Russia now holds 520 Ukrainians on politically motivated criminal charges from occupied Crimea — more than double the 238 documented at the time of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Many of them are Crimean Tatars, reports the Crimean Tatar Resource Center.

The number has grown through a year of peace talks in Geneva, Abu Dhabi, and Istanbul. Combatants have been exchanged. A handful of 2014-era civilians have trickled home. But the 520 Ukrainians Russia converted into its own "domestic criminals" through the legal fiction of its 2014 annexation are almost never on the lists.

Examples of persecution

Of those political prisoners, 277 are Crimean Tatars, and 351 are in pre-trial detention or serving sentences in penal colonies, according to the Crimean Tatar Resource Center as of 20 April 2026. In the first quarter of 2026, the occupation authorities carried out 57 arrests on the peninsula, 18 of them targeting Crimean Tatars, Zarema Bariiev from the Crimean Tatar Resource Center told Ukrinform.

Behind these figures are individual cases that follow a familiar pattern. Russia has built what the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group and Ukrainian activists have called a conveyor belt of fabricated cases against the peninsula's pro-Ukrainian residents — farmers, pensioners, Muslim believers, human rights defenders, journalists. What has changed is the scale and the silence: the cases multiply, while the diplomatic tables where Ukraine's future is being drawn have no seat for the people Russia is still arresting.

Oleh Prykhodko: the welder, who refused to look away

Oleh Prykhodko was 62 when a Russian military court in Rostov-on-Don sentenced him, on 3 March 2021, to five years in a high-security colony for preparing terrorist attackshe never prepared. He is a welder from the village of Orekhovo, in the Saky region of western Crimea. He had been openly pro-Ukrainian since long before the occupation, flew a Ukrainian flag over his land, and never hid his view that Crimea belonged to Ukraine.

The case against him rested on explosives the FSB said they had found in his garage during a search. The catch: the FSB had already searched his home earlier, during previous rounds of pressure on his pro-Ukrainian activity. When Prykhodko asked the officers to search his second garage, they refused — which suggested, as his defence pointed out, that they knew there was nothing there.

Prykhodko pleaded not guilty and stated at trial that he was an ordinary man who had openly opposed the occupation of Crimea. The court convicted him anyway. An extra month was added to his sentence — officially for contempt of court over insults aimed at the two FSB officers who had fabricated the case. Then, in November 2023, a Russian court added another four-and-a-half years, based on fellow inmates' testimony that he had "promoted terrorism" and "praised Hitler" in prison cell conversations — the sort of charge, as the Memorial Human Rights Centre has warned, that can be mechanically applied to any political prisoner Russia wants to keep.

On 5 March 2026 the FSB announced a fourth criminal case against him. This one charges him with "abetting terrorist activities" and "planning to incite state treason" — based on alleged conversations with cellmates. It can carry up to life in prison. Now 67, he suffers from hearing loss and other untreated health conditions.

Emir-Usein Kuku: the human rights defender Russia keeps breaking

Emir-Usein Kuku lived in the village of Koreiz, near Yalta, with his wife Meriem and their two sons. He is a Crimean Tatar, an economist and accountant by training, and a human rights defender. After the occupation, he helped found the Crimean Contact Group on Human Rights, which monitored the growing list of Crimean Tatars abducted, disappeared, or killed on the peninsula.

In April 2015 the FSB beat him severely on his way home from work, injuring his spine. He never received proper treatment. Russian officers then approached him several times and asked him to become an informant. He refused. In February 2016 they came for him, charging him with membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir — an Islamic political movement legal in Ukraine and most of the world, but which Russia's Supreme Court banned as "terrorist" in 2003. Russia applies the ban on the peninsula it occupies. The only evidence against Kuku was a recording of a kitchen conversation where the participants discussed politics, Islam, and the fate of Crimea; one of the men, his lawyer stated, was likely a planted witness.

A Russian military court sentenced him to 12 years in a maximum-security colony in November 2019. In between, he was subjected to forced psychiatric evaluation, spent almost a month in isolation at Simferopol Psychiatric Hospital No. 1, and went on a 24-day hunger strike in solidarity with filmmaker Oleh Sentsov. Russia moved him to Penal Colony No. 16 in Salavat, Bashkortostan — 2,500 kilometres from his home.

The spine never healed. Neither did the kidneys. In June 2023, Kuku was rushed to hospital with acute abdominal pain; doctors performed emergency surgery for an intestinal obstruction, Front Line Defenders reported. Three days later, against medical advice, he was sent back to the colony. He received no post-operative care, no diet guidance, and no record of what had been done to him. In February 2025 the UN Special Rapporteur on torture publicly called on Russia to provide him with urgent medical care. No response followed.

Server Mustafayev: the man who was punished for helping prisoners' families

Server Mustafayev was born in 1986 in Uzbekistan, where Stalin had deported his family in 1944. As a boy, he returned with his parents to newly independent Ukraine and rebuilt a life in his ancestors' homeland. By the time Russia occupied Crimea, he was a father of four and a co-founder of Crimean Solidarity — the grassroots network that documents searches, arrests, and sham trials, and that raises money for the wives and children of Crimean Tatars imprisoned by Russia.

In May 2018 the FSB detained him. The charge was the familiar one: participation in Hizb ut-Tahrir. On 16 September 2020 a Russian military court in Rostov-on-Don sentenced him and six other defendants in what human rights activists call the "second Bakhchysarai case" to between 13 and 19 years. Mustafayev received 14 years in a strict-regime penal colony. The case rested on covertly recorded conversations inside a mosque, transcribed by an FSB operative who did not know Arabic well and made dozens of errors, and analysed by "experts" from a pedagogical university in Ufa with no background in Islam.

On 20 May 2025, Freedom House awarded Mustafayev its first-ever Alfred Moses Liberty Award for his work with Crimean Solidarity, noting that he had helped victims of Russian persecution before Russia decided he was one of them. He is currently serving his sentence in a Russian colony. His four children have grown up without him.

History, in his case, is repeating itself. His family was exiled from Crimea by the Soviet state in 1944 on invented charges of collective treason. Now a Russian state has again removed him from Crimea and placed him in a colony in Russia — for helping the children of other exiles.

What release looks like

Since 2014, fewer than a dozen political prisoners from Crimea have been returned to Ukraine through exchanges, according to the Crimean Tatar Resource Center's count. The most visible among them show what it takes.

Akhtem Chiygoz, deputy head of the Mejlis, was arrested in January 2015 for his role in organising a rally in Simferopol on 26 February 2014, in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity — a rally held before Russia had even formally extended its "jurisdiction" to the peninsula. He spent 1,000 days in pre-trial detention and was sentenced to eight years. On 25 October 2017 he and fellow Mejlis deputy head Ilmi Umerov were released by Russia and flown to Türkiye, reportedly pardoned by Vladimir Putin after personal intervention by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Nariman Dzhelyal, first deputy chairman of the Mejlis, was taken in September 2021 — days after he attended the inaugural Crimea Platform summit in Kyiv. Russia accused him and his cousins of blowing up a gas pipe in Perevalne. He was sentenced to 17 years. On 28 June 2024 he was returned to Ukraine in a 53rd prisoner exchange brokered with Vatican mediation. The Holy See, Cardinal Matteo Zuppi, and the Apostolic Nuncio to Ukraine were publicly credited; the diplomatic weight required was considerable. In January 2025 Ukraine appointed Dzhelyal its ambassador to Türkiye.

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Ukraine secures release of 10 civilians in Vatican-brokered exchange, including Crimean Tatar leader

Human Rights House Crimea and Crimean Process have launched an AI-assisted platform that makes it possible to write letters to Crimean political prisoners through official channels that work with Russian prisons. The system generates a letter based on answers to a short questionnaire, translates it into Russian to comply with prison censorship requirements, and forwards any response to the sender.

For now, that may be the only channel available. As negotiations continue, the number of Crimean prisoners keeps growing—largely unseen and almost entirely excluded from the deals meant to end the war.

Ukraine has lost roughly 500 of the 4,100 M-113 armored personnel carriers its allies supplied. Now a Kyiv manufacturer is building a replacement—and improving on the 1960s American design.

Meet the the Skif by UkrArmoTech, Ukraine's answer to America's iconic M-113 "battle taxi," thousands of which perform an array of lifesaving tasks in Ukrainian brigades.

Designed to match the 14-ton M-113's high speed, impressive maneuverability, flexibility, capaciousness and ease of use, the Skif also improves on the American vehicle's biggest flaw: its thin armor. If it works as advertised, the Skif could speed infantry to and from front-line positions, help wounded troops evacuate to field hospitals and—with add-on weapons—defend against drones or even join mechanized assaults across the 1,200-km no-man's-land.

As a bonus, the tracked Skif could do all these things on rough terrain where Ukrainian forces' other most useful vehicles—its wheeled infantry mobility vehicles—tend to get mired.

The OSINT account Special Kherson Cat helpfully collated the Skif's specifications as the vehicle enters builder's trials.

The Skif's capacity and mobility specifications are similar to the M-113's, but the Ukrainian vehicle has roughly double the protection compared to the American vehicle, which was designed in the 1960s.

It's tall order to replace all the M-113s Ukraine has received from its allies in the 50 months since Russia widened its war of aggression, so don't expect an all-Skif military any time soon. Ukraine has taken delivery of more than 4,100 M-113s, including thousands of standard APC variants as well as specialized models with cargo beds and gun turrets.

The war has been hard on the M-113 fleet, however. The Ukrainians have lost around 500 of the vehicles in combat—and surely written off many more owing to wear and tear.

High demand

Given than a single mechanized brigade might want to possess 100 or so M-113s for various roles, it's easy to imagine overall demand in Ukraine for 10,000 M-113s and similar vehicles. While Ukraine may continue to receive M-113s from allies, it would benefit Ukrainian troops and Ukrainian industry to tap a domestic source for analogue—and improved—vehicles.

It's worth noting that the Americans' own next-generation APC, the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, costs around $2.5 million per vehicle. A made-in-Ukraine APC, even one with a significant number of imported components, would surely be much cheaper.

Still, it's unclear whether Kyiv is willing to spend potentially $1 billion on a large fleet of new APCs when there are other, seemingly more urgent, priorities. Namely, drones.

But inasmuch as Ukrainian forces still need to maneuver under armor and over rough terrain along or near the wide no-man's-land, they should do so in vehicles that balance mobility and protection. The M-113 already balances those competing requirements pretty well. The Skif may balance them even better—and Ukraine would own the supply chain.

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Attacking through Russia’s best drones, a Ukrainian column lost a precious M-1 tank—and potentially a lot of troops

Ukrainian forces are flying a new AI-assisted attack drone over Donetsk city in order to strike at critical logistical targets.

That Ukrainian drones can range over Donetsk with near impunity is further evidence of the ongoing collapse of Russian air defenses. A collapse that itself is being hastened along by Ukrainian drone strikes.

The fixed-wing Hornet drone, built by US-based Swift Beat LLC, boasts an internal algorithm that scrutinizes the image from the drone's forward-looking camera, and automatically recognizes military targets. The AI can steer the explosive drone to a precision hit even when the distant human operator loses contact with the drone due to interference from weather, terrain or Russian jamming.

The Hornet is a recent addition to the Ukrainian arsenal, and a powerful one. The Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps claimed its drones, which can be identified as Hornets by their distinctive operator displays, are flying over Donetsk city with ease. "Drone units maintain constant surveillance and fire control over all supply routes around Donetsk," the corps stated.

Donetsk city, 40 km from the eastern front line, is a Russian stronghold. But it's an increasingly vulnerable one as Ukraine forces degrade Russian air defenses.

Systematically hunting Russian radio jammers, radars, surface-to-air missile batteries and mobile guns and launchers all along the 1,200-km front line of Russia’s 50-month wider war on Ukraine, Ukrainian forces are “collaps[ing] the layered defensive architecture that the Russian integrated air defense doctrine depends upon to function,” according to an investigation by Tochnyi.info.

The attacks on Russian air defenses—at least 492 of them between June 2025 and early March 2026—are part of a wider plan. Destroying the right air defenses faster than the Russians can replace them has the effect of “facilitating strikes on more critical targets deep within Russian territory,” Tochnyi.info explained.

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Russian air defenses are collapsing. Now Ukrainian warplanes can hit harder.

Close glide bombing

That was evident on 14 April, when Ukrainian warplanes flew close enough to Donetsk airport to strike Russian drone storage at the airport with GBU-39 glide bombs that range just 40 km or so when dropped from low altitude. That kind of close strike on Donetsk by manned warplanes wasn't possible until recently.

More and more, all sorts of Ukrainian air operations are possible in the increasingly permissive air over Donetsk. Now the 1st Azov Corps' drone units "maintain constant surveillance and fire control over all supply routes around Donetsk."

If any drone-grounding radio jammers have survived the Ukrainian campaign targeting Russian air defenses in the city, the Hornet drones' internal AI can steer the drones right through the electronic protection.

The Hornets appear to be prioritizing trucks and other logistics forces, but if they also strike any remaining air defense systems, they could further loosen the Russians' control of the air space over Donetsk.

That, in turn, would allow Ukrainian drones and warplanes to strike even harder, more precisely and more often in a wider swathe of the Russian rear area.

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Killer robots don’t exist yet but Ukraine and Russia are getting closer

Ukraine is developing its own version of Russia's Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile. If the air-launched version of Fire Point's FP-9 missile actually works, it could significantly expand the area of Russia where Ukrainian forces can inflict lasting damage on air bases, factories, oil refineries and other strategic targets.

Fire Point has been working on the FP-9 for many months. But it wasn't until recently that Fire Point chief engineer Denys Shtilerman revealed that the ground-launched ballistic missile could eventually evolve into an air-launched ballistic missile in the same class as the 4,300-kg Kinzhal.

Ranging as far as 850 km with an 800-kg warhead, the precision-guided FP-9 is a bigger version of Fire Point's FP-7 ground-launched ballistic missile, which ranges 200 km with a 150-kg warhead. The FP-7 is already in testing. Fire Point plans to begin testing of the FP-9 as early as this summer.

If it enters service and evolves into an air-launched munition, the FP-9 would be the first of its type for Ukrainian forces. Only the most powerful air forces—the Russian and Israeli air forces, to name two—possess air-launched ballistic missiles. Launching a ballistic missile from the air instead of the ground extends its range by potentially hundreds of kilometers.

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Ukraine is becoming a space power

Even aside from their long range, air-launched ballistic missiles are uniquely powerful munitions. Their high speed makes them extremely hard to intercept.

The Kinzhal, which is launched a specially modified Mikoyan MiG-31 interceptor, streaks across the sky as fast as Mach 5.7. It’s so fast that Ukraine’s best kinetic air defenses, its US-made Patriot missiles, struggle to hit incoming Kinzhals. The Russians often include a few Kinzhals in the mix when they bombard Ukrainian cities and power plants.

Desperate to blunt the Kinzhal raids, Ukrainian forces have even deployed sophisticated electronic warfare systems that can, in theory, confuse the Russian missile's flight controls and send it off course. The Ukrainians are apparently eager to hit back at the Russians with a missile that's equally difficult to block.

Space connections

Technically speaking, an air-launched FP-9 is well within the means of Ukraine's sprawling missile industry. The Dnipro-based Yuzhnoye State Design Office has been tinkering with air-launched rockets since the late 1980s.

