RightSpeaks

The Architecture of Electoral Polarization: A Comprehensive Analysis of Hate Speech in Assam's Political Landscape

2026-04-02T20:02:00.000+05:30

Introduction

The intersection of electoral politics, demographic anxiety, and digital communication has transformed the democratic landscape of the Indian subcontinent, with the northeastern state of Assam serving as one of the most volatile crucibles for these converging forces. As the world's largest democracy navigates successive electoral cycles, the strategic deployment of hate speech has evolved from a fringe rhetorical device into a central, institutionalized mechanism for voter mobilization and societal polarization.1 In Assam, a state characterized by a complex historical tapestry of indigenous tribes, historical migrants, and religious minorities, the discourse surrounding elections has undergone a profound and highly orchestrated metamorphosis. Over the past decade, the political narrative has systematically shifted from regional ethno-linguistic protectionism toward a virulent strain of religious majoritarianism, primarily targeting the state's Bengali-origin Muslim population.3

Recent civil society reports, international monitors, and human rights tribunals have documented an alarming trajectory in the volume, severity, and institutional backing of hate speech across India. This trajectory is deeply intertwined with the ideological ambitions of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the broader Hindu nationalist movement. National data reveals that hate speech incidents targeting religious minorities surged from 668 in 2023 to 1,165 in 2024, representing a staggering 74.4% increase.2 Within this national framework, Assam occupies a unique and highly precarious position. The state's historical anxieties regarding cross-border immigration from neighboring Bangladesh have been repurposed and weaponized by political elites to construct a perpetual existential threat. This narrative portrays Bengali-origin Muslims—often derogatorily referred to as "Miyas," "infiltrators," or "encroachers"—as a demographic, environmental, and cultural menace to the indigenous Assamese and the broader Hindu identity.5

The deployment of hate speech in this context is not merely an unfortunate byproduct of heated political campaigns; rather, it constitutes the fundamental architecture of the electoral strategy.1 By synthesizing data from civil society monitoring groups, historical analyses, legal frameworks, and digital rights assessments, this exhaustive report systematically deconstructs the anatomy of electoral hate speech in Assam. The analysis traces the historical antecedents of the state's demographic anxieties, examines the legislative gerrymandering that redefined citizenship, and evaluates the catalytic role of social media platforms and artificial intelligence in the hyper-amplification of dangerous speech. Furthermore, the report investigates the profound real-world consequences of this rhetoric—including state-sponsored violence, mass evictions, and democratic backsliding—while critically assessing the efficacy of institutional responses from the Election Commission of India (ECI) and the judiciary, alongside the emergence of grassroots civil society resistance.

Historical Antecedents: Migration, Demographics, and the Genesis of the "Other"

To accurately comprehend the contemporary weaponization of hate speech in Assam, it is imperative to contextualize the state's long-standing, deeply entrenched demographic anxieties. The historical roots of the "Muslim question" in Assam extend far beyond the singular narrative of colonial-era peasant migration; they are inextricably linked to the complex cartographic evolution of the region under British rule. The demographic contours of modern Assam began taking shape following the Treaty of Yandabo in 1826, which brought the Ahom kingdom under the British Empire. Crucially, even prior to this annexation, western and southern territories—specifically Greater Goalpara and the Sylhet region—were already under British administration and home to deep-rooted Bengali-speaking populations. When the colonial government carved out Assam as a separate Chief Commissioner's Province in 1874, it administratively tethered these populous, Bengali-majority districts to the Assamese-speaking Brahmaputra Valley to ensure the new province's economic viability. It was upon this already intricate, shifting ethno-linguistic mosaic that the British later superimposed policies encouraging the migration of landless East Bengali peasants to Assam’s fertile riverine plains to boost agricultural revenue and support the tea industry. Consequently, the enduring friction between the Assamese and Bengali-speaking communities is the product of deliberate administrative boundary-drawing and the merging of distinct geographies, compounded by subsequent economic migrations.

The historical culmination of these tensions was the Assam Movement, also known as the Anti-Foreigners Agitation, which spanned from 1979 to 1985.9 Led by the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), this mass uprising demanded the immediate detection, disenfranchisement, and deportation of "illegal aliens" who had allegedly encroached upon the state's electoral rolls.9 The movement defined a six-year period of sustained civil disobedience, political instability, and catastrophic ethnic violence, most notably the Nellie massacre of 1983, wherein thousands of Bengali Muslims were slaughtered in a highly organized pogrom.8

The agitation officially concluded with the signing of the Assam Accord in 1985 under the Rajiv Gandhi administration. The Accord established midnight of March 24, 1971—the eve of the Bangladesh Liberation War—as the absolute cutoff date for defining legal citizenship in the state.8 Anyone entering India from Bangladesh after this date was officially labeled an "illegal immigrant" subject to deportation. For decades following the Accord, the political fault lines in Assam remained primarily ethno-linguistic, pitting the indigenous Assamese against Bengali-speaking migrants, irrespective of the latter's religious affiliation (Hindu or Muslim). The fear of the "Bangladeshi" was a unifying political rallying cry that brought together disparate, ideologically opposed ethnic factions under the banner of regional sub-nationalism.3

However, the political landscape underwent a seismic shift with the ascent of the BJP to state power in 2016. The political discourse was meticulously re-engineered to map the existing insider-outsider binary directly onto a Hindu-Muslim axis.3 The BJP's electoral promise to protect indigenous rights through the slogan of Jati-Mati-Bheti (identity, land, and base) gradually transitioned from a defense of Assamese culture into a defense of Hindu civilizational supremacy.3 The xenophobia rooted in the Assam Movement was thus surgically extracted from its ethno-linguistic context and repurposed as a tool for religious polarization, transforming the "Bangladeshi immigrant" into the purely religious category of the "Miya Muslim".3

The Legislative Crucible: NRC, CAA, and the Redefinition of Citizenship

The transition from ethno-nationalism to religious majoritarianism in Assam's political rhetoric was not achieved through speech alone; it was structurally cemented through highly controversial legislative and bureaucratic frameworks. The primary instruments of this transformation were the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) of 2019.3

The NRC update in Assam, a bureaucratic exercise ostensibly aimed at separating genuine citizens from undocumented immigrants based on legacy data dating back to 1951, culminated in the publication of a final list in August 2019. The process was fraught with immense human suffering, as millions of impoverished, semi-literate individuals were forced to navigate a labyrinthine legal system to prove their citizenship.13 The final NRC excluded approximately 1.9 million individuals, effectively rendering them stateless. However, the demographic composition of the excluded population posed a significant political dilemma for the ruling BJP: a substantial portion of those left off the list were Bengali Hindus, a core constituency for the party.3

To circumvent the political fallout of disenfranchising its own voter base, the central government pushed through the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) in December 2019. The CAA provided an expedited pathway to Indian citizenship for religious minorities—specifically Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians—fleeing persecution from neighboring Muslim-majority countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) who had entered India before December 31, 2014.11 Crucially, the legislation explicitly excluded Muslims from this amnesty provision.12

In the context of Assam, the CAA effectively operated as a legislative safeguard for migrant Hindus excluded by the NRC, while simultaneously cementing the status of Bengali-origin Muslims as the sole, irredeemable "illegal infiltrators".3 This dual mechanism fundamentally altered the constitutional definition of citizenship in India, tying it explicitly to religious identity and violating the secular principles enshrined in the Constitution.12 The legislative maneuvering provided absolute validation to the Hindu nationalist narrative. It allowed political leaders to openly distinguish between "indigenous" (Khilonjia) Muslims, whom they claimed to tolerate, and Bengali-origin "Miya" Muslims, who were systematically stripped of their civic legitimacy and exposed to relentless rhetorical and physical attacks.3

Paradigm Element	Pre-2014 Ethno-Nationalist Discourse	Post-2014 Hindu Nationalist Discourse
Primary Fault Line	Linguistic and Ethnic (Assamese vs. Bengali)	Religious (Hindu vs. Muslim)
Definition of "Outsider"	Any immigrant arriving after March 24, 1971	Specifically Bengali-origin Muslims ("Miyas")
Legislative Framework	Assam Accord (1985)	National Register of Citizens (NRC) & Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA, 2019)
Core Political Slogan	Protection of Assamese Sub-nationalism	Protection of Hindu Rashtra and Jati-Mati-Bheti
Proposed Solution	Deportation of all "foreigners" regardless of faith	Amnesty for non-Muslims; disenfranchisement and detention of Muslims

The Anatomy of Electoral Hate Speech: Lexicon, Tropes, and Dehumanization

The contemporary electoral strategy in Assam relies heavily on the meticulous construction and amplification of fear. The rhetoric deployed during the 2021 state assembly elections, the 2024 general elections, and the ongoing preparations for the 2026 state elections demonstrates a highly orchestrated campaign to polarize the electorate by demonizing the Bengali-origin Muslim community.3 This hate speech operates through a specific, hyper-localized lexicon designed to strip the targeted population of their humanity, agency, and civic rights.

The Weaponization of the "Miya" Identity

The term "Miya," historically utilized as a respectful Urdu term of address for a gentleman, has been violently reclaimed and repurposed in Assam's political lexicon as a highly pejorative slur. It is deployed exclusively to denote Bengali-origin Muslims, inextricably linking their identity to the specter of the "illegal Bangladeshi encroacher".5 During election campaigns, the political participation of this demographic is routinely portrayed as an existential threat. Political rhetoric frequently insists that the state is under siege by "Miyas," creating a narrative wherein the very presence of this community is an act of demographic aggression.6

For instance, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has explicitly stated in public addresses that the demographic growth of the Muslim population—which constitutes roughly 36% of the state—represents an influx of "infiltrators" who will eventually be "kicked out".7 He has publicly alleged that Bengali-origin Muslims are conspiring to "take over" upper Assam, warning native residents against allowing this demographic shift.16 The rhetoric extends to the cultural sphere as well. When proposals were made to establish a museum celebrating the culture of riverine char-dwellers, BJP legislators like Shiladitya Dev launched vitriolic attacks, demanding the museum be "set on fire" and declaring that "Miya culture cannot be the culture of Assam," further asserting that the community's identity markers, such as the Lungi and Topi, are foreign impositions.17

Biological Determinism and Entomological Metaphors

The dehumanization of the minority community frequently descends into biological determinism and entomological metaphors, a hallmark of genocidal rhetoric globally. High-ranking political figures have repeatedly utilized parasitic metaphors to describe the Bengali-origin Muslim demographic. During multiple election rallies, Union Home Minister Amit Shah notoriously referred to Bangladeshi migrants as "termites" that are eating into the nation's resources and security, promising a nationwide NRC to eradicate them.18

This linguistic framing serves a critical psychological function: by categorizing a human population as an infestation, an ecological hazard, or a disease, the state implicitly justifies extreme, extralegal measures of eradication, exclusion, and violence.18 Official state discourse and regional media frequently equate Bengali Muslim char-dwellers with "rats," "crows," and "vultures," projecting them as environmental waste producers who systematically destroy natural habitats, national parks, and government grazing reserves.21 The concept of "environmental racism" is thus deeply embedded in the electoral hate speech of Assam, utilizing the pretext of ecological conservation to justify violent eviction drives against marginalized Muslim farmers.21

The Manufacture of Localized "Jihads"

To sustain the momentum of polarization and maintain the electorate in a state of perpetual anxiety, political elites in Assam have cultivated a constantly evolving, highly localized taxonomy of conspiracy theories. By appending the suffix "jihad" to ordinary socio-economic activities, the state apparatus transforms mundane daily life into acts of organized warfare against the Hindu majority.16

While the national Hindu right-wing relies heavily on the trope of "Love Jihad" (the baseless conspiracy that Muslim men feign love to convert Hindu women) and "Vote Jihad" (the coordinated voting by minorities to defeat majoritarian candidates) 23, the discourse in Assam has been creatively expanded. Chief Minister Sarma has routinely accused the minority community of waging "Land Jihad" (allegations of Muslims systematically and illegally occupying indigenous land), "Fertilizer Jihad" (claims that Muslim farmers deliberately use excessive chemical fertilizers to poison Hindu consumers), and "Flood Jihad" (bizarre accusations that Muslims deliberately caused catastrophic urban flooding in Guwahati by intentionally altering drainage systems).16

Furthermore, the state leadership has publicly blamed the "Miya" community for fluctuating macroeconomic indicators, such as the rise in the price of vegetables in urban centers, suggesting a coordinated economic attack against the Assamese people.25 In public speeches, Sarma has also claimed that newly arrived Muslims have "weaponized" the consumption of beef and the Islamic call to prayer as deliberate tactics to drive out local Hindus and pollute sacred spaces.5 This relentless barrage of conspiracy theories ensures that the majority community views the minority not as fellow citizens, but as active combatants in an undeclared civilizational war.3

Typology of Conspiracy	Rhetorical Claim	Intended Electoral/Psychological Impact
Land Jihad	Muslims are systematically encroaching upon and stealing indigenous and monastic lands.	Justifies brutal state-led eviction drives and demolition of minority properties.
Fertilizer Jihad	Muslim farmers are deliberately poisoning agricultural produce with toxic chemicals to harm Hindus.	Promotes economic boycotts of Muslim vendors and agricultural workers.
Flood Jihad	Muslims intentionally alter drainage systems and topography to cause urban flooding in Hindu-majority areas.	Deflects state accountability for poor urban infrastructure and disaster management onto the minority.
Vote Jihad	Minorities engage in coordinated, monolithic voting patterns specifically to defeat Hindu nationalist candidates.	Delegitimizes the democratic participation of minorities; justifies voter roll purges (D-voters).
Economic Jihad	"Miya" traders artificially inflate the prices of essential commodities like vegetables to economically drain the Assamese.	Fosters deep-seated communal resentment and calls for segregated economic ecosystems.

The Statistical Topography of Hate: Empirical Data and Trends

The escalation of hate speech in India, and specifically in Assam, is not merely anecdotal; it is substantiated by robust empirical data compiled by independent civil society organizations and research laboratories. An analysis of the data reveals a clear correlation between the intensity of hate speech and the occurrence of significant electoral events, underscoring its utility as a primary campaign strategy.

According to a comprehensive 2024 report by the Center for the Study of Organized Hate (CSOH) and the India Hate Lab (IHL), the number of verified in-person hate speech events in India surged from 668 in 2023 to 1,165 in 2024.2 This represents a staggering 74.4% increase year-over-year.2 The targeting is highly asymmetrical: of the 1,165 events recorded in 2024, an overwhelming 1,147 (98.5%) explicitly targeted religious minorities, primarily Muslims (1,050 events explicitly) and Christians.29

The nature of the speeches has also grown increasingly violent. The concept of "dangerous speech"—defined academically and legally as speech that significantly increases the risk that its audience will condone or participate in violence against members of another group—saw a dramatic rise.2 In 2024, 274 hate speeches (23.5%) openly called for the seizure, removal, or destruction of places of worship owned by minorities; 123 speeches (10.6%) included explicit calls to arms, advocating for Hindus to procure weapons under the guise of "protection"; and 111 speeches (9.5%) demanded the total social and economic boycott of minority communities.2 Furthermore, 182 speeches (15.6%) specifically promoted the "Bangladeshi infiltrator" bogeyman, a narrative highly concentrated in the political discourse of Assam and neighboring eastern states.2

The data also reveals a stark political alignment regarding the origin of these speeches. In 2023, 75% of all hate speech events took place in states or union territories ruled by the BJP.30 During the 2024 General Election period alone (March 16 to May 29, 2024), the South Asia Justice Campaign documented 380 "top and intermediate-level" hate speeches. Shockingly, 287 of these speeches (76%) were delivered by senior BJP leaders, representing a 600% increase compared to the 2019 general election period.7 The top offenders included the Prime Minister (61 speeches), the Union Home Minister (43 speeches), and the Chief Minister of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, who delivered at least 22 highly inciteful speeches.7 This data unequivocally demonstrates that hate speech is not an aberration committed by fringe vigilantes, but a highly coordinated, top-down electoral methodology.

Hate Speech Metric	2023 Data	2024 Data	Percentage Increase / Prevalence
Total In-Person Hate Speech Events	668	1,165	+74.4%
Events Targeting Muslims/Christians	N/A	1,147	98.5% of total events
Calls for Destruction of Worship Places	N/A	274	23.5% of total events
Explicit Calls to Arms / Weaponization	N/A	123	10.6% of total events
Speeches Promoting "Infiltrator" Trope	N/A	182	15.6% of total events
Speeches by Senior Political Leaders (Election Period)	40 (2019 GE)	287 (2024 GE)	+600% increase

The Digital Amplification Engine: Social Media and Vernacular Blind Spots

The unparalleled efficacy and reach of electoral hate speech in Assam are inextricably linked to the region's rapid digitalization and the strategic manipulation of social media platforms. Over the past decade, India has transitioned into a complex hybrid media system, where traditional broadcasting networks work in tandem with online platforms like Facebook, YouTube, X (formerly Twitter), and WhatsApp to create hermetically sealed echo chambers of majoritarian outrage.32 While traditional regional television channels in Assam, such as News Live and DY365, have frequently been criticized for sensationalizing conflict and aligning with powerful political interests 35, it is the unregulated expanse of social media that has truly democratized the distribution of hate.

Algorithmic Bias and Live-Streaming Virality

Social media platforms are fundamentally designed to prioritize engagement, and content that elicits high-arousal emotions such as anger, fear, and tribalistic indignation naturally receives preferential algorithmic amplification.33 Political parties have weaponized this architecture. Of the 1,165 verified hate speech events in India in 2024, an overwhelming 995 (85.4%) were first shared or live-streamed on social media platforms.2 Facebook emerged as the primary vector, accounting for 495 events, while 211 events were exclusively shared on YouTube.29

The ruling establishment extensively utilizes Facebook Live and YouTube Live to broadcast election campaign speeches, allowing anti-Muslim hate to bypass traditional media fact-checking and reach millions of smartphones instantaneously.29 In 2024, 266 anti-minority hate speeches delivered by senior political leaders were simultaneously live-streamed across official party accounts boasting millions of followers.29 Furthermore, platforms like YouTube have facilitated the rise of "Hindutva Pop"—a genre of far-right, highly provocative music videos that explicitly promote anti-Muslim conspiracy theories and glorify violence, serving as a potent tool for the digital radicalization of the youth.29

The Failure of Vernacular Content Moderation

Despite possessing comprehensive community standards prohibiting hate speech and incitement to violence, global social media conglomerates have proven to be catastrophically inept at moderating content in regional Indian languages. A pivotal investigative report by the global advocacy group Avaaz highlighted that hate speech targeted at Bengali Muslims in Assam spread almost unabated on Facebook during the highly volatile period of the NRC publication, when nearly two million people faced potential statelessness.20

The Avaaz report exposed a fundamental and lethal flaw in the platforms' reliance on Artificial Intelligence for content moderation: AI models lack the nuanced linguistic training, cultural context, and syntax recognition required to detect hate speech in Assamese and its local dialects.20 When human rights defenders manually flagged explicit posts calling Bengali Muslims "parasites," "rats," and "rapists," and demanding their extermination, Facebook's automated systems routinely dismissed the reports, responding with automated messages stating that the content did not breach community standards.20

This "vernacular blind spot" grants impunity to digital hatemongers. The CSOH report noted that out of 259 recorded instances of dangerous speech on social media in 2024, Facebook had removed only 3 videos as of February 2025; the remaining 98.4% of the violative content remained active and accessible, continuing to radicalize the populace.2 When platforms fail to deploy human moderators fluent in regional languages like Assamese, they effectively become complicit in the architecture of polarization, prioritizing market expansion over user safety and democratic integrity.20

The Frontier of Electoral Manipulation: Generative AI and Weaponized Disinformation

The most alarming development in the lead-up to recent and upcoming elections in Assam has been the highly sophisticated integration of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) to manufacture bespoke disinformation and synthetic realities. While traditional hate speech relies on rhetorical persuasion, AI-weaponized disinformation creates a hyper-realistic, visceral simulation of the majority community's worst fears, fundamentally altering the epistemology of the public sphere.

