Scribbles of a Lunatic Mind

CIR vs. PAL [504 SCRA 90]

2012-02-26T22:25:00.001-08:00

Facts: A franchise is a legislative grant to operate a public utility. In the present case, P.D. 1590 granted PAL an option to pay the lower of two alternatives: (a) “the basic corporate income tax based on PAL’s annual net taxable income computed in accordance with the provisions of the NIRC” or (b) “a franchise tax of 2% of gross revenues.” Availment of either of these two alternatives shall exempt the airline from the payment of “all other taxes” including the 20 percent final withholding tax on bank deposits. On Nov. 5, 1997, PAL’s AVP-Revenue filed with the CIR a written request for refund in the amount of P2M, which represents the total amount of 20% final withholding tax withheld from the respondent by various withholding agent banks. CTA ruled PAL was not entitled to refund. The CA held that PAL was bound to pay only either (A) or (B); that Sec. 13 of PD 1590 exempts respondent form paying all other taxes, duties, royalties and other feeds of any kind. Having chosen to pay its corporate income tax liability, respondent should now be exempt from paying all other taxes including the final withholding tax.

Issue: Whether the CA erred on a question of law ruling that the “in lieu of all other taxes” provisions in Sec. 13 of PD No. 1590 applies even if there were in fact no taxes paid under any of subsections (A) and (B) of the said decree.

Held: Note that the tax liability of PAL under the option it chose (Item ‘a’ of Sec. 13 of PD 1590) is to be “computed in accordance with the provisions of the NIRC”. “Taxable income” means the pertinent items of gross income specified in the Tax Code, less the deductions and/or personal and additional exemptions, if any, authorized for these types of income. Under Sec. 32 of the Tax Code, gross income means income derived from whatever source, including compensation for services; the conduct of trade or business or the exercise of a profession; dealings in property; interests; rents; royalties; dividends; annuities; prizes and winnings; pensions; and a partner’s distributive share in the net income of a general professional partnership. Sec. 34 enumerates the allowable deductions; Sec. 35, personal and additional exemptions.

The definition of gross income is broad enough to include all passive incomes subject to specific rates or final taxes. However, since these passive incomes are already subject to different rates and taxed finally at source, they are no longer included in the computation of gross income, which determines taxable income.

Thus, PAL’s franchise exempts it from paying any tax other than the option it chooses: either the “basic corporate income tax” or the 2% gross revenue tax.

CIR vs CA and YMCA, [298 SCRA 83]

2012-02-26T22:23:00.001-08:00

Facts: The main question in this case is: “is the income derived from rentals of real property owned by Young Men’s Christian Association of the Philippines (YMCA) – established as “a welfare, educational and charitable non-profit corporation” – subject to income tax under the NIRC and the Constitution? In 1980, YMCA earned an income of P676,829 from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators and P44k form parking fees.

Issue: Is the rental income of the YMCA taxable?

Held: Yes. The exemption claimed by the YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of the last paragraph of then Sec. 27 of the NIRC; court is duty-bound to abide strictly by its literal meaning and to refrain from resorting to any convoluted attempt at construction. The said provision mandates that the income of exempt organizations (such as YMCA) from any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to the tax imposed by the same Code. Private respondent is exempt from the payment of property tax, but nit income tax on rentals from its property.

CIR vs. GCL Retirement Plan

2012-02-26T22:20:00.001-08:00

Facts: GCL is an employees' trust maintained by the employer, GCL Inc., to provide retirement, pension, disability and death benefits to its employees. As such, it was exempt from income tax.

GCL made investments and earned interest income from which was withheld the fifteen per centum (15%) final withholding tax.

GCL filed with CIR a claim for refund for the amounts withheld. GCL disagreed with the collection of the 15% final withholding tax from the interest income as it is an entity fully exempt from income tax.

The refund requested having been denied, GCL elevated the matter to the CTA, which ruled in favor of GCL, holding that employees' trusts are exempt from the 15% final withholding tax on interest income and ordering a refund of the tax withheld. CA upheld the CTA Decision.

CIR seeks a reversal of the decision.

Issue: Whether or not GCL is exempt from the final withholding tax on interest income

Held: YES.

Employees' trusts or benefit plans normally provide economic assistance to employees upon the occurrence of certain contingencies, particularly, old age retirement, death, sickness, or disability. It provides security against certain hazards to which members of the Plan may be exposed. It is an independent and additional source of protection for the working group. What is more, it is established for their exclusive benefit and for no other purpose.

The tax advantage was conceived in order to encourage the formation and establishment of such private plans for the benefit of laborers and employees outside of the Social Security Act.

