Sabermetrics Suck

Saberfans and the Narrative

2013-10-25T12:26:00.000-04:00

Is David Ortiz clutch? Or is that just a myth? (Photo source: Wikipedia)

Some saberfans get really hung up on "the narrative" in baseball. They seem to feel that announcers and writers often fixate on a particular storyline and continue to talk about it, even though THE NUMBERS DON'T BACK IT UP!

What the saberfans they don't seem to realize is that this can be a two-way street. For instance, saberfans enjoy debunking the theory of "clutchness" in baseball. They enjoy debunking this narrative so much that "there is no such thing as clutchness" has become a narrative in itself.

For a good example, let's check out this recent Tweet by noted saberdouche Bill Baer of the blog Crashburn Alley:

David Ortiz Regular Season: .292/.390/.572 Playoffs: .277/.384/.528
— Bill Baer (@CrashburnAlley) October 25, 2013

Bill was presumably watching the World Series and listened as Red Sox DH David Ortiz was repeatedly described as being a clutch player. Bill has made no secret of his dislike of the clutchness narrative, so he was probably all to eager to prove it false.

In this case, Bill's disdain is obviously merited because he has numbers on his side. This proves that he is correct and the stupid people who insist on supporting this narrative are wrong.

Or maybe not. Another Twitter user helpfully pointed out that Bill's Tweet might not be telling the whole story:

@CrashburnAlley Probably need to look at adjusted-for-opponent stats to properly gauge that though. Better pitching in the playoffs.
— Max Laughton (@dshban) October 25, 2013

So yes, Ortiz's excellent numbers are not quite as good in the playoffs as they are in the regular season. But, considering that just about every at bat in the playoffs is high pressure, and a guy like Ortiz is almost never going to get an easy at bat against a weak pitcher, it's impressive that his numbers are even in the same range.

By the way, Ortiz's postseason OPS of .912 would have ranked 5th in the American League this season. A guy who puts up postseason numbers like that would certainly seem to qualify as "clutch," right?

If you were curious to how Bill responded to this:

@dshban agreed, I'm too lazy though
— Bill Baer (@CrashburnAlley) October 25, 2013

Apparently, he's too lazy to do any research when it might not support his particular narrative.

So remember, following the narrative isn't just for traditionalists. Saberfans can enjoy the wonders of the narrative too!

Fun With Rob Neyer: Let the players vote for everything. Wait, no don't!

2013-07-09T10:23:00.000-04:00

Angst over All-Star selections is not something that is limited to saberfans. Baseball fans of all types get riled up about who was selected and who got snubbed. Part of the problem is that just about everyone has a different opinion as to what the criteria for making the team should be.

This doesn't stop saberfans from being especially annoying about it. Saberfans tend to think that because they have advanced stats to back up their argument, they KNOW who the deserving players are.

Naturally, Rob Neyer isn't going to let the All-Star debate go by without putting in his two cents.

I wasn't going to pick on Neyer, because the douchiest part of the column is actually a quote from Joe Sheehan. Then again, Rob makes a point to mention how much he agrees with Sheehan, so I won't cut him too much slack.

Neyer isn't content to just agree with Sheehan's douchieness. He needs to add some of his own:

But they're not qualified to evaluate the overall value of players they see a few times a year, because they've got little or no interest in doing the actual work that would require. How many of the players, before filling out their ballots, actually sat down and looked at Baseball-Reference.com or any other source listing something other than batting average and RBI's and wins and losses and ERA? A dozen, maybe?

Is Miguel Cabrera worthy of being an All-Star?
It's impossible to tell without hours of research.

According to Neyer, only through extensive research can it be determined who deserves to be an All-Star. Since the players are either unwilling or unable to put in the hard work that is necessary, that responsibility should be reassigned.

Bud Selig should take the All-Star selection duty away from the players and the fans. He could then assign it to someone who would tirelessly scour reference sites in order to identify the players who are truly worthy of the All-Star honor. Obviously, there is only one man capable of handling this crucial responsibility: Rob Neyer.

If Neyer was assigned this sacred duty, he would construct the ultimate All-Star team rosters. Players would not be foolishly named All-Stars simply because they have a high RBI total. The result would surely be the greatest All-Star Game ever played; one that would be talked about for years to come.

Sigh...if only.

Fun with Rob Neyer

2013-06-13T15:29:00.001-04:00

There's going to be a a change here at Sabermetrics Suck.

Since I created this site, updates have been sporadic. That is mostly because I try to make thoughtful arguments and not resort to the usual taunts of "Sabermetrics are stupid because...Grandma's basement!" Unfortunately, thoughtful arguments require time and energy which I don't often have.

Fortunately, I have found a muse that will allow me to post more regularly. I had a lot of fun making fun of Rob Neyer in my last post. So I asked myself, "Why don't I do that more often?"

Neyer makes an ideal target because he is prolific and comes off as unbearably smug. The mockery practically writes itself! And because Neyer shows no reluctance to mock others, I don't even feel any guilt. It's a win-win situation!

Nice shades (Photo source: Gawker)

Let's take a look at this recent piece where he questions some of the decisions made by Dodgers manager Don Mattingly:

http://www.baseballnation.com/2013/6/11/4420126/don-mattingly-brandon-league-closer-situation

If you've read much of Neyer's work, it becomes obvious that he thinks is smarter than most Major League managers.

Neyer begins by praising Mattingly for using the team's best reliever (Kenley Jansen) instead of the team's closer (Brandon League) in a key situation. In typical Neyer fashion, the compliment is served in a backhanded manner:

Hey, that's great! Mattingly figured Jansen's his best reliever and used him against the Diamondbacks' best hitters! Bravo!

But wouldn't it still make sense to use a good pitcher in the ninth?

Neyer takes issue with Mattingly's use of League in the ninth inning since League hasn't proven to be effective in that role. The criticism is confusing because Neyer goes on to admit that none of the Dodgers' relievers are especially good.

So what's the problem? So far Neyer has praised one of Mattingly's moves and defended another. Shouldn't this article be titled "Don Mattingly: Doing a Swell Job?"

The problem comes when Mattingly gives part of the reasoning behind his moves: League had better career numbers against the scheduled hitters than Jansen did.

I think that Mattingly's rationale was solid. While the sample size wasn't large, it wasn't like he had many good options. Why not go with the guy who has had success against those hitters?

Naturally, Neyer disagrees:

... and you really have to wonder about your manager's marbles, since 0 for 5 and five for 10 are utterly meaningless in this context. If tiny batter-versus-pitcher samples are your rationale for bullpen decisions, you're doing it wrong.

But then again, when you're bullpen's got 15 losses, you're probably doing something wrong. Or you're making a lot of solid decisions that just didn't work. That's possible, I guess.

So even though he already admitted that the Dodgers don't have good relievers, the team's problems are obviously the fault of Mattingly because he uses such ridiculous logic.

I'm impressed that Neyer was able to restrain himself. Here's what he probably wanted to write:

That foolish manager! The ignoramus actually uses batter-versus-pitcher samples? Sabermetrics has declared that such things are not definitive therefore they must not be considered in any decisions!

Those 15 losses are clearly all his fault. If I were the manager, I would have found a way for the team to have won all of those games. For I am Rob Neyer, Baseball Genius!

Thank you for holding back, Rob. And thank you for the inspiration!

Saberdouchery: Rob Neyer and Dustin Ackley

2013-06-06T11:36:00.000-04:00

In my last post, I mentioned that my goal was to find examples of saberdouchery on the web. Instead, I found an article by Keith Law that made me reconsider my whole anti-sabermetrics stance.