A comprehensive preliminary monitoring report by the Diaspora in Action for Human Rights and Democracy (DAHRD) meticulously documented the normalization of AI-generated propaganda in Assam's electoral campaigns.38 Conducting an open-source analysis of 57 social media accounts between November 2023 and March 2024, the DAHRD identified 158 confirmed AI-generated posts specifically targeting Bengali-speaking Muslim communities. These posts, which garnered over 1.38 million views, were not produced by fringe actors but were distributed through official political channels, including the verified accounts of state cabinet ministers.38

The watershed moment in this technological escalation was the release of an AI-generated deepfake video by the Assam BJP's official X (formerly Twitter) handle, ominously titled "Assam Without BJP".39 The video abandoned traditional textual stereotyping in favor of a cinematic, dystopian hallucination. It depicted a fabricated future where Muslims have achieved total demographic dominance (falsely claiming a "90% Muslim population") and have culturally erased the Assamese identity.39 The highly produced deepfake imagery showed Muslims violently seizing indigenous land, operating public beef stalls in sacred spaces, and transforming ancient Assamese landmarks into Islamic sites.39 To politically weaponize this manufactured dystopia, the video featured deepfakes of prominent opposition leaders, including Gaurav Gogoi and Rahul Gandhi, standing alongside the Pakistani flag, explicitly insinuating an unholy, anti-national alliance designed to orchestrate the downfall of the Hindu population.38

This deployment of AI represents a profound paradigm shift in electoral manipulation. By visually manifesting the abstract concept of demographic invasion, synthetic media short-circuits rational political debate and critical thinking.1 The psychological impact of witnessing one's homeland visually desecrated in high-definition video directly stimulates tribalistic survival instincts, ensuring that voting behavior is driven entirely by communal panic and the absolute necessity of retaining the current regime for physical safety.1

Administrative Coercion: State Violence, Evictions, and Disenfranchisement

The unrelenting barrage of electoral hate speech in Assam is not merely a crisis of public discourse; it is the primary catalyst for tangible, devastating socio-political violence and systemic disenfranchisement. When state executives and constitutional authorities employ eliminationist rhetoric, the administrative apparatus invariably translates these dog whistles into aggressive state policy. The linguistic dehumanization of the minority seamlessly transitions into physical dispossession.24

The Weaponization of Land and the Garukhuti Evictions

The most direct and brutal manifestation of hate speech translating into state violence is witnessed in the targeted eviction drives against Bengali-origin Muslim farming communities. The political framing of these communities as "illegal encroachers" waging "Land Jihad" provides the necessary ideological scaffolding for mass demolitions without due process.5

The Garukhuti Agriculture Project in the Darrang district serves as a harrowing case study of this dynamic. Promoted politically as a visionary initiative to reclaim agricultural land for "indigenous" youth, the state government launched a massive, militarized eviction drive in September 2021 against Muslim farmers who had cultivated the riverine areas for decades.42 The evictions were characterized by extreme, disproportionate state violence, culminating in police opening fire on protesting civilians, resulting in the fatal shootings of Moinul Haque and Shaikh Farid.42 Fact-finding reports by civil rights groups, such as the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), highlighted that the rhetoric justifying these brutal evictions was heavily steeped in the Islamophobic narratives normalized during the preceding election campaigns.42 Following the violence, groups mobilized by local ethno-nationalist organizations demanded that the evicted Muslims be denied shelter or resettlement in any surrounding areas, utilizing the slur "Miya" to justify their total exclusion and destitution.5

Electoral Purges and the Specter of Statelessness

Concurrently, the rhetoric of the "infiltrator" operates in tandem with bureaucratic harassment aimed at political disenfranchisement. The ongoing Special Revision (SR) of electoral rolls in Assam has been deeply controversial due to the mass filing of objections under Form-7.43 Unlike routine revisions, civil society groups and opposition parties have alleged that the SR mechanism is being systematically misused by workers affiliated with the ruling party to target the citizenship status of Bengali-speaking Muslims.43

This targeted administrative purge led to the deletion of over 2.43 lakh so-called "doubtful voters" (D-voters) from the final electoral rolls published in early 2026.44 Millions of Bengali Muslims live under the constant terror that a minor spelling mismatch or a clerical error in their birthdate will not only end their voting rights but result in their classification as "foreigners," leading to their internment in the massive detention centers constructed across the state.43

The Panel of Independent International Experts (PIIE) has issued stark warnings regarding these developments. The panel concluded that the cumulative, institutionalized pattern of hate speech by the Chief Minister and state actors, combined with large-scale expulsions and demolitions, reflects the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights. The PIIE cautioned that such actions may amount to crimes against humanity, specifically persecution and forcible transfer, signaling that the rhetoric is actively preparing the ground for ethnic cleansing.46

Institutional Paralysis: The Election Commission and the Judiciary

The unfettered proliferation of hate speech during Assam's electoral cycles exposes a profound crisis of institutional accountability. Despite possessing a robust theoretical framework of constitutional morality and comprehensive penal codes designed to prevent the incitement of communal enmity, the enforcement apparatus remains paralyzed, highly selective, or willfully complicit.

The Inefficacy of the Election Commission of India (ECI)

The Election Commission of India (ECI) is constitutionally mandated under Article 324 to conduct free and fair elections. This mandate is operationalized through the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), which explicitly prohibits political parties and candidates from engaging in any activity that aggravates existing differences, creates mutual hatred, or appeals to caste or communal feelings to secure votes.47 Furthermore, Section 123(3) and Section 125 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, criminalize the promotion of enmity between classes of citizens on the grounds of religion.40

However, the ECI's response to top-tier political leadership engaging in egregious hate speech has been overwhelmingly characterized by profound inaction or superficial censure. While the Commission has occasionally demonstrated the capacity to act—such as the 72-hour campaign ban imposed on certain politicians in 2019 50, or the show-cause notice served to Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma in October 2023 for communally charged statements in Chhattisgarh 51—these interventions are wildly inconsistent and fail to act as a systemic deterrent.

During the 2024 general elections and subsequent state campaigns, opposition blocs and civil society organizations like Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) filed numerous detailed complaints against the Assam Chief Minister for delivering highly inflammatory speeches in states like Jharkhand, where he repeatedly branded Muslims as "infiltrators" threatening local demography.27 Despite these detailed submissions highlighting clear violations of the MCC and the RPA, the ECI has largely abstained from imposing significant penalties, public censures, or campaign bans on executive heads.27 The failure of the ECI to decisively penalize the architects of state-level hate campaigns renders the electoral regulatory framework functionally impotent, effectively granting impunity to those who weaponize religion for political gain.54

Judicial Oversight and the Impunity Paradigm

The Indian judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, has repeatedly voiced severe concerns regarding the normalization of hate speech. The Court has issued stern warnings to the political class, emphasizing that constitutional power must be exercised with restraint and that leaders hold a continuous obligation to uphold constitutional values and foster fraternity.56 Petitions filed by civil servants, diplomats, and intellectuals have eloquently argued that when hate speech emanates from constitutional authorities, it acquires a coercive force that shapes administrative behavior and legitimizes discriminatory governance, even in the absence of explicit incitement to violence.24

However, the translation of judicial concern into systemic accountability is severely hampered by a sluggish legal system and a highly partisan law enforcement apparatus.57 Data from the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) illustrates the deep entrenchment of this issue: recent analyses reveal that 107 sitting Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) nationwide have declared criminal cases related to hate speech against themselves, and 480 candidates with such cases have contested elections in the last five years.58 This data demonstrates that deploying communal rhetoric is not merely unpunished; it is actively rewarded with electoral success.58 When police forces operate under the direct command of the very politicians orchestrating the hate campaigns, the invocation of hate speech laws—such as Section 153A (promoting enmity) or Section 295A (outraging religious feelings) of the Indian Penal Code—becomes highly selective. These laws are frequently weaponized to persecute dissenting journalists, academics, and civil rights activists, rather than prosecuting the actual purveyors of communal hate.54

Institutional Body	Stated Mandate / Legal Framework	Practical Reality & Enforcement Failures
Election Commission (ECI)	Model Code of Conduct; Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Sec 123, 125).	Inconsistent application; failure to penalize top-tier executive leadership; issues non-binding censures that lack deterrent value.
Law Enforcement / Police	Indian Penal Code (Sec 153A, 295A) prohibiting the promotion of communal enmity.	Highly partisan application; laws often weaponized against dissidents and minorities while granting impunity to ruling party politicians.
Judiciary (Supreme Court)	Upholding Constitutional Morality and Fraternity; issuing guidelines on hate speech.	Issues strong verbal reprimands, but systemic delays and reliance on biased police investigations prevent meaningful accountability for hate crimes.
Social Media Corporations	Internal Community Standards prohibiting hate speech and incitement.	Total failure of AI moderation in regional languages (Assamese); algorithms actively amplify outrage and dangerous speech for engagement.

Grassroots Defiance: Civil Society Resistance and Counter-Narratives

In the vast vacuum left by institutional failure and administrative complicity, civil society organizations, grassroots activists, and the marginalized communities themselves have emerged as the primary, and often solitary, bulwarks against the deluge of electoral hate speech. Despite operating in a climate of intense state surveillance and intimidation, these actors continuously strive to document abuses, seek legal recourse, and construct powerful cultural counter-narratives.61

Organizations such as Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), the India Hate Lab, and the South Asia Justice Campaign have undertaken the critical, albeit highly dangerous, task of exhaustively monitoring, recording, and legally challenging hate speech events across the nation.7 By continuously filing First Information Reports (FIRs) and lodging formal, meticulously documented complaints with state electoral officers against high-profile politicians, these entities strive to create an indelible evidentiary archive of the state's descent into majoritarianism. While immediate legal victories may be scarce, this relentless documentation forces a degree of bureaucratic friction against unchecked impunity and provides crucial data for international human rights monitors.25

Simultaneously, an organic, profoundly resilient cultural resistance has galvanized within the targeted communities themselves. The "Miya Poetry" movement stands as a remarkable example of subaltern defiance in contemporary Assam.21 Emerging directly from the Bengali Muslim char-dwellers, this literary movement subversively reclaims the pejorative slur "Miya" to articulate the deep pain of historical marginalization, the terror of statelessness, and the visceral trauma inflicted by the NRC and CAA processes.21

Writing in their native, hyper-localized dialects, these poets directly challenge the state's dehumanizing narrative that portrays them as "environmental waste producers" and "parasites." Instead, they express what scholars term an "ecopolitical spirituality"—a deep, nurturing, and historical entanglement with the land, the riverine ecology of the Brahmaputra, and the flora and fauna of Assam.21 By humanizing their lived reality through art, the Miya poets construct a powerful counter-storytelling mechanism that fundamentally refuses the exclusionary, Hindutva-based territoriality of the state. They assert their rightful, dignified claim to citizenship, belonging, and humanity in a space that seeks their erasure.22

Furthermore, digital activism has carved out new spaces for civic expression in Assam, despite the severe risks of online harassment and doxing.62 Activists, including women and LGBTQ+ individuals, utilize digital platforms to build solidarity networks, raise awareness about state violence, and organize resistance against dominant caste and religious hierarchies.62 However, this digital resistance is constantly threatened by the "digital divide," which excludes rural populations, and the constant peril of state reprisal, where online dissent is frequently criminalized under the guise of maintaining public order.62

Conclusion

The mobilization of hate speech during elections in Assam is not an anomaly, a momentary lapse in political decorum, or a byproduct of passionate democratic campaigning. It is, unequivocally, a calculated, highly structured strategy engineered to consolidate political power by fundamentally fracturing the social contract. The transition from historical ethno-linguistic anxieties to a sharp, religiously motivated majoritarianism has been systematically facilitated by sweeping legislative gerrymandering—most notably the CAA—and the bureaucratic violence of the NRC. These mechanisms have collectively laid the impenetrable groundwork for the systemic othering, disenfranchisement, and persecution of Bengali-origin Muslims.

This comprehensive analysis underscores that the contemporary architecture of electoral hate relies on a lethal, symbiotic relationship between multiple actors. It requires political executives who are willing to normalize dehumanizing rhetoric and fabricate existential threats—ranging from "termites" to various "jihads"—to keep the majority in a state of perpetual panic. It requires an unregulated digital ecosystem where global social media corporations prioritize algorithmic engagement over human safety, exhibiting catastrophic failures in vernacular content moderation that allow genocidal ideation to flourish online. The advent of AI-weaponized disinformation and hyper-realistic deepfakes further accelerates this dangerous dynamic, completely bypassing rational political discourse to directly trigger visceral, communal panic among the electorate.

The consequences of this institutionalized strategy are dire and measurable in human lives and shattered communities. Rhetoric inevitably bleeds into reality, manifesting as brutal, militarized eviction drives, fatal police shootings, economic boycotts, and the looming, terrifying threat of mass statelessness and detention for millions of citizens. Concurrently, the total paralyzation of constitutional safeguards—evidenced by the Election Commission's profound reluctance to penalize top leadership and law enforcement's active complicity in weaponizing the law against minorities and dissidents—signals a severe and potentially irreversible crisis in India's democratic framework.

Addressing this escalating, existential crisis requires interventions that move far beyond mere observation and judicial reprimands. It demands the rigorous, impartial enforcement of existing electoral and penal laws against constitutional authorities, entirely free from political interference. The Election Commission must reclaim its independence and exercise its punitive powers decisively to deter hate speech at the highest executive levels. Furthermore, it necessitates urgent, binding, and internationally monitored regulatory frameworks for social media platforms to combat algorithmic amplification, enforce strict vernacular content moderation, and neutralize the threat of AI-generated deepfakes. Ultimately, restoring the democratic integrity and social harmony of Assam—and by extension, the broader Republic of India—depends entirely on dismantling the political utility of hate. Elections must revert to being contests of developmental policy, economic progress, and social welfare, rather than violent, exclusionary referendums on the survival, legitimacy, and fundamental human dignity of minority communities.

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The Horror of Nellie: India’s Forgotten Genocide and the Shadows It Casts

2025-11-28T12:47:00.003+05:30

Rabia Begum was feeding her breast to her 17-month-old daughter, sitting on a stool in the veranda of her roadside bamboo and straw hut. Her other children were playing in the small courtyard. Her husband, Chandeh Ali, was busy with some work at the back of the house. They did not even guess what was to come in the next few minutes.

Suddenly, the playing children rushed toward their mother in panic and grasped her. Already, there were hues and cries around their house. Hearing the desperate cries of his children, when Chandeh Ali entered the courtyard, he saw a group of people armed with swords, daggers, knives, tridents, and petrol. The attackers divided into three groups. One chased the running Chandeh Ali. Another set fire to the house. The third struck their weapons on the children and their mother including the one in her lap. In minutes, they were transformed into a heap of human limbs. The house became an ash-heap. And Chandeh Ali? A trident struck him from behind.

This is not a scene from a horror movie. These are words etched into the history of independent, secular, socialist, democratic India, written in the blood of more than 3,000 Bengali-speaking Muslims in remote villages around Nellie, in what was then Nagaon district (now Morigaon) in Assam, on Friday, 18 February 1983. The carnage unfolded over a mere six to seven hours, turning fields into graveyards and villages into smoldering ruins. Read about it, and be afraid. I read accounts of it and couldn’t sleep prow for months. The scenes stll haunt like personal ghosts, terrifying to the core, shaking faith in humanity itself. If we call ourselves beasts for such acts, it insults the beasts. Civilization sometimes turns wilder than the wildest savagery. Nellie reminds us of Auschwitz, Birkenau, and other earthly hells—one of the most horrendous genocides on record.

The massacre was no spontaneous outburst but a calculated eruption amid the Assam Agitation, a movement from 1979 to 1985 against alleged “illegal immigrants” from Bangladesh. It began after the 1978 death of Mangaldoi MP Hiralal Patwari, when a by-election was opposed alleging inclusions of “doubtful citizens” in electoral rolls. The All Assam Students Union (AASU) and All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) spread fears, portraying Bengali-speaking Muslims, many settled since the 1930s, as threats to Assamese culture, identity, and livelihoods. They demanded detection, deletion from voter lists, and deportation of these so-called “Bangladeshis.”

By 1983, tensions boiled over with the controversial Assembly elections. The central government under Indira Gandhi pushed forward despite AASU’s boycott calls. AASU leaders threatened dire consequences for voters, mapping minority areas. On the other side, Congress workers urged minorities to vote to prove citizenship. Reports emerged that on 14 February many in Nagaon cast votes, infuriating agitators. Plans were hatched in surrounding Assamese villages: the date fixed for February 18, the agenda—genocide to “save mother Assam.”

The attackers, drawn from Assamese chauvinist groups linked to AASU and AAGSP, along with Tiwa (Lalung) tribals, descended on 14 villages: Alisingha, Khulapathar, Basundhari, Borjula, Butuni, Indurmari, Mati Parbat, Muladhari, Silbheta, Borburi, and others. They blocked escapes, burned homes, and slaughtered indiscriminately— women, children, elders unable to flee. Eyewitnesses later identified perpetrators from nearby villages, yet myths persisted that it was solely tribal handiwork, absolving Assamese nationalists.

Investigative works, such as Diganta Sharma’s 2007 book ‘Nellie, 1983: Asom Andolonor Borborotom Gonohatyar Postmortem Report’, strip away these falsehoods through painstaking documentation. Sharma, then a young reporter for the Assamese weekly Sadin, exposed AASU’s direct involvement, reproducing a Janakranti report from April 17, 1983, where Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia claimed AASU branches issued orders to attack minority areas. President Nurul Hussain denied it, blaming government agents. But Sharma’s evidence points to chauvinist orchestration.

Worse, the police facilitated the horror. A wireless message from Nagaon Police Station’s officer-in-charge, Jahiruddin Ahmed, on 15 February warned of 1,000 armed Assamese assembling near Nellie, with minorities in panic. No action followed. Instead, local police diverted Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) patrols, claiming no trouble— even as smoke rose from burning villages. The National Police Commission’s report on communal riots noted officers shunning responsibility, avoiding scenes or slipping away. In Nellie, they acted in favor of the carnage, enjoying it from afar.

One survivor, Nur Jamal Bhuiyan, filed an FIR identifying 13 attackers who burned his home and killed 12 family members. A charge sheet under sections 147, 148, 326, 379, 436, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code followed. 10 Overall, 688 cases arose from Jagi Road Police Station; 318 closed for “no evidence,” 310 charge-sheeted. But when Asom Gana Parishad (AGP)— AASU’s political wing— took power in 1985 via the Assam Accord, all cases dropped. The Accord ended the agitation but granted impunity, swimming over the blood of over 3,000 in Nellie, hundreds elsewhere, and even 500 AASU workers.

The death toll varies: official figures cite 1,811 in Nagaon (including Nellie), part of 3,023 statewide from January to April 1983, per the Tewary Commission. Locals and witnesses insist on 2,000–3,000 in Nellie alone, mostly children and women. No ex-gratia payments, no rehabilitation. The report was tabled in 1987 in the Assam legislative assembly by the AGP government. However, only one copy was provided to the Assembly Speaker at that time, with no wider distribution to legislators or the public, effectively keeping it suppressed for decades.

Now on 25 November 2025, the Assam Assembly tabled two reports: the official Tewary Commission, focusing on Nellie and rejecting election blame while noting pre-existing foreigner and language tensions; and the unofficial Mehta Commission, by agitation groups, attributing violence to forced polls without roll revisions. Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma highlighted the contrasts for political mileage, but survivors question if this brings justice.

Victims, traumatized for decades, now awaken. They ask: Why, in 42 years, couldn’t nationalists prove us “Bangladeshi”? Even now, if proven, we’ll leave. But the haunting persists. Diganta Sharma’s work compares Assamese chauvinism to Lady Macbeth: “A little water clears us of this deed” before exposure; after, “All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten these little hands.”

Nellie was India’s great shame, precursor to Delhi 1984, Mumbai 1993, Gujarat 2002. What horrors lurk next? Read about it. Be ashamed. Be afraid. Be haunted. And act— for justice, nothing less, to wash the blood from our hands.

Islam and Music: Myth Vs. Reality

2025-11-12T21:29:00.004+05:30

Feeding from and into the popular misconceptions about the place of music in Islam and Muslim society, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma recently has claimed that Islam prohibits music and song. This claim is false. It relies on narrow views. It ignores the full history of Islam. It overlooks diverse traditions in the faith. Music has deep roots in Islamic culture. It serves spiritual and social roles. It connects the soul to the Divine for those who pursue spirituality.

The Quran has no verse that bans music. It mentions instruments like the lute and flute in positive ways. For example, in Surah An-Najm, it speaks of a “melodious voice” from heaven. The Prophet Muhammad did not forbid music outright. He allowed it in joyful settings. At weddings, he let girls sing songs of praise. They used the daff, a simple frame drum. He listened and smiled. He said such songs bring happiness. This shows music can uplift the heart, according to Islam. It goes with faith when it avoids excess or lewdness. He even joined in clapping to rhythms during battles to boost morale. His example set a tone of balance. Music was not a threat but a gift.

Some hadith texts suggest bans on music. These are weak or disputed. Many trace back to one companion, Umar ibn al-Khattab. Umar was the second caliph. He valued strict discipline. He saw music as a distraction from prayer. During Hajj, he whipped singers in the streets. He feared it led to idleness. As ruler, he banned string instruments in Medina. He removed lutes from markets. He ordered patrols to enforce quiet. But these were his decisions. They came from his time of war and hardship. The Prophet never issued such a broad ban. Other scholars later relaxed these rules. They saw Umar’s views as personal, not binding. Ijma, or consensus, allows music for good purposes. Later jurists like Al-Ghazali weighed in. They permitted it if it stirs piety.

Many of the Prophet’s companions embraced music. They saw it as part of life. Aisha, his beloved wife, loved songs. She invited girls to sing and dance in her home. The Prophet watched with joy. He called it a mercy. She later defended music against critics. Abu Bakr, the first caliph, recited poetry with a tune. He used melody to teach Quran verses. His voice carried emotion in lessons. Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth caliph, wrote verses himself. He praised “nasheeds” with rhythm. These are devotional songs. He said they soften the heart for truth. Ibn Abbas, a great scholar, defended music that stirs love for God. He said songs like those of Bilal, the first muezzin, touch the soul. Bilal’s call to prayer was a melody itself. Even Umar softened at times. He permitted the daff during Eid festivals. He allowed women to sing at home. He joined in cheers at victories. This variety proves no single ban exists. Companions balanced joy and piety. Their lives show music as a bridge to God.

Sufi music began in early Islamic times. It started in the 8th and 9th centuries. Places like Basra in Iraq and Nishapur in Persia were key. Sufism grew as a mystical path. It sought direct union with God. Early Sufis faced criticism from rulers. They turned to music for inner peace. Rabia al-Basri, a woman saint from the 8th century, used chants in her prayers. She sang of divine love. Her poems became songs. She cried out in verse, “I carry You in my heart.” These words echoed in gatherings. Later, Al-Hallaj in the 9th century faced death for his ecstatic verses. These were set to tunes. He shouted “Ana al-Haqq” in rapture. His story inspired singers. The term sama means “listening.” It refers to spiritual concerts. Sufis used voice and simple tools. The ney flute symbolized the soul’s longing. It wails like a reed separated from its root. The daff drum marked rhythms of the heart. This music blended with local arts. It drew from Arab poetry and Persian modes. It evolved from desert chants to courtly airs.

