REALaw

Burden of Evidence Shifts to Employee When Employer Submits Evidence of Payment

2017-10-23T22:23:00.002-07:00

"In repeated occasions, this Court ruled that the debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. To discharge means to extinguish an obligation, and in contract law discharge occurs either when the parties have performed their obligations in the contract, or when an event the conduct of the parties, or the operation of law releases the parties from performing. Thus, a party who alleges that an obligation has been extinguished must prove facts or acts giving rise to the extinction.

The fact of underpayment does not shift the burden of evidence to the plaintiff-herein respondent because partial payment does not extinguish the obligation. Only when the debtor introduces evidence that the obligation has been extinguished does the burden of evidence shift to the creditor who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why payment does not extinguish the obligation."

(See G & M PHILIPPINES, INC. vs BATOMALAQUE, G. R. No. 151849, June 23, 2005)

Employee must prove entitlement to overtime pay and premium pay

2017-10-23T21:52:00.000-07:00

"However, the CA was correct in its finding that the petitioners failed to provide sufficient factual basis for the award of overtime, and premium pays for holidays and rest days. The burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay and premium pay for holidays and rest days rests on the employee because these are not incurred in the normal course of business. In the present case, the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence that would show that they actually rendered service in excess of the regular eight working hours a day, and that they in fact worked on holidays and rest days."

(See WILGEN LOON, ET. AL vs. POWER MASTER, INC., G.R. No. 189404, December 11, 2013)

RELATED ARTICLES:
Employer has the burden of proving payment of employee's benefits
Doubts in the parties' evidence should be resolved in favor of the employee

Labor Law: Doubts in parties' evidence should be resolved in favor of employee

2017-10-17T05:51:00.001-07:00

"It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor."

(Nicario v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125340, September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 619, 626-627)

Labor Law: Employer has the burden of proving payment of employee's benefits

2017-10-17T05:38:00.000-07:00

"Moreover, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave, and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. Thus, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged with payment falls on the debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Only when the debtor introduces evidence that the obligation has been extinguished does the burden shift to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why payment does not extinguish the obligation. In this case, petitioner was unable to present ample evidence to prove its claim that respondent had received all his salaries and benefits in full."

(G & M PHILIPPINES, INC. vs CUAMBOT, G.R. No. 162308, November 22, 2006)

RELATED ARTICLES:

Sample Form: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY (To Represent In A Mediation)

2017-10-05T21:33:00.000-07:00

SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

I, ___________________, of legal age, married, Filipino, with postal address at ________________________________, do hereby appoint, name and constitute Mr. ________________________, likewise of legal age, singe/married, with residence at _______________________________ as my true and legal representative to act for and in my name and stead and to represent me during the mediation proceedings before the Philippine Mediation Center Unit in the Court of Appeals relative to the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No._________, to offer, negotiate, accept, decide and enter into a compromise agreement without need of further approval by or notification to me.

I hereby grant my representative full power and authority to execute and perform every act necessary to render effective the power to compromise as though I myself have so performed it and hereby approving all that he may do by virtue of these presents.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this ______ day of ____________________, 2017 at ________________.

____________________

Principal

Conforme:

_____________________

Attorney-in-fact

Republic of the Philippines )

_____________________) S.S

BEFORE ME, personally appeared:

Name ID Number Date/Place Issued

Known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntary act and deed.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL, on the date and place first above written.

Doc. No.______;

Page No. ______;

Book No.______;

Series of 2017

Sample Form: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY (To Claim Check)

2017-10-05T21:12:00.001-07:00

SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

I, _______________, of legal age, married, Filipino, with postal address at c/o ___________________________, do hereby appoint, name and constitute Mr. ______________________, likewise of legal age, married, with residence at _____________________________ as my true and legal representative to act for and in my name and stead and to claim my check from the NLRC Cashier representing the cash bond which I personally posted in relation to the case ______________________ vs. _____________________, bearing case number NLRC LAC No._________ / CASE No. _________, and as well as other checks, if any.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this ______ day of ____________________, 2017 at ________________.