I started to wonder: Have I been too hard on saberfans? Are they really not as bad as I have made them out to be? Is this whole site completely misguided? (That sound you hear is the saberfans who stumble across the site nodding vigorously)

Fortunately, Rob Neyer restored my faith by providing this excellent example of saberdouchery:

Saberdouche

http://www.baseballnation.com/2013/5/28/4373416/dustin-ackley-demoted-eric-wedge-blames-sabermetrics#165096129

The article has everything: Snark! Mockery of announcers! An irrational defense of sabermetrics! Instant dismissal of a person who criticizes sabermetrics! More snark!

Let's take a look at all the douchey goodness.

The article begins with Neyer taking issue with Braves announcer Joe Simpson. Simpson suggested that there is a mental aspect to pitching and that it might be tougher for some pitchers to succeed in late game situations.

According to Neyer, this is absolute nonsense. He probably would have been gracious enough to allow this comment to pass, but then Simpson had the nerve to suggest that sabermetrics (gasp!) might have been wrong about something.

That obviously crossed a line, and Neyer wasn't going to let Simpson to get away with it. He dismissed Simpson a Luddite who "wasn't interested in facts" and only sought to impress his fellow non-believers.

Next, Neyer takes a shot at Mariners' manager Eric Wedge. Wedge tried to explain the struggles of young hitter Justin Ackley, and implied that sabermetrics might be partially to blame.

Uh oh. Neyer's not gonna like that one bit.

Wedge notes that some people in the Mariners' organization are encouraging a more sabermetric friendly approach while at bat. As a result, Ackley has been too concerned with taking pitches and trying to draw walks rather than relying on his natural instincts.

I'm not going to deny that patience and a high on-base percentage are good qualities for a hitter to possess. But it is foolish to think that all hitters will succeed with a patient approach. There are some hitters whose success is based on a more aggressive approach at the plate

Ackley could be such a hitter. If he is indeed trying to be more patient in order to please some organizational figures who are stressing high OBP, then it seems entirely possible that the change could be affecting him negatively.

Neyer dismisses this possibility, and there seems to be no real point to the dismissal except for the fact that Wedge criticized sabermetrics.

Apparently, in Rob Neyer's world, Sabermetrics are perfect and never to be criticized. It's slightly frightening how obsessed he seems. He comes off like a top lieutenant in a cult.

"What do you mean The Leader is not perfect? How dare you spread such blasphemy! We must silence the non-believer! Burn him!"

"Bill James - I mean, The Leader - is all knowing and all seeing!"

Thank you, Rob Neyer. I feel much better about everything now.

In Defense Of: Keith Law???

2013-03-28T12:48:00.000-04:00

I'll be honest. I was trying to find something to write about, so I perused the web in search of saberdouchery.

Saberdouchery is when a baseball analyst makes some sort of argument that goes against traditional baseball thinking. He'll make a point to deliver the message in the most arrogant way possible, letting everyone know how much smarter he is than the Luddite traditionalists.

I figured that Keith Law was a good bet to supply me with some material, so I looked through his article archive on ESPN.com.

I expected to find saberdouchery. Instead, I found this article:

The Stats I Can't Live Without

(Article requires an ESPN Insider subscription to read. Sorry for all you non-subscribers)

Law starts out by putting a disclaimer on WAR, pointing out that without knowing how the WAR value was calculated, it doesn't really provide much insight into a player's value. Next, he points out that because players build their WAR in different ways, it's not necessarily a great tool to analyze players going forward.

What? Was I reading this correctly?

He uses Michael Bourn as an example. Much of Bourn's value is based on speed. As he ages, his speed is likely to decrease, meaning that Bourn's value will likely decrease faster than other players with a similar WAR value.

Michael Bourn's WAR may not be indicative of future performance

He then goes on to talk about a few key statistics, what they are designed to do, how they can be misleading, and why they are useful in analyzing and predicting a player's performance moving forward.

I was shocked. This was a helpful and accessible article from an unlikely source.

Despite what some people may think, I have made an effort to understand and appreciate sabermetrics. I feel I have gotten a solid grasp on how most of the more prominent statistics are calculated and why they are considered valuable. But it certainly wasn't easy for me to do so.

If analysts like Law really want sabermetrics to fully gain mainstream acceptance, they need to produce more articles like this one. This article should have been placed on the front page of ESPN.com and been made easily accessible to everyone who wanted to gain a better handle on sabermetrics.

I'm not saying it's a perfect article. Law can't completely avoid showing some disdain for the non-believers when he makes a comment about the Trout vs. Cabrera debate.

But had I read something like this a few years ago, it's possible that my whole outlook on sabermetrics might have changed. Maybe this site would be called "Sabermetrics Rule" instead!

Well...probably not. There still would have been plenty of saberdouches out there doing their best to earn my disdain.

Regardless, I look at this article as a step in the right direction. Good job, Mr. Law!

In Defense Of: Ruben Amaro - Part Two

2013-02-12T16:43:00.000-05:00

As expected, many saberfans did not enjoy my defense of Ruben Amaro.

Sadly, I think many of them saw the name of the blog, got their hackles up, and were simply determined to hate anything I had written.

So I thought: How can I make the blog more accessible for them? How can I show them that I'm not just full of anti-sabermetric hate? How can I show them that I actually hear and value their opinions?

The answer came to me: I need to bring in a lovable character from pop culture to help me out!

Fans of the book The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy will be thrilled when I introduce today's special guest. He's short. He's shiny. He talks like Hans Gruber. He's Marvin the Paranoid Android!

Sigh

Much like many saberfans who follow the Phillies, Marvin is pessimistic about this year's team. (Although to be fair, Marvin is pessimistic about everything) And much like many saberfans, Marvin behaves like a robot. He can analyze numbers and statistics with precision, but sometimes he has some trouble understanding how to put those numbers in the right perspective.

It may have been unfair to saberfans when I didn't give them a voice in part one. So this time around, Marvin will serve as their spokesperson.

Thanks for joining us, Marvin!

Marvin: I wish I could say that it's a pleasure being here. But it isn't. It isn't a pleasure being anywhere.

Cutter: Well, thanks regardless. Let's get started. What's your first complaint about Amaro?

Marvin: He's overpaid for players and now the Phillies have no money left to improve the team.

Cutter: Overpaid is a funny word to use. If you're just making your judgements based on some sort of dollars-to-WAR scale, then I'm sure the Phillies have overpaid.

While it is great to have money available, it's even better to spend that money on good players.

I get the impression that some Phillies fans would prefer that the team act like a small-market team who has to try and find market inequities so that they can outsmart the big boys. They seem to think that it would somehow be more fun if the Phillies were made up of a bunch of Ben Zobrist types who have been unappreciated by the market, but are super valuable according to WAR.

I think it's more fun that our GM can say, "We need a reliever. Who's the best one on the market? Papelbon? I'll take it!"

Finances in baseball aren't equal. A Papelbon might not be a wise signing for most teams, but for a team in the Phillies' position, it does make sense.

If Ruben wants a Papelbon, then Ruben shall get a Papelbon!

Marvin: I thought you weren't going to use negative stereotypes regarding saberfans?

Cutter: You're right. That was probably a bit of an exaggeration.

So why are you under the impression that the Phillies have been financially restrained?

Marvin: Amaro didn't make any moves to improve the team this offseason. He didn't sign one of the free agent outfielders who were available.

Cutter: But wasn't the consensus that just about every free agent outfielder got "overpaid" this offseason? You're criticizing Amaro for overpaying players...because it prevented him from overpaying other players?

Remember all the panic last season that the Phillies wouldn't be able to re-sign Cole Hamels? Well, they re-signed Cole Hamels.

Still a Phillie

Marvin: Even that was a bad move. Had they signed him earlier, they could have gotten him cheaper. Players get more expensive the closer they get to free agency.

Cutter: That's usually true. But there's no indication that Hamels would have signed any earlier than he did.