It is evident that tax-exemption is likewise to be enjoyed by the income of the pension trust. Otherwise, taxation of those earnings would result in a diminution accumulated income and reduce whatever the trust beneficiaries would receive out of the trust fund. This would run afoul of the very intendment of the law.

There can be no denying either that the final withholding tax is collected from income in respect of which employees' trusts are declared exempt. The application of the withholdings system to interest on bank deposits or yield from deposit substitutes is essentially to maximize and expedite the collection of income taxes by requiring its payment at the source. If an employees' trust like the GCL enjoys a tax-exempt status from income, we see no logic in withholding a certain percentage of that income which it is not supposed to pay in the first place.

Helvering vs. Clifford

2012-02-26T22:18:00.002-08:00

Facts: In 1934, Respondent declared himself trustee of certain securities which he owned. All net income from the trust was to be held for the "exclusive benefit" of respondent's wife. The trust was for a term of five years, except that it would terminate earlier on the death of either respondent or his wife. On termination of the trust the entire corpus was to go to respondent, while all "accrued or undistributed net income" and "any proceeds from the investment of such net income" was to be treated as property owned absolutely by the wife. During the continuance of the trust, respondent was to pay over to his wife the whole or such part of the net income as he, in his "absolute discretion," might determine.

Respondent paid a federal gift tax on this transfer. In the same year, all income from the trust was distributed to the wife, who included it in her individual return for that year. The Commissioner, however, determined a deficiency in respondent's return for that year on the theory that income from the trust was taxable to him. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained that redetermination. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. We granted certiorari because of the importance to the revenue of the use of such short-term trusts in the reduction of surtaxes.

Issue: Whether or not the grantor, after the trust has been established, may still be treated, as the owner of the corpus

Held: YES. We cannot conclude as a matter of law that respondent ceased to be the owner of the corpus after the trust was created. Rather, the short duration of the trust, the fact that the wife was the beneficiary, and the retention of control over the corpus by respondent all lead irresistibly to the conclusion that respondent continued to be the owner.

So far as his dominion and control were concerned, it seems clear that the trust did not effect any substantial change. In substance, his control over the corpus was in all essential respects the same after the trust was created as before. The wide powers which he retained included, for all practical purposes, most of the control which he as an individual would have.

We have, at best, a temporary reallocation of income within an intimate family group. Since the income remains in the family, and since the husband retains control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance that the trust will not effect any substantial change in his economic position. It is hard to imagine that respondent felt himself the poorer after this trust had been executed, or, if he did, that it had any rational foundation in fact. For, as a result of the terms of the trust and the intimacy of the familial relationship, respondent retained the substance of full enjoyment of all the rights which previously he had in the property.

Thus where, as in this case, the benefits directly or indirectly retained blend so imperceptibly with the normal concepts of full ownership, it is correct to say that the husband was the owner of the corpus. To hold otherwise would be to treat the wife as a complete stranger, to let mere formalism obscure the normal consequences of family solidarity, and to force concepts of ownership to be fashioned out of legal niceties which may have little or no significance in such household arrangements.

IMPORTANT:

1. A husband who declared himself trustee of certain securities for the term of five years, to pay to his wife the income accruing during that period, but retained in himself the right to accumulate income, and, with insignificant exceptions, the complete control over the principal fund -- its conversion, investment, reinvestment, etc. -- and the reversion of the Corpus at the end of the term, may properly be found by the federal taxing authorities to be owner of the fund, notwithstanding the trust, and taxable on the trust income as part of his personal income.

2. Whether the creator of a trust may still be treated as the owner of the corpus is not determined by technicalities of the law of trusts and conveyances, but must depend on analysis of the terms of the trust and on all the circumstances attendant on its creation and operation.

Where the grantor is the trustee, and the beneficiaries are members of his family group, special scrutiny is necessary, lest what is in reality but one economic unit be increased to two or more.

CIR vs. British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC)

2012-02-26T22:16:00.003-08:00

Facts: British Overseas Airways Corp (BOAC) is a 100% British Government-owned corporation engaged in international airline business and is a member of the Interline Air Transport Association, and thus, it operates air transportation services and sells transportation tickets over the routes of the other airline members.

From 1959 to 1972, BOAC had no landing rights for traffic purposes in the Philippines and thus, did not carry passengers and/or cargo to or from the Philippines but maintained a general sales agent in the Philippines - Warner Barnes & Co. Ltd. and later, Qantas Airways - which was responsible for selling BOAC tickets covering passengers and cargoes. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed deficiency income taxes against BOAC.

Issue: Whether the revenue derived by BOAC from ticket sales in the Philippines, constitute income of BOAC from Philippine sources, and accordingly taxable.