_________________

Principal

Conforme:

_____________________

Attorney-in-fact

Republic of the Philippines )

_____________________) S.S

BEFORE ME, personally appeared:

Name ID Number Date/Place Issued

Known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntary act and deed.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL, on the date and place first above written.

Notary Public

Doc. No.______;

Page No. ______;

Book No.______;

Series of 2017

Nestle's "Coffee-Mate" vs. Puregold's "Coffee Match"

2017-10-02T02:29:00.002-07:00

In a Decision dated September 6, 2017 in the case of SOCIETE DES PRODUITS, NESTLE, S.A. vs. PUREGOLD PRICE CLUB, G.R. No. 217194, the Supreme Court Ruled in favor of Puregold:

The word "COFFEE" is the common dominant feature between Nestle's mark "COFFEE-MATE" and Puregold's mark "COFFEE MATCH." However, following Section 123, paragraph (h) of RA 8293 which prohibits exclusive registration of generic marks, the word "COFFEE" cannot be exclusively appropriated by either Nestle or Puregold since it is generic or descriptive of the goods they seek to identify. In Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,55 this Court held that generic or descriptive words are not subject to registration and belong to the public domain. Consequently, we must look at the word or words paired with the generic or descriptive word, in this particular case "-MATE" for Nestle's mark and "MATCH" for Puregold's mark, to determine the distinctiveness and registrability of Puregold's mark "COFFEE MATCH."

We agree with the findings of the BLA-IPO and ODG-IPO. The distinctive features of both marks are sufficient to warn the purchasing public which are Nestle's products and which are Puregold's products. While both "-MATE" and "MATCH" contain the same first three letters, the last two letters in Puregold's mark, "C" and "H," rendered a visual and aural character that made it easily distinguishable from Nestle's mark. Also, the distinctiveness of Puregold's mark with two separate words with capital letters "C" and "M" made it distinguishable from Nestle's mark which is one word with a hyphenated small letter "-m" in its mark. In addition, there is a phonetic difference in pronunciation between Nestle's "-MATE" and Puregold's "MATCH." As a result, the eyes and ears of the consumer would not mistake Nestle's product for Puregold's product. Accordingly, this Court sustains the findings of the BLA-IPO and ODG-IPO that the likelihood of confusion between Nestle's product and Puregold's product does not exist and upholds the registration of Puregold's mark.

How to pay capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax at the BIR

2017-09-27T04:18:00.000-07:00

This is an actual process we went through when we processed the payment of capital gains tax (CGT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)

1.) Fill-up the proper eBIR forms 1706 and 2000-OT (check BIR website) and have a printout of these forms. You can do this at home thru online or offline which requires downloading of the app from the BIR website.

(indicate the name of the seller in the forms even if he/she is represented by an attorney-in-fact)

2.) At the BIR Revenue District Office (RDO), proceed to TIN Verification Section and fill-up Form 1904-Application for Registration, for both the seller and buyer.

3.) Next is at the ONETT (One-Time Transactions) section and have the taxes computed (thru a Computation Sheet) based on the Deed of Sale and Tax Declaration (Certified True Copy)

4.) Proceed to any of the RDO's Accredited Banks

- (Better to know which bank submits/reports payments to BIR the earliest)

- Fill–up deposit slips (1 for DST and 1 for CGT)

- Submit the BIR forms 1706 and 2000-OT

- Get Official Receipt of deposits and bank-stamped forms

5.) Back to BIR again. Secure and fill-up Form 0605 (Payment Form). Photocopy 2 copies.

6.) Proceed to AAB and fill-up deposit slip (1 for each title) and pay P100 per title as Certification Fee. Attach 3 copies of forms

7.) Submit to ONETT – Original copies of Verified TINs, bank deposit slips and forms showing payment of Certification Fee, two copies of Deed of Sale (with special power of attorney, if any), original Tax Declaration, Certified True Copy of Title (must be nearest the time of transaction), Bank Deposit slips and Forms 1706 and 200-OT. And 1 set of photocopies of the same documents.

