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    <title>RiskPundit</title>
    
    
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    <updated>2010-06-13T19:07:09-04:00</updated>
    <subtitle>Thoughts and opinion on IT Security issues from a practical Risk Management perspective</subtitle>
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    <atom10:link xmlns:atom10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/Riskpundit" /><feedburner:info xmlns:feedburner="http://rssnamespace.org/feedburner/ext/1.0" uri="riskpundit" /><atom10:link xmlns:atom10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" rel="hub" href="http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/" /><atom10:link xmlns:atom10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" rel="hub" href="http://hubbub.api.typepad.com/" /><entry>
        <title>HoneyBot - Automated IRC Social Engineering</title>
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/06/honeybot-automated-irc-social-engineering.html" />
        <link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/06/honeybot-automated-irc-social-engineering.html" thr:count="0" />
        <id>tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a01157148a11a970c01348414b8c4970c</id>
        <published>2010-06-13T19:07:09-04:00</published>
        <updated>2010-06-13T19:07:09-04:00</updated>
        <summary>IRC-Junkie is reporting that researchers at TU Wien (Vienna University of Technology, Austria) have developed a software program that performs a "man-in-the-middle" attack between IRC users causing them to click on malicious links at a 76% click rate. As opposed to impersonating a user and attempting to perform one side of the conversation, this program sits between two users and simply makes changes to the words and inserts malicious links. The so called "HoneyBot" is capable of influencing the ongoing conversation by “dropping, inserting, or modifying messages” and the researchers assert that “if links (or questions) are inserted into such...</summary>
        <author>
            <name>riskpundit</name>
        </author>
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Social Engineering" />
        
        
<content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en-US" xml:base="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>IRC-Junkie is <a href="http://www.irc-junkie.org/2010-06-11/researchers-develop-honeybot-social-engineer-irc-users-automatically/" mce_href="http://www.irc-junkie.org/2010-06-11/researchers-develop-honeybot-social-engineer-irc-users-automatically/" target="_blank">reporting </a>that researchers at TU Wien (Vienna 
University of Technology, Austria) have developed a software program 
that performs a "man-in-the-middle" attack between IRC users causing 
them to click on malicious links at a 76% click rate. As opposed to 
impersonating a user and attempting to perform one side of the 
conversation, this program sits between two users and simply makes 
changes to the words and inserts malicious links.</p>
<blockquote><p>The so called "HoneyBot" is capable of influencing the 
ongoing conversation by <em>“dropping, inserting, or modifying messages”</em>
 and the researchers assert that <em>“if links (or questions) are 
inserted into such a conversation, they will seem to originate from a 
human user”</em> and therefore the click-probability will be <em>“higher 
than in artificial conversation approaches”.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>It seems to me that the high click rate is due to the lack of 
knowledge that such an attack is even possible and therefore people are 
not in the least bit suspicious. If HoneyBots become more prevalent, 
people will be more on guard.</p>
<p>In any case, approach each link cautiously - hover over the link and 
inspect the URL that is displayed at the bottom of the browser. If you 
cannot determine exactly where the URL is going to take you, don't click
 on it.</p>
<p>Another thought, how long before we see this type of attack in the 
wild on Facebook?</p></div>
</content>



    </entry>
    <entry>
        <title>The End of Malware? Hardly.</title>
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/06/the-end-of-malware-hardly.html" />
        <link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/06/the-end-of-malware-hardly.html" thr:count="0" />
        <id>tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a01157148a11a970c01348365a8ef970c</id>
        <published>2010-06-06T18:10:49-04:00</published>
        <updated>2010-06-06T18:10:49-04:00</updated>
        <summary>Slate recently published an article entitled, "The End of Malware?" The sub-title is, "How Android, Chrome, and the iPad are shielding us from dastardly programs." The premise trotted out the usual, Windows is insecure; Android, Chrome, and the iPad are more secure because they deploy sandboxing technology, i.e. restricting an application's access to operating system resources. While this may be a good thing, it is hardly the "end of malware." Not even close.What the author is missing is the intent and motiviation of the bad guys. They go where the money is, i.e. where there is the opportunity to steal...</summary>
        <author>
            <name>riskpundit</name>
        </author>
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Malware" />
        
