Brain and Behavior

Opportunity Costs And Why Fireworks Complaints Are Up This Year

sb admin — Tue, 30 Jun 2020 16:17:46 +0000

2012 train derailment, first responders and "indefensible actions"

48% of respondents reported spending >12 hours at the site, and only 22% reported using respiratory protection during their response activities
26% reported experiencing headaches, 26% reported experiencing upper respiratory symptoms, and 22% reported experiencing lower respiratory symptoms

Among the 72 respondents who reported they did not wear respiratory protection on initial arrival at the scene:

49% said they didn't' think it was required for their work
24% said none was available
17% said they were not advised to wear respiratory protection
17% said they did not think they needed it

"It is imperative that every step is taken to protect and train emergency responders. When the exposure levels are unknown, the leadership onsite should proceed to instruct emergency responders to protect themselves as if the level is above established occupational exposure limits until it is proven otherwise.”

In the Paulsboro incident, that didn’t happen. The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation describes the troubling nature of the emergency response. For example:

There was confusion about the contents of some of the railcars. About 25 minutes after the derailment, the fire chief radioed: “We are getting some information that a couple of these tanks have bad stuff, we just can’t get the placards.”

The trainmaster reviewed the shipping manifest [a.k.a., train consist] with the deputy fire chief, but then the trainmaster departed with the document. It was the only available copy. “The trainmaster retained possession of the consist for almost 3.5 hours, leaving emergency responders with no means of referencing the document for response planning."

“The incident commander and other first responders remained within about 50 yards of an active vinyl chloride release. ...About 6 hours into the incident, the fire chief had yet to relocate the ICP [incident command post] to a safe location and failed to establish PPE requirements for the accident scene.”

NTS Board Member Robert Sumwalt noted:

"This new location was only about 1/4 mile from the ruptured tank car—a distance that still posed unacceptable risk because the responders were not wearing protective clothing and equipment.”

“How can volunteer firefighters obtain the training they need to do their jobs adequately without being required to have so much training that people who have full-time jobs will choose not to be a volunteer firefighter because the training requirements are more than they can reasonably handle?”

There was harsh criticism directed at individuals in charge of the emergency response. NTS Board Member Sumwalt said:

“…when disasters occur, the very men and women putting their lives on the line as first responders count on prudent, informed decision-making by their incident commanders. While the decision to not evacuate nearby Paulsboro residents can be somewhat explained by logistical concerns and uncertainty, what is indefensible are the decisions, actions, and inactions that placed first responders directly in harm’s way.”

cmonforton Fri, 01/09/2015 - 11:44

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'Virtual' Communication During Social Distancing: How We Change When We Know We're Being Seen

sb admin — Mon, 30 Mar 2020 21:25:13 +0000

2012 train derailment, first responders and "indefensible actions"

48% of respondents reported spending >12 hours at the site, and only 22% reported using respiratory protection during their response activities
26% reported experiencing headaches, 26% reported experiencing upper respiratory symptoms, and 22% reported experiencing lower respiratory symptoms

Among the 72 respondents who reported they did not wear respiratory protection on initial arrival at the scene:

49% said they didn't' think it was required for their work
24% said none was available
17% said they were not advised to wear respiratory protection
17% said they did not think they needed it

"It is imperative that every step is taken to protect and train emergency responders. When the exposure levels are unknown, the leadership onsite should proceed to instruct emergency responders to protect themselves as if the level is above established occupational exposure limits until it is proven otherwise.”

In the Paulsboro incident, that didn’t happen. The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation describes the troubling nature of the emergency response. For example:

There was confusion about the contents of some of the railcars. About 25 minutes after the derailment, the fire chief radioed: “We are getting some information that a couple of these tanks have bad stuff, we just can’t get the placards.”

The trainmaster reviewed the shipping manifest [a.k.a., train consist] with the deputy fire chief, but then the trainmaster departed with the document. It was the only available copy. “The trainmaster retained possession of the consist for almost 3.5 hours, leaving emergency responders with no means of referencing the document for response planning."

“The incident commander and other first responders remained within about 50 yards of an active vinyl chloride release. ...About 6 hours into the incident, the fire chief had yet to relocate the ICP [incident command post] to a safe location and failed to establish PPE requirements for the accident scene.”

NTS Board Member Robert Sumwalt noted:

"This new location was only about 1/4 mile from the ruptured tank car—a distance that still posed unacceptable risk because the responders were not wearing protective clothing and equipment.”

“How can volunteer firefighters obtain the training they need to do their jobs adequately without being required to have so much training that people who have full-time jobs will choose not to be a volunteer firefighter because the training requirements are more than they can reasonably handle?”