8.) Get Claim Slip with contact numbers for making follow-up calls.

9.) Claim the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) and the original copies of the documents previously submitted. Make sure that what your receiving are original copies which would also be required by the Registry of Deeds. This will save you time and the hassle of returning to the BIR just to get the originals.

Authorization to use property

2017-09-27T01:06:00.000-07:00

Date

To whom it may concern,

AUTHORIZATION

The undersigned individuals hereby authorize Mr. _________ to use, occupy, take care, maintain our property specifically located at _______________________.

We also authorize him to represent us before the developer Empire East and/or the condominium association or homeowners association on any matter concerning the said property.

This authorization shall be effective immediately and indefinitely until revoked in writing.

Thank you very much.

Respectfully,

________________

Authorization to use car / motor vehicle

2017-09-27T01:02:00.001-07:00

AUTHORIZATION TO USE VEHICLE

Date

To whom it may concern,

I am the actual owner of the following vehicle as shown in the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the registered owner __________:

2003 Toyota Vios MT / MV File No. _______ / Plate No. _____ / CR No. _____ / OR No. ______

I hereby grant my authorization and consent to ____________________ for the use of this vehicle as stated in this letter.

Copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, OR and CR for the said motor vehicle are hereto attached.

Sincerely,

_________________

Affidavit of Loss (Identification cards)

2017-09-27T00:56:00.001-07:00

Republic of the Philippines)

) S.S.

AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS

(Identification Cards)

I, ________, of legal age, Filipino, single and a resident of _________________, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and state THAT:

1. I am a seafarer working overseas and was recently deployed in Hawaii.

2. Previously, I was issued the following documents/identification cards by the Philippine government:

a.) SSS ID No. ________

b.) Pag-ibig ID No. _________

c.) TIN ID No. _________

d.) OWWA Membership ID

3. During my latest deployment as fisherman-seafarer in Hawaii, I brought with me the said identification cards. I placed all of them in my wallet.

4. Unfortunately, on ________ around 4PM, our fishing vessel FV ______, while docked at ___________, got burned which started from the electrical components in the pilot house.

5. Luckily, I was not present during the said incident as I was in another boat having a haircut, but I left my wallet with all the above identification cards inside my locker which were all consumed by fire.

6. I tried to look for the said IDs after the fire was put out by a fire truck but the entire cabin area where my locker is located was burned; thus, these identification cards are now lost beyond recovery.

4. As such, I am executing this affidavit to attest to the foregoing facts and to support the application for the issuance of the new ones in lieu of those ones which were lost.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this ___________________ in ___________, Metro Manila, Philippines.

_____________

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _______ day of __________________ in __________________, Metro Manila, affiant exhibiting to her Government Issued ID No. __________ issued on _____________ at ____________.

NOTARY PUBLIC

Doc. No.

Page No.

Book No.

Series of 2017.

Affidavit of Loss (Passport)

2017-09-27T00:52:00.000-07:00

Republic of the Philippines)

) S.S.

AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS

(PASSPORT)

I, ___________________, of legal age, Filipino, single and a resident of _______________________________, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and state THAT:

1. On January 12, 2010, I was issued a Philippine Passport by the Department of Affairs in Manila;

2. Recently, I had tried to look for the said passport but the same could not be found;

3. Despite diligent search and efforts to locate the said passport, I could not find the same such that I believe that it is now lost beyond recovery;

4. As such, I am executing this affidavit to attest to the foregoing facts and to support the application for the issuance of a new one in lieu of the one which was lost.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this ___________________ in ___________, Metro Manila, Philippines.

_______________

Affiant

Doc. No. ____;
Page No. ____;
Book No. ____;
Series of 2017.

Affidavit of Loss

2017-09-27T00:47:00.001-07:00

Republic of the Philippines)

) S.S.

AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS OF SPA

I, ________________, of legal age, Filipino, single and a resident of _________________________, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and state THAT:

On November 17, 2016, a Special Power of Attorney was executed by the registered owners ________ and ____________ acknowledged before Notary Public ____________ (Doc. No. ___; Page No. __; Book No. __; Series of 2016) authorizing Ms.________ to sell the property covered by CCT Nos. ______ and ______ and execute necessary documents relative thereto.