Some players sign early extensions because they're very comfortable in their situation and they'd rather have immediate financial security. Other players would rather take the risk that they'll stay healthy and productive and be able to make more on the open market.

I'm sure that at some point, Amaro did indeed say something to Hamels' agent along the lines of, "Here's what we think you're worth. Please sign this contract."

Hamels' agent probably responded, "That's sweet and all, but if Cole becomes a free agent, some team is going to offer him more money than that."

So what's your next complaint?

Marvin: The Phillies are an old team because Amaro let them get old.

Cutter: The Phillies are indeed an old team. But that's mostly because they've had a very good team for a few years, and now that core has gotten older.

But could that have been avoided?

When you've got a team in contention, is that the time to start rebuilding? Was he supposed to break up a 102 win team after the 2011 season?

Championship quality cores don't come around all that often. Amaro needed to do all he could to help that core to win another championship.

Besides, being an old team doesn't necessarily keep a team from being good.

Marvin: But he seems to go out of his way to make the team older. All of the players he's picked up over the years have been older like Raul Ibanez and Placido Polanco.

Cutter: Once again, when you've got a championship level core, would you rather add younger, unproven players, or proven veterans?

It would be nice if the Phillies had picked up some young stars who were about to enter their primes, but those players aren't readily available, especially if they're really only supporting pieces to the core of the team.

I don't recall the other available options, but I don't think there were any 28 year old All-Star outfielders on the free agent market.

Speaking of 28 year old All-Star outfielders, want to talk about Hunter Pence?

Many saberfans regard the Pence trade as a bad idea

Marvin: Ugh, yes. What a horrible trade. Amaro traded some top prospects for one year of a player who would be only a marginal upgrade.

Cutter: Let's re-visit the 2011 trade deadline. The Phillies were essentially a lock to make the playoffs. However, the lineup was still a slight question mark.

In the 2009 and 2010 playoffs, the team's fatal flaw was probably it's vulnerability against left handed relievers. Opposing managers used lefty specialists to great effect against the Phillies hitters.

Pence was an attempt to correct that flaw. He was a 28 year old right handed hitter in the midst of an All-Star season Was he overachieving that season? Probably. Was he the best available option to improve the Phillies' chances of winning the World Series? I think so.

And here's the part that people seem to forget: Pence wasn't supposed to be a one-year player. Part of the reason Amaro wanted him was because he was under team control through the 2013 season.

Did they trade away a top prospect in Jonathan Singleton?  Yes, but keep in mind that Singleton is a first baseman, and the Phillies have a guy signed long-term at that position. (No matter how you feel about the Howard contract, that was the reality at the time of the trade)

Personally, I thought it was a bad move to trade him away last year, as he would have been a solid part of the lineup this season. But maybe Amaro felt like a top catching prospect (Tommy Joseph) was too much too pass up.

Marvin: If they hadn't traded for Pence, they would have been able to trade for Justin Upton this offseason.

Cutter: That's probably true. But trading for Justin Upton now wouldn't have helped them win the World Series in 2011. (And yes, I know that they didn't. But as I've said, I think the trade for Pence helped their chances)

Marvin: It was just one example of Amaro's insistence on destroying the team's farm system.

Cutter: No, it was an example of Amaro using those prospects as ways to help his current team.

Marvin: But then you have nothing left for tomorrow. This is the reason that teams have "championship windows." Doing things like trading away prospects causes those windows to close.

Cutter: I'll ask again: Which would you rather take a chance on? Adding a piece to a championship caliber team or a bunch of prospects who might never pan out?

Every team has a window.  The only way to truly extend it is to have the minor leagues develop players as good as the ones who have gotten old or departed.

Marvin: Yes, and Amaro hasn't done that.

Cutter: That is indeed an issue. It certainly doesn't look like the Phillies are producing new talent that can capably replace the aging core. Part of that is because they Phillies have given up both draft picks and prospects in an attempt to "win now."

You should remember that the draft system is designed to promote parity. It's much easier for losing teams to build a good farm system.

Losing teams get better draft position. Losing teams can trade away players for prospects or obtain extra draft picks when their players leave as free agents.

The Phillies have been in the opposite situation and it has hurt them.

Marvin: It doesn't matter why the minor league system is weak. You admitted that it is, and therefore, there's no chance to rebuild, and therefore there's no hope for the future.

Cutter: Why are you acting like Amaro has failed at a rebuilding process that hasn't really begun?

The way I see it: The core of this team has one more chance in 2013. If they fail, then veterans like Chase Utley, Roy Halladay, and maybe even Carlos Ruiz are likely gone. They'll then have plenty of money to spend to build around the remaining core.

And even though the farm system looks a little weak right now, as I mentioned in part one, that can turn around in a hurry. If Dom Brown pans out, and if prospects like Jessie Biddle and Tommy Joseph continue to develop, then all of a sudden, the Phillies farm system looks pretty good.

Marvin: Dom Brown? He's not going to pan out because the Phillies signed Delmon Young, and Young is going to take all of Brown's playing time without providing any value.

Cutter: Why are you so upset about Delmon Young?  Young is signed to a one-year contract for less than a million.

He also was once a top prospect and minor league player of the year (What was I saying about prospects not always panning out?) who is still young enough that he might fulfill his potential given a second chance. If not, then the Phillies can easily part ways with him.

Not worth the angst

Marvin: I doubt that. Amaro and Charlie Manuel will always favor veterans. Just look at Chad Qualls last year.

Cutter: Always? How many games did Luis Castillo or Dontrelle Willis play for the Phillies?

As for Chad Qualls, he wasn't blocking anyone's progress. He was pitching because Antonio Bastardo was inconsistent, and guys like Michael Stutes and Justin DeFratus got hurt.

If Dom Brown (and Darin Ruf as well) prove more worthy of playing time than Delmon Young, then they'll likely receive it.

I don't think that the Phillies success hinges on Delmon Young. And it certainly doesn't hinge on Yuniesky Betancourt, another low risk singing Amaro made this offseason.

This year's team will depend on their expensive players playing up to their capabilities. If Ryan Howard, Chase Utley, Roy Halladay, and Cliff Lee all play well, then I think the Phillies make the playoffs.

Marvin: Your optimism depresses me.

Cutter: I know. It does the same to me sometimes. But thanks for coming here, Marvin. I had fun!

Marvin: That makes one of us.

I'll conclude by saying this:

Am I making guesses and assumptions regarding Amaro's motivations and thought processes. Yes, but I think that's no different than what most of his critics have done. I think that if you like Amaro, then you'll give him the benefit of the doubt and assume the best. If you hate Amaro, you'll do the opposite.

We can speculate over which moves were the right ones, but all we know for sure is the results. And despite what some Amaro critics might have you believe, Amaro has gotten results.

The team improved its record every year from 2009-2011, and in each of those seasons, Amaro made moves which increased the team's chances of winning the World Series.

Did those moves all work out? Obviously not, since the team didn't win the World Series. But there's a difference between a bad move and a good move that didn't work out.

I feel the 2012 Phillies missed the playoffs because Roy Halladay, Ryan Howard, and Chase Utley suffered injuries that caused them to miss time and be less effective. I feel they also had some veterans suffer disappointing seasons.

I am optimistic that given good health (Which I know is certainly no guarantee for an older team), the Phillies will rebound in 2013.

If the Phillies fail, then I think that Amaro needs to concentrate his efforts towards rebuilding. But he should certainly be given a chance to do that.

My point is this: Until the Phillies actually encounter failure under Amaro, I don't see any way that you can declare him to be a failure as general manager.

A failure? No.

I Am Not a Troll

2013-01-29T12:15:00.000-05:00

Since I've had a lot of new readers come by the site in recent days, I thought it was appropriate to re-state and clarify the intention behind this site.