Yuzhnoye's rockets, designed to be launched by Antonov An-124 transports or Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, are meant for space missions. But it's not difficult to modify a space launch vehicle, meant to carry satellites into orbit, into a weapon. Just swap the satellite for a warhead and send the rocket arcing downward instead of up.

Ukraine is working hard to establish a significant space launch capability. Member of parliament Fedir Venislavskyi, who heads the Subcommittee on State Security of the Verkhovna Rada Defense Committee, told RBC-Ukraine the Ukrainian main intelligence directorate has launched at least two space rockets in the 50 months since Russia widened its war on Ukraine.

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Russian air defenses are collapsing. Now Ukrainian warplanes can hit harder.

"This is a unique situation for a country engaged in a full-scale war," Venislavskyi said. He mentioned one launch that occurred in mid-air from the hold of a transport plane. It's unclear whether that launch was one of the two launches conducted by the main intelligence directorate.

That experience could prove extremely valuable as Fire Point develops the FP-9. The first step is to deploy the FP-9 in a simpler ground-launched version. Later, Fire Point could leverage Ukrainian space efforts to also launch FP-9s from the air.

The result, if the stars align, would be a hard-hitting deep strike capability that Russia's air defenses—already frayed by relentless Ukrainian drone strikes—may struggle to defeat.

The Ukrainian air force struck a reported Russian drone storage site at the Donetsk airport in eastern Ukraine on 14 April, apparently heavily damaging the site and potentially suppressing Russian drone strikes until new production can make good whatever drones the Russians lost in the strike.

That the Ukrainians targeted a Russian drone depot isn't surprising. Ukrainian forces frequently target Russian drones before they even reach the front line. There were at least two major raids on drone storage at Donetsk airport last month.

What's surprising is how the Ukrainians targeted the depot just northwest of Donetsk city, some 40 km from the front line. According to one observer, the attack involved a mix of SCALP-EG cruise missiles and GBU-39 glide bombs.

The 1,300-kg, French-made SCALP-EG, launched by the Ukrainian air force's small fleet of ex-Soviet Sukhoi Su-24 bombers, ranges hundreds of kilometers under inertial and satellite guidance. It's not terribly difficult for a missile-armed Su-24 to hit Donetsk airport from a launch point safely inside Ukrainian-controlled air space, even the Su-24 is flying low to avoid detection.

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Ukraine is becoming a space power

The 130-kg, American-made GBU-39 is another matter. The satellite-guided bomb can range more than 100 km on its pop-out wings—but only when dropped from high altitude. From low altitude, the bomb may range just 40 km or so.

For the Ukrainian air force to hit Donetsk airport with GBU-39s means one of two things. Either the launching planes flew high and fast as they vectored toward the airport. Or they flew low—and got close.

Either possibility points to a serious problem for Russian air defenses in the east. A plane flying at high altitude should be an easy target for enemy air defenses. By the same token, a plane flying low directly over territory the enemy controls should also be an easy target.

Ukrainian and American contractors have modified the Ukrainian air force's Soviet-made Sukhoi Su-27 and Mikoyan MiG-29 fighters to carry GBU-39s. The air force's ex-European Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters are also compatible with the highly accurate bombs.

Degraded air defenses

That the Russians couldn't stop Ukrainian jets from lobbing GBU-39s at a target 40 km inside Russian-controlled territory underscores how badly Ukrainian forces have degraded Russian air defenses in recent months.

Systematically striking Russian radars, surface-to-air missile batteries and mobile air defense systems all along the 1,200-km front line of Russia’s 50-month wider war on Ukraine, Ukrainian forces are “collaps[ing] the layered defensive architecture that the Russian integrated air defense doctrine depends upon to function,” according to an in-depth investigation by Tochnyi.info.

The strikes on Russian air defenses—at least 492 of them between June and early March—are part of a carefully scripted plan. Destroying the right air defenses faster than the Russians can replace them has the effect of “facilitating strikes on more critical targets deep within Russian territory,” Tochnyi.info explained.

The 14 April raid on Donetsk airport is just one of the operations facilitated by the wider Ukrainian campaign targeting Russian air defenses. The Russians are increasingly vulnerable to ever-deeper Ukrainian air, missile and drone strikes because they're losing air defense systems faster than they can replace them.

One objective of the Ukrainian deep strike campaign is to suppress Russia's own campaign of deep strikes targeting Ukrainian cities. There's evidence the Ukrainian effort is working.

Just nine months ago, Russia was flinging as many as 2,000 Shahed one-way attack drones at Ukrainian cities every week. Air defenses took down 90% of the drones, but the 10% that got through inflicted heavy damage.

And there was seemingly no in sight. The trend line pointed to Russia producing potentially 7,000 Shaheds a week—a volume of drones that could’ve overwhelmed Ukrainian defenses.

But then, without many outside observers noticing, something changed. In recent months, the pace of Shahed strikes has flat-lined, according to one analysis.

Yes, the Russians still pummel Ukrainian cities with 1,500 or more Shaheds a week. But there’s no longer a noticeable trend toward more Shahed attacks. Possibly because the Ukrainians are blowing up more Russian drones on the ground.

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Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is down to 7 major warships. Ukraine is hunting them one by one.

American defense contractor Raytheon signed a $3.7 billion deal to build Patriot missiles for Ukraine using German funding, the company announced on 14 April. 

This will provide an air defense lifeline for Ukraine — for now, Patriots are Ukraine’s only answer to Russian ballistic missiles, although the types of missiles to be produced are older models, less effective against modern ballistics compared to newer versions.

The specific generation Raytheon will supply to Kyiv are Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T) designed to counter tactical ballistic missiles and other airborne threats. According to Raytheon and Kyiv officials, “several hundred” missiles will be provided. 

"Raytheon is investing heavily to increase GEM-T production to support growing global demand, driven by major internal and partner investments, second‑sourcing initiatives and the expansion of our global supply chain,” Raytheon President Phil Jasper said in a statement. 

The new GEM-T production facility in Schrobenhausen, Germany will play a "key role" — this facility is operated by a joint venture between Raytheon and MBDA Deutschland, a large German missile manufacturer.

The arrangement is part of a new strategic partnership agreement reached today between Kyiv and Berlin, which included a flurry of arms deals to the tune of 4 billion euros. These include Germany providing Ukraine with more IRIS-T air defense missile launchers, investing in Kyiv’s deep strike capabilities, and exchanging battlefield data. 

"Today we have new cooperation agreements — 10 in total in key areas," said President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. 

Part of that includes the joint production of drones, including mid-strike drones enhanced with AI, according to Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. 

 “Our experience can be integrated into the European security system,” Zelenskyy said. 

Why "several hundred" missiles?

PAC-2 GEM-Ts haven’t been procured by the US military for a while. While some publications have put per-unit cost at $4 million, that price is likely much lower, with $2 million a conservative bottom estimate, US open source analyst John Ridge said. The newer PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) costs $3.8 million apiece, according to US Army documents. 

This would mean that $3.7 billion could theoretically pay for anywhere between 925 to 1,850 GEM-T missiles. 

The announcements did not clarify how the money would be spent or what the production capacity of the Schrobenhausen facility is. 

“Several hundred missiles” could be vague diplomatic language designed to obscure the specifics of the deals or to hide the true number of missiles from Russia. 

It's also unclear when Ukraine will get these missiles. In December, Hartpunkt reported that Germany plans to produce PAC-2 GEM-Ts on its territory with Raytheon, but the delivery date of the first 1,000 to Germany and several other European countries was listed as 2028.

Patriot missile hunger

There is a global hunger for Patriot missiles, especially after the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran.

US defense contractors can produce 550 PAC-3 MSE interceptors per year, according to the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Estimates. The US Army is buying 224 of them, while the remaining amount is slated for foreign sales. PAC-2s are produced in fewer numbers, Ridge said.

Washington is trying to remedy this. The DoD recently signed a framework with defense giant Lockheed Martin to raise PAC-3 MSE production from 550 to 2,000 units per year over the next 6-7 years.

Business Insider reported that Lockheed is on track to produce more than 600, promising a "significant increase" in 2027. 

Oslo University missile expert Fabian Hoffmann estimated that the current annual production of PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE interceptors is around 850 to 880. However, this barely exceeds the lower-end estimate for annual 9M723 and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missile production, he wrote.  

Ukrainian intelligence wrote that Russia produces at least 70 ballistic missiles of various types per month, many of which go straight from the factory to the launch site, to be used against Ukraine. 

Other miltech agreements

German company Diehl Defence is also providing Ukraine with more IRIS-T launchers, according to the German Defense Ministry. Ukraine's Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said a total of 36 IRIS-T launchers will be supplied.

IRIS-T surface-launched missiles come in different variants, including short-range (SLS) and medium-range (SLM) variants, which have a higher operational ceiling.

Diehl also signed a cooperation agreement with Ukrainian companies Fire Point and Luch Design Bureau. The former makes a range of attack drones and missiles including the Flamingo, while the latter is behind the Neptune cruise missile and the recently re-unveiled Koral surface to air missile, among other products.

Additionally, Germany will invest 300 million euros in Ukraine’s long-range capabilities, to help Ukraine ramp up its production of drones and missiles that can hit Russia.

This will add further momentum to Ukraine’s scaling deep strike campaign targeting Russia’s energy and military infrastructure. Said campaign hit a new peak last month, with some estimates saying that Ukraine launched more long-range drone strikes than Russia in March — over 7,000 systems, at ranges of up to 1,500 kilometers into Russia’s territory.

“The campaign's results speak for themselves, likely crossing thresholds earlier phases did not reach: cumulative damage to Russian energy infrastructure now appears to be outpacing Russia’s capacity to repair and replace it,” Hoffmann wrote. 

Then, Ukraine and Germany are also jointly producing mid-strike drones, which have been giving the Russian troops extra trouble of late. These mid-range drones like the FP-2, the Rubaka, and others, are striking Russian deployment points, HQs, repair bases, warehouses, aircraft, ships, and so on, much to the chagrin of Russian warfighters and military bloggers.

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Ukraine tips drone war in its favor

Fedorov said that in the first phase of the agreement, 5,000 AI-enhanced drones will be built for the Ukrainian military. 

“Grateful to Boris Pistorius for his leadership and systemic support,” Fedorov said in a statement. “This is a win-win cooperation that strengthens the defense of Ukraine and the security of all of Europe.”

Finally, Germany and Ukraine agreed to share battlefield data. That includes analysis of the deployment of German weapon systems, including the PzH 2000, RCH 155, and IRIS-T, as well as the exchange of Ukrainian expertise and battlefield data, including digital systems such as Avengers, DELTA, and other solutions.

Last month, Ukraine opened up its battlefield data to allies, to help train their military AI. According to Fedorov, the data sharing platform will allow partners to safely train models without direct access to sensitive information, and work with a large array of labeled photo and video materials, which is constantly updated.

Experts told Euromaidan Press that Ukraine is most likely a world leader in such data, making it an attractive partner for any ally seeking to implement machine learning in their weapons.

Full list of 14 April agreements

• A declaration of strategic partnership between Ukraine and Germany
• Cooperation on battlefield data — enhanced interaction between the ministries of defense on tech and data use to upgrade battlefield equipment
• Joint declaration supporting industrial recovery and resilience — Germany will contribute an initial 30 million euros to aid Ukrainian industry and restore capacity
• Implementation of the agreement on joint production of Anubis and Seth-X-G unmanned systems. The contract value is 281 million euros
• Raytheon deal for the supply of PAC-2 missiles and Diehl deal for IRIS-T systems
• Memorandum of Cooperation between the Ministry of Community and Territorial Development of Ukraine and the German Federal Ministry of Housing, Urban Development, and Construction
• A Memorandum of Understanding between the State Service of Geology and Subsoil of Ukraine and the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources of Germany on mineral exploration
• Joint Communiqué on Ukrainian-German Cooperation in the Field of Mineral Resources
• Joint Declaration of Intent on expanding institutional partnership between Germany’s Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy, Family, and Unity 

Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate has a space launch capability, a Ukrainian lawmaker revealed to RBC-Ukraine. At least twice since Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022, the intelligence directorate has launched rockets as high as 200 km. Space begins at 100 km.

One launch took place in mid-air. A transport plane carried the rocket to an altitude of 8 km before releasing it.

That's a new capability for Ukraine but it's not a new concept. For a period of time beginning in the late 1980s, the Dnipro-based Yuzhnoye State Design Office developed multi-stage space launch vehicles that could be launched by military aircraft.

Launching a rocket from an airplane in mid-air reduces the thrust a rocket must produce to reach the edge of the atmosphere, 100 km up.

Revived for use in the current war, the mid-air rocket launches could—along with the ground launches—help transform Ukraine into a regional space power. Ukrainian forces could loft early-warning satellites that could detect incoming Russian attacks. With further development, the launch vehicles could even evolve into interceptors capable of knocking down Russian missiles and satellites.

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Russia’s unstoppable Mach-6 missile just got killed by a Ukrainian drone

Member of parliament Fedir Venislavskyi, who heads the Subcommittee on State Security of the Verkhovna Rada Defense Committee, told RBC-Ukraine the main intelligence directorate has launched at least two rockets in the 50 months since Russia widened its war on Ukraine. One rocket reached an altitude of 100 km; another climbed to 204 km.

"This is a unique situation for a country engaged in a full-scale war," Venislavskyi said.

Venislavskyi mentioned a launch that occurred in mid-air from the hold of a transport plane. It's unclear whether that launch was one of the two launches conducted by the main intelligence directorate.

In any event, Venislavskyi said the series of launches "means Ukraine already has the technical capability to counter similar enemy attack systems and destroy them in space."

In fact, there's probably a lot of work left to do—especially for routine mid-air launches of operational space capabilities. Yuzhnoye has been developing air-launched rockets since the late 1980s without a lot of obvious progress. "More than a dozen of air-space rocket complex versions have been considered with different launch vehicles," the company explained in a pamphlet.

The rockets themselves aren't even the hard part.

Payload is everything

It's one thing to stack solid- and liquid-fueled rocket stages on top of each other and either hang them under the belly of a Sukhoi Su-27 fighter or load them into the cargo hold of an Antonov An-124 airlifter. The Su-27 could launch the rocket while in a steep climb. The An-124 would drop the rocket from its hold while in a gentle climb. Once free of the hold, the rocket would ignite.

But a launch vehicle is only as useful as its payload. Venislavskyi claimed the recent launches weren't tests—they part of wartime operations.

It's not clear what that means, however. Did the intelligence directorate launch sensor-equipped satellites, perhaps as part of a wider effort to equip Ukraine with the same kind of space-based early warning systems that many of its most powerful allies already posses?

Or did the intel agency place tiny communications satellites into orbit in order to decrease Ukraine's reliance on private space firms such as Elon Musk's Starlink.

We don't know.

It's far less likely Ukraine is developing an anti-satellite rocket, or an interceptor rocket that can hit enemy ballistic missiles in the cold of space. Few countries possess robust anti-satellite capability. Even fewer possess missile-defenses that can function in a vacuum.

Kyiv obviously has lofty space ambitions, however. In launching rockets from the ground and from the air, Ukraine is restarting long-stalled efforts that made it—and, by extension, the now-defunct Soviet Union—a leading space power during the Cold War.

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Ukraine launched rockets into space twice, from its own territory, during the full-scale invasion and more are on the way, Fedir Venislavskyi, head of the Subcommittee on State Security on the Parliamentary Defense Committee, told RBC-Ukraine in an interview. 