        
<content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en-US" xml:base="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Slate recently published an article entitled, "<a href="http://www.slate.com/id/2255917/" mce_href="http://www.slate.com/id/2255917/" target="_blank">The End of 
Malware?</a>" The sub-title is, "How Android, Chrome, and the iPad are 
shielding us from dastardly programs." The premise trotted out the 
usual, Windows is insecure; Android, Chrome, and the iPad are more 
secure because they deploy sandboxing technology, i.e. restricting an 
application's access to operating system resources.</p>
<p>While this may be a good thing, it is hardly the "end of malware." 
Not even close.What the author is missing is the intent and motiviation 
of the bad guys. They go where the money is, i.e. where there is the 
opportunity to steal cash from people's bank accounts, steal credit card
 information, steal intellectual property they can sell. At present, 
these opportunities are minimal on Android, Chrome, and iPads. Once 
there is critical mass for profitable hacking, you will definitely see 
an increase in exploits on these devices.</p>
<p>Now even with limited opportunities for profitable hacking we are 
starting to hear about vulnerabilities on these devices. Just yesterday I
 wrote about a <a href="http://www.cymbel.com/?p=601" mce_href="http://www.cymbel.com/?p=601" target="_blank">Massive iPhone 
Security Issue</a> where passcode protected content on the iPhone can be
 accessed by simply attaching the device to a computer running Ubuntu or
 OSX. Therefore, if you lose your iPhone, your passcode protection is 
useless.</p>
<p>If you need to hear more, check out the June 3 article in the Wall 
St. Journal, <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703340904575284532175834088.html?mod=rss_whats_news_technology&amp;utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wsj%2Fxml%2Frss%2F3_7015+%28WSJ.com%3A+What%27s+News+Technology%29&amp;utm_content=My+Yahoo" mce_href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703340904575284532175834088.html?mod=rss_whats_news_technology&amp;utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wsj%2Fxml%2Frss%2F3_7015+%28WSJ.com%3A+What%27s+News+Technology%29&amp;utm_content=My+Yahoo" target="_blank">Dark Side Arises for Phone Apps</a>. Here are some key 
quotes, first on Google:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>In one incident, Google pulled dozens of unauthorized 
mobile-banking apps from its Android Market in December. The apps, 
priced at $1.50, were made by a developer named "09Droid" and claimed 
to offer access to accounts at many of the world's banks. Google said 
it pulled the apps because they violated its trademark policy. </em></p>
<p><em>The apps were more useless than malicious, but could have been 
updated to capture customers' banking credentials, said John Hering, 
chief executive of Lookout, a mobile security provider. "It is becoming
 easier for the bad guys to use the app stores," Mr. Hering said.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>And on Apple:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>Apple vets applications before they appear in its App 
Store, but risks still exist. In July 2008, Apple pulled a popular game
 called Aurora Feint from its store after it was discovered to be 
uploading users' contact lists to the game maker's servers. More 
recently, it yanked hundreds of apps it said violated its policies, 
some out of security concerns.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>In conclusion, while sandboxing is a good idea, there is no silver 
bullet when it comes to security.</p></div>
</content>



    </entry>
    <entry>
        <title>Massive iPhone Security Issue</title>
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/06/massive-iphone-security-issue.html" />
        <link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/06/massive-iphone-security-issue.html" thr:count="0" />
        <id>tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a01157148a11a970c0133f03bd665970b</id>
        <published>2010-06-06T18:08:56-04:00</published>
        <updated>2010-06-06T18:08:56-04:00</updated>
        <summary>ReadWriteEnterprise is reporting that: Content stored on an iPhone 3GS with passcode protection can be accessed without the passcode simply by attaching the device to a computer running the latest version of Ubuntu or a Windows or OSX system running off the shelf software such as iPhone Explorer. This flaw was discovered by Bernd Marienfeld, an information security professional and blogger, last week. Recently, the enterprise has seen a steep increase in the adoption of the iPhone and iPad. But Apple will need to aggressively address security concerns such as these in order to gain and hold market share. Read...</summary>
        <author>
            <name>riskpundit</name>
        </author>
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Malware" />
        
