigation then enters the Report Production Phase. A confidential draft report is approved by the Board and sent to persons and corporations who are directly concerned by the report. They then have the opportunity to dispute, correct or contradict information that they believe is incorrect. The Board considers all representations before approving the final report, which is subsequently released to the public. For more information, see the Investigation Process page.

First Air B737 Crash in Nunavut

2011-08-20T18:08:00.003-04:00

August 20, 2011

A First Air Boeing 737-200 has crashed on approach to Resolute Bay Nunavut - reports say 15 people were on board the plane and 12 were killed, 3 survivors were taken to hospital for treatment. The plane was a chartered flight en route from Yellowknife.

The RCMP released the following statement: "On Saturday the 20th day August, 2011, at approximately 1:36pm, the RCMP was notified that a 737 First Air Chartered flight # 6560 traveling from Yellowknife, NWT to Resolute Bay, NU crashed near the Hamlet of Resolute Bay. It is our information that there were 15 people on board of the aircraft, including 4 crew members. No flight list is yet available.

To date, the RCMP was made aware of the possibility of some survivors.

The RCMP and the Canadian Forces have deployed manpower to assist in this rescue."

First Air 737 - Wikipedia

For release - August 20, 2011

Transport Canada issues a statement on aircraft accident in Resolute Bay, Nunavut

OTTAWA — The Department of Transport issued the following statement today:

At approximately 12:30 EST, First Air Flight 6560 from Yellowknife to Resolute Bay crashed on approach to Resolute Bay. There were 15 passengers on board. At this time, 12 people are thought to be dead and three injured. Our thoughts go out to those affected by this tragic accident.
Transport Canada has appointed a Minister's Observer, who will keep TC informed of the investigation's progress. We will cooperate fully with the Transportation Safety Board who is currently on site investigating this accident.

The Canadian Armed Forces are in Resolute Bay for Exercise Operation Nanook 2011 and are responding in support of emergency operations to the situation.

First Air issues a statement

On Sunday August 21, 2011, First Air Vice President of Marketing and Sales, Chris Ferris, made the following statement to the media from the First Air Head Office in Kanata:

As you are aware, yesterday at 12:40pm First Air experienced a tragic loss of
charter flight 6560. We are deeply saddened by this tragedy and offer our sincere condolences to the families.

The details we have at this time are as follows: a First Air Boeing 737-200 combi travelling from Yellowknife to Resolute Bay, went down 5 miles from the airport. The flight was carrying 11 passengers and four crew. There were 12 fatalities including all four crew members.
Our first priority has been contacting and looking after the families of passengers and crew. Out of respect for the passengers, our crew, and their families, we are not releasing any names or passenger details.

The three injured passengers were Medivac’d to Iqaluit for further treatment last evening. Two of the three passengers have since been moved to Ottawa, while the third remains in Iqaluit in stable condition.

At this time the cause of the accident is unknown. The Transportation Safety Board is conducting their investigation and First Air is cooperating fully.

Our thoughts and focus are with the families and friends of the passengers and crew; and the community of Resolute Bay. Field teams including counsellors, have been deployed to provide support in Resolute Bay, Yellowknife and other main stations in our network.
We would like to thank the Canadian Military whose on-site presence and immediate response was instrumental in the rescue efforts.

We will be providing further updates as they become available.

Nov 2010 CF-18 Crash: Pilot Error

2011-07-27T19:26:00.000-04:00

July 27, 2011 The DND Flight Safety Directorate has released preliminary information about the November 2010 crash of a CF-18 near Cold Lake - the pilot elected to eject after becoming disoriented during a night training flight.

CF-18 Crash at Cold Lake Nov 2010

The single seat CF-18 was flying as the second aircraft in a two-aircraft formation on a Night Vision Goggles (NVG) training mission. The prevailing weather was instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and the accident occurred at night. During a radar trail instrument approach to runway 13L at Cold Lake, Lead called for the landing gear to be selected down. Upon selection of the landing gear, the wingman was almost immediately disoriented by the sudden rush of falling snow as it was illuminated by his landing light, which also reflected enough light through his Head Up Display (HUD) to washout the instrument references he used to control the aircraft. As a result of the visual inputs, the pilot perceived that he had entered a steep descent. In response, the pilot made an aft stick input and pulled the aircraft into a nose-high attitude. Still feeling that he was in a dive and thinking he was rapidly approaching the ground below, but unable to confirm his attitude using outside references or his HUD, the pilot decided to eject.

The ejection was successful and the parachute landing in a forested area was uneventful. The aircraft crashed in a nose-down, near wings level attitude and was destroyed. The uninjured pilot activated his personal locator beacon and used flares to direct the Search and Rescue helicopter to his location. The pilot was transported back to 4 Wing Cold Lake two and one half hours after his ejection.

A review of the recorded flight data and pilot testimony indicated that the aircraft was serviceable and operating normally. A preliminary review of operator practices determined that CF-18 aircraft at the time of the accident were routinely operating on NVGs in IMC and at an unlit airfield, however, neither are authorized in accordance with Division Flying Orders.