There was harsh criticism directed at individuals in charge of the emergency response. NTS Board Member Sumwalt said:

“…when disasters occur, the very men and women putting their lives on the line as first responders count on prudent, informed decision-making by their incident commanders. While the decision to not evacuate nearby Paulsboro residents can be somewhat explained by logistical concerns and uncertainty, what is indefensible are the decisions, actions, and inactions that placed first responders directly in harm’s way.”

cmonforton Fri, 01/09/2015 - 11:44

Tags

FHR4: Age-Related Macular Degeneration Breakthrough

sb admin — Fri, 07 Feb 2020 16:52:20 +0000

2012 train derailment, first responders and "indefensible actions"

48% of respondents reported spending >12 hours at the site, and only 22% reported using respiratory protection during their response activities
26% reported experiencing headaches, 26% reported experiencing upper respiratory symptoms, and 22% reported experiencing lower respiratory symptoms

Among the 72 respondents who reported they did not wear respiratory protection on initial arrival at the scene:

49% said they didn't' think it was required for their work
24% said none was available
17% said they were not advised to wear respiratory protection
17% said they did not think they needed it

"It is imperative that every step is taken to protect and train emergency responders. When the exposure levels are unknown, the leadership onsite should proceed to instruct emergency responders to protect themselves as if the level is above established occupational exposure limits until it is proven otherwise.”

In the Paulsboro incident, that didn’t happen. The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation describes the troubling nature of the emergency response. For example:

There was confusion about the contents of some of the railcars. About 25 minutes after the derailment, the fire chief radioed: “We are getting some information that a couple of these tanks have bad stuff, we just can’t get the placards.”

The trainmaster reviewed the shipping manifest [a.k.a., train consist] with the deputy fire chief, but then the trainmaster departed with the document. It was the only available copy. “The trainmaster retained possession of the consist for almost 3.5 hours, leaving emergency responders with no means of referencing the document for response planning."

“The incident commander and other first responders remained within about 50 yards of an active vinyl chloride release. ...About 6 hours into the incident, the fire chief had yet to relocate the ICP [incident command post] to a safe location and failed to establish PPE requirements for the accident scene.”

NTS Board Member Robert Sumwalt noted:

"This new location was only about 1/4 mile from the ruptured tank car—a distance that still posed unacceptable risk because the responders were not wearing protective clothing and equipment.”

“How can volunteer firefighters obtain the training they need to do their jobs adequately without being required to have so much training that people who have full-time jobs will choose not to be a volunteer firefighter because the training requirements are more than they can reasonably handle?”

There was harsh criticism directed at individuals in charge of the emergency response. NTS Board Member Sumwalt said:

“…when disasters occur, the very men and women putting their lives on the line as first responders count on prudent, informed decision-making by their incident commanders. While the decision to not evacuate nearby Paulsboro residents can be somewhat explained by logistical concerns and uncertainty, what is indefensible are the decisions, actions, and inactions that placed first responders directly in harm’s way.”

cmonforton Fri, 01/09/2015 - 11:44

Tags

Eppendorf & Science Prize for Neurobiology Entries Accepted Until June 15, 2019

hank_campbell — Wed, 03 Apr 2019 14:38:26 +0000

2012 train derailment, first responders and "indefensible actions"

48% of respondents reported spending >12 hours at the site, and only 22% reported using respiratory protection during their response activities
26% reported experiencing headaches, 26% reported experiencing upper respiratory symptoms, and 22% reported experiencing lower respiratory symptoms

Among the 72 respondents who reported they did not wear respiratory protection on initial arrival at the scene:

49% said they didn't' think it was required for their work
24% said none was available
17% said they were not advised to wear respiratory protection
17% said they did not think they needed it

"It is imperative that every step is taken to protect and train emergency responders. When the exposure levels are unknown, the leadership onsite should proceed to instruct emergency responders to protect themselves as if the level is above established occupational exposure limits until it is proven otherwise.”

In the Paulsboro incident, that didn’t happen. The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation describes the troubling nature of the emergency response. For example:

There was confusion about the contents of some of the railcars. About 25 minutes after the derailment, the fire chief radioed: “We are getting some information that a couple of these tanks have bad stuff, we just can’t get the placards.”

The trainmaster reviewed the shipping manifest [a.k.a., train consist] with the deputy fire chief, but then the trainmaster departed with the document. It was the only available copy. “The trainmaster retained possession of the consist for almost 3.5 hours, leaving emergency responders with no means of referencing the document for response planning."