Ibn Arabi added profound depth to this tradition. Born in 1165 in Murcia, Spain, he was a towering Sufi mystic. He traveled widely, from Andalusia to Mecca. His writings shaped Sufi thought on love and unity. In Tarjuman al-Ashwaq, his 13th-century poetry collection, he expressed divine romance. These ghazals pulse with passion. They describe God as the Beloved. Lines like “My heart holds every faith” became anthems. Sufis set them to melody in sama sessions. His verses fueled ecstatic dances. In Fusus al-Hikam, he linked music to cosmology. He saw tones as mirrors of divine names. Each note reveals wahdat al-wujud, the unity of being. Ibn Arabi attended sama in Damascus. He defended it against foes. He said music unveils the heart’s secrets. Like a veil lifted, it shows truth. His influence spread through disciples. Orders like the Shadhili adopted his poems. Singers in Fez and Cairo chant them today. Ibn Arabi’s work made music a path to gnosis. It turned songs into ladders to heaven.

Sufi orders helped spread this music far and wide. Each tariqa, or order, added its style. The Chishti order reached India in the 12th century. It flowered under Nizamuddin Auliya in Delhi. His disciple Amir Khusrau invented new forms. In the 13th century, he mixed Persian scales with Indian ragas. He created qawwali, a call-and-response style. Singers repeat Allah’s names in trance. Drums build to crescendos. Today, qawwali echoes at Ajmer and Nizamuddin’s shrines. Thousands gather yearly. They sway in unity. The Naqshbandi order took silent dhikr with melody to Central Asia. In Bukhara, they used soft chants. It spread to Turkey under Ottoman rule. There, it entered palace halls. Sultans hosted concerts with ney masters.

The Mevlevi order, founded by Rumi’s followers, made whirling dances famous. In 13th-century Konya, Anatolia, dervishes spun to ney and drum. This sema ritual seeks fana, or annihilation in God. Rumi’s Masnavi verses drive the spin. It influenced art and poetry across Europe. Bells on skirts chime like prayers. In North Africa, Sufi music fused with Berber traditions. The Gnawa brotherhood in Morocco started in the 16th century. Slaves from sub-Saharan lands brought it. They use the guembri, a three-string lute. Their lila ceremonies heal through possession and song. Castanets clap in frenzy. In East Africa, the Taarab style arose in Zanzibar. From the 19th century, it mixed Arabic ud lute with Swahili lyrics. Sultan Barghash patronized it. It spread to Kenya and Tanzania coasts. Ensembles play at weddings. Lyrics tell of longing and fate.

Ibn Khaldun offers deep insight. He was a 14th-century Tunisian scholar. In his Muqaddimah, he treats music as a science. He places it under math and physics. He explains tones through ratios. A string’s length halves for an octave. This echoes Greek ideas like Pythagoras. He studies modes, or maqams. Arab bayati mode brings sadness. It softens the spirit. Hijaz mode stirs passion. It awakens zeal. He links music to society. Bedouins sang simple chants for camels. These kept herds calm. Cities developed complex orchestras. Flutes and ouds filled bazaars. Courts in Baghdad used it for feasts. It boosted soldiers’ morale. Caliphs rewarded composers.

Khaldun sees music’s power on the soul. It moves humors in the body. It can lead to ecstasy, like Sufi trances. Or it brings calm reflection. A slow tune heals grief. He warns of excess. Drunken songs corrupt. They lead to sin. But pure music ennobles. It refines character. He says bans come from culture, not faith. Rural tribes shun it for hardship. They focus on survival. Urban folk embrace it. They seek beauty. His work influenced later thinkers. It shows Islam values knowledge of arts. From theory to practice, it honors creation.

Islamic music in Bengal and Assam came through Sufi paths. It blends faith with local rhythms. Fakiri songs echo in Bengal’s villages. Marfati verses praise the Prophet there. Zikir chants rise in Assam’s hills. These forms draw from early Sufis. They unite hearts across borders. They turn melody into prayer.

Bengal’s Islamic music roots in the 13th century. Sufi saints arrived with Delhi’s sultans. They settled in deltas and dooars. Places like Sylhet and Chittagong became hubs. Fakirs wandered as mendicants. They sang to spread the message of Islam, God’s oneness. Local boatmen and farmers joined. Drums and flutes mixed with calls to God. This created a gentle sound. It soothed souls amid floods and harvests.

Fakiri songs form the core. They live simply, like the Prophet. These songs started in the 15th century. Haji Bayazid Bistami’s followers inspired them. But Bengal’s own Lalon Shah, in the 18th century, shaped them deep. Sylhet’ Hason Raja made huge contribution to this tradition. Rabindranath Tagore was mesmerised by them. Though syncretic, their tunes carry Islamic fire. Fakiri lyrics speak of inner jihad. They urge leaving ego for divine love. Singers use ektara, a one-string lute. It plucks like a heartbeat. The dotara adds strings for depth. Voices rise in call and response. Groups sit in akharas and khanqas, open halls. They sway under banyan trees. A lead singer starts: “Fakir is he who finds the Friend.” Others echo back. This builds trance. Fakiri spread to markets and courts. Mughal nawabs in Murshidabad hosted them. Today, in Bangladesh’s Kushtia, annual fairs draw thousands. Artists like Purna Das Baul keep it alive. But pure Fakiri stays in mosques. It teaches humility through hum.

Marfati songs honor the Prophet Muhammad. They arose in the 17th century. Shah Jalal’s descendants in Sylhet penned early ones. Abdul Karim Shah, a 19th-century poet, mastered them. He wrote in simple Bengali. His lines flow like river currents. Singers use mandira cymbals. These ring like stars. The sarinda bow scrapes soulful notes. Groups perform at milads, birthday gatherings. Women veil and join softly. Men beat dobs, clay drums. A verse goes: “Light of lights, you guide the lost.” It stirs tears and joy. Marfati crossed to India after 1947. In West Bengal’s Murshidabad, they fill Eid nights. Radios once aired them. Now apps stream live. Scholars like Muhammad Enamul Haq studied them. He called them bridges to Sunnah. They keep the Prophet close. In daily life, they calm feuds. A Marfati shared heals rifts.

Assam’s Zikir ties to Bengal’s flow. But it grows wild in tea gardens and valleys. Zikir means remembrance. It chants Allah’s names. Sufis brought it in the 16th century. Sayyid Shah Milan, from Baghdad, settled in Goalpara. His order, the Milani, fused Zikir with Bodo beats. Early Zikirs were silent. Then melody entered. In the 18th century, under Ahom kings, it spread. Muslims in Kamrup hid in forests. They sang low to avoid raids. Zikir uses dotara too. But Assam adds bamboo flutes. These whistle like winds in Brahmaputra. Groups form majlis in madrasas. They sit cross-legged. A pir leads: “La ilaha illallah.” Drums pulse slow. Breath deepens. Hands clap in unison. This seeks fana, loss in God. Women have separate circles. They hum softly. Zikir nights last till dawn. In Barpeta’s sattras, it blends with Vaishnava chants. Pir of Baghbar’s tomb hosts yearly urs. Pilgrims from Manipur join. Thousands circle in ecstasy.

These traditions link Bengal and Assam. Rivers carry songs downstream. Traders swap tunes at haats, markets. Sufi pirs marry across lines. Fakiri influences Zikir rhythms. Marfati verses enter Assamese madrasas. In 20th century, partitions split them. Yet radio united. All India Radio aired Fakiri in 1950s. Assam’s AIR Guwahati broadcast Zikir. Now, YouTube revives. Young singers like Zahid Khan mix them with folk. Festivals like Beshakh in Sylhet draw crowds. Assam’s Ali Ai Ligiri fair echoes Marfati.

Figures like Haji Mohammad Fakir shaped Bengal’s sound. In 19th century Kushtia, he wandered with ektara. His songs warned of worldly traps. “Fakir begs not bread, but sight of Him.” Disciples spread them to Dhaka. In Assam, Gias Uddin Ahmed wrote Zikir poems. His 20th-century works use local words. They praise the Prophet in Kamrupi dialect. Scholars analyze them. Enamul Haq’s books trace roots. He links to Persian sama. But local soil makes them unique.

Sufi music reached the West too. In the 20th century, Inayat Khan took it to Europe. He founded Sufi centers in London. He taught universal harmony through ragas. Artists like Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan globalized qawwali. His 1980s tours filled stadiums in the US and UK. His voice soared over tablas. Abida Parveen sings in Urdu and Punjabi. Her voice carries Sufi fire. She wails of separation from God. Modern fusions blend it with jazz or rock. Peter Gabriel collaborated on tracks. Festivals like Fez in Morocco draw crowds. Pakistan’s Data Ganj Bakhsh urs features all-night sama. Voices rise in chorus. This shows music’s living role. It unites Muslims across borders. It counters isolation. It adapts yet stays pure.

Challenges face these arts. Urban youth chase Bollywood. Mosques ban instruments sometimes. Like Umar’s old rigor. But resilience holds. NGOs teach Fakiri in schools. Bangladesh’s folk academy revives Marfati. Assam’s cultural boards fund Zikir troupes. Global diaspora sings them in London. They keep roots alive.

Islamic music in Bengal and Assam whispers eternity. Fakiri humbles. Marfati exalts. Zikir remembers. They join heart and rhythm. From deltas to hills, they draw to the Divine. True faith sings what silences fear. It unites in melody.

Sarma’s claim misses this rich story. It paints Islam as rigid. Yet music builds community. It teaches tawhid, God’s oneness. From prophetic homes to global stages, it joins heart and rhythm. Islam celebrates what draws the believers to the Divine. Bans serve fear, not faith. They divide. Music unites. It echoes eternity.

"Muslim threat": facts and figures

2025-10-13T18:54:00.002+05:30

In recent years, especially during election campaigns and on social media, leaders from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have repeatedly claimed that India's Muslim population is growing at an alarming rate, threatening to outnumber Hindus and destabilize the country. For instance, in October 2025, Union Home Minister Amit Shah stated during a rally that the Muslim population has risen to 24.6 percent due to infiltration from Bangladesh and Pakistan, while the Hindu share has dropped, framing it as a direct threat to national security. RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat has echoed this, alleging "planned efforts" since the 1930s to increase Muslim numbers through conversions, infiltration, and foreign funding, calling for a uniform population policy to maintain "balance." A 2024 working paper from the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council was seized upon by BJP spokespersons like Amit Malviya, who warned on social media that Muslims' share grew 43 percent from 1950 to 2015, suggesting a conspiracy under opposition rule that could leave "no country for Hindus." These assertions, often amplified in Bihar's 2025 assembly polls where Muslims in regions like Seemanchal are labeled "Bangladeshi infiltrators," are not new—they stem from the RSS's founding ideology in 1925, which has long portrayed Muslims as outsiders intent on demographic dominance to undermine Hindu society. But a closer look at census data, fertility trends, independent studies, and even judicial scrutiny reveals these claims as baseless propaganda, designed more to polarize voters than reflect reality.

The core of this narrative rests on selective statistics that ignore context and trends. India's 2011 Census, the most recent full count before the 2021 exercise delayed to 2025-26, shows Muslims at 14.2 percent of the population, or about 172 million, with Hindus at 79.8 percent. Projections for 2025 estimate Muslims at around 200-230 million, still 14-15 percent of India's 1.45 billion total, far from Shah's inflated 24.6 percent figure, which appears to misuse outdated or unadjusted decadal growth rates without accounting for base effects. The EAC paper, titled "Share of Religious Minorities: A Cross-Country Analysis (1950-2015)," has been widely criticized for fueling this myth. It reports a 7.82 percent decline in Hindus' share (from 84.68 to 78.06 percent) and a 43.15 percent rise in Muslims' (from 9.84 to 14.09 percent), but experts like the Population Foundation of India called these "misreported" and "misleading," noting the paper uses relative percentage changes in shares, not absolute growth, exaggerating shifts in a growing population. As demographer Poonam Muttreja explained, the absolute increase was modest— Muslims added 4.25 percentage points over 65 years— consistent with global trends where minorities grow proportionally in diverse societies, not evidence of a "population jihad." The Hindu's editorial dubbed it "clickbait," pointing out how it ignores fertility convergence and was timed amid 2024 elections to stoke communal fears. Al Jazeera's analysis labeled it a "half-truth" that revives unfounded conspiracy theories, especially since the paper's own data shows India's changes align with tolerant democracies, not authoritarian regimes where majorities suppress minorities.

Digging into fertility rates dismantles the "breeding threat" trope even further. The National Family Health Survey-5 (2019-21) records Muslim total fertility at 2.36 children per woman, down from 4.41 in 1992-93— a 46 percent drop— compared to Hindus' 1.94 from 3.3, a 41 percent decline. Muslims have seen the steepest fall among all groups, with Christians at 1.88, Sikhs at 1.61, and Jains at 1.6. A 2024 India Forum study confirms rapid convergence across socio-religious lines, driven by education, urbanization, and women's empowerment, not religion. Pew Research's 2021 report, based on NFHS and census data, notes Muslims' higher baseline stems from socioeconomic factors like lower literacy (68.5 percent vs. Hindus' 73.3 percent) and poverty, but rates are equalizing; by 2050, Muslims are projected at 18 percent (310 million), Hindus at 77 percent (1.2 billion), with overall population stabilizing below replacement level (2.1). Former Election Commissioner S.Y. Quraishi's 2021 book "The Population Myth" crunches decades of data to show Muslims' growth rate slowing faster (from 32.9 percent in 1981-91 to 24.6 in 2001-11) than Hindus' (22.7 to 16.8), debunking polygamy claims— it's rarer among Muslims (1.9 percent) than Hindus (5.8 percent)— and attributing differences to development gaps, not intent. A 2024 IDR article highlights how misinformation ignores regional variations: southern states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu have sub-2.0 TFR across faiths, while northern ones like Bihar lag for all, proving economics, not faith, drives births. Even Bangladesh, often cited as a source of "infiltrators," has a TFR of 2.0, undercutting migration-driven explosion theories.

Assam serves as a prime example where this propaganda takes root, blending border fears with religious bias. Historical census tables from 1911-71 reveal no disproportionate Muslim surge. As detailed in Susanta Krishna Dass's paper "Immigration and Demographic Transformation of Assam, 1891-1981," published in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 15, No. 19 (May 10, 1980), pp. 850-859, Table 9 in the paper shows Assam's Muslim share rising modestly from 25.09 percent in 1951 to 25.96 in 1971, while Hindus went from 65.09 to 67.88 percent. In 1961-71, Muslims actually declined by 0.74 percentage points, Hindus gained 1.18, and Christians 0.18—contrasting India's national trend where Hindu share fell 0.78 points and Muslim rose 0.50. Table 10 in Dass (1980) compares Assam to India: Muslim growth lagged nationally, with lower variation rates. These figures account for territorial changes—Sylhet's 1947 partition removed a Muslim-majority area, and later splits of Nagaland, Meghalaya, and Mizoram shifted Christian populations—explaining apparent swells without infiltration. Dass's analysis in the paper finds Assam's post-1951 growth outpaced India's due to natural increases, Hindu refugees from East Pakistan, and internal migration, not Bangladeshi Muslims. Post-1947 inflows were mostly Bengali Hindus fleeing violence, not Muslims. Dass tested the assimilation hypothesis: if Muslim infiltrators adopted Assamese, both Muslim and Assamese-speaking shares should spike. They didn't— Assamese speakers grew normally, Muslim rates paralleled Hindus'. "Apprehensions about infiltration... are not supported by facts," he concluded in the paper, corroborated by the tables showing Muslim increases never exceeding Hindus' except in 1911-31's economic migration era. Recent studies echo this: a 2024 Hindu op-ed dispels EAC-triggered myths, noting Assam's adjusted data shows stable ratios, with no evidence of post-1971 floods. South Asia Monitor's 2022 analysis calls the "explosion" a myth, as Muslims' decadal growth has halved since 1981, aligning with national declines.

This distortion extends to the judiciary, where RSS influence has shaped outcomes only to be later corrected. In the 2005 Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India (2005 (5) SCC 665) case, the Supreme Court struck down the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 (IMDT), which placed the burden on accusers to prove illegal migration in Assam's sensitive context. The judgment heavily relied on a 1998 report by Governor S.K. Sinha, an RSS-affiliated ex-army officer who claimed 5,000-10,000 monthly Muslim infiltrators posed "external aggression" under Article 355 of the Constitution of India, equating them to invaders worse than China's. Sinha's report, criticized as "spurious" for lacking data and relying on anecdotes, ignored Dass's findings and exaggerated threats to justify harsh measures. The Court, invoking Sinha uncritically, shifted proof to the accused under the Foreigners Act, 1946, enabling arbitrary detentions. But in October 2024's ruling on challenges to Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955—inserted via the 1985 Assam Accord to grant citizenship to pre-1971 migrants while deporting later ones— a 4:1 Supreme Court bench upheld it [Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, In Re, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2880, decided on 17-10-2024] dismissing Sonowal's infiltration rhetoric as non-binding "obiter dicta," not core "ratio decidendi." CJI D.Y. Chandrachud's majority opinion emphasized Parliament's Article 11 powers for such exceptions, noting Assam's higher migrant ratio but no proven cultural or demographic overrun. Justice Surya Kant added that post-Accord mechanisms like NRC have addressed concerns without evidence of ongoing aggression. Dissenting Justice Pardiwala worried about unchecked influx, but the verdict exposed Sonowal's flaws: Sinha's bias, unverified claims, and overreach. This reversal highlights how propaganda infiltrates institutions— Sinha's RSS ties, including praise for founders like Hedgewar, tainted his "report," yet it swayed a bench amid rising Hindutva tides.

Ultimately, this RSS-BJP campaign exposes a calculated strategy to "other" Muslims, rooted in the Sangh's 1925 origins amid colonial communalism. Studies like a 2022 Wire fact-check trace it to debunked myths of "population imbalance," revived via fake news despite data showing stability. Policies like CAA-NRC exclude Muslims from citizenship register, codifying bias, while ignoring real issues: India's TFR at 2.0 risks aging crises by 2040, with 200 million stunted children and unemployment demanding focus over division. In Assam, it sparked 1983's Nellie massacre (2,000 dead) and 2012 riots, turning economic migrants into scapegoats. Nationally, it distracts from governance failures, as CFR notes worsening discrimination under BJP. Facts from Pew, NFHS, and courts refute the explosion—growth is natural, converging, and non-threatening. The real aggression? Propaganda that erodes India's secular weave for electoral gains. As Quraishi argues, addressing development closes gaps; fearmongering only widens them.

Table 9 and Table 10 from "Immigration and Demographic Transformation of Assam, 1891-1981," published in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 15, No. 19 (May 10, 1980), pp. 850-859.