        
<content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en-US" xml:base="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>ReadWriteEnterprise is reporting that:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>Content stored on an iPhone 3GS with passcode 
protection can be accessed without the passcode simply by attaching the
 device to a computer running the latest version of Ubuntu or a Windows
 or OSX system running off the shelf software such as <a href="http://www.macroplant.com/iphoneexplorer/" mce_href="http://www.macroplant.com/iphoneexplorer/">iPhone Explorer</a>.
 This flaw was <a href="http://marienfeldt.wordpress.com/2010/03/22/iphone-business-security-framework/" mce_href="http://marienfeldt.wordpress.com/2010/03/22/iphone-business-security-framework/" target="_blank">discovered </a>by Bernd Marienfeld, an information 
security professional and blogger, last week. Recently, the enterprise 
has seen a steep increase in the adoption of the <a href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/enterprise/2010/05/4-of-10-iphones-sold-to-enterp.php" mce_href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/enterprise/2010/05/4-of-10-iphones-sold-to-enterp.php" target="_blank">iPhone</a> and <a href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/cloud/2010/05/beyond-browsing-will-80-of-businesses-support-the-ipad.php" mce_href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/cloud/2010/05/beyond-browsing-will-80-of-businesses-support-the-ipad.php" target="_blank">iPad</a>. But <a href="http://apple.com/" mce_href="http://apple.com/" target="_blank">Apple</a> will need to 
aggressively address security concerns such as these in order to gain 
and hold market share</em>.</p></blockquote>
<p>Read the whole article <a href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/enterprise/2010/05/massive-iphone-security-issue-could-endanger-enterprise-adoption.php?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+readwriteenterprise+%28ReadWriteEnterprise%29" mce_href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/enterprise/2010/05/massive-iphone-security-issue-could-endanger-enterprise-adoption.php?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+readwriteenterprise+%28ReadWriteEnterprise%29" target="_blank">here</a>.</p></div>
</content>



    </entry>
    <entry>
        <title>Tabnabbing - a new variation on phishing</title>
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/tabnabbing-a-new-variation-on-phishing.html" />
        <link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/tabnabbing-a-new-variation-on-phishing.html" thr:count="0" />
        <id>tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a01157148a11a970c0133ee8679dd970b</id>
        <published>2010-05-25T17:26:33-04:00</published>
        <updated>2010-05-25T17:26:33-04:00</updated>
        <summary>Aza Raskin, the Creative Lead for Firefox, (via Ajaxian) describes a new variation on phishing called "tabnabbing," the "process of replacing the entire contents of a page while it's on a background tab." This is another example of malicious Javascript in action. Does your Secure Web Gateway vendor block this attack?</summary>
        <author>
            <name>riskpundit</name>
        </author>
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Malware" />
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Phishing" />
        
        <category scheme="http://sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" term="IT Security" />
        
<content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en-US" xml:base="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Aza Raskin, the Creative Lead for Firefox, (via <a href="http://ajaxian.com/archives/tabnabbing-phishing-by-switching-background-tab-content" target="_blank">Ajaxian</a>) <a href="http://www.azarask.in/blog/post/a-new-type-of-phishing-attack/" target="_blank">describes </a>a new variation on phishing called "tabnabbing," the "process of replacing the entire contents of a page while it's on a background tab." This is another example of malicious Javascript in action. Does your Secure Web Gateway vendor block this attack?</div>
</content>



    </entry>
    <entry>
        <title>Identity theft the old-fashioned way</title>
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/identity-theft-the-oldfashioned-way.html" />
        <link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/identity-theft-the-oldfashioned-way.html" thr:count="0" />
        <id>tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a01157148a11a970c01348179278a970c</id>
        <published>2010-05-22T18:16:15-04:00</published>
        <updated>2010-05-22T18:16:15-04:00</updated>
        <summary>We are constantly amazed at the new levels of creativity criminals apply to achieve their goals. However, sometimes the old-fashioned approaches work just as well. From the Office of Inadequate Security comes this report: Silicon Valley Eyecare Optometry and Contact Lenses State: California Approx. # of Individuals Affected: 40,000 Date of Breach: 4/02/10 Type of Breach: Theft Location of Breached Information: Network Server An FAQ on the firm’s web site says, in part: What happened? On Friday morning April 2, 2010 at 5:30 a.m., two burglars broke an outside window to the administrative area of our office at 770 Scott...</summary>
        <author>
            <name>riskpundit</name>
        </author>
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Breaches" />
        
        
<content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en-US" xml:base="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We are constantly amazed at the new levels of creativity criminals apply to achieve their goals. However, sometimes the old-fashioned approaches work just as well. From the Office of Inadequate Security comes this <a href="http://www.databreaches.net/?p=11688" target="_blank">report</a>:</p><blockquote><p><em><strong>Silicon Valley Eyecare Optometry and Contact Lenses</strong><br />
State:	 California<br />
Approx. # of Individuals Affected:	 40,000<br />
Date of Breach:	 4/02/10<br />
Type of Breach:	 Theft<br />
Location of Breached Information:	 Network Server</em></p><p><em>An FAQ on the firm’s <a href="http://sites.google.com/site/svepublicnotice/FAQs">web site</a> 
says, in part:</em></p></blockquote>