The country’s intelligence directorate (GUR) was in charge of the launches during the tenure of former director Kyrylo Budanov — one launch vehicle supposedly reached 100 kilometers and the other one reached 204 kilometers. According to Venislavskyi, these were not experiments, but actual combat missions.

"This is a unique situation for a country engaged in a full-scale war," the MP said. "Ukraine has the technical capability to counter similar enemy attack systems and strike them down in space."

Elsewhere in the interview, the MP noted that Ukraine wants to create its own space force, in part to defend from Russian weapons like the Oreshnik, an intermediate-range ballistic missile that can carry multiple independent warheads. 

These programs aren’t just meant for defense.

"We have missiles that almost nobody knows about, which are able to strike enemy territory at ranges up to 500 kilometers at hypersonic speeds," Venislavskyi added.

This doesn’t necessarily mean that Ukraine has been developing dedicated hypersonic weapons, such as hypersonic glide vehicles. “Ordinary” ballistic missiles can reach speeds above Mach 5 (6,100 kilometers per hour), a commonly-defined threshold of where “hypersonic” speed begins. 

Rather, Venislavsky’s words hinted that Ukraine’s arsenal is more varied than most people are aware of, though the current scale of these capabilities is still unclear.

The MP also said that GUR successfully launched a carrier rocket from an aircraft flying 8 kilometers in the air and is working on expanding this program.

Airborne launches of this sort reduce how much gravity and atmospheric resistance the vehicle must fight against, increasing how far they can go on a full supply of fuel. 

Space missile defense

According to the interview, Ukraine wants to create its own space force for two major reasons, one of which is missile defense. Venislavskyi mentioned the Oreshnik by name. 

Russia launched its second Oreshnik attack on Ukraine on 8 January, most likely targeting the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant. It is armed with up to six multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each of which can carry up to six submunitions. 

Evidence suggests that the missile was not equipped with high explosives, instead dealing damage with sheer kinetic impact. However, the Oreshnik's payloads have limited accuracy, with a 50% chance of hitting within 200 meters of their targets, according to missile expert Fabian Hoffmann.

This reduces its utility at destroying targets, unless multiple missiles are used. Problem is, they’re expensive. That gives Russia limited utility per ruble invested. Still, that doesn’t mean the Oreshnik can’t be scary. 

If Ukraine wants to be able to shoot down these kinds of weapons, it's too late to react by the time the payloads are hurtling down at Mach 10 onto their targets. The MP said that it's much easier to shoot down such weapons while they're still 100 kilometers above the earth's surface, if Ukraine has sufficient warning of launch.

Independent communications

The other major purpose of Ukraine’s nascent space force program is for communications. 

Ukraine relies heavily on Starlink, which is owned by Elon Musk’s company SpaceX. Starlink has been extremely useful to Ukrainian forces for its reliability and ease of use. Russia also got a lot out of Starlink until the Defense Ministry moved to block them, in cooperation with the company.

Starlink is also hard to jam. The signal is of a higher frequency than ones typically used on the battlefield, making it more difficult to jam. Because the signal travels vertically towards the satellites and back, that only increases jam resistance, compared to waves that travel horizontally. 

However, this reliance comes with risks. Starlink is, after all, a foreign company, whose owner has a fraught relationship with Ukraine. 

Musk has cut off Starlink access before, sabotaging an attack on occupied Crimea; mocked Ukraine's stance on national sovereignty; and talked smack about its NATO prospects. His father even visited Moscow to praise Putin and spread propaganda, among other controversies. 

The US threatened to cut off Starlink in February 2025 if Ukraine didn’t sign a minerals deal.

Venislavskyi said that if Ukraine has its own satellites “will provide fully secure communications for both the state and military leadership.”

Launching satellites isn't cheap but Kyiv and Moscow are trying

However, it's not so simple. Creating a space program requires massive resources and investments and Ukraine isn't exactly flush with cash, armed forces sources told Euromaidan Press. 

After the crackdown, Russia is planning to create its own alternative called Rassvet — “Dawn," spending billions of dollars with a plan to eventually have 900 satellites in orbit by 2035, having launched the first 16 in March. 

These plans are reportedly running into delays already. Meanwhile, Starlink has over 10,000 satellites in orbit today.

Ukraine has less money than Russia. Still, Kyiv is trying. 

Ukrainian company STETMAN is planning to launch its own UASAT low earth orbit satellite in October, with a goal to eventually create a constellation of 245 units. The goal is to reduce reliance on external companies such as SpaceX. 

STETMAN says it's being supported by the Ukrainian government and European partners and has already registered the first satellite with Ukraine's regulatory bodies.

Additionally, Deputy Prime Minister for Strategic Industries Oleh Urusky said last month that SpaceX was selected to launch the Sich 2-30 remote sensing satellite into orbit in December. 

Urusky said the Sich 2-30 is “practically ready.” 

Ukrainian drones are on a winning streak. The assessment is coming from all directions — from Russian milbloggers to international military analysts to Ukrainian warfighters to Kyiv’s Commander in Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi.

“Starting from December, our unmanned systems units have neutralized more enemy personnel than they recruit to their ranks,” Syrskyi posted on 9 April. 

Multiple Russian bloggers recently posted that Ukrainian drones are flying farther, hitting more precisely, and are getting harder to stop. 

Military sources and analysts connect this trend to two factors: Ukraine having a more dynamic military-industrial system that's better for innovation and Kyiv finally learning to start harnessing it to its fuller potential.

The most dramatic results are coming from mid-range UAVs, which strike targets at distances between 20 and several hundred kilometers. This appears to be wreaking havoc on Russian logistics, air defense, and other high-value targets, as seen in multiple open-source strike videos reviewed by Euromaidan Press. 

The Institute for the Study of War partially credited mid-range strikes for Russia’s recent stalled advances and Ukraine’s successful counterattacks. 

“As you may see from numerous videos from the other side, Russia is helpless against our medium and deep-strike drones,” Valentyn Prokopchenko, a UAV specialist with the 13th Khartia Brigade, told Euromaidan Press.

This is a welcome turnaround for Ukrainian forces, which were judged to be falling behind in drone warfare last year and in mid-range strikes more recently. 

Insiders and analysts gave three reasons for this development. 

• Ukraine’s defense industry has matured. What was once a menagerie of bootstrap operations has become an established industrial base that’s growing rapidly, without sacrificing the rapid widespread innovation that put it on the global map.
• Technological sophistication is increasing. While Ukraine has fallen behind Russia in jam-proof fiber-optic drones, its UAVs have gained range, speed, accuracy, EW resistance, and reliability. 
• Kyiv is becoming better at scaling what works. In the past, Ukraine struggled to get the most out of its innovation, which would often plateau at the brigade level. This appears to be changing, especially after Mykhailo Fedorov became defense minister.

Many sources agree on the following picture. Ukraine has more widespread, faster innovation, while Russia has stronger scaling capabilities. Now, Ukraine’s ability to scale is rising, too. “Anything that can fly and hit moving vehicles is immediately scaled up and used by the enemy at the front,” RT reporter Aleksandr Kharchenko wrote on Telegram. 

Russia has innovation as well — multiple research institutes, massively-funded industrial concerns, and of course Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov’s Rubicon Center, which is on the cutting edge of Russia’s drone tactics and strategy. Rubicon remains a deadly threat to defending forces. 

However, the way Ukraine operates is now starting to pay greater dividends, in spite of this threat, sources said — Russia’s ability to innovate is inhibited by its top-down, autocratic bureaucracy, because of which, it cannot follow Ukraine’s example. 

Successful strikes on the rise

Part of the trend is recent. According to Syrskyi, Ukrainian unmanned forces hit 50% more verified targets and dealt 29% more casualties in March, compared to February. 

Syrskyi wrote that’s over 150,000 targets. Unmanned forces units are conducting more than 11,000 combat missions per day, which would mean that their hit rate is closing on 50%. ISW wrote that innovations allowed Ukrainians to inflict higher casualties in Q1 2026 compared to 2025. 

In the mid-range strike category, Syrskyi wrote that 350 strikes were carried out up to the depth of up to 120 kilometers, hitting 143 logistics facilities, 52 command posts, 20 oil and energy facilities, and “many” other targets. 

ISW geolocated evidence of 41 mid-range strikes in January, 61 in February, and 115 in March.

But according to open source analyst Dnipro OSINT, writing for Oboronka, this trend has also been building up since a year ago, when Ukraine's military intelligence (GUR) posted the first video of its Spectre unit hitting 21 military assets in Crimea, most of which were air defenses.

Analyzing videos of 365 strikes over the past year, Dnipro OSINT concluded that mid-range drone strikes hit everything: deployment points, HQs, repair bases, ships, warehouses, aircraft, ships, and so on. "But Ukrainian operators seem to be focusing most on air defense – almost half of the strikes hit Russian radar stations, launchers, and other elements of the air defense system."

Analyst Mykola Bielieskov noted that this methodical dismantling of air defenses in occupied Ukraine cuts corridors for longer-range drones to fly into Russia and hit its oil and manufacturing plants.

“The zone approximately 50-250 kilometers from the front line is becoming dangerous for the enemy,” Dnipro OSINT wrote, adding that as military infrastructure is picked apart, offensive operations are becoming harder. ISW wrote that recent evidence suggests Russian forces are facing real setbacks and recent drone innovations shifted the field in Ukraine’s favor.

“When a drone campaign begins to affect export schedules, port operations, or energy handling capacity, that is not a media story,” said Bogdan Popov, an analyst with Ukraine’s Triada Trade Partners advisory group. “That is operational pressure with strategic implications.”

Russians raise alarms

Russian milbloggers are saying similar things. While their words must often be taken with heaping pinches of salt on the best of days, posts on Telegram seem to agree that Ukraine is taking the advantage.

This week, Russian blogger Andrei Medvedev wrote that Ukrainian companies have taken a "qualitative leap" as early as half a year ago. According to him, the number of loitering munitions that can hit 100 kilometers away has “increased significantly.” 

“The enemy is combining inexpensive, mass-produced strike weapons with expensive foreign-made equivalents,” he wrote. “Anything that can fly and hit moving vehicles is quickly scaled up and deployed on the front lines.” 

RT blogger Aleksandr Kharchenko wrote in response: “I can confirm the significant leap forward in Ukrainian UAV operations. Transports are now burning at a distance of over 40 kilometers from the line of contact. The number of enemy loitering munitions hunting vehicles within a 100 kilometer radius of the line of contact has increased significantly.”

Some Russian bloggers are stating an unconfirmed report that Belousov told Putin about a "serious technological advantage" of Ukrainian UAVs on the front. He allegedly described the situation as "critical" — that it's no longer about the number of drones but new generations of tech.

“Putin was told directly that the enemy was using more sophisticated systems for which Russian units were largely unprepared,” the unconfirmed report said. It claimed that new drones operate around the clock, are hard to hear, hard to detect by standard equipment, and resist electronic warfare, “making conventional defense methods ineffective.”

Euromaidan Press was not able to authenticate this announcement by the time of publication. Still, Popov believes that overall Russian concerns appear to be genuine.

“Russian military bloggers are reacting to something real,” Popov told Euromaidan Press. “Their complaints reflect a battlefield problem that has become increasingly visible over recent months. Ukrainian drone strikes, especially in the mid-range segment, are becoming more difficult for Russian forces to counter.”

Better decisions, better scaling

As technology advances and the industry matures, drones have grown from being niche to universal solutions. They are used for ISR, interdiction, strikes against personnel, materiel, and armor, and sophisticated precision attacks. Drones are used for jobs that once required artillery, aviation, or much more expensive precision weapons. 

Ukraine plans to make 7 million military drones in 2026, deputy defense minister Serhiy Boev said in January. The country has been able to roughly double its drone manufacturing count each year, producing at least 4 million in 2025, 2.2 million in 2024, and 800,000 in 2023.

The country's defense tech market more than doubled in 2025. The top three segments grew from $2.8 billion to $6.8 billion, the Kyiv School of Economics found in a 31 March report. Production of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) soared by 137% to $6.3 billion, by far the largest segment.

Thousands of Ukrainian companies aren’t just making more drones but better ones, through constant iteration with quick feedback from troops. Battery life, range, payload, EW resistance and accuracy, among other specs are being improved little by little. 

“It’s the basic difference between Ukrainian and Russian approaches: Ukraine has hundreds of R&D companies and producers, which constantly compete and modernise drones and systems; Russia has vertical structure of R&D, production and scaling,” said Mykhailo Samus, a Ukrainian veteran and defense expert. “While Ukraine is always using emerging technologies, Russia is scaling the effective ones.”

Ukraine has also struggled with top-down systems, a hangover from its Soviet past. Multiple sources, including Ukrainian and foreign veterans who worked with the military confirmed to Euromaidan Press that this is a significant issue. 

However, things appear to be changing in Kyiv to make it easier to scale proven technologies. Last year, Ukraine created the DOT-Chain marketplace, allowing brigades to acquire technology they trust, bypassing the central weapon procurement system, which can be cumbersome.

Brave1’s ePoints system rewards successful missions with points that can be spent on materiel, but it also has another purpose: tracking which units and which equipment has proven effective in combat. 

The Russians seem to have come to the same conclusion. Medvedev on April 6 wrote on Telegram that Ukraine has built a "highly understandable system, free from unnecessary paperwork and bureaucracy, based on direct interaction between producers and consumers... Ukrainian manufacturers can safely invest their profits in new developments without fearing pressure for 'misappropriation.'"

Another Russian blogger, Romanov Lite, concurred: "The enemy is recruiting and developing ALL operational UAV and countermeasure systems. We, however, have a strict barrier to the introduction (purchase) of new UAV systems, control systems, and countermeasures."

Some bloggers lay blame at the feet of two figures: Yuri Vaganov, who heads Russia's unmanned systems forces, and Russia's first deputy defense minister Alexey Krivoruchko. Samuel Bendett, a Russia analyst with CNA said that there's some resentment towards both figures among Russian warfighters and patriots. They come from business backgrounds, with potentially murky pasts, raising discomfort about them being in the position to make key decisions.

The Fedorov factor

Some sources who spoke to Euromaidan Press credit the arrival of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov with the most recent improvements in Ukraine. 

Since Fedorov came in, “the pace of technological integration has clearly accelerated. Deep-strike operations and the combat use of FPV systems have expanded dramatically. In practical terms, the tempo of deep strikes has increased at least threefold, and FPV usage has also risen by several times across a number of sectors,” Popov said. 

For example, in March, Fedorov's defense ministry created a new procurement approach, which analyzes drone effectiveness through DOT-chain, ePoints and the Delta battle management system. Then, 80% of funds are directed exclusively towards proven solutions, while 20% are reserved for innovation and buying new developments for testing.

Bielieskov also credited the appointment of Robert “Magyar” Brovdy as commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces in June with the growth in mid-range strikes. 

“Brovdy has managed to overcome institutional divisions within the Ukrainian military and unite the efforts of different drone units, while also securing the resources for a comprehensive campaign of mid-range strikes,” Bielieskov wrote. 

Russia's military Antonov aircraft fleet is approaching a maintenance collapse it cannot stop, with its own officials privately acknowledging the crisis in documents obtained by a private intelligence and analytics company, Dallas. Two fatal crashes in four months — one of them covered up — and a repair monopoly left nearly bankrupt and led by a man with no aviation background illustrate how the war against Ukraine, combined with Western sanctions, has hollowed out a critical pillar of Russian military aviation.

