RUBIN ON TAX

Florida Supreme Court Dramatically Expands Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Protection for Bank Accounts

2026-01-15T15:56:00.000-05:00

December 2025 delivered an important Florida asset-protection decision. In Loumpos v. Dove Investment Corp., the Florida Supreme Court resolved a long-standing conflict among the district courts of appeal and clarified—once and for all—that Florida spouses may convert an individually owned Florida bank account into a protected tenancy-by-the-entireties (“TBE”) account simply by retitling it, without satisfying traditional common-law “unity of time” or “unity of title” requirements.

For estate planners, tax advisors, and asset-protection practitioners, Loumpos is a landmark decision—but also one that invites misunderstanding if applied too broadly or casually.

Background: Why Loumpos Matters

Tenancy by the entireties is one of Florida’s most powerful creditor-protection doctrines. Property held as TBE by married spouses is generally immune from execution by creditors of only one spouse.

Until now, however, there was uncertainty about whether a bank account originally opened by one spouse could later be directly converted into TBE property. Two Florida appellate courts had reached opposite conclusions:

The Second District held that such conversions failed because they violated the common-law unities of time and title.
The Fourth District reached the opposite conclusion on nearly identical facts.

The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to resolve this certified conflict—and decisively sided with the Fourth District.

The Holding: Unity of Time and Title Are Gone—for Florida Bank Accounts

The Court held that Florida Statutes § 655.79(1), as amended in 2008, eliminates the common-law unity requirements for spousal bank accounts.

Specifically:

“Any deposit or account made in the name of two persons who are husband and wife shall be considered a tenancy by the entirety unless otherwise specified in writing.”

The Court emphasized that this language applies not only at account inception, but also during account maintenance, including retitling by execution of a new signature card.

Bottom line:

A Florida bank account:

Originally opened by one spouse
Later retitled into both spouses’ names
With a signature card expressly designating “tenancy by the entireties”

is presumptively entireties property, even though the account did not begin that way.

Why Beal Bank Did Not Control the Outcome

The Court carefully explained that its seminal 2001 decision in Beal Bank v. Almand never addressed post-opening account conversions. Beal Bank explicitly limited its analysis to situations “if the unities required to establish ownership as a tenancy by the entireties exist.”

Because Beal Bank declined to address later retitling, the Court rejected arguments that it silently preserved unity requirements for converted accounts.

Statutory Interpretation: “Deposit or Account Made” Means What It Says

A key analytical move in Loumpos was the Court’s focus on statutory language:

The statute refers to “any deposit or account made” in the name of husband and wife.
“Deposit made” clearly refers to ongoing activity, not merely account opening.
Reading “account made” more narrowly would improperly ignore half the sentence.

The Court also emphasized that § 655.79(1):

Contemplates signature cards executed during account maintenance, not just opening
Allows rebuttal only for fraud, undue influence, or clear and convincing evidence of contrary intent
Contains no reference whatsoever to common-law unities

The presumption against implied changes to common law could not override clear statutory text.

Practical Implications for Estate Planning and Asset Protection

1. Retitling Florida Bank Accounts Is Now Outcome-Determinative

For Florida bank accounts, the signature card controls. If it clearly designates tenancy by the entireties and is signed by both spouses, the account is presumptively protected.

This dramatically simplifies:

Judgment-creditor planning for married couples
Cleanup of legacy accounts opened before marriage
Coordination between wage exemptions and deposit planning

2. Source of Funds Does Not Matter

In Loumpos, the account was funded entirely with the non-debtor spouse’s wages. The Court nonetheless upheld entireties status.

3. Fraudulent Transfer Law Still Applies

The decision does not create a creditor-proof shield in all cases.

Under § 655.79(2) and Florida’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, creditors may still rebut the presumption by proving:

Fraudulent intent
Undue influence
Clear and convincing evidence of contrary intent (e.g., “convenience signer” situations)

Notably, the Loumpos facts themselves would likely not support a fraudulent transfer claim, because the transfer moved assets from a non-debtor spouse into the debtor spouse’s reach, not the other way around.

4. This Case Applies Only to Florida Bank Accounts

A critical—and often overlooked—limitation:

§ 655.79 applies only to deposit accounts opened in Florida.

It does not automatically extend to:

Brokerage accounts
Securities
Promissory notes
Tangible personal property
Out-of-state accounts

Clients may incorrectly assume any jointly titled asset gains entireties protection. That assumption is wrong—and potentially dangerous.

5. Account Agreements May Defeat TBE Status

The statute applies “unless otherwise specified in writing.”

Some financial institutions:

Disclaim tenancy by the entireties in their account agreements
Reserve unilateral setoff rights against TBE accounts
Use ambiguous titling that defaults to joint tenancy, not TBE

Practitioners should review the actual account agreement, not just the signature card.

Open Questions After Loumpos

The decision leaves several issues unresolved, including:

Whether similar reasoning applies to brokerage or investment accounts
Whether one spouse’s signature alone can ever suffice
Treatment of accounts converted before the 2008 statutory amendment
Whether “joint tenancy with right of survivorship” language qualifies as “otherwise specified in writing”
Enforceability of contractual bank setoff provisions against TBE accounts

Strategic Planning Considerations

For higher-net-worth or higher-risk clients, Loumpos should be viewed as one tool—not a complete solution.

Common next-level strategies include:

TBE-owned LLCs for personal property
Charging-order-protected entity structures
Post-death asset-protection obligations for surviving spouses
Coordination with federal tax lien and bankruptcy rules (which may override state protections)

Conclusion

Loumpos v. Dove Investment Corp. represents a major expansion of creditor protection for married couples in Florida, grounded in a plain-text reading of § 655.79(1). By eliminating common-law unity requirements for Florida bank accounts, the Court has made tenancy-by-the-entireties ownership easier to implement—but also easier to misunderstand.

Used thoughtfully, it is a powerful planning tool. Used carelessly, it invites litigation and disappointment.

Advisors and clients alike should approach this decision with both enthusiasm and precision.

Gamblers Lose Out (Literally) under the Big Beautiful Act

2025-07-16T18:48:00.002-05:00

Amid the fanfare surrounding the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, enacted on July 4, 2025, gambling enthusiasts and the gambling industry take a hit. Buried in the Act lies a modification that's stirring discontent among recreational bettors, professional players, and gaming industry leaders. This provision restricts gambling loss deductions to 90% of incurred losses, while maintaining the overall cap at the level of winnings. Applicable to tax periods beginning after December 31, 2025, it has the potential to transform neutral outcomes into tax liabilities and further erode already slim profit edges for those in the field.

Although the measure is expected to bring in more than $1 billion in additional funds over the next decade, it appears more like a fiscal shortcut than a balanced reform.

Decoding the Revised Guidelines: Shifting from Complete Neutralization to a Built-In 10% Penalty

Historically, tax regulations have treated gambling earnings as taxable, but permitting deductions for losses solely up to the winnings total when itemizing on Schedule A. This framework ensured that if outflows equaled or surpassed inflows, the inflows would not be taxed due to the resulting net break-even or economic loss.

The updated act introduces a 90% ceiling on allowable losses. Deductions are now confined to the smaller of winnings or 90% of verified losses (encompassing associated costs for career gamblers). Consequently, even in scenarios of break-even gambling, taxes could apply to 10% of earnings.

Take a weekend bettor with $20,000 in roulette victories but $20,000 in losses throughout the year. In the past, they'd offset the entire $20,000, resulting in no taxable betting income. Now, the maximum deduction is $18,000 (90% of setbacks), yielding $2,000 in taxable income despite no net gain. For a dedicated card player earning $400,000 from events but facing $440,000 in entry costs, lodging, and similar outlays, the allowable offset shrinks to $396,000, imposing taxes on $4,000 where previously none applied, even though the player was an overall net loser.

This adjustment isn't abstract; it heightens the fiscal strain in a pursuit where returns are frequently marginal. Career participants, whose operational costs, such as tournament fees and training, are now categorized under "betting setbacks," encounter amplified challenges since the restriction encompasses everything.

Practical Consequences: Affecting Card Rooms to Betting Lounges

The revision has ignited swift opposition, especially in states like Nevada where gaming sustains vast employment and contributes substantially to economic output. Sector experts fear it may discourage major players, diverting them to unlicensed international sites with minimal oversight and safeguards.

For occasional participants, the policy complicates an already burdensome tracking process. Numerous hobbyists skip itemizing due to elevated standard thresholds from earlier tax law changes, but those who do—typically affluent individuals with larger stakes—now have the motivation to misreport or bypass official avenues.

On the political front, the clause has forged unexpected coalitions. Lawmakers from Nevada have proposed measures, such as the Equitable Wagering Act, to overturn it, contending that it discriminates against betting relative to other sectors. Organizations representing the industry, despite endorsing the larger bill, are pushing for amendments, emphasizing the risks of underground operations.

Article Summary: Estate Planning with Cognitively Impaired Clients

2025-07-06T13:49:00.007-05:00

The following is a summary, with additional commentary and analysis, of the article Estate Planning and Cognitive Impairment: Capacity, Ethics, and Risk Management, which was authored by Stefan Dunkelgrun and published in the June 2025 edition of Estate Planning Journal (WG&L). I read the articles so you don't have to! Of course, if the topic is of interest or more information is needed, you should consult the full article.

Overview

Cognitive conditions like Alzheimer’s don’t automatically disqualify someone from estate planning. Instead, the ability to make legal decisions hinges on a client’s understanding at the time of signing documents. Attorneys play a critical role in assessing this capacity, ensuring client wishes are honored, and protecting against disputes or undue influence. By leveraging thorough documentation and tools like video evidence, lawyers can create robust estate plans while addressing ethical obligations. This summary, of Stefan Dunkelgrun’s article distills essential insights and offers practical strategies for practitioners, enriched with commentary on balancing client autonomy and legal safeguards.

Core Insights

Decision-Making Ability: Capacity is evaluated based on a client’s grasp of their actions when signing documents, not a medical diagnosis. For instance, someone with cognitive decline may still understand their will’s implications during a lucid moment.
Ethical Balancing Act: Lawyers must honor a client’s valid intentions while guarding against coercion or incapacity. If harm is likely, protective steps are warranted, per ABA guidelines.
Undue Influence Risks: Disputes often arise when someone pressures a vulnerable client, skewing their decisions. Courts look for signs like unusual changes to prior plans or a beneficiary’s excessive involvement.
Litigation Prevention: Detailed records, independent legal advice, and clear client intent help shield plans from challenges. In some states, the burden may fall on the will’s proponent to disprove coercion.
Medical Collaboration: Doctors’ insights on a client’s mental state are valuable but don’t determine legal capacity. Lawyers must assess decision-making ability directly.
Video Evidence: Recording a client’s intent can bolster a plan’s validity but requires careful execution to avoid misinterpretation.
Proactive Tools: Documents like powers of attorney or health care directives can prevent the need for court-ordered guardianship, preserving client control.