<blockquote><p><em><strong>What happened?</strong><br />
On Friday morning April 2, 2010 at 5:30 a.m., two burglars broke an 
outside window to the administrative area of our office at 770 Scott 
Boulevard in Santa Clara, CA. Our security cameras show the intruders 
coming through the window, confiscating the computer, and pushing the 
computer and a plasma TV back out the window of entrance, all within 50 
seconds. Our cameras recorded the type of vehicle they were driving. The
 alarm system was activated and the police were notified. A full police
 report was filed. </em></p>
<p><em><strong>What data was stored on the stolen computer server?</strong><br />
The server that was stolen contained our patient data base information. 
The patient records contain names, addresses, phone numbers, and in some
 cases social security numbers. E-mail addresses birthdates, family 
members, medical insurances as well as medical and ocular health 
information was included. No Optomap retinal images were stored on the 
system. No credit card information was stored on the system.</em></p>
<p><em><strong>Was the information secured?</strong><br />
Yes. There were 3 levels of security in place: physical, technical and
 administrative. Physical security consisted of locked doors, an alarm 
system to the police office, and surveillance cameras. For technical 
security, the data was password protected on two levels: a detailed 
password to access the server and a second password to access the 
patient data base. Administrative security was in place allowing no 
public access to the server.</em></p>
<p><em><strong>Is all of my patient data lost?</strong><br />
No. Our patient data base is backed up nightly and an encrypted copy is
 stored off-site. We were able to restore our data and retrieve our 
patient records. <br /></em></p></blockquote><p>Note that the off-site backup copy of the data is encrypted but the on-site version was not.</p><p><em><br /></em></p><p /><p /></div>
</content>



    </entry>
    <entry>
        <title>Heartland settles with MasterCard for $41 million</title>
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/heartland-settles-with-mastercard-for-41-million.html" />
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        <id>tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a01157148a11a970c01348178cd69970c</id>
        <published>2010-05-22T16:05:43-04:00</published>
        <updated>2010-05-22T16:05:43-04:00</updated>
        <summary>DarkReading is reporting: In a legal settlement over its 2008 security breach, Heartland Payment Systems has agreed to pay up to $41.4 million to MasterCard Worldwide and its card issuers to repay operational costs and fraud losses attributed to the breach. The article does not state whether this is included in the $139 million they said they set aside in a recent SEC filing. Given that the filing was recent, I would think, yes. As i posted earlier this month, $139 million is a far cry from the initial expected costs of $12 million.</summary>
        <author>
            <name>riskpundit</name>
        </author>
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Breaches" />
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Legal" />
        
        <category scheme="http://sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" term="IT Security" />
        
<content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en-US" xml:base="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>DarkReading is <a href="http://www.darkreading.com/security/attacks/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=224900619&amp;cid=RSSfeed" target="_blank">reporting</a>:</p><blockquote><p><em><span class="smalltext">In a legal settlement over its 2008 security 
breach, Heartland Payment Systems has agreed to pay up to $41.4 million 
to MasterCard Worldwide and its card issuers to repay operational costs 
and fraud losses attributed to the breach. 
</span></em></p></blockquote><p>The article does not state whether this is included in the $139 million they said they set aside in a recent SEC filing. Given that the filing was recent, I would think, yes. As i <a href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/heartland-breach-expenses-reach-139-million-so-far.html" target="_blank">posted </a>earlier this month, $139 million is a far cry from the initial expected costs of $12 million.</p></div>
</content>



    </entry>
    <entry>
        <title>LifeLock's CEO's Identity Stolen 13 Times - Who's fault?</title>
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/lifelocks-ceos-identity-stolen-13-times-whos-fault.html" />
        <link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/lifelocks-ceos-identity-stolen-13-times-whos-fault.html" thr:count="0" />
        <id>tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a01157148a11a970c0134812082d0970c</id>
        <published>2010-05-22T15:50:33-04:00</published>
        <updated>2010-05-22T15:50:16-04:00</updated>
        <summary>The Phoenix New Times (via Wired) is reporting that LifeLock's CEO Todd Davis's identity was stolen 13 times. That's 12 more than had been previously reported. The question is, who's fault is it? Clearly from a security perspective, it's not a good idea to display your Social Security Number on billboards and TV advertisements. However, from a marketing perspective it was brilliant. The actual dollar amounts lost due to these identity theft incidents were low. If those costs were simply written off as marketing expenses, it was a good deal for Todd Davis. On the other hand, the legal expenses...</summary>
        <author>
            <name>riskpundit</name>
        </author>
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Identity Theft" />
        