A fleet with no future

Behind every Russian military aircraft stands state company JSC Aviaremont, the repair monopoly operating under Rostec and its subsidiary, the United Aircraft Corporation. Dallas obtained internal company documents dating to December 2025 that expose an industry in deep crisis — most visibly in the An-series fleet, Soviet-era transports designed by the Kyiv-based Antonov design bureau that Russia can no longer produce, replace, or properly maintain.

Russia's connections to Ukraine's Antonov design bureau collapsed virtually overnight after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Moscow lost access to Ukrainian engineering expertise, spare parts, and production lines simultaneously. No new An-series aircraft have entered production anywhere in the world since 2016, leaving Russia with an aging fleet and nowhere to turn.

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The crash that was covered up

The consequences became visible in December 2025. An An-22 — the world's largest turboprop, and a plane that had already exceeded its anticipated service life — broke apart in midair during a test flight and fell into a reservoir in Russia's Ivanovo Oblast, killing all seven people on board. Russia's Investigative Committee opened a criminal case into possible violations of flight preparation regulations.

The crash occurred in the same city as the 308th Aircraft Repair Plant (308 ARZ), Aviaremont's primary facility for An-series overhaul. The plant moved quickly to distance itself, stating the aircraft had last passed through its workshops in 2007. Dallas obtained a document proving otherwise: 308 ARZ performed repair work on the same aircraft in August 2025, four months before it fell out of the sky. The plant's denial does not hold up.

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The next fatal crash was impossible to quietly bury. On 31 March 2026, a military An-26 transport went down during a routine flight over occupied Crimea, killing all 29 people on board. Among the dead was Lieutenant General Aleksandr Otroshchenko, commander of the Mixed Aviation Corps of the Northern Fleet. Russia's Defense Ministry stated the preliminary cause was a technical malfunction with no external impact.

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Russia's own officials wrote it all down

Dallas reviewed a frank internal report submitted by Aviaremont director-general Albert Bakov directly to Rostec chief Sergei Chemezov — addressed by his initials, SVC — in late December 2025. The report concerns 308 ARZ's condition and states plainly that the plant cannot carry out An-series repairs for three reasons: no import substitution has been implemented for key components, complete design documentation is absent, and no domestic production of spare parts has been established in Russia. Bakov further notes that Russia's Ministry of Defense has failed to implement the comprehensive An-series maintenance schedules that its own minister approved in 2023.

A separate internal Aviaremont letter addressed to Rostec deputy director-general Aleksandr Nazarov in August 2025 reveals that Russia was operating approximately 368 An-series aircraft — An-12, An-26, and An-72 variants — across the Defense Ministry, Rosgvardia, and FSB Aviation, with 143 requiring repair. Russia's Ministry of Industry and Trade officially confirmed to Aviaremont that domestic production of components and assemblies for An-series aircraft does not exist, making it impossible to fulfill repair contracts on schedule.

A third document from May 2025 goes further still: unless urgent measures are taken, An-series repairs will become impossible within 18 to 24 months, and the fleet's operation will cease entirely.

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No parts, no plan, no money — and a film director's son-in-law in charge

The 308 ARZ is working on 11 state defense contracts covering 14 An-series aircraft, but all advance payments have already been spent, and the plant has no other income. RT-Capital loans cleared wage arrears, and remaining funds covered employee advances only through 25 January 2026. A spare-parts program under development by the V.M. Myasishchev plant needs about $300 million, yet funding is not set to begin until 2029 — well after the collapse window in Dallas’s documents.

Rostec worsened the problem by appointing Albert Bakov to lead Aviaremont in October 2022 despite his lack of aviation experience. An economist by training, he had already led several defense enterprises into acute financial trouble. His main asset appears to be connections: he is the son-in-law of Kremlin-linked film director Nikita Mikhalkov and close to Rostec deputy chief Igor Zavyalov.

 

Time running out

Aviaremont's 2024 consolidated loss totaled $60 million, and eight subsidiaries are on Rostec's distressed assets register. The risks extend beyond military aviation. In Siberia and Russia's Far East, the An-26 and An-24 remain the backbone of civilian air links to remote communities. Those passengers face the same maintenance failures. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service has forecast that Russia could lose nearly half of its civilian fleet by 2030 as sanctions continue to bite. 

Dallas's analysis calls the aviation sector a rare clear proof of sanctions working: unlike economic statistics, planes either fly or they don't.

Ukrainian drone manufacturer General Cherry and Croatia's ORQA signed a memorandum of cooperation on 7 April. They agreed to jointly develop and manufacture interceptor drones and counter-drone systems, including an underground factory in Ukraine under the Build in Ukraine localization program, the companies announced.

The deal is the latest and most structurally ambitious push by Ukraine's drone industry to sever its dependence on foreign components. Ukrainian drones have relied heavily on Chinese-made flight stacks, communication modules, and electronics since the full-scale invasion began.

That dependency is a recognized vulnerability in a war where supply chains can be sanctioned, disrupted, or simply cut off.

The General Cherry–ORQA partnership aims to fully localize component production in Ukraine. ORQA, which already supplies 24 NATO member states and manufactures everything in-house, excluding Chinese parts, offers a proven template for exactly what Ukraine needs to build.

Underground factory for drone independence

Under the Build in Ukraine program, General Cherry and ORQA plan to construct an underground facility in Ukraine to produce drone electronics and peripheral components.

Production will start with flight stacks and communication systems, with the stated goal of eventually manufacturing all UAV components on site.

"We are ready to supply components to all our partners in Ukraine. This is our shared major aim to get rid of Chinese components," General Cherry told the online media Militarnyi.

The companies do not expect significant price increases from replacing Chinese suppliers. Technological independence, they say, is a step the entire drone industry must take. Alongside the Ukrainian facility, they will launch serial production in Croatia, where ORQA's manufacturing infrastructure will be combined with General Cherry's battlefield-driven development cycle.

Croatia and Ukraine: alliance built on shared memory

The industrial partnership sits within a broader relationship that runs deeper than most NATO members' ties to Ukraine. Croatia knows what it costs to fight for territorial sovereignty—a fact that has shaped its politics toward Kyiv since 2022.

Its government has backed Ukraine with helicopters, tanks, and demining robots, while Croatian volunteers have fought in Ukrainian ranks, including in the rebuilt Azov regiment during the battle for Bakhmut, Croatian outlet Večernji.hr reported.

That solidarity has not been cost-free. Defense Minister Ivan Anušić clashed publicly with Hungary last year over Kyiv, asking parliament whether Croatia wanted "to side with Serbia and Hungary, which are now publicly supporting Putin."

Croatia also held firm in refusing to transit Russian crude through the Adriatic pipeline, even as Budapest and Bratislava pressured Kyiv over energy.

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President Zoran Milanović has staked out different ground. He has publicly questioned Ukraine's territorial integrity and stated Croatia will not send a single soldier to Ukraine, RBC-Ukraine reported.

Last October, Anušić challenged that stance directly before parliament, after Milanović refused to authorize Croatian participation in NATO's military training mission for Ukraine.

The gap between the president and his defense minister defines a Croatia that supports Ukraine through its institutional structures, while its head of state keeps his distance.

That has not stopped the cooperation from compounding: Croatia previously partnered with Croatian manufacturer DOK-ING to localize production of the MV-4 demining robot inside Ukraine. The General Cherry–ORQA deal extends that model to drone components, built underground, and built to last.

Ukraine’s sea drones are continuing to evolve, mounting machine guns on their hulls. This allows them to fire on enemy UAVs coming to get them and lay down suppressing fire at other targets within range. 

This is the latest example of Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels’ (USVs’) growing sophistication from floating swarm bombs to machines that can simulate combined arms operations at sea, in tandem with UAVs. 

Evidence for this adaptation comes from both Ukrainian and Russian sources. 

The Ukrainian Navy posted a video of yesterday’s operation against the Sivash drilling rig in the Black Sea. According to the Navy, the rig was being used as a base for surveillance, comms relays, electronic warfare, and short-range air defense. Russian special forces were also present, with weapons to shoot at drones and boats.

The Navy and Unmanned Systems Forces hit the rig with a plethora of different weapons, including missiles, flying drones, and naval drones. But the video also showed a machine gun being fired towards the rig from a floating platform.

It’s not immediately clear from the video what that platform is. Ukrainian military blogger Serhiy Misyura wrote that these are most likely Sargan-3000 naval drones, which can be armed with guns and missiles.  

Ukrainian publication Dumskaya cited Navy spokesman Dmitry Pletenchuk that Sargan-3000s participated in the REPMUS military exercises off the coast of Portugal in 2025. During these exercises, Ukrainian drones reportedly “sank” a NATO frigate, targeting it before the NATO team became aware of their presence. 

“The enemy was suppressed by small arms fire — I can understand the shock of the Russian specialists when a machine gun fires from the sea, a drone flies from the sky, and several cruise missiles approach,” Misyura wrote. 

Russia also has naval drones called Sargan, which appear to be quite different from the Ukrainian versions. In both Ukrainian and Russian, “sargan” means “garfish.”

Russian media and online channels also posted a video of their UAVs taking out what looks like a very large Ukrainian sea drone with a machine gun mount. The drone was reportedly part of the attack towards the Novorossiysk port, which struck the Russian frigate Admiral Makarov. 

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If the Russian footage is genuine, the blast suggests that the drone is rigged to explode to destroy its target, like many standard Ukrainian surface drones from the Magura and Sea Baby lines. 

The machine gun is a standout feature, possibly meant to impart added protection to the chonky drone, to help it survive longer in hostile waters, though it’s unclear how much their accuracy will be impacted from bobbing on the waves, while hurtling full-send at a target.  

For this unit, the machine gun didn’t seem to save it from the Russian UAVs, which look like they came in from above at a steep angle. 

However, the Telegram channel ExileNova+, which was among the sources posting these images, painted the following picture.

“Now imagine the picture in a few months, a flock of USVs with machine guns raiding the port of Novorossiysk, shooting down enemy mobile fire teams, while in the air, attack drones are flying towards their targets.” 

The large USV also appears to be fitted with a a satellite guidance package, something Ukraine has been known to use in their surface drones on the Black Sea. 

After years of relentless Ukrainian strikes from the air, the surface, and below the surface, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is a shadow of its former self. Just seven warships now represent the once-powerful fleet's offensive firepower.

Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces claimed it just hit one of them. Under the cover of darkness on Monday, one-way attack drones targeted the frigate Admiral Makarov while the 125-m, missile-armed vessel was at its pier in the port of Novorossiysk in southern Russia.

The strike marks the latest in an escalating Ukrainian campaign against the handful of warships Russia has left in the Black Sea. Every successful hit shrinks the Kalibr-launching capacity Moscow uses to bombard Ukrainian cities—and pushes the once-dominant fleet closer to combat irrelevance.

The USF claimed its 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Center "struck" the ship, which is armed with surface-to-air missiles and Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles.

Admiral Makarov, sister frigate Admiral Essen, three Buyan-class corvettes and potentially just two Improved Kilo-class submarines—all seven currently sheltering in Novorossiysk—routinely fire the 2,300-kg Kalibrs at Ukrainian cities.

Footage from the forward-facing thermal cameras aboard the 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Center's FP-1 or FP-2 drones depicts the drones barreling toward Admiral Makarov, and also depicts the frigate firing at least one surface-to-air missile in self-defense.

The footage doesn't clearly depict any impact on the frigate. The ambiguity is familiar. After a Ukrainian drone submarine infiltrated Novorossiysk exploded near a the submarine Kolpino back in December, observers spent weeks debating whether the sub had suffered any harm.

Satellite imagery from after the raid was inconclusive; the best evidence Kolpino had taken some damage was the many weeks it took the vessel to move away from its pier.

Likewise, it could be a while before there's any hard proof that Admiral Makarov was damaged or not damaged by the FP-1/2s.

Weak drones

The Ukrainians' potential hits on Admiral Makarov, which has served as the Black Sea Fleet's flagship ever since Ukrainian anti-ship missiles sank the cruiser Moskva back in April 2022, come after months of trying. On the night of 1-2 March, scores of Ukrainian drones swarmed the port, targeting at least eight warships including Admiral Makarov.

But that raid failed to cause any serious damage. One persistent problem for the USF and other Ukrainian drone operators is the relative weakness of its best deep strike drones.

Air-launched cruise missiles such as the British-made Storm Shadow or French SCALP-EG hit hard with 450-kg penetrating warheads that can devastate a ship. Just look at what a Storm Shadow did to the Russian submarine Rostov-on-Don back in 2024.

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Storm Shadows and SCALP-EGs are in short supply in the Ukrainian inventory, however. One-way attack drones are, by contrast, fairly abundant—as Ukrainian industry can build them without a lot of external assistance.

But the drones that are capable of reaching Novorossiysk, 430 km from the front line, tend to devote most of their payload to fuel instead of explosives. And that means that even when they hit their targets, they often inflict only cosmetic damage.

The FP-1 is one of those drone designs that favors range over striking power. The propeller-drive FP-1 ranges nearly 1,400 km under satellite and inertial guidance but carries a warhead weighing as little as 60 kg. The similar FP-2 trades fuel for explosives and strikes with a much more damaging 100-kg warhead. But the standard FP-2 ranges just 200 km or so, likely placing Novorossiysk beyond its reach.

The caveat is that Fire Point, which manufactures the FP-1 and FP-2, is working on new variants of both types that have fuel tanks in their wings instead of in their fuselages. Shifting the fuel tanks makes space for bigger warheads.

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The improved FP-1 will carry a 100-kg warhead, according to Denys Shtilierman, Fire Point’s co-owner. That might be sufficient explosive firepower to damage a steel-hulled warship.

Whether the drones that targeted Admiral Makarov on Monday had the bigger warheads is unclear. Ultimately, it doesn't matter. Ukraine is striking at the dwindling Black Sea Fleet more and more often with heavier and heavier drones.

If the Ukrainians missed Admiral Makarov on Monday—or hit the frigate but inflicted no lasting damage—it's a safe bet they'll just try again in the coming weeks. And keep trying until Admiral Makarov is out of action.

From a corner table here in Virmenka café, three days after a Shahed drone hit downtown Lviv's 17th-century Bernardine monastery, I consider how Ukraine's complex history exposes its vulnerability to not just Russian imperialism but also to Western simplifications.

Three ladies in their 50s sit across from me, one updating her lipstick. Perhaps they came as rebel teens when Virmenka drew Ukrainian dissidents before the Soviet Union shuddered and fell, or later in the early 90s when dissident-turned-politician Viacheslav Chornovil rallied people for democracy in a fragile new Ukrainian state, or during the 2004 Orange Revolution for democracy, or during the 2014 Maidan uprising for democracy.

Chornovil, who'd spent 15 years imprisoned or exiled by Soviet Russia, died in a 1999 car crash still clouded in suspicion, but clouds and suspicion come with Ukrainian history, as its giant neighbor on three sides prefers. Most lately, that neighbor has succeeded in clouding the minds of an increasingly dim-witted American president and his followers, who believe the country is a failed state that should not have resisted Russian aggression and is unworthy of Western attention, let alone respect.

"Hostility to Ukraine is becoming a party line on the MAGA right," Cathy Young wrote a year ago in the conservative Quillette after Zelenskyy's Oval Office ambush and subsequent US suspension of air defense supplies and intelligence to Ukraine.