The pilot was inexperienced in night flying and it had been 224 days since his previous NVG training mission. The investigation is focussing on the human factors surrounding the occurrence. This will include disorientation, organizational pressures and training practices. 1 Canadian Air Division has directed that CF188 NVG training now commence only after a pilot has increased flying experience.

http://rainaviationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/cf-18-hornet-crashes-near-4-wing-cold.html

Air Canada Overall Traffic Up in June

2011-07-26T20:12:00.001-04:00

MONTREAL, July 6, 2011 - For the month of June, Air Canada reported a system load factor of 84.2 per cent, versus 84.7 per cent in June 2010, a decrease of 0.5 percentage points. System traffic increased 2.5 per cent on a system-wide capacity increase of 3.0 per cent. Air Canada reports traffic results on a system-wide basis, including regional airlines from which Air Canada purchases capacity.

"For the month of June, Air Canada reported a system load factor of 84.2 per cent. Led by an 8.4 per cent traffic increase in Latin America and Sun destination markets, we generated system wide traffic growth of 2.5 per cent on a capacity increase of 3 per cent through higher utilization of our existing fleet," said Calin Rovinescu, President and Chief Executive Officer. "Following on the record load factor we reported for June 2010, these solid results highlight Air Canada's ongoing focus on operating the airline in a disciplined and efficient manner with respect to capacity and asset deployment. On June 30th, we carried more than 122,000 passengers, a record for a single day as we head into the peak summer travel season. I want to thank our employees for their commitment to taking care of our customers and for safely transporting them to their destination."

Completing the Mission

2011-07-24T18:59:00.000-04:00

After completing the STS-135 mission, space shuttle Atlantis is rolled over to the Orbiter Processing Facility shortly after landing at NASA's Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility. Atlantis and the STS-135 crew completed a 13-day mission to the International Space Station and the final flight of the Space Shuttle Program, early Thursday morning, July 21, 2011, in Cape Canaveral, Fla. Overall, Atlantis spent 307 days in space and traveled nearly 126 million miles during its 33 flights. Atlantis, the fourth orbiter built, launched on its first mission on Oct. 3, 1985.

Image Credit: NASA/Bill Ingalls

Operation FORGE: CF Air Operations Cease After Airlifting More Than 3,600 Northern Ontario Residents To Safety

2011-07-24T18:57:00.000-04:00

July 22, 2011 - OTTAWA – After successfully evacuating more than 3,600 residents from seven northern Ontario communities that had been threatened by wildfires, Canadian Forces airlift is no longer needed as part of the Province of Ontario-led evacuation efforts.

“The Province of Ontario has advised us that Canadian Forces airlift is no longer required to support the evacuation of northern Ontario communities,” said the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence. “However, we will continue to monitor the situation and be prepared to resume assistance to our partners in helping Canadians if and when the need for the Canadian Forces’ unique capabilities is required.”

Six CC-130 Hercules military transport aircraft flew a total of 42 missions, evacuating 3,614 people from Deer Lake, Cat Lake, Fort Hope, Keewaywin, Kingfisher Lake, Kasabonika and Sandy Lake since July 6, 2011. Half of those flights took place in the past three days.

“I am very proud of the hundreds of men and women of the Canadian Forces who have come together from across the country to aid their fellow citizens during this crisis,” said Lieutenant-General Walter Semianiw, the Commander of Canada Command. “Working together with provincial and municipal emergency management personnel, they made an effective team in rescuing people from the wildfires.”

Photo: DND - Captain Kevin William Brown, a Movement Officer at 17 Wing in Winnipeg Manitoba helps a family a they are being evacuated onboard a Canadian Forces CC-130 Hercules aircraft.

Working alongside federal, provincial and municipal partners in evacuating citizens from the forest fire-ravaged areas of northern Ontario, hundreds of Canadian Forces personnel from across the country were involved in Operation FORGE. These include air and ground crew from Winnipeg, Manitoba; Trenton, Ontario; and Greenwood, Nova Scotia, as well as planning staff from Petawawa, Toronto, Winnipeg and Ottawa. Over 50 Canadian Rangers from the 3rd Canadian Ranger Patrol Group were mobilized in 14 communities across northern Ontario to assist with the evacuations by working with military ground coordination teams.

American Airlines Orders up to 300 Boeing Jets

2011-07-21T08:24:00.000-04:00

SEATTLE, July 20, 2011 /PRNewswire/ -- Boeing (NYSE: BA) confirmed that American Airlines has selected Boeing to provide 200 narrowbody airplanes, with options for 100 more, to accelerate its single-aisle fleet replacement.

The agreement includes 100 Next-Generation 737s, with options for an additional 40 airplanes. Boeing and American Airlines will work to finalize the agreement over the next several weeks, at which time it will be a firm order and posted to the Boeing Orders and Deliveries website.
In addition, American Airlines has committed to order a variant of the 737 featuring new more fuel-efficient engines, pending final airplane configuration and launch approval of the program by the Boeing board of directors. This commitment for 100 airplanes, with options for 60 more, is the first of many anticipated for this variant. The airplane would be powered by CFM International's LEAP-X engine.

"This agreement highlights our focus on investing in our fleet for the benefit of our shareholders, customers and employees," said Tom Horton, president, AMR Corp., the parent company of American Airlines and American Eagle. "The addition of these Next-Generation 737s will play a critical role in replacing our narrowbody fleet with more fuel-efficient aircraft offering state-of-the-art customer features."

American Airlines' current fleet of more than 600 Boeing airplanes includes 156 Next-Generation 737-800s delivered to date. The agreement builds on American Airlines' existing backlog of 64 Boeing airplanes consisting of 51 737-800s, seven 777-200ERs (extended range) and six 777-300ERs. In addition, American Airlines has an existing purchase agreement with Boeing to acquire an initial 42 787-9 Dreamliners, with the right to purchase up to 58 additional 787s.