Russia: Other Points of View

THE TALE OF TWO PRESIDENTS

CCI — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 09:31:35 -0800

ROPV CONTRIBUTORS

The tale of two presidents: a man for the country or a country for the man?

By Eugene Ivanov

A few weeks ago, the good old science of Kremlinology got a delightful gift. At a meeting with members of the Valdai Club, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told the audience that in 2012, he and President Dmitri Medvedev will sit together and decide which of the two will run for presidency. The interpretation of Putin’s words by Western pundits and the media was swift and unambiguous, if somewhat expandable. They concluded that Putin is going to return to his old Kremlin office and possibly stay there until 2024.

Before trying to infer what Putin actually meant to say, it’s worth pointing out that forecasting his future has always been a dubious job. For example, a prominent Russia expert predicted, in January 2005, that “Putin will be out of office in the near future.” Yet in the fall of 2007, the same expert opined that Putin will remain in power indefinitely by "possibly following declaration of a national military emergency." Needless to say, neither forecast has come even close to getting materialized.

It turns out that the much better predictor of what Putin will or will not do has been his own words. Whatever one might think about the Russian strongman, lying for the sake of political expediency is not in his character (a feature pointed to by many world leaders, including President George W. Bush). During his presidency, Putin has always maintained that he was not going to change the Constitution in order to run for a third term. At the same time, he repeatedly indicated his desire to endorse, sometime in 2007, a “successor.” This is exactly what happened in reality: in December 2007, Putin threw his weight behind Dmitri Medvedev who was nominated shortly before that by United Russia and other political parties.

In light of these “historic precedents”, it would appear sensible to interpret Putin’s Valdai statement literally: that he hasn’t made up his plans for 2012, much less beyond that, and the decision on which of the two, Putin or Medvedev, will run for Russia’s top office will be made no earlier than 2012 -- based on their shared analysis of political and economic situation in the country. (Putin specifically mentioned that the opinion of the United Russia party will be taken into consideration too. This is important: United Russia is the party that will officially nominate the candidate, be it Putin or Medvedev, and then use its formidable electoral campaign machine to ensure that the candidate wins a landslide victory).

One would have to admit that the West’s obsession with Putin’s persona (like ruminating over his K.G.B. background or deciphering the meaning of his bare-chest vacation pictures) often borders on the irrational. It’s hard to comprehend why so much anxiety is being caused by the prospect of Putin returning to the Kremlin again. No one in the West lost a good night’s sleep over the fact that in neighboring Finland, Urho Kekkonen had been the country’s Prime Minister and President for a whopping 23 years – practically in a row.

It seems in the minds of many Western observers, Russia’s transition from a failing state in the 90s to a world power is inseparable from Putin’s self-confident and often aggressive style of governing. This fuels the fear that as long as Putin remains the country’s ruler, Russia will be a difficult partner for the West.

At the core of this logic lies a belief that Putin can shape Russia’s future by whim and push the country, single-handedly, in whatever direction he may choose. This logic is false. Putin has been successful as president -- and is still tremendously popular. Why? Because back in 2000, he was able to understand Russians’ prevailing public sentiments, demands, and expectations. He was also able to recognize what kind of leadership Russia needed, given its political and socio-economic situation, and then provided exactly this kind of leadership. Saying it differently, it wasn’t Putin who chose which country Russia was to become; it was Russia that accepted the most fitting man to lead it in difficult times.

Putin’s major objective as president has been preventing Russia’s economic and political collapse (which seemed almost inevitable at the end of the 90s, due to the disastrous policies of his predecessor). By the middle of his second presidential term, it became apparent that this goal was achieved. However, it also became clear that the stabilization came at a price of excessive centralization of power within the executive branch of government. Equally troubling, the Russian economy has developed a perilous addiction to the export of commodities to underwrite its fast growth. A sense that Russia needed an adjustment was in the air.

The intensity with which President Medvedev spoke recently about “modernization,” created the impression that he was the first among the country’s leadership to recognize that Russia needed serious structural economic reforms. This isn’t true: in his address to the Federal Assembly in May 2006, then President Putin spoke at length about restructuring the Russian economy by instilling an “innovation quality” in it. Ever sensitive to blowing political winds, Speaker of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, titled his speech to the 6^th Congress of United Russia (November 2005) as “From Stability to Development.”

It appears that a combination of two factors – Putin’s strong intention to step down from the office and his understanding of the need for reforms – led Putin to conclude that Medvedev will be the best fit for the presidency for the next four years. It’s hardly by accident that Putin chose Medvedev with his business experience over the other potential “successor”, Sergei Ivanov, who had a background very similar to Putin’s.

It’s now common to hear, both inside and outside of Russia, that for the first 18 months of his presidency, Medvedev has done “nothing.” However, it’s worth remembering that three months into Medvedev’s presidency, Russia had to fight a war with Georgia. A severe economic crisis followed shortly thereafter. Nothing in Medvedev’s previous years in government had prepared him to deal with either calamity. Not surprisingly, his modernization agenda had to be put on hold.

However, as the first, if only tentative, signs emerged that the Russian economy was coming out of the woods, Medvedev launched an aggressive PR campaign – by publishing an article “Russia, forward!” He next gave a number of public speeches to promote his plans of liberal economic reforms. Largely missed by Western observers was the fact that in contrast to Putin, Medvedev has linked the modernization of Russian economy with the need for concomitant political reforms, however timid and “evolutionary.”

Ever attentive to signs of the “split” between Putin and Medvedev, The Wall Street Journal’s Marc Champion interpreted Medvedev’s “Russia, forward!” article as an indication that Medvedev was “deeply critical of the system Mr. Putin has created.” It’s difficult to agree with this conclusion. As a loyal member of Putin’s team and a top-level Kremlin insider, Medvedev has been intimately involved in the creation of this “system.” (This is as if the former Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, decided to criticize the Bush administration’s foreign policy) after having a hand in it herself. Besides, many problems that Medvedev highlighted in his liberal manifesto, such as a natural resources-dependent economy and chronic corruption, were brought into the “system” years before Medvedev (and Putin, for that matter) was even born.

Medvedev obviously is fully aware that he’s up against formidable obstacles. And so far, his approach to promoting himself has been anything but traditional for Russia’s arcane system of political campaigning (or, rather, lack thereof). He described his “Russia, forward!” article as a basis for his upcoming address to the Federal Assembly and then invited the general public to provide feedback to his blog. As the Kommersant newspaper reported on October 14, about 20,000 responses had been posted by that time “by Russian citizens (including anarchists, futurists, economists and political scientists).”

Medvedev also reached out to the business community, not a common practice, to say the least, during Putin’s presidency. He met with members of the Russian Union of Industries and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) and invited them to participate in brainstorming for the economic section of the Federal Assembly address. The RUIE head, TNK-BP’s Mikhail Friedman, was asked by Medvedev to prepare a report analyzing the economic situation in the country.

Domestic critics predictably accused Medvedev in being short “on specifics.” This is true (but one has first to listen to the address itself). However, being “specific” is hardly Medvedev’s main priority. His goal seems to be to create interest to and, perhaps, even excitement about his ambitious goals, a sentiment he can capitalize upon when (if) running for re-election in 2012. Given the legendary apathy of the Russian electorate, this isn’t easy. But it’s doable. After all, Medvedev doesn’t have to prove that he’s “different” from Putin, much less that he’s “better.” All he has to do is to show the Russian voters that he’s fit to run the country for the next six years.

It appears plausible that should Russia’s conditions remain conducive to reforms in 2012, it is Medvedev, not Putin, who’ll run for presidency. However, should the situation in the country deteriorate – as a result of the second wave of the economic crisis, growing violence in the North Caucasus or another military conflict – to the extent that “stability”, not “modernization”, will be again the Kremlin’s major objective, then it’s Putin who’ll become president.

Perhaps, this is what Vladimir Vladimirovich had in mind when he promised to sit down and talk with Dmitri Anatolievich in 2012.

Jumping to Conclusions: The Washington Post’s Unjust Coverage of Russia’s Murders

CCI — Fri, 06 Nov 2009 11:12:09 -0800

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn

An October 29^th Washington Post editorial again continued to distort reality in Russia’s North Caucasus. The editorial follows the Post’s and U.S. mainstream media’s perverted practice of covering the North Caucasus only within the context of’ Russian human rights’ violations. The Polish Foreign Minister and former Defense Minister Radek Sikorski’s wife, Anne Applebaum, the Post’s main Russia ‘observer’, probably penned the article.

The Post editorial jumps to judgment in concluding that a single hand is behind the murders of courageous human rights defenders Anna Politkovskaya, Natalya Estemirova, Stanislav Markelov, Anastasia Baburova as well as Ingushetia opposition leader Maksharip Aushev, head of a Chechen children's charity Zarema Sadulayeva and her husband. The Post claims that all the above were activists defending human rights in the Caucasus, and this common trait made them a target of forces dispatched or tolerated by Russian Prime Minister and former President Vladimir Putin.

The fact is that only a few of these murders are likely to be a single chain, and are likely to be the deadly product of local Caucasus inter-clan and/or political infighting. Neither Sadulaeva nor her husband was a human rights activist, and Sadulaeva’s husband was a former Chechen militant. Thus, he and his wife could easily have been targeted by the Caucasus Emirate jihadists or former nationalist separatists among others.

The murder of Markelov and Baburova has several possible versions, as Russia media Watch reported earlier (see Gordon M. Hahn, “ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR THE MARKELOV MURDER: Going Beyond the Mainstream Media’s Agenda,” Russia: Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch, January 26, 2009)

Markelov often defended anti-fascists and was attacked by skinheads in April 2004. Shortly after the murder, leader of the liberal Republican Party Vladimir Ryzhov stated that Markelov had recently received threats from neo-Nazis. (See “Murdered Russian lawyer received threats from skinheads, says opposition figure,” BBC Monitoring, 20 January 2009 citing Ren TV, Moscow, 13:30 GMT, 20 January 2009.) Russia media reported on November 4^th that Russian prosecutors any day now would announce indictments of people connected to the neo-fascist community.

Therefore, it remains unclear just how many of these murders were at all political in nature, and whether they were part of a chain of crimes committed by local law enforcement and rulers, like Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, who is barely tolerated by the Kremlin. There is no basis for the Post’s claim that the Russians “know that Mr. Putin could put a stop to the state-sponsored murders if he chose to; he does not.” This is a particularly odd assertion since no leader can control such murders, and in light of Putin’s 70% plus approval ratings with the Russian public. Obviously Russians themselves don’t believe Putin could prevent these murders, let alone that he is responsible for them.

To be sure, the Russian justice system does not work effectively or justly, and neither Putin nor President Dmitry Medvedev have done enough to improve matters. On the other hand, they are making significant efforts to reform both the Ministry of Internal Affairs (and the military), and there have been some efforts with regard to the courts. Unfortunately, the FSB and Main Military Intelligence remain untouchables to date, and efforts to reform those could destabilize the whole system.

The Kremlin has no good choices in governing Russia’s North Caucasus. The region’s political culture and social customs hot-headedly encourage ritualized ‘blood revenge’ and violence between clans and ethnic groups, and its corruption levels are the highest in Russia. Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov might not have been the best candidate for stabilizing this war-torn Russian republic, but he was probably the best hope for meeting the incredibly difficult challenge there. Likewise, U.S. forces have found themselves lying next to some nasty bedfellows in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moscow has less choice in the Caucasus given that it is dealing Russian Caucasus’ people on Russia’s own territory which could lead to a failed state with millions of tons of materials for making WMDs.

Perhaps most importantly, one question that might be asked of the Post: Do the Caucasus Emirate’s jihadi terrorist attacks constitute violations of ‘human rights’? If so, then the Post needs to admit that jihadists’ violations of human rights far outnumber those committed by North Caucasus republic and Russian security and law enforcement organs.

There certainly can be no justification for the hundreds of jihadist killings of cops, traffic police, and civilian officials. Yet the Post editorial’ have never devoted even one feature article or editorial to the terrorist group, the Caucasus Emirate – even after the present author published numerous articles and one of several major books on the North Caucasus jihad and informed the Post’s opinion page editor about the CE several months ago.