Though the latter resumed, it all normalized what followed: no more direct military aid, holdups of previously approved aid, and now limitations on the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), which replaced direct aid by allowing NATO countries to purchase US weapons for Ukraine—because some of those most essential weapons, like air defense interceptor missiles, are now essential to America's confused and backfiring Iran misadventure.

That Trump and his MAGA followers now dominate the Ukraine narrative with assertions of ostensible realism and alleged Ukrainian perfidy is just Russia's latest accomplishment in historical distortion dating back even half a millennium before that monastery and its St. Andrew church was built in the early 1600s. Actually, that church replaced earlier 15^th and 16^th-century churches, themselves probably built over earlier structures dating to the 13^th and 14^th-century Ruthenian kingdom of Danylo Romanovich and his son Prince Lev, after whom Lviv is named.

Recently, Russia's UN ambassador Vasily Nebenzia cited those times 800 years ago as justification for his country's aggression, repeating Putin's line that the Kyivan Rus' empire that flourished from the 9^th to the mid 13^th century until Mongol hordes destroyed it was Russia, and that Ukraine was always an artificial idea. Ukraine's UN ambassador Andriy Melnyk called bullshit on him, saying Moscow was a swamp with croaking frogs while Kyiv flourished during this time.

On Palm Sunday in Lviv, it was obvious that religion is not near death in this part of Europe, at least. I toured churches in the center, starting with that formerly Bernardine and now Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church of St. Andrew the Protokletos, the first-called by Jesus. The church was packed, and the crowd on Soborna Square outside was growing. Song rose with Byzantine muscle from loudspeakers, overwhelming the alms plea from a legless war veteran who had parked his wheelchair front and center.

Last year just its stained-glass windows were covered. However, since the latest attack the church has become a festival of plywood and serrated sheet metal, oddly now better matching the facing statue of Polish-Lithuanian patron saint John of Dukla that has been thickly scaffolded since 2022.

Poland is everywhere and nowhere in Lviv, a ghostly presence. What the city officially calls the Latin Cathedral, but locals usually call the Polish cathedral, was my next stop, just off Rynok, itself a Polish word for the main market square. Here, bells pealed in more melodic and restrained Roman Catholic fashion, it seemed.

People poured out with their blessed palm fronds, and I bucked the current to enter for a rare look, because this church—also splattered with sheet metal and plywood—is usually closed now. Just a little to the north on Teatralna street, the equally packed Jesuit Latin Cathedral of St. Peter and Paul was also broadcasting its service to a scattered crowd outside.

The Jesuits arrived a little before the 1596 Union of Brest got Eastern Orthodox churches here to submit to Papal authority while maintaining their Orthodox liturgies, thus becoming Greek Catholic or "Uniate," indicating union with Roman Catholicism. They built their church, imitating Rome's Il Gesù, also in the early 1600s.

After Soviet Russia took Lviv from Poland post-World War II, they closed this church and turned it into a warehouse. They also banned Ukrainian Greek Catholicism and closed its churches, though many of the latter continued practicing their religion secretly at great personal risk.

It turns out that you don't need a drone attack or even the most recent invasion in general to feel Russia's boot print in Ukraine: just take a walk and read the historical plaques.

I continued farther north, bells pealing from several directions, and further back in time to when Lviv first became Polish, when King Casimir III the Great in 1349 annexed the crumbling and wartorn Ruthenian kingdom descended from Kyivan Rus, whose identity those Ukrainian and Russian diplomats so hotly debated at the UN the week before. You need too many clauses to describe Ukraine's history, understandably making foreign readers' eyes drowsy.

The Armenian Cathedral dates from those hoary times, its stone panels at the entrance carved with medieval Armenian letters by priests and traders who settled here by the mid-1200s, under King Danylo. The latter had to declare fealty to the Mongols to save his kingdom. After he was required to drink a cup of fermented milk to seal that fealty, Batu Khan said to him "Now you are one of us," says legend.

Mongols, Poles, Lithuanians, Hungarians, Austrians, Soviet Russians, and Nazi Germans, and Soviet Russians again, and now this monstrous new Russia have all declared Ukrainians "one of us," and naturally, stubborn Ukrainian silence has often been mistaken for acquiescence.

But it's not. It matters not that Ukrainians have only called themselves by this name since the mid-19^th century national revival. They have always known who they are.

Light streamed through a stained glass window high up in the Armenian Cathedral in front of a very old icon of Christ, spookily enough to nudge an old agnostic slightly more toward belief. That was Palm Sunday. By Good Friday, this most magical of churches was darker, its altar blocked by a deep purple curtain, signifying mourning.

Even an agnostic can mourn this week, leading to the anniversary of Christ's crucifixion, for it is also the anniversary of the week in which the horrors of Bucha and Irpin were revealed four years ago.

By Good Friday, too, we'd had 10 air alerts in six days, six of them mid-day. Ukrainian defense experts say this, along with more frequent strikes in western Ukraine, marks a significant shift in Russian strategy.

Following hard on the winter's punishing energy infrastructure attacks, they are Russia's next effort to create a sense of constant, ubiquitous danger among civilians, the experts say. And Russia seems suddenly able to impose such terror, in places and at times that had not yet known it, with a dramatic upsurge in drone and missile production and launches.

According to Ukrainian Air Force data analyzed by The Kyiv Independent, Moscow has launched almost 50% more drones and over 150% more missiles against Ukraine in the first three months of 2026 than in the same period last year. I could not help but wonder, in that dark and sorrowing old church, what the Iran war's soaring oil prices and lifted sanctions will do to those numbers, and whether enough countries will even care.

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Contents

• Russia’s war is getting cheaper. That’s the worst news Europe has heard in years.
  1. Lviv Garrison Church chaplains help soldiers find God amid war. And a pair of good boots
  2. Lychakiv Cemetery, Lviv: an open-air museum of history, culture, art and remembrance
  3. International project renovates priceless frescoes in historic Garrison Church in Lviv
  4. Lviv Garrison Church chaplains help soldiers find God amid war. And a pair of good boots

Russia’s war is getting cheaper. That’s the worst news Europe has heard in years.

I promised my wife that I would go down to the hotel bomb shelter for each air raid alert, and I did, even though I felt like an idiot because Lvivans all around me just continued their daily Easter Week business, ignoring the sirens.

But I sat in the shelter and battled on Facebook with people (or bots) who overwhelmed pages memorializing the Bucha and Irpin massacres, mockingly calling them fake, or saying they were real but committed by Ukrainian troops, or that Ukraine started the war, or asking what about Ukraine's attacks on Donbas from 2014–2022, or what about Western imperialism, or what about this, or that. Some just outright celebrate the atrocities, and at least they are honest.

It is a strange war of bots and drones, fakes and posts, but it is real enough. On Holy Thursday, I rode out to the Lychakiv Cemetery with Mikhailo Bilynsky, head of Ivan Franko University's English department and a veteran interpreter for official Ukrainian delegations.

Early this year the cemetery's famous Field of Mars reached full capacity; we visited instead the new addition a little distance from the main cemetery. The earth was broken and fresh, as were the dead. Already a couple hundred were buried here, killed at the front just during the past two months. An impossibly young-looking soldier, judging from his photo, was buried next to an impossibly old-looking one. We watched a family tidy a grave and lay flowers.

"We are paying very dearly for the fact that we exist," Bilynsky said, and then there was nothing more to say. However, right after the last air raid, the next day on Good Friday, around 3 p.m., as thick velvet descended on altars in this city of churches, I emerged from the shelter outside and noticed that workers were already half-finished replacing the drone-destroyed monastery roof. Somehow, I smiled.

Andrew Giarelli reported from Lviv during Western Holy Week (29 March–5 April 2026). Orthodox and most Ukrainian Orthodox Easter falls on 12 April this year.

Andrew Giarelli

Andrew Giarelli is senior lecturer in journalism and literature at Anglo-American University in Prague. He writes frequently about Ukraine for Czech and Slovak media. His latest book, The Lands Between: A Central European Journey (danzig & unfried, 2025), ends with a chapter on Lviv.

Striking harder with heavier warheads, Ukraine's medium-range attack drones are finally inflicting serious and lasting damage on Russian bases in the logistical zone, which extends from around 20 km to as deep as 200 km behind the front line.

Early in the morning on 2 April, Fire Point FP-2 drones operated the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces and Main Intelligence Directorate motored 165 km to strike Kirovske air base in Russian-occupied Crimea. The first-person-view FP-2s reportedly destroyed four of Russia's Orion armed drones, a P-37 radar and a derelict ex-Ukrainian transport plane while inflicting heavy damage to the base's infrastructure.

It wasn't the first time the Ukrainians have hit Kirovske. The USF hit the base back in October without causing much visible damage. By contrast, the 2 April attack blasted holes in hangars and blew up four Orions, each of which ranges 1,400 km with an 1,150-kg payload.

"The precision of USF operations and their carefully planned execution are degrading the enemy’s military potential faster than it can be restored," the USF boasted.

The wrecked Orions and blasted hangar aren't the whole story at Kirovske. For most of 2025, elite Russian drone units pummeled Ukrainian bases as deep as 200 km behind the front—and Ukraine had almost nothing comparable striking back. The FP-2's 2 April raid suggests that asymmetry is closing.

The intensification of Ukrainian drone strikes in the middle zone is a welcome development for friends of a free Ukraine. As recently as last year, Ukrainian commanders concentrated short-range drones directly over the front line while also occasionally striking deep inside Russia with long-range drones. But they neglected the vast area in between the front and the deep rear.

The choice drew harsh criticism. Yes, the sheer density of Ukrainian FPV drones over the front line resulted in heavy casualties among Russian troops. But the absence of heavier Ukrainian drones over the logistical zone handed the Russians a relative safe haven right behind the front line.

Ryan O'Leary, an American who once led a volunteer company fighting for Ukraine, worries that Ukrainian leaders are effectively handing Russia the drone advantage in the deep logistical zone.

"The drone war is not about the number of killed today," Ryan O'Leary, an American who once led a volunteer company fighting for Ukraine, wrote in a now-deleted post. "It is about controlling the space tomorrow. Ownership of the depth means control of movement, logistics, [surveillance], communication and decisions in the sector, not just in the trench."

The dearth of heavier Ukrainian drones over the Russian logistical zone stung even more given the comparative abundance of heavier Russian drones over the Ukrainian logistical zone. Elite Russian drone units, including the Rubicon (also spelled Rubikon) Center, have extended their unmanned strikes as deep as 200 km behind the front, relentlessly hammering Ukrainian air bases and air defenses and fraying Ukrainian supply lines.

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Ukraine dominates the drone war at the front—but Russia owns the sky behind it

Drone escalation

Fortunately for the Ukrainian war effort, the alarm over the drone gap in that middle zone spurred real action in Kyiv. Ukrainian industry developed new types of medium-range drones with heavier warheads—and massively scaled up production. As 2025 ground into 2026, Ukrainian drone units began striking deeper and harder.

The FP-2 one-way attack drone is indicative of Ukraine's new emphasis on strikes in the middle zone. The propeller-driven FP-2 is a version of Fire Point’s long-range FP-1 that’s optimized for more damaging, shorter-range attacks. Where the FP-1 devotes most of its 250-kg payload to fuel, extending its range to nearly 1,400 km, the FP-2 devotes most of its payload to its warhead.

So where the FP-1 strikes with a 60-kg warhead, the FP-2 explodes with a much more powerful 100-kg warhead. The downside is the newer drone’s limited range: just 200 km or so. That range makes the FP-2 unsuitable for the deepest strikes on oil refineries and other strategic targets inside Russia—but for raids across the logistical zone, it’s just the thing.

Consider how much more damage the 2 April raid on Kirovske inflicted compared to the October raid on the same base. USF commander Robert Brovdi didn't claim any specific heavy damage in the aftermath of the October attack. But video footage the USF captured during the 2 April attack points to heavy damage.

A metal hangar can shelter aircraft from strikes by smaller drones. But not from strikes by the FP-2. The USF's footage indicates one FP-2 punched right through a hangar door and exploded inside the shelter, triggering a raging blaze that may account for the four Orion drones the USF claimed it destroyed at Kirovske on 2 April.

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Russia’s 2026 war plan had two objectives. Ukraine is wrecking both.

Ukraine’s defense tech market more than doubled in 2025. The top three segments grew from $2.8 billion to $6.8 billion, the Kyiv School of Economics revealed in a 31 March report. 

Production of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) soared by 137%, Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) by 488% and Electronic Warfare systems by 215%. Other segments like battlefield AI are expanding as well. 

These are conservative estimates. Many military procurements are shrouded in secrecy and many brigades buy their own equipment, bypassing the center. 

Ukraine was a major Soviet arms producer. After independence, it was a top-20 defense exporter. But now, a new innovation-driven ecosystem is diversifying Ukraine’s arms industry beyond conventional weapons and heavy platforms inherited from its past. 

“Ukraine’s defense-technology sector is rapidly evolving into one of the most dynamic and scalable components of the country’s industrial economy,” KSE wrote.  

“While total defense output in 2025 was constrained by the volume of domestic procurement financing, high-technology segments continued to expand at exceptional rates, confirming a structural shift from legacy platforms toward innovation-driven production.”

In 2025, Ukrainian defense tech companies attracted about $129 million worth of investment that we know of, with the biggest ones going into AI and software. 

The financing landscape combines grants, venture equity, accelerators, strategic investments and loans, as well as procurement-linked support from partner states.

KSE estimated that should Ukraine's international agreements with the US and the G7 nations hold, it could set the stage for a post-war defense tech boom, generating $690 billion over 10 years.

UAVs

UAVs represent by far the biggest segment of Ukraine’s arms industry at $6.3 billion in 2025, up from $2.7 billion in 2024. 

While bigger companies anchor the UAV output, ensuring volume and stability, the medium-sized companies are the backbone, providing scalable production, according to KSE. Meanwhile, a profusion of smaller companies shorten development cycles and speed up innovation.  

Deep strike weapons were the fastest growing subsegment, increasing by 169%. 

Ukraine keeps breaking its own records in its long-range attacks on Russian territory. In March, five factories and 10 oil refineries were hit, according to the Ministry of Defense. These attacks are putting a painful strain on Russia's hydrocarbon cash cow and wartime logistics.

Yet FPV drones are still the poster child of the UAV industry. The FPV market, which grew by 110% last year, produces the most widely used assets for daily engagements along the front lines. 

This subsegment is “characterized by intense competition, with a large number of manufacturers with similar products and continuous pressure to improve performance while reducing unit costs.”

Bomber UAV production grew by 121%. These reusable tactical assets are making a killing — literally — often dropping grenades on Russian units whenever they are bunched up. KSE found that the market for bombers is more concentrated, with a limited number of proven models responsible for most deployments. 

ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) drones had the most modest growth, at 11%, despite their critical role on the battlefield. 

“This is the oldest and most structurally stable UAV market in Ukraine, with clear and consistent market leaders,” according to their report. 

The interceptor UAV segment entered an active development phase only in 2025. Although several models have already achieved early dominance, the market is still in its formative stage and offers substantial room for new entrants.

Two more UAV segments are likely to grow in the future. 