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[49] India election results: Did ‘secular’ parties let Muslims down, too? - https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/5/india-election-results-did-secular-parties-let-down-muslims-too (Published: Jun 5, 2024)

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[95] The myth and truth about Muslim ‘population explosion’ in India - https://www.southasiamonitor.org/spotlight/myth-and-truth-about-muslim-population-explosion-india (Published: Nov 16, 2022)

[96] The population myth, prejudice and dangers of a misguided policy - https://www.southasiamonitor.org/perspective/population-myth-prejudice-and-dangers-misguided-policy (Published: Oct 19, 2022)

[97] Has India’s Muslim population really exploded? - Al Jazeera - https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/18/has-indias-muslim-population-really-exploded (Published: May 18, 2024)

[98] Muslim World-Wide Population Explosion - A Myth - New Age Islam - https://www.newageislam.com/islamic-society/dr-mih-farooqi-new-age-islam/muslim-world-wide-population-explosion-myth/d/131624 (Published: Jan 30, 2024)

[99] Debunking the Myth: Muslim Population Growth Is Driven by Birth … - https://voxdivini.in/2025/08/31/debunking-the-myth-muslim-population-growth-is-driven-by-birth-rates-not-mass-conversions/ (Published: Aug 31, 2025)

[100] [PDF] Sarbananda Sonowal vs Union Of India & Anr on 12 July, 2005 - http://www.mcrg.ac.in/RLS_Migration_2019/Readings_MODULE_F/Sarbananda%2520Sonowal%2520vs%2520UoI.PDF

[101] Sarbananda Sonowal (Ii) v. Union Of India . | Judgment | Law - https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae31e4b0149711413215

[102] Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India - Refworld - https://www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/indsc/2006/en/96293 (Published: Dec 5, 2006)

[103] [PDF] SECTION 6A OF THE CITIZENSHIP - Supreme Court Observer - https://www.scobserver.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Judgement-upholding-Section-6A-of-the-Citizenship-Act-Assam-Accord.pdf (Published: Oct 17, 2024)

[104] Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India - Quimbee - https://www.quimbee.com/cases/sarbananda-sonowal-v-union-of-india

[105] Illegal Migration into Assam - https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/documents/papers/illegal_migration_in_assam.htm

[106] [PDF] Bangladeshi Illegal Migration into Assam - https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/137432/IB_BangladeshiIllegalMigrationintoAssam.pdf (Published: Jan 11, 2010)

[107] Ex-Assam guv SK Sinha’s report on illegal immigration in state is … - https://www.firstpost.com/india/ex-assam-guv-sk-sinhas-report-on-illegal-immigration-in-state-is-riddled-with-contradictions-dubious-data-7057761.html (Published: Jul 29, 2019)

[108] [PDF] Illegal Bangladeshi Migration into Assam - SAS Publishers - https://saspublishers.com/article/13363/download/ (Published: Oct 30, 2017)

[109] IMDT (Assam) Judgement Violative of HumanRights Norms - https://oldwebsite.iosworld.org/IMDT%2520%28Assam%29%2520Judgement%2520Violative%2520of%2520Human%2520Rights%2520Norms.htm

[110] Section 6A of the Citizenship Act | Judgement Summary - https://www.scobserver.in/reports/section-6a-of-the-citizenship-act-judgement-summary/ (Published: Oct 19, 2024)

[111] [PDF] SECTION 6A OF THE CITIZENSHIP - Supreme Court of India - https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2009/16113/16113_2009_1_1501_56604_Judgement_17-Oct-2024.pdf (Published: Oct 17, 2024)

[112] Section 6A of Citizenship Act | Five-judge bench upholds … - https://www.scobserver.in/reports/supreme-court-upholds-constitutionality-of-section-6a-of-the-citizenship-act-judgement-pronouncement-constitution-bench-in-re-section-6a-of-citizenship-act/ (Published: Oct 17, 2024)

[113] [PDF] SECTION 6A OF THE CITIZENSHIP ACT, 1955 - https://statelessnessandcitizenshipreview.com/index.php/journal/article/download/727/439/

[114] In Re Section 6A of the Citizenship Act: Supreme Court Verdict - https://www.dhyeyalaw.in/in-re-section-6a-of-the-citizenship-act

[115] Fact-Check: Mohan Bhagwat’s ‘Religion-Based Imbalance’ Theory … - https://thewire.in/communalism/fact-check-mohan-bhagwats-religion-based-imbalance-theory-and-indias-population-growth (Published: Oct 5, 2022)

[116] Demographic myth about the Muslim Population in India - Islamonweb - https://en.islamonweb.net/demographic-myth-about-the-muslim-population-in-india (Published: May 20, 2024)

[117] The myth of India’s Muslim population ’explosion - ToppersNotes - https://toppersnotes.co/current-affairs/blog/the-myth-of-indias-muslim-population-explosion-LRkj (Published: Jun 27, 2024)

[118] Fact vs fiction: National Family Health Survey busts some myths … - https://theprint.in/india/fact-vs-fiction-national-family-health-survey-busts-some-myths-about-muslims-in-india/966513/ (Published: May 23, 2022)

[119] Busting myths about India’s population growth - IDR - https://idronline.org/article/ecosystem-development/addressing-misinformation-on-indias-population-growth/ (Published: Aug 14, 2024)

[120] [PDF] India’s Demography at 2040: Planning Public Good Provision for the … - https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2019-20/economicsurvey/doc/vol1chapter/echap07_vol1.pdf

[121] India’s birth crisis: What the Lancet forecast of fertility rate dip to 1.29 … - https://indianexpress.com/article/health-wellness/indias-birth-crisis-lancet-forecast-fertility-rate-dip-2050-9227759/ (Published: Mar 22, 2024)

[122] India’s Demography at 2040 : Planning Public Good Provision … - PIB - https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1577022 (Published: Jul 4, 2019)

[123] INDIA’S FALLING FERTILITY RATE: A WAKE-UP CALL - Lukmaan IAS - https://blog.lukmaanias.com/2024/04/01/indias-falling-fertility-rate-a-wake-up-call/ (Published: Apr 1, 2024)

[124] Prospective Changes in the Age Structure of India’s Population - https://www.theindiaforum.in/society/prospective-changes-age-structure-indias-population-regional-dimension (Published: Jul 15, 2024)

[125] BBC Audio | Witness History | The Nellie massacre - https://www.bbc.com/audio/play/w3ct5ynq (Published: Feb 25, 2025)

[126] Forgetting Nellie: Forty two years and counting - Genocide Watch - https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/forgetting-nellie-forty-two-years-and-counting (Published: Mar 7, 2025)

[127] The Nellie massacre of 1983: agency of rioters, by Makiko Kimura - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14631369.2014.880592

[128] Category:Nellie massacre - Wikipedia - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Nellie_massacre

[129] The Nellie massacre of 1983 : agency of rioters - https://search.tcsedsystem.edu/discovery/fulldisplay/alma991000382319406756/01TCSEDSYSTEM_INST:KSCOM

[130] India’s Muslims: An Increasingly Marginalized Population - https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/india-muslims-marginalized-population-bjp-modi

[131] India: Government Policies, Actions Target Minorities - https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/19/india-government-policies-actions-target-minorities (Published: Feb 19, 2021)

[132] A history of the marginalization of India’s Muslim population - PBS - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-history-of-the-marginalization-of-indias-muslim-population (Published: Apr 28, 2024)

[133] India: Religious Freedom Issues - Congress.gov - https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45303 (Published: Nov 13, 2024)

[134] Human rights in India - Amnesty International - https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india/report-india/

[135] 2012 Assam violence - Wikipedia - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Assam_violence

[136] Understanding the Historical Conflicts Behind Today’s Violence in … - https://www.americanprogress.org/article/understanding-the-historical-conflicts-behind-todays-violence-in-assam/ (Published: Aug 29, 2012)

[137] In Pictures: Violence erupts in Assam | Gallery - Al Jazeera - https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2012/8/15/in-pictures-violence-erupts-in-assam (Published: Aug 15, 2012)

[138] What lies behind Assam violence? - BBC News - https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-18993905 (Published: Jul 26, 2012)

[139] Communal violence – DW – 07/26/2012 - https://www.dw.com/en/refugees-continue-to-flee-indias-troubled-assam-state/a-16125641 (Published: Jul 26, 2012)

India's hunger, anger and distraction

2025-10-13T18:01:00.001+05:30

India is going through some of the toughest times in its recent history. The gap between the rich and the poor is growing, and millions of people are struggling just to survive. More than 234 million Indians live in extreme poverty, which is about 16% of the population. These are people who often cannot afford even one full meal a day. Hunger is widespread and dangerous, especially for children. According to the Global Hunger Index 2024, India ranks 105th out of 127 countries, with a score of 27.3 that places it in the “serious” category. Children suffer the most. Around 35.5% of children are stunted, meaning they are too short for their age due to poor nutrition. Another 18.7% are wasted, which shows they are dangerously underweight. This kind of malnutrition affects their health, learning ability, and chances of living a healthy life.

At the same time, young people in India are struggling to find jobs. Even those who have college degrees are sitting at home, unable to earn a living. Nearly 20% of graduates are unemployed. There are very few opportunities, especially in rural areas. The jobs that are available often pay too little or involve hard labour under unsafe conditions. The government talks a lot about economic growth, but most of the benefits go to big companies and the ultra-rich. Poor and middle-class families see no improvement in their lives. Many small businesses are suffering, and there is not enough support for rural employment. The focus of the government appears to be on helping large corporations rather than solving everyday problems faced by ordinary people.

Healthcare is another serious concern. Public hospitals are underfunded, overcrowded, and lacking in staff and equipment. For poor families, going to a private hospital is not even an option because of the high cost. Medicines are expensive, and treatment delays are common. The same story repeats in education. Many families cannot afford to send their children to school, especially girls. In rural areas, schools often do not have enough teachers, proper toilets, or even drinking water. Without education and healthcare, people remain stuck in poverty from one generation to the next.

Women in India face constant threats to their safety. The Women’s Safety Index 2024 ranks India 71st out of 146 countries, showing how unsafe women feel. Cases of sexual assault and harassment are reported daily, and many more go unreported out of fear or shame. Even when women speak up, justice is delayed or denied. The Global Gender Gap Index 2024 ranks India at 129th out of 146, pointing to deep inequality in jobs, wages, education, and political participation. Women are expected to stay silent, sacrifice their ambitions, and live within narrow roles set by society.

Caste-based discrimination is still alive, even decades after it was outlawed. Dalits, who have faced untouchability for generations, are still denied land, education, and respect. They are attacked for small things like trying to draw water from a common well or entering temples. Dalit women face even more violence, as they are targeted for both their caste and gender. Adivasis too suffer silently in far-off villages, often displaced from their lands for mining or big projects, without proper compensation or rehabilitation. Despite having laws to protect them, these communities continue to face injustice while the government turns a blind eye.

The justice system, which is supposed to protect people, is often unfair and broken. India ranks 79th out of 142 countries in the Rule of Law Index 2024. This means the laws are not applied equally, and many powerful people escape punishment while the poor are jailed for minor offenses. Corruption is everywhere—from getting a hospital bed to getting a job. India’s position on the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024 is 93rd out of 180 countries, showing how deeply corruption has rooted itself into public life. People lose trust in the system when they see that only the rich and well-connected get what they want, while others are forced to struggle.

Frustration is rising. People are angry and tired of poverty, crime, joblessness, and lack of basic services. But instead of questioning the government or holding leaders accountable, this anger is often misdirected. It turns against minorities, especially Muslims and Christians. This shift is not accidental. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) often uses religious nationalism to distract from its failures. Policies like the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) have singled out Muslims, making them feel like outsiders in their own country. Recent amendments to Waqf law are also perceive as targeting Muslims. Hate speeches by political figures go unpunished. The idea of a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu Nation) is promoted to create division and win votes, while real issues like hunger and jobs are ignored.

This misdirected anger leads to violence. After the Pahalgam terror attack on 22 April 2025, where 26 Hindu tourists were killed, there was a wave of attacks—not against the terrorists—but against innocent Muslim civilians. In Pulwama’s Tahab village, army personnel reportedly assaulted Muslim and Pandit families in the middle of the night, vandalized their homes, and terrorized women and children. People from all communities in the village came out to protest, demanding the removal of the army camp responsible for the violence. Across India, Kashmiri Muslims faced harassment and discrimination. Students were beaten, vendors were driven out of cities, and social media was flooded with hate speech. None of these people had anything to do with the attack, but they were made scapegoats. The government failed to protect them or speak out against the hate. This is just one example of how public frustration is turned against the weak, rather than being directed at those in power.

Meanwhile, the ultra-rich are becoming richer. Business tycoons like Gautam Adani and Mukesh Ambani receive special treatment. They are awarded huge contracts, given land and licenses, and supported by state machinery. This is known as crony capitalism—when the government helps a few close allies instead of serving the entire population. While most Indians are worried about rising prices, unemployment, and poor services, a handful of industrialists enjoy unchecked growth and influence. The gap between rich and poor keeps widening.

Globally, India’s rankings reveal how deep the crisis runs. The Human Development Index 2023/24 ranks India 134th out of 193 countries, reflecting low levels of education, health, and income. The World Happiness Report 2024 places India at 126th out of 143 countries, showing that most Indians are not happy or satisfied with their lives. India is ranked 116th on the Global Peace Index 2024, pointing to rising violence and internal conflict. Press freedom is shrinking. India is now ranked 159th out of 180 countries on the World Press Freedom Index 2024. Journalists are harassed, arrested, or silenced for questioning the government. A free press is essential for any democracy, and its decline is a dangerous sign.

India is clearly at a crossroads. The problems are real—poverty, inequality, corruption, discrimination, and violence. But instead of addressing these, the focus is shifted to religion and hate. Minorities, Dalits, women, and the poor become the targets of society’s anger, while the powerful escape scrutiny. This blame game must stop.

Real change is possible, but it requires courage. The government must invest in jobs, healthcare, and education. It must ensure justice and safety for all, especially the most vulnerable. Corruption must be fought, not ignored. People must unite across caste, religion, and region to demand real accountability. Movements against the CAA and for the rights of women, workers, and minorities show that change is possible. These voices need support—not fear or silence.

India has the potential to rise, but only if it stops blaming the weak and starts fixing what is broken. Everyone deserves to live with dignity, safety, and hope. It’s time to choose unity over division, truth over propaganda, and justice over hate.

Reminiscing May Day: The Forgotten Toil of Bhuvan Valley’s Tea Workers

2025-05-03T09:56:00.000+05:30

This May Day, as the world celebrates the dignity of labour, my mind returned to a tea estate in Cachar district in Assam. The tea garden is called Bhuvan Valley Tea Estate . It is a place of lush green tea gardens, but also of deep-rooted despair. Over a decade has passed since the starvation deaths of tea workers first shook the conscience of those of us in the Barak Human Rights Protection Committee (BHRPC), a human rights group, yet the memories remain vivid — etched into our minds like the lines on the tired faces of the workers we met.

The crisis began quietly in October 2011. There was no warning — just a sudden shutdown of the Bhuvan Valley Tea Estate by its Kolkata-based owners. Wages were withheld. Bonuses were denied. Nine long weeks passed without a rupee reaching the pockets of around 500 permanent and 1,000 casual workers. In those weeks, hunger spread like a silent plague. It was not just the absence of food, but of dignity, of recognition, of justice. Families exhausted their meagre savings, sold off utensils, and bartered clothes for rice. But the rice ran out, and so did time.

By early 2012, we were receiving scattered reports of unexplained deaths. When we arrived to conduct a fact-finding mission, we were unprepared for what we saw. Fourteen people — elderly workers, young mothers, children — had died. The causes given were vague: illness, weakness, fatigue. But the reality was plain to see. One of our team members muttered, “It is more like Death Valley than Bhuvan Valley.” And indeed, that grim title stuck.

We documented cases of workers surviving on a single meal a day, often just boiled rice or a piece of dry roti. A frail mother told us, “We eat rice and roti two times a day. One meal is full, the other half… When they were small they did not need so much.” There was no clean drinking water; only a contaminated canal from which children fetched water in plastic bottles. Diarrhoea, tuberculosis, and skin infections were rampant. The estate’s healthcare unit was a ghost facility, the roof caved in, medicines nonexistent.

The wages — when paid — were a pittance: ₹41 to ₹55 a day, well below the minimum wage even by Assam’s already exploitative standards. Welfare schemes, theoretically meant to protect such vulnerable communities, had all but evaporated. Most workers didn’t even have ration cards. Anganwadi centres claimed to be operational, but we found locked doors, falsified attendance sheets, and signatures forged to siphon off supplies.

In 2015, tragedy returned. Four more people, including a newborn baby and elderly workers, died after the estate once again cut off rations and medical support. We found 43 individuals suffering from visible signs of acute malnutrition. Their arms were stick-thin, their limbs swollen. Skin diseases and dizziness were common. At a health camp organized by volunteers, doctors confirmed what we feared: “The workers and their families are stalked by malnutrition.”

What was most crushing wasn’t just the suffering, but the indifference. Government authorities dismissed starvation as the cause. One official claimed alcohol abuse was to blame. Others said the deaths were “natural.” We knew better. Our reports cited violations of the Plantation Labour Act, 1951 — a law so frequently ignored that it might as well not exist. The law mandates basic rights — wages, housing, healthcare — none of which the workers were getting.

We brought the matter before the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). After relentless advocacy, the Commission acknowledged the crisis, recommending monetary relief: ₹2 lakh to the families of deceased workers, ₹1 lakh for dependents. But the implementation was patchy at best. The bureaucracy was slow, the paperwork endless, and the political will absent. The families continued to wait.

We reached out beyond borders. The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) issued hunger alerts and appealed to the United Nations. Their findings echoed ours: the government’s inquiries were deeply flawed, designed more to suppress than to reveal the truth. Meanwhile, Indian media — CNN-IBN, Tehelka, and others — gave the crisis the attention it deserved. “The question haunts Barak Valley,” Tehelka wrote. “Did they die of hunger?”

During the COVID-19 pandemic, things grew worse. With lockdowns in place, the fragile supply chains broke down entirely. We, at BHRPC, distributed grocery kits where we could, and pressured local authorities to provide hazard pay and health support to workers. Again, the response was slow. Again, the suffering deepened.

The systemic rot was — and remains — profound. The estate eventually reopened in 2012, but inequality continued: workers in Barak Valley were paid ₹68/day, while their counterparts in West Bengal earned ₹85. When a magisterial inquiry was finally announced, it turned out to be a whitewash. The state official leading the probe had conflicts of interest. We called it what it was: “A violation of natural justice… no one should be a judge in their own cause.”

One woman’s son told us, “They gave us paracetamol for kidney disease. My mother died in pain.” These are not isolated anecdotes — they are testimonies, cries from the heart of a community long abandoned by the state, ignored by the nation, and betrayed by promises.

Yet the fight continued. We at BHRPC continued to demand universal access to the Public Distribution System, wage parity with other tea regions, and independent judicial inquiries. These are not just legal demands — they are moral imperatives. As we wrote in one of our submissions, “The right to truth and justice is a collective right… moral responsibility must be assumed.”

But even today, exploitation remains embedded in the soil of Bhuvan Valley. Starvation has not been eradicated; it has merely retreated into the shadows. One survivor told us, her eyes hollow yet defiant, “There’s no hope for me or my children… their condition is as bad as mine.”

On this May Day, I think not only of those who work, but of those who wither while working — the tea pluckers of Bhuvan Valley, whose suffering taught us the true meaning of justice delayed. Their story is not over. And neither is our responsibility.

(FYI, BHRPC is now dissolved)

Maulana Azad’s Idea of Rabubiyat, Secularism, and Nationalism

2025-04-26T00:47:00.000+05:30

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) remains one of the most compelling figures in India’s intellectual and political history. An Islamic scholar of immense learning, a formidable freedom fighter, and India’s first Education Minister, Azad shaped the foundations of India’s pluralist identity. His legacy was not confined to his political achievements; it extended deeply into philosophical and theological realms. At the heart of Azad’s worldview was the Quranic concept of Rabubiyat, i.e., God’s lordship, sustenance, and care over all creation. For Azad, Rabubiyat was more than a theological proposition. it was a moral principle that shaped his understanding of justice, secularism, and nationalism. Grounding his politics in Islamic ethics, Azad articulated a vision of India as a united, inclusive nation.

The foundation of Azad’s political theology was the Quranic description of God as Rabb al-‘Alamin—“the Lord of all the worlds”—a title that opens the Quran itself in Surah Al-Fatiha (1:2): “Alhamdu lillahi Rabbil ‘alamin” (“All praise is due to Allah, Lord of the worlds”). Azad understood this phrase not as a generic invocation but as an assertion of divine sustainment that embraces all of creation without partiality. In his commentary Tarjuman al-Quran, he emphasized that if God is the sustainer of all that exists, then the ethical implications are profound: no human being or community can claim superiority over another. The oneness of God (tawhid) necessarily implies the oneness of humanity and the indivisibility of its moral worth.

This theological vision found further grounding in Surah Al-Hujurat (49:13), which declares: “O mankind! We created you from a single pair of male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous among you. Indeed, Allah is All-Knowing, All-Aware.” For Azad, this verse provided divine sanction for human diversity. It affirmed that distinctions of nation, tribe, or ethnicity were not causes for division but opportunities for mutual recognition and respect. From this scriptural basis, Azad argued that sectarianism, racism, and nationalism premised on exclusion were all violations of God’s intent. The divine order, or mizan, as he described it, demands a just balance among all people, and both colonial domination and religious communalism disrupted this balance.

Though Azad did not explicitly use the term Rabubiyat in a formalized doctrine, his interpretation was later echoed and crystallized by figures like Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, who described it as the principle of “undivided equality of all people irrespective of caste, nationality, and religion.” Azad’s writings and speeches clearly anticipated this definition. In Al-Hilal, his groundbreaking political journal, he condemned British colonialism not just as a foreign occupation but as an affront to divine justice. Exploitation of India’s resources, economic subjugation, and cultural alienation were, in Azad’s view, contrary to the Quranic ethics of stewardship and human dignity.

Azad’s understanding of secularism flowed naturally from this moral universe. His secularism was not based on the European model that demands the exclusion of religion from politics. Rather, it was a spiritual secularism that allowed religious diversity to flourish under a shared ethical canopy. Azad found support for this view in Quranic verses such as Surah Al-Baqarah (2:62), which affirms: “Indeed, those who believed, and those who were Jews or Christians or Sabians— those [among them] who believed in God and the Last Day and did righteousness— will have their reward with their Lord. No fear will there be concerning them, nor will they grieve.” This verse, for Azad, was a theological affirmation of religious pluralism. It undercut any claims to exclusivist salvation and instead emphasized righteousness and ethical action as the true basis of divine reward.

Azad’s commitment to this pluralism was not theoretical; it had profound political implications. During the 1940 Ramgarh session of the Indian National Congress, he famously declared: “I am a Muslim and profoundly conscious of that fact… But I am equally proud that I am an Indian.” This was no mere rhetorical flourish. It was a statement of his belief that religious identity and national identity were not contradictory but complementary. His opposition to the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan was grounded in this ethical framework. Azad warned that dividing India along religious lines would not heal communal tensions but deepen them, violating both the spirit of Islam and the cultural unity of the subcontinent.

After independence, Azad carried these principles into governance. As India’s first Education Minister, he laid the foundation for a modern, democratic, and inclusive educational infrastructure. He established institutions such as the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and the University Grants Commission (UGC) not merely to modernize India but to democratize knowledge. For him, education was a moral imperative and a way to create citizens who were both intellectually competent and spiritually aware. He championed linguistic unity between Hindi and Urdu, promoted scientific inquiry alongside cultural preservation, and encouraged a composite nationalism that drew from India’s pluralistic heritage.

Azad’s nationalism was inseparable from his Islamic ethics. He did not view the struggle for independence as a secular battle alone; it was a form of jihad in its truest sense—a spiritual and moral struggle against injustice. He invoked verses such as Surah Al-Hajj (22:39–40), which states: “Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory— [They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right— only because they say, ‘Our Lord is Allah.’ And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned.” Azad interpreted this as a divine endorsement of resistance to oppression and a call to protect all places of worship, not just Islamic ones. This, he believed, was the true spirit of Islam: to stand against tyranny and to safeguard the dignity of all religious traditions.

His opposition to Partition was rooted in this profound theological and moral vision. He believed that India’s diverse religious and cultural landscape was a divine design, not a historical accident. “To divide India,” he wrote, “is to deny God’s wisdom in creating a land where multiple faiths coexist.” His 1946 speech in Delhi was a passionate plea for unity and a prophetic warning against the bloodshed and displacement that Partition would bring. Tragically, his fears were realized, but his vision of a united India has remained an enduring ideal.