        
<content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en-US" xml:base="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The Phoenix New Times (via <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/05/lifelock-identity-theft/#more-16209" target="_blank">Wired</a>) is reporting that LifeLock's CEO Todd Davis's identity was stolen 13 times. That's 12 more than had been previously reported. The question is, who's fault is it?</p><p>Clearly from a security perspective, it's not a good idea to display your Social Security Number on billboards and TV advertisements. However, from a marketing perspective it was brilliant. The actual dollar amounts lost due to these identity theft incidents were low. If those costs were simply written off as marketing expenses, it was a good deal for Todd Davis. </p><p>On the other hand, the legal expenses LifeLock has incurred are a different matter. I am not sure if the $12 million in legal judgments could also be simply written off as marketing expenses. I previously wrote about the $11 million and $1 million judgments 
against LifeLock <a href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/03/lifelock-pays-12-million-to-settle-charges-of-false-and-deceptive-claims.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</p><p>LifeLock's identity theft protection is really limited to automatically posting "Initial Fraud Alerts" with the three consumer credit agencies, Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union. </p><p>The actual FTC <a href="http://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/03/lifelockcomplaint.pdf" target="_blank">complaint</a>, in section 18 details the limitations of an "Initial Alert." In other words, there are many ways you can still suffer an identity theft attack with an Initial Alert turned on with all three consumer reporting agencies. Many of these are due to third parties not exercising the due diligence they should.</p><p>To my knowledge, only <a href="http://www.equifax.com/compare-products/" target="_blank">Equifax </a>provides a service that actually enables you to LOCK your account. However, locking is not the silver bullet either as there are forms of identity theft that can be perpetrated without accessing your credit report. And since you can only lock Equifax, you are still vulnerable to Experian or TransUnion being abused. Finally, even if Experian and TransUnion added an easy locking process similar to Equifax's, you would have to pay fees to them as well.</p><p><br /> </p><p /></div>
</content>



    </entry>
    <entry>
        <title>Heartland breach expenses reach $139 million - so far</title>
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/heartland-breach-expenses-reach-139-million-so-far.html" />
        <link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/heartland-breach-expenses-reach-139-million-so-far.html" thr:count="0" />
        <id>tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a01157148a11a970c0133ed837c1d970b</id>
        <published>2010-05-12T08:55:34-04:00</published>
        <updated>2010-05-12T08:55:17-04:00</updated>
        <summary>Computerworld is reporting that Heartland Payment Systems' recent quarterly financial filing revealed that the credit card payment processor's expenses related to their 2008 breach of 130 million credit cards have risen to $139.4 million. This is a far cry from the $12 million CEO Bob Carr said was the appropriate amount to set aside in December 2009 when he settled with American Express for $3.6 million. In January 2010, just one month later, Heartland settled for $60 million with Visa. The Computerworld article also reports that a recent Ponemon Institute study shows that the average cost per security breach in...</summary>
        <author>
            <name>riskpundit</name>
        </author>
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Breaches" />
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Legal" />
        
        <category scheme="http://sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" term="IT Security" />
        