• Middle strike UAVs — drones that are intended to target enemy logistics in the rear, with a longer range than standard UAVs, but shorter range than ones meant to strike targets deep inside Russia. Both Kyiv and Moscow are trying to expand the drone “kill zone” towards their opponent’s held territory. 
• Decoy UAVs are also likely to become more prominent. Their job is to saturate enemy air defenses and allow actual weapons to pass through and strike their targets. 

UGVs

Compared to UAVs, the market for ground-based drones is still very young and has yet to reach its full potential, worth just $252 million in 2025. Still, the UGV market is “highly diversified” by manufacturer, with room for producers to enter if they have good products. 

Lyuba Shipovich, head of the military support fund Dignitas, expects 2026 to be a year of ground robots. 

The majority of this segment is carried by logistics UGVs, which transport materiel and evacuate casualties. These accounted for 61% of UGV sector volume in 2025 and were the primary growth driver, increasing by 556% compared to 2024. 

Kamikaze UGVs grew by 967%, but remain a tiny segment of the market for the time being. They are significantly more problematic to operate than single-use UAVs due to their lower maneuverability and vulnerability to difficult terrain and landmines. 

The Strike UGV segment grew by 19%, but is a small share of the overall market. These weapon-mounting systems need more time in the oven and have yet to be deployed at scale. However, with future breakthroughs, these machines can become more prominent on the battlefield. 

More niche segments include demining and firefighting UGVs, though their development highlights the importance of dual-use technological pathways.

UGVs are becoming more versatile over time. Ukrainian forces still largely use them to deliver supplies and pull out the wounded, but they are increasingly fitted with weapons and launch cradles for UAVs. 

Electronic Warfare

Ukraine’s EW sector has expanded rapidly in recent years, moving from a relatively small and volatile segment to one of the key technology-driven components of the defense ecosystem. 

In 2025, this part of the market generated $220 million, growing 3.4 times. This growth has been fueled by wartime demand, the critical role of spectrum dominance on the battlefield, and the ability of domestic companies to deliver solutions in a very short development cycle. 

While a small group of medium and large manufacturers produce most of the output, they’re joined by many small specialists, according to KSE. Recently, production has become “significantly more concentrated among leading companies, reflecting the transition from experimental development to scaled manufacturing” of proven systems.

Short-range EW, which provides immediate tactical protection from Russian drones, forms the biggest share of the market, with 36%. This segment grew by 122% over the past year.

The counter-UAV segment also showed substantial growth, increasing by 195%. This reflects the continuing rise in the use of enemy unmanned systems and the need for layered defensive solutions capable of detection, disruption, and suppression across different ranges and frequencies. 

KSE noted that in 2025, a key development was the growth of systems meant to combat guided munitions and advanced strike systems — these systems reached 19% of the total EW market in a single year. 

The report expects continued growth across all types of EW. As maximum protection is achieved by different systems used in tandem, it’s difficult to isolate the prominence of any single EW category. 

Naval drones

According to KSI, surface drones reached operational maturity early on in the full-scale war, with a small number of companies dominating production and deployment. 

The biggest trend has shifted from production scaling to improving versatility and integration with other capabilities. 

Over four years, Ukrainian sea drones have evolved from being simple swarming bombs towards being able to simulate littoral combined arms operations by mounting different weapons and working together with UAVs.

Multiple countries are interested in Ukraine’s USVs and experience at using them, especially following the start of the latest war in Iran. 

The youngest, most unproven, yet promising segment of this market is underwater and semi-submersible unpiloted systems. 

Last year, Ukraine unveiled its Toloka series of torpedo-shaped submersible drones, which can operate at depths of 300 meters, making them impervious to many of the above-surface weapons that have no trouble dealing with surface vessels.

The largest Toloka models are claimed to have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers and a payload of up to 5,000 kilograms.

AI

While fully-autonomous weapons are still out of reach, both Ukraine and Russia have made strides in semi-autonomy, from target recognition to navigation to target locking and guidance. 

Other important uses of AI include crunching through terabytes and terabytes of battlefield data to create predictive analytics, in addition to simplifying clerical gruntwork such as creating reports. 

The report didn’t state the dollar value, citing the fact that AI is embedded across multiple product categories rather than procured as a standalone capability.

However, as of March 2024, more than 10% of venture capital in Ukraine’s defense sector was channeled towards AI companies. 

Ukraine has perhaps the world’s greatest collection of organized battlefield data that can be used for AI training, which the Defense Ministry recently made available to eligible partners. Ukraine recently opened the A1 Defense AI Center hub, whose goal is to develop and implement AI solutions.

“The Ukrainian defense AI sector faces a critical need to stay a step (if not several steps) ahead of Russia, especially given the enemy's significant investments in the field,” KSE wrote. 

“To remain competitive, Ukraine must match Russia's investment volumes. While it is debatable whether Russia will be able to develop a fully AI-controlled kill chain, its financial capabilities are undoubtedly more extensive.”

Counterattacking along a notorious road of death between the village of Hryshyne and the Russian-occupied ruins of Pokrovsk in in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast on Tuesday, a mechanized column led by the Ukrainian 425th Assault Regiment blundered into mines, ran afoul of a roadside ditch and then got hammered by first-person-view drones from Russia's elite Rubicon Center.

The result: the Ukrainian column lost a precious M-1 tank, at least two other vehicles, and as many as a dozen troops. It was a high price to pay to transport a few surviving infantry a short distance to a partially surrounded Ukrainian position—and now tempers are flaring.

"Treating our people this way is a crime," wrote Serhii Sternenko, a fundraiser and advisor to the Ukrainian defense ministry. "And there must be accountability for it. What some units are doing to their people is no better than Russian practices. This has to stop."

The 425th Assault Regiment, one of three units equipped with Ukraine's 60 or so remaining American-made M-1s, objected to Sternenko's criticism. Despite evidence to the contrary, the 425th Assault Regiment insisted just two soldiers died in the Tuesday assault. But it conceded it lost four vehicles.

The mission was important, the 425th Assault Regiment claimed. "To support our fighters and destroy the advancing enemy, counterattacks must be conducted," the regiment stated. "Otherwise, the enemy could encircle some of our positions, and all personnel would perish without rotation, evacuation or reinforcement."

The Tuesday assault was a response to a recent Russian assault that resulted in the Russians capturing a position just outside the industrial outskirts of Pokrovsk, which fell to a yearlong Russian siege late last year. In finally capturing Pokrovsk, the Russian Center Group of Forces positioned itself for an eventual offensive toward the twin cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, 50 km to the north.

Ukrainian units, including the 425th Assault Regiment, are determined to block the march on Kramatorsk and Sloviansk before it can even begin. That means holding defensive positions north of Pokrovsk—and, if you buy the 425th Assault Regiment's argument, recapturing those positions when the Russians seize them.

Counter claim

The regiment claimed that, on Tuesday, it "conducted a successful counterattack on one of the key tactical objects in Pokrovsk that the enemy had captured."

"To accomplish the task and preserve the lives of the fighters, favorable weather conditions were utilized, personnel moved in armored vehicles with additional protection, reliable communications were established, aerial reconnaissance was conducted, and fire support was provided by drones, artillery, and a tank," the regiment explained.

But the favorable weather, a thick spring fog, didn't stop the Russians from seeding the Hryshyne-Pokrovsk road with mines, one of which immobilized the M-1 leading the Tuesday assault. And the same fog may have contributed to the disorientation as one Ukrainian crew accidentally tipped their vehicle into a ditch, stranding it. The Rubicon (also spelled Rubikon) Center's fiber-optic FPV drones barreled right through the fog to attack the remaining three vehicles, hitting two of them.

More about the assault troops

“Certainly not a Russian model”: Ukraine’s assault architect confronts accusations of meat-wave tactics

Yes, some infantry reached their objective outside Pokrovsk and later reported in to their headquarters. Was this modest reinforcement worth the cost? And could the 425th Assault Regiment do anything differently to improve its chances?

One observer identified what they viewed as a lack of preparation by the aggressive assault regiment. "The combat mission was carried out schematically" on the basis of standard templates "and without adequate preparation and reconnaissance," Thorkill surmised.

"The road should have been cleared of mines and [parked ambush drones] before the counterattack," Thorkill added. "I've seen that Ukrainians often use Vampire [bomber] drones for this, which methodically drop bombs on successive sections of the road, thereby de-mining it. Clearly, this was not done here. Adding a mine plow to the tank could have helped, as well."

Explore further

Russia’s enormous “giga turtle” tank covered in chains, spines, and mine rollers just attacked Kostiantynivka at 10 km/hr

Sweden and Denmark are sending parts for the Tridon air defense system to Ukraine "to get important experience and data from the Ukrainian battlefield for our drone defense," Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson posted on Twitter on 2 April.

Sweden has signed 8.7 billion ($916 million) in defense contracts for multiple air defense systems to be delivered in 2027 and 2028 — gun platforms, Trackfire systems, electronic warfare, and command and control systems. 

That appears to include $180 million for the Tridon Mk2 anti-aircraft system, a truck-mounted 40-mm autocannon produced by BAE Systems. These machines form part of a modular anti-drone system called Gute ‌II.

BAE Systems says the Tridon has multi-target capability and can engage drones, cruise missiles, and aircraft. In a pinch, the system can also fire at ground threats like armored vehicles.

Jonson said in February that Tridon systems bound for Ukraine will arrive within one year and come with detection, command-and-control components, spare parts, and ammo. 

The system is armed with a Bofors 40 Mk4 gun, which can rapidly switch between ammunition and can engage aerial targets up to 13 kilometers away.

The Bofors 3P (pre-fragmented, programmable, proximity-fused) ammunition can be programmed in six different ways to increase effectiveness against specific targets. 

Each fuse is automatically programmed going off data from the fire control computer before being fired. The rounds can airburst a cloud of fragments to increase the chance to strike the target.

Sweden’s procurement of these systems is meant to support a mobile defense concept according to Jonson. The idea revolves around nimble anti-drone capabilities that can be quickly moved and redeployed. 

“Sweden is large and we cannot defend all locations with air defense at the same time,” Jonson said.

Sweden appears to be trying to learn from Ukraine, whose massive territory is swarmed nightly by hundreds of flying attack drones.

Despite Russia setting new records by volume of attacks, Ukraine’s interception rate didn’t fall below 80% throughout 2025 and has climbed to 90% in March. 

Ukraine has been forced to adapt a dizzying menagerie of systems, including missiles, drone interceptors, point defense guns, mobile squads with machine guns and MANPADS, different types of aviation, electronic warfare, and other systems. 

Integrating all these diverse capabilities into a single air defense system has been a significant challenge for the country. However, the results have spoken for themselves — European countries like Sweden and Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar have taken notice. 

The occupation administration of the Russian-controlled part of Donetsk Oblast has proposed using mine water to supply residents, claiming the plan as an "innovative" solution to the region's chronic drinking water shortage, Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation (CPD) reported on 1 April. The CPD assessed the proposal as a simulation of governance rather than a genuine fix, in line with a series of previously announced water supply solutions under occupation that were never built.

The proposal

So-called "first vice premier" of the Russian-run "Donetsk people's republic" Andrei Chertkov announced plans to use mine water for the population. The CPD noted the proposal was presented as an innovative approach to a crisis that has left residents without reliable drinking water for years.

Mine water in the Donbas contains heavy metals, salts, bacterial contaminants, and, in some cases, radioactive elements, the Center noted. Purification is theoretically possible but extremely expensive and technically complex — resources the occupation administration has never demonstrated it can deploy.

A pattern of unbuilt solutions

Similar proposals have been made before under Russian occupation, the Countering Disinformation Center says. None was implemented. The CPD assessed the pattern as serving a specific function: occupation officials simulate active governance to maintain their posts and preserve access to financial flows from Moscow, while residents' actual problems go unresolved.

Explore further

Russian occupiers tell Donetsk residents to drink toxic mine water as infrastructure collapses

Why mine water is dangerous

The hazards of Donbas mine water run deeper than contamination from decades-long industrial activity. Since 2014, occupation authorities flooded dozens of coal mines by simply shutting down pumping equipment without proper decommissioning — a process that changed water tables and contaminated local water bodies with heavy metals and other hazardous substances.

Among the flooded mines is the Yunkom mine in Yenakiieve, where the Soviet Union conducted an underground nuclear explosion in 1979. Occupation authorities halted pumping there in 2018, raising the risk that radioactive material could enter groundwater. 

As the weather warms and Russian forces become more active on the ground and in the air following a long winter hibernation, Moscow's objectives for the fifth year of wider war are becoming clearer.

The main aims of the 700,000-strong Russian force in Ukraine are to advance toward the left bank of the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine while also pushing toward the twin free cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk in eastern Ukraine.

The former objective would consolidate Russian control over most of the Ukrainian Black Sea coast. The latter objective could result in full Russian control of Donetsk Oblast.

Both are much easier planned than done. Ukraine's southeastern counteroffensive has stalled any Russian advance toward the Dnipro. And Ukrainian forces' stiff defense of two key towns—Kostiantynivka and Lyman—is impeding the planned march on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

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Contents

• Russia’s tanks are back after a year in hiding. Thursday was a massacre.
  1. Seasonal fighting
     • Russia marched into Huliaipole in December. Now it can’t march out.
     • Russia’s enormous “giga turtle” tank covered in chains, spines, and mine rollers just attacked Kostiantynivka at 10 km/hr

Russia’s tanks are back after a year in hiding. Thursday was a massacre.

But a long spring-to-fall fighting season looms. Russian field armies are once again mobilizing heavy forces that mostly idled for much of the past year. Russian aerial bombardment is intensifying along the most critical sectors.

And while the Ukrainians are killing and maiming more Russians than ever and thoroughly wrecking the season's initial Russian mechanized assaults, Russian troops and vehicles still greatly outnumber Ukrainian troops and vehicles.

Plans are just that: plans. The coming months could make a mockery of Russian objectives, or reveal the same objectives as unnecessarily conservative. The only thing anyone can say with any certainty is that the fighting will be brutal. And losses will be painful for both sides.

Seasonal fighting

The war in Ukraine has a seasonal rhythm. The Russians push hardest, often with mechanized forces, when the weather is warm and the ground is dry. When the weather is cold and wet, infantry take over—creeping across the wide, contested "gray zone" in order to destabilize Ukrainian positions and potentially even capture a city or two.

Last winter, Russian infantry succeeded in capturing Pokrovsk and neighboring Myrnohrad in Donetsk Oblast in the east, seeming opening a southern path toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, 50 km to the north. They also marched westward across Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts in the southeast, ultimately capturing Huliaipole and setting conditions for a future push toward Orikhiv, the last major Ukrainian strongpoint between the Russians and Zaporizhzhia city, on the Dnipro's left bank 80 km west of the gray zone.

But the Russians suffered tens of thousands of casualties marching toward and eventually capturing Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad; their exhaustion is evident in the sharp slowdown in Russian assaults since the two settlements fell late last year. Kostiantynivka holds.

And in the southeast, a Ukrainian counteroffensive—timed to take advantage of a collapse in Russia's front-line communications—not only halted the Russian march on Orikhiv, it reversed it. The Russians are falling back in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts at the time plans call for them to lunge forward.

That doesn't mean the Russians won't resume their slow grind across Ukraine in the coming months. The Russian air force has escalated its aerial bombardment of Ukrainian positions around Kramatorsk and Sloviansk in the east and west of Huliaipole in the southeast, aiming to weaken the Ukrainian defense ahead of renewed Russian offensives along both axes.