For Azad, the cultural syncretism of India, its Sufi shrines, Bhakti poetry, shared festivals, and multilingual traditions, were not superficial symbols but deep manifestations of Rabubiyat in the Indian context. He saw in India a unique civilizational experiment where multiple truths could coexist, enriching rather than negating one another. His concept of composite nationalism was, therefore, both a political strategy and a spiritual commitment. While it shared some affinities with Gandhi’s idea of Ram Rajya, Azad’s vision was distinctly Islamic, rooted in Quranic ethics and a theology of justice and diversity.

Azad’s thought forms a coherent and compelling triad: Rabubiyat as the theological foundation of universal human dignity; secularism as the ethical mode of governance that protects religious plurality; and nationalism as the civic expression of a united, inclusive community. His educational reforms were an extension of this framework. They were not aimed merely at increasing literacy rates but at cultivating morally grounded citizens who embodied values of compassion (rahma), justice (adl), and moral responsibility (taqwa). The institutions he helped build—like the IITs—were, for him, symbols of how spiritual values and scientific advancement could coexist in a harmonious society.

In contemporary India, grappling with the resurgence of communal politics and majoritarian nationalism, Azad’s ideas remain profoundly relevant. His vision offers a powerful counter-narrative to exclusionary ideologies, reminding us that pluralism is not just a political arrangement but a spiritual truth. During the protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (CAA) in 2020, many demonstrators carried posters with Azad’s quotes and verses he had often cited, invoking him as a moral compass in troubled times. While some critics argue that Azad underestimated the depth of communal divisions, his emphasis on education, justice, and ethical governance continues to offer a compelling path forward.

Maulana Azad’s Rabubiyat was never a mere abstraction. It was a revolutionary philosophy that infused his politics with a profound sense of moral purpose. His secularism did not seek to marginalize religion but to elevate shared values above sectarian interests. His nationalism did not aim for homogeneity but celebrated India’s diversity as a reflection of divine intent. At a time when the world seems increasingly divided by race, religion, and nationalism, Azad’s life and thought remind us that true sovereignty begins with recognizing the sanctity of human dignity. As he himself once said: “The essence of secularism is not the rejection of religion, but the rejection of any form of discrimination.” In that statement lies a vision as necessary today as it was in his time.

The Waqf Amendment: Addressing a Misinformation Campaign

2025-04-20T10:26:00.000+05:30

A pervasive misinformation campaign, particularly on social media platforms, falsely claims that the doctrine of waqf by user allows Muslims to claim public spaces as waqf property simply by offering prayers there, such as a few instances of namaz in a park or street. This narrative wrongly suggests that waqf by user facilitates arbitrary land grabs, threatening public or private properties. Such claims are legally baseless, as waqf by user under Islamic jurisprudence and Indian law requires prolonged, consistent, and public use for religious, pious, or charitable purposes, often spanning decades or centuries, supported by historical records or community practices. Sporadic acts like offering prayers in public do not meet these stringent criteria, as courts and the Waqf Act, 1995, demand substantial evidence of dedication. The false claims have intensified after 2025 amendment delegalising waqf by user drawing considerable criticism of the legislative interference on this score. This misinformation fuels communal tensions and distorts the legal and religious framework of waqf, necessitating a clear refutation through legal analysis, judicial precedents, a comparison with analogous common law principles, and the Supreme Court’s recent stance on the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025.

This is a brief view of the issue touching on legal definition of waqf by user, a comparison with custom having the force of law in common law jurisdictions, references to decided cases, an analysis of the 2025 amendments, the Supreme Court’s stand during hearings on petitions challenging these amendments, and a rebuttal of the misinformation campaign.

What is the definition of waqf by user as per Islamic Jurisprudence?In Islamic law, waqf is the permanent dedication of movable or immovable property for religious, pious, or charitable purposes, with ownership symbolically transferred to God, ensuring the property’s usufruct serves beneficiaries perpetually. Waqf by user recognizes a property as waqf based on its prolonged and consistent use for such purposes, even without a formal deed (waqfnama). This doctrine is rooted in the Hanafi school, prevalent in India, which defines waqf as the detention of a specific property in God’s implied ownership, with profits devoted to charity (per Imam Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, and Imam Muhammad). Waqf by user reflects the principle that long-term, public use for Islamic purposes, like maintaining a mosque, graveyard, or madrasa, demonstrates the waqif’s intent of dedication.

The foundation of waqf lies in hadiths, notably one narrated by Ibn Umar (Sahih Bukhari), where the Prophet advised Umar ibn al-Khattab to dedicate land in Khaybar as waqf, emphasizing inalienability and charitable use. Waqf by user extends this by inferring dedication from immemorial usage.

What does Indian Waqf Law say about this? The Waqf Act, 1995 (amended in 2013) governs waqf in India, defining it under Section 3(r) as “the permanent dedication by any person, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable.” Section 3(r)(i) explicitly recognizes waqf by user, stating that a waqf includes “a waqf by user but such waqf shall not cease to be a waqf by reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cesser.” This provision acknowledges properties used for religious or charitable purposes over a long period as waqf, even if their use temporarily ceases, provided the original purpose was pious.

A closer look will show some key features of waqf by user in Indian Law. These are as follows:

1 No Formal Deed Required: Waqf by user does not necessitate a written waqfnama; dedication is inferred from prolonged public use.

2 Perpetuity and Inalienability: Once recognized, the property is inalienable, cannot be sold, gifted, or inherited, and its benefits serve the designated purpose.

3 Judicial Recognition: Courts rely on evidence like historical records, revenue documents, or community testimonies to establish waqf status.

4 Survey and Registration: State Waqf Boards identify waqf by user through surveys, local inquiries, and public records.

At this point a comparative view of waqf by user and custom having force of law in Common Law Jurisdictions would not be out of place as both share conceptual similarities inasmuch as both rely on long-standing, consistent practices to establish legal rights or statuses without formal documentation. However, they differ in their legal foundations, scope, and application. Below is a detailed comparison, integrated here to provide a broader legal context for understanding waqf by user:

1 Definition and Basis:

Waqf by user recognizes a property as waqf based on its prolonged, consistent, and public use for religious, pious, or charitable purposes under Islamic law, as codified in the Waqf Act, 1995 (Section 3(r)(i)). It is rooted in the Hanafi school’s principle of divine ownership and perpetual charity, with judicial recognition requiring evidence of immemorial use (e.g., Sayyed Ali v. Andhra Pradesh Waqf Board, 1998).

Custom in common law is a long-established practice that, if certain conditions are met, acquires the force of law within a specific locality or community. It is recognized in common law jurisdictions (e.g., England, India, and other former British colonies) as a source of law, particularly for property rights or communal practices. For example, a village green used for recreation for centuries may be recognized as a customary right under English law.

2 Requirements for Recognition:

Waqf by user requires (i) prolonged and consistent use (often decades or centuries), (ii) a purpose recognized by Islamic law (e.g., mosque, graveyard), (iii) public and uninterrupted use, and (iv) evidence like historical records or community testimony. Courts emphasize the intent of dedication to God, as seen in Abdul Sakur v. Abu Bakkar (1930) 54 Bom 358.

Custom in common law must satisfy strict criteria, as outlined in English law (e.g., Halsbury’s Laws of England): (i) antiquity (immemorial or long-standing use, typically pre-1189 in England, though relaxed in India); (ii) continuity (uninterrupted practice); (iii) peaceable enjoyment (without opposition); (iv) certainty (clearly defined practice); (v) reasonableness (not contrary to public policy); and (vi) obligatory (binding on the community). In India, the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1968) AIR 1968 SC 281 recognized custom as a source of law if it meets these tests.

3 Legal Effect:

Once recognized as waqf by user the property becomes waqf, inalienable, and perpetually dedicated to its religious or charitable purpose. It cannot be sold, gifted, or inherited, and its status is protected by the principle of “once a waqf, always a waqf” (Sayyed Ali, 1998).

A recognized custom also creates legally enforceable rights, such as communal access to land (e.g., right of way, grazing rights) or exemptions from certain laws. For example, in R. v. Oxfordshire County Council (1999) UKHL, the House of Lords upheld a village green’s customary status based on long-term recreational use. Unlike waqf, custom does not transfer ownership to a divine entity but establishes usage rights.

4 Judicial Scrutiny:

Indian courts rigorously scrutinize claims, requiring robust evidence of long-term use, as seen in the Ramjanmabhoomi Case (2019) 8 SCC 1, where the Sunni Waqf Board’s waqf by user claim was evaluated against historical evidence.

In case of custom in courts also apply strict tests, often rejecting customs that fail to meet antiquity or certainty. In India, Laxmi v. Bhagwan (1973) AIR 1973 SC 250 upheld a customary right to irrigation based on long-standing village practice, but only after verifying its continuity and acceptance.

5 Similarities:

a) Both rely on long-term, consistent practice to establish legal status without formal documentation.

b) Both require public acceptance and uninterrupted use, ensuring the practice is embedded in community tradition.

c) Both are subject to judicial scrutiny, with courts demanding evidence of historical use (e.g., revenue records for waqf by user, local testimonies for custom).

d) Both protect common interests, whether religious (waqf) or societal (customary rights like access to commons).

The misinformation campaign about waqf by user ignores its similarity to custom, a respected common law principle. Just as sporadic use of a village green does not establish a customary right, occasional prayers in a public space cannot create a waqf by user. Both doctrines require substantial evidence, countering false claims of arbitrary land grabs. This comparison highlights that waqf by user, like custom in common law, is a robust legal mechanism rooted in historical practice, not a tool for opportunistic claims, as misrepresented by misinformation campaigns.

The claim that waqf by user allows Muslims to claim public places as waqf by offering prayers is a gross misrepresentation as (i) waqf by user requires prolonged and consistent use for religious or charitable purposes, typically over decades or centuries, not sporadic acts like offering namaz in a public place. Courts have held that the use must be public, uninterrupted, and reflective of a clear intent to dedicate the property as waqf (Abdul Sakur v. Abu Bakkar, 1930). (ii) Sporadic prayers in a park or street do not constitute “user” under the Waqf Act, as they lack permanence and exclusivity. The Supreme Court in Sayyed Ali v. Andhra Pradesh Waqf Board (1998) clarified that waqf by user requires immemorial or substantial use, supported by historical or documentary evidence. (iii) Courts reject frivolous waqf by user claims lacking evidence of prolonged use. In the Ramjanmabhoomi Case (2019), the Supreme Court required robust evidence of continuous religious use, demonstrating rigorous scrutiny. (iv) The Waqf Act, 1995 mandates Waqf Boards to verify claims through surveys and inquiries, ensuring only genuine waqf properties are recognized. (v) Section 6 of the Waqf Act allows challenges to waqf notifications, protecting public and private properties. The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, introduces stricter verification, further preventing misuse. (vi) posts on social media falsely claimed that offering namaz in a public park could convert it into waqf, ignoring the legal threshold for waqf by user. Such misinformation contradicts judicial precedents and statutory requirements, exploiting communal sentiments. (vii) Practical eality also goes against such fearing mongering. Of 872,852 waqf properties in India, only 13,200 are disputed, and most waqf by user properties are historical mosques, graveyards, or madrasas with centuries-old usage, some even stretching back to 14th, 15th or 16th centuries. Claims over public spaces are highly unlikely and would be dismissed by courts.

Indian courts have consistently upheld waqf by user while ensuring it is not misused. Key cases include:

1 Sayyed Ali v. Andhra Pradesh Waqf Board (1998) (AIR 1998 SC 972) where waqf by user was recognised as a valid mode, emphasizing prolonged use for religious purposes. Affirmed “once a waqf, always a waqf.” The decision clarified that waqf by user requires substantial evidence, refuting claims that sporadic acts suffice.

2 M. Ismail v. Thakur Sabir Ali (1962) (AIR 1962 SC 1722) where it is held that waqf properties, including those by user, are dedicated to God, with clear evidence of religious use sufficing. The decision einforced the need for consistent use.

3 Ramjanmabhoomi Case (2019) (2019) 8 SCC 1) where waqf by user was acknowledged but required robust evidence of continuous religious use, scrutinizing the Sunni Waqf Board’s claim. This case emonstrated judicial rigor as opposed to fear mongering by misinformation campaign.

4 Kassimiah Charities v. Secretary, Madras State Waqf Board (1964) (AIR 1964 Mad 227). The decision ecognized waqf by user for properties dedicated through long-term charitable use and larified the legal basis for waqf by user.

5 Abdul Sakur v. Abu Bakkar (1930) (1930) 54 Bom 358). Here the court upheld waqf by user for a mosque based on long-term use, stressing clear intent and evidence. This case stablished that waqf by user requires sustained practice.

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, introduces drastic changes to waqf regulation, including provisions affecting waqf by user. These amendments, debated in the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) and challenged in the Supreme Court, have sparked apprehension among both minorities and constitutionalists. The original draft proposed abolishing waqf by user, requiring formal deeds to establish waqf. Abolishing waqf by user would have destabilizing affect on historical waqf properties, such as centuries-old mosques or graveyards, lacking documentation due to oral or customary traditions. On recommendation of JPC the revised Act retained waqf by user in an infective and diluted form providing that properties registered as waqf by user before the Act’s enactment would retain their status unless disputed or identified as government land. New claims post-2025 would require stricter evidence (e.g., historical records). New law further requires that waqf by user properties must be verified by district collectors or Waqf Tribunals, with provision of appeals to High Courts. It is apprehended that verification under the new law risks unsettling historical waqfs in states with weak documentation. Reliance on district collectors may also lead to prejudice.

Therefore, the Supreme Court during hearing of the petitions challenging the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, contesting provisions affecting waqf by user, made certain significant observations. The Court’s observations provide critical insight into its stance. The Court reiterated the validity of waqf by user, referencing Sayyed Ali v. Andhra Pradesh Waqf Board (1998), which upheld waqf by user as a recognized mode under Islamic law and the Waqf Act, 1995. The bench, led by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, emphasized that waqf by user is essential for preserving historical waqf properties lacking formal deeds due to their antiquity. The Court noted that waqf by user embodies the principle of “once a waqf, always a waqf,” ensuring perpetuity and inalienability.

Petitioners argued that the initial proposal to abolish waqf by user and the revised verification requirements violate Articles 25 (freedom of religion) and 26 (management of religious affairs). They contended that verifying pre-existing waqf by user properties could lead to disputes, endangering tens of thousands of waqf properties. The Court expressed apprehension about the amendments’ potential to cause “huge consequences” for waqf properties, noting that requiring verification of long-settled waqfs could unsettle community rights and lead to bureaucratic overreach. The Court indicated it might stay provisions affecting waqf by user, pending a detailed examination. Chief Justice Khanna remarked, “We cannot allow historical waqfs, recognized by long usage, to be suddenly open to challenge without clear justification.” The Court directed the government to clarify how verification would safeguard genuine waqf by user properties and prevent arbitrary reclamation as government property, seeking safeguards for impartiality by district collectors.

The Court underscored that waqf by user is a “settled principle” in Indian law, rooted in Islamic jurisprudence and codified in the Waqf Act, 1995. It cautioned against legislative changes eroding this principle without justification. The Supreme Court’s stance reinforces waqf by user’s sanctity, countering misinformation by affirming its historical significance while supporting safeguards against misuse. The potential stay on the amendments signals a commitment to protecting religious rights while ensuring reforms do not harm established waqfs.

Waqf by user, akin to custom in common law, preserves historical endowments through long-standing practice, aligning with Islamic principles of perpetual charity and codified in Indian law. Its recognition through cases like Sayyed Ali v. Andhra Pradesh Waqf Board (1998) ensures undocumented properties serve community needs. However, its reliance on customary evidence makes it vulnerable to disputes and misinformation about arbitrary claims. The Supreme Court’s cautious approach, emphasizing the doctrine’s validity and signaling a potential stay, reflects a commitment to constitutional protections. However, verification risks bureaucratic delays and bias, necessitating robust safeguards.

The misinformation campaign exploits ignorance of waqf by user’s legal rigor, ignoring its similarity to common law custom, which also requires substantial evidence. The Supreme Court’s reaffirmation counter these false claims.

In sum, waqf by user is defined as the recognition of a property as a waqf under Islamic jurisprudence and Indian law based on its prolonged, consistent, and public use for religious, pious, or charitable purposes, without requiring a formal deed. Comparable to custom in common law, it relies on long-standing practice but is distinct in its religious purpose and perpetuity. Rooted in the Hanafi school and codified in the Waqf Act, 1995 (Section 3(r)(i)), it is upheld by cases like Sayyed Ali v. Andhra Pradesh Waqf Board (1998) and Ramjanmabhoomi Case (2019). The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, sought to annul it. The Supreme Court, in April 2025 hearings, reaffirmed waqf by user’s validity, expressed concerns about the amendments’ potential to disrupt settled waqfs, and indicated a possible stay, balancing reform with constitutional protections. The misinformation campaign alleging waqf by user enables Muslims to claim public spaces by offering prayers is baseless, as the doctrine requires decades of documented use, a fact reinforced by the Court, the 2025 amendments, and its parallel with common law custom.

The Waqf Amendment: Impact of Law of Limitation on the Doctrine of Perpetuity

2025-04-20T10:19:00.001+05:30

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, has made several significant changes to the law of waqf as applied in India. One of the aspect, it appears , has not drawn as much attention as it deserves. The amendment made the law of limitation applicable to the law of waqf. Its impact on the law is not less devastating than any other changes made to the law. Here is a bird’s eye view on how law of limitation undermines the islamic law of waqf.

There is a doctrine in Islamic law relating to Waqf known as “once a waqf always a waqf”. It is a fundamental principle governing the institution of waqf. This doctrine underscores the perpetual and irrevocable nature of a waqf once it is validly created.

A brief descriptive definition of waqf can be given as waqf is a voluntary, permanent dedication of property (movable or immovable) by a Muslim for a purpose recognized as pious, charitable, or religious under Islamic law. The property is placed in a trust-like arrangement, and its benefits are used for the intended purpose, such as supporting mosques, schools, hospitals, or the poor, while the principal remains intact.

The doctrine of “once a waqf , always a waqf” establishes that once a property is dedicated as a waqf, it remains so perpetually.

This means:

1. The donor (waqif) cannot revoke or reclaim the waqf property after its creation, as it is considered a dedication to Allah for the benefit of the community or specified beneficiaries. It is called irrevocability which the doctrine entails.

2. The waqf must endure indefinitely, and the property cannot be sold, gifted, inherited, or otherwise alienated except in exceptional circumstances permitted by Islamic law. This is known as perpetuity.

3. The waqf property is removed from the personal ownership of the donor and cannot be transferred or used for purposes other than those specified in the waqf deed (waqf-nama).

This principle known as “once a waqf always a waqf” ensures that the charitable intent of the donor is preserved and that the benefits of the waqf continue to serve the community or purpose for which it was established.

The doctrine is rooted in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and draws from the Quran, Hadith, and scholarly consensus.

First, while the Quran does not explicitly mention waqf, verses encouraging charity (sadaqah) and spending for the sake of Allah (e.g., Surah Al-Baqarah 2:261, Surah Aal-E-Imran 3:92) provide the spiritual basis for waqf as an act of perpetual charity (sadaqah jariyah).

Second, a well-known Hadith narrated by Abu Hurairah (Sahih Muslim) states that when a person dies, their deeds cease except for three, one of which is a “continuous charity” (sadaqah jariyah). Waqf is considered a prime example of such charity.

Third, Islamic scholars across major schools of thought (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali) agree on the perpetual and irrevocable nature of waqf, emphasizing its role in serving public welfare and religious objectives.

In simple language, the doctrine means that the waqf property is dedicated “forever” to the specified purpose. Even if the original purpose becomes obsolete, the property must be redirected to a similar charitable cause rather than reverting to private ownership. The waqf property cannot be sold, gifted, or inherited. Its ownership is effectively transferred to Allah, with the benefits accruing to the designated beneficiaries. Once the waqf is created through a valid declaration (oral or written) and the property is delivered to the trustee (mutawalli), it becomes legally binding and cannot be undone by the donor or their heirs. The waqf property is managed by a trustee or administrator who ensures its upkeep and that its income or benefits are used as per the donor’s intent.

So, how does the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, affected this important doctrine of the law of waqf?

One of the significant changes brought about by the amendment is making the Limitation Act, 1963, applicable to waqf properties by omitting Section 107 of the 1995 Act. Prior to the amendment, Section 107 of the Waqf Act, 1995, exempted waqf properties from the Limitation Act, allowing Waqf Boards to pursue claims (e.g., for encroachment or recovery of property) without any time bar. This meant that even long-standing encroachments could be legally challenged at any time.

The 2025 amendment removes this exemption, making the Limitation Act, 1963, applicable. Under this Act, claims related to property disputes, such as recovery of possession, are generally subject to a limitation period of 12 years from the date the cause of action arises (e.g., when the property was encroached upon). After this period, claims may be barred, and encroachers could potentially claim ownership through adverse possession if they have occupied the property openly and continuously for over 12 years.

Application of the Limitation Act severely restricts Waqf Boards’ ability to reclaim encroached properties, especially in cases where encroachments have gone unchallenged for decades. For instance, if a waqf property has been illegally occupied for more than 12 years, the Waqf Board may lose its legal right to recover it, potentially legitimizing encroachments and undermining the inalienable nature of waqf properties (the doctrine of “once a waqf, always a waqf”). This change could lead to significant losses for Waqf Boards, as many waqf properties in India have been subject to prolonged encroachments due to mismanagement or lack of timely action.