Video Evidence: Benefits and Challenges

Recording a client’s estate planning process can be a powerful tool, but it demands precision to be effective.

Benefits:
- Demonstrates Clarity: A video showing a client explaining their choices can confirm their understanding, strengthening the case for capacity.
- Authentic Voice: Capturing the client’s own words offers direct evidence of intent, minimizing reliance on others’ accounts.
- Dispute Defense: Clear footage can refute claims of manipulation or confusion, reinforcing the plan’s legitimacy.
Challenges:
- Risk of Misinterpretation: If others are present or the client appears frail, viewers might suspect coercion, even if none occurred.
- Technical Pitfalls: Poor audio or visuals can weaken the recording’s impact, making it less persuasive in court.
- Over-Reliance: Videos alone aren’t enough; they must complement other records to form a complete defense.
- Client Comfort: Some clients may feel uneasy about being filmed, which could affect their demeanor. Consent and privacy are critical.
- Risk of Unexpected Behavior: There is a risk of unexpected statements or behaviors that might work against a finding of capacity in a dispute. Deleting the recording, editing it, or re-recording with a re-execution of the documents creates problems in and of itself.

Practical Strategies for Attorneys

Evaluate Capacity Actively: Engage clients during clear-headed moments, asking them to describe assets or relationships to confirm comprehension.
Build a Robust Record: Note client discussions, reasons for choices, and any refusal of external input to show independent decision-making.
Counter Coercion Claims: Verify clients act independently, limit beneficiary involvement, and document helpful actions by family as supportive, not controlling.
Optimize Video Use: Secure consent, film in a neutral setting with clear audio, and pair with written notes for a comprehensive file.
Leverage Medical Input Judiciously: Use doctors’ observations to inform, not dictate, capacity assessments, focusing on legal standards.
Promote Forward-Thinking Tools: Advocate for powers of attorney and health care proxies to reduce reliance on invasive guardianship.

Perspective

Beyond technical strategies, estate planning with cognitive challenges requires a human-centered approach. Attorneys must act as both legal guides and advocates for dignity, ensuring clients’ voices are heard even as their capacities fluctuate. This dual role—upholding legal rigor while fostering trust—sets estate planning apart in these cases. By anticipating disputes and documenting intent with care, lawyers not only protect assets but also preserve a client’s legacy and peace of mind for their families.

POOF: FLORIDA'S SALES TAX ON COMMERCIAL LEASES IS NOW HISTORY

2025-07-02T17:58:00.002-05:00

In a bold move to boost Florida’s business climate, Governor Ron DeSantis signed House Bill 7031 on June 30, 2025, abolishing the state’s sales tax on commercial property leases, often called the Business Rent Tax (BRT). Effective October 1, 2025, this repeal ends a tax that has weighed on Florida businesses for over five decades. This post dives into the tax’s history, the repeal’s details, its impact on tenants and landlords, and actionable steps for navigating the change.

The Business Rent Tax: A Historical Overview

Since 1969, Florida has been the only U.S. state to impose a statewide sales tax on commercial real estate leases, codified under section 212.031 of the Florida Statutes. This tax applied to rents for office spaces, retail shops, warehouses, self-storage units, and other real property. It covered not just base rent but also additional charges like common area maintenance fees, property taxes, or insurance passed through to tenants, significantly increasing costs for businesses.

The tax’s roots go back to 1949, when Florida began taxing certain property rentals. By the late 1960s, it expanded to cover commercial spaces.. The BRT generated roughly $900 million annually for the state, but it made Florida less competitive, as no other state had a comparable tax. Over time, pressure from businesses led to gradual reductions. By June 1, 2024, the state rate had dropped to 2%, with county-level surtaxes (0.5% to 2%) bringing the total to 2.5%–4% in most areas. Despite these cuts, the tax remained a hurdle for businesses, especially those operating across state lines.

Repeal Details: Scope, Timing, and Legislation

House Bill 7031, enacted on June 30, 2025, eliminates section 212.031, Florida Statutes, removing the state’s 2% sales tax and local surtaxes on commercial leases starting October 1, 2025. This repeal erases the combined 2.5%–3.5% tax rate applied in most counties. For instance, a business paying $15,000 monthly in rent at a 3% tax rate will save $5,400 per year, unlocking funds for expansion or other priorities.

The tax exemption applies to rent for occupancy periods beginning on or after October 1, 2025. Prepayments for October or later made before this date are tax-free, but payments for earlier periods (e.g., overdue September rent paid in October) remain taxable. The repeal does not affect taxes on short-term residential rentals (six months or less), boat docks, parking lots, or aircraft hangars, which fall under other statutes.

Included in Florida’s $115.1 billion fiscal year 2026 budget, the repeal is expected to save businesses $2.5 billion annually, making it one of the state’s most significant tax cuts since the 2006 intangibles tax elimination. It reflects Florida’s push to reduce business costs while maintaining its low-tax reputation.

Impacts and Insights

Boost for Businesses: Industry groups like the National Federation of Independent Businesses and real estate advocates estimate the repeal could generate $20 billion in economic activity and create tens of thousands of jobs over the next few years. Lower lease costs make Florida more attractive for startups, retailers, and corporations. Compare this to the imposition or threat of imposition of new or additional business taxes in other states.
Level Playing Field: By removing a tax unique to Florida, the state aligns with competitors, simplifying lease negotiations for businesses operating in multiple states and reducing compliance complexities.
Streamlined Operations: Landlords benefit from simplified billing, as they no longer need to collect or remit sales tax on leases after September 30, 2025, cutting administrative costs and risks of errors.

Challenges to address include:

Transition Complexity: Businesses must adjust accounting systems to stop charging tax for post-September 30 occupancy. Past compliance remains subject to audits by the Florida Department of Revenue, requiring robust recordkeeping.
Budget Considerations: The state’s loss of $900 million in annual revenue has sparked discussions about future fiscal strategies, though tourism-related taxes help offset the impact.

Practical Steps for Tenants, Landlords, and Advisors

To capitalize on the repeal and ensure compliance, stakeholders should act strategically:

Tenants:
- Check lease terms to confirm tax charges cease for October 2025 occupancy. Inform subtenants to avoid overbilling.
- Keep records for pre-repeal periods, as audits may target historical tax filings for up to three years.
Landlords and Property Managers:
- Revise billing systems, lease software, and payment processes by October 1, 2025, to eliminate sales tax charges. A simple tenant notice can clarify the change.
- Close sales tax accounts with the Florida Department of Revenue if no other taxable activities apply.
- Add clauses in new leases to address potential future tax reinstatement, protecting against policy shifts.
Tax Professionals:
- Guide clients through the transition, ensuring accurate reporting for pre-repeal periods and clarity on occupancy-based tax rules.
- Stay updated on Florida Department of Revenue guidance, expected before October 2025, for compliance details.
- Support clients in audits for prior BRT payments, drawing on expertise from firms specializing in Florida tax disputes.

Moving Forward

The elimination of Florida’s Business Rent Tax is a pivotal step toward a more competitive business environment, easing financial and administrative burdens for tenants and landlords. By acting now to update systems, review contracts, and prepare for potential audits, businesses can fully harness this tax relief. The repeal strengthens Florida’s position as a top destination for commerce, promising long-term economic benefits.

Sources: Florida House Bill 7031, signed June 30, 2025; Greenberg Traurig, “Florida Legislature Repeals Sales Tax on Commercial Leases,” June 22, 2025; National Law Review, “Florida Ends Business Rent Tax Effective in October 2025,” June 16, 2025; RSM US, “Florida budget eliminates business rent tax,” July 1, 2025; Moffa Tax Law, “Florida to End Sales Tax on Commercial Rent,” June 17, 2025; Florida Realtors, “Florida Eliminates Burdensome Business Rent Tax,” June 30, 2025.

The TurboTax Defense: A New Chapter

2025-06-11T17:45:00.008-05:00

The TurboTax Defense to federal tax penalties—where taxpayers cite reliance on tax software like TurboTax to avoid penalties—has historically been a tough sell. However, Huang v. United States (N.D. Cal. 5/28/2025) offers a fresh perspective, potentially strengthening this defense at least for late-filed international information returns like Form 3520. The TurboTax Defense: Origins

The TurboTax Defense argues that good-faith reliance on tax software constitutes reasonable cause for non-compliance, excusing penalties. In my 2012 post, I discussed Au v. Commissioner (T.C. Memo 2010-78), where the Tax Court rejected this defense. The court required evidence of a specific software error and diligent taxpayer effort to determine correct tax liability—neither of which the Aus provided. I wrote:

That case involved the TurboTax tax preparation software, and this defense is often referred to as the 'TurboTax Defense.' In the Au’s case, the Court found that the taxpayers did not provide evidence of a mistake in the software instructions, nor of a thorough effort by the taxpayers to determine their correct tax liability. This seemingly leaves the door open to the successful use of the TurboTax Defense if a taxpayer can actually prove up a mistake in tax preparation software or its instructions.

This suggested a narrow path for success, contingent on proving software error. Huang tests this path.

Huang v. United States: Case Summary

In Huang v. United States (No. 24-cv-06298-RS), pro se taxpayer Jiaxing Huang faced $91,238.75 in IRS penalties for late-filed Forms 3520 (2015 and 2016). Huang received large gifts from her non-resident foreign parents to relocate to the U.S. and buy a home. IRC § 6039F requires U.S. persons to report foreign gifts over a specific threshold via Form 3520. Huang, using TurboTax, claimed the software advised that only gift-givers, not recipients, needed to report. Relying on this, she filed the forms late in 2018 after learning of the filing requirement. The IRS assessed penalties, which Huang challenged, citing reasonable cause.

The government moved to dismiss, arguing Huang’s reliance didn’t establish reasonable cause. The court disagreed, finding her allegations plausible enough to survive dismissal and proceed to discovery. This ruling marks a shift from prior skepticism toward the TurboTax Defense.

Key Rulings in Huang

The court’s decision rests on several points:

Software as Professional Advice: Huang alleged TurboTax explicitly advised no reporting was needed for gift recipients. The court equated this to reliance on a “competent professional,” citing Olsen v. Commissioner (T.C. 2011), which recognized software reliance as potential reasonable cause.
Reasonable Cause Factors: Ignorance of the law alone isn’t enough, but combined with Huang’s inexperience and the complexity of Form 3520, it may support her claim.
Distinguishing Precedent: The government cited Spottiswood v. United States (N.D. Cal. 2018), where a similar defense failed. The court noted Spottiswood was decided at summary judgment, not dismissal, allowing Huang’s case to advance.