Sometime in July 2017, the original copy of the said Special Power of Attorney given to me could not be found and that despite of diligent search and efforts, the same could no longer be found such that I now believe that it is now lost beyond recovery.

As such, I am executing this Affidavit of Loss to attest to the truth of the foregoing and for whatever legal purposes that this may serve.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this ___________________ in ___________, Metro Manila, Philippines.

___________

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _______ day of __________________ in __________________, Metro Manila, affiant exhibiting to her Government Issued ID No. ____________.

Doc. No.

Page No.

Book No.

Series of 2017.

Labor Law: GRANDTEQ INDUSTRIAL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. vs MARGALLO, G.R. No. 181393, July 28, 2009

2014-12-27T07:55:00.002-08:00

"The Court rigorously disapproves contracts that demonstrate a clear attempt to exploit the employee and deprive him of the protection sanctioned by both the Constitution and the Labor Code."

(GRANDTEQ INDUSTRIAL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. vs MARGALLO, G.R. No. 181393, July 28, 2009)

Labor Bar Exam Coverage: Four-fold Test

2012-12-29T22:54:00.000-08:00

a. Four-fold Test

a. Selection and engagement of employee;
b. Payment of wages;
c. Power of dismissal; and
d. Power of control (the most important test)

The 2013 Bar Examination

2012-12-15T08:38:00.001-08:00

BAR BULLETIN NO. 1

Office of the Bar Confidant

Supreme Court of the Philippines

December 7, 2012

1. Bar Exam Venue: University of Sto. Tomas, Espana, Manila

2. Examination Dates: Four Sundays of October 2013:

October 6:

8 a.m. - 12 noon - Political Law

2 p.m. - 6 p.m. - Labor Law

October 13:

8 a.m. - 12 noon - Civil Law

2 p.m. - 6 p.m. – Taxation

October 20:

8 a.m. - 12 noon - Commercial Law

2 p.m. - 6 p.m. - Criminal Law

October 27:

8 a.m. - 12 noon - Remedial Law

2 p.m. - 6 p.m - Legal Ethics

3. Coverage: Questions shall strictly fall within the defined Syllabus for every subject. The Syllabi shall be released through a Bar Bulletin or before December 31, 2012.

The cut-off for Supreme Court decisions covered by the 2013 Bar Examinations shall be January 31, 2013. 2

4. Exam Structure and Format of Questions

a. The Examination shall consist of 20% Multiple Choice Questions (MCQ) and 80% Essay-type questions.

b. Whether MCQ or essay, the questions shall be based on a given set of facts, presented as briefly but as clearly and completely as possible, taking into account that every examinee needs reading, understanding, consideration of the applicable law, and answering time for every question.

The whole examination should be answerable by the average bar examinee within 3 .5 hours (210 minutes) to allow him or her 30 minutes of review time.

c. The basic elements of problem solving that the Examiners shall particularly look for are: the examinee's (1) proper understanding and appreciation of the facts, particularly of the components or details that can be material in resolving the given problem; (2) his or her appreciation of the applicable /awls that may come into play; (3) recognition of the issues posed; and the (4) resolution of the issues through the analysis and application of the law to the given facts. The examinee's presentation and articulation of his or her answer shall also be given weight.

d. The 20% MCQ portion of the examination shall be divided into 4 or 5 main fact situations from which the MCQ questions shall be asked.

The 80% essay portion of the exam shall be divided into eight (8) divisions of ten (10) points each, with a maximum of two facts per division from which question shall be drawn.

The corresponding weight of each question shall properly be indicated in the questionnaire, together with estimated answering time, to allow the examinee proper allotment of his or her exam time.