The application of law of limitation severely undermines the aspect of inalienability of the doctrine of “once a wqf, always a waqf”. Under the doctrine Waqf properties are traditionally considered inalienable, dedicated perpetually for religious or charitable purposes. The application of the Limitation Act introduces a legal framework that conflicts with this principle, as it allows for the possibility of waqf properties being lost to adverse possession.

In sum, the application of the Limitation Act, 1963, to waqf properties under the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, introduces time-bound restrictions on legal claims. This measure outright undermines the inalienable nature of waqf properties by allowing adverse possession after 12 years, potentially leading to significant losses for Waqf Boards. This change has sparked legal and constitutional challenges as it infringes on religious and property rights. This aspect of the amendment was not given as much attention as it deserves.

Sense of betrayal

2025-04-18T09:37:00.001+05:30

There is a feeling among a large number ot people that reflects a deep sense of disappointment and disillusionment with the state of India’s democratic and social fabric, particularly in relation to the ideals enshrined in its Constitution. When you examine the concerns systematically, looking at the roles of political parties, state institutions, civil society, and social structures, as well as their impact on minorities and India’s global standing you will find that the feeling is strongly rooted in reality and lived experiences.

Lets take a look at the issue. While doing so, lets also keep in mind the comprexity of the issue.

India’s Constitution, adopted in 1950, is a great document that promises justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity for all citizens, regardless of caste, creed, religion, or gender. It emphasizes secularism, social justice, and the protection of minority rights. However , the reality on the ground shows that these ideals have been undermined by various actors and institutions.

Lets start with political parties as they are central to India’s democracy. It is obvious that most of them have prioritised power, vote-bank politics, and divisive rhetoric over constitutional values. In recent years, political discourse in India has been criticized for fostering religious and caste-based polarization. Some parties have been accused of promoting majoritarian agendas, sidelining minority communities, particularly Muslims, Christians, and Dalits. For example, incidents of communal violence, such as the 2020 Delhi riots, and anti-Muslim policies like the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (CAA), brutal repression of democratic protests against CAA-NRC (National Register of Citizens) combine, indefinite incarceration of protesters along with increasing incidence of hate crimes like beef lynching, dehumanising and humiliating hate speech and vilification campaign against Muslims have fueled perceptions of increasing Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims. Political parties across the spectrum have faced allegations of corruption, cronyism, and compromising democratic principles for electoral gains. The weakening of opposition voices, through defections or institutional pressure, has raised concerns about democratic backsliding. Despite economic growth, India remains deeply unequal, with persistent poverty to the extent of living on the verge of starvation, inter-generational malnutrition and lack of access to health care, unemployment, and caste-based discrimination. Political parties have always been seen failing to deliver on promises of inclusive development, leaving marginalized groups behind.

However, it’s worth noting that India’s democracy remains vibrant in some respects, with regular elections and democratic protests against state excesses as well as its inactions. The resilience of democratic participation suggests that not all hope is lost, though significant challenges remain.

Now lets take a look at the state and its institutions: judiciary, police, bureaucracy, and election machiner. These institutions are meant to uphold constitutional values. Yet, there are concerns about their impartiality and effectiveness. The judiciary has historically been a bulwark of constitutional values, but recent years have seen criticisms of delayed justice, perceived alignment with the executive in some cases, and a backlog of cases affecting marginalized groups. For instance, the handling of cases related to communal violence or dissent has sparked debates about judicial neutrality. Reports of custodial violence, extrajudicial killings, and bias against minorities and lower castes have tarnished the police’s reputation. Human rights organizations have documented cases of targeted harassment of minority communities, activists, and journalists. Institutions like the Election Commission, Reserve Bank of India, and media regulatory bodies have faced accusations of being influenced by the ruling government, undermining their independence. The use of laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) against dissenters has raised alarms about shrinking democratic space.

On the positive side, institutions like the Supreme Court have occasionally delivered progressive judgments, such as decriminalizing homosexuality (2018) or affirming privacy rights (2017). These examples show that institutional failures are not universal, and reform is possible.

Now turning to civil society, i.e., NGOs, activists, and citizen movements, it can be seen that it plays a crucial role in holding power accountable. However, it has faced challenges. Activists, journalists, and academics critical of the government have faced harassment, arrests, or funding restrictions. The Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 2010 (FCRA) has been used to limit NGOs’ operations, particularly those working on minority rights, human rights or environmental issues. Civil society is diverse but often divided along ideological, regional, or caste lines, limiting its ability to present a united front against systemic issues. Despite these challenges, civil society has achieved successes, such as mobilizing against gender-based violence (e.g., Nirbhaya protests) or farmers protests against now repealed farm laws or advocating for tribal rights. Movements like these demonstrate that civil society remains a force for change.

Fourth, Social institutions like family, community, and cultural norms. These are also important as they shape India’s social fabric but often perpetuate inequalities. Caste-based discrimination and communal tensions continue to undermine fraternity. Lynchings over cow vigilantism, honor killings, and caste atrocities highlight the failure to eradicate regressive practices. Despite legal reforms, gender-based violence and discrimination persist, with no progress in empowering women and gender minorities. Social institutions have been slow to embrace progressive values, partly due to uneven access to education and entrenched hierarchies. However, younger generations and urban movements are challenging these norms, offering hope for change. Movements like these demonstrate that civil society remains a force for change.

The feeling that minorities have been betrayed is rooted in specific grievances. Muslims, who constitute about 14% of India’s population, have faced rising Islamophobia, including hate speech, discriminatory laws, and economic exclusion. Christians and Sikhs have also reported targeted attacks in some regions. The CAA and National Register of Citizens (NRC) debates amplified fears of disenfranchisement among Muslims. Dalits and Adivasis continue to face systemic discrimination, with limited access to education, jobs, and justice. Atrocities against these groups often go unpunished, reinforcing a sense of abandonment. Linguistic diversity is a strength, but tensions over language policies (e.g., Hindi imposition) have alienated some communities. Yet, India’s diversity also fosters resilience. Minority communities have organized protests, such as the anti-CAA and anti-waqf amendment demonstrations, and continue to assert their rights through democratic means. This activism suggests that the constitutional framework still provides avenues for redress.

The perception that India has betrayed the world at large stems from its democratic reputation and global responsibilities. International indices, like the Freedom House Democracy Index, have downgraded India’s status (e.g., from “free” to “partly free” in 2021) due to concerns over press freedom, minority rights, and judicial independence. This has damaged India’s image as the “world’s largest democracy.” Reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have highlighted issues like internet shutdowns, arbitrary detentions, and violence against minorities, drawing global scrutiny. As a country trying to draw global attention, India is expected to uphold democratic values and human rights. Failures in this regard risk alienating allies and weakening its soft power. However, efforts to project a positive image, such as through cultural diplomacy or climate commitments, indicate that India has not entirely lost its global standing.

While the concerns highlighted above are grounded in real challenges, there are reasons to believe that India has not reached a “point of no return” and that the feeling of betrayal, while understandable, is not the full picture. India’s elections remain largely free and fair, with high voter turnout. The 2024 general elections saw robust participation, and opposition parties have shown they can challenge the ruling coalition in some states. The judiciary, despite pressures, continues to deliver landmark judgments. Institutions like the National Human Rights Commission, though imperfect, provide mechanisms for accountability. Young Indians, particularly in urban areas, are increasingly vocal about issues like climate change, gender equality, and minority rights. Social media platforms amplify these voices, creating pressure for change.

To address the sense of betrayal and restore faith in constitutional ideals, several steps could be taken. Reforming the judiciary, police, and electoral bodies to ensure independence and accountability is critical. Transparency in governance can rebuild trust. Policies that prioritize minority welfare, reduce inequality, and address caste and gender discrimination are essential. Affirmative action and education reforms can help. Political parties and civil society must foster dialogue to bridge communal and ideological divides. Media can play a role in countering hate speech and misinformation. Supporting young activists and local organizations can drive long-term change, as seen in successful movements like the farmers’ protests (2020-21).

The feeling that India has failed to uphold its constitutional commitments is not entirely false, as it reflects genuine challenges: political polarization, institutional erosion, minority marginalization, and social inequalities. These issues have strained India’s democratic fabric and global reputation. However, the situation is not irreparable. India’s resilient democracy, active civil society, and pockets of institutional integrity offer hope for renewal. By addressing systemic issues and recommitting to constitutional values, India can move away from the “point of no return” and restore faith among its citizens and the world.

The Wqaf Amendment: A Secular State's Selective Interference

2025-04-14T09:58:00.000+05:30

On April 5, 2025, the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 received Presidential assent and became binding law. What was introduced as a set of administrative reforms has, in reality, made sweeping changes to the legal framework governing waqf properties—assets that have, for centuries, formed the backbone of religious, charitable, and welfare activities in India’s Muslim community. These properties, once dedicated as waqf, are intended to remain forever devoted to the service of the public through mosques, schools, graveyards, hospitals, orphanages, and other such institutions. The waqf system is rooted in a deep religious tradition that treats such property not as personal or transferable wealth, but as a perpetual endowment—a trust in the service of God and society. By enacting this amendment, the state has imposed new controls and conditions on the management of these properties, and in doing so, it has stirred serious constitutional and ethical concerns that go to the very heart of India’s secular and democratic fabric.

One of the most significant and contentious aspects of this new law is its requirement that non-Muslim members be included in the governing bodies responsible for waqf administration. Until now, both the Central Waqf Council and the various State Waqf Boards have been comprised solely of Muslims, based on the reasonable and well-understood logic that a religious endowment grounded in Islamic jurisprudence should be managed by those who understand and adhere to that faith. Waqf is not a neutral asset; its creation, governance, and purpose are tied directly to religious doctrine. By mandating the inclusion of individuals from outside the Muslim faith into the core decision-making process, the law interferes with the internal affairs of a religious community in a way that is unprecedented, discriminatory, and constitutionally unsound.

This move strikes directly at the heart of Article 26 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees to every religious denomination the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. This right is not conditional on state approval; it is an autonomous space protected from majoritarian control. The state, in its role as a secular entity, has no business deciding how a religious body should govern itself, unless there is clear evidence of harm or illegality. In this case, the inclusion of non-Muslims is not based on any identified abuse or failure of the waqf system, but on a vague desire to “reform” or “standardize” it—standards that are not being imposed on other religious communities. Hindu temples are not required to appoint non-Hindus to their trust boards. Christian churches and Sikh gurdwaras are not compelled to allow outsiders into their governing bodies. Only the Muslim community is being asked to alter its religious institutions in a way that directly contradicts its religious principles and institutional independence. This selective interference makes a mockery of the secular ideal.

The principle of secularism, which is a part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution, requires that the state maintain an equal distance from all religions. Secularism does not mean that the state should suppress religion—it means the state must avoid interfering in religious matters and must treat all faiths with the same degree of respect and restraint. The Waqf (Amendment) Act violates this principle by singling out one religious community and placing its institutions under conditions that others are not subject to. Far from being a neutral act of reform, the law appears to be based on an assumption that Muslim religious institutions require special oversight or control, while others are allowed to function autonomously. This is not secular governance—it is a form of state favoritism and distrust that targets one community under the guise of administrative reform.

The inequality is further compounded when we consider Article 14, which promises all persons equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Any law that treats one group differently from others must be based on an intelligible classification and must have a rational connection to a legitimate objective. Here, the law applies intrusive controls only to Muslim endowments, without any demonstrated reason why waqf institutions uniquely require such measures. If transparency, accountability, or efficiency are the goals, then all religious and charitable trusts—regardless of religion—should be subject to the same standards. By applying special burdens only on waqf institutions, the law creates a classification that is both arbitrary and unconstitutional. This kind of discrimination violates the very spirit of equal treatment that the Constitution guarantees and erodes public faith in the neutrality of the legal system.

Equally troubling is the Act’s transfer of adjudicatory power from Waqf Tribunals to ordinary government officers in determining whether a property is waqf or not. Previously, such matters were heard by specialized tribunals that, although imperfect, at least functioned as quasi-judicial bodies with some familiarity with Islamic law and waqf practice. The new law hands this power over to revenue officials, such as district magistrates or collectors—executive agents of the state who lack judicial independence and religious expertise. This move not only politicizes the process but also weakens due process protections. Under Article 21, no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law. And over decades of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has clarified that this procedure must be just, fair, and reasonable—not arbitrary, opaque, or biased.

Giving government officers the final say in disputes over religious property strips away this fairness. Such decisions are likely to be influenced by political pressure, land-use priorities, or personal prejudice. In a country where land is scarce and waqf properties are often located in prime areas, this opens the door to massive misuse. Communities could lose control over mosques, schools, or graveyards not because of any legal fault, but because a bureaucrat deemed the land to be non-waqf. The loss here is not only of real estate, but of identity, heritage, and sacred space. Due process is reduced to a formality, and fundamental rights are rendered meaningless in practice.

Another devastating consequence of the new law is its removal of waqf property’s exemption from the Limitation Act, 1963, thereby allowing adverse possession to extinguish waqf claims. Under the previous regime, waqf land could not be lost merely because someone had occupied it for twelve years without contest. The reason was clear: waqf property is held in trust not for the trustee, but for the public—specifically for religious or charitable use. It is not like private property that a person can forget to protect. The very purpose of waqf is continuity and perpetuity. By making it subject to adverse possession, the new law effectively allows waqf land to be stolen through encroachment, and then legalized through bureaucratic inaction. In many cases, waqf boards lack the resources to track or litigate every piece of land. Under this regime, they will now also lose land they cannot immediately recover, even if it was wrongfully taken. This violates not only religious trust but also the constitutional right to property under Article 300A, which protects individuals and communities from being deprived of their property without legal authority. The irony is that the very law intended to regulate waqf may now become the means by which waqf property is legally lost forever.

In addition to all of this, the law demands that waqf properties must have formal documentation—a registered waqfnama—to be recognized. While this might seem like a logical administrative requirement, in practice, it means that a vast number of older waqf properties will be excluded from the official record simply because they were established in an era when documentation was rare. Many waqf lands are known by local custom, oral tradition, and continued community use. To now require them to produce written deeds is to apply modern bureaucratic standards to historical realities, with disastrous consequences. This not only undermines the protection of genuine waqf assets but also punishes communities for their historical poverty or illiteracy.

Altogether, the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 is not a minor regulatory adjustment—it is a profound disruption of constitutional norms, legal protections, and secular principles. It treats Muslim institutions differently from others, burdens them with special restrictions, exposes them to state interference, and deprives them of rights that other communities take for granted. It violates Article 14’s promise of equality, Article 21’s guarantee of fair process, Article 26’s assurance of religious autonomy, and Article 300A’s protection of property. It also departs from the spirit of secularism by casting the state not as a neutral guardian, but as an active participant in the internal affairs of one particular faith.

The dangers of this law are not hypothetical. They will be felt in everyday ways—when a mosque is lost to encroachment, when a waqf school is shut due to lack of recognition, when a community can no longer bury its dead in ancestral graveyards, or when an honest mutawalli (trustee) is replaced by a politically connected appointee. The consequences will be deeply human, and often irreversible.

If India is to remain true to its founding ideals—of pluralism, equality, justice, and secular governance—then laws like the Waqf (Amendment) Act must be reconsidered and challenged. The rights of religious communities cannot be made subject to the convenience of the state. They cannot be taken away quietly, under the pretext of reform. Constitutional rights are not privileges—they are guarantees. And they must be defended, especially when it is unpopular, inconvenient, or politically costly to do so. The Constitution does not allow for second-class rights, and it does not recognize second-class citizens. That must include the Muslim community, and it must include the institutions it holds sacred.All reactions:

Legislative milestones in the last two decades

2025-04-05T14:45:00.000+05:30

Over the past two decades, India has witnessed the passage of numerous transformative laws under the tenures of Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh (2004–2014) and Narendra Modi (2014–present). These legislative milestones, shaped by distinct political visions, have sparked widespread debate, reflecting the evolving priorities of governance—be it welfare, economic reform, or identity politics. From empowering citizens with rights to reshaping constitutional frameworks, the 14 most talked-about laws of this period highlight both progressive strides and contentious shifts, offering a lens into India’s socio-political journey.

Here are the 7 laws pased in Manmohan era:

1. The Right to Information Act (RTI), 2005 is a law that empowered citizens to access information from public authorities, promoting transparency and accountability in governance. It gave people a tool to hold the government accountable for delivering services and benefits, reducing corruption in welfare schemes. It mandated timely responses (within 30 days) to information requests, with provisions for penalties on officials who failed to comply.

2. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 2005 is a law that guaranteed 100 days of wage employment per year to rural households willing to do unskilled manual work. It aimed to combat rural poverty and unemployment while fostering infrastructure development (e.g., roads, water conservation projects). By 2014, it had provided employment to millions, with a focus on inclusivity. Over 50% of workers were women and marginalized groups.

3. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE), 2009: This law made education a fundamental right for children aged 6 to 14 under Article 21A of the Constitution. It mandated free education in government schools and reserved 25% of seats in private schools for economically disadvantaged children. This measure was aimed to reduce dropout rates and improve literacy, particularly among underprivileged communities.

4. The National Food Security Act (NFSA), 2013: This Act aimed to provide subsidized food grains to approximately two-thirds of India’s population (around 800 million people). It entitled eligible households to 5 kg of rice, wheat, or coarse grains per person per month at low prices (e.g., ₹3/kg for rice). It also included provisions for free meals for pregnant women, lactating mothers, and children up to 14 years through programs like the Mid-Day Meal Scheme, addressing hunger and malnutrition as core welfare goals.

5. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, provided legal recourse for women facing domestic violence, including physical, emotional, or economic abuse. It offered welfare support through protection orders, residence rights, and monetary relief, aiming to safeguard women’s well-being and security within households.

6. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: This Act replaced the colonial Land Acquisition Act of 1894. It mandated fair compensation, rehabilitation, and resettlement for those displaced by land acquisition for development projects. It sought to protect livelihoods of rural and tribal populations, requiring consent from 80% of affected families for private projects.

7. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, often called the Forest Rights Act (FRA), granted land and resource rights to forest-dwelling communities. It aimed to correct historical injustices by providing welfare through secure tenure, access to forest produce, and community rights, benefiting millions of tribal and forest-dependent people.

Thereafter Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister. So far his premiership spans a period more or less around the same period as Manmohan Singh. Below is a list of 7 most talked about laws passed during his period:

1. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), 2019: It amends the Citizenship Act of 1955 to grant citizenship to non-Muslim migrants (Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians) from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan who entered India before December 31, 2014, fleeing religious persecution. Critics argue it violates India’s secular ethos by excluding Muslims, pairing it with the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC) to potentially disenfranchise Muslim citizens lacking documentation. Protests erupted nationwide, with over 100 deaths reported during clashes in 2019–2020, notably in Delhi and Uttar Pradesh.

2. The Farm Laws (2020, Repealed 2021): Three agricultural laws passed in September 2020—The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, The Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm Services Act, and The Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act—aimed to liberalize farming by allowing sales outside regulated mandis, enabling contract farming, and easing stock limits. Farmers, especially from Punjab and Haryana, protested for over a year, fearing corporate exploitation and the erosion of Minimum Support Prices (MSP). The laws were repealed on November 29, 2021, after massive demonstrations blockaded Delhi, with Modi citing failure to convince farmers.

3. Abrogation of Article 370 and Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019: On 5 August 2019 the government revoked Article 370, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its special autonomy, and passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, bifurcating the state into two Union Territories: Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature) and Ladakh (without). This ended decades of constitutional privileges, like separate laws and land rights. Critics decried the move as unilateral, imposed during a communication blackout and mass detentions, undermining federalism and Kashmiri identity.

4. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019: This law criminalizes instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat), making it punishable with up to three years in jail. Championed as a women’s rights reform following a 2017 Supreme Court ruling, it faced backlash from democratic groups and opposition parties who called it an intrusion into personal laws and a step toward a Uniform Civil Code (UCC), potentially targeting Muslims.

5. Three New Criminal Laws (2023): the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam replace the colonial Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Indian Evidence Act. Aimed at modernizing justice—e.g., adding community service as punishment and tackling cybercrime—they’ve been criticized for expanding police powers (e.g., up to 90-day custody without charges) and vague sedition-like provisions (e.g., BNS Section 152 on “acts endangering sovereignty”).

6. Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019: This law seeks to protect transgender rights by prohibiting discrimination and mandating welfare measures. However, it’s controversial for requiring a certificate for gender recognition, lacking reservations in jobs or education, and imposing lighter penalties for crimes against transgender individuals compared to others. Activists argue it undermines self-identification rights upheld by a 2014 Supreme Court ruling, while the government frames it as a progressive step.

7. The Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2024: Already passedby both houses of parliamentbut still awaitingassent of the president, this bill proposes to regulate Waqf properties by mandating registration, allowing non-Muslim board members, and empowering district collectors to resolve disputes. Critics, including opposition MPs, call it an attack on Muslim religious autonomy and constitutional rights, accusing it of communal intent.

In sum, the laws enacted during Singh’s tenure leaned heavily toward social welfare and inclusivity, laying foundational rights to information, education, employment, and food security, often remembered as a period of steady, if imperfect, progress. In contrast, Modi’s era has been marked by bold, polarizing reforms—restructuring agriculture, citizenship, and regional autonomy—heralded by supporters as “achche din” (good days) and “amrit kaal” (golden era), yet leaving many nostalgic for the “bad old days” of Singh’s regime. These legislative legacies, for better or worse, speak volumes about the aspirations and fault lines of contemporary India.