Evolution Since 2012

In 2012, I noted the TurboTax Defense’s slim chances, requiring proof of software error and taxpayer diligence. Huang lowers this bar at the dismissal stage, accepting plausible allegations of erroneous software advice as akin to professional guidance. This reflects growing judicial recognition of tax software’s role and the complexities of international reporting, contrasting with Au’s stricter stance.

Implications

Stronger Defense: Taxpayers relying on software in good faith may avoid penalties, especially for complex forms. This benefits pro se filers or those without access to tax professionals.
Discovery Hurdles: Huang must prove TurboTax’s incorrect advice and reasonable reliance in discovery, highlighting the need to document software interactions. It remains to be seen what additional evidence Huang will need to prevail, such as whether she will need to prove the correct input of gift amounts and the language of and the required specificity of the advice of the program.
Software Accountability: If the defense gains traction, providers like Intuit may face pressure to improve guidance accuracy for niche areas.
IRS Enforcement: The IRS’ aggressive penalty assessments for late international filings suggest taxpayers must verify requirements, even with software.

Related Cases

Huang aligns with Olsen (2011), supporting software reliance, but contrasts with Au (2010) and Spottiswood (2018), where defenses failed due to evidence or procedural issues.

Conclusion

Huang v. United States revitalizes the TurboTax Defense, moving it from a long shot to a viable argument, at least early in litigation. As I noted in 2012, proving software error could open the door to success. Huang steps through, leveraging alleged TurboTax misguidance to challenge penalties. While discovery will test her claims, the case underscores tax software’s growing influence and the need for careful documentation. Taxpayers and professionals should verify complex requirements and preserve evidence of software advice, as the TurboTax Defense reshapes reasonable cause in the digital era.

Sources:

Huang v. United States, No. 3:24-cv-062998-RS (N.D. Cal. 5/28/2025)
"TurboTax Defense Fail"
Olsen v. Commissioner, 2011 WL 5885082 (T.C. 2011)

Section 7872 Defeats IRS Claim of Gift Involving Family Loan

2025-04-24T18:31:00.003-05:00

In a recent U.S. Tax Court case, Estate of Barbara Galli, Deceased, Stephen R. Galli, Executor, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court addressed a tax dispute involving a $2.3 million purported loan transfer between Barbara Galli and her son, Stephen, in 2013. The case, decided via summary judgment, centered on whether this transfer was a loan, a gift, or a partial gift. Since the IRS did not assert that the entire transaction was not a loan but instead was a part loan/part gift, the court found no gift at all because the loan documents provided for adequate interest under Section 7872.

FACTS: Barbara Galli, who passed away in Florida in 2016, transferred $2.3 million to her son, Stephen, in 2013. The transfer was documented as a loan with a 9-year term and an interest rate of 1.01%, matching the mid-term Applicable Federal Rate (AFR) at the time. The loan was unsecured, lacked standard commercial enforcement provisions, and required annual interest payments with the principal due at the end of the term. Stephen made interest payments in 2014, 2015, and 2016, and the unpaid loan was included in Barbara’s estate tax return, valued at $1.624 million. The premise of the IRS’ claim was that there was a question about whether Stephen had the financial wherewithal to repay the loan, and thus the principal amount should be discounted by appraisal taking into the ability to repay. The excess of the principal amount over the discounted value was asserted to be a taxable gift. Bolstering its argument, the IRS sought to apply the consistency doctrine, since Barbara’s estate reported a lower than face value amount as to the value of the note for estate tax purposes, taking into account similar considerations that warranted a reduced value for the note. The taxpayer moved for summary judgment on the gift issue citing Frazee v. Commissioner (1992), which held that §7872 provides comprehensive treatment for loans at or above the AFR for both income and gift tax purposes, displacing traditional fair market valuation methods for gift tax purposes. The court agreed, also acknowledging that the consistency doctrine did not apply due to the different rules that applied under §7872 versus estate tax valuation.

COMMENTS: There are several takeaways from this case. The first is that the court accepted the premise of the taxpayer’s argument that traditional valuation principles that value a promissory note for estate tax purposes, which include judgments relating to the likelihood of repayment, do not apply in determining whether a loan transaction constitutes a partial gift if there is loan and it is not considered a below-market loan under §7872. Secondly, if the IRS could have shown that there was no valid loan element at all, then §7872 would not apply and presumably the entire transfer would have been a taxable gift. Therefore, if factually there are substantial questions about whether loan treatment at all is proper, a gift can result. In this case, even though the note was unsecured, that the interest was timely paid was probably a useful fact in this regard. The decision can provide some comfort to taxpayers that there appears to be an all or nothing approach to the IRS being able to obtain gift treatment if there is adequate interest under §7872 but there may be some question as to ability to repay– assuming adequate interest either the transaction is entirely free of gift tax as a loan, or fully a gift if it can be shown that there was no bona fide loan at all. This case can be compared to Estate of Bolles v. Comm’r, 133 AFTR 2d 2024-1235 (9th Cir 2024), affirming TC Memo 2020-71, in which loans were entirely reclassified as gifts where there were no repayments and there was evidence of lack of ability of the borrower to repay the loans.

CITES: Estate of Barbara Galli v Comm’r, Docket Nos. 7003-20 and 7005-20 (March 5, 2025); Frazee v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 554 (1992); Estate of Bolles v. Comm’r, 133 AFTR 2d 2024-1235 (9th Cir 2024), affirming TC Memo 2020-71; Code § 7872.

Key Questions & Answers Regarding Florida's New Law Restricting Real Estate Ownership by Persons of Foreign Countries of Concern

2023-05-18T17:00:00.007-05:00

To What Does the New Act Apply?

Generally, it applies to acquisitions of defined Florida real property interests by certain described owners. There are three general categories of prohibited transfer and ownership. To apply the new provisions, one needs to focus on two separate issues regarding each of the three categories of prohibition described in the law. The first is to determine what Florida real property is subject to prohibition under the category and then what owners are prohibited under the category. For there to be a violation of a category, the type of real property that is prohibited must be involved, as well as the defined class of prohibited owner for the category.

The three categories of prohibition are referred to herein as the "agricultural category," the "protected facilities category,” and the "PRC category."

Which Real Property Interests Are Covered Under Each Category?

For the agricultural category, the applicable Florida real property is agricultural land.

For the protected facilities category, the applicable Florida real property is real property within 10 miles of a military installation or critical infrastructure facility in Florida.

For the PRC category, all applicable Florida real property is all Florida real property.

Real property means land, buildings, fixtures, and all other improvements to land.

OBSERVATION: The prohibitions generally apply to direct and indirect interests in real property. By use of the word "indirect" and making exceptions for certain interests in publicly traded corporations owning the subject Florida real property, the statute is strongly suggestive that interests in entities (domestic or foreign) not excluded as “de minimus indirect interests” (which are discussed below) are interests in real property for this purpose, thus subjecting transfers and ownership of those interests to the new law in addition to direct interests in real property. Admittedly, the statute is not a paragon of clarity on this important issue, but if this broader reading is determined to apply then the scope of the new law is significantly expanded beyond what many may expect.

Which Owners Are Covered?

Persons prohibited from owning or acquiring prohibited real property in the agricultural category and the protected facilities category are the following persons, governmental units, organizations and other entities:

governments, government officials, political parties, and political party members of a foreign country of concern;
various entities including partnerships, associations, corporations, organizations and other combinations of persons organized in a foreign country of concern or having its principal place of business therein and subsidiaries of such entities;
any person domiciled in a foreign country of concern who is not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident; and
the preceding types of persons and entities so described that have a controlling interest in an entity formed to own Florida real property.

The PRC category covers the same general prohibited owners but only for such persons and entities of the People's Republic of China.

What are the "Foreign Countries of Concern?"

The foreign countries of concern are the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the Venezuelan regime of Nicolás Maduro, and the Syrian Arab Republic, including any agency of or any other entity of significant control of such foreign country of concern.

Can You Give Me a Short-Form Summary of the Prohibited Ownership Categories?

Agricultural: prohibition on ownership of Florida agricultural land interest by persons, governmental units, organizations, and entities of any foreign country of concern.

2. Protected facilities: prohibition on ownership of any Florida real property interest located within 10 miles of a military installation or critical infrastructure facility by persons, governmental units, organizations, and entities of any foreign country of concern.

3. PRS: prohibition on ownership of any real property interest by persons, governmental units, organizations, and entities of the PRC.

There may be circumstances simultaneously subject to more than one of these categories. Whether all the provisions of the applicable categories apply in that circumstance remains to be seen.

What Are the Principal Exceptions?

The categories have various exceptions. These exceptions include the following:

For de minimis indirect interests in publicly traded entities that own the subject land if a 5% ownership threshold is not violated or it is a non-controlling interest in a domestic entity registered with the SEC as an investment advisor;
For the protected facilities category and the PRS category, for one residential real property of the owner up to 2 acres in size if various other requirements are met; and
Property acquired by devise, descent, enforcement of security interests, or collection of debts if the land is divested within three years of the violative acquisition.

Real property acquired for a diplomatic purpose that is recognized, acknowledged, or allowed by the Federal Government is excluded from the law.

Are Transfers by Gift, Devise, or Descent Subject to the Law?

Yes!

COMMENT: This greatly expands the persons that have to address the law to avoid penalty and/or forfeiture. Essentially, any lifetime or testamentary transfer of prohibited property to a prohibited person violates the law (subject to the allowed 3 year divestment period). In the case of a testamentary transfer, presumably, the violation does not occur until the later date of transfer. What should personal representatives and trustees do when faced with a mandated prohibited transfer? Does the divestment period remove them from having any responsibility in these matters when the facts allow for it? As far as criminal penalties are concerned, as discussed below, these penalties are likely imposed only on sellers (on the transferor side), so absent a sale, there should be no exposure to the transferors in gratuitous transfers, but forfeiture by the transferee remains absent timely divestiture. If the property is encumbered by debt, does the transfer convert it to a "sale" for these purposes and subject a knowledgeable transferor to criminal liability?

How Does a Transferor Comply With the Law?

In a purchase and sale transaction, the purchaser must provide to the seller an affidavit prepared under penalties of perjury that the purchaser is not a prohibited person (or in the case of the protected facilities category or the PRC category is otherwise permitted to own the property under the law) and is in compliance with the provisions of this law. It would appear (although the statute does not explicitly provide) that a seller avoids violating the law when the seller receives such an affidavit. This affidavit is akin to a FIRPTA affidavit that is ubiquitous in real property transactions, and this affidavit will likely find its way into most closing procedures.