5. Communications

a. All administrative matters relating to the Bar Examinations shall be handled by and shall be coursed through the Supreme Court's Office of the Bar Confidant's (OBC). All communications should be addressed to the Office of the Bar Confidant c/o Atty. Tina Layusa, SC Bar Confidant.

b. The OBC can be reached at landline number 5257929; 5268122; 5268119; cellular phone number 09088864293; and by e-mail at baroffice@sc.judiciary.goy.ph. It holds office at the Supreme Court, Padre Faura, Manila, and is open at regular office hours on regular working days. All inquiries regarding the Bar Examinations should be directed at the OBC. Interested parties are urged to first communicate with the OBC by phone or by email to determine if the need exists for them to personally go to the OBC.

c. The Bar Confidant shall act as Spokesperson for the Bar Examinations and shall handle all announcements and relations with the media, with the law schools, and with examinees. Public announcements shall be through Bar Bulletins issued by the OBC at the SC website:

sc.j udiciary .gov. ph.

Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/bar%20admissions/bulletin/bulletin1.pdf

MVRB CRESAR Schedule for the 2013 Real Estate Brokers Exam

2012-12-10T23:54:00.000-08:00

CRESAR: Marikina Valley Realtors Board (MVRB)

Join PAREB-MVRB's 120 unit Comprehensive Real Estate Seminar and Review (CRESAR) for the March 2013 PRC real estate brokers examination

Schedule - Jan. 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, Feb. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 ,10, 2013

Venue - BSA Twin Towers, Everest Room B, Bank Drive, St. Francis Square ( Behind SM Megamall Bldg. A)

Seminar Fee - P15,000 for early bird (up to, Dec. 15, 2012), P18,000 (Dec. 16-31, 2012) Includes food, coffee, training materials

Contact - Mike Caparros (02) 347-0652 or (0922) 899-6453 mikecaparros@yahoo.com

Source: http://aboutrealestatetransactions.blogspot.com

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CASE DIGEST: Sambar vs. Levi Strauss

2012-12-01T14:33:00.000-08:00

VENANCIO SAMBAR, doing business under the name and style of CVS Garment Enterprises vs. LEVI STRAUSS & CO., LEVI STRAUSS (PHIL.), INC.

FACTS:

Private respondents alleged in their complaint that Levi Strauss and Co. (LS&Co.), an internationally known clothing manufacturer, own the arcuate design trademark which was registered under US Trademark Registration No. 404,248 on November 16, 1943. That sometime in 1987, CVSGIC and Venancio Sambar, without the consent and authority of private respondents and in infringement and unfair competition, sold and advertised, and despite demands to cease and desist, continued to manufacture, sell and advertise denim, pants under the brand name “Europress” with back pockets bearing a design similar to the arcuate trademark of private respondents, thereby causing confusion on the buying public, prejudiced to private respondent’s goodwill and property right.

Sambar filed a separate answer. He admitted that copyright Registration No. 1-1998 was issued to him, but he denied using it. He said he did not authorize anyone to use the copyrighted design.

Trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining CVSGIC and petitioner from manufacturing, advertising and selling pants with the arcuate design on their back pockets.

Private respondents moved for reconsideration praying for the cancellation of petitioner’s copyright registration.

Trial court granted the prayer.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner infringe on private respondent’s arcuate design.

HELD:

To be entitled to a copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the author through his own skill, labor and judgment, without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another.

Both the trail court and the Court of Appeals found there was infringement.

CASE DIGEST: Vargas vs. FM Yaptico

2012-12-01T14:29:00.000-08:00

ANGEL VARGAS vs F. M. YAPTICO & CO. (Ltd.)

G.R. No. 14101, September 24, 1919

Facts:

Plaintiff Angel Vargas, a farmer, was issued patents by the United States Patent Office for his so-called invention of an improved adjustable plow with the use his own native plow. A certified copy of the patent was filed in the Division of Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Executive Bureau, Government of the Philippine Islands.

Defendant F. M. Yaptico & Co. (Ltd.), a firm engaged in the foundry business in Iloilo City, was a manufacturer of plow parts. It produced points, shares, shoes, and heel pieces in a considerable amount adapted to replace worn-out parts of the Vargas plow.