I realize that by naming the site Sabermetrics Suck, it makes it appear that this blog is either an attempt to instigate, or a parody of an anti-sabermetrics traditionalist.

I assure you that it is neither.

Unfortunately, the title "Sabermetrics Are Good When Used in Moderation But Some People Take It Too Far" seemed a bit clunky. Also, "Sabermetrics Suck" is definitely catchier.

The goal of the site is not to whine about "geeks with calculators sitting in their mother's basement." I am not complaining that "these newfangled stats have ruined baseball."

I accept that the battle between traditionalists and saberfans is pretty much over, and the saberfans have won.

It's pretty tough to deny that fact when I look at ESPN.com and see several baseball writers who focus on advanced statistics. They even include WAR on their statistics page!

So then what is the point of the site?

In my eyes, the empowered sabermetric crowd has become the new arrogant elite. It feels like many saberfans were held down and mocked by the traditionalists for so long, that now that they've gained acceptance, they carry themselves with a know-it-all attitude.

Prominent saber-minded writers like Rob Neyer and Keith Law certainly aren't helping that reputation. Instead of educating and enlightening people to the ways of sabermetrics, they seem to drive people away with their snarky arrogance.

Saberfans portray traditionalists as stubborn, unyielding old fools who refuse to give up antiquated ways of thinking. Yet from my experience, saberfans can be even more stubborn and refusing to yield.

The best I can tell, this stubbornness comes from the saberfans having "numbers on their side."

Ah yes, numbers and statistics. I believe Homer Simpson said it best:

“Oh, people can come up with statistics to prove anything. 14% of people know that.”

The typical sabermetric thought process seems to be along these lines:

Come up with a hypothesis.
Find a statistic that backs up that hypothesis.
Convince yourself that the statistic offers irrefutable proof.
Refuse to yield.

It's kind of fun to do, actually! Here's an example:

Hypothesize that RBIs are an important measure of a player's offensive production.
Check the rosters of every team in baseball, and add up the number of RBIs for each player.
Find that the teams with the highest player RBI totals were the highest scoring offenses.
Conclude that RBIs are a good measure of offensive production.
Refuse to yield.

I'm not advocating abandoning statistical research in baseball. I think it has indeed provided people with more insight about the game. I regularly read sabermetrics-focused sites to try and gain more knowledge, and have learned some things that I find fascinating.

What I'm trying to do is to remind people that while baseball is about numbers, it is also more than just numbers. It's about team chemistry, luck, clutch plays, and moments both amazing and bizarre that make it fun to be a baseball fan.

It's about a team having a "1 in 100" chance of winning, and still finding a way to pull out a victory.

I think that some people have just gotten a little too deep into the numbers to see what's really going on. I'm trying to help people see the big picture.

The "pendulum has swung" to the side of the saberfans. The blog represents the start of the back swing.

I just hope some of you stick around to enjoy the ride.

In Defense of: Ruben Amaro

2013-01-25T10:33:00.000-05:00

One of the sites I frequently visit is Crashburn Alley. It is a Phillies site that looks at the team from a sabermetric perspective.

Most of the site's writers and readers are not fans of the Phillies' General Manager Ruben Amaro, and the way he has handled the team. The dislike seems to come because the Phillies have taken a mostly non-sabermetric approach towards the construction of the team.

They seem to hold Amaro responsible for the Phillies falling from a championship contender to a team that some people think will be lucky to finish in 4th place in the National League East in 2012.

The devil?

First off, it seems a bit premature to write off the Phillies. They finished at .500 in a 2012 season that saw them suffer quite a few injuries. It isn't a huge stretch to think of them as at least contenders for a playoff spot in 2013.

And considering the success that the team has had under Amaro, to declare him "a complete failure" is absurd. While some of the success can be attributed to his predecessors Pat Gillick and Ed Wade, Amaro has done more than his fair share as well.

I am not going to claim that Amaro has been flawless. He's made some moves which I have disagreed with, and that in hindsight, look like mistakes.

But I will defend Amaro by saying this:

He took over the team immediately following the championship season of 2008. He identified that the core of the team was capable of winning a championship. (A sound assumption since they had just won the World Series) He recognized that the core would only have a limited window, so he would have to do his best to maximize the team's chances of winning within that window.

Obviously, his efforts have fallen short, but it is hard to argue that in any given season from 2009-2011 he didn't make moves which would presumably increase the team's chances of winning the World Series that season.

The pessimism heading into 2013 is because the Phillies have an expensive roster of players who mostly appear to be on the downsides of their careers. Worse, the minor league system doesn't appear to be flush with talent ready to replace them.

According to many readers and contributors at Crashburn Alley, this was all due to Amaro's missteps.

Some claim that the Phillies' underwhelming moves this offseason were due to the team not having enough money to spend on more expensive free agents.

I am amazed at how many people in the blogosphere seem to have inside knowledge regarding the Phillies moves. For example, they seem to know for a fact that the reason the team didn't sign BJ Upton or any of the other expensive free agents was because their payroll was already too high.

For instance, most saberfans think that closer Jonathan Papelbon was overpaid in the 2012 offseason since according to sabermetric principles, a relief pitcher can't affect a team's fortunes all that much.

Overpaid?

I will counter with my best guess as to how Amaro approached the signing:

Amaro assumed that the Phillies rotation would match their sterling performance of 2011. This would mean that the starters would regularly be providing seven or eight quality innings.

Perhaps it was foolish to assume that the starters would be as good as they were in 2011, but when you have as much money invested in starting pitching, that's the assumption you have to make.

Based on this assumption, it became extremely important for the team to have a solid option in the ninth inning, (to finish off all those strong starts) but not as important to have many other reliable relievers (because there wouldn't be too many relief innings to go around).

Therefore, Amaro paid top dollar to get the best, most reliable ninth inning option he could get, and tried to use cheaper options for the rest of the bullpen.

Did Amaro overpay for Papelbon? It looks that way, since Papelbon did receive a much larger contract than any other free agent reliever, but perhaps that was because he was the best option available.

Some people have a naive belief that all a team has to do is offer a player a contract and that player will sign with them. That's not how the free market works. If another team was also pursuing Papelbon, maybe Amaro felt the only way to sign him was to "overpay."

Aside from the payroll, the other main criticism of Amaro is that he has ruined the Phillies future by trading many of the team's minor league prospects for veterans over the past few seasons.

Here's a comment from Crashburn Alley which implies that Amaro's trades were shortsighted:

There was absolutely no need to "win now" because a smart team with lots of assets, both financial and talent-wise, can sustain their success nearly indefinitely.

Trading players to put you over the top for some near-term goal is the act that actually creates the window you're talking about! Read this: http://www.thegoodphight.com/2011/7/27/2299271/the-window-isnt-closing-unless-you-want-it-to-close

This comment and the linked article make one very foolish assumption: That you can depend on prospects to develop into major league contributors.

Some people seem to think that success in baseball is a simple three step process:

Call up minor league prospects
Have them play well in the majors
Win!

Unfortunately, it isn't quite that easy.

For a good example, look at the Oakland A's under Billy Beane. The famed General Manager's teams experienced success in the early 2000s thanks to a core of star players like Jason Giambi, Barry Zito, and Tim Hudson. All of these players were eventually deemed too expensive, so they were either traded away or allowed to leave as free agents.

In return, the A's received several highly touted prospects and were the beneficiaries of many high draft picks. Yet, the team went five years without a winning record.

The main reason why? Because the players they developed or called up turned out to be inferior to the players who left.

Prospects might be the biggest uncertainty in sports. Even the most heralded prospects might not pan out in the big leagues.

Just look at Nationals pitcher Stephen Strasburg. He might be the most "sure thing" prospect ever, and yet he's already missed a season due to injury, with the team scared to death of him suffering another.