COMMENT: It does not appear that the affidavit is required in a gratuitous transfer situation (at least of unencumbered property), since the statute imposes the obligation on a “buyer.”

Alternatively, as to the agricultural category and the protected facilities category, it appears that the transferor can confirm for itself that the subject property does not come within the prohibited category when that is the case.

Transferors and closing agents in sales transactions, to avoid potential penalties where there is no affidavit given, may need to do their due diligence to confirm as to these two categories that the real property does not fall into them if they want to proceed to closing. I would expect title companies and/or other entrepreneurs to develop databases to assist transferors in making these determinations. This method of compliance does not apply to the PRC category since it applies to all Florida real property. Trust settlors, donors, and testators will need to conduct a similar analysis as to transfers of assets that may constitute Florida real property to assure the recipient is not a prohibited person or the real property interest is not of a prohibited type so as to avoid forfeiture risks in the hands of a prohibited owner-recipient.

What Is Required as to Applicable Real Property that a Covered Owner Owns Before July 1, 2023?

Real estate owned in a manner prohibited under the new law that was held that way on July 1, 2023 does not violate the law and is grandfathered in, but registration with specified Florida Departments (depending on what category is involved) must be made by the beginning of 2024. Failure to file results in a $1,000/day penalty.

COMMENT: So in addition to advising clients in regard to Florida real property interest transfers, advisors should also assist their clients who own prohibited real property in meeting the registration requirements.

Persons Who May be Surprised that the Law Affects Them.

As noted, non-sale transfers by donors, settlors of trusts, and testators should not result in criminal liability exposure to the transferor, but a violative transfer may defeat transferor expectations by subjecting the property to forfeiture to the state if the property is not timely divested by the new owner.

The statute includes as prohibited owners a subsidiary of an entity organized in or principally operating out of a foreign country of concern. However, the statute does not limit those subsidiaries to subsidiaries organized in or principally operating out of the foreign country of concern. Thus, the transfer of Florida real property to any entity may result in prohibited ownership. Where the transferee is an entity not formed in or not principally operating out of a foreign country of concern, interested persons may be surprised that the new law may apply to their transaction.

OBSERVATION: As noted above, the statute is unclear as to whether a transfer of an interest in an entity that owns a real property interest subject to ownership prohibition to a prohibited owner is a transfer subject to the statute – that is, the transfer of an entity interest, and not just a direct interest in real property, may be prohibited transfer and subject a knowledgeable transferor to criminal liability. If such indirect transfers are ultimately determined to be subject to the statute, it dramatically increases the scope of the law to transfers of interests of entities if such entities own Florida real property themselves or through subsidiaries. It is interesting to note that in the area of FIRPTA tax and withholding (Internal Revenue Code Sections 897 and 1445) relating to dispositions of real property interests by non-U.S. persons, there is much ink and complexity in the tax statute and regulations regarding when and how to look through entities that by analogy should have similar complexity here if this new law covers mere transfers of interests in entities. Assuming this is what the legislature intended, one may wonder if it realized the burden it imposes on daily business and estate planning transactions involving entity interests in Florida that do not involve the direct transfer of Florida real property.

Who Can Be Penalized?

Either or both of the recipient foreign owner and the transferor is subject to criminal liability. There is also language in the statute that closing agents may have liability if they have actual knowledge of a violation of the law, but the statute is not clear on this. There is also language in the statute that appears to limit criminal liability of transferors to only those engaged in sale transactions and not gratuitous transfers.

What Are the Criminal Penalties for Noncompliance?

A foreign owner is guilty of a second-degree misdemeanor (or third-degree felony as to the PRC category).

A seller who knowingly violates the law commits a second-degree misdemeanor (or first-degree misdemeanor as to the PRC category).

OBSERVATION: As noted above, by use of the terminology "seller" in the statute, other transferors, such as donors, trust settlors, and testators, not engaged in a sale transaction should not be committing a crime even if they knowingly violate this law.

What Are Some Other Consequences of Noncompliance with the Law?

Subject to the rights of bona fide lienholders, the subject property may be forfeited to the State of Florida via a civil action for forfeiture.

Can Forfeiture Apply if the Real Property is Homestead Property of the Owner?

Perhaps not under Florida’s constitutional protections of homestead. It is unlikely that prohibited property will constitute homestead property given the types of owners that are subject to the statute, but there are some possible circumstances where it may be homestead property of the owner.

Where Should One Look for Further Guidance?

The law gives direction for the issuance of rules to assist in the interpretation and application of the new law. In addition, a statutory direction to create forms of affidavits is also given.

What is the Effective Date of the New Law?

July 1, 2023.

Does the Above Tell Me Everything I Need to Know?

No, it is an introductory summary only. This summary is a preliminary read of a somewhat complex statute, even though it may not appear so on an initial read-through. The law has a fair amount of detail and should be consulted to precisely determine when and how it applies. Some of the descriptions above are based on interpretations by the writer based on extrapolations from some of the statutory language, which may not be found to be appropriate or correct by the State of Florida or courts dealing with these issues. Rules will also be promulgated that are likely to provide more detail and possibly additional related compliance requirements. Accordingly, interested persons are encouraged to consult the statute to confirm any of the preceding statements and for other details of its operation.

New Decision Is a Welcome Clarification of Florida Waiver of Homestead by Deed Issues [Florida]

2023-04-16T11:01:00.005-05:00

Fla. Stats. Section 732.7025 provides that if a spouse transfers their interest in property that is or will be homestead property of their spouse by using specific language in the deed, then the transferring spouse waives all homestead rights in such property. Thus, for example, their spouse can convey the subject property at death without the limitations on devise that would otherwise apply when there is a surviving spouse.

That statutory provision is a safe harbor that avoids any question when a waiver will occur. Nonetheless, a waiver by deed can occur outside of that statute. Until now, there has been a fair amount of ambiguity about when a deed will constitute a waiver of homestead rights by a transferring spouse.

In Stone v. Stone, 157 So.3d 295 (4th DCA 2014), a husband and wife jointly owned homestead property. They then deeded the property to each other as tenants in common, preliminary to subsequently deeding it into separate qualified personal residence trusts. The trial court and the appellate court concluded this was a waiver by the wife of her rights in husband's share of the homestead, per language in the deed that the transferring spouse "grants, bargains, sells, aliens, remises, releases, conveys, and confirms" the property "together with all the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining." Thus, it would appear that a deed conveying a spouse's entire interest in the subject property can, at least in certain circumstances, constitute a valid waiver.

What are those circumstances? Note the use of the terms “hereditaments” and “releases” in the Stone deed. In Habeeb v. Linder, 2011 WL 613392, 36 FLW D300 (3rd DCA 2011), withdrawn by 64 So.3d 1275, a husband and wife owned homestead property as tenants by the entireties. During the marriage, title was transferred by husband and wife via a warranty deed to the husband. The deed did not have any language of waiver or homestead. The wife died first, and the issue arose whether the husband had homestead rights to the homestead. The trial court found the deed to constitute a valid waiver of homestead rights by the husband, and Florida's 3rd District Court of Appeal affirmed, noting the use of the term “hereditaments” in the deed involved in that case. The court noted that hereditaments means inheritance rights, and thus by signing a deed with that term in it, the wife waived all of her inheritance rights including her homestead rights. However, the 3rd DCA eventually withdrew its opinion. As such, the case has no precedential value. While Stone also had the hereditaments language, the appellate decision did not provide that it was the reason for its finding of waiver (although the language was included in an excerpt from the subject deed). Thus, uncertainty remained after Stone as to what particular circumstances allowed for a waiver by deed. In 2023, much of this uncertainty was resolved.

In Thayer and Jefferson v. Hawthorn, No. 4D22-244, 2023 WL 2903993 (4th DCA) Apr. 12, 2023), the 4th DCA, which had decided Stone, has now taken another bite at the apple. In Thayer, the subject deed signed by the transferring spouse did not have language of transfer of hereditaments nor language of release. In the search for language of waiver, the appellate court compared the deed in Thayer and the deed in Stone, and found the lack of hereditament and release language significant enough that the waiver found in Stone should not extend to the deed in Thayer. The appellate court also noted that the acknowledgement in the deed that the transferee trustees had “full power and authority to protect, conserve, sell, lease, encumber or otherwise to manage and dispose of the real property described herein” was not equivalent to a transfer of “all rights” under Fla.Stats. §732.702(1) that would give rise to a homestead waiver. Further, the court noted the burden on a party asserting waiver to sustain their position since “language waiving a constitutional right must be able to be clearly understood as waiving the right.” That Stone and Thayer were both promulgated by the 4th DCA effectively requires them to be read together and that Thayer acts as a clarification and modification of Stone with precedential authority. There is language in the opinion that suggests that if called upon to rule again on Stone that the court might not have found a waiver there when it said “[w]hile one may question whether the language in Stone was sufficiently specific to waive homestead, it is still more specific than the deed's language in this case.” Having concluded that the deed in Thayer was not a waiver, the court also concluded that the deed could not be corrected to treat it as a waiver based on external evidence of the parties’ intent, such as testimony of the estate planning attorney who was involved in the transfer by deed.

Reading the case law together, it is a fair conclusion that specific language of release, waiver, or at least reference to transfer of hereditaments is now required in a deed for the deed to constitute a waiver by deed (except as waivers under Fla.Stats. §732.7025). Thayer is a welcome clarification on this issue.

Interestingly, neither Thayer nor Stone discussed the fair disclosure requirements of Fla.Stats. §732.702(2). Perhaps the court presumed that the only item requiring disclosure was the subject property which was already described on the deed, the issue was not brought to the court’s attention, or full disclosure occurred but was not mentioned in the court’s opinions.

In preparing a deed of property that will remain homestead property of the transferor’s spouse, if a waiver of homestead rights is not desired, care should be taken to avoid language of waiver, release, ‘all rights,’ and assignment of hereditaments (and similar language).

Landmark Florida Supreme Court Decision on Homestead Protections Has Been Written Out of the Law by Two Appellate Courts, and No One Appears to Have Noticed

2022-08-28T18:08:00.001-05:00

SUMMARY: In Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the Florida constitutional protections of homestead property against creditor claims trump Florida's fraudulent transfer laws. Thus, homestead protections include nonexempt assets that are added to or invested in a homestead, even if added with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors. However, in a recent appellate opinion, this recognition was effectively ignored and, in practice, vitiates the holding of Havoco. And this is the second time an appellate court has done so in recent years.