This is not to say that the Post should ignore state violence in Russia, but rather that it should cover all perpetrators of human rights violations and crimes against humanity in proportion commensurate with the scale of their crimes.

Dr. Gordon M. Hahn – Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch; Senior Researcher, Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program and Visiting Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California; and Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group. Dr Hahn is author of two well-received books, Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002), and numerous articles on Russian and Eurasian politics.

ARTICLE IN QUESTION:

Washington Post
October 29, 2009
Russia's political murders - When was the last time that killings of human rights activists were so blatant, and so common?
EDITORIAL

MURDERS OF human rights activists in Russia have been happening with such frequency that some will be tempted to shrug at the brutal slaying on Sunday of Maksharip Aushev, who campaigned against abuses by the security forces in the Caucasian republic of Ingushetia. Mr. Maksharip AUSHEV was driving on a major highway, in broad daylight, when a car pulled up beside him and delivered a fusillade of bullets. His funeral came two months after that of Zarema Sadulayeva, the head of a children's charity in neighboring Chechnya, and her husband, who were shot and stuffed in a car trunk. Those murders, in turn, followed the July 15 killing of Natalya Estemirova, Chechnya's most prominent human rights activist.

No one has been arrested, much less held responsible, in any of these cases. No one has been charged for the murder last Jan. 19 of human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov and journalist Anastasia Baburova, who were gunned down on a busy street just blocks from the Kremlin. The murderers of journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who was assassinated outside her Moscow apartment three years ago this month, remain at large. These courageous men and women had in common their effort to hold Russian security forces accountable for the extrajudicial killings, torture and rape of innocent civilians in Chechnya, Ingushetia and other Caucasus republics.

Russia leader Vladimir Putin has been shrugging at this gangsterism all along. He disparaged Ms. Politkovskaya, one of the country's most renowned journalists, shortly after her death, and he's had nothing to say about the recent killings. President Dmitry Medvedev has been a little more responsive, expressing regrets and once meeting with editors of the newspaper where Ms. Politkovskaya and Ms. Baburova worked. But he doesn't seem to have much influence over his country's security forces. A year ago Mr. Medvedev replaced the governor of Ingushetia after Mr. Aushev led protests against the killing of an opposition journalist. But the new governor was powerless to stop the latest assassination, which he blamed on "power-wielding structures."

Everyone in Russia knows who he is talking about: the lawless gunmen commanded by the Kremlin-backed ruler of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, and the Federal Security Service, which is the successor to Mr. Putin's KGB. Russians also know that Mr. Putin could put a stop to the state-sponsored murders if he chose to; he does not. This is not new, of course. Past Kremlin rulers have used murder to shore up their authority. Not since the time of Joseph Stalin, however, have the political killings been so blatant -- or so chillingly common.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

CCI — Thu, 05 Nov 2009 11:03:24 -0800

by Patrick Armstrong

Election fraud. Two opinion polls, both by Levada, give us data on how people say they voted in the elections last month. A poll of Muscovites (JRL/201/4) gives 46.1% for United Russia (official numbers 66.25%), 27.1% for the communists (13.3%), 11.8% for LDPR (6.13%), 7.9% for Just Russia (5.33%) and 3.7% for Yabloko (4.71%). A nation-wide poll asking the same question gives United Russia 47%, communists 13%, Just Russia 8%, LDPR 7% and Yabloko 2%. When the Yabloko leader said his vote hadn’t been counted at all, a recount was ordered and, lo! it was found that some Yabloko votes had “accidently” been miscounted. But these numbers do not give us a clear picture. Levada tells us that Muscovites voted communist at twice the rate of the nation; this seems improbable. Levada also tells us that fewer people voted for Yabloko than the official numbers give; this too seems improbable if the scenario were to inflate United Russia’s numbers and deflate the others. So, as always, an examination of the data we have deepens the mystery. The Yabloko leader has described what his people told him and it appears that fake voters was the preferred method. Medvedev met with the head of the CEC and said “All types of claims must be investigated thoroughly”. Well, we’ll see. These numbers make a prima facie cause for fraud favouring the pedestal party but leave us in the dark as to what degree of fraud there was.

Stalinshchina. Last Friday was the Remembrance Day of Victims of Political Repression and Medvedev made an address on his video blog. “It is impossible to imagine now the scale of terror which affected all the peoples of our country and peaked in the years 1937-1938… For twenty years before the World War II entire strata and classes of our society were eliminated… millions of people died as a result of terror and false accusations – millions… But even today you can still hear voices claiming that those innumerable victims were justified for some higher national purpose. I believe that no national progress, successes or ambitions can develop at the price of human misery and loss… But it is equally important not to sanction, under the guise of restoring historical justice, any justification of those who destroyed our people.” The Kommentariat will either ignore this or try and spin it into a difference between Medvedev and Putin (despite the latter’s similar remarks at the Butovo Memorial two years ago).

Opel. The GM Board of Directors has voted to keep Opel, thereby blocking the Russian-Canadian offer to buy it; but workers in the Opal plants in Europe are not happy.

Markelov murder. It is reported that one of the suspects has confessed.

North Caucasus. More violence in the last two weeks but the authorities have done better: an assassination attempt on Kadyrov was said to have been prevented and the instigator killed, another senior “emir” was killed in Chechnya; “militants” were killed in Dagestan. Two suicide bombers were stopped in Groznyy. The Chechnya Interior Minister says that 144 “militants” have been killed since April, 118 of them in Chechnya. On the other hand, the imam of a village mosque in Dagestan was murdered (murder of Muslim clerics who oppose Wahhabism is an important jihadist tactic).

Ukraine. Readers are reminded that there is a rather vicious election campaign in Ukraine in which President Yushchenko, whose ratings are very low, and PM Tymoshenko are rivals. It would be wise to regard all statements by either as part of that campaign. Yushchenko will be campaigning as the man who stands up to Russia and would like a crisis to prove it; Putin reports that Tymoshenko told him that he was blocking payments for Russian gas supplies. Tymoshenko will be campaigning as the person who can get things done and she has ordered a 3-week closure of schools and cinemas because of the H1N1 flu. Yushchenko then appealed for international help (including from NATO!). Yanukovych, the favourite, so far has been silent. He will no doubt be campaigning as the man Ukrainians should have picked in the first place.

Georgia. Two more reasons to be happy that Georgia is not in NATO. International PEN says that “mass media in Georgia is under strict censorship” and “government controlled broadcasting organisations are led by companies that are themselves part of the government administration”. The newly-appointed Public Defender (his predecessor has joined the opposition) reports that the human rights situation, especially in prisons, is “grave”. Meanwhile, we discover that the Foreign Minister of Georgia has Russian citizenship! He, after a Russian Duma member tried to get him stripped of it, has decided to renounce it.

LOCAL ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA

CCI — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:07:14 -0800

ARTICLE CRITIQUE

Response to New York Times "Why Russians Ignore Ballot Fraud" by Clifford J. Levy, October 25, 2009

by Gordon Hahn

The following New York Times article is correct only in its main point: It is true that the pro-Kremlin United Russia’s victory in Russia’s local elections (winning 60 percent of seats overall in hundreds of local mayoral and council elections, including the Moscow city council election) was exaggerated in the final results by the unfair playing field, the party’s access to ‘administrative resources, and various methods of ballot stuffing and vote count fraud. Indeed, the last three sentences of the article relate an experience that I myself witnessed in the 2004 presidential elections. Beyond the obvious and relatively belabored point of dishonest Russian elections, the NYT’s and author’s oversimplifications about the electoral and political system and their extreme prejudices about Russia and Russians taint the article. It is yet another U.S. mainstream media article, masked as ‘news reporting’, functioning as biased opinion and providing no alternative points of view on the debatable points. In short, it is a U.S. mainstream media classic.

To access the full analysis, please click here Download NYT_Levy_11_09

Memory of National Tragedies is as Sacred as the Memory of Victories

CCI — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 13:30:37 -0800

REPRINTS

www.Kremlin.ru

PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Today is the Remembrance Day of Victims of Political Repression. Eighteen years has passed since this day was inaugurated as such in our calendar.

I am convinced that the memory of national tragedies is as sacred as the memory of victories. And it is extremely important that young people have not only historical knowledge but also civic spirit. That they be able to empathize with one of the greatest tragedies in the history of Russia. Regretfully, it is not always so.

Two years ago, sociologists conducted a survey and nearly 90 percent of our young citizens aged 18 to 24, failed to name famous people who suffered or died during those years of repression. And this, of course, cannot but be disturbing.

It is impossible to imagine now the scale of terror which affected all the peoples of our country and peaked in the years 1937-1938. The Volga river of people's grief, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn called it, the endless stream of repressed at that period.

For twenty years before the World War II entire strata and classes of our society were eliminated. The Cossacks were virtually liquidated. The peasantry was expropriated (or 'dekulakised') and weakened. Intellectuals, workers and the military were subject to political persecution. Representatives of absolutely all religious faiths were subject to harassment.

October 30 is a Remembrance Day for millions of crippled destinies. For people who were shot without trial and without investigation, people who were sent to labour camps and exile, deprived of civil rights for having the 'wrong' occupation or 'improper social origin'. The label of 'enemies of the people' and 'accomplices' was then pasted on whole families.

Let's just think about it: millions of people died as a result of terror and false accusations – millions. They were deprived of all rights, even the right to a decent human burial; for years their names were simply erased from history.

But even today you can still hear voices claiming that those innumerable victims were justified for some higher national purpose. I believe that no national progress, successes or ambitions can develop at the price of human misery and loss.

Nothing can take precedence over the value of human life. And there is no excuse for repression.We pay a great deal of attention to the fight against the revisionist falsification of our history. Yet somehow I often feel that we are merely talking about the falsification of the events of the Great Patriotic War.

But it is equally important not to sanction, under the guise of restoring historical justice, any justification of those who destroyed our people. It is true that Stalin's crimes cannot diminish the heroic deeds of the people who triumphed in the Great Patriotic War, who made our country a mighty industrial power, and who raised our industry, science and culture to top global standards. The ability to accept one's past for what it is, is the mark of mature civic culture.

It is equally important to study the past and to speak out against indifference and the desire to forget its tragic aspects. And we can only do this ourselves.

A year ago in September I was in Magadan where the Memorial Mask of Sorrow by Ernst Neizvestny made a deep impression on me. It was built not only with public funds but also with donations.We need such commemorative centres to pass on the memory of historical experiences from generation to generation. Of course we should continue to work to find mass graves, recover the names of the victims and when necessary to ensure their vindication.

I know that subscribers to my blog are very concerned about this topic. Without an understanding of our complex history, of the contradictory history of our country, we cannot grasp the roots of many of our problems and the difficulties of today's Russia.

But once again I would like to say: only we can resolve these problems. We need to bring up our children and foster their respect for the law, for human rights, the value of human life, and moral standards which originate in our national traditions and our religion. Only we can preserve this historical memory and pass it on to future generations.

Medvedev's video blog

MEDVEDEV: POLITICAL DUNCE, DUPE, DECEPTIONIST, OR DEMOCRAT?

CCI — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 10:59:54 -0800

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn

For nearly a decade Russia has been living under a stealth-like soft authoritarianism, not a 'managed democracy', as many persist in calling the regime. Last week's local elections removed the cloaking device from the system's no longer stealth-like dagger. 'You Tube' and various Russian websites exposed efforts to control and falsify the vote, the bulk of which were undertaken by supporters of the authorities' party, United Russia, although not necessarily at the request of Medvedev or Putin.

This is not to say that the election results were completely falsified. In some regions, such as in the North Caucasus republics of Adygeya and Karachaevo-Cherkessia, opposition candidates managed to win mayoral elections in the second largest cities in both of those republics. However, on the whole and especially in the important city council vote in Moscow, the elections were a real abomination. Hence, even Russia's 'managed opposition' perceived the demise of Russia's hitherto virtual democracy.