“The incident commander and other first responders remained within about 50 yards of an active vinyl chloride release. ...About 6 hours into the incident, the fire chief had yet to relocate the ICP [incident command post] to a safe location and failed to establish PPE requirements for the accident scene.”

NTS Board Member Robert Sumwalt noted:

"This new location was only about 1/4 mile from the ruptured tank car—a distance that still posed unacceptable risk because the responders were not wearing protective clothing and equipment.”

“How can volunteer firefighters obtain the training they need to do their jobs adequately without being required to have so much training that people who have full-time jobs will choose not to be a volunteer firefighter because the training requirements are more than they can reasonably handle?”

There was harsh criticism directed at individuals in charge of the emergency response. NTS Board Member Sumwalt said:

“…when disasters occur, the very men and women putting their lives on the line as first responders count on prudent, informed decision-making by their incident commanders. While the decision to not evacuate nearby Paulsboro residents can be somewhat explained by logistical concerns and uncertainty, what is indefensible are the decisions, actions, and inactions that placed first responders directly in harm’s way.”

cmonforton Fri, 01/09/2015 - 11:44

Tags

For Both Liberals And Conservatives, Beliefs Distort Ability To Reason

sb admin — Fri, 15 Mar 2019 13:09:20 +0000

2012 train derailment, first responders and "indefensible actions"

48% of respondents reported spending >12 hours at the site, and only 22% reported using respiratory protection during their response activities
26% reported experiencing headaches, 26% reported experiencing upper respiratory symptoms, and 22% reported experiencing lower respiratory symptoms

Among the 72 respondents who reported they did not wear respiratory protection on initial arrival at the scene:

49% said they didn't' think it was required for their work
24% said none was available
17% said they were not advised to wear respiratory protection
17% said they did not think they needed it

"It is imperative that every step is taken to protect and train emergency responders. When the exposure levels are unknown, the leadership onsite should proceed to instruct emergency responders to protect themselves as if the level is above established occupational exposure limits until it is proven otherwise.”

In the Paulsboro incident, that didn’t happen. The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation describes the troubling nature of the emergency response. For example:

There was confusion about the contents of some of the railcars. About 25 minutes after the derailment, the fire chief radioed: “We are getting some information that a couple of these tanks have bad stuff, we just can’t get the placards.”

The trainmaster reviewed the shipping manifest [a.k.a., train consist] with the deputy fire chief, but then the trainmaster departed with the document. It was the only available copy. “The trainmaster retained possession of the consist for almost 3.5 hours, leaving emergency responders with no means of referencing the document for response planning."

“The incident commander and other first responders remained within about 50 yards of an active vinyl chloride release. ...About 6 hours into the incident, the fire chief had yet to relocate the ICP [incident command post] to a safe location and failed to establish PPE requirements for the accident scene.”

NTS Board Member Robert Sumwalt noted:

"This new location was only about 1/4 mile from the ruptured tank car—a distance that still posed unacceptable risk because the responders were not wearing protective clothing and equipment.”

“How can volunteer firefighters obtain the training they need to do their jobs adequately without being required to have so much training that people who have full-time jobs will choose not to be a volunteer firefighter because the training requirements are more than they can reasonably handle?”

There was harsh criticism directed at individuals in charge of the emergency response. NTS Board Member Sumwalt said:

“…when disasters occur, the very men and women putting their lives on the line as first responders count on prudent, informed decision-making by their incident commanders. While the decision to not evacuate nearby Paulsboro residents can be somewhat explained by logistical concerns and uncertainty, what is indefensible are the decisions, actions, and inactions that placed first responders directly in harm’s way.”

cmonforton Fri, 01/09/2015 - 11:44

Tags

#5: Competition horses calmed by lavender

dr. dolittle — Tue, 17 Oct 2017 10:26:39 +0000

2012 train derailment, first responders and "indefensible actions"

48% of respondents reported spending >12 hours at the site, and only 22% reported using respiratory protection during their response activities
26% reported experiencing headaches, 26% reported experiencing upper respiratory symptoms, and 22% reported experiencing lower respiratory symptoms

Among the 72 respondents who reported they did not wear respiratory protection on initial arrival at the scene:

49% said they didn't' think it was required for their work
24% said none was available
17% said they were not advised to wear respiratory protection
17% said they did not think they needed it

"It is imperative that every step is taken to protect and train emergency responders. When the exposure levels are unknown, the leadership onsite should proceed to instruct emergency responders to protect themselves as if the level is above established occupational exposure limits until it is proven otherwise.”