FACTS: Article X, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution exempts from forced sale the homestead of a natural person, except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement, or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on the realty. Aside from these explicit three exceptions to homestead protection, over time, Florida case law has developed some additional exceptions, principally relating to equitable liens for bad acts of the owner. In Havoco, the Florida Supreme Court limited the scope of this equitable lien exception for protection, holding that a transfer of assets into a homestead with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors is not enough, by itself, to give rise to an equitable lien that defeats the homestead protection. It further provided Florida's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (FUFTA) has no effect on the constitutional protection. However, the court did allow that an equitable lien could arise when the funds invested were obtained through theft, fraud, or egregious conduct – something akin to a source of funds exception.

Havoco specifically provided:

The federal courts which have addressed the applicability of section 726.105 [Florida's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] to homestead claims have concluded that it has no effect on the constitutionally created homestead exemption … We agree.

So unless the funds invested in the homestead were obtained through theft, fraud, or egregious conduct, the homestead remains protected per Havoco. One conceptual way to summarize this is that a fraudulent transfer is not the fraud, theft, or egregious conduct that vitiates constitutional protection. Such fraud must be something beyond the incidents of a fraudulent transfer, such as common law fraud (generally requiring a misrepresentation or intentionally false statement or concealment) or similar egregious action.

In Renda v. Price, a recent Florida appellate decision, a $10 million judgment was obtained against a corporation relating to an automobile accident. Arrangements were made for corporate assets to reach the wife of the corporation's owner, after which the wife sold the assets and invested them in homestead property. The judgment holder sought to reach the homestead assets. The trial court allowed the equitable lien, predicated on the defendant's conduct constituting "badges of fraud" as enumerated by FUFTA, but would not allow the judgment creditor to foreclose on it. Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeals upheld the lien and also allowed foreclosure to proceed. The appellate court noted that under Havoco, an equitable lien on homestead property could attach and be foreclosed when the property was acquired with funds generated by fraudulent or egregious activity. It effectively found that the homestead was purchased with funds obtained by fraud and thus could be reached by the creditor. The appellate court did not indicate what the fraud was, other than indirectly, by reference to the trial court's finding of fraud via the existence of badges of fraud under FUFTA. So, while Havoco specifically provided that a fraudulent transfer is not the fraud that vitiates constitutional protection, the trial and appellate courts found the "fraud" that Havoco allowed to allow an equitable lien was the indicia (badges of fraud) that are used to establish a fraudulent transfer.

COMMENT: Havoco says the application of FUFTA, even with the intent to defraud, does not override the constitutional protection – the subject assets must have been obtained by fraud or other egregious behavior. That is, the subject assets must be obtained by fraud or egregious behavior beyond the behavior that gives rise to a fraudulent transfer under FUFTA. If the only bad behavior is the behavior described in FUFTA (which appears to be the case in Renda), then the holding in Havoco is written out of the law when the only "fraudulent behavior" are badges of fraud indicia under FUFTA. That is, the Renda courts are saying that the "fraud" exception to Havoco is met by a mere finding of a fraudulent transfer under FUFTA by reason of badges of fraud thereunder that are used to prove requisite intent. With that logic, the Florida Supreme Court's holding that a mere fraudulent transfer under FUFTA is not enough to void the constitutional protection is vitiated since only elements of FUFTA are being used to demonstrate fraud outside of FUFTA. While Havoco also allows an equitable lien when the subject proceeds are obtained by egregious behavior, the defendant's conduct, whether called egregious or not, is not bad behavior beyond the badges of fraud provided in the fraudulent transfer statute, so the egregious label should not weaken the continued constitutional protection. There is no suggestion in the opinion that the subject assets were obtained via "theft."

This is not the only appellate court to make a similar argument. In 2014, in the bankruptcy case of In re Bifani, a debtor in bankruptcy fraudulently transferred property to his cohabitating girlfriend. The girlfriend sold the property and invested $669,233 of the proceeds to purchase a home in Sarasota, Florida. The debtor and the girlfriend then resided together at the home, which qualified as homestead property of the debtor's girlfriend. The bankruptcy trustee went after the girlfriend and persuaded the Bankruptcy Court to impose an equitable lien on the homestead. The Bankruptcy Court imposed the lien and did this based on general equitable principles, noting "the court may impose an equitable lien if the general considerations of right and justice dictate that one party has a special right to a particular property and there is an absence of an available lien or no adequate remedy at law." Interestingly, there is no reference to or consideration of the above-quoted language of Havoco declaring that the specific intent to defraud creditors does not void the homestead protection from creditors.

The Bankruptcy Court opinion was appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Here, that court picks up on the limitations that Havoco imposed and reverses the Bankruptcy Court. The analysis is instructive:

Florida's appellate courts have interpreted Havoco to limit equitable liens on homesteads to cases "in which the homesteads were purchased with the fruits of fraudulent activity." Willis v. Red Reef, Inc., 921 So. 2d 681, 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Those cases do not include situations where the homestead owner converted otherwise reachable funds into an exempt homestead, even if this is done through a fraudulent transfer made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Id.; See Dowling, 2007 WL 1839555, at *4 ("[T]he homestead exemption does not contain an express exception for real property that is acquired in Florida for the sole purpose of defeating the claims of out-of-state creditors."); Conseco Servs., LLC v. Cuneo, 904 So. 2d 438, 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) ("It is not enough that the Cuneos transferred their nonexempt funds to an exempt asset to keep those funds from creditors. If a debtor acquires homestead property with the 'specific intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditor,' the property still enjoys Florida's constitutional homestead protection.”). Havoco and its progeny instruct that the fraudulent transfer of assets into a homestead does not provide a basis for the imposition of an equitable lien. The Bankruptcy Court, therefore, abused its discretion by imposing an equitable lien on LaMarca's homestead, as the lien infringes on the homestead exemption granted in article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.

All is well that ends well? Not quite. On appeal, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the U.S. District Court and allowed the equitable lien to attach to the girlfriend's homestead property. The court noted that while Havoco allows homestead creditor protection to continue for funds put into a homestead, that is not the case where funds obtained through fraud or egregious conduct were used to invest in, purchase, or improve the homestead. The court went on to find "fraud" that allowed the equitable lien due to various badges of fraud under the fraudulent conveyance statute – exactly what also occurred in Renda in the first case discussed above – and with the same effective overwrite of the holding of Havoco.

It is the author's opinion that these appellate courts have confused the typical legal definition of "fraud" with "fraudulent transfer" and concluded that a fraudulent transfer constitutes fraud. They would not be the first courts to conclude that a "fraudulent transfer" constitutes fraud under law. Indeed, more modern fraudulent transfer statutes such as the Uniform Voidable Transfer Act intentionally eschew the terms "fraud" and "fraudulent" to avoid unintended characterizations. An article on the subject provides:

The driving force behind the change is the concept of "constructive fraud," which permits the avoidance of transfers made or of obligations incurred by an insolvent debtor in exchange for less than reasonably equivalent value. Although denominated as "fraud," a constructively fraudulent transfer involves neither fraud nor improper intent, creating confusion among some courts that have issued rulings improperly limiting the scope of the avoidance remedy. To address these concerns, the word "fraud" has been supplanted by the term "voidable" in nearly every portion of the UVTA and the Commission's official comments. Moreover, the UVTA adopts the more aggressive view that even "actually fraudulent" transfers do not require fraud. In lieu of the traditional standard applied to transfers made with the intent to "hinder, delay or defraud" creditors, the comments to the UVTA shift the inquiry to "hinder or delay" and substitute the idea of "unacceptably contraven[ing] norms of creditors' rights" as the measure for when efforts to hinder or delay render a transaction voidable. Uniform Voidable Transactions Act Approved by Uniform Law Commission to Replace UFTA, Jones Day Publications, September/October 2014.

Presently, a motion for rehearing, for rehearing en banc, and/or certification of the issue to the Florida Supreme Court is pending in Renda. One can only hope that the issue is revisited, and the improper overwriting of the holding in Havoco is recognized and reversed. Or barring that, that an appeal is taken to and accepted by the Florida Supreme Court to protect its holding in Havoco.

CITES: Fla. Const. Article X, section 4(a); Florida Statutes Chapter 726; Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 2001), Renda v. Price, No. 4D21-534, 2022 WL 2962564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 27, 2022); In re Bifani, 493 B.R. 866 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013); Uniform Voidable Transactions Act Approved by Uniform Law Commission to Replace UFTA, Jones Day Publications, September/October 2014.

IRS COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST OVERSEAS ASSETS

2022-07-31T12:32:00.002-05:00

The IRS Chief Counsel's Office has issued a Program Manager Technical Advice regarding questions about IRS activity to collect tax delinquencies from assets located outside of the U.S. While some of the Advice is fairly technical, it does provide some interesting information on what the IRS can and cannot do in this arena and some of the approaches they will take.

Some of the collection avenues the IRS may take include:

The input of a Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) Lookout Indicator. This is a mechanism to help locate a taxpayer's location.
Initiation of an outbound Mutual Collection Assistance Request (MCAR) to a treaty partner.
Levy on a domestic branch of a foreign bank
Bringing a lawsuit to repatriate assets.
Issuance of Letter 6152, Notice of Intent to Request U.S. Department of State to Revoke Your Passport.
Referral to U.S. Dept. of State (DOS) for passport revocation after Letter 6152 issuance.

The IRS can proceed along multiple lines at the same time, except the final item above can commence only after Letter 6152 is sent. The Advice notes that if lien or levy action has already occurred to collect a seriously delinquent tax debt under the passport revocation procedures, the IRS does not have to undertake further collection action after issuing a Letter 6152 before referring the matter to the DOS for passport revocation.

The IRS may use FATCA data from taxpayer filings to assist in locating foreign assets, but with some limitations on FATCA data obtained under a treaty.

The Advice also discusses the ability of a taxpayer to obtain information on these collection processes in discovery in a federal lawsuit or in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, and what objections to disclosure can be made by the IRS to such disclosure attempts.

Program Manager Technical Advice 2022-006

New Retirement Plan Distribution Rules Likely on the Way

2022-07-21T18:47:00.000-05:00

Several years ago, the SECURE Act was passed, which had major changes to the tax rules relating to retirement plan distributions. Another act on that subject is working through Congress - the Enhancing American Retirement Now (EARN) Act. A version has passed the House of Representatives, with the Senate working on its own version. Given the almost unanimous passage by the House, there is a very good chance that the Act will make its way into law.