Even Stephen Strasburg wasn't guaranteed to be successful

If you're going to take risks, I'd rather take risks on established players.

In 2009, the Phillies had two top prospects in their system named Kyle Drabek and Travis d'Arnaud. They were both traded away for Roy Halladay. While Drabek and d'Arnaud may some day develop into major league stars, it wasn't too much of a stretch to say that Halladay gave the team a better shot to win the World Series over the next few seasons.

Considering the Phillies went 28 years between developing championship caliber cores, why are people so sure that they can easily develop another one? Maybe some of the prospects he traded away might become stars one day. But at the time, Amaro felt like the Phillies needed an extra piece to win the World Series.

I'll say that it takes a lot less time to rebuild a pool of minor league prospects than it does to build a core of major league talent capable of winning.

In 2008, the Phillies were rumored to want to make a trade for pitcher CC Sabathia. But they simply didn't have enough valued prospects in their system to make it happen. Yet over the next couple of seasons, they had some minor leaguers develop to the point where they could trade for Cliff Lee, Roy Halladay, and Roy Oswalt.

Some may counter that the postseason is a "crap shoot" and the Phillies shouldn't have made those moves since they only minimally improved the team's chances of winning a World Series.

As a fan, I much prefer the "All in" approach rather than the "Let's just give ourselves a chance and hope things break our way" mindset Did the moves pay off? Obviously not, since the Phillies have fallen short, but I can't say that management didn't make an effort to win.

Maybe the Phillies are truly finished as contenders. If that is true, was there any way to avoid that fate?

The Phillies conceivably could have let some of their now expensive players leave as free agents or traded some veterans for prospects. But considering the Phillies were championship contenders and were being supported by a rabid fan base who was selling out the stadium every night, was this truly an option?

There's a reason that teams don't regularly experience the kind of sustained success the Phillies have recently enjoyed. Inevitably, the star players who fuel such success either become too old or too expensive. Unless you have a truly great farm system that keeps providing the team with new top talent, the run will have to end at some point.

If the Phillies' championship window is truly closed, then instead of lambasting Amaro for his failure to magically sustain it, we should applaud him for doing his best to maximize the team's chances while the window was open.

WAR is not the Answer

2013-01-09T10:50:00.000-05:00

It would be great if we had a universal statistic that took all of the players in baseball and gave us a fair way to compare them.

Arguments about baseball would practically cease. There would be no reason for them, as this one magical statistic would settle everything. It might usher in a new era of understanding that could eventually lead to world peace.

Unfortunately, I don't think such a statistic is possible. But even if it was, WAR is certainly not it.

This is not the stat you are looking for.

A quick primer for the uneducated:

WAR stands for Wins Above Replacement. It is supposed to measure how many wins a given player has contributed to a team compared to a theoretical replacement player. For a more detailed explanation, please check the WAR section on Baseball-Reference.com.

I understand why people want WAR to work, and I will concede that the statistic does have some worth. For instance, it rewards players who are versatile and help their team in many ways, as opposed to statistics like home runs, which only measure one particular skill.

But does it accurately determine a player's value to his team? I don't think so.

Admittedly, most saberfans do not claim that WAR is the ultimate statistic, or that it is the best measure of a player's value. They claim that it should only be used as a "conversation starter."

And yet, it seems like every time a saberfan debates a player's value, WAR is the first thing they point to.

Don't believe me? Check out some of the things that were written during the 2012 AL MVP debate:

WAR backs up Trout's MVP candidacy

Stats Revolution doesn't have enough clout

Mike Trout is your AL MVP

It seems like every saber-minded writer was required to do two things when weighing in on the MVP debate:

Make it clear that WAR is not perfect and they are not basing their judgement solely on it.
Use Trout's WAR value as evidence that he deserved the MVP.

Some of these guys would make great politicians the way they endorse WAR while also refusing to fully commit to it.

On the other hand, I will take a firm stance: I don't like WAR.

I don't like it because I don't like the fundamental concept of a replacement player that the statistic is based on.

I tried to determine just what makes someone a "replacement player." I've searched the web, and I've never been able to find an answer that isn't vague at best. From what I can gather, a replacement player is a borderline major league player who can be easily obtained from the minor leagues.

But should a judgement be made based on a theoretical player? If you're going to try to determine how many "wins" a player is providing over his replacement, then shouldn't you consider the actual player who would replace him?

For example, let's say that the Dodgers have Joe Shortstop playing the shortstop position. (Crazy coincidence, huh?)

Pictured: Joe Shortstop, or as some people call him, "Hanley Ramirez."

Joe puts up solid numbers both offensively and defensively. According to the formula behind WAR, shortstops are more valuable than most of the other positions, because it is typically more difficult to find a good shortstop than a left fielder or first baseman. Since he performs well at an important position, Joe has a high WAR.

Unfortunately, Joe suffers and injury and has to miss a few months of the season. At first glance, it seems like the Dodgers are screwed because based on Joe's WAR, it will be very tough to replace him.

Thankfully for the Dodgers, they have their top prospect Billy Shortstop playing at AAA. The Dodgers call up Billy, and he ends up playing about as well as Joe did.

According to WAR, Joe is more valuable simply because he plays shortstop. But if you're going to reward him based on his position, don't you also have to deduct him some points because he doesn't actually provide much more value than his replacement?

Of course, there's no way to accurately determine just how well a given player's replacement would perform. The best that could be done would be to project the production of all of a team's potential replacements, and make a calculation based on that. But even that would be mostly guesswork, and nearly impossible to measure.

That impossibility is the main reason why WAR doesn't really work as a measure of true value.

As I said, I understand the motivation for coming up with a universal statistic. But in this case, much like Marvin Gaye once said: WAR is not the answer.

The AL MVP Debate: Trout vs. Cabrera

2012-11-15T09:36:00.000-05:00

We are in the midst of baseball's award season in which Major League Baseball recognizes the standout players from the preceding season.

Yesterday, they announced the winners of the Cy Young Award. This criteria for this award used to seem rather simple: Give it to the best pitcher in the league regardless of his team's position in the standings. After all, a pitcher could only affect the games that he himself pitched, so why should he be penalized for poor performance by his teammates?

With the rise of sabermetrics, the situation has become more complicated. A pitcher's win total used to go a long way towards determining the winner, but since the sabermetric devaluation of that statistic, wins have been less influential. For an example, look at recent winners Felix Hernandez in 2010 (13 wins) and Tim Lincecum in 2009. Ten years earlier, they probably don't win due to their relatively low win totals.

If the Cy Young Award has become difficult to decide, then the MVP award has become a complete quagmire.

This award has always given people some difficulty based on its name. There are differing opinions as to what makes a player "valuable." Some believe that the best player is automatically the most valuable and he should receive the award. Others feel like the winner should come from a playoff team, or at the very least, a contender. Because if a player couldn't get his team into contention, just how valuable could he be?

With that kind of inconsistency as the benchmark, it is no wonder that sabermetrics has only muddied the waters of the debate.

The 2012 American League MVP award has become a key battleground in the battle between traditionalists and sabermetrics advocates. The traditionalists favor Tigers third baseman Miguel Cabrera while the saber fans favor Angels outfielder Mike Trout.

Miguel Cabrera is the MVP choice of most traditionalists

Both players are having excellent seasons, and chances are, no matter which one wins the award, nobody is going to look back a few years from now and wonder, "How did that guy win MVP?" But one of them is going to win, and one of the groups is going to claim the decision as a grand victory for their philosophy.

Here's a breakdown of the typical arguments for both camps:

Traditionalist: Cabrera won the Triple Crown! That means he's the MVP.

Sabermetrics: The Triple Crown is an arbitrary grouping of three offensive statistics, two of which are vastly overrated. Trout led the league in WAR which is a much better indication of his value.