How India's Secularism Became a Tool of Religious Exclusion

2025-03-23T00:26:00.000+05:30

The recent incident at Assam University, where authorities denied permission for an Iftar gathering while routinely approving Hindu festivals such as Saraswati Puja and Holi, underscores a systemic contradiction plaguing India’s secular framework. This pattern of unequal treatment, masked by institutional claims of religious neutrality, is not an isolated lapse but a reflection of a deeper ideological bias that conflates Hindu traditions with “Indian culture” while marginalizing minority practices as sectarian. The university’s defense that it cannot endorse “religious” events rings hollow when juxtaposed against its active facilitation of Hindu rituals rebranded as “cultural” or “educational” activities. This duality, replicated across educational institutions, government bodies, and public spaces, reveals how secularism has been weaponized to normalize majoritarian preferences while eroding the constitutional guarantee of equal respect for all faiths.

To grasp the full dimensions of this crisis, one must examine India’s historical relationship with secularism. Unlike western models that advocate strict church-state separation, Indian secularism emerged as a pluralistic compromise, aiming to protect minority rights in a Hindu-majority society post-Partition. However, over decades, this delicate balance has been distorted by political forces seeking to redefine national identity through a Hindu cultural lens. Festivals like Holi and Saraswati Puja, while undeniably religious in origin, have been systematically recast as “shared heritage,” enabling institutions to celebrate them without appearing partisan. Meanwhile, Muslim, Christian, or Sikh observances, despite their equally deep roots in India’s history, remain categorized as exclusionary “religious” acts. This semantic sleight-of-hand, as seen in Assam University’s justification, allows systemic discrimination to flourish under the guise of neutrality.

The ramifications extend far beyond festival permissions. In Karnataka, the hijab ban in educational institutions framed as enforcing “uniformity” exposes how secularism is twisted to police minority identity. Similarly, the restriction of Muslim Friday prayers in public spaces—a practice tolerated for decades—is now deemed “non-secular,” even as Hindu temple rituals on government premises face no such scrutiny. These decisions, often justified through circular logic (“Hindu practices are cultural, thus secular”), institutionalize a hierarchy of citizenship. The message is unambiguous: majority traditions represent the nation’s ethos, while minority expressions threaten social cohesion.

Such selective secularism violates Article 14’s equality clause and Article 15’s prohibition of religious discrimination. The Supreme Court’s 1994 S.R. Bommai judgment [(1994) 3 SCC 1] explicitly warned against using secularism to suppress minority rights, stating that religion cannot be mixed with political activities. Yet institutions routinely disregard this principle. For instance, Saraswati Puja in schools, a worship ritual for a Hindu deity, is defended as “fostering knowledge,” while Christmas carols or Quran recitations are barred as “proselytization.” This inconsistency betrays not administrative pragmatism but a tacit endorsement of Hindutva’s cultural nationalism, which equates Indianness with Hindu symbolism.

The psychological toll on minorities is profound. When a Muslim student sees her Eid celebration restricted as “divisive” while Diwali fireworks illuminate government offices, it reinforces her status as a second-class citizen. A large number of minority students in BJP-ruled states feel pressured to hide religious identity markers. This alienation fuels communal distrust and erodes the pluralist social fabric enshrined in the Constitution’s preamble.

Security concerns, often cited to restrict minority events, further expose institutional bias. While Kumbh Melas attracting millions are managed as logistical challenges, small Iftar gatherings are deemed “law-and-order risks.” Authorities in Uttar Pradesh, for example, permitted the 2021 Kanwar Yatra amid pandemic surges but banned Muharram processions citing COVID protocols. Such disproportionate scrutiny stems not from evidence but stereotypes casting Muslim gatherings as inherently volatile which is a prejudice reinforced by media narratives and political rhetoric.

Addressing this crisis requires redefining secularism through an equity lens. Institutions must adopt transparent, uniform criteria for event approvals, distinguishing between worship and cultural celebration without favoring any faith. If Saraswati Puja is permitted as an academic tradition, then Eid or Guru Nanak Jayanti observances emphasizing charity or community service should receive equal accommodation. Legislative measures may be considered for preventing discrimination and atrocities against minorities penalizing religious bias in public spaces. Courts must revisit narrow interpretations of secularism, as in the hijab case, and reaffirm the right to religious expression under Articles 25-28.

Ultimately, India’s secular ideal cannot survive as a veneer for majoritarianism. It demands acknowledging that Hindu festivals, while culturally significant, are not politically neutral in a multifaith society. True secularism isn’t achieved by erasing religion from public life but by ensuring no community feels targeted or excluded. As Dr. B.R. Ambedkar warned, constitutional morality must prevail over populist majoritarianism. Only when a Dalit student’s Buddha Jayanti, a tribal scholar’s Sarhul festival, and a Muslim professor’s Iftar are treated with the same respect as Holi can India claim to honor its founding pledge of “fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual.” Until then, the selective celebration of festivals will remain not merely administrative hypocrisy but a betrayal of the republic’s soul.

The Waqf (Amendment) Bill: A Legal and Constitutional Critique

2025-03-19T01:43:00.003+05:30

The proposed Waqf (Amendment) Bill, ostensibly framed to "reform" the governance of Waqf properties under the Waqf Act, 1995, constitutes a constitutionally suspect legislative maneuver that disproportionately targets India’s Muslim minority. Its provisions violate the principles of secularism, equality, and religious autonomy enshrined in Articles 14, 15, 25, and 26 of the Indian Constitution, while perpetuating systemic discrimination against minorities in contravention of international human rights obligations.

The bill’s proposal to induct non-Muslim members into Waqf Boards flagrantly infringes upon the absolute right of religious denominations under Article 26 to manage their own religious affairs. Waqf, as a quintessentially Islamic institution rooted in Sharia principles, is governed by specific theological mandates that require trusteeship (mutawalli) and oversight to align with Islamic jurisprudence. The imposition of non-Muslim members, who lack doctrinal competence, into governance structures constitutes state interference in religious practice, undermining the constitutional guarantee of autonomy under Article 26(b). This contrasts starkly with the state’s hands-off approach to Hindu religious endowments (governed by state-specific Acts) or Christian charitable trusts, which retain exclusive denominational control. Such discriminatory singling out of Muslim institutions violates the equality clause (Article 14) and perpetuates an asymmetrical application of secularism, reducing it to majoritarian appeasement.

Further, the bill’s transfer of authority to declare properties as Waqf from Waqf Boards to government-appointed officials (e.g., District Commissioners) represents an unconstitutional usurpation of quasi-judicial functions by the executive. Under the 1995 Act, Waqf Tribunals, specialized bodies with expertise in Islamic law, adjudicate disputes to ensure doctrinal fidelity. By shifting this power to bureaucrats, the bill violates principles of natural justice, as state officials lack the theological and legal expertise required to interpret Waqf deeds (waqfiyya). This undermines the rule of law by replacing specialized tribunals with a politicized executive, risking arbitrary or biased decisions contrary to Article 14’s guarantee of equality before law. It also infringes on due process under Article 21, as disputes over religious endowments demand adjudication by bodies versed in the relevant religious law— a safeguard denied to Muslims alone. This move mirrors broader efforts to dilute minority institutions through bureaucratic overreach, setting a dangerous precedent for state control over all religious trusts.

The bill’s enhanced scrutiny of Waqf properties— absent parallel measures for Hindu, Sikh, or Christian trusts— violates the essential secular character of India’s constitutional framework. The state’s selective intervention in Muslim endowments, under the guise of “transparency” or “modernization,” constitutes invidious discrimination under Article 15(1), which prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion. This discrimination is exacerbated by the broader socio-political context, including the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (CAA), which excludes Muslims from its purview; proposals for a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) targeting Muslim personal law; and demolitions of Muslim-owned properties under municipal pretexts. Such systemic marginalization reveals a pattern of legislative othering, reducing secularism to a majoritarian tool and violating Article 25’s guarantee of freedom of conscience and free profession of religion.

The bill’s delegation of Waqf governance to non-expert bureaucrats exceeds the permissible limits of delegated legislation under constitutional jurisprudence. In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015), the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that core functions of specialized bodies cannot be transferred to the executive without violating separation of powers. Similarly, in India, the Supreme Court in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee (1995) held that the judiciary’s independence is sacrosanct. By dismantling Waqf Tribunals, the bill subverts institutional autonomy, rendering it ultra vires the doctrine of separation of powers.

India’s obligations under Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which protect minorities’ rights to religious and cultural autonomy, are further breached by the bill. The UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues has repeatedly cautioned against laws that “disproportionately affect religious minorities under the guise of governance reforms”—a descriptor fitting the Waqf Bill.

With over 600,000 registered Waqf properties valued at ₹1.2 lakh crore, the Muslim community relies on these assets for educational, healthcare, and housing support. By transferring control to state actors, the bill risks alienation of Waqf lands through mismanagement or outright expropriation, deepening socio-economic disparities. This violates Article 39(b) of the Directive Principles, which mandates equitable distribution of community resources.

The Waqf (Amendment) Bill is not merely a regulatory overhaul but a calculated erosion of minority rights that weaponizes state machinery to dilute Islamic institutions. Its provisions contravene constitutional guarantees of equality, secularism, and religious freedom, while aligning with a broader agenda of marginalizing Muslims. If enacted, it would institutionalize discrimination, erode trust in governance, and further fracture India’s pluralist ethos. Judicial intervention is imperative to scrutinize the bill’s constitutionality, safeguard minority rights, and uphold the Basic Structure doctrine against majoritarian encroachment. The state must withdraw this pernicious legislation and reaffirm its commitment to equality—not merely in rhetoric, but in constitutional practice.

Arbitrary Arrests of Mahbubul Hoque Expose Politically Motivated Legal Persecution

2025-03-18T19:13:00.002+05:30

The repeated arrests of Mahbubul Hoque, Chancellor of the University of Science and Technology Meghalaya (USTM), in early 2025 reflect a glaring pattern of procedural abuse, jurisdictional overreach, and politically motivated harassment, rather than a legitimate legal process. While the allegations against Hoque— primarily centered on unproven claims of exam fraud at a CBSE-affiliated school in Assam— remain conspicuously unsupported by publicly disclosed evidence, the actions of Assam authorities violate fundamental legal principles, including due process, presumption of innocence, and protection against double jeopardy.

1. Procedural Irregularities and Abuse of Process:

Hoque’s arrests follow a troubling pattern of legal arbitrariness. After his initial arrest on February 21, 2025, the Gauhati High Court granted him bail on March 3 in one case, only for Assam Police to keep him detained under a second FIR from Sribhumi. When the High Court granted bail in the second case on March 12 and explicitly barred his arrest in three additional FIRs, Sonitpur Police circumvented the court’s order by filing a new case on March 14, ensuring his continued custody. This cycle of “arrest-on-bail” demonstrates a deliberate strategy to weaponize the legal system. Legal experts argue that such serial FIRs, filed across disparate districts (Gossaigaon, Kokrajhar, Barpeta, Sonitpur), constitute a blatant misuse of power to harass rather than investigate.

2. Politically Charged Rhetoric Undermines Rule of Law:

Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma’s inflammatory rhetoric—including baseless accusations of “flood jihad” and calling Hoque a “big fraud”— has irreparably prejudiced the legal process. Sarma’s unsubstantiated claim that USTM’s construction caused flash floods in Guwahati is not only scientifically absurd but also emblematic of a broader campaign to vilify Hoque and delegitimize USTM, a Meghalaya-based institution. His threats to bar USTM graduates from Assam government jobs further expose a retaliatory agenda, conflating governance with vendetta. Such statements, made by a sitting CM, violate the rules of propriety and principles of judicial independence, effectively turning state machinery into a tool of political persecution.

3. Lack of Evidence & Jurisdictional Overreach:

Authorities have failed to produce credible evidence linking Hoque directly to exam malpractices. The allegations hinge on vague claims of “financial corruption” and student coercion, yet no forensic audit, paper leaks, or student testimonies have been disclosed. Meanwhile, the jurisdictional validity of Assam’s actions is questionable: the Central Public School in Patharkandi is part of Hoque’s ERDF network, which operates across multiple states. By contrast, Meghalaya CM Conrad Sangma has reaffirmed USTM’s legitimacy, noting its NAAC accreditation and recognition by the UGC, underscoring Assam’s overreach into educational matters beyond its purview.

4. Systemic Violation of Constitutional Safeguards:

The rapid filing of FIRs across districts mirrors tactics of “forum shopping” to deny Hoque access to a fair trial, infringing on Articles 14 (equality before law) and 21 (right to liberty) of the Indian Constitution. Legal scholars emphasize that bail should be the norm, not the exception, in cases lacking concrete evidence. Hoque’s prolonged detention without trial—coupled with the Assam government’s refusal to comply with High Court restraints—signals a collapse of constitutional governance.

5. Interstate Political Tensions:

The stark contrast between Assam’s punitive actions and Meghalaya’s defense of USTM highlights the arrest campaign’s politicized nature. Sarma’s targeting of Hoque aligns with longstanding tensions between Assam and Meghalaya over territorial and administrative autonomy, reducing law enforcement to a tool of regional rivalry.

Conclusion: A Dangerous Precedent:

The persecution of Mahbubul Hoque represents a flagrant assault on judicial integrity and educational autonomy. Rather than upholding justice, Assam’s actions reflect a politically orchestrated effort to silence a prominent minority educator and undermine a neighboring state’s institution. Civil society, legal bodies, and national authorities must condemn this abuse of power, demand immediate transparency in investigations, and reaffirm the constitutional rights shielding citizens from state-sponsored harassment. Until credible evidence is presented, Hoque’s detention must be recognized for what it is: arbitrary, illegal, and a threat to democracy itself

Breathe right

2025-02-02T18:58:00.000+05:30

just breathe right

and survive the night.

the sun setting down,

over the mountain crown,

means it will be light,

just after the night.

the darkness does never,

it doesn't last forever.

it is the morning

that comes after the mourning.

the darkness and the coldness

will be replaced by light and freshness.

just breathe right

and survive the night.

there it is life in the morrow

an end to all misery and sorrow

death and decay will be away

and democracy will rule the day.

CoViD 19: A case for releasing inmates of Assam detention camps

2020-05-06T21:20:00.000+05:30

All the six detention centers meant for declared foreign nationals in the northeastern state of India are inside congested prisons with no concept of social distancing. Detainees have hardly any rights and no waged work or parole. They must be released in the process of decongestion of prisons.

By Arijit Sen

Illustration by Priya Kuriyan

Attempts are on across India to try and prevent the spread of COVID-19 pandemic. There’s a lockdown in place. Physical distancing, a luxury for many, is imperative, and so is personal hygiene. In this fight, poor migrants and daily wage laborers have been dehumanized. Treated with indignity, they have been stranded without work, money, food or a roof above their heads, left to fend for themselves. The lockdown, unplanned and sudden, has been a lethal blow for them.

In the first week of the lockdown, 27 Indians died according to the National Campaign Against Torture. Inside the detention centers meant to incarcerate foreigners in Assam in India’s northeast, this tale of horror assumes an even more terrible face. The hunt for foreigners or illegal migrants in Assam has been going on for many years. From 1979 to 1985, Assam witnessed a widespread and violent anti-foreigner movement that demanded detection of foreigners, their deletion from voter lists and their deportation to neighboring Bangladesh. The implicit assumption was equating foreigners with Bangladeshis. The Assam agitation ended with the signing of the Assam Accord in 1985, which led to special provisions to determine Indian citizenship that was were only applicable to Assam. The agitation also had a demand to use the National Register of Citizens (NRC) 1951 that was based on the census of the same year to create a legal list of citizens. That demand for an NRC re-emerged and was set in motion in 2014, after the Supreme Court directed the state government to update the NRC list. Those not on the list have to face Foreigners’ Tribunals to prove their citizenship. In Assam, the Border Police and the State Election Commission can send notices to citizens suspected to be foreigners. The burden of proof lies on those marked as alleged foreigners; a failure to do so, leads them to the detention centers. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 (CAA) also lies within this chase for foreigners.

The detainees, packed in overcrowded rooms, are vulnerable at the best of times. Now it’s even worse. On 25 March 2020, a Guwahati-based organization called Justice and Liberty Initiative submitted a representation before the Chief Justice of India, seeking the release of all detainees, all of them in custody after being declared foreign nationals.

Lawyer Aman Wadud, who heads the organization, told me, that they can’t be sitting ducks for an infection that the entire world is trying to fight. “Detention centers are crowded. When the entire country is practicing social distancing, why should detainees live in crowded places? Often people are detained and sent to detention centers, what if they carry contagious diseases? Under any circumstance detaining declared foreigners, the way it is done in Assam, is unreasonable. In these testing times, let a historical wrong be corrected.”

Detainees face punishment meant for criminals. In crowded prisons, rights of detainees are erased every day to the point of being non-existent.There are 802 detainees lodged in six detention centers across Assam. At least ten people died in these centers in 2019 alone. There has been a total of 30 deaths since 2016 in Assam. People who have spent time in the centers agree that they are worse than hell. There is no segregation between undertrials, convicts and detainees. There is overcrowding and absence of basic hygiene. Detainees face punishment meant for criminals. In crowded prisons, rights of detainees are erased every day to the point of being non-existent. The centers are almost like spaces of legal exception and indifference. A 2018 report on the six detention centers in Assam submitted by a former special monitor to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Harsh Mander, clearly established how these centers are overcrowded. Mander resigned and made the report public after no action was taken by the NHRC. The report pointed out that the state did not make any distinction between detention centers and jails. The detention centers are in fact inside jail premises and the detainees add to the number of people who are incarcerated. According to the latest statistics available with the Ministry of Home Affairs’ National Crime Records Bureau, the general occupancy rates in all jails in Assam are at 93.2 per cent. In district jails of Assam, the percentage is at 103.03. Silchar, Goalpara, Tezpur, Kokrajhar, Dibrugarh, and Jorhat are all district jails inside which the detention centers are situated. A six-feet social distancing is an impossibility in such circumstances of congestion.

“Reaching the camp, I saw that there was no proper food, we didn’t get any bathing soap or oil or any such thing. We used to only get soaps that are used to wash clothes, the cheap ones. They used to give us food, which was fit for dogs and cats,” Ashraf Ali, a former detainee at the Goalpara detention center in Assam, told me when we met some time ago.

With him was his neighbor Kismat. Both of them had been sent to the same detention center, one of six in Assam meant for people declared as foreign nationals by the Foreigners’ Tribunals. That these tribunals exist to serve the government’s cause and not those of the people is an open secret.

“The room had a capacity of 40 people, but when we reached there it was filled with around 120 people. There was no space, we had to live on top of one another,” Kismat told me. “Ashraf and I slept next to the bathroom. It was dirty, we couldn’t sleep at all. Each of us had around two-two-and-a-half-feet of space. We were threatened. The convicts get much bigger beds. At that time, we were all put together – we shared space with convicts, all mixed. Each day the numbers increased. It was very hot, there was a fan, but it didn’t work. There was no space or peace.”

The rooms Kismat mentioned were roughly 80 feet by 21 feet–for 120 people. Ashraf and Kismat have left, but nothing has changed in the six detention centers, even in 2020.

Technically, declared foreigners are detained not as a punishment but to wait before they are deported to their alleged country of citizenship. It’s like a waiting hall, Wadud adds, “but it is apparent that deportation is not foreseeable. In the last six years only four declared foreigners have been deported. If deportation is not possible, why detain them? Hence we feel that they should be released from the detention centers.”

The treatment of detainees follows the pattern of stigmatization faced by people suspected to be foreigners in Assam for decades. There have been innumerable instances of genuine citizens being marked as “suspects,” as “foreigners” and then being harassed by a mob.All these detainees are tried under The Foreigners Act 1946, which provides for non-incarcerative alternatives such as requiring a person to reside at a particular place, imposing restrictions on movement, requiring the person to check in with authorities periodically, prohibiting the person from associating with certain people or engaging in certain activities. Yet, as pointed out by Amnesty International, detention has become the default option in Assam. The government plans to set up ten more detention centers. The treatment of detainees follows the pattern of stigmatization faced by people suspected to be foreigners in Assam for decades. There have been innumerable instances of genuine citizens being marked as “suspects,” as “foreigners” and then being harassed by a mob. There are a hundred Foreigners’ Tribunals in Assam, which decide if a person is a foreigner or not (or Indian or not). The burden of proof is on the person suspected to be a foreigner, or an infiltrator. Before this, a person suspected of being an illegal migrant was tried under the Illegal Migration (Determination by Tribunal) Act 1983 that was enacted as a response to the Assam agitation. The burden of proof was then on the state agency or whoever accused a person as being a foreigner. This was challenged before the Supreme Court and struck down, in 2005, as being too lenient.

This process of finding an illegal migrant has been in the spotlight because of a citizenship drive called the National Register of Citizens (NRC) that puts together a legal list of citizens. The process has been found to be deeply biased and in violation of basic constitutional rights granted to all Indian citizens: 1.9 million people in Assam have been left out of it and have to prove their citizenship. At the end of the process there is the prospect of overcrowded detention centers and statelessness for thousands.

Why can’t detainees be released?

The Supreme Court of India recently took suo motu cognizance of a writ-petition on overcrowding at prisons in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak. The Court underlined that in India’s 1,339 prisons, there are at least 466,084 inmates and, according to the National Crime Records Bureau, the occupancy rate is at 117.6 %. The Court further noted that in closed spaces such as prisons the chances of the COVID-19 virus spreading is high. It puts at risk not only the prisoners — old and new — but every single person associated with the prison. “We are of the opinion that there is an imminent need to take steps on an urgent basis to prevent the contagion of COVID-19 virus in our prisons,” the Court said.

The state of Uttar Pradesh, where overcrowding stands at 176.5%, has decided to release 11,000 prisoners from 71 facilities. This includes 8,500 undertrials and 2,500 convicts. All of them, face jail terms of seven years or less and hence, according to the Supreme Court’s instructions, are eligible for release. Maharashtra has decided to release 11,000 prisoners from its 60 jails. Prisoners have also been released from Delhi’s Tihar Jail. In West Bengal, 3,076 prisoners have been released. Assam has also released 722 undertrials.