We cannot tell what all the provisions will be, but here is a list of items that are in one or both of the House and Senate bills and thus have a reasonably good chance of being in the final version:

extending the date on which the required beginning date is based, from the year in which the employee or IRA owner reaches age 72 to the year in which he or she reaches age 75, effective after 2031
allowing up to $2,000 per year of 401(k) assets to be used for long-term care insurance
reducing the Code Sec. 4974 50% excise tax on the failure to take a required minimum distribution to 25% and reducing it to 10% for an individual who, during a correction window, corrects the shortfall and submits a return reflecting the tax
indexing for inflation the $100,000 limitation on qualified charitable distributions from an IRA and permitting a one-time election to treat up to $50,000 in distributions (also indexed for inflation) from an IRA to a charitable remainder trust or charitable gift annuity as if they were made directly to a qualifying charity
excluding from the additional 10% tax on early distributions under Code Sec. 72(t), distributions made to a terminally ill individual;
excluding from the additional 10% tax on early distributions under Code Sec. 72(t), distributions of up to $1,000 per year to meet expenses relating to personal or family emergencies
excluding from the 10% additional tax on early distributions under Code Sec. 72(t), eligible distributions of up to $10,000 (or, if less, 50% of the account balance) for distributions to domestic abuse victims

Time Period to File Estate Tax Return to Make Portability Election Extended to 5 Years

2022-07-10T16:39:00.001-05:00

If a spouse dies and his/her estate does not fully use the decedent's remaining unified credit, the surviving spouse can use the unused credit if certain conditions are met. One of the conditions is that an estate tax return is filed for the decedent that makes a portability election, even if no estate tax return is otherwise needed.

An estate tax return is due 9 months after death, with an automatic extension granted for 6 months if timely requested. When no return is required, a return being made solely to make a portability election can be filed late, up to two years after death of the first spouse, if the extension procedures of Rev.Proc. 2017-34 are followed (generally, filing a return within that time period while adding a specified legend to the top of the return).

This two year period has now been extended to 5 years. This was principally due to the IRS receiving too many Form 9100 requests (requiring a private letter ruling) after the two year period but often within 5 years. To save IRS resources, the extension period is now 5 years.

Note that if it turns out that an estate tax return was otherwise required, the extension is null and void.

Rev.Proc. 2022-32

HUSBAND USES TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES PROPERTY TO MAKE A GIFT TO GIRLFRIEND - WHAT'S THE REMEDY?

2022-05-15T13:00:00.001-05:00

In Florida, tenancy by entireties (TBE) property of two spouses provides various benefits. These include protection of the assets against creditors of only one spouse, avoidance of probate, and protection of one spouse from unauthorized disposition of TBE property by the other.

Regarding this last point, it is well settled in Florida that an estate by the entireties is vested in the husband and wife as one person, and neither spouse can sell, forfeit, or encumber any part of the estate without the consent of the other, nor can one spouse alone lease it or contract for its disposition without such consent.

What happens if this is violated? If this rule is violated, can the injured spouse recover the assets from a third party recipient, or is the remedy of the injured spouse only a judgment against the wrongful spouse and collection from the assets of that spouse? Where the wrongful spouse has insufficient assets to make the injured spouse whole, the ability to collect against the transferred assets could be critical to the injured spouse.

A recent Florida case summarizes and applies the law in Florida on this issue. In the case, the husband diverted millions of dollars of TBE property to the husband's girlfriend. While a matter of dispute, the trial court believed this was done without the wife's consent.

The court allowed a constructive trust to be applied to the assets in the hands of the girlfriend. Interestingly, and importantly, the court noted that such a constructive trust can be imposed even if the recipient did not engage in any wrongful conduct. Thus, the case confirms that an injured spouse can go against the recipient of property to collect back any property transferred without the injured spouse's consent.

Wallace v. Torres-Rodriguez, 3rd DCA 5/11/22

WHAT DOMESTIC ESTATE PLANNERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT BRUSSELS IV

2022-04-01T18:10:00.001-05:00

Ask many estate planners in the U.S. about Brussels IV, and you are apt to get the response “Brussels for what?” While in effect since 2015, it is more unknown than known. In most circumstances, Brussels IV will not impact estate planning in the U.S. But if a U.S. citizen owns assets situated in the European Union (“EU”), Brussels IV can provide substantial benefits and should always be considered by the estate planner.

Brussels IV is the common name used to refer to Regulation (EU) No. 650/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. It is an extensive provision enacted in 2012 that is intended to address the substantial differences in laws of succession that apply among various EU member states. For instance, the different members of the EU have different forced heirship provisions. A decedent residing in one state with property in another may find forced heirship applying to the property in one country even though that concept is not applied, or is applied with different rules and property divisions, in his or her country of residence. A key aspect is that it provides a default mechanism for determining which laws will apply to the succession of a decedent’s assets in the EU and to allow one EU nation’s laws to apply to the succession of all of a decedent’s EU property. The default provision under Brussels IV is that the law applicable to the succession of a decedent’s property as a whole will be the country in which the deceased has his or her habitual residence at the time of death.

So what does this have to do with U.S. citizens? U.S. citizens with property in an EU country (especially real property and other physical property, but not necessarily limited to that) may find that such property is subject to forced heirship that defeats the intent of the owner and may create U.S. transfer tax issues. For example, if the owner desires to leave all assets to a surviving spouse, or to have a standard A/B trust division between a marital gift and a family trust to use unified credit, the assets in the EU country may have to pass to in part to children under a forced heirship regime. This can defeat both the desired disposition and result in estate taxes that could have been avoided through a larger marital deduction gift.

What Brussels IV allows is that a national of any country, even one outside of the EU, can elect to apply the succession law of his own nationality to property situated in the EU. Thus a U.S. citizen can elect to apply the law of a U.S. state to the succession of his or her property in the EU, even if the EU country in which the property is located has forced heirship laws that would force dispositions of some or all property to spouses and/or other family members in fixed shares. Therefore, estate planners with clients holding EU assets should give serious consideration to electing to apply U.S. state law to avoid EU forced heirship laws, and also avoid uncertainties about which country’s succession laws apply to which properties.

The election to apply U.S. state law goes beyond mere forced heirship planning. It can smooth the entire estate administration process, since the election of law of the national will result in having that law apply to all of these succession issues: (a) the causes, time and place of the opening of the succession; (b) the determination of the beneficiaries, of their respective shares and of the obligations which may be imposed on them by the deceased, and the determination of other succession rights, including the succession rights of the surviving spouse or partner; (c) the capacity to inherit; (d) disinheritance and disqualification by conduct; (e) the transfer to the heirs and, as the case may be, to the legatees of the assets, rights and obligations forming part of the estate, including the conditions and effects of the acceptance or waiver of the succession or of a legacy; (f) the powers of the heirs, the executors of the wills and other administrators of the estate, in particular as regards the sale of property and the payment of creditors; (g) liability for the debts under the succession; (h) the disposable part of the estate, the reserved shares and other restrictions on the disposal of property upon death as well as claims which persons close to the deceased may have against the estate or the heirs; (i) any obligation to restore or account for gifts, advancements or legacies when determining the shares of the different beneficiaries; and (j) the sharing-out of the estate.

The election is made via putting a provision to that effect in a testamentary document (usually a Last Will), although the election can be implied. There are provisions that deal with which state’s law (within the U.S.) can be elected, which is generally resolved by U.S. conflict of law provisions.

There are some provisos. First, there are a few EU member states that have elected out of Brussels IV. Therefore, a review and determination are needed in planning that the EU member state that holds the property has not elected out. Second, presently France has enacted domestic legislation that under some circumstances may override Brussels IV and allow its domestic succession law to nonetheless apply. Whether that law will be allowed to override Brussels IV will likely be an issue litigated in the EU at some point. Third, Brussels IV does not affect the taxing jurisdiction of the EU member states. Lastly, there is some uncertainty about how this interfaces with marital law. Therefore, a planner should consider consulting with local counsel to confirm Brussels IV will apply, and what local tax and other consequences and issues may arise.

Planners may also want to consider a boilerplate provision in their estate planning documents making the election to apply U.S. succession law (after discussion with their clients) as most U.S. nationals would likely want to apply the U.S. succession law in lieu of the EU member state law. Having such a provision will also cover the situation of the acquisition of EU property after the estate planning documents have been prepared.

Regulation No. 650/2012

FBAR Case Reversed - Nonwillful Filing Penalties Based on Number of Accounts Not Reported

2021-12-14T17:57:00.002-05:00

Back in 2000, I wrote here about a case where a taxpayer did not report multiple foreign accounts on an FBAR. The question for the court was whether the $10,000 penalty for a nonwillful failure to file meant $10,000 per return not filed, or $10,000 per account not reported on the return. For a multi-year failure to file, if there are a lot of accounts this could dramatically impact how large the penalties are. The court held the penalty is based on a per return not filed basis.

The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed the trial court and allowed the penalty be imposed on a per account basis, and thus vastly increased the penalties for the taxpayer.

U.S. v. Bittner, Case No. 20-40597 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2021)

Broad Reading of Six Year Statute of Limitations for Subpart F Omission

2021-12-05T20:31:00.003-05:00

Code Sec. 6501(e)(1)(C) extends the normal three-year statute of limitations on assessment to six years as to omissions of Subpart F income. In a Chief Counsel Advice, the extended six-year period was determined to apply to the entire tax liability of the corporation for that year, not just to the specific subpart F items constituting the gross income omission.

Chief Counsel Advise 202142009

Of Spousal Gifts and the Substance Over Form Doctrine

2021-11-22T18:39:00.005-05:00

U.S. spouses each have a unified credit that allows for substantial gifting to third parties without requiring the payment of gift tax. What happens if one spouse has assets to be gifted away, but that spouse does not have sufficient remaining unified credit exemption to cover the gift and wants to use the exemption of the other spouse?

At times, the spouses can agree to split the gift for gift tax purposes, which treats 1/2 the gift as coming from each spouse. This allows the unified credit of the spouse not making the gift to be used to avoid gift tax on the 1/2 that such spouse is treated as making. However, it can be an imperfect solution if the spouse with the assets does not have enough unified credit to offset his or her 1/2 of the gift.

Oftentimes, the parties may contemplate having the party with the assets transfer them by gift to the other spouse (a tax-free gift under the gift tax marital deduction), and then the receiving spouse makes a gift to the third party applying his or her own unified credit. The question in these circumstances is whether the IRS will respect the transaction and allow the receiving spouse's unified credit to be applied to the gift to the third party, or whether it would seek to apply the "substance over form" doctrine to treat the gift as coming from the spouse who transferred the assets to the other spouse and does not have enough unified credit to fully cover the gift.