Traditionalist: WAR? WAR is just some trendy statistic that even you people can't agree on.

Sabermetrics: Whichever version you use, it's still the best statistic we have for measuring a player's overall value. Shouldn't we look at all facets of a player's game rather than just three offensive categories? Even if you think that Cabrera was the better offensive player, Trout was far superior on defense and on the base paths.

Do Trout's defense and baserunning give him an edge?

Traditionalist: Defense is overrated. And I don't know how you even measure the effect that a player's baserunning has on a game.

Besides, Cabrera's team made the playoffs. Trout's team did not.

Sabermetrics: Yes, but the Angels had a better record! They were just unfortunate to have played in a stronger division. Why are we giving Cabrera credit for things out of his control?

That's the whole basis for using WAR. Eliminate all peripheral factors and judge the player's performance on its own merits.

Traditionalist: Except that's not how baseball works. Baseball is a team game, and a player's value has to take into account how well he helped his team perform. Just look at how well Cabrera performed down the stretch while his team was fighting for a playoff spot. That was an MVP performance. Meanwhile, Trout's numbers slipped a bit in the late going.

Sabermetrics: That is irrelevant. Games in June count just as much as games in September.

Traditionalist: In theory that is true. But the MVP is really just a measure of baseball history. And baseball history goes beyond just statistics. For example, Bobby Thomson hit 32 home runs in 1951, but only one of them is known by just about every baseball fan.

"The Shot Heard Round the World."

Take a home run that is hit in the 9th inning of a 10-2 game in April. Compare that to a home run hit in the 9th inning of a 4-3 game in September. Do you really feel that the same value should be placed on both?

Sabermetrics: Yes, because in the long run, those types of things tend to even out. That's exactly why we need to use WAR. It eliminates personal bias and emotion from the decision.

Trout had the highest WAR. That means he supplied the most value to his team. Hence, he is the MVP.

Traditionalist: If you eliminate emotion from baseball, then you might as well just play the game on a computer. Cabrera won the Triple Crown and led his team to a playoff spot with a strong stretch run. That makes him the MVP.

If someone wants to look at Trout's WAR and decide that he is the hands down MVP, I understand. Personally, (and this should come as no surprise based on the name of this blog) I think that you do need to factor in stretch run performance and even RBIs, since they measure success in a team setting.

Both men are worthy candidates, but I feel that Cabrera deserves the MVP.

ESPN's SweetSpot: Bonds is Right

2012-08-08T21:18:00.001-04:00

In a recent SweetSpot column, David Schoenfield discusses the Hall of Fame candidacy of Barry Bonds. Schoenfield agrees with a statement made by Bonds that he deserves to be a Hall of Famer.

Hall of Famer?

Schoenfield says that if people are holding Bonds' PED use against him, then they should only consider his career up to 1998, and judge him based on that.

Isn't that kind of like saying when evaluating O.J. Simpson's life, we should only consider what he did up until the point when his ex-wife was murdered? Up until that point, he sure seemed like a swell fellow, right?

Even if we ignore his post-1998 career, it may be a bit naive for us to assume that Bonds didn't use PEDs before 1998. Steroids were reportedly prevalent in baseball throughout most of the 1990s, so why should we assume that Bonds only joined the party in 1998?

Schoenfield goes on to demonstrate just how dominant Bonds was prior to 1998. Based on the evidence presented, it is clear that the ten years of Bonds' career between 1988 and 1997 is about as strong as any player has ever had. If we only used that as our criteria, then I think just about everyone would agree that Bonds is indeed Hall-worthy.

Schoenfield should have just ended his argument there. Unfortunately, he follows up by saying that Bonds' alleged cheating should have no impact on whether or not he gets in. He says that people shouldn't play the "moral police" in determining who deserves to be in the Hall of Fame.

Really? Hasn't baseball always done this? Last time I checked, Pete Rose isn't in the Hall of Fame. Should we just ignore the fact that he bet on baseball because he had a good career up to that point?

Apparently, Schoenfield doesn't hold cheating against a player because as he points out, several other Hall of Famers may have cheated in their careers. I guess since everyone cheated, we can't hold it against anyone? Even someone who may have ruined baseball's most cherished records because he cheated?

This is one instance where Schoenfield should have just stuck to the numbers.

In Defense of: RBIs

2012-07-10T13:00:00.000-04:00

If there is one statistic that saber fans hate, it is the RBI. To them, the RBI epitomizes the antiquated methods of baseball analysis that they hold in such disdain.

Any time a writer or announcer touts a player's performance by mentioning his RBI total, you can rest assured that the sabermetric blogosphere will erupt in outrage over the media continuing to spread such ignorance.

The main criticism of RBIs is that they are too dependent on both the situation and the hitter's teammates.

For example, if a player singles with a runner on third base, he will most likely earn an RBI. If he singles with the bases empty, he will not. Since the hitter couldn't control whether or not a runner was on base, why should we give him more credit for the first hit?

Saber fans will tell you that instead of tracking RBIs, we should instead emphasize statistics that are more within a hitter's control such as on-base percentage or slugging percentage. Even better, we can utilize advanced statistics that combine these elements such as wOBA or OPS.

The theory is that a player with a high on-base percentage or slugging percentage will contribute towards the scoring of runs. The problem is, baseball is not played theoretically. The hitter with a high OPS might have contributed to runs being scored, but there is no way of knowing if he actually did.

Consider that actions must be performed in a certain order for a run to score. If a batter walks, and then the next batter hits a triple, a run scores. While if a batter hits a triple, and the next batter walks, a run does not score.

Is it fair to give more credit to the hitter who tripled while a runner was already on base? Given a different situation, the hitter who tripled with the bases empty might have caused a run to score. But baseball doesn't measure "might haves." Either a run scored or it did not.

I liken it to a bakery. There are several important tasks that need to be performed in order to bake a cake: Add the ingerdients, stir the bowl, and put the mix in the oven. While you may have done all of these steps, if they haven't been done in the proper sequence, you're not going to get a cake.

Sure, if you perform the steps enough times, you'll get some cakes. But isn't it also worthwhile to measure how many times a baker actually got a completed cake into the oven?

All that matters is how many cakes were baked

I understand that by favoring individual statistics over RBIs, sabermetrics is attempting to isolate a hitter's performance But is that really the only measure we should take of a hitter?

A hitter doesn't perform in a vacuum. Baseball is a team game, and teammates usually have to work together in order to score runs. Therefore, there is some worth in measuring how well a player is contributing towards the scoring of runs within the context of a lineup.

You can tell me how many theoretical runs a hitter is creating which is very useful. But I think it can also be useful to measure how many actual runs a hitter is generating as well. Which is why the RBI does indeed have value as a statistic.

ESPN's Sweet Spot: Lincecum not unlucky, just pitching poorly

2012-06-01T12:11:00.001-04:00

If I'm going to criticize ESPN.com's SweetSpot blog for their bad articles, I suppose it is only fair to give them praise when it is due.

In this article, David Schoenfield discusses Giants pitcher Tim Lincecum and the struggles he has had this year.

He mentions that normally, analysts might point to Lincecum's high BABIP and say his failures are mostly due to bad luck. But Schoenfield actually takes the time to look a little deeper and see that perhaps there is a reason for Lincecum's poor season beyond just plain luck.

Schoenfield illustrates that Lincecum's control has been much poorer than in seasons past, and as a result, he has been giving hitters better pitches to hit. It stands to reason that if a pitcher gives a hitter better pitches to hit, then they're going to have more success.

Well done, Mr. Schoenfield. It's nice to see you actually look beyond the numbers and put them into a real world context. I wish all sabermetric analysts would do the same.