October 11's elections exposed President Dmitry Medvedev either negatively as a political dunce, dupe, or deceptionist - or more positively as a skillful reformer maneuvering in an authoritarian-friendly environment. Which conclusion you come to depends on what your interpretation of the politics surrounding the elections is. Which one is right will be borne out by Medvedev's (and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's) future actions.

According to the political dunce scenario, Medvedev repeatedly raises expectations of a gradual political thaw, only to have his resulting expectations smashed. Thus, he published his bold article "Forward Russia!" - a call for a democratic mobilization against authoritarian bureaucrats and its guardians (the siloviki) - just before perhaps the most fraudulent elections in post-Soviet Russian history. One cause of revolutions is raised but unmet expectations, especially when the gap between expectations and actual circumstances peaks.

Recent moves contribute to such a dynamic. Medvedev's article promised political reform, but his endorsement of the election results discredited him and the prospects for democratic reforms in many eyes. They angered leading democrats and insulted the loyal 'opposition', prompting the latter to boycott the Duma in protest. Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev chimed in, harshly attacking the regime's not-so-stealth authoritarianism. Opinion polls suggest that the overwhelming majority of Russians agrees with the democrats rather than with Medvedev and Putin regarding the election. Noviye Izvestia published one poll that found just 3 percent of respondents believing the vote to be free and fair. A third of respondents regarded United Russia's victory to be the result of "massive falsifications," and 44 percent said it resulted from its access to "administrative resources."

If the above is the truth of Russian politics' last few weeks, then Medvedev is a political dunce, and his actions make a revolution from below in the mid- to long-term more likely than before the raised expectations, especially if Russia's economic recovery stalls or backslides.

However, might Medvedev have been duped into discrediting his democratic credentials in a Putin power play?

This scenario holds that Medvedev sincerely expected his calls for permitting the opposition to function freely would be heeded by bureaucrats, siloviki and regional elites - and that the loyal 'opposition' and some outside democrats would garner more, not fewer votes as is typical in Russia's local elections. Under this 'dupe scenario,' Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, First Deputy Presidential Administration Head Vladislav Surkov, and others would have encouraged this illusion, setting the president up for a fall on the way to Putin's return to the presidency in 2012. Falling for the deception, Medvedev's "Forward Russia!" would have seemed a brilliant stroke, setting the stage for proposals gradual political reforms.

A twist on the dupe scenario is that Medvedev and Putin are partnering in the deception promising re-democratization to keep the West and domestic opposition off balance. A deceptive tandem-ocracy scenario is the most dismal for the Russian present and future.

There is one remaining hopeful scenario: Medvedev planned the discrepancy between words and deeds, between the promise of "Forward Russia" and October 11's vote and further backtracking on democracy. He foresaw the betrayal and persistence of the chinovniki and the siloviki and hoped the contradiction would outrage liberals, democrats, and even parts of the loyal 'opposition' and mobilize them into new political formations he can harness to push reforms forward.

Medvedev's upcoming presidential speech to parliament could be the best, and the last chance to kickoff a Medvedev or Putin-era re-democratization plan. Chairman of the Federation Council and loyal opposition party 'Free Russia', Sergei Mironov, has made a series of sound proposals for eliminating electoral fraud. Medvedev's speech will likely and indeed should declare the Kremlin's intent to pass these proposals into law.

In lieu of proposals for re-democratization in Medvedev's speech, Russia will see a long period of prohibitively slow development, even stagnation. It might be punctuated by a few forms of economic modernization, but could very well conclude with yet another risky Russian revolution. To avoid the dangers of miscalculation, the Kremlin should begin significant re-democratization now. Real modernization with a guarantee of political stability will be impossible without a political liberalization. Russian history's lesson is not that democracy is eternally alien to Russian culture. Rather, that illegal revolutionary methods to attain democracy or authority, whether from above or below, bring catastrophes. The only way for Russia to move forward is by real reform that includes the responsible opposition in the process of political competition and development.

WORKING WITH RUSSIA TO PREVENT EURASIAN COLLAPSE

CCI — Fri, 30 Oct 2009 12:46:45 -0700

REPRINTS

by Andrey Tsygankov

RFERL, Oct 29, 2009

The Eurasian region continues to disintegrate, and neither Russia nor the West has been able to arrest the destabilizing dynamics.

Evidence of rising instability throughout the region include the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, renewed terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus, the persistent failure of Western forces to stabilize Afghanistan, the inability of Central Asian rulers to reign in local clans and drug lords, and the paralysis of legitimately elected bodies of power in Ukraine and Moldova.

Violence is gradually spreading, waiting for an opportunity to erupt into a large-scale conflict. Transregional transportation routes may soon be choked due to Russia's conflicts with Ukraine, Georgia, and Turkmenistan.

The West's attempts to secure and stabilize Eurasia after the end of the Cold War must be recognized as a failure. In the mid-1990s, U.S. geostrategists such as Zbigniew Brzezinski recommended that the United States pursue a policy of replacing Russia as the referee and protector of the newly established non-Russian states in the region. After initial hesitation, the United States and other Western states followed this advice.

Yet Eurasia has not become stable or peaceful and continues to disintegrate. The bureaucrats in Washington and Brussels have failed to understand that they lack the resources, the will, and the experience to stabilize the complex region. Today -- after the Iraq war and the global financial crisis -- the United States is beginning to recognize its overextension, but it is not at all clear if Washington and Brussels are prepared to act differently in Eurasia.

Continue reading this article

RUSSIA'S REFORMIST GOVERNOR

CCI — Wed, 28 Oct 2009 10:38:45 -0700

REPRINTS

The Dissident Who Came In From the Cold Nikita Belykh is radically remaking Russia's vast Kirov region. The country's democratic future may depend on his success.

By Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova

Newsweek, November 2, 2009

Dozens of villagers are lined up at the gates of the decrepit local boatyard on a breezy Saturday morning to witness an unheard-of event. They gaze in wonder as the visitor arrives: never in living memory has a regional governor paid a call to the backwater town of Arkul, on the Vyatka River, roughly 500 miles northeast of Moscow. Climbing out of his battered Land Cruiser in scuffed jeans and a New York Yankees cap, Nikita Belykh makes a startling contrast to Russia's standard-issue provincial bureaucrats.

Looks are the least of the differences: Belykh made his name opposing those entrenched post-Soviet apparatchiks as one of the most determined pro-democracy activists in the country. Old friends were shocked and angry when he abruptly abandoned their street protests and took a Kremlin appointment as governor of Kirov oblast, deep in Russia's neglected heartland. But Belykh is tackling his new job with all the energy he used to radiate as an opposition leader. He immediately begins peppering the boatyard's director with questions, especially about what needs fixing. "Tell me what you do!" Belykh says briskly. "Tell me everything!"

The shipyard is one small piece of an experiment he hopes will transform Russia and so far, at least, he has the blessing of no less than Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev. It was Medvedev who appointed Belykh to the job late last year, essentially granting him a socioeconomic laboratory slightly larger than England. Kirov is a microcosm of Russia and its problems: chronic unemployment, decaying Soviet infrastructure and wretched public-health conditions, to name only three. Medvedev has made it clear that Kirov is his personal project and Belykh his protégé. If Belykh can raise Kirov up from its knees, there will be a clear precedent for applying the same management style across Russia. "Maybe some people would like to see us liberals fail," says Belykh. "My job is to prove the opposite."

And fast. Medvedev publicly deplores Russia's economic plight and has called for massive changes, but he may not have much longer to do anything about it. Former president Vladimir Putin, the KGB veteran who chose him as successor, recently dropped broad hints that he intends to take the presidency back at the next election, in 2012. Worse yet for both Medvedev and Belykh, hostility toward the Kirov project is growing, even within Medvedev's (and Putin's) own United Russia party. Two weeks ago the party's youth wing, the Young Guards, marched against Belykh's plan to hold a conference on regional development in Kirov. Whipped up by false rumors that the conference was sponsored by the U.S. International Republican Institute, the protesters carried professionally made banners with slogans like GET OUT WASHINGTON ORGANIZERS! and YANKEE GO HOME! They displayed no qualms about publicly attacking Medvedev's protégé - a sign of bigger challenges ahead.

But Belykh seems undeterred. Even by the standards of Russian democratic activists, he has a mind of his own. He grew up in a well-educated family near the Urals city of Perm. His parents expected him to study at one of the top schools in Moscow, but when he was 16 his father died of a heart attack, and Belykh stayed in Perm to look after his mother. That was the year Boris Yeltsin stood atop a tank and defied an attempted coup by hardliners trying to roll back democratic reforms. To this day, Russia's first post-Soviet president remains Belykh's hero. "I come from a generation of Yeltsin democrats," he says. "Nobody else but Yeltsin dared to give people freedom in the conditions Russia lived in the 1990s. Unfortunately we did not manage to keep that hard-won freedom." Belykh adds, "Now our job is to rehabilitate democracy."

A high flier from the start, Belykh majored in law and economics simultaneously at Perm State. At 23 he was made vice president of a local investment house, and at 28 he was appointed the region's vice governor. The next year, 2003, he ran for Parliament on the reformist Union of Right Forces ticket, but the tide had turned against the progressives: the party won no seats at all. Belykh stuck with the party anyway and moved to Moscow to become its leader, but times grew even tougher, and members began talking about making peace with Putin. Belykh opposed any such idea. "I did not see myself as a part of the Kremlin's project," he recalls. He quit the party in protest.

Putin's strong-arm tactics had effectively neutered Russia's liberal opposition. And yet Belykh couldn't just stand by while the country deteriorated. While Putin has won heavy domestic support with his loud, aggressive foreign policy, Russia is hollowing out inside. Reform at the local level gets no attention, but it's essential if the country is ever to thrive.

That's where Belykh decided to focus his efforts. He passed a message to Medvedev that he wanted to work in regional government. He knew his old associates would accuse him of selling out, but he saw no other way he could make a difference. He was still struggling with himself when Medvedev suggested making him governor of Kirov.

The Kremlin wasn't taking chances. Belykh's first interview was with Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin's chief ideologist, who warned him to keep his mouth shut in public about national issues like the war with Georgia. Belykh would be permitted to do a weekly radio show called A Governor's Diary on the liberal Moscow-based Radio Echo network, but only if the program stayed away from "provocative" questions.

The new governor arrived in Kirov in January. One of the first things he did was hang a portrait of Boris Yeltsin on his office wall. Then he auctioned off his predecessor's official car, a Lexus. He allowed all street protests to go ahead, including a thinly attended gay pride parade, and announced he was ready to meet with any group that had a beef with the government. He's been working 12-hour days ever since, mainly talking with people about their grievances.

Kirov has no shortage of complaints. Unemployment is set to reach 20 percent by the end of the year. The oblast's sole gasoline distributor, Lukoil, uses its monopoly to demand the highest prices in the entire Volga federal region. Infrastructure and public utilities are a constant source of outrage. And as almost everywhere in Russia, the demographics are a disaster: between January and August 2008 (the most recent statistics available) Kirov recorded 10,474 births and 16,204 deaths in a total population of 1.5 million. On top of that, an estimated 15,000 people left last year to seek better lives elsewhere.

But what seems even more baffling to Belykh is that Kirov's people seem stuck in the old ways of dealing with a hostile bureaucracy. "For the first time in my life I find myself on the same side of the barricades as the government," he says in frustration. At one recent meeting, he struck a deal with local labor chiefs on job security and keeping factories open, and the next day, they published an open letter excoriating him for trying to cut teachers' salaries. In another instance, a group of local NGOs organized street protests against high utility rates only a day after Belykh gathered their leaders in his office to find a solution to exactly that problem. "I want to say to them: 'People, I am much more experienced with protests than all of you. Here I am, your governor, come in and find solutions together with me!' "

But the single biggest challenge may be the region's law-enforcement system. Local NGOs have documented dozens of police-brutality charges, including numerous alleged cases of anal rape in police custody. At least four alleged victims have registered complaints with prosecutors. Nevertheless, victims who were interviewed by NEWSWEEK insisted on closing their curtains and speaking in whispers for fear of retribution. Few have much hope that Belykh will prevail over the local security forces. "There are areas which neither Belykh nor even President Medvedev can change," says one of the victims' lawyers, asking not to be named criticizing the police. "I have lived a long life in the Russian law-enforcement system and can assure you, it lives by its own rules."