This is not a black and white issue. On one end of the spectrum, ideally, you have a transfer between the spouses occurring many months or years before the subsequent gift to the third party, with no intent to make a gift to a third party before the transfer between spouses, and the receiving spouse has no restrictions on the use of the received property and takes full and complete ownership over it. It is safe to say that the IRS would have an extremely difficult time imposing the substance over form transaction in this circumstance.

On the other end of the spectrum, there is an almost simultaneous transfer from one spouse to the other and then the gift to the third party, the recipient spouse is not treated as owning the asset for income tax purposes, and the recipient spouse effectively has no legal ownership or control of the asset or the ability not to make the transfer to the third party. In other words, you would have the facts of Smaldino v. Commissioner, a recent Tax Court case. In this case, the husband made a gift of an asset to his wife a day before she made the gift to a third party. The Tax Court applied the substance over form doctrine and treated the husband as the one that made the gift to the third party - thus, the unified credit of the wife could not be applied to the gift to reduce or eliminate gift taxes.

There were a number of particular facts that made it easier to sustain the substance over form argument. A review of those facts will help taxpayers avoid the application of the doctrine by avoiding as many of those facts as much as possible:

a. The transfer to the spouse occurred the day before the transfer to the third party. Clearly, the more time between the transfers, the better.

b. The recipient spouse did not receive real ownership of the transferred property so that she could have disposed of it other than by a subsequent gift. The court found that since the amount transferred was not even determined, pursuant to a valuation clause, until four months after the transfer, by that time the property had already been transferred by the wife. So the wife never had control of the property. Getting the recipient spouse true and effective ownership of the asset should be done.

c. The transferred property was an LLC interest, but the tax return of the LLC never reflected even the one day of ownership of the wife. Her ownership was never reflected in an operating agreement, either. Thus, the income tax and gift tax reporting was inconsistent.

d. Husband and wife had a prearranged plan for her to gift the received property, which the wife admitted.

e. The gift tax appraisals did not separately value the interest passing from one spouse to the other and onto the recipient from a separate transfer that the husband made directly to the recipient. That is, the wife's ownership and transfer to the recipient was disregarded.

Smaldino v. Commissioner, U.S. Tax Court (November 10, 2021)

Increases in Estate and Gift Tax Exemption Amounts Announced by IRS

2021-11-18T19:47:00.006-05:00

We have gone from scrambling to deal with a decrease in the unified credit under proposed legislation, to now enjoying the 2022 inflation adjustments. Enjoy!

2022 Annual Gift Tax Exclusion - increased to $16,000 from $15,000. Good news, but makes it a little harder to do the math for mutliple gifts in your head.

2022 Estate/Gift/GST Exemption - increased to $12.06 million from $11.7 million.

2022 Annual Exclusion Gift to non-U.S. Citizen Spouse - increased to $164,000.

Let's not forget my favorite annual amount announcement - for calendar year 2022, the tax imposed under§ 4161(b)(2)(A) on the first sale by the manufacturer, producer, or importer of any shaft of a type used in the manufacture of certain arrows is $0.55 per shaft.

Rev.Proc. 2021-45

Clock is Ticking to Request Older Copies of Forms 706 and 709 from the IRS

2021-11-18T19:33:00.001-05:00

The IRS presently has a 75-year retention period for estate tax returns and related gift tax returns. It is going to reduce that period to 40 years. They are advising taxpayers who want copies of returns older than 40 years to request now (more precisely, by Feburary 11, 2022) or forever hold your peace. To obtain a copy, use Form 4506 to make the request. For more on this change of policy, visit the IRS website at https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/whats-new-estate-and-gift-tax.

Indirect Loans Between a Private Foundation and a Disqualified Person Are on the IRS' Radar

2021-09-15T18:12:00.000-05:00

Code Section 4941(d)(1)(B) treats lending transactions between a private foundation and disqualified person as an act of self-dealing (although an interest-free loan by the disqualified person to the private foundation is not self-dealing) subject to an excise tax. What happens if the private foundation owns an interest in an entity, and that entity holds a promissory note of a disqualified person? Does this avoid self-dealing?

In Rev. Proc. 2021-40, the IRS advises that it will no longer issue private letter rulings regarding the applicability of the self-dealing rules under this fact pattern. Taxpayers should take this as a warning that the IRS may seek to treat such arrangements as self-dealing.

Rev Proc 2021-40, 2021-38 IRB

Foreign Grantor Trust Making a Distribution to Owner/Beneficiary - One or Two Penalties for Nonreporting?

2021-08-15T17:09:00.000-05:00

A U.S. grantor of a foreign trust that is a grantor trust that receives a distribution from the trust as a beneficiary has two U.S. filing requirements attributable to the foreign trust status:

Code Section 6048(b) requires U.S. owners of any portion of a foreign trust to ensure that the trust files a return for the tax year. A 5% penalty applies for noncompliance under Code Section 6677(b).
Code section 6048(c) requires U.S. beneficiaries of a foreign trust that receive a distribution from the trust to report the distributions. A 35% penalty applies for noncompliance under Code Section 6677(a).

Forms 3520 and 3520-A are used for these reportings.

Before his death, Joseph A. Wilson received a $9.2 million distribution from a foreign grantor trust of which he was 100% owner. No filings were made under the above two provisions. The IRS imposed a 35% penalty of $3,221,183.

Wilson (and after his death) his estate claimed that when he was the owner of the trust, then only the 5% penalty should apply. The District Court ruled in favor of the estate.

On appeal, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that both penalties could apply (although technically the 5% penalty did not apply because that penalty is measured against the assets remaining in the trust at the end of the year and that amount was $0).

The taxpayer made numerous technical arguments based on various arguments that parsed the language of the various provisions. But in the end, the appellate court determined that the two reporting requirements were separate reporting requirements and the penalty provisions were also separate, with each applicable to its one particular reporting requirement to which it relates. No language in the statute supported an argument that only one of these penalties could be assessed when there are reporting failures under the two separate reporting requirements.

Estate of Wilson v. U.S., 2nd CA, Case No. 20-603 (July 28, 2021)

New Homestead Laws in Florida

2021-08-05T19:42:00.001-05:00

In its most recent legislative session, the Florida legislature enacted a number of additions and modifications to Florida statutory law relating to Florida's homestead exemption. These provisions can be summarized as enhancing or clarifying the exemption. The following is a summary of the new provisions, along with some excerpts.

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736.0201(7): A proceeding to determine the homestead status of real property owned by a trust may be filed in the probate proceeding for the settlor’s estate if the settlor was treated as the owner of the interest held in the trust under s. 732.4015. The proceeding shall be governed by the Florida Probate Rules.

This provision provides jurisdiction to the probate court in a probate proceeding of a revocable trust settlor to determine the homestead status of real property owned by a trust. This should only apply to revocable trusts defined under Fla.Stats. § 733.707(3) and not other trusts, per the reference to Fla.Stats. § 732.4015. Fla.Stats. § 732.4015 references Fla.Stats. § 733.707(3). Generally, a revocable trust described in Fla.Stats. § 733.707(3) is one which the grantor has a right of revocation at death. Fla.Stats. § 733.707(3)(e) defines a “right of revocation” for this purpose as the power to amend or revoke the trust and revest the principal of the trust in the decedent, or withdraw or appoint the principal of the trust to or for the decedent’s benefit.

This provision was added due to a perceived lack of apparent authority for the probate court to otherwise make that homestead determination in these circumstances. Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, to CS/CS/SB 1070 dated April 15, 2021, Page 5.

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736.1109 (1): If a devise of homestead under a trust violates the limitations on the devise of homestead in s. 4(c), Art. X of the State Constitution, title shall pass as provided in s. 732.401 at the moment of death.

The constitutional restrictions on the devise of homestead are not defeated via ownership of the homestead of a decedent in a trust, subject to statutory carve-outs. This provision clarifies that if there is an improper testamentary devise in the trust, the property will pass to the same recipients who would receive it as if the decedent died owning the property directly and had attempted an invalid testamentary devise - that is Fla.Stats. § 732.401 of the Probate Code would apply, and the title passage occurs at the moment of death even though titled in the trust.

The provision applies only to revocable trusts and testamentary trusts.

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736.1109 (2) A power of sale or general direction to pay debts, expenses and claims within the trust instrument does not subject an interest in the protected homestead to the claims of decedent’s creditors, expenses of administration, and obligations of the decedent’s estate as provided in 736.05053.

If a trust holds an interest in a decedent’s protected homestead at death, this provision codifies a parallel probate result which applies to directly owned homesteads, such that a general power of sale or direction to pay debts, expenses, and claims of the decedent in the trust instrument does not in and of itself make the homestead subject to claims of the decedent’s creditors, expenses of administration, and obligations of the decedent’s estate.

The provision applies only to revocable trusts and testamentary trusts.

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736.1109(3) If a trust directs the sale of property that would otherwise qualify as protected homestead, and the property is not subject to the constitutional limitations on the devise of homestead under the State Constitution, title shall remain vested in the trustee and subject to the provisions of the trust.

Homestead property owned by a decedent that is protected homestead (i.e., it is directed to pass to an heir) and that is devisable, passes automatically at death to the recipient heir(s) and is not part of the probate estate. However, that is not the case if the decedent’s last will requires that property be sold and the proceeds to be divided among the heirs of the decedent or applied to estate obligations.

This provision extends this principle to when a trust owning the property has the direction for sale - in that circumstance, the trustee retains title to the property, and it does not pass automatically to the designated heir(s).

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736.151 Homestead property.—

(1) Property that is transferred to or acquired subject to a community property trust may continue to qualify or may initially qualify as the settlor spouses’ homestead within the meaning of s. 4(a)(1), Art. X of the State Constitution and for all purposes of general law, provided that the property would qualify as the settlor spouses’ homestead if title was held in one or both of the settlor spouses’ individual names.

(2) The settlor spouses shall be deemed to have beneficial title in equity to the homestead property held subject to a community property trust for all purposes, including for purposes of s. 196.031.

This provision is part of the new community property trust provisions of the Florida Trust Code. They seek to allow homestead protections to homestead property held in a community property trust.

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736.1104. Person Killer not entitled to receive property or other benefits by reason of victim's death --

(3) A beneficiary of a trust who was convicted in any state or foreign jurisdiction of abuse, neglect, exploitation, or aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or a disabled adult, as those terms are defined in s. 825.101, for conduct against a settlor or another person on whose death such beneficiary's interest depends is not entitled to any trust interest, including a homestead dependent on the victim's death, and such interest shall devolve as though the abuser, neglector, exploiter, or killer had predeceased the victim.