Defense is Overrated

2012-05-22T21:30:00.000-04:00

One tenet of sabermetrics is that run prevention is as important as run creation. This essentially means that preventing a run from scoring is as useful as creating a run offensively.

In principle, I agree with this. After all, the point of the game is to outscore your opponent, and it doesn't matter if the final score is 1-0 or 15-14. (And yes, I picked two infamous scores from Phillies history)

But when it comes down to it, I feel that a player's contributions towards creating runs are much more valuable than his contributions towards preventing runs.

Why? It's a simple matter of opportunity.

By nature, every spot in the lineup is going to get at least three plate appearances a game. And in most games, each spot in the batting order is going to come to the plate four or five times. Which means that most regular players are going to get four or five opportunities to contribute on offense.

In contrast, there is no certainty as to how many opportunities a player will get on defense. Theoretically, a player could go an entire season without having to make a defensive play.

So if a player is going to have much more of an opportunity to contribute on offense, shouldn't we be more concerned with his offensive performance rather than what he'll do with his potentially limited chances on defense?

If he goes 4-4, this error will be easily forgotten

I'd much rather take the good offensive player who is a little shaky on defense than the defensive whiz who can't hit. I know he's going to get several opportunities to help the team on offense, while his chances to be a detriment on defense will likely be much less frequent.

On the other hand, a good defensive player who can't hit MIGHT make a play that helps save a run on defense, but chances are, he'll do more damage to the team's chances in his four or five times at bat.

Luck or Not, it Still Counts

2012-04-26T10:14:00.000-04:00

According to sabermetrics, sometimes when a player performs unexpectedly well, it is mostly the result of good luck.

Sabermetric analysts will point out that a hitter having an unexpectedly good year may be benefitting from an abnormally high batting average on balls in play (BABIP), or that a pitcher's newfound success is mostly due to a high rate of stranding runners on base.

They'll argue that these values are largely dependent on luck, and are therefore unsustainable. As a result, the player's performance will decline going forward.

I'm not going to argue this. Studies show that on an infinite timeline, these stats are largely going to be near the mean values.

But the important thing to remember is that baseball is not played on an infinite timeline.

Think about a casino. The odds for all of the games are set up so that given a long enough period of time, the player will always lose.

And yet, there are plenty of instances of people winning at casinos. If they had continued to play for long enough, chances are that the odds would catch up to them and they would lose. But over the short term, they came out ahead.

Baseball is much the same way.

Sometimes, a player can get on a "hot" streak that is largely luck dependent. The stats may indicate that his success isn't sustainable and that he's probably going to suffer a drop off in the future. But that doesn't change what happened. All of the hits he got, all of the runs he scored, and all of the wins that the team earned as a result still count.

Therefore, it irks me to hear analysts downplay a player's accomplishments because they were due to luck.

For an example, look at former Phillies pitcher J.A. Happ.

On the surface, Happ had an oustanding year in 2009. He went 12-4 with a 2.93 ERA which was good enough to finish second in the rookie of the year voting for that season.

But apparently, his success was not due to any overwhelming skill he possessed, and it was more a result of good fortune.

Some analysts downplayed his acheivements. ESPN.com's Keith Law summed up Happ's season:

I said he's probably going to win the rookie of the year award, but not that he deserves to. Happ's 2009 season has been respectable, but his sub-3.00 ERA in no way reflects how well he's pitched

Even if his success was based on luck, does that diminish what he accomplished? In the end, does it matter if a pitcher was lucky or good? If he's helping his team win games due to luck, then I'll gladly take luck. If it wasn't for Happ's "luck" in 2009, the Phillies probably don't make it to the World Series.

In 2011, Happ did indeed have the drop off that many predicted. Ironically, peripheral stats showed that in contrast to 2009, he was actually unlucky in 2011. But that drop off can partially be attributed to being traded from the first place Phillies to the last place Astros. The quality of a the defense behind a pitcher will often affect his performance.

But even if 2009 was just a fluky year propelled by luck, it still happened, and we shouldn't discount it. Because luck or not, the end results still count.

ESPN's SweetSpot: Dial it to 11!

2012-04-19T16:48:00.000-04:00

I'm back with another look at a post on ESPN.com's SweetSpot blog and comparing it to the work of an enthusiastic 13 year old.

Christina Kahrl talks about the amazing pitching performance by Cliff Lee in which he threw 10 shutout innings, only for his team to lose the game due to the equally brilliant performance by the opposing starter, Matt Cain.

In her second paragraph, Ms. Kahrl goes a little off the rails:

OK, that’s pretty amazing. But what’s even more amazing? He didn’t even have the highest game score in that ballgame. Matt Cain did, outpointing Lee 86-85 by allowing just three baserunners in his nine shutout innings to Lee’s seven hits and seven K's. Admittedly, Game Score might be sort of sabermetrics’ answer to figure skating-style judging, but to put these nights into perspective, neither game would rate among the top 300 starts by game score from 2000-2012. So, really good, but not as good as Cain’s smackdown of the Pirates on Friday the 13th -- his last time out -- when he had a Game Score of 96. That’s awesome, but that’s Cain in a nutshell. Even when the other guy’s getting the immediate attention, whoever that guy may be, Cain might just be the better pitcher.

Maybe this is my ignorance of some of the newer sabermetric terms, but what the heck is a game score? Is this an actual thing?

Based on this post, I have a feeling that game score isn't going to take off. If your statistic tells you that a 10 inning shutout wasn't one of the best 300 starts in the past three years, then there's a good chance that your statistic sucks.

It also isn't good when you pretty much admit the shakiness of the statistic you just used by comparing it to the criteria used for judging figure skating. Of course, if you pretty much admit your statistic sucks, then maybe you shouldn't use it as the basis for a blog post.

Then again, I guess saying that Cliff Lee's start wasn't THAT good garners much more attention than simply saying Cliff Lee was awesome.

How the 13 year old would have blogged about the game:

Cliff Lee was awesome last night! 10 inning shut out!!! Matt Cain was good too, but Cliff Lee? Awesome!

Sometimes simpler analysis is better. Game score my @$$.

Winner: 13 Year Old

ESPN's SweetSpot Blog vs. An Enthusiastic 13 Year Old with a Calculator.

2012-04-19T12:10:00.000-04:00

When I was 13 years old, my friend and I created a magazine that reviewed the Phillies 1991 season and looked ahead to the 1992 season.

Using the accepted statistics of the day, I tried to give some predictions about how the 1992 season would turn out for both the Phillies and all of baseball.

If I recall correctly, it was some hard hitting stuff.

I am often reminded of this homemade preview magazine when I visit ESPN.com and read their SweetSpot blog.

The blog's goal is presumably to provide daily baseball coverage with a sabermetric slant. It used to be run by Rob Neyer, until he decided that ESPN.com was not big enough to contain his douchebaggery, so he left to head up the baseball division at SB Nation.

Replacing him is a committee of writers headed up by David Schoenfield. Schoenfield seems like a nice enough man. Unlike some of his colleagues - especially his predecessor - he doesn't come off as snarky or condescending.

And while I can appreciate the difficulty in coming up with new content on a regular basis, some of the blog's posts come unfortunately close to the quality that you might have expected from a preview magazine written by a 13 year old.

SweetSpot's writers use a wide variety of statistics. But they seem to be used in such haphazard a fashion, that I'm not entirely convinced that they know why they're using them. It often seems like they just pick whichever statistic will best prove whatever point they are trying to make. If you ever want a good example of confirmation bias, I recommend you take a look at SweetSpot.

And so, from time to time, I'm going to take a look at a post in the SweetSpot blog, and see how it would compare to the work of an enthusiastic 13 year old armed with the internet and a calculator.

Who can provide better baseball analysis? The SweetSpot writers or these guys?