In the Paulsboro incident, that didn’t happen. The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation describes the troubling nature of the emergency response. For example:

There was confusion about the contents of some of the railcars. About 25 minutes after the derailment, the fire chief radioed: “We are getting some information that a couple of these tanks have bad stuff, we just can’t get the placards.”

The trainmaster reviewed the shipping manifest [a.k.a., train consist] with the deputy fire chief, but then the trainmaster departed with the document. It was the only available copy. “The trainmaster retained possession of the consist for almost 3.5 hours, leaving emergency responders with no means of referencing the document for response planning."

“The incident commander and other first responders remained within about 50 yards of an active vinyl chloride release. ...About 6 hours into the incident, the fire chief had yet to relocate the ICP [incident command post] to a safe location and failed to establish PPE requirements for the accident scene.”

NTS Board Member Robert Sumwalt noted:

"This new location was only about 1/4 mile from the ruptured tank car—a distance that still posed unacceptable risk because the responders were not wearing protective clothing and equipment.”

“How can volunteer firefighters obtain the training they need to do their jobs adequately without being required to have so much training that people who have full-time jobs will choose not to be a volunteer firefighter because the training requirements are more than they can reasonably handle?”

There was harsh criticism directed at individuals in charge of the emergency response. NTS Board Member Sumwalt said:

“…when disasters occur, the very men and women putting their lives on the line as first responders count on prudent, informed decision-making by their incident commanders. While the decision to not evacuate nearby Paulsboro residents can be somewhat explained by logistical concerns and uncertainty, what is indefensible are the decisions, actions, and inactions that placed first responders directly in harm’s way.”

cmonforton Fri, 01/09/2015 - 11:44

Tags

Cheap Science Books

gregladen — Wed, 04 Oct 2017 12:02:43 +0000

2012 train derailment, first responders and "indefensible actions"

48% of respondents reported spending >12 hours at the site, and only 22% reported using respiratory protection during their response activities
26% reported experiencing headaches, 26% reported experiencing upper respiratory symptoms, and 22% reported experiencing lower respiratory symptoms

Among the 72 respondents who reported they did not wear respiratory protection on initial arrival at the scene:

49% said they didn't' think it was required for their work
24% said none was available
17% said they were not advised to wear respiratory protection
17% said they did not think they needed it

"It is imperative that every step is taken to protect and train emergency responders. When the exposure levels are unknown, the leadership onsite should proceed to instruct emergency responders to protect themselves as if the level is above established occupational exposure limits until it is proven otherwise.”

In the Paulsboro incident, that didn’t happen. The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation describes the troubling nature of the emergency response. For example:

There was confusion about the contents of some of the railcars. About 25 minutes after the derailment, the fire chief radioed: “We are getting some information that a couple of these tanks have bad stuff, we just can’t get the placards.”

The trainmaster reviewed the shipping manifest [a.k.a., train consist] with the deputy fire chief, but then the trainmaster departed with the document. It was the only available copy. “The trainmaster retained possession of the consist for almost 3.5 hours, leaving emergency responders with no means of referencing the document for response planning."

“The incident commander and other first responders remained within about 50 yards of an active vinyl chloride release. ...About 6 hours into the incident, the fire chief had yet to relocate the ICP [incident command post] to a safe location and failed to establish PPE requirements for the accident scene.”

NTS Board Member Robert Sumwalt noted:

"This new location was only about 1/4 mile from the ruptured tank car—a distance that still posed unacceptable risk because the responders were not wearing protective clothing and equipment.”

“How can volunteer firefighters obtain the training they need to do their jobs adequately without being required to have so much training that people who have full-time jobs will choose not to be a volunteer firefighter because the training requirements are more than they can reasonably handle?”

There was harsh criticism directed at individuals in charge of the emergency response. NTS Board Member Sumwalt said:

“…when disasters occur, the very men and women putting their lives on the line as first responders count on prudent, informed decision-making by their incident commanders. While the decision to not evacuate nearby Paulsboro residents can be somewhat explained by logistical concerns and uncertainty, what is indefensible are the decisions, actions, and inactions that placed first responders directly in harm’s way.”

cmonforton Fri, 01/09/2015 - 11:44

Tags

Pigeons outperform humans when it comes to multitasking

dr. dolittle — Thu, 28 Sep 2017 22:51:54 +0000

2012 train derailment, first responders and "indefensible actions"

48% of respondents reported spending >12 hours at the site, and only 22% reported using respiratory protection during their response activities
26% reported experiencing headaches, 26% reported experiencing upper respiratory symptoms, and 22% reported experiencing lower respiratory symptoms

Among the 72 respondents who reported they did not wear respiratory protection on initial arrival at the scene:

49% said they didn't' think it was required for their work
24% said none was available
17% said they were not advised to wear respiratory protection
17% said they did not think they needed it

"It is imperative that every step is taken to protect and train emergency responders. When the exposure levels are unknown, the leadership onsite should proceed to instruct emergency responders to protect themselves as if the level is above established occupational exposure limits until it is proven otherwise.”