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Mapper Clément Molin observed 4,000 Russian air strikes along the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk axis since 2024 and 900 Russian air strikes around Huliaipole in the same timeframe. A follow-on Russian ground offensive is taking shape in the east. "The current offensive actions are slowly increasing from Lyman to Pokrovsk," Molin noted.

The first few Russian mechanized assaults toward Lyman ended in disaster for the Russians, with heavy losses in vehicles and personnel. But the Russians spent much of 2025 replenishing its depleted armored forces: it's possible there are now more tanks and other armored vehicles on the Russian side of the gray zone than at any point in the 50-month wider war.

All that is to say, the Russian pressure on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk will only increase.

In the southeast, the Russians must first defeat the Ukrainian counteroffensive before they can resume their westward march. Analyst Andrew Perpetua is skeptical that it'll happen any time soon—although not for a lack of violence.

"Overall, Russia’s plans in Zaporizhzhia are being blocked," Perpetua wrote. "Their advance on Orikhiv’s eastern side has slowed a lot because of Ukrainian counterattacks and strong defenses."

"If Russia wants to focus its summer campaign on the [Dnipro] riverbank as planned, they would need to capture Orikhiv within about a month," Perpetua wrote recently. "That’s not going to happen. More likely, they’ll spend the summer trying to take Orikhiv, which might fail, and never reach their yearly goal of capturing the bank."

If the most optimistic predictions for the Ukrainians come true, the Russians may make only limited progress toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk in the east and Orikhiv in the south. In that case, the Kremlin's objectives for 2026 could roll into 2027 as the wider war grinds on.

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Russia’s Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies "Rubicon" claims that it greatly increased the number of Ukrainian targets it struck in March 2026, compared to the previous month, as well as March 2025.

In a release on its Telegram channel, the elite drone unit said that in March, their number of successful strikes exceeded their previous November 2025 record by over 40%, and that they've hit 5.7 times more targets than they did in March 2025. 

The website lostarmour, which purports to record successful takedowns of Ukrainian forces, contains 22,000 videos under the Rubicon rubric. While Russia has repeatedly exaggerated its success throughout the full-scale invasion, multiple Ukrainian military personnel have said that Rubicon represents a real and serious threat. 

According to Rubicon’s Telegram statement, it took down the following numbers of units last month, with percentages comparing the figures to February 2026. 

• UAVs — 1,160 (+121%)

• UGVs — 203 (+55%)

• Radar, Communication, and Surveillance Systems — 603 (+93%)

• Personnel — 219 (+5%)

• Vehicles — 270 (+17%)

• Temporary Deployment Points and Field Fortifications — 433 (+39%)

• Artillery Systems — 67 (+26%)

• Armored Fighting Vehicles — 158 (+125%)

• Tanks — 13 (+85%)

Rubicon has approximately 5,000 personnel and significant financial resources. Its objectives include disrupting Ukrainian logistics, neutralizing UAV command teams, and training other Russian units.

The group demonstrates “strong political will and significant involvement” of Russian intelligence services in directly organizing this structure. It is capable of executing complex, high-risk, and systematic strikes deep into Ukrainian formations.

LIGA.net reported that Russian military intelligence and the Russian Minister of Defense, Andrey Belousov, are behind the center, according to an officer of Ukrainian defense intelligence with the callsign “Azimut".

Russia is actively recruiting personnel to the unit through incentives and a youth program connected to United Russia, training thousands of 16–17-year-old future drone pilots who will be mobilized at 18.

In the words of Come Back Alive Fund consultant Taras Tymochko, Rubicon “taught the enemy how to fight” with drones. 

Still, the unit is not invulnerable. In March, Ukraine's Special Operations Forces said they conducted a series of strikes in occupied Donetsk Oblast, hitting a Rubicon base, reportedly with information fed by underground resistance members.

Ukraine’s shootdown rate of Russian air attacks is climbing consistently, even as Russia sends unprecedented numbers of drones and missiles, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. 

The MoD posted an interception success rate of 89.9% for March, compared to 85.6% in February, 82.5% in January, and 80.2% in December. That is a 9.7 percentage point increase in three months. Kyiv’s goal is to consistently destroy at least 95% of all incoming weapons. 

“In total, 5,935 enemy air attack weapons failed to reach their targets last month. Many lives were saved,” the MoD wrote, crediting the “introduction of new air defense systems and further development of proven ones.” 

If the numbers are accurate, this is no mean feat as March 2026 set a new record for how many weapons Russia flung at Ukraine, with 6,462 reported one-way attack drones. That's more than the total number of drones launched between September 2022 and July 2024.

On 23-24 March, Russia set a new record, launching 982 drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles at Ukraine in a single 24-hour period. Kyiv claimed that 931 of these threats were neutralized.

The MoD put the total number of weapons launched in March at 6,600. That number is only poised to grow in the future. 

Russian air attacks surged over past year

Ukraine had an interception rate of 96.58% in January 2025, according to data from the Institute for Science and International Security.

At the time, the Russians were only launching 2,600 weapons per month. But that number more than doubled by June 2025, reaching a peak of 6,297 in July, before falling to a nadir of 5,131 in December. Since then, the strikes have started rapidly growing in number once again.

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Over the course of 2025, the percentage of successful hits has gone up, while the interception rate fell. Since April 2025, the shootdown percentage never climbed out of the 80s until just barely coming in under 90% in March.    

While raw numbers played into this trend, there were other reasons. Russian drones and tactics became more sophisticated, with better guidance and more EW resistance. Russians gained a better understanding of where Ukrainian air defenses were positioned and how to avoid them or bait out fire with decoys.  

On the Ukrainian side, equipment availability and lack of training time kept personnel from mastering their diverse menagerie of systems. Mobile fire teams weren't always used with maximum effectiveness. There was also a radar shortage, not to mention a rigid vertical hierarchy delaying decisionmaking. 

However, Ukraine appears to be bouncing back as it integrates new techologies and ways to apply them.

How Ukraine's air defense evolved in 2025-2026

Interceptor drones

Interceptor drones surged in prominence over the past year, becoming more widely integrated into Ukraine’s air defense at a rapid rate. 

Top General Oleksandr Syrskyi said that interceptors made 6,300 sorties in February, taking down over 1,500 Russian UAVs of various types. He credited these drones with destroying 70% of Russian one way attack drones over Kyiv Oblast that month.

The country produced 40,000 interceptors in January, according to the government, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy saying that the country has the capacity to make 2,000 per day if it receives sufficient financing. 

Half of that number could be exported — about a dozen Gulf countries made overtures after the start of the Iran war and Ukraine recently signed defense deals with Saudi Arabia and Qatar — negotiations are ongoing with neighbors. 

Improved autonomy through AI

Ukrainian and foreign arms developers working with Ukraine are implementing progressively more effective machine learning systems into weapons. Developers with Ukraine's National Guard told Euromaidan Press "we are already deep into practical battlefield autonomy" — the ability to recognize targets, lock on, and pursue them.

This is especially prominent within air defense. Interceptor drones that incorporate semi-autonomous capabilities are being fielded in increasing numbers, while prototype automatic turrets like the Sky Sentinel are already downing Shaheds, according to reports.

Ukraine recently created the A1 Defense AI Center, which will work on implementing AI in weaponry, battlefield intelligence analysis, command and control, and other capabilities.

Improved jet fighter effectiveness

During a Russian missile attack in December, Ukrainian forces shot down 34 of 35 cruise missiles "mainly" using the F-16s. In January 2025, a single pilot took out six cruise missiles, according to Ukraine's air force command.

Ukrainian pilots are developing their own tactics, in response to their threat environment, according to the air force. They are also using equipment such as the Sniper pod passive sensor, in tandem with AGR-20 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems — rockets upgraded with a precision guidance package.

Light aviation and helicopters

Ukraine started using light aircraft to fight Shaheds. Armed with machine guns, electronic warfare suites, air-to-air missiles, and interceptor drones, these converted civilian craft are much cheaper to operate than dedicated fighter aircraft, which are needed to shoot down missiles and perform strikes against Russian positions. 

Ukrainians increasingly use helicopters for this purpose as well. Syrskyi said that air defense choppers sometimes destroy up to 40% of drones in their areas of operation, depending on the weather. He added that the helicopters need to be equipped with better detection systems to pick up Russian drones on infrared sensors.

Air defense reorganization

Zelenskyy announced in February that the military is changing how air defense is organized. “In some regions, the way teams work is being completely rebuilt — interceptors, mobile fire groups, the entire component of small-scale air defense.”

The president said that the military will change how frontline units are provisioned with drones, weapons, “and most importantly, personnel.” 

“People are the key issue: training, as well as the actual replenishment of brigades,” the president wrote. “The Minister of Defense, together with the military command, are preparing appropriate solutions that will strengthen Ukraine and can solve existing problems.”

Private air defense claims first kills

More recently, Ukraine gave the go-ahead to an initiative allowing private companies to participate in air defense directly, with one company already shooting down several Shahed and Zala drones as of 30 March, according to the MoD.

Private air defenders are integrated into Ukraine's command and control system — their job is to protect facilities and contribute to shooting down Shaheds. Businesses can defend their own assets. These groups are armed by, and answer to the Air Force command. 

The MoD announced on Monday that 13 new companies are joining the initiative. While participants are in different states of readiness, they are expected to strengthen the country’s air defense as increasing numbers become combat capable, reducing the strain on military personnel.

“This means more protected facilities, more targets shot down, and faster response to attacks. Our goal is to build a multi-layered air defense system that ensures maximum coverage and effective interception of aerial threats,” Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said in a statement.

The Ukrainian 1st Assault Regiment is transforming at least one of its ex-Australian M-1 Abrams tanks into a drone-proof turtle tank with many of the latest innovations. And it clearly aims to use it. We've seen 1st Assault Regiment tanks in action recently as part of Ukraine's ongoing southeastern counteroffensive.

On or just before Monday, a 1st Assault Regiment tank was observed rolling up on a Russian infantry position outside the village of Pryluky in southeastern Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and blasting that position at close range with its 120-millimeter main gun.

Unlike most drone-caged tanks on both sides, which sacrifice their main guns for protection, the 1st Assault Regiment's design shields only the turret—letting the crew rotate and fire. If it works, it solves the central dilemma of armored warfare in the drone age: how to survive and fight.

The footage of that Monday tank assault, along with earlier imagery of a 1st Assault Regiment workshop, seems to confirm that the regiment is the third Ukrainian unit to operate the 69-ton, four-person M-1—after the 47th Mechanized Brigade and the 425th Assault Regiment.

When Elon Musk's Starlink abruptly bricked Russia's thousands of stolen and smuggled satellite communications terminals around two months ago, throwing Russian communications into disarray, it wasn't a foregone conclusion that the Ukrainians would seize the opportunity—and counterattack.

But they did, and tanks led the way in many of the assaults. This was a risky choice on the part of Ukrainian commanders.

Russia parked its tanks. Ukraine didn't.

For much of 2025, drone-battered Russian forces in Ukraine parked their own tanks and other armored vehicles, instead opting to send in infantry on foot or on motorcycles or all-terrain vehicles. The idea, it seems, was that small teams of infantry, spread out over a wide area, would be able to slip past Ukraine's drones much more easily than vehicles could do.

Ukrainian forces were less reluctant to deploy their own tanks, occasionally mustering them for swift counterattacks in areas where the Ukrainians had the aerial edge. That Ukrainian brigades and regiments could deploy tanks at all last year speaks to Ukraine's enduring advantages in drone and counter-drone technologies and tactics.

And when the drone gap widened amid the one-sided Starlink shutdown, Ukrainian tankers grew even bolder—and pushed across the wide contested "gray zone" to assault Russian defenses in Zaporizhzhia. They were clearly betting on the collapse in Russian comms to ground many of the most dangerous Russian drones.

If the footage of that apparently successful M-1 assault around Pryluky is any indication, it was a winning bet. Ukraine's tanks are back.

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Ukraine has received 80 of the 2000s-vintage M-1s: 31 from the United States in 2023 and 49 from Australia last year. The analysts at the Oryx collective have confirmed the destruction or capture of at least 11 M-1s. Another 12 M-1s have been damaged or abandoned, potentially resulting in additional permanent losses.

The 57 to 69 survivors are spread across three brigades and regiments—and fighting hard. The 425th Assault Regiment lost one M-1 during the initial attacks that kicked off Ukraine's southeastern counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia and neighboring Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts starting in early February.

But the tankers have taken every prudent precaution, heaping all the latest anti-drone innovations on their M-1s and other tanks. The 47th Mechanized Brigade was the first to add layers of explosive reactive armor and rubber skirts to stiffen the built-in composite armor on its roughly 30 M-1s.

The 425th Assault Regiment later added, to its own dozen or so M-1s, a large metal frame supporting thousands of drone-detonating metal spines. For its part, the 1st Assault Regiment seems to be applying a new variant of the metal frame that only surrounds the M-1's turrets, allowing the turrets to rotate left and right to aim their main guns.

The concept first appeared in Russian blueprints from the Omsk tank factory earlier this year—Ukrainian engineers quickly adapted it for the M-1. It's unclear whether the 425th Assault Regiment M-1s can traverse their turrets.

Many Russian and Ukrainian tanks have metal frames that surround both the turret and the hull and effectively trap the gun, preventing it from rotating and aiming. These tanks can function as heavily-armored assault vehicles that can clear mines and transport infantry under their add-on armor. Unable to aim their guns, they can't close with and engage enemy troops—they can't function as tanks.

But the 1st Assault Regiment clearly wants its M-1s to work as tanks—so it can continue deploying them for attacks even after the Russians restore their comms and launch more drones over the gray zone.

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Ukraine’s 8th Corps announced that they pioneered a new system that takes the wait out of destroying the Russians. It’s called Target Hub and it purports to turn the detect-identify-decide-engage-assess pipeline into a “digital service.” 

Here’s how it works. A scout or drone operator gets visual on an enemy target, feeding that information into the Delta battle management system. Delta immediately outputs which friendly units are available to hit that target. A command can then quickly be transmitted to that unit to strike. 

Delta’s Target Hub module eliminates the need for writing a target report, passing it up the command chain, then waiting for the decision. According to the 8th Corps, the wait sometimes took up to three days, giving the target ample time to reposition. 

“As it is now: the principle is as simple as an online taxi service: we see a ‘client’ — we assign the nearest available ‘car’ — we get the enemy a ride to the afterlife. All within minutes,” the 8th Corps wrote in a statement. 

The system also keeps multiple units from trying to take out the same target, wasting time and ammo in the process. It may soon spread to other units across the front line.

“Other units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have already shown interest in the experience of the 8th Corps, and we are ready to become a base for scaling this technology to all of Ukraine’s defense forces,” the 8th wrote. 

‘A few minutes to pray’

The 8th Corps’ Kursk Grouping was the first to test out the Target Hub system, which was tested over two months of combat in the North-Slobozhanske axis in partnership with the Defense Ministry, with feedback from warfighters. 

As the latest refinement of Ukraine’s Delta system, it appears to help resolve a problem that still plagues the Ukrainian armed forces: the Soviet hangover of top-down decisionmaking and insufficient delegation.

Multiple military insiders have previously told Euromaidan Press that the military can be top-heavy, with lower-level officers concerned about being punished for going against a higher-up commander. The three-day waiting period to strike enemy targets is consistent with this critique. 