Belykh has asked all his old activist friends to join his team in Kirov, but few are willing to relocate so far from the social and cultural mainstream. Even his wife and their three children remain in Moscow, where she manages a travel agency. (Their eldest son, 6-year-old Yuri, started school there in September because Belykh didn't want the boy tagged by Kirov classmates as "the governor's son.") One activist friend who has accepted the invitation is Maria Gaidar, 27, the daughter of Yeltsin's acting prime minister back in 1992, Yegor Gaidar. She once rappelled down the side of the Great Stone Bridge just outside the Kremlin, to unfurl a banner declaring NO TO KGB POWER. When Belykh accepted the Kirov job, she excoriated him for "selling his soul to the devil" but then elented. Another old friend from the opposition, Konstantin Arzamastsev, had to think hard before joining the team. "Only my respect for Belykh made me take this job," he says. "Kirov is far from being an easy place to liberalize."

After months of wrangling, Belykh has managed to appoint eight deputies, but almost every other member of his government is a holdover from the old regime. Kirov's legislature has blocked other appointments. By law the governor is also entitled to nominate a senator to represent Kirov in the Federation Council, but Belykh's pick was vetoed by Medvedev himself. "They made Belykh governor without letting him put together a team of his own," says an aide to Nikolai Shaklein, the senator who was named instead, requesting anonymity when discussing his bosses.

Nevertheless, Belykh insists on running the place his way as democratically as possible. He keeps his advisers working practically nonstop and has them debate all sides of any issue before he makes a decision on it. "We plan to turn this region into the most transparent, corruption-free, and business-friendly region in Russia," says Gaidar. "But that is a long way off. We face a wall of Soviet mentality that has not changed in 20 years." Sometimes it seems nearly impossible. "On my worst days I think it is easier to rule like an Asian despot than to become a Russian Obama," Belykh says. "But look, to me this job is a chance to change people's attitudes about democratic values."

Changing those attitudes in Kirov alone will take "a social revolution," Belykh says. First, people need to see tangible benefits in their lives. "The level of trust for liberals in Putin's Russia has shrunk to almost zero," says Belykh. Even so, Medvedev has shown plenty of trust in him. This May the president became the first Russian leader to visit the oblast since Tsar Alexander I in 1824. Medvedev didn't merely put in an appearance; with Belykh at his side, he announced a crowd-pleasing new plan to pay newly unemployed Russians a full year's benefits to help them launch new businesses. "I am Medvedev's man," says Belykh. "I am his appointee, on his team. And not anybody else's." The question is how far the leader of that team can go to make Belykh's experiment a success.

UKRAINE-RUSSIA TENSION IN CRIMEA?

CCI — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 15:02:40 -0700

ARTICLE CRITIQUE

Response to Washington Post "Ukraine-Russia Tensions Evident in Crimea - Kremlin Asserting Its Influence in Region" by Philip P. Pan, Oct 6, 2009

by Gordon Hahn

The Washington Post article reviewed below is yet another one from the paper littered with one-sided opinion masquerading as news. The article is yet another that insinuates into readers’ minds the view that Russia is planning aggression against Ukraine and is solely to blame for the deterioration in relations between the two countries. It contains numerous inaccurate statements, claims unsupported by data or facts, and a consistently one-sided perspective. It should be noted that this article follows a summer replete with articles in the Post and other mainstream media and other news outlets purporting to show that Russia would attack Georgia this summer. ROPV continues to wait and see when these predictions will be borne out in and whether anyone else will hold the U.S. mainstream media responsible in any way for its misleading reporting.

To access the full analysis, please click here Download WP_Pan_6_Oct_09

RUSSIA LAUNCHES INTERNET PORTAL To FIGHT 'FALSIFICATION OF HISTORY'

CCI — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 11:46:27 -0700

REPRINTS

Interfax Agency

Moscow, 21 October: A project called Runivers has been launched in Russia. It offers to all Internet users free access to original historical materials, which will make it possible to counter attempts to falsify Russian history, the head of the project:

"The purpose of our project is to provide free access to original documents, books and texts on Russian history, which are kept in major libraries and state archives," said Mikhail Baranov, the president of the board of the Runivers, a non-commercial organization for the creation and development of a historical and cultural electronic encyclopedia and library, This was reported at a news conference on Wednesday (21 October).

Baranov said: "We want to return original books and encyclopedias on Russian history published in the late 19th - early 20th century into cultural circulation."

He added that at the moment the project has 600 books, however by the end of the year it is planned to upload some 1,000 more books.

One of the sections will feature documents on topical political issues, which are being actively discussed, in particular compilations of documents on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Katyn case, on how the Crimea, Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Kuril Islands and East Prussia joined Russia.

Baranov said that the books were uploaded in their original form and will be of use to professionals who study Russian history. The project does not ban copying or citing its materials.

Baranov said that the project was prompted by the lack of truthful information on Russian history both in the Internet and in bookstores, where there are mainly translated books by foreign authors, which often are of an anti-Russian nature. Access to similar materials is now mainly on a paid basis.

For his part, a State Duma deputy, a member of the Runivers board, Vladimir Medinskiy, PhD in Political Studies, said: "Russia does not have an institution that would be dealing in historical propaganda, which is why we are losing in the war aimed to falsify Russian history." (Passage omitted)

"The Runivers and similar projects should enjoy powerful state support," he said. (Passage omitted)

FEIGNING BALANCE: WASHINGTON POST MASKS ATTACK ON RUSSIA AS ATTACK ON OBAMA

CCI — Fri, 23 Oct 2009 10:13:32 -0700

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn

The Washington Post recently produced a harsh and unprecedented critique of President Barak Obama’s early foreign policy steps written by Charles Krauthammer. The harsh words, leveled against the liberal president on the pages of the liberal paper, were most striking. Even more striking was the deal, implicit or explicit, that must have been cut. In return for allowing Krauthammer to vent against the president, the Washington Post got an attack on its favorite enemy, Moscow.

Whether Krauthammer understood apriori that the vitriol of his article required attaching an additional critique that the Post’s editors would approve of, or whether there was a quid pro quo demanded by the editors remains unclear but in the end is unimportant. What is important is a harsh critique of a liberal and non-Republican U.S. president appearing on the Post’s pages with the proper ‘compensation.’

The Krauthammer article delivered that and then some 462 words were devoted to criticizing Obama’s Russia policy and Russia, but only 288 were left for Obama’s other foreign policy mistakes. Krauthammer focused particularly on “Obama's single most dramatic foreign policy stroke -- the sudden abrogation of missile defense arrangements with Poland and the Czech Republic that Russia had virulently opposed.” In the Post’s and Krauthammer’s mind, this ‘mistake’ outweighs Obama’s “national self-denigration” policy, Clinton’s dropping human rights in forming America’s China agenda and the absurdity of the Nobel prize Committee accepting Obama’s nomination as a prize recipient mere days after his inauguration and then awarding him that prize in lieu of any accomplishments.

The Post’s editors likely attributed great value to Krauthammer’s mischaracterization of missile defense policy change as “a gratuitous restoration of Russian influence over a region that thought it had regained independence under American protection.” A close reading of this phrase reveals that in the view of the article’s author and purveyors Eastern Europe received independence “under American protection.” In fact, Mikhail Gorbachev provided the protection that led to their independence from the Soviet empire. To be sure Western, especially American resistance to Soviet communism helped pave the way for that liberation, but the U.S. role in the 1980s was probably secondary to that of the divided Soviet leadership commandeered by Mr. Gorbachev.

The article is replete with much else from the Post’s obsessive brief against Russia. Indeed, the author uses rather incestuously a Post headline as data to support his line of reasoning: "Russia Not Budging on Iran Sanctions; Clinton Unable to Sway Counterpart." Krauthammer adds: “Note how thoroughly Clinton was rebuffed. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that "threats, sanctions and threats of pressure" are "counterproductive." Note: It's not just sanctions that are worse than useless, but even the threat of mere pressure.” But note that a reading of the Post, AP and other sources reveals the truth for once; Lavrov said Medvedev's statement last month about sanctions “sometimes are inevitable” meant that they should be considered only after all political and diplomatic efforts are exhausted (see, for example, Owen Matthews, "Russian FM: Iran sanctions threats won't work" Washington Post, 13 October 2009.) The Post’s editors let through Krauthammer’s mischaracterization of not just the facts but of their own reporting as well. Thus, the journalistic incest continues between the liberal WP and neoconservatives on Russia. In short, no Pulitzers deserved for this genre of journalism.

ARTICLE IN
QUESTION:

Washington Post

October 16, 2009
Debacle in Moscow

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
About the only thing more comical than Barack Obama's Nobel Peace Prize was the reaction of those who deemed the award "premature," as if the brilliance of Obama's foreign policy is so self-evident and its success so assured that if only the Norway Five had waited a few years, his Nobel worthiness would have been universally acknowledged.

To believe this, you have to be a dreamy adolescent (preferably Scandinavian and a member of the Socialist International) or an indiscriminate imbiber of White House talking points. After all, this was precisely the spin on the president's various apology tours through Europe and the Middle East: National self-denigration -- excuse me, outreach and understanding -- is not meant to yield immediate results; it simply plants the seeds of good feeling from which foreign policy successes shall come. Chauncey Gardiner could not have said it better. Well, at nine months, let's review.

What's come from Obama holding his tongue while Iranian demonstrators were being shot and from his recognizing the legitimacy of a thug regime illegitimately returned to power in a fraudulent election? Iran cracks down even more mercilessly on the opposition and races ahead with its nuclear program.

What's come from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton taking human rights off the table on a visit to China and from Obama's shameful refusal to see the Dalai Lama (a postponement, we are told)? China hasn't moved an inch on North Korea, Iran or human rights. Indeed, it's pushing with Russia to dethrone the dollar as the world's reserve currency.

What's come from the new-respect-for-Muslims Cairo speech and the unprecedented pressure on Israel for a total settlement freeze? "The settlement push backfired," reports The Post, and Arab-Israeli peace prospects have "arguably regressed."

And what's come from Obama's single most dramatic foreign policy stroke -- the sudden abrogation of missile defense arrangements with Poland and the Czech Republic that Russia had virulently opposed? For the East Europeans it was a crushing blow, a gratuitous restoration of Russian influence over a region that thought it had regained independence under American protection.

But maybe not gratuitous. Surely we got something in return for selling out our friends. Some brilliant secret trade-off to get strong Russian support for stopping Iran from going nuclear before it's too late? Just wait and see, said administration officials, who then gleefully played up an oblique statement by President Dmitry Medvedev a week later as vindication of the missile defense betrayal.

The Russian statement was so equivocal that such a claim seemed a ridiculous stretch at the time. Well, Clinton went to Moscow this week to nail down the deal. What did she get?

"Russia Not Budging on Iran Sanctions; Clinton Unable to Sway Counterpart." Such was The Post headline's succinct summary of the debacle.

Note how thoroughly Clinton was rebuffed. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that "threats, sanctions and threats of pressure" are "counterproductive." Note: It's not just sanctions that are worse than useless, but even the threat of mere pressure.

It gets worse. Having failed to get any movement from the Russians, Clinton herself moved -- to accommodate the Russian position! Sanctions? What sanctions? "We are not at that point yet," she averred. "That is not a conclusion we have reached . . . it is our preference that Iran work with the international community."

But wait a minute. Didn't Obama say in July that Iran had to show compliance by the G-20 summit in late September? And when that deadline passed, did he not then warn Iran that it would face "sanctions that have bite" and that it would have to take "a new course or face consequences"?

Gone with the wind. It's the United States that's now retreating from its already flimsy position of just three weeks ago. We're not doing sanctions now, you see. We're back to engagement. Just as the Russians suggest.

Henry Kissinger once said that the main job of Anatoly Dobrynin, the perennial Soviet ambassador to Washington, was to tell the Kremlin leadership that whenever they received a proposal from the United States that appeared disadvantageous to the United States, not to assume it was a trick.