<content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en-US" xml:base="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Computerworld is <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9176507/Heartland_breach_expenses_pegged_at_140M_so_far" target="_blank">reporting </a>that Heartland Payment Systems' recent quarterly financial filing revealed that the credit card payment processor's expenses related to their 2008 breach of 130 million credit cards have risen to $139.4 million. </p><p>This is a far cry from the $12 million CEO Bob Carr <a href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2009/12/heartland-pays-amex-36-million-for-2008-breach.html" target="_blank">said </a>was the appropriate amount to set aside in December 2009 when he settled with American Express for $3.6 million. In January 2010, just one month later, Heartland <a href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/01/heartland-to-pay-visa-up-to-60-million-for-its-130-million-credit-card-data-breach-in-2008.html" target="_blank">settled </a>for $60 million with Visa.</p><p>The Computerworld article also reports that a recent Ponemon Institute study shows that the average cost per security breach in the U.S. rose to $6.75 million. The "per record' cost is averaging $204. </p><p>First, while not to invalidate, or even question, the results of this study, I would like to point out that it was <a href="http://www.pgp.com/insight/newsroom/press_releases/2009_annual_study_global_cost_of_data_breach.html" target="_blank">sponsored
 </a>by PGP Corporation (being acquired by Symantec).  </p><p>Second, I am not a big fan of averages. See the <a href="http://www.flawofaverages.com/" target="_blank">Flaw of Averages</a> by Sam Savage of Stanford. The point being that you cannot use the average when calculating your risk of the cost of a breach. And Heartland's costs make the point.</p></div>
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    </entry>
    <entry>
        <title>Simplistic attacks still work some of the time</title>
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/simplistic-attacks-still-work-some-of-the-time.html" />
        <link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/simplistic-attacks-still-work-some-of-the-time.html" thr:count="0" />
        <id>tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a01157148a11a970c013480b6afd2970c</id>
        <published>2010-05-12T08:13:19-04:00</published>
        <updated>2010-05-12T08:13:19-04:00</updated>
        <summary>Sunbelt has a detailed blog post of a ridiculously simple and obvious social engineering attack on Facebook users. The good news is that only 0.05% of Facebook users fell for it. The bad news is that the actual number of Facebook users is 191,372. Given the ease of creating these attacks and the rewards to the attackers, they are not going to stop anytime soon.</summary>
        <author>
            <name>riskpundit</name>
        </author>
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Malware" />
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Social Engineering" />
        
        <category scheme="http://sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" term="IT Security" />
        
<content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en-US" xml:base="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sunbelt has a detailed blog <a href="http://sunbeltblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/javascript-code-this-on-facebook.html" target="_blank">post </a>of a ridiculously simple and obvious social engineering attack on Facebook users. The good news is that only 0.05% of Facebook users fell for it. The bad news is that the actual number of Facebook users is 191,372. Given the ease of creating these attacks and the rewards to the attackers, they are not going to stop anytime soon.</div>
</content>



    </entry>
    <entry>
        <title>New attack bypasses all tested anti-virus products</title>
        <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/new-attack-bypasses-all-tested-antivirus-products.html" />
        <link rel="replies" type="text/html" href="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/2010/05/new-attack-bypasses-all-tested-antivirus-products.html" thr:count="1" thr:updated="2010-05-10T15:13:18-04:00" />
        <id>tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a01157148a11a970c013480a3f474970c</id>
        <published>2010-05-10T08:45:24-04:00</published>
        <updated>2010-05-10T08:45:24-04:00</updated>
        <summary>Researchers at matousec.com, a security research and consulting group, released a paper describing a vulnerability in the way that anti-virus vendors integrate their products with Windows - System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT). They also built code that exploits this vulnerability which enables them to bypass these anti-virus programs. The Register has a good summary. My first reaction is "so what?" Anti-virus programs have become almost irrelevant as the primary attack vector has shifted to browser-based applications. On the other hand, this vulnerability could lead to a resurgence of more direct viruses. Second, how and how quickly will Microsoft and the...</summary>
        <author>
            <name>riskpundit</name>
        </author>
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Innovation" />
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Malware" />
        <category scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" term="Research" />
        
        <category scheme="http://sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" term="IT Security" />
        
<content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en-US" xml:base="http://www.riskpundit.com/riskpundit/">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Researchers at matousec.com, a security research and consulting group, released a <a href="http://www.matousec.com/info/articles/khobe-8.0-earthquake-for-windows-desktop-security-software.php" target="_blank">paper </a>describing a vulnerability in the way that anti-virus vendors integrate their products with Windows - System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT). They also built code that exploits this vulnerability which enables them to bypass these anti-virus programs. The Register has a good <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/05/07/argument_switch_av_bypass/" target="_blank">summary</a>.</p><p>My first reaction is "so what?" Anti-virus programs have become almost irrelevant as the primary attack vector has shifted to browser-based applications. On the other hand, this vulnerability could lead to a resurgence of more direct viruses. </p><p>Second, how and how quickly will Microsoft and the anti-virus vendors react?  </p><p>Third, what are the implications for Intel's <a href="http://www.intel.com/technology/vpro/index.htm" target="_blank">vPro </a>technology?</p><p>Fourth, is there an anti-virus vendor out there that does not use SSDT to integrate with Windows?</p></div>
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