In spite of this, the Ukrainian military is very spread out, with each brigade often left to its own devices. 

If Delta’s Target Hub module works as well as the 8th Corps claims and it can be scaled across the armed forces, it can make the Ukrainians much more nimble in responding to threats, increasing pressure on the Russians, provided there’s a friendly unit in place, with enough drones or shells to strike the enemy target. 

“It significantly simplifies fire coordination both within one unit and between neighboring brigades,” the 8th wrote. “And thanks to a single digital ecosystem, it reduces the risk of data loss or human error.”

“The occupiers no longer have three days while we coordinate the papers. They only have a few minutes to pray.”

"Russian forces are equipping Shahed drones with passive radar homing." This claim made a splash in Ukrainian media after an image of what looks like an antenna module appeared on military auction site Reibert, supposedly taken from an enemy drone.  

A popular Telegram channel called Colonel GSh analyzed the photos, concluding that “theoretically, it can autonomously guide the UAV to active radio sources, including radar.” 

If true, this can potentially transform modified Shaheds into discount versions of anti-radiation weapons — radar hunters. 

Ukrainians have used anti-radiation missiles to take out Russia’s air defense installations, especially during the earlier phases of the war. Russians also use anti-radiation missiles in their strikes. This taught Ukrainians to be crafty about how long they switch on their radar to detect aerial threats before shutting them off again to avoid becoming a target. 

A source in Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces told Euromaidan Press that the Colonel GSh theory is plausible.

However, an analysis by Ukrainian site Defense Express was more cautious. While this may be an attempt to Frankenstein together a passive radio seeker out of other equipment, much would depend on the drone from which it was supposedly taken — and that information is not currently available. 

If the drone had an explosive payload, then it's possible. However, if there was no payload, it's likely this device is meant to find the locations of surrounding air defense units, then transmit that information to the operator.

For now, further information about the supposed drone is not available. But in either case, this device is another sign of how the Russians are constantly adapting their Shahed drones to make them better at evading or destroying Ukrainian air defenses. 

“There is currently no confirmation that this passive radar homing head was obtained from a Russian attack drone of the Shahed type,” wrote Anton Zemlyanyi, a senior analyst with the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center.

“However, if this is indeed the case, then this is another attempt by Russian engineers to optimize the use of drones, to expand their functionality.”

Possible undercooked prototype

The equipment is on sale for a starting price of UAH 100,000 (about $2,277). The photos display a module with four passive antennas with the label 125AE02 CIVR.464651.015.

According to multiple analysts, these numbers are attached to a venerable Russian IFF (identify friend or foe) system called ES GRLO or "Password.” This IFF is part of the "Lyra-VM" communication system. 

The module has a piece of white tape stuck over it, with a handwritten date of when this device was calibrated: 30 September, 2024.

Defense Express noted that the module doesn't appear to have a yoke, which would allow the antenna to move and point itself towards a radio source, thus guiding the drone in that direction. This type of yoke is often used in Russian anti-radiation missiles. 

Zemlyanyi said that it’s possible that this is part of the Russians’ attempts to add more functionality to their attack drones. Trying to shut down Ukrainian radar that detects Shaheds is a logical step. 

However, these kinds of modules are probably not being mass-produced just yet, “otherwise their use would have become known even sooner.” If the Shahed modified with this equipment existed, it was likely a prototype. 

“Similar modifications of Russian Shaheds do not have the effectiveness and impact that Russian designers and engineers attributed to them,” Zemlyanyi wrote. 

Euromaidan Press has joined 20 other Ukrainian media organizations and civil society groups in a joint statement condemning Russia's in absentia conviction of journalist and media expert Iryna Zemlyana. The Moscow City Court sentenced Zemlyana to 13 years in a general regime colony over a 2022 protest in Warsaw — a verdict the signatories call a politically motivated fabrication.

The statement warns that Russia is now attempting to use international law enforcement mechanisms to pursue her internationally, and that her case is a template for targeting any anti-war activist in Europe.

The joint condemnation

Signed by the Institute of Mass Information (IMI), Detector Media, Lviv Media Forum, the Center for Democracy and Rule of Law, Ukraїner, and 16 other organizations, the statement calls the verdict "politically motivated persecution for professional activity, public stance, and spreading the truth about Russia's crimes." The organizations call on Ukrainian authorities and international press freedom bodies to formally recognize the verdict as political persecution, and to take all possible steps to prevent Russia from weaponizing international legal mechanisms against Zemlyana.

The signatories single out Russia's use of "incitement of hatred" and "spreading fakes about the army" charges — the same articles Russian authorities also deploy systematically to silence journalists and critics inside Russia. 

What Zemlyana is accused of

On 9 May 2022 — weeks after the world learned of Russia's massacre of civilians in Bucha — Ukrainian activists blocked Russian then-Ambassador to Poland Sergey Andreyev and pelted him with red liquid as he attempted to lay flowers at the Soviet military cemetery in Warsaw — participants used beet juice to symbolize the blood of Ukrainians killed by Russia's forces. Poland investigated the incident and found no crime, closing the case in June 2023. 

Within hours after the incident, Russian Telegram channels published her passport number, phone number, home address, and social media accounts, calling for her to be "exterminated." She received tens of thousands of threats and was forced to leave Warsaw. 

Russian outlet Mediazona reported the ruling on 10 March 2026. Russia charged Zemlyana under three articles of its criminal code: attacking a representative of a foreign state with the aim of complicating international relations; inciting hatred and enmity through violent means; and publicly spreading "false information" about the Russian army. The court also banned her from administering websites for four additional years.

Russia declared Zemlyana wanted in November 2022. In February 2024, it added her to its Rosfinmonitoring "terrorists and extremists" list at number 7191. The Basmanny District Court of Moscow issued an arrest warrant for her in absentia in March 2024. Zemlyana said she had no contact with Russian authorities throughout. 

"Everything I know about my own case comes exclusively from Russian propaganda media," she told RFI.

Zemlyana denies throwing anything at Andreyev and says she only poured juice on herself during the 2022 protest rally.

"Obviously, this verdict is a political signal, not real justice," she said to IMI. "The case is completely fabricated — just look at the photos and videos to understand I didn't do it. Polish law enforcement also cleared me."

Russia is seeking to add Zemlyana to Interpol's Red Notice wanted list, according to her. Her name does not currently appear in Interpol's public database, but Interpol does not always disclose such information, RFI noted. Zemlyana says Russia deliberately framed the case as a criminal matter — an attack on a diplomat rather than a political protest — specifically to clear Interpol's bar. 

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On 23 March, Ukrainian MP Yaroslav Yurchyshyn, chair of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech, appealed to the National Police in its capacity as Ukraine's official Interpol representative. The National Police responded that it had taken measures to prevent Russia from using the Interpol system to persecute Zemlyana, citing Article 3 of the Interpol Statute, which prohibits the organization from intervening in matters of a political character.

Shaheds already mount air-to-air missiles to fire on Ukrainian planes trying to shoot them down. Now, they are putting decoy missiles on these drones to confuse defenders.

Defense ministry adviser Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov on 30 March posted an image of a Shahed with what resembles an R-60 air-to-air missile on top at first glance. But this is a fake. 

“The goal is to intimidate our aviation and draw the attention of interceptors," Flash wrote. 

While he added that the military "knows how to respond to such things," he also pointed out that everyone will try to destroy such a priority target. "We need to think about how we can distinguish Shaheds with fake missiles."

R-60 missiles have been found on the wreckage of downed Shaheds since at least December. They are infrared homing missiles with a range of 10 kilometers that have been used on a wide range of Russia's manned aircraft and are used in many countries around the world. 

These allow the attack drones to pose a threat not just to the target, but to the helicopters and planes trying to shoot them down. 

Helicopters are an important part of Ukraine's air defense. Top commander Oleksandr Syrskyi told reporters in october that choppers can sometimes shoot down up to 40% of drones in their area.

Ukraine also heavily uses planes, be they Western F-16s or Ukraine’s venerable Migs. These are often deployed against missiles, but Ukrainians have also started using light aviation to shoot down attack drones.

Shaheds can carry more than missiles — they can also be configured to launch smaller FPV drones. The Darknode unit of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces shot one down earlier this month before it was able to release the FPVs. 

Russia’s constant iteration on this once-Iranian weapon is progressively making it trickier to deal with, forcing Ukraine to adapt in response. 

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he signed 10-year defense cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia and Qatar during his tour of the Middle East last week, a first for Ukraine.

"I believe these are historic agreements. We have agreed on strategic cooperation in the MilTech direction and other areas. We are talking ten-year agreements," the president said in a statement. "This is about exports, about opening up exports. But it's about opening up properly, when you know you're actually selling partners a system, not just interceptors."

That system includes "a line of defense, software, and electronic warfare systems," according to Zelenskyy, who said that Kyiv is "approaching this issue systematically."

Middle Eastern countries are also interested in sea drones, which may be put to work unblocking the Strait of Hormuz, using Ukraine's experience of breaking the Russian Black Sea Fleet's blockade of its maritime exports.

"We raised this issue because it is painful and hot for the whole world, because there is an energy crisis," the president said. "They know that they can count on our expertise in this area. We shared the experience of the Black Sea corridor, how it functions."

Zelenskyy also visited the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, and is in talks with other states in the region. National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov is currently in the Middle East for a series of meetings.

In exchange, Ukraine hopes to secure anti-ballistic capabilities, which are in global short supply. The president also said that Gulf countries agreed to support Ukraine with energy supplies and diesel fuel.

Critical defense partnership

Zelenskyy's meetings were well-timed. Over the weekend, Iran attacked the US's Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, injuring at least 12 service members, damaging two aerial refueling planes and taking out an E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control system aircraft, putting a serious strain on American air operations in the region.

Other attacks struck airport in Erbil in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, which houses a US consulate. A radar system in Kuwait’s international airport was also damaged. Earlier, Iran hit Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas plant, taking out 17 percent of the country's liquefied natural gas export capacity.

Kyiv has already dispatched its military experts to at least a dozen countries in the region to put on an air defense clinic on how to protect against modern mass strikes with drones and missiles. 

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Ukraine now has the opportunity to sell battle-tested, affordable solutions to Middle Eastern countries, and teach them how to use them and properly integrate them into a comprehensive air defense doctrine.

Ukraine's naval drones can also be used to take on Iran's attacks in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, escort tanker traffic, and put pressure on Iranian logistics.

Observers told Euromaidan Press that a “systemic push to build a new security architecture” in the Gulf could become “the most important defense partnership story of the next few years.”

How the deals might look

Ukraine is still working on ways to pave the way for such cooperation. The legislative and bureaucratic system to allow arms exports is still being put together, sources in the Defense Ministry have told Euromaidan Press.

Sources also said that Kyiv is paranoid about giving away its proprietary tech, military secrets, or hard-won battlefield expertise, paid for in blood. This is putting the brakes on both paving the way for miltech sales, as well as the deployment of veteran warfighters to other countries to serve as instructors. 

Timofiy Mylovanov, president of the Kyiv School of Economics, wrote that if Ukraine doesn't create a working system for exports and experience sharing, it risks becoming a country that "invented and proved everything, but didn't earn."

"However, recently, the Ministry of Defense team proposed a clear export model, which almost all players in the market agree with," Mylovanov added.

Under this model, the government has a 30-day window to buy from a defense contractor, after which it allows them to export their products. Additionally, exports are allowed only to partner countries; only goods not needed at the front are eligible; and a 10% export duty is charged to procure frontline supplies.

Ukraine is also eyeing joint production agreements, such as the Build With Ukraine model.

"This model is as profitable as possible for our country, it needs to be launched as soon as possible," Mylovanov wrote. "The main mistake is to think that the world will wait. It will not wait."

Russian forces have been trying and failing for more than a year to capture Kostiantynivka, a major obstacle between the Russian Center Group of Forces and the free cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast.

Despite suffering horrific casualties in their long siege of Kostiantynivka, the Russians aren't giving up. On or just before 26 March, one of the Center Group of Forces' most experienced units—the 4th Motor Rifle Brigade—rolled out its best vehicles for a fresh push toward the fortified city.

The giga turtles' return is part of a bigger shift. After a year of infantry-only assaults that cost Russia more than 418,000 casualties, Russian commanders are putting their troops back inside vehicles. The early results haven't been encouraging. A 54-vehicle assault near Lyman on 19 March ended in what one Ukrainian drone operator called a "massacre."

These giant, up-armored "giga turtle" tanks are the products of years of trial and error by Russian troops desperately innovating to protect their vehicles and themselves from Ukraine's first-person-view drones. The giga turtles have proved they can absorb multiple FPV strikes. If there's a downside to the massive vehicles, it's their slow speed: just 10 km/hr, according to one observer.

All that extra metal comes at the cost of extra bulk and weight. The giga turtles are too big to hide. They're too heavy to run. Their only protection is, luckily for their crews and passengers, also their best protection: their layers of armor.

The 4th MRB takes a standard T-72B3M tank, adds a frame for drone-defeating metal plating and spines, installs floors under the plating to support infantry and hatches for the infantry to ingress and egress—and covers any gaps with dangling metal chains.

Add a rear extension for extra infantry, frontal rollers to safely detonate mines, and top-mounted radio jammers for protection against wireless drones, and you've got potentially the biggest and toughest assault vehicles on either side of Russia's 50-month war in Ukraine.

Too bad about the slow speed, of course. It prolongs a giga turtle's exposure to attacking drones.

Frequent visitors

The 4th MRB's giga turtles frequently appeared on the roads toward Kostiantynivka late last year, but became rarer as 2025 ground into 2026 and the Russians mostly parked their armored vehicles in favor of infantry-led assaults across wet winter terrain.

Those assaults were extremely costly, however. As the weather warmed and the wet ground dried, Russian vehicles made a comeback. The return of the 4th MRB's giga turtles signals the re-mechanization of a temporarily de-mechanized force.

But the Russians' initial vehicular assaults have all failed—not just along the Kostiantynivka axis but also along the Lyman axis farther to the north. Kostiantynivka blocks the Russians' south-to-north march on Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Lyman blocks the east-to-west march toward the same objectives.

On or before 26 March, at least two of the giga turtles rolled toward Kostiantynivka with assault troops tucked under their metal shells. But Ukrainian drones were watching. And as the giga turtles slowly crawled through Ivanopillya, 5 km south of Kostiantynivka, fiber-optic FPVs from the Ukrainian 28th Mechanized Brigade attacked.

The 28th Mechanized Brigade claimed it knocked out one giga turtle. Indeed, it's evident from overhead surveillance that at least one giga turtle suffered some damage.

It's not evident that either giga turtle was immobilized or destroyed, however, despite the 28th Mechanized Brigade's claim. The co-located 100th Mechanized Brigade observed two Russian tanks leaving Ivanopillya and driving south, perhaps confirming that both giga turtles survived despite taking damage.

Subsequent strikes on dismounted Russian infantry indicate the giga turtles may have succeeded in disembarking some of their passengers on the southern outskirts of Kostiantynivka. In any event, the Russian assault troops failed to claim new ground in or around the city, according to the 28th Mechanized Brigade. "We are already used to endless small groups [and] repelling mechanized assaults," the brigade quipped.

Kostiantynivka holds for now. But the Russians and their giga turtles will be back. "Day after day, the Russians are increasing the number of attempts to drag as many of their troops as possible into Kostiantynivka," the 28th Mechanized Brigade warned.