No need for a Dobrynin today. The Russian leadership, hardly believing its luck, needs no interpreter to understand that when the Obama team clownishly rushes in bearing gifts and "reset" buttons, there is nothing ulterior, diabolical, clever or even serious behind it. It is amateurishness, wrapped in naivete, inside credulity. In short, the very stuff of Nobels.

WHY THE US-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP IS SO CHALLENGING

CCI — Fri, 23 Oct 2009 09:27:09 -0700

IN MY HUMBLE OPINION

by Sharon Tennison

Dear Friends,

Many of you know that I've spent 27 years working across all parts of the US and Russia to develop constructive relations between these two countries. Being still at it, I've decided to write a 12-part email series of what's behind the relationship that makes it so challenging.

The topics will include: Why the US-Russia Relationship is so Challenging (included below); Putin, Dictator or What?; the Medvedev/Putin Relationship; US-Russia, 1000 Years of Cultural Differences; Corruption, Forever a part of Russia?; Is Russia ready for Democracy?; Russia's Pressure on Eastern European Countries; Media Muzzling, Facts and/or Fiction; Journalists' Murders - Putin or Who; the US/Russia/Iran Conundrum; the Russia/Georgia/US Facts; the Russia/Ukraine/US Equation; Russia's NGOs, the On Ground Reality; Russia's Political Opposition - Fiction and Facts; US-Russia Relations, Can the Quagmire be Healed?; Oligarchs: Democrats/ Robbers/Contributors?; and other issues you may submit. Your suggestions or comments will be welcomed.

~~~~~~~~~~~
SERIES #1

WHY THE US-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP IS SO CHALLENGING?

1. There is a lingering 'cold war' mentality in America, particularly among those 50 years and over - these are today's decision makers' in business, media, and politics. Then there's the Post-Cold War generation, those in their 40's to 50s, some of whom had high hopes of converting Russia into America's democratic twin during the 90s -they have been sorely disappointed that Russians turned against democracy during Yeltsin's devastating presidency. Last, there is the younger generation who have no remembrance of the Cold War - and aren't concerned with Russia one way or another except for holding vague stereotypes. It may be news to most, but our country has been at odds with Russia for some 130 years. See Rutgers' PhD historian, David Foglesong's recent book. During this lengthy history, the US-Russia relationship was occasionally acceptable (never good), but for the most part, it's been difficult to dangerous. The worst 75 years happened during the Soviet era (even then we Americans called the Soviets 'Ruskies'). At the end of WWII, my father exclaimed at the family table, "Next we have to take out the Russians!" Later on, we believed with good cause, that the Russians-become-Soviets could (and would) rain nuclear bombs down on our cities. Our national budget strained to protect 'us' from 'them'. Is it any wonder that there remains deep-seated suspicion of Russia and all things Russian in America's psyche? And that today we are ready to believe anything negative (whether true or not) about Russia?

2. We Americans and Russians have opposite historic "conditioning" and communication modes, which date back several hundred years. Each society has unconsciously-held assumptions, priorities, expectations, loyalties, concepts of authority and law, timing and initiative that are vastly different from the other. Moreover, we frequently use the same words but mean different ideas when they are used. Granted, light conversation between us is warm so long as we don't get into serious working relations. But where business and nation-to-nation interactions are carried out, these differences create enormous divisiveness. A highly insightful Russian woman of 70 years gave a telling example when CCI was organizing a Russian delegation to learn innovation in Silicon Valley. She said, "Sharon, your country was settled by self-starting individuals who left Europe to create independent lives for themselves. They championed self promotion and individualism. We Russians come from a thousand years of being told what to do, when to do, and how to think. We haven't experienced individualism. Today we need to learn to think independently for the first time, to take personal responsibility, and to initiate.” Natalia voiced only a few of the ingrained conditionings that I've observed between our two peoples.

3. Russians and Americans have different allies and adversaries today which causes huge problems - these country-to-country relationships were forged during the Cold War. For instance, Russia has long been friends with Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Serbia, Palestine and Cuba. These are the countries with whom America has her greatest challenges. Russia is caught in a bind trying to stay neutral, protecting her trade, while avoiding the US' conflicts with their friends. America stays perturbed that Russia won't (or thinks it can't) stand with us on our geopolitical issues with these countries which have been their long-term partners.

4. Last, US mainstream media adds to the misunderstanding by writing highly-charged "us - them" press on any topic related to Russia. They distort differences and present 'opinion pieces' as accurate news. These articles get stepped down to second, third and fourth tier newspapers across the US. The result? A nation of ill-informed American citizens who don't have other media options on Russia issues. Check our analyses of current articles from the NYT, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and other key outlets. Observe how many sentences per article are highlighted in yellow denoting inaccuracies, then footnoted to give the reader the facts behind the stories.

DOES THE US-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP MATTER? Yes, greatly.

* Russia has 4,000 nuclear weapons, the US has 5,500, with worrisome countries like Pakistan having approximately 100, North Korea a few, and Iran none at all yet. Do these relative numbers matter? YES. It's not in America's security interests to taunt and isolate a major nation with this much nuclear capacity.
* No other nation could be so helpful regarding the US' critical challenges ahead: 1) the war on terrorism; 2) reduction and control of WMDs; 3) global energy sufficiency; 4) global warming; and 5) a powerful partner with which to build a multi-polar world - in the wake of the fact that a unipolar world is no longer feasible.
* If the US and Russia could get beyond this decades-long military stand-off, the deadly weapons and space competition, and the costly arm-twisting across the world to maintain allies, there would be more than enough money available to rebuild America's economy and democracy.

OP-ED to NEW YORK TIMES and INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE

CCI — Thu, 22 Oct 2009 11:57:29 -0700

ROPV CONTRIBUTORS

by Nick Sluchevsky

In the contemporary world where mainstream media go out of their way to provide ‘balance’, it is truly extraordinary that the New York Times persists in its Russia reporting with such an apparent negative bias. For a liberal and intellectual newspaper that is expected to be a beacon of excellent journalism – which, for the most part it is – I continue to find this perplexing.

Clifford Levy’s recent article is a perfect case-in-point. The Oct.18^th lead informs readers that “Nearly two decades after the collapse of the Communist Party, Russia’s rulers have hit upon a model for future success: the Communist Party.” This is both sensational and completely incorrect. Frankly, I found it rather embarrassing. To begin with, China’s primary economic model is pure capitalism, as evidenced by their colossal success over the years. For an American audience this should prove to be a positive comparison. But that is not the comparison Levy seeks to make. The use of the pejorative ‘Communist Party’ clearly attempts to draw the reader to the belief that Russia – especially under Putin – has been sliding back to its Soviet roots. By extension, this approach seeks to establish a conflict situation between the US and Russia along ideological grounds.

This is inherently dangerous, not to mention morally indefensible, for a journalist to do. Frankly, any simplistic and reductionist thinking on this scale is bound to be. Let’s be perfectly clear: there is nothing remotely ‘communist’ in Russia’s current thinking. They have become, for better or for worse, true believers in capitalism. Following the disaster of the 90s, Russian leadership has also become quite wary of the West’s ‘help’ and have become highly pragmatic. They are results driven – hence the Chinese model they seek to ‘emulate’.

Converting the Russian people into this new model is an extremely difficult process, which Levy and others ignore. Ingrained habits, corruption at an unimaginable level, and a vast legacy of SOEs (state owned enterprises) make this a painstakingly slow process. A considerable legacy of the Soviet Union exists in Russia’s bureaucracy, not in their leaders’ ideology.

There is a great deal more that could be said here, but the greater point to be made is the bias issue and where it comes from. I believe it is too simplistic to say that this bias is a holdover from the Cold War. There seems to be something more ominous at work, although I admit being at a loss as to what this might be. I use the word ‘ominous’ only due to the fairly ubiquitous nature of such journalism, with identical bias noted in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and the Economist.

Perhaps Levy and others of his persuasion are merely Friedmanesque (Milton) economic imperialists who felt betrayed by the failure of Russia to become an American vassal in the 90s [see Stiglitz, Joseph “Globalization and Its Discontents” and Klein, Naomi “The Shock Doctrine” for excellent coverage of the complex issues]. While this may explain, to some extent, Michael McFaul’s [senior director of Russian and Eurasian affairs] worldview, it does not fit with well with Levy and his colleagues. What, then, is the reason? This is well worth pondering.

Nicholas V. Sluchevsky is Chairman of the non-profit foundation “Stolypin Memorial Center”, based in Moscow. The Stolypin Memorial Center, named after Piotr Stolypin, the reformist Prime Minister under Czar Nicholas II, is dedicated to issues of government development and growth of civil society in Russia.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

CCI — Thu, 22 Oct 2009 09:22:33 -0700

by Patrick Armstrong

Election fraud. There are objective and perfectly understandable reasons for United Russia to win most elections in Russia. The population supports its leaders and, consequently, extends that support to their pedestal. In fact, Levada’s most recent numbers show United Russia with more than one and a half times as much support as all the others combined. The losers always charge vote fraud but usually it ends there. This time, the three losers, LDPR, KPRF and Just Russia actually walked out of the Duma in protest (all have now returned); there have been some small protests, the Communists are demanding the resignation of the Head of the CEC and says it will be holding rallies today. So this one has better legs (and supporting detail) than the pro-forma protests of earlier times. We will see what happens. Again, however, I stress that a consideration of polling numbers over time shows that United Russia is bound to win; cheating only determines the scale of that win (so, indeed, why do it at all?) Medvedev once murmured something about reducing the 7% threshold. I believe 7% is too high for Russia’s conditions (unless, of course, its purpose is to produce enormous United Russia majorities across the country) and it would be better to go back to the old 5% threshold. But there is no “correct” number and there is great variation across the world.

Iran. Negotiations between Russia, the USA, France and Iran in Vienna have produced a draft agreement according to which Iran will export uranium to Russia for enrichment; it will then go to France for final processing for use in the Iranian reactor. But, Tehran is baulking at France’s involvement, or perhaps not, or maybe there’s more going on. I also notice that the Russian defence industry is warning that Russia will lose “billions” if the S-300 sale is dropped. They wouldn’t be saying this if they didn’t fear that it might be. Things are developing.

Customs Union. We are told that the long-announced, and long-delayed, Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus will launch on 1 January.

State ownership. Another strong hint from Medvedev that the state will sell off some of its holdings.

GLONASS. It is said that the 18 satellites necessary for full coverage of Russia are operating but there seems to be a problem with the next 6 necessary for world-wide coverage. A launch of 3 was again delayed.

Economy. It is reported that GDP grew 0.6% quarter-on-quarter; this would be the first growth in more than a year. Overall, it declined 9.4% year-on-year.

Russia-EU. Russia and the EU have begun negotiating a new partnership and cooperation agreement. The last agreement expired in 2007 but was automatically extended.

Press freedom. Reporters Without Borders in its latest report puts Russia at 153rd in press freedom. I don’t take this organisation very seriously: one of its biggest concerns is deaths of reporters and it’s clear that it uses different standards for Russia: almost any reporter who dies is counted. And Georgia has improved 39 places!

Gas. Yerevan and Gazprom are negotiating new gas prices. Unnoticed by most of the Kommentariat, which obsesses on the notion that Moscow uses gas prices as a weapon against its “enemies”, Armenia, generally considered “friendly” to Moscow, has also had its price put up. Until March 2009 it paid US$110 tcm (then a common price for Moscow’s former USSR customers); it had a price rise to US$154 tcm from April 2009 to March 2010; the price was then expected to rise to US$200 tcm. But, with the fall of energy prices, Yerevan is hoping to sign for US$180. It is Moscow’s long-repeated aim to get them all up to European prices. None of them is yet and to that extent, Moscow/Gazprom continues to subsidise its neighbours.

Ukraine. On Monday the Presidential election campaign officially opened in Ukraine. Preliminary indications suggest a very dirty campaign is coming. Current polls show Yanukovych well out in front at about 25%, Tymoshenko about ten points behind and Yatsenyuk about 5 points behind her. President Yushchenko is well at the bottom. Tymoshenko has hired Obama’s strategists. What an interesting end to the “Orange Revolution” it would be if Yanukovych, reviled by the Kommentariat as “Moscow’s stooge” were elected. But four years of the NATO obsession has exacerbated Ukraine’s divisions and taken attention away from its true problems.