Vargas filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to enjoin the alleged infringement of his U.S. Patent by the defendant F. M Yaptico & Co. (Ltd.), and to recover the damages suffered by reason of this infringement, to which the court issued the preliminary injunction prayed for.

The defendant denied the allegations and defended that the patent lacked novelty or invention, that there was no priority of ideas or device in the principle and construction of the plow, and that the plow, whose manufacture it was sought to have enjoined by the plaintiff, had already been in public use for more than two years before the application of the plaintiff for his patent.

The trial judge rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, declaring null and without effect the patent in question and dismissing the suit with costs against the plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff appealed said judgment.

Issues:

1. Whether the patented invention is void for lack of novelty and invention?

2. Whether the patent is invalid considering that the plow had already been in public use for over two years prior to the application for a patent.

Ruling:

1. Yes, the patent if void. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the plow of the plaintiff is not different from the native plow, except in the material, in the form, in the weight and the grade of the result, the said differences giving it neither a new function nor a new result distinct from the function and the result obtained from the native plow. Also, its production does not presuppose the exercise of the inventive faculty but merely of mechanical skill, which does not give a right to a patent of an invention under the provisions of the Patent Law.

2. Yes, the patent is void. Under the provisions of the statute, an inventor's creation must not have been in public use or on sale in the United States (and the Philippine Islands) for more than two years prior to his application.

Further, it was proved that the invention was used in public at Iloilo by others than Vargas, the inventor, more than two years before the application for the patent thus, the patent is invalid.

CASE DIGEST: Universal Mills Corporation vs. Universal Textile Mills

2012-12-01T14:26:00.002-08:00

78 SCRA 62 (1977)

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission granting a petition by the respondent to have the petitioner’s corporate name be changed as it is “confusingly and deceptively similar” to that of the former.

On January 8, 1954, respondent Universal Textile Mills was issued a certificate of Corporation as a textile manufacturing firm. On the other hand, petitioner, which deals in the production of hosieries and apparels, acquired its current name by amending its articles of incorporation, changing its name from Universal Hosiery mills Corporation to Universal Mills corporation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petioner’s trade name is confusingly similar with that of respondent’s.

HELD:

Yes. The corporate names in question are not identical, but they are indisputably so similar that even under the test of reasonable care and observation as the public generally are capable of using and may be expected to exercise” invoked by appellant. We are apprehensive confusion will usually arise, considering that x x x appellant included among its primary purposes the manufacturing, dyeing, finishing and selling of fabrics of all kinds” which respondent had been engaged for more than a decade ahead of petitioner.

CASE DIGEST: Kenneth Roy Savege vs. Taypin

2012-12-01T14:21:00.004-08:00

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE vs. JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding Judge, RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City, CEBU PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Region VII, Cebu City, JUANITA NG MENDOZA, MENDCO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ALFREDO SABJON and DANTE SOSMEÑA

G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu.

The complaint was lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO), alleging that Savage’s products are the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Savage contends however, that there was no existence of offense leading to the issuance of a search warrant and eventual seizure of its products.

Issue: Whether or not unfair competition involving design patents are punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: To provide a clear view, the Intellectual Property Code took effect on January 1, 1998. The repealing clause of the IPC provides that Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), Presidential Decree No. 49, are hereby repealed The issue involving the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design patents, referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has been rendered moot and academic by the repeal of the article. Hence, the search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a possible violation of the IPR Code.

There is no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving design patents in the controlling provisions on Unfair Competition of the RPC. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code.

The court is are prevented from applying these principles, along with the new provisions on Unfair Competition found in the IPR Code, to the alleged acts of the petitioners, for such acts constitute patent infringement as defined by the same Code

Although the case traces its origins to the year 1997 or before the enactment of the IPR Code, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall be applied retrospectively, if such application would be beneficial to the accused. Since the IPR Code effectively obliterates the possibility of any criminal liability attaching to the acts alleged, then RPC provisions must be applied.

CASE DIGEST: Samson vs. Tarroza

2012-12-01T14:15:00.000-08:00

28 SCRA 792 (1969)

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Director of Patents denying the petition for the cancellation of Utility Model Letters Patent No. 62 in favor of respondent Felipe Tarroza for his Side Tilting-Dumping Wheelbarrow.