In the Paulsboro incident, that didn’t happen. The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation describes the troubling nature of the emergency response. For example:

There was confusion about the contents of some of the railcars. About 25 minutes after the derailment, the fire chief radioed: “We are getting some information that a couple of these tanks have bad stuff, we just can’t get the placards.”

The trainmaster reviewed the shipping manifest [a.k.a., train consist] with the deputy fire chief, but then the trainmaster departed with the document. It was the only available copy. “The trainmaster retained possession of the consist for almost 3.5 hours, leaving emergency responders with no means of referencing the document for response planning."

“The incident commander and other first responders remained within about 50 yards of an active vinyl chloride release. ...About 6 hours into the incident, the fire chief had yet to relocate the ICP [incident command post] to a safe location and failed to establish PPE requirements for the accident scene.”

NTS Board Member Robert Sumwalt noted:

"This new location was only about 1/4 mile from the ruptured tank car—a distance that still posed unacceptable risk because the responders were not wearing protective clothing and equipment.”

“How can volunteer firefighters obtain the training they need to do their jobs adequately without being required to have so much training that people who have full-time jobs will choose not to be a volunteer firefighter because the training requirements are more than they can reasonably handle?”

There was harsh criticism directed at individuals in charge of the emergency response. NTS Board Member Sumwalt said:

“…when disasters occur, the very men and women putting their lives on the line as first responders count on prudent, informed decision-making by their incident commanders. While the decision to not evacuate nearby Paulsboro residents can be somewhat explained by logistical concerns and uncertainty, what is indefensible are the decisions, actions, and inactions that placed first responders directly in harm’s way.”

cmonforton Fri, 01/09/2015 - 11:44

Tags

Torturing more mice in the name of antivaccine pseudoscience: PubPeer versus antivaxers

oracknows — Wed, 27 Sep 2017 05:00:40 +0000

2012 train derailment, first responders and "indefensible actions"

48% of respondents reported spending >12 hours at the site, and only 22% reported using respiratory protection during their response activities
26% reported experiencing headaches, 26% reported experiencing upper respiratory symptoms, and 22% reported experiencing lower respiratory symptoms

Among the 72 respondents who reported they did not wear respiratory protection on initial arrival at the scene:

49% said they didn't' think it was required for their work
24% said none was available
17% said they were not advised to wear respiratory protection
17% said they did not think they needed it

"It is imperative that every step is taken to protect and train emergency responders. When the exposure levels are unknown, the leadership onsite should proceed to instruct emergency responders to protect themselves as if the level is above established occupational exposure limits until it is proven otherwise.”

In the Paulsboro incident, that didn’t happen. The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation describes the troubling nature of the emergency response. For example:

There was confusion about the contents of some of the railcars. About 25 minutes after the derailment, the fire chief radioed: “We are getting some information that a couple of these tanks have bad stuff, we just can’t get the placards.”

The trainmaster reviewed the shipping manifest [a.k.a., train consist] with the deputy fire chief, but then the trainmaster departed with the document. It was the only available copy. “The trainmaster retained possession of the consist for almost 3.5 hours, leaving emergency responders with no means of referencing the document for response planning."

“The incident commander and other first responders remained within about 50 yards of an active vinyl chloride release. ...About 6 hours into the incident, the fire chief had yet to relocate the ICP [incident command post] to a safe location and failed to establish PPE requirements for the accident scene.”

NTS Board Member Robert Sumwalt noted:

"This new location was only about 1/4 mile from the ruptured tank car—a distance that still posed unacceptable risk because the responders were not wearing protective clothing and equipment.”

“How can volunteer firefighters obtain the training they need to do their jobs adequately without being required to have so much training that people who have full-time jobs will choose not to be a volunteer firefighter because the training requirements are more than they can reasonably handle?”

There was harsh criticism directed at individuals in charge of the emergency response. NTS Board Member Sumwalt said:

“…when disasters occur, the very men and women putting their lives on the line as first responders count on prudent, informed decision-making by their incident commanders. While the decision to not evacuate nearby Paulsboro residents can be somewhat explained by logistical concerns and uncertainty, what is indefensible are the decisions, actions, and inactions that placed first responders directly in harm’s way.”

cmonforton Fri, 01/09/2015 - 11:44

Tags