Georgia. A train carrying fuel was bombed in Svanetia. I may be reading too much into this but the Svans are another of Georgia’s restive minorities and Tbilisi has still not caught Emzar Kvitsiani. Something to watch.

RUSSIA'S TILT TOWARD CHIINA

CCI — Mon, 19 Oct 2009 10:42:06 -0700

ROPV CONTRIBUTORS

by Andrey Tsygankov

Russia is increasingly unable to resist the charm of China’s economic and political influence. As Russia’s relatively low productivity translates into declining competitiveness, China’s ways of influencing the north continue to expand.

Even routine domestic economic decisions in Russia are increasingly made with a consideration for China. For instance, Beijing sent a delegation to Moscow in July to negotiate conditions of a large group of ethnic Chinese affected by the Moscow government’s decision to close the large Cherkizovsky Market following multiple violations of labor and immigration law. Headed by Beijing’s deputy trade minister, the delegation negotiated restoration of the trading area on condition of a Chinese $1 billion investment.

But in recognition of the growing need for China’s investments and export markets, Russia was unwilling to press environmental claims against its neighbor when it polluted the Amur River.

China’s rising importance has translated into the growing prominence of the Sinophiles in Russia’s national discussions. Since the end of the Soviet Union, the China discourse has evolved from one dominated by the Westernizers to one largely controlled by the Sinophiles, who have supporters in the government, energy firms with ties to Asia and the military-industrial complex.

The general public has also grown more pro-China over time. For example, a June poll by VTsIOM revealed that the share of Russians viewing China as a strategic and economic partner had grown from 34 percent to 41 percent over the past several years. In addition, 47 percent of the respondents voiced optimism regarding the future of relations with China.

The Sinophiles are pushing to strengthen relations with China based on Russia’s economic and security priorities. Although they want to protect Russia’s sovereignty, they insist that it would be better protected by closer economic and political ties with China rather than with the West. This is driven by influential leaders in the Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry and military-industrial complex who want to prevent the United States from dominating global affairs. Creating a multipolar world is necessary to revive Russia’s superpower status. Pushing for a U.S. retreat from Eurasia in the next five years, the advocates of multipolarity call for a political, economic and military union along the lines of a Warsaw Pact with China, India, Iran and other non-Western nations.

In the area of economic relations, the pro-China position is often favored by energy producers and military enterprises in search of high-ticket defense contracts in Asia. Kremlin strategists believe that the country would be better off redirecting its oil and gas supplies toward Eurasian countries such as China and India because such a measure would assist the country in developing energy-intensive goods and transforming its current status as a raw materials appendage of Europe.

As of now, Russia’s most commonly exported products to China are energy and weapons, whereas the most commonly imported products include everything from electronics to clothes. In addition, some state corporations have benefited from Chinese loans. For example, China’s $6 billion loan helped Rosneft purchase Yuganskneftegaz in a December 2004 auction. Notably, the chairman of Rosneft is Igor Sechin, who is a deputy prime minister and member of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. As the key negotiator, Sechin is now applying the model of a recently signed oil deal with China to other energy areas including electricity, natural gas and atomic energy.

The prospect of a growing pro-China tilt in Russia’s foreign policy may force the West to alter its foreign policy course. Rather than trying to secure the 21st century as another American or Western century, Washington and Brussels will do well to prepare for the emergence of a post-Western world and reassess the role that Russia will play in this new structure.

Preventing a potentially anti-Western Moscow-Beijing axis means that the West has to strengthen its ties with Russia, while preserving strong relations with China. The objective should be not to marginalize or isolate China, but rather to strengthen Russia’s ability to choose its future partners in the post-Western world.

Andrei P. Tsygankov is a professor of international relations at San Francisco State University.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

CCI — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 12:22:00 -0700

by Patrick Armstrong

Regional elections. Elections were held across Russia on Sunday and, as usual, United Russia dominated the results. The losing parties have charged fraud and walked out of the Duma on Wednesday in protest. What are we to make of this? It is very likely there was a degree of fraud, both from the top of the power pyramid and from the bottom. But there are objective reasons for the domination of United Russia. It is the party in power and the population has showed, in innumerable opinion polls, that it approves of the people in power; approval of Medvedev and Putin is easily transferred to their pedestal party. Some opposition parties have been led by the same people for 15 years: why should anyone decide that Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov, who have been rejected time and time again, suddenly have the answers? As to the others, Yabloko, while it has a new leader, marginalised itself by its repeated refusal to collaborate with like-minded people, Just Russia has never really got off the ground and Other Russia is a stunt for Western naïfs. Therefore, in my opinion, fraud, pressure and the like can account for the margin of victory but not for the victory itself. The Russian “opposition” has found a comfortable niche which is personally profitable to its leaders while United Russia gets things done. Not an ideal situation to be sure, but one which many hands have made.

Economic crisis. In an interview Medvedev admitted, as he has before, that “the real damage to our economy was far greater than anything predicted by ourselves, the World Bank, and other expert organisations” and that unemployment is worse than expected. He believed the government had made some correct decisions especially in supporting banks and maintaining the level of social welfare payments. As before, he stressed the need to modernise the economy: “You know, whether we're in a crisis or not in a crisis, we can safely say that the economic challenge facing us is the same: we need to modernise the economy.” And that won’t be soon: “Not a year, not two, not three, but maybe 10-15 years – that is a perfectly plausible time frame in which to create a new economy, an economy that will be competitive with other major world economies”.

Today’s flavoured headline. “Statistics Chief Claims Number Shenanigans”; quotation from piece: “At least they don’t tell us how to monitor. They don’t try to manipulate figures.” Sheesh!

Clinton visit. Reports suggest reasonably amicable meetings; details no doubt will come out eventually.

Iran. Medvedev has said that Moscow is against “the extension of the nuclear club” and this was echoed by the Chair of the Security Council. Moscow remains opposed to more sanctions, saying it sees them as ineffective. Or right now this minute anyway. Clinton is quoted as saying “I believe if sanctions become necessary, we will have support from Russia”.

Military doctrine. Yet another version is on the way and it, like its predecessors (I can’t quite remember – I’ve lost count of them – but certainly in 2000 and 2003) will say that a nuclear first strike is possible. I do not understood why Moscow feels it necessary to spell out the obvious: it would be much better advised to imitate NATO’s formless language: “Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.”

People power. A poll shows half its residents oppose a skyscraper in St Petersburg. We shall see whether their wishes continue to be ignored. The Governor, who approved it last month, now appears to be backtracking.

Tbilisi and jihadists. The FSB Director says that evidence has been found that Georgian authorities are collaborating with and training jihadists who then go to the North Caucasus; Tbilisi has denied it. But the last time the Russians said that there were jihadists in Georgia, Tbilisi denied and denied until 2003 when it finally admitted the truth of Moscow’s statements. So, in my opinion, the Russian accusation should not be dismissed.

Georgia. The Labour Party promises revelations about Saakashvili’s corruption and has urged Washington to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate the financial involvement of some US officials in “bankrolling” the “Rose Revolution”. Zurabishvili says a new wave of protests will begin 7 Nov. Meanwhile, Tbilisi is irritating Berlin with its accusations that Germans involved in the EU report were bought by Moscow.

Armenia-Turkey. The agreement was signed in Zurich on Saturday after a last-minute delay. I expect this success of multilateral patient diplomacy to bear fruit on the Karabakh problem eventually.

THE YELTSIN SCANDAL

CCI — Wed, 14 Oct 2009 08:50:06 -0700

ROPV CONTRIBUTORS

By William Dunkerley

A stone drunk Boris Yeltsin stood across from the White House in Washington. He was there in his underwear hailing a taxi. In his stupor, Yeltsin just wanted to go out for a pizza.

That bizarre incident from the 90s made the news recently. The PR blitz for a book by Taylor Branch about the Clinton presidency seems to have propelled the story.

But those Yeltsin antics of inebriation aren't the scandal here. Indeed, the recently-circulated story was not actually news. The whole tale had been told earlier by Strobe Talbott in his book on Clinton presidential diplomacy. It was released in 2002 and garnered media attention back then.

So then what is the "Yeltsin Scandal"? The crux of it is the Western press' inexplicably lenient treatment of the Yeltsin presidency, especially in comparison to his successors.

It's Another Bizarre Story

As a media professional, I've followed with interest the press coverage of the recent Russian presidents: Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev. And, I have to admit that I've found the nature of the coverage itself to be yet another bizarre story, one with mystery and intrigue of its own.

Over the years, Yeltsin has been characterized variously as a hero who brought down communism, as the foremost proponent of Russia's transformation to democracy and a market economy, and as a stalwart of Russia's free press.

Beyond that popular imagery, however, there was a less attractive side. Yeltsin presided over a looting of state assets that created a circle of newly-minted tycoons that helped to protect Yeltsin. In addition, acting against the constitution, Yeltsin dismissed the duly elected parliament. And when the members refused to go, he brought in tanks to shell the parliament building in a confrontation that ultimately claimed approximately 150 lives. Somehow he was able to win reelection in a contest where he held roughly a 5 percent approval rating going into the election season. Ultimately, Yeltsin led the country into a financial collapse near the end of his presidency.

Admiring Boris

Yeltsin is nevertheless used in many media accounts and in political discourse as a standard of accomplishment against which his successors are being compared. Notably, Putin is criticized widely in the media for rolling back the democratic gains of the Yeltsin era, for reversing the course Yeltsin had taken away from Soviet-era autocratic rule, and for clamping down on Russia's free press. Typical headlines include "The Rollback of Democracy in Vladimir Putin's Russia" ( Washington Post) and "How Putin Muzzled Russia's Free Press" (Wall Street Journal).

According to my analysis, media accounts seem generally to advance a Yeltsin persona that combines hero, fierce democratic and market reformer, and relatively harmless drunk. Indeed, President Bill Clinton has been quoted as observing, "We can't ever forget that Yeltsin drunk is better than most of the alternatives sober."

Putin's persona in the press, however, is more that of a suspicious, power-hungry autocrat who will stop at nothing, not even murder. On the PBS News Hour with Jim Lehrer, Senator John McCain once accused Putin's Kremlin of instituting a "state-run kind of Mussolini style government."

A Closer Look at Yeltsin

As a case-in-point, I examined the New York Times coverage of Yeltsin's shelling of the parliament in 1993. That was one of Yeltsin's most egregious acts. The Times ran a story entitled "SHOWDOWN IN MOSCOW: Tactics; Yeltsin Attack Strategy: Bursts Followed by Lulls." Here are some excerpts illustrating how the Times covered the story:

"The assault on the Russian Parliament building today was a textbook example of the decisive application of military power…

"And as the daylong assault went on, it was clear that Mr. Yeltsin's commanders had decided on gradualism…

"The Russian troops were looking for Bolshoi Devyatinsky lane ... where the defiant lawmakers had maintained their headquarters…

"With the outcome of the battle never in doubt, the clear preference of the military was to scare the anti-Yeltsin demonstrators into surrendering and to limit casualties…

"The only question was the number of lives that would be lost. And that was largely left up to the rebels as they were alternately bombarded with shells and appeals to surrender."

Just note how soft this coverage is. I'm not taking sides on whether Yeltsin's actions were appropriate or not. But, the Yeltsin side is characterized as valiant and measured. The other side is characterized as defiant and to blame for its own fate. The story has a factual basis. The president really did launch a tank assault on the parliament. However, the circumstances clearly seem to be spun in a way that tempers that stark reality.

What About Putin?

The flip side of Yeltsin's spun-positive media treatment is the very dark characterizations that are given to Putin. To substantiate that conclusion, I'd like to share with you my investigations into the coverage of two issues: Putin's alleged crackdown on Russia's free press, a frequent media theme, and his alleged culpability in the murder of reputed former spy Alexander Litvinenko.