For my first example, I'll look at this recent post in which Schoenfield tries to use the Detroit Tigers to disprove the theory of lineup protection. Or at least that's what I think he's doing. He doesn't exactly make it clear.

The post points out that Miguel Cabrera, the Tigers' perennial MVP candidate, now has another top hitter (Prince Fielder) behind him in the lineup. If lineup protection is real, then Cabrera should be seeing better pitches to hit. As a result, his hitting numbers should be better and his walk rate should be lower.

Except that Cabrera is actually hitting much worse than he did last season, and his walk rate has only decreased by a minimal amount. Which is evidence that lineup protection is indeed a myth.

But then, Schoenfield then goes on to argue in favor of lineup protection. He mentions that Fielder -who does not have an MVP candidate hitting behind him - is walking at a much higher rate than he did last season.

So what was the point of the post? Apparently nothing, since Schoenfield prefaced the post by saying it comes after only ten games, which is a ridiculously short amount of time to draw a conclusion from.

So how does this post compare to the work of an enthusiastic 13 year old?

Most 13 year olds are not known for their patience, so they might make a similarly premature jump to conclusions. On the other hand, if a 13 year old had a point to make, they probably would not immediately contradict themselves like Schoenfield did.

The 13 year old likely would have just stopped once they found some evidence that supported their case and not bothered to share the contradictory information. So while I give Schoenfield some points for thoroughness, it still makes me wonder what the point of the post was.

Since all of the evidence didn't support his theory, I'm guessing the 13 year old might have decided that the post wasn't worth writing at all. Since it's hard for me to argue otherwise, I'm going to have to award this round to the 13 year old.

In Defense of: The Joey Votto Extension

2012-04-05T15:14:00.000-04:00

First baseman Joey Votto recently received an massive contract extension that will pay him $225 million through the 2023 season.

Votto's extension has received considerable criticism from some analysts.

NBC Sports' Matthew Pouliot wrote:

It’s an incredible commitment and a giant risk, given the number of years involved. Votto is one of the game’s best players now, but there’s no telling whether he will be five or eight years down the road...Yet there’s certainly little reason to think he’ll be anything close to a $20 million-$23 million player from age 34 on.

ESPN.com's Keith Law commented:

The Reds already had Votto under contract for 2012 and 2013 at well-below-market salaries, so the extension won't begin in earnest until his age-30 season, by which point Votto will most likely have already peaked, meaning he'll spend virtually the entire extension declining from his peak. Granted, that peak -- about seven wins above replacement a year, per FanGraphs -- is extremely high, meaning Votto likely will still be a valuable player for the next four or five years, but he's also a slow-footed first baseman, one of the worst-aging categories of players. His value likely will drop by half before the extension is halfway through, perhaps sooner given the propensity of position players to miss more time due to injuries in their 30s.

It seems as if the main criticisms of the extension are:

1. They didn't have to offer this deal now since Votto still had two years before becoming a free agent

2. He is unlikely to maintain his current levels of production in the final years of the contract, and will therefore be overpaid.

No matter your opinion of the contracts recently signed by Albert Pujols and Prince Fielder, they did effectively set the market value for power hitting first basemen.

You could argue that since Votto was still under contract for the next two seasons, that he shouldn't have been able to command the same amount of money. On the other hand, a player's contract demands typically increase the closer they get to free agency. If Votto did hit the open market in two years, the Pujols and Fielder deals likely would have been treated as starting points by his agent.

There is another benefit to signing Votto to an early extension. The Reds expect to be contenders for the next couple of seasons. They probably felt that having Votto's impending free agency looming over the club was a distraction that they didn't need. While it worked out well for the Cardinals last year, I'm guessing that given the choice, most teams would prefer to avoid such distractions.

As far as the length of the contract, once again, we have to refer to the Pujols and Fielder deals as guidelines. Teams are willing to give these players long-term deals which means they will pay them large amounts of money for seasons in which they are theoretically going to be in decline.

If the Reds could have signed Votto to a shorter deal, maybe they would have done so. But there is no evidence that leads us to believe that was an option.

The only other choices the Reds had were to either let Votto leave as a free agent or to trade him away before free agency.

While these moves might have relieved the Reds of some salary burden towards the end of the decade, it would have done nothing to improve their chances on the field.

You could point to Votto's expected WAR in the final seasons of the deal, and say that you can find replacements at a much lower price.

But is it really that simple?

It is extremely difficult to let your star players leave, replace them with inexpensive players from the minors and continue to contend. The Tampa Bay Rays are just about the only team who has been able to pull that off, and that is due to having one of the most fertile farm systems in baseball.

If Votto does decline during the latter part of the contract, will his contract be a huge burden on the team's payroll and their ability to contend? Yes. But if they got rid of him and the players they brought in to replace him didn't match his numbers, that might be an even greater burden.

Not only would have the team lost the production that Votto provided, but it would have also been a major blow to the team's fans. It's extremely depressing to be a fan of a team who basically says that they can't afford to keep their top players, and that no matter how good a player is, he's eventually going to leave for a large payroll team.

By ensuring Votto will be with the team for the long haul, it sends an important message to the team and the fan base. They are declaring that they are willing to make the necessary financial commitment to keep one of the franchise's great players.

The Reds have essentially wagered that their star will continue to play well and be worth the money down the line. In my opinion, that's a pretty good bet to make.

Mission Statement

2012-04-05T15:02:00.000-04:00

The title of this blog is a bit misleading. I don't really hate sabermetrics.

I think advanced statistical analysis can be very useful when analyzing baseball, and that it can indeed provide a deeper understanding of the game.

But I think that it may have been taken a little too far.

I am a longtime baseball fan, and I try to absorb as much knowledge and information about baseball as I can. Lately, I have found myself getting a bit frustrated, as more and more, baseball analysis seems too focused on sabermetrics. And by delving too deeply into the numbers, I think that many people have lost sight of the big picture.

I am also annoyed by some members of the saber community. For a group that supposedly seeks a more enlightened approach to baseball analysis, I have found that many saber fans are actually quite closed minded. Many have become so convinced that sabermetrics is the end-all, be-all of baseball analysis that they refuse to consider any alternative.

According to many saber fans, if your case doesn't use the latest and greatest set of statistics, then you don't have a case at all. If you can't back up your point using advanced metrics, then you're going to be regarded as either ignorant or stupid.

"You're using RBIs to measure a player's value? How foolish! Everyone knows that OPS is a much more accurate barometer of a player's worth."

Go ahead and try to claim that despite a lesser WAR value, one player is superior than another. Many saber fans will act like you just declared the world to be flat.

I've found that some of the worst offenders are the mainstream analysts who should be doing their best to help bring saber awareness to the masses. ESPN.com's Keith Law and SB Nation's Rob Neyer have done the saber community no favors with their snarky, condescending writing.

I don't want this blog to resort to the standard anti-saber "nerds are ruining baseball!" commentary. Instead, here are the main points I would like to get across:

Being able to look up statistics doesn't make you a baseball expert. I feel like too many people have decided that they are now an authority on baseball just because they have access to advanced statistics.

Scouts, managers, and sportswriters who have followed, or been a part of the game of baseball for decades just might have some knowledge about the game that might go beyond looking at statistics.

And finally, while I feel that the numbers can go a long way towards explaining baseball, I also feel that they don't tell the whole story.

Baseball isn't just about which player has the best numbers. It's also about the big moments. It's about Chris Carpenter outdueling Roy Halladay. It's about Bobby Thompson, Joe Carter, David Freese, and many others hitting home runs that will forever be ingrained in baseball history.

Moments like that can't be captured purely by statistics.

I just hope that everyone reading this keeps an open mind. If you're willing to look at things from a different angle, you might realize that sabermetrics aren't necessarily the absolute truth that some people have made them out to be.