In a 2013 judgment (Thana Singh versus Central Bureau of Narcotics), the Supreme Court made an important observation about a person in a prison awaiting trial. The plight of the undertrial, said the Court, gains focus “only on a solicitous enquiry by this Court, and soon after, quickly fades into the backdrop.” In this context, the story of Machan Lalung in Assam is relevant. A member of the Tiwa community in Arunachal Pradesh, Machan was in prison for 54 years without any specific charge or facing trial. He was released in 2005 and died two years later. India’s undertrial population (the third highest in Asia) and those who are in the six detention centers of Assam face the same indifference with which Machan was treated. It is ironic that it has come to the deadly COVID-19 pandemic to bring focus back on these lives in incarceration.

Detainees should be released on personal recognizance bond irrespective of how many years they were in detention because they are not criminals.The recent Supreme Court order says that prisons across India are overcrowded thus social distancing is an impossibility. The Court underlines that “contagious viruses such as COVID-19 virus proliferate in closed spaces such as prisons. Studies also establish that prison inmates are highly prone to contagious viruses. The rate of ingress and egress in prisons is very high, especially since persons (accused, convicts, detenues etc.) are brought to the prisons on a daily basis.” Detainees inside these prisons cannot be the exception to that observation. When it comes to detainees, the Assam government in its White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue (published on 20 October 2012 when there were only three detention centers) approved the use of detention for those declared as ‘“irregular foreigners”’ to restrict their movements and to ensure that they “do not perform the act of vanishing.” The reason was to keep a tab on individuals declared as foreigners, but for this detention is not required, says advocate Oliullah Laskar. “It can be done if they are released on bail.” Both Oliullah and Wadud agree that there has been no initiative on the part of the Government of India in respect of their deportation. During our interview, Oliullah recalls a Supreme Court panel on prison conditions headed by Justice Amitav Roy set up in 2018. It had recommended, among other things, that people who are otherwise entitled to bail and are unable to arrange surety should be released on a Personal Recognizance Bond.This is important in the context of former Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi’s direction to release detainees who were in detention for more than three years on a surety of INR 200,000. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court also held that bail cannot be made conditional upon heavy deposits beyond the financial capacity of an applicant for bail. (Dhanapal versus State, (2019) 6 SCC 743). Detainees should be released on personal recognizance bond irrespective of how many years they were in detention because they are not criminals. So far, Assam has only released undertrials.

A few months ago, I visited the site for an upcoming detention center in Assam’s Goalpara district. The project is in a 300,000-square-feet area and is designed to house 3,000 detainees — women, children and men. It will be the largest detention center in India: unreal, dystopian; high walls, watchtowers, searchlights; the signs of a dehumanized space ready to take away and wipe out rights. The place reminded me of a conversation with a doctor who was treating detainees at a center in Assam two years ago. “Most of the detainees suffer from depression,” he told me. “The main shortcomings in detention centers are that the environment is not healthy. They are not criminals, and yet the jail security guards treat them as criminals.” Former detainees, I met, had stories of fellow detainees suffering from brain-short disease — a word they use for acute psychosis, or even madness.

“Inside [the center where I was detained] there were 30-40 women in the room. There were very old people. 50-, 60-, even 80-year old people. There were young children too with their mothers. People used to cry a lot. Some of the women went hungry. There was immense sadness,” Rashminara Begum, a former detainee told me about two years ago, while recalling her time at in a detention center.

Photo by Arijit Sen

In December 2019, I met Manikjan Bibi and Ashida Bibi in Bongaigaon. Manikjan was sent to a detention center by a Foreigners Tribunal and had been there for four years. She was released only after the Supreme Court’s direction to release those detainees who had spent more than three years in detention. She has to report to the local police station every week. Her name appeared on the final list of the National Register of Citizens but was removed after “‘someone”’ filed an objection. “At the detention center, I felt like I was in a graveyard. I have documents. I was born in India. My father and grandfather are Indians. I don’t know what else I should do,” she told me. Manikjan’s neighbor Ashida Bibi was also sent to a detention center for a year. Her husband died while she was inside, and she was not allowed to attend his funeral despite her requests. Ashida now works as a daily wage laborer. “I have all the documents,” she insists, “I still don’t know why I was sent to a detention center. My life has been destroyed.”

Inside the detention centers there are many others whose lives have been destroyed. They are stuck without any clue as to why they are there and are desperate to get out of the congested rooms.

According to Dr. Saptak Sarkar, a junior resident at Diamond Harbour Medical College and Hospital in West Bengal, congested rooms will fail to maintain all the criteria specified by either the Center for Disease Control for Interim Management in Correctional or Detention facilities or by the Ministry of Health in India for the COVID-19 prevention. “The virus mainly transmits through droplets emitting from other persons’ cough or sneezes; from direct contact or contact with used object and body fluid of COVID-19 positive individuals. Hence, the practice of social distancing and maintenance of proper hygiene in camps can prevent the spread many folds if not cease the spread for good.” It is therefore imperative need to free the detainees.

In response to the current emergency, there has also been a call from another NGO, the Committee for Justice and Peace, to convert that site for the new detention center into a hospital to treat COVID-19 patients, a sensible idea at a time when dignity and hope for the poor seem to be absent from lockdown policies. In addition to this, if the government has a change of heart and releases the detainees as Wadud demands, then perhaps this moment of crisis could be a small step towards something good.

Justice and Liberty Initiative’s application will be heard by the Supreme Court on 13 April 2020. In another petitionfiled by detainee Rajubala Das, the Court has issued notices to the Central Government and the Assam Government to file their reply and the matter will again be considered on the same date.

In Assam, lives have been lost, migrants have been stigmatized, people viewed with suspicion in the citizenship debate. This crisis, though, can be an opportunity, a page-turner for the detainees in Assam. Will the people in power do the right thing, though?

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Arijit Sen is an independent journalist based in Kolkata. Over the years he has been covering the northeast as a reporter and researcher, apart from traveling the region during a stint with Amnesty International. He tweets @senarijit.

The essay was first published in the Polis Project and it is reposted here verbatim for wider dissemination. The original piece can be accessed here.

Immigration and demographic transformation of Assam

2018-04-29T10:54:00.000+05:30

Susanta Krishna Dass studied the problem of immigration and demographic transformation of Assam and published a paper with the findings that:

(1) Since 1951, the rate of increase of Assam's population has been much higher than that of the country as a whole or of any state or province. But unlike in other states, this heavy increase has been due to (a) an acceleration of the natural rate of increase; (b) influx of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan; and (c) heavier migration of Indians from the rest of the country.

(2) The tremendous swelling in the number of the, Assamese speaking population during 1911-31 as a consequence of people belonging to other language groups adopting Assamese language is a unique instance of its kind.

(3) Apprehensions about the infiltration of Bangladeshi or East Pakistani Muslims into Assam appear not to be supported by facts. The fact is that while it was mainly the Bengali Muslims, motivated by economic as well as political factors, who migrated to Assam between 1891 and 1947, such migration as has taken place' since 1947, almost entirely due to political reasons, has been of Bengali Hindus.

On the specific problem of Muslim infiltration he had to say:

There is a general and widely held apprehension, both in Assam and in the rest of the country, about 'Muslim infiltration' in the state. "The frustration is further fueled by fears that in the not too distant future, they may be swamped by 'foreign nationals', mostly Muslims from Bangladesh". It is presumed that such Muslim 'infiltrators' into Assam got assimilated with the Assamese speaking population following the practice of their predecessors.

If this presumption is correct, two things must follow. First, being an addition to the bonafide Muslim, nationals living in Assam, and given their natural rate of increase which is generally higher than that of the Hindus, there should have been a steep rise in the Muslim population of Assam, at least at a rate higher than that of the Muslim population in the rest of the country. Secondly, since these are supposed to have adopted Assamese, there should have been an equally steep hike in the Assamese speaking population. It has been found above that between 1951-71, there was no hike in the Assamese speaking population and the rate of increase was quite normal in the decade 1961-71. This part of the presumption is thus not tenable.

Table 9 presents the distribution of Assam's population by religion, all other conditions remaining same as those of Table 7. The Table shows that between 1951-71, Muslim population of Assam varied almost at par with its Hindu counterpart. There was no hike. This is further confirmed by the fact that during the decade 1961-71, the Muslim population declined by --0.74 per cent of the total population of the state, the link relative rate of variation also being lower than that for the Hindus and the Christians. This, along with the slow natural rate of increase of the Assamese speaking population, shows that the apprehension of 'infiltration' of 'Bengali Muslims' between 1951-71 is not statistically
valid. An interesting corroborating factor that emerges out of Table 9 is that other than between 1911-31, the increase of the Muslim population was never higher than that of its Hindu counterpart. This tallies with the huge immigration of Bengali Muslim cultivators
that took place between 1911-31.

When the distribution of population by religion of Assam for the decade 1961-71 is compared with that of India, it is found that (i) the Hindu population of India as percentage of total population declined during this period by --0.78 per cent while that of Assam increased by 1.18 per cent; (ii) the Muslim population of India went up by 0.50 per cent while that of Assam declined by --0.74 per cent; (iii) the Christian population of Assam increased at a faster rate than that of India and (iv) rate of increase was lowest for the Muslims of Assam compared to the Hindus and the Christians. All these are evident from Table 10.

These lower figures for the Muslim population of Assam in all respects compared to those for the Indian Muslims also confirms that apprehensions about 'infiltration' of 'Bangladeshi Muslims' are not factually tenable. This also reveals that since the people opting for adoption, namely, the Bengali Muslims, have become scarce, the Assamese language has failed to swell since 1951.

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 15, No. 19 (May 10, 1980), pp. 850-859

Law relating to cow slaughter in Assam

2017-04-07T08:43:00.000+05:30

They have started cow vigilatism in Assam also. According to a report, three people, including a minor, were arrested from Jorhat town in Assam on April 4 for carrying beef and thereby hurting the religious sentiments of some people. The first incident is by police in the name of law enforcement. But there are concerns that the private groups of vigilantes may start to go on the rampage like in the states of North India.

So, it is better to have a look at the law relating to cow slaughter in Assam.

In North East India there is no law prohibiting or regulating cow slaughter in the states of Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Tripura and Nagaland.

But not in Assam. In the state there is a state legislation called the Assam Cattle Preservation Act, 1950 that prohibits slaughter of certain types of cattle. The Act defines “cattle” as `Bulls, bullocks, cows, calves, male and female buffaloes and buffalo calves. Section 5 provides that the cattle can only be slaughtered on a certificate of ‘fit for slaughter’ given by a veterinary officer for the area if cattle is over 14 years of age or has become permanently incapacitated for work or breeding due to injury, deformity or any incurable disease and according to section 6 such cattle can be slaughtered only in places specified for this purpose. The offence under the Act may attract punishment of imprisonment up to maximum of 6 months or fine of up to Rs 1,000 or both and it is a cognisable offence.

However, section 13 empowers the state government to to impose, exempt from the operation of this Act, the slaughter of any cattle for any religious, ceremonial, medical research or any other purposes. It also states that “the operation of the Act will not be applicable to the slaughter of any cattle on the occasion of Id-uz-Zuha festival on such conditions as the State Government may specify regarding privacy”.

It is obvious that the Act does not absolutely prohibit slaughter of cow. It only regulates cattle slaughter. But the provisions are vulnerable to be misused. The problem is that they don't much care for the laws. The law nowhere prohibits carrying and eating of beef.

Muslim women voting for Yogi Adityanath should be the last nail in the coffin of triple talaq

2017-03-26T17:19:00.000+05:30

It is claimed that many Muslim women in UP voted for Yogi Adityanath's BJP. Yes, the Yogi whose supporters, in his presence, asked Hindus to excavate graves of Muslim women and rape their dead bodies. They voted him, it is said, because Adityanath promised to protect them from the scrouge of triple talaq.

If there is even an iota of truth in this claim it should have dealt a huge blow along the spine, if they have any, of the community compelling them to seriously work on the issue of triple talaq and other laws and practices oppressive and unjust to women.

I don't see any reasons to disbelief this claim as something similar happened during the first part of 20th century. This was before passing of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. Muslim law as it was practised at that time didn't provide for ways to get rid of husbands even if it was not possible for the women to continue to live with their husbands except by committing suicide, or becoming apostate. The later was far more easier as Christian missionaries also came to their rescue. Women only need to utter some words declaring their unbelief of Islam. Muftis would declare them apostate and consequently their marriages dissolved. Women increasingly resrted to this device.

This dealt a huge blow to the Muslim leaders and intellectuals of the time. The philosopher and poet Allama Muhammad Iqbal led a campaign for reforms of relevant parts of the Muslim law forcing a conservative Deobandi Mufti like Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi to revise the laws/fatwas. In 1931, after several years of extensive consultations with muftis in India and abroad, he published a long fatwa entitled "al-Hilat al-Najiza li'l-Halilat al-'Ajiza" (A Successful Legal Device for the Helpless Wife). In the revised fatwa, Maulana Thanvi argued that apostasy did not annul the marriage contract and could not be used as a legal device. He agreed that judicial divorce might be used to provide relief to Hanafi Muslim women, invoking Maliki doctrine in support of this point. (See Muhammad Khalid Masud, "Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas" (Harvard University Press, 1996) Chapter Sixteen, pp. 193-203.)

This booklet provided the basis of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. The Act provides for ten grounds for Muslim women to obtain a decree of the dissolution of marriage from a court of law. A decree for dissolving marriage made avaialable for the reasons that for a term of four years the particulars about the husband are unknown, the woman has been abandoned by the husband or he failed to provide maintenance for the woman for a term of two years, the husband has married another woman contravening the provisions of Muslim Family laws Ordinance, 1961, the husband has been subject to imprisonment for a term of seven years or more etc., the nonperformance of marital obligations, impotency, insanity, leprosy, virulent venereal disease, cruelty etc. or any other legal causes can be taken as ground for getting divorce. This Act is still in force.

It is obvious that this time there is no Muslim intellectual who has the courage to follow the foot steps of Allama Iqbal and lead a campaign and force the likes of Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi to revisit the laws and abolish triple talaq and polygamy.

Assam: Farce of NRC updation may lead millions to statelessness

2015-07-03T00:40:00.000+05:30

Updating process of NRC (National Register of Citizens) is going on in Assam. Those who have their names in 1951 NRC, any electoral rolls issued upto 1971 or any other of the 14 documents mentioned in application form are eligible to be included in the updated NRC.

Parts of 1951 NRC and some electoral rolls of pre-1971 period have been made available online and termed "legacy data".

The NRC which is under preparation is not a new NRC. It is an updating process of 1951 NRC which was prepared on the basis of census data of 1951. However, section 15 of the Census Act, 1948 says that records of census are not admissible in evidence notwithstanding anything contrary in the India Evidence Act, 1872. Moreover, 1951 NRC data for many areas of the state are not available. Not prepared at all or subsequently destroyed.

Not all electoral rolls upto 1971 are available. Only electoral rolls of 1966 and 1971 have been made available online. But they also don't cover the whole of Assam. For many areas electoral roll of 1966 is not available.

Legacy data for the districts of the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills and the Mizo Hills, which were part of Assam until they were separated in 1972 are not made available.

Apart from variations in spelling of the names and other anomalies in legacy data it has now came to light that names of many people are not found. Adivasi organisations are claiming that around 80% of their people does not have names in legacy data while authorities says that only about 10% does not have. My guesstimate is that about 20% of people of all communities may not find their names in legacy data.

The other 14 documents that can be submitted must be pre-1971 origin. How can one accept that poor people of villages in this flood affected state to preserve their pre-1971 papers. Assam is the state with highest IDPs in the world. Then, there are lakhs of landless and homeless people.

This farce of updation of NRC based on an inadmissible document, if carried to its conclusion and is taken as the basis of citizenship, may drive about 20% of about 31 million people to statelessness.

Supreme Court diecrtives regarding arrest of accused by police for offences punishable with seven years imprisonment or less

2015-06-28T21:41:00.001+05:30

Supreme Court Guidelines regarding arrests of the accused by the police in cases punishable with 7 years imprisonment or less issued Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar and Another (Criminal Appeal No. 1277 of 2014):

1.All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41, Cr.PC;

2. All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub- clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);

3. The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;

4. The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;

5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of Cr.PC be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

7. Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

8. Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.

9. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the cases under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years; whether with or without fine.

10. We direct that a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Chief Secretaries as also the Director Generals of Police of all the State Governments and the Union Territories and the Registrar General of all the High Courts for onward transmission and ensuring its compliance.

Sex work: To criminalize or to decriminalize?

2014-12-07T15:25:00.000+05:30

National Commission for Women is pushing for a bill to legalise sex work. Activists argue that it will not address the problems faced by the women in flesh trade. According to them, it will increase the exploitation of sex workers by those who manage brothels as well as by the law-enforcement officials, as it is happening now. They are concerned that in a country like India where farmers are driven to commit suicide and tea workers are literally dying of hunger, legalisation of sex work will increase trafficking in women and children. It will be difficult to determine who are forced into the trade and who have freely chosen it as an occupation when they are living in a condition of famine and slavery.

By the way, speaking of free choice, I am reminded of the public stand of present NCW chief on the matter. She is on record saying that women should not assert their autonomy because they may face backlash from the biased society. It is another matter that the statutory body headed by her is mandated to protect the rights of women against the prejudices of society and not the other way around.

This NCW wants to legalise sex work apparently to protect rights and interests of women in the trade.

However, before we take any legislative actions we need to understand what is involved in flesh trade and how it is infringing rights of women.

Radical feminists hold that prostitution and pornography are aspects of male violence against women. Not only the individual women involved are subjected to degrading treatments and dehumanisation but the women as a collective is dehumanised by the practice of prostitution and pornography.

However, I feel more inclined to agree with the understanding of prostitution by the Swedish lawmakers. They say "In Sweden prostitution is regarded as an aspect of male violence against women and children. It is officially acknowledged as a form of exploitation of women and children and constitutes a significant social problem... gender equality will remain unattainable so long as men buy, sell and exploit women and children by prostituting them."

And their solution?

In 1999, after years of research and study, Sweden passed a legislation that a) criminalizes the buying of sex, and b) decriminalizes the selling of sex.

I think India can effectively deal with the problem in Swedish way.

Stopping supply of subsidised foodgrains for tea workers causes serious concerns

2014-12-06T13:43:00.000+05:30

The Union Government of India has decided to stop supply of subsidised foodgrains for tea garden workers through FCI.*

This is a very very unfortunate development. It may cause mass starvation deaths of tea workers in Assam. Particularly in those tea estates which are closed now.

Even in the gardens which are producing, labourers are paid as less as Rs 75/- per day. It is barely possible to maintain physical existence of a family of 4/5 persons on this money. They get some help from ICDS, MGNREGA and PDS rations. If MGNREGA is reduced and ration is stopped there is nothing to stop mass starvation deaths, I am afraid.

In a span of a few months in 2012/13 we documented as many as 32 hunger deaths in a single tea estate in South Assam. The estate was closed. After our intervention it was opened. A compensation to the tune of Rs 1700000/- was provided to the next of kins of some of the deceased workers. Some other ameliorative actions were also taken. It was a temporary relief in practical sense. Technically the government closed the chapter.

During documentation we came to know that due to the closure of the work provisions of government subsidised rations were also stopped. The foodgrains were provided to the owner of the tea gardens under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and who in turn distributed it to the workers who were the intended beneficiaries.

The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) heard and disposed of our complaint about these hunger deaths in its camp sitting in Guwahati last year. In the second day of the camp, the commission had a sitting with the local human rights defenders where I raised the issue and among other things I specifically stressed that the ration should be directly given to the labourers through their panchayats and not through the owners. The commission apparently was convinced and directed the officials present (a deputy home secretary and others) orally to consider my proposal. Though the state government kept giving us assurances but no change in the practice was made.

And now the Modi government decided to stop altogether the supply of rations to the labourers.

I am really very concerned about the tea labourers of Assam.

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* As reported by the Assam Tribune accessed at http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=dec0414/at053

Why I Support Indo-Bangla Land Boundary Agreement?

2014-12-05T20:04:00.000+05:30

The Indo-Bangla Land Boundary Agreement is a mere formality. But this formality will end virtual statelessness of more than 51 thousand people.

According to a report, 37,334 Indians are residing in 111 enclaves in Bangladesh that spread over 17,000 acres and 14,215 Bangladeshi people are residing in 51 enclaves in India that spread over 7,110 acres. As these 51,549 people are living in land-locked parcels of land situated within another country they can not exercise and avail any of the rights and amenities which citizens are provided with by the constitution and laws of their respective countries. They are virtually stateless people.

The Land Boundary Agreement was first signed by Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1974 stipulated that both countries would exchange the enclaves of land that both countries had within each other's territory. India even agreed to forgo compensation for land that would be transferred to Bangladesh. India would lose about 40 square kilometres of land. But it is a matter of formality since there is no sensible ways to use these lands as they sit in small enclaves within another country.

As per the agreement, people living in the enclaves would be given a choice either to go to their country or to stay where they were living by becoming the citizens of that country. It is reported that no significant exchange of population would be involved as people reportedly wanted to stay where they were living for generations.

Bangladesh parliament ratified the agreement but India did not. When, after decades, the Manmohan Singh government attempted to move the constitutional amendment bill required for ratification of the agreement in parliament in 2013, it was strongly opposed by BJP and regional parties like TMC and AGP.

But now that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs tabled its report in which it recommended that the constitution amendement bill be moved to end the boundary issue between the two nations and the Prime Minister also announced his intention to go ahead with the bill, I hope, it will be passed and these 51 thousand odd stateless people will get some relief.