Actually, the press freedom situation is entirely different from how it has been characterized in the Western press. There never was any free press for Putin to have cracked down on. Right from the start of the Russian Federation, laws were put into place that assured that. They provided that the media could not achieve the financial strength to be free and independent. As a result, the press was thrust into the clutches of politicians and business tycoons who propped up the bankrupt media companies in return for the ability to color the news in their own favor. The media were (and still are for the most part) subjugated, not free. Any reportage that there had been a truly free press was either evidence of misunderstanding or falsification. I detailed all this in an article entitled "Russia's Free Press Hoax." You can find it at http://www.publishinghelp.com/oen01.

Media Mythology

The coverage of the Litvinenko story offers another textbook case. In a sense, there are similarities to Yeltsin's battle with parliament. There is irrefutable evidence that both basic events actually happened. The attack on parliament did take place, and Litvinenko was poisoned. Another similarity is that both stories made the top-stories-of-the-year lists for 1993 and 2006, respectively.

But when you get into the who-did-what-to-whom, the two stories start to become dissimilar in character. There was lots of evidence that it was Yeltsin who launched the assault on parliament. With the Litvinenko story, however, there were no journalists who had reliable evidence that Putin was involved. Yet so many stories trumpeted the unsupported allegation that Putin was behind the murder.

In 2007, the organizers of the World Congress of the International Federation of Journalists commissioned me to study the Litvinenko coverage and to report my findings at their meeting. What I found is that most of the popular stories of the time seem to have been based on sheer fabrication. They were all part of a PR blitz cooked up by a disgruntled Russian tycoon. My report to IFJ presents further detail on all this, and can be found at http://www.publishinghelp.com/rp091.

The Yeltsin Scandal in Focus

So, now you have a better picture of the Yeltsin scandal. As you can see, it isn't about the then-president of Russia. It is really about the media and how they have covered Yeltsin and his successors. It is a scandal of the professional malfeasance of journalists. They have been caught taking shady PR accounts that should have been scrutinized and exploding them into stories of enormous proportion.

It's not been just the Litvinenko story. There's been the incessant stories of how Russia is using energy as a weapon, how there was a rash of journalist murders under Putin, how Russia started a war with Georgia. None of these appear to be the whole honest truth, either.

The Outcome?

What ever happened to Yeltsin's drunken pizza escapade? According to Bill Clinton, "Yeltsin got his pizza."

As to the real Yeltsin scandal, the shoddy coverage of Yeltsin and his successors? That one is still unfolding. Some journalists are still taking a slipshod approach to reporting. As you read that reportage, keep in mind the "Yeltsin Scandal." Look for factual substantiation of those future reports, positive or negative!

William Dunkerley is a media business analyst and consultant based in New Britain, CT. He works extensively with media organizations in Russia and other post-communist countries, and has advised government leaders on strategies for building press freedom and a healthy media sector.

IN AN INVASION, WHEN CAN A SPADE BE CALLED A SPADE?

CCI — Mon, 12 Oct 2009 11:09:18 -0700

ARTICLE CRITIQUE

Response to Wall Street Journal Europe "Europe Exposes Russia's Guilt in Georgia" by Svante E. Cornell, October 2, 2009

by Gordon Hahn

The WSJ Europe article reviewed below provides an exceedingly one-sided view of the EU report on the cases, conduct, and consequences of the August 2008 Five-Day Georgian-Ossetian/Russian War.

To access the full analysis, please click here Download GH_WSJ_Cornell_2Oct2009

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

CCI — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 13:45:29 -0700

by Patrick Armstrong

Missile Defence. Medvedev has formally announced, after some confusion (again!) from various spokesmen, that the deployment of Iskander Missiles to Kaliningrad has been cancelled (they never were actually deployed – it was always conditional). Yesterday the Foreign Minister Lavrov said that the new US plans presented no risks for Russia, good conditions were present for dialogue and that Moscow and Washington would soon hold talks on missile defence. Of course: Moscow was concerned when the idea was to stop ICBMs, but defence against medium- and short- range missiles doesn’t bother it. On the other hand, Russia’s UN Ambassador said that it would complicate nuclear disarmament. I have often wished the Russian Foreign Ministry would get a better grip on its people and stop this dribble of confusing and partially contradictory statements. Mind you, NATO’s no better: it is asking for help while encouraging Tbilisi’s NATO aspirations. What message will any of the suspicious people out there take from these pairs of statements?

EU Report. The report was published last week. It is probably not a coincidence that the next day PACE rejected Tbilisi’s motion to deprive Russia of voting rights. Nino Burjanadze has accused the government of covering up the report; while Saakashvili has hailed it as complete vindication some Georgians are claiming that Russian money is to be found there. I regard it as rather little, rather late, naïve and incomplete; my argument is here. But at least it knows who started the war.

SSNs. It was announced that by the end of next year, RosAtom will have dismantled 191 out of 198 decommissioned nuclear submarines; at the moment it has destroyed 166.

Sayano-Shushenskaya HEP accident. RosTekhNadzor has announced the result of its enquiry. Terrorist attack has been ruled out but a full slate of blame is laid: design, operation, repair and lack of training. Anatoliy Chubays, head of the electricity monopoly 1998 to 2008, is taking some of the blame.

Loans. The Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin has said that Moscow will not disburse the remaining US$500 million (of a US$2 billion) loan to Belarus and will not lend Ukraine US$5 billion; he added, however, that Moscow fully supported IMF actions. The reason given was that Moscow should assess the chance of repayment. Given that Ukraine has already received US$10.6 billion of a US$16.4 billion IMF loan and Belarus received US$2.46 billion with another billion likely on its way, this may be a prudent decision. It’s not shortage of money: Russia has plenty in the kitty (the Reserve Fund is US$76.37 billion, National Welfare Fund US$91.86 billion and international reserves of more than US$400 billion).

De-nationalisation. The Finance Minister said that the government intends to sell the shares in companies that it purchased during the crisis. The only timeframe he gave was “the medium term”.

Things you won’t hear about. Last week customs officers in Krasnodar claimed to have prevented an attempt to smuggle MiG-29 components to Syria. Russian rescue teams arrived in Sumatra on Sunday in response to Wednesday’s earthquake.

Karabakh. Maybe (maybe) some movement here. An Azerbaijanian official is quoted as saying that Armenia and Azerbaijan should be able to use the Lachin Corridor jointly. Access from Armenia to Karabakh would have to be part of any genuine settlement. Meanwhile the Turkish PM is quoted as saying that Ankara and Yerevan will be signing an agreement on Saturday re-opening the border and establishing relations. I believe that Ankara could play a very important part in resolving the Karabakh issue. One of the lessons of the South Ossetia war is that these gifts of Stalin’s cartographical skills should not be left to fester.

Transdnestr. Speaking of Stalin’s cartography, with the coming to power in Moldova of politicians who at one time or another called for Moldova’s absorption into Romania (the casus belli of the Transdnestr wars), it is prudent to look at that issue. And the mediators (Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE) did call for the resumption of talks. There is a doable solution that has been floating around – high autonomy for Transdnestr with the option to secede should Moldova join Romania – and hopefully it just needs some pressure to make it happen. The last thing we need is more nonsense about how it’s all Moscow’s doing. But, again, the “Georgia lesson” is, I believe, gradually sinking in.

THE EU REPORT: LITTLE AND LATE

CCI — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 09:21:46 -0700

COMMENTARY

by Patrick Armstrong

The long-delayed Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia was finally issued on 30 September, 13 months after the war. It is to be found here: Vol I (Introductory); Vol II (Report); Vol III (Submitted material). In what follows quotations are from the BBC-supplied version (which is somewhat faster loading). Generally speaking, I regard it as rather little, rather late, naïve and incomplete. It is also excruciatingly delicate – even precious – in what it says and what it avoids saying. It concludes with a number of unexceptionable, but rather vague, recommendations.

It is incomplete because it, evidently seeing the conflict as one between Georgia and Russia as other commentators have, leaves the Ossetians out. While the authors feel it useful to give some historical background on Georgia, going back to the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783, there is no equivalent discussion of the Ossetian (or Abkhazian) point of view. But, if asked, Ossetians would certainly speak of their unwillingness to be part of Georgia and refer to earlier Georgian attacks in 1920 and 1991. Their arguments for independent status (here is Abkhazia’s) should be heard out even if they are to be refuted. Tendentious perhaps but a significant factor in Ossetian (and Abkhazian) perceptions. The fact is that the Ossetians, rightly or wrongly, do not want to be part of Georgia, fought for their independence when the Russian Empire collapsed, were placed in the Georgian SSR by Stalin-Jughashvili, tried to be excluded from it when the USSR collapsed, fought another independence war and, very probably, stopped the Georgian attack before the Russian forces got there (some Tskhinvali combat footage at 7:50). To leave their point of view out of the Report is to be incomplete. Added to which, the discussion about their citizenship (the authors assert that they were Georgian citizens) is to altogether ignore their contention that, while they were certainly Soviet citizens in 1991, they never agreed to becoming Georgian citizens. Indeed the world recognised Georgia, in the borders that Stalin gave it, while the disputes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were actually going on.

The Report is legalistic: “According to the overwhelmingly accepted uti possidetis principle, only former constituent republics such as Georgia but not territorial sub-units such as South Ossetia or Abkhazia are granted independence in case of dismemberment of a larger entity such as the former Soviet Union. Hence, South Ossetia did not have a right to secede from Georgia, and the same holds true for Abkhazia for much of the same reasons.” This may well be true from a narrow legal perspective but by dismissing the Ossetians’ wishes it hardly points to a solution of the problem. Nor should it mean that South Ossetia and Abkhazia should lose the status they had had under the Soviet system just because Tbilisi says they should. It is not Moscow’s fishing in Georgian waters, but Tbilisi’s refusal under Gamsakhurdia in the 1990s to entertain the possibility of South Ossetia and Abkhazia retaining the quasi-autonomy they had had in the Georgian SSR that is where and when this latest round in the conflict began. The world recognised Stalin’s Georgia without consideration of this problem (just as it did with Azerbaijan and Karabakh and Moldova and Transdnestr. And Russia and Chechnya). In retrospect, it would have been better had we all made recognition conditional on a civilised compromise (as, for example, Ukraine’s government negotiated with Crimea).

The Report is incomplete because it fails even to mention two important pieces of evidence. One from the former Georgian Defence Minister, Irakly Okruashvili: “But Okruashvili, a close Saakashvili ally who served as defence minister from 2004 to 2006, said he and the president worked together on military plans to invade South Ossetia and a second breakaway region on the Black Sea coast, Abkhazia.” The second, from Georgia’s former Ambassador to Russia in 2008 Erosi Kitsmarishvili who said in his November testimony in Tbilisi:

first that an attack was considered in 2004 (“During that meeting, President Saakashvili asked the question whether to launch a military assault on Tskhinvali or not?... We were very close to taking a decision in favor of the operation, because Okruashvili, who was in favor of the military operation, was at that time very close associate to President Saakashvili”);
second that there was a plan to attack Abkhazia earlier in the year that was put off (“The military operation should have been undertaken in direction of Abkhazia; military instructors from Israel were brought here in order to prepare that military operation; Kezerashvili also said at that meeting that the operation should have started in early May, or at least before the snow melted on the mountain passes; This decision was not materialized);
and third that Saakashvili thought that he had Washington’s approval for the attack on South Ossetia (“In the second half of April, 2008, I have learnt from the President's inner circle that they have received a green light from the western partner to carry out a military operation; When asked to specify “the western partner” Kitsmarishvili said: after a meeting with the U.S. President George W. Bush [the meeting between Bush and Saakashvili took place in Washington on March 19], our leadership was saying that they had the U.S. support to carry out the military operation; In order to double-check this information, I have met with John Tefft, the U.S. ambassador in Tbilisi and asked him whether it was true or not; he categorically denied that;”).

Thus, these two men, close to Saakashvili and to decision-making in Tbilisi, attest there was always a war plan and that there had been several close calls. This is a very important part of the background to the August war: one can assume that Moscow and Tskhinvali had knowledge of this. To leave testimony from such sources out of the Report altogether is to seriously distort the discussion of the immediate background.