Petitioner Gerardo Samson, Jr was also a prior grantee of Utility Model Patent No. 27 for a Dumping and Detachable Wheelbarrow, which he claims to have been infringed by the respondent, they being neighbors.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s Utility Model Patent deserves cancellation.

HELD:

No. There is an express recognition under the Patent Law that any new model of implements or tools or of any industrial product even if not possessed of the quality of invention but which is of “practical utility” is entitled to a “patent for a utility model: From the description of the side of tilting-dumping wheelbarrow, the product of ingenuity and industry, it is quite apparent that it has a place in the market and possesses what the statute refers to as “practical utility.”

CASE DIGEST: Philippine Nut Industry vs. Standards Brands

2012-12-01T14:11:00.004-08:00

PHILIPPINE NUT INDUSTRY, INC. vs. STANDARD BRANDS INCORPORATED and TIBURCIO S. EVALLE as Director of Patents

G.R. No. L-23035 July 31, 1975

Facts:

Philippine Nut Industry Inc., a domestic corporation, obtained from the Patent Office on August 10, 1961, a certificate covering the trademark "PHILIPPINE PLANTERS CORDIAL PEANUTS," the label used on its product of salted peanuts.

On May 14, 1962, Standard Brands, a foreign corporation, filed a case with the Director of Patent, asking for the cancellation of Philippine Nut's certificate of registration on the ground that "the registrant was not entitled to register the mark at the time of its application for registration thereof" for the reason that it (Standard Brands) is the owner of the trademark "PLANTERS COCKTAIL PEANUTS" covered by Certificate of Registration No. SR-172, issued by the Patent Office on July 28, 1958.

Thereafter, the Philippine Nut filed its answer invoking the special defense that its registered label is not confusingly similar to that of Standard Brands as the latter alleges.

Respondent Director of Patents gave due course to Standard Brand's petition, ordering the cancellation of Philippine Nut's Certificate of Registration.

Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Philippine Nut petitioned for a review, seeking the reversal of the Director of Patents’ decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the trademark "PHILIPPINE PLANTERS CORDIAL PEANUTS" used by Philippine Nut on its label for salted peanuts with the same coloring scheme and the same lay-out of words, confusingly similar to the trademark "PLANTERS COCKTAIL PEANUTS" used by Standard Brands on its product.

Ruling:

Yes. As to appearance and general impression of the two trademarks, the Supreme Court said it found a very confusing similarity.

The word PLANTERS printed across the upper portion of the label in bold letters easily attracts and catches the eye of the ordinary consumer and it is that word and none other that sticks in his mind when he thinks of salted peanuts.

The Supreme Court also held that although it is true that no producer or manufacturer may have a monopoly of any color scheme or form of words in a label, but when a competitor adopts a distinctive or dominant mark or feature of another's trademark and with it makes use of the same color ensemble, employs similar words written in a style, type and size of lettering almost identical with those found in the other trademark, the intent to pass to the public his product as that of the other is quite obvious. It deceives the public.

Hence, the decision of respondent Director of Patents was affirmed.

CASE DIGEST: Mighty vs. La Campana Fabrica

2012-12-01T14:07:00.001-08:00

MIGHTY CORPORATION and LA CAMPANA FABRICA DE TABACO, INC. vs. E.J. GALLO WINERY and THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC.

FACTS:

On March 12, 1993, respondents sued petitioners in the RTC-Makati for trademark and trade name infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for damages and preliminary injunction.

They claimed that petitioners adopted the Gallo trademark to ride on Gallo Winery’s and Gallo and Ernest & Julio Gallo trademark’s established reputation and popularity, thus causing confusion, deception and mistake on the part of the purchasing public who had always associated Gallo and Ernest and Julio & Gallo trademarks with Gallo Winery’s wines.