This provision will void transfers of homestead interests in trusts where the recipient is convicted of neglect, exploitation, or aggravated manslaughter. What happens if the surviving spouse is the person so convicted? Does the spouse lose the interest if it was devised to the spouse under the trust? It would appear that the trust transfer is void, but would the Florida Constitution limits on devise when there is a surviving spouse restore the transfer to the trust? Interestingly, the Constitution does not directly provide that the spouse succeeds to the interest - this incurs under Florida statutory law. That being the case, does this mean that this provision can be interpreted as also overriding the statutorily required transfer to the surviving spouse in the event of a prohibited devise, and/or does the Florida Consitution nonetheless still require passage to the surviving spouse since it is the spouse that the constiutional interest seeks to protect (in addition to the protection of minor children)?

Note that a surviving spouse is entitled to the decedent’s homestead under the Florida Constitution (wholly, or in part, if there are surviving minor children), such that presumably this statutory provision does not void that spouse’s interest if they are the person so convicted.

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Changes to Fla.Stats. Section 196.075.

This statute is modified to avoid the need for representations of income beyond the first year of exemption in regard to the additional homestead ad valorem exemption to persons 65 or older at lower income levels.

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Changes to Ad Valorem Valuation of Homesteads.

Chapter 2021-31 (H.B. No. 7061) made several changes to Florida Statutes regarding the ad valorem value of homestead interests, principally:

1. Adding new exceptions to the rule that ad valorem values are adjusted upon a change of ownership when the change or transfer is the removal from the title of a co-tenant holding title by joint tenancy with right of survivorship when the other co-tenants remain on the title. Such removal may be by instrument or the death of the co-tenant.

2. Relating to adjustments in value of damaged property.

3. Relating to adjustments in value of voluntarily elevated property.

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Change to Fla.Stats. Section 719.103(25).

A change to this statute provides that a unit in a co-op is an interest in real property.

The effect of this change is that such units can now qualify as homestead property for all purposes under Article X, s.4 of the Florida Constitution. This resolves disparate results among courts and different provisions of Article X, s. 4 as to whether a co-op unit can qualify as homestead property.

Maltese Pension Plan in the Sights of the IRS

2021-07-04T12:53:00.000-05:00

The Maltese pension plan is a planning device for U.S. taxpayers to use the U.S. - Malta tax treaty to obtain tax deferral and tax avoidance benefits similar to a Roth IRA, but without many of the limitations of a Roth IRA. For more about it, search "Maltese pension plan" and you will find many sites touting its benefits.

For any of those involved with such plans or contemplating entering into one, they should take note that the IRS has added the arrangement to its 2021 "Dirty Dozen" scams list - at least as to transfers of appreciated property to the plan. Such planning generally treats the contribution of such appreciated property to the plan as a transfer to a "grantor trust," thus avoiding gain generation. However, gain from such disposition is purportedly then not taxed immediately to the participant.

This is what the IRS has to say:

"Some U.S. citizens and residents are relying on an interpretation of the U.S.-Malta Income Tax Treaty (Treaty) to take the position that they may contribute appreciated property tax free to certain Maltese pension plans and that there are also no tax consequences when the plan sells the assets and distributes proceeds to the U.S. taxpayer. Ordinarily gain would be recognized upon disposition of the plan's assets and distributions of the proceeds. The IRS is evaluating the issue to determine the validity of these arrangements and whether Treaty benefits should be available in such instances and may challenge the associated tax treatment."

This is not an outright determination that such arrangements are abusive, but are a warning that the IRS will be looking more closely at that them and has serious concerns about the claimed tax benefits.

IR-2021-144, July 1, 2021

Q&A on Florida's New Directed Trust Act

2021-05-17T11:53:00.005-05:00

Below is a copy of article to be published this evening on Leimberg Information Services:

Florida’s version of the Uniform Directed Trust Act (the “FUDTA”) has passed both houses of the Florida legislature and is expected to be signed into law by Governor DeSantis. Charles (Chuck) Rubin chaired the Florida Bar subcommittee that reviewed and adapted the Uniform Directed Trust Act, and Jenna Rubin also served on the subcommittee. They provide a review of the key provisions that practitioners should be aware of.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Who does the FUDTA principally affect? Trust directors (persons with authority under a trust instrument to give directions to be followed) and directed trustees (the trustees who are supposed to follow the directions).

Can I avoid the application of the FUDTA by not calling the person with the power to direct a protector or trust director? No. The label given is irrelevant. If a person has the power to direct, then they are a trust director.

Can a trustee be a trust director? No, only persons who have a power to direct but are not trustees are trust directors.

So, any non-trustee with a power to direct is a trust director? Mostly, but there are a few powers one can hold that alone will not make you a trust director, such as the power to remove or appoint a trustee, a power of appointment, and a power of a settlor over a revocable trust.

Why should I care whether a power holder is a trust director? Well, there are a lot of rules and benefits that apply under the FUDTA, but probably the biggest implication is that the trust director is subject to fiduciary duty in the exercise of the power of direction in the same manner as a trustee. Note that some states do not impose fiduciary duties on persons with roles similar to a trust director, or allow the trust instrument to remove such duties entirely.

Wow, that’s pretty harsh for a player with a small role. How are settlors supposed to get someone to take on the role if they have such a duty and the liability that comes along with it? Helpfully, like most provisions in the Trust Code, the trust provisions can be drafted to reduce (or increase) the level of duty.

So I can relieve the trust director of all duty and liability? No, the FUDTA will not let you go that far. Just like a trust instrument cannot entirely relieve a trustee of fiduciary duty (the duty to act in good faith and in accordance with the terms of the trust must always remain), a trust director is also subject to the good faith minimum duty no matter what the trust instrument says.

A trust director can only exercise the powers granted to it in the trust instrument, correct? Mostly, but in addition to the express powers, the trust director also has further powers appropriate to the the exercise or nonexercise of the expressly granted power of direction. Draftpersons can breathe easier knowing they do not have to think of and include every explicit power that a trust director may need in order to exercise the desired power of direction.

How can a trust director protect itself from liability? Not serve! But short of that, the Trust Code provisions that shorten the applicable limitations period for breach of trust to six months via the delivery of a trust disclosure document applies equally to trustees and trust directors.

Does the directed trustee have to follow the directions of the trust director, even if the directed trustee disagrees with the appropriateness of the directions? Yes. The only exceptions are if the trust director is acting outside the scope of the power of direction, or if following the directions would result in willful misconduct by the directed trustee.

What if the direction is a breach of trust by the trust director – does that make it outside the scope of the power of direction and thus the directed trustee does not have to follow it? No, that is not the case. The policy is that if the trust director commits a breach of trust in making the direction, that trust director is liable. This encourages the directed trustee to act in accordance with directions, and since the beneficiaries can sue the trust director they have a remedy and do not have to also be able to sue the trustee.

How can the directed trustee protect itself as to questionable instructions? The trustee can go to court and seek instructions as to its obligations to follow the directions, and can charge the trust for fees and costs incurred in doing so.

Can a trust director demand relevant information from the directed trustee? Yes as to information needed to do its job, and the directed trustee can similarly demand needed information from the trust director.

Does the trust director have to keep an eye on the trustee or give advice or notifications to beneficiaries or other interested persons? No, in the absence of trust provisions requiring it. And the same applies to the directed trustee in regard to monitoring the trust director.

A trust director situation seems similar to a trust that gives power to one trustee to direct a co-trustee. Are the duties and obligations of the affected fiduciaries similar under the Florida Trust Code? Yes, the FUDTA coordinates the duties and liabilities in those two situations so that they are pretty much the same.

Are the rules for suing a trust director for breach of trust similar to suing a trustee? Yes. Such actions are subject to the same statute of limitations and defenses.

A trustee and a trust director both exercise powers over a trust. Do all the Florida Trust Code provisions applicable to trustees apply to trust directors? No, they do not. However, there is an extensive list of Florida Trust Code provisions included in the FUDTA that were determined to be appropriate to apply to trust directors, and those listed provisions do apply.

Does the FUDTA apply only to trusts created after the July 1, 2021 effective date? No, it applies also to trusts created before then, but only as to decisions or actions occurring after that date.

How closely does the FUDTA track the Uniform Directed Trust Act (the “UDTA”)? The FUDTA closely follows the UDTA so decisions from UDTA states will likely be useful in interpreting the FUDTA (and vice-vers_, but care should be exercised since the FUDTA does have some modifications and additions.

No "All Going to Charity" Exception for Chenoweth/Ahmanson Funding Issue

2021-03-21T11:20:00.000-05:00

Taxpayers and planners love to use valuation reductions for partial interests in entities as a method for reducing transfer taxes. Such reductions and discounts can be a two-edged sword, however.

The Ahmanson and Chenoweth cases point out that when a majority interest in an entity is included in a taxpayer's gross estate, the valuation discounts will typically be substantially less than will apply to a noncontrolling or minority interest, and that this can have undesirable consequences when a portion of the entity is transferred to a charity or a marital deduction trust. For example, assume that a 100% interest owned by a decedent as his sole asset in an operating corporation is valued at $10 million, with little or no discounts taken.

Then assume that 60% of the corporation will pass to a bypass trust, with the remaining 40% passing to a charity. One might think that there should be no estate tax, because the 60% is covered by the decedent's unified credit exemption, and the 40% is covered by the charitable deduction. However, the case law advises that the value passing to the charity for which the charitable deduction is allowed is not 40% of the company's reported value. Instead, the 40% interest must be valued on its own, and as a minority interest, larger valuation discounts will apply. Thus, if we assume a 25% combined marketability and lack of control discount on the 40% interest, if it has a gross value of $4 million, the charitable deduction is limited to $3 million in the example. This leaves $1 million exposed to estate tax.

In a recent Tax Court memorandum decision, controlling interests in several real estate holding LLCs owned by a decedent were given 75% to one charity and 25% to a different charity. The IRS argued that the 25% piece going to one charity would need to be heavily discounted (citing Ahmanson), thus reducing the charitable deduction for that piece and having the same issue as noted in the previous paragraph.

The taxpayer tried to rebuff the discount's application by claiming that since 100% of the business interests were going to charity (albeit two separate charities), then no discount should be taken for purposes of the charitable deduction. The Tax Court rejected the argument, noting that there were two separate transfers to two separate charities, and standard valuation principles should apply to each gift on its own.

Note that while this decision involved the charitable deduction, the concept similarly applies to the marital deduction. In planning where marital deduction gifts or charitable gifts are likely and closely held business interests are involved, efforts should always be undertaken to anticipate these issues in the planning stage to avoid the division of a majority interest in a business into minority interests that are used to fund these deductible transfers.

Estate of Warne v. Comm., T.C. Memo 2021-17