The Report is naïve in its discussion of the ceasefire. In one part the authors say “On 10 August, the Georgian Government declared a unilateral ceasefire and its intention to withdraw Georgian forces from South Ossetia. This ceasefire, however, was not followed by the opposite side”. Why would Moscow believe Saakashvili? He preceded the attack on Tskhinvali with a ceasefire declaration. It is naïve of the authors to expect Moscow – or anyone – to trust Saakashvili’s declarations after that. But at another place they write: “After five days of fighting, a ceasefire agreement was negotiated on 12 August 2008 between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and French President Nicolas Sarkozy”. But did Saakashvili sign it? A French Report says that he did but another report suggests that he only signed on the 15^th. There was also some confusion over just what he signed. Then the Report refers to an implementation agreement on 8 September. The Report charges “However, the Russian and South Ossetian forces reportedly continued their advances for some days after the August ceasefire was declared”. My question is which “August ceasefire?” the 10^th, the 12^th or the 15^th? At one point the authors write “Furthermore, all South Ossetian military actions directed against Georgian armed forces after the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 had come into effect were illegal as well.” Ah, but when did it “come into effect”? It is naïve to think that there is any such thing as a unilateral ceasefire and it is naïve to expect forces in contact to stop shooting immediately.

The Report is incomplete in its charge that “Russian armed forces, covered by air strikes and by elements of its Black Sea fleet, penetrated deep into Georgia” going “far beyond the reasonable limits of defence”. Georgia is not a very large country, to be sure, and “deep” there does not mean the same distance as it would in a larger country. But of the list of towns mentioned in the Report – Gori, Zugdidi, Senaki and Poti – Senaki, at about 40 kilometres from the Abkhazian border, is the deepest. I would not have used the word “deep” here, but that is a matter of opinion. What is more important, showing both naïvety and incompleteness, is that no reason for the Russian “penetration” is entertained. But the fleeing Georgian forces, still in contact, with no mutually agreed ceasefire, abandoned significant amounts of weapons, armoured vehicles, ammunition and fuel in the army bases at Senaki and Gori (at least a battle group’s worth in the latter). In the case of Gori, certainly and probably also Senaki, all local authorities, from the mayor to the police, had fled with the retreating army. Should Russian forces have just left these weapons unguarded? One can imagine what the authors of the Report would have said had the Russian commanders shrugged their shoulders and left these tanks, APCs and artillery pieces, fuelled and armed, to the first group of Ossetians or Abkhazians bent on revenge. Poti was a naval base for warships that had fired at Russian ships and Zugdidi is on the way to Senaki. War has its logic and part of that logic is that forces, once set in motion, seek out the enemy and destroy his resources. Until there is a ceasefire, and as we have seen, the authors of the Report fudge the issue of just when there was a mutual ceasefire, that military logic holds. Therefore this charge is weak, naïve and, its use of “deep” is rather questionable.

The Report several times charges the Russian forces with “massive and extended military action ranging from the bombing of the upper Kodori Valley to the deployment of armoured units to reach extensive parts of Georgia, to the setting up of military positions in and nearby major Georgian towns as well as to control major highways, and to the deployment of navy units on the Black Sea.” More naïvety: just because an artillery piece, or air base firing on Russian forces is not actually located in South Ossetia does not give it immunity. Russian forces attacked Georgian air assets until they stopped action; it attacked artillery units until they stopped action. It occupied key positions until there was a solid ceasefire and then it left them. That is war and, it is to be recalled, Saakashvili chose war. At least the Report avoids the fatuous expression “disproportionate”. The Russian reaction was in fact quite “proportionate”. If one wishes to see what a “disproportionate” use of force would be, one may consider the case of Novy Sad which was bombed many times by NATO aircraft in 1999: every single bridge over the Danube was destroyed, the oil refinery was destroyed, the TV station was destroyed and its water and electrical supplies were knocked out. Novy Sad is over 200 kilometres from Kosovo. Nothing like that happened to Georgia.

Many refugees were created (“far more than 100 000 civilians who fled their homes. Around 35 000 still have not been able to return to their homes”). And, given the way the war turned out, most of them are Georgians who have left (or been pushed out) from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Report spends much time discussing them, and rightly. But it fails to take into consideration what would have happened had the outcome been different. Which is naïve. There is some reason to suspect that the Georgian aim, by bombarding the population of Tskhinvali just after Saakashvili had secured surprise by saying “I have been proposing and I am proposing Russia act as a guarantor of South Ossetian autonomy within Georgia”, was to force as many Ossetians to flee north as possible. The Report ought to at least entertain the alternative possibility. But, throughout, it refuses to speculate on Tbilisi’s intentions. Which is remarkable given that the authors accept that Tbilisi fired first. What was Tbilisi trying to do? The authors are quite incurious.

On the other hand, the authors are clear that Tbilisi fired first and that its action was unjustifiable: “There is the question of whether the use of force by Georgia in South Ossetia, beginning with the shelling of Tskhinvali during the night of 7/8 August 2008, was justifiable under international law. It was not…. It is not possible to accept that the shelling of Tskhinvali during much of the night with GRAD multiple rocket launchers (MRLS) and heavy artillery would satisfy the requirements of having been necessary and proportionate in order to defend those villages.” The authors of the Report judge the action, but they do not understand it because they fail to ask the key question: “What war did Saakashvili think he was starting?” Certainly not the war he got. This failure is probably the most naïve and unreflective part of the Report. The authors treat the events of August and September 2008 as if they were disconnected: Russia is justified to do this but not that; Georgia that but not this (“In a matter of a very few days, the pattern of legitimate and illegitimate military action had thus turned around between the two main actors Georgia and Russia”). When Saakashvili ordered the opening of fire, he took an irrevocable step and transformed a long crisis into something else. The Ossetians fought back, the Russians intervened, the Georgians collapsed and fled leaving their weapons and the population they were supposed to defend behind, a period of confusion ensued in Tbilisi and elsewhere, revenge for the devastation of Tskhinvali was taken, soldiers secured themselves against danger, eventually an agreed settlement appeared and it stopped. It is a continuous flow of actions and reactions; it cannot be packaged into discrete segments and judged independently. The weakness of the legalistic approach taken by the authors of the Report is precisely this lack of context and understanding of the connectedness of events. Especially as concerning wars which are easy to start but difficult to finish. The authors seem to assume that everyone had perfect knowledge and perfect control.

But at least the Report got who started the war right and most of the headlines have concentrated on that point. It is amusing to see Tbilisi’s apologists now pretending that the bombardment didn’t really matter: “Tagliavini’s Report does state that Georgia started the war. That should not be confused with the question of responsibility. Indeed, the Report acknowledges that firing the first shot does not necessarily mean bearing responsibility for the conflict”. This is to burke the essence of what happened: Saakashvili claimed that Ossetians were Georgian citizens, and after professing his “love” for them – indeed the timing means that he must have already given the preparatory orders – ordered what the Report calls “a sustained Georgian artillery attack” on the town of Tskhinvali. Curious indeed to pretend that this action, from which there could be no turning back, is not “responsibility”.

The Report is dismissive of Moscow’s claimed justifications for action. To prevent “genocide”: well, it’s true that there were no mass deaths in Tskhinvali but the Report does not take into consideration the excited reports of casualties at the time, the thousands of refugees fleeing north or what might have happened had Tbilisi won. This is consistent with its inexplicable lack of curiosity over what Tbilisi’s plans and intentions were. It spurns Moscow’s rationale of protecting Russian citizens by decreeing that the South Ossetians were not Russian citizens at all, dismissing the issue of whether, in the conditions of the collapse of the USSR and the skirmishing already happening there (and in Abkhazia), it is really correct to say that they were Georgian citizens, given that to have accepted Georgian passports would have been to concede their whole argument and desire. It dismisses the “humanitarian intervention” justification in what seems to me to be a rather confused paragraph, (“Could the use of force by Russia then possibly be justified as a “humanitarian intervention”, in order to protect South Ossetian civilians? To begin with, it is a highly controversial issue among legal experts whether there is any justification or not for humanitarian intervention. It might be assumed, however, that humanitarian intervention to prevent human rights violations abroad is allowed only under very limited circumstances, if at all. Among major powers, Russia in particular has consistently and persistently objected to any justification of the NATO Kosovo intervention as a humanitarian intervention. It can therefore not rely on this putative title to justify its own intervention on Georgian territory. And as a directly neighbouring state, Russia has important political and other interests of its own in South Ossetia and the region. In such a constellation, a humanitarian intervention is not recognised at all”.)

But, to be sure, there was plenty of hypocrisy on Moscow’s side. In August 2008 Moscow posed as a humanitarian hero – a quality in short supply in the Chechen wars, especially the first – and a defender of self-determination, ditto. But NATO’s position (and the EU’s) was equally hypocritical: they took their stance on the principle of territorial integrity – something that apparently didn’t apply in Kosovo – and Russia’s supposedly “disproportionate” response, despite their actions in Kosovo. Moscow’s real concern, in my opinion, was the fear that Georgia’s war with South Ossetia and Abkhazia would, as it did in the 1990s, attract fighters from the North Caucasus and spread back into Russia. But, it is certain, Moscow cannot be unhappy with Saakashvili’s discomfiture and the likely end of Georgia’s entry into NATO.

Saakashvili’s story changed several times. Initially, in his “victory speech” on the 8^th when he believed Georgian forces controlled “most of South Ossetia”, he made no reference to Russian forces entering South Ossetia before the Georgian attack. It was later, on the 23^rd when he had a catastrophic defeat to explain away, that his story became “Russia then started its land invasion in the early hours of Aug. 7”. (No matter how preposterous the idea was that, having giving the Russian forces an 18-hour head start on a 55 kilometre road race, he would order the attack anyway). It is evident that the later charge was false – had he had evidence that the Russians had invaded, he would certainly have mentioned it on the 8^th. The Report is coy in its assessment of this obvious falsehood: “The Mission is not in a position to consider as sufficiently substantiated the Georgian claim concerning a large-scale Russian military incursion into South Ossetia before 8 August 2008.” Not “sufficiently substantiated” – does that mean it’s not true? Tergiversations like this justify the adjective “little”.

As to Abkhazia; of course it seized its chance to clear Georgian forces out of the last corner of the former Abkhazian ASSR – and Tbilisi should count itself fortunate that Svanetia, Javakhetia and Ajaria did not: perhaps they would have had the war lasted longer. But, as Kitsmarishvili’s testimony shows, Abkhazia had reason to fear it would be next on the list.

This sentence caught my eye: “The military aid [from Washington to Tbilisi] was at first designed to assist Georgia in regaining full control over the Pankisi Valley in the Caucasus where Chechen fighters had allegedly sought refuge, as Russia had claimed.” “Allegedly” “as Russia claimed”? More tergiversation: was Russia correct in so claiming? A very confused sentence altogether. In fact, Moscow was correct in so claiming, as Georgian officials finally admitted in 2003 and the earlier denials by the Georgian government helped to form Moscow’s opinions about Tbilisi’s veracity and reliability.

This Report is late because all of its conclusions, thirteen months afterwards, were knowable at the time. There is nothing in the Report from Tbilisi’s starting the shooting, to the falseness of Saakashvili’s claims, to the hypocrisy of Russia’s stated war aims that I (and many others) did not see.

Thus the Report is little, late, naïve and incomplete.

And finally, I don’t pretend to any kind of knowledge of international law but, according to Wikipedia, uti possidetis is defined as “a principle in international law that territory and other property remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict, unless provided for by treaty. Originating in Roman law, this principle enables a belligerent party to claim territory that it has acquired by war. The term has historically been used to legally formalize territorial conquests, such as the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the German Empire in 1871”. Does that mean that South Ossetia and Abkhazia were independent in 2008 by virtue of having won their independence wars against Georgia in the early 1990s? The Report is clearly referring to this meaning of the term, but one can ask. Certainly the so-called international community has to come up with a better answer to long-held grievances than the mantra of “territorial integrity”. Especially when the territory in question was designed by someone like Stalin.