In their answer, petitioners alleged, among other affirmative defenses that: petitioners Gallo cigarettes and Gallo Winery’s wine were totally unrelated products. To wit:

1. Gallo Winery’s GALLO trademark registration certificates covered wines only, and not cigarettes;

2. GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were sold through different channels of trade;

3. the target market of Gallo Winery’s wines was the middle or high-income bracket while Gallo cigarette buyers were farmers, fishermen, laborers and other low-income workers;

4. the dominant feature of the Gallo cigarette was the rooster device with the manufacturer’s name clearly indicated as MIGHTY CORPORATION, while in the case of Gallo Winery’s wines, it was the full names of the founders-owners ERNEST & JULIO GALLO or just their surname GALLO;

On April 21, 1993, the Makati RTC denied, for lack of merit, respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On August 19, 1993, respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On February 20, 1995, the CA likewise dismissed respondent’s petition for review on certiorari.

After the trial on the merits, however, the Makati RTC, on November 26, 1998, held petitioners liable for, permanently enjoined from committing trademark infringement and unfair competition with respect to the GALLO trademark.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the Makati RTC’s decision and subsequently denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were identical, similar or related goods for the reason alone that they were purportedly forms of vice.

HELD:

Wines and cigarettes are not identical, similar, competing or related goods.

In resolving whether goods are related, several factors come into play:

· the business (and its location) to which the goods belong

· the class of product to which the good belong

· the product’s quality, quantity, or size, including the nature of the package, wrapper or container

· the nature and cost of the articles

· the descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential characteristics with reference to their form, composition, texture or quality

· the purpose of the goods

· whether the article is bought for immediate consumption, that is, day-to-day household items

· the field of manufacture

· the conditions under which the article is usually purchased and

· the articles of the trade through which the goods flow, how they are distributed, marketed, displayed and sold.

The test of fraudulent simulation is to the likelihood of the deception of some persons in some measure acquainted with an established design and desirous of purchasing the commodity with which that design has been associated. The simulation, in order to be objectionable, must be as appears likely to mislead the ordinary intelligent buyer who has a need to supply and is familiar with the article that he seeks to purchase.

The petitioners are not liable for trademark infringement, unfair competition or damages.

WHEREFORE, petition is granted.

CASE DIGEST: Joaquin vs. Drilon

2012-12-01T13:41:00.001-08:00

FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR. and BJ PRODUCTIONS, INC. vs. HONORABLE RANKLIN M. DRILON, GABRIEL ZOSA, WILLIAM ESPOSO, FELIPE MEDINA, JR., and CASEY FRANCISCO

FACTS:

Petitioner BJ Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder / grantee of Certificate of Copyright No. M922, dated January 28, 1971, of Rhoda and Me, a dating game show aired from 1970 to 1977.

On June 28, 1973, petitioner BJPI submitted to the National Library an addendum to its certificate of copyright specifying the show’s format and style of presentation.

Upon complaint of petitioners, information for violation of PD No. 49 was filed against private respondent Zosa together with certain officers of RPN 9 for airing It’s a Date. It was assigned to Branch 104 of RTC Quezon City.

Zosa sought review of the resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor before the Department of Justice.

On August 12, 1992, respondent Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon reversed the Assistant City Prosecutor’s findings and directed him to move for the dismissal of the case against private respondents.

Petitioner Joaquin filed motion for reconsideration but such was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the format or mechanics or petitioner’s television show is entitled to copyright protection.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the format of the show is not copyrightable. Sec. 2 of PD No. 49, otherwise known as the Decree on Intellectual Property, enumerates the classes of work entitled to copyright protection. The provision is substantially the same as Sec. 172 of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (RA 8293). The format or mechanics of a television show is not included in the list of protected works in Sec. 2 of PD No. 49. For this reason, the protection afforded by the law cannot be extended to cover them.

Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new independent right granted by the statute and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by the statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the person and on terms and conditions specified in the statute.

The Court is of the opinion that petitioner BJPI’s copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within the class of works mentioned in PD 49.

The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show.

Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is insufficient; the presentation of the master videotape in evidence was indispensable to the determination of the existence of a probable cause.

A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general copyright / format of both dating game shows.