Held: The source of an income is the property, activity, or service that produced the income. For the source of income to be considered as coming from the Philippines, it is sufficient that the income is derived from activity within the Philippines. Herein, the sale of tickets in the Philippines is the activity that produced the income. The tickets exchanged hands here and payment for fares were also made here in the Philippine currency.

The situs of the source of payments is the Philippines. The flow of wealth proceeded from, and occurred within Philippine territory, enjoying the protection accorded by the Philippine government. In consideration of such protection, the flow of wealth should share the burden of supporting the government. PD 68, in relation to PD 1355, ensures that international airlines are taxed on their income from Philippine sources. The 2 1/2% tax on gross billings is an income tax. If it had been intended as an excise tax or percentage tax, it would have been placed under Title V of the Tax Code covering taxes on business.

Sugbanon Rural Bank Inc., vs. Laguesma [2000]

2012-02-26T22:06:00.001-08:00

Facts: Private respondent SRBI-APSOTEU (Union) is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with TUCP. DOLE Regional Office granted a Certificate of Registration, and thereafter the union filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory employees of petitioner SRBI. Med-Arbiter set the pre-election conference. SRBI, however filed a motion to dismiss based on 2 grounds:

(1) Members of APSOTEU-TUCP were managerial or confidential employees thus disqualified from forming or joining unions (attached job descriptions)

(2) ALU-TUCP was representing the union, thus there was a violation of the principle of separation of unions

Med-Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the certification election. DOLE also dismissed the subsequent appeal of SRBI, ruling that APSOTEU-TUCP was a legitimate labor organization and it had the legal right to represent its members for collective bargaining purposes.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or highly-placed confidential employees hence prohibited by law from joining labor organizations

(2) Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification election upon filing of a petition for certification election, despite the petitioner’s appeal pending before the DOLE Secretary

Held:

(1) No. Art.212(m) of the Labor Code defines managerial employees as “one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.” Petitioner argues that responsibilities of employees involved constitute the very core of the banking business, then cited cases (Tabacalera, Panday) where credit and collection supervisors were deemed as managerial employees.

In this case, however, petitioners failed to show that the employees in question (cashiers, accountants, acting chief of loans department) were vested with powers to “recommend the hiring and firing of his subordinates.” At best they only had recommendatory functions subject to review by the bank’s management.

Neither were the respondents confidential employees (requisites: 1. assist and act in confidential capacity, 2. Persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies). The two criteria are cumulative. Article 245 does not directly prohibit confidential employees but applies under the doctrine of necessary implication (because they become aware of management policies relating to labor relations).

(2) YES. Article 242 (b) LC provides that one of the rights of a legitimate labor organization is the right to be certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Article 257 states that certification election shall be automatically conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon filing of petition of legitimate labor organization.

Petitioner argues that giving due course to the certification election would violate the separation of unions doctrine (alleges that union is a mere alter-ego of ALU). This argument must fail. Petition was filed by APSOTEU-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization, and not the ALU nor the TUCP (national labor federation). A local union maintains its separate personality despite its affiliation with a larger national federation. There are nothing in the records to support the contentions of the petitioner.

Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) vs Noriel

2012-02-26T21:56:00.001-08:00

Facts: Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) negotiated and executed a CBA with Elizalde Steel Consolidated Inc. However, Elisco-Elirol then was not yet a registered union. In order to be able to execute the CBA, they had the union registered, which was granted. They likewise moved to disaffiliate themselves with NAFLU. Elizalde, however, refused to recognized them as the SEBA and it dismissed the officers of the union because of the union security clause in the CBA. Elisco-Elirol filed a complaint for unfair labor practice with the BLR. The BLR dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not Elisco-Elirol is the SEBA

Held: YES. The error of BLR is not perceiving that the employees and members of the local union did not form a new union but merely registered the local union as was their right. Petitioner Elisco-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU, consisting of employees and members of the local union was the principal party to the agreement. NAFLU as the mother union" in participating in the execution of the bargaining agreement with respondent company acted merely as agent of the local union, which remained the basic unit of the association existing principally and freely to serve the common interest of all its members, including the freedom to disaffiliate when the circumstances so warranted as in the present case.

"(T)he locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members in the economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and capital; and the association of the locals into the national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same end. These associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such legal relations with their members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common enterprise to increase by collective action the common bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into existence." (Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills Inc.)

Such maintenance of the membership clause could not be so distorted.. What is paramount is the security of tenure of the workers and not the security of the union.

Holy Cross of Davao vs. Faculty Union

2012-02-26T21:53:00.001-08:00

Facts: Jean Legaspi, an English teacher and permanent employee of petitioner school, submitted an application for the 1999 Manbusho scholarship grant, which was granted. Consequently, she requested petitioner to allow her to be on study leave with grant-in aid equivalent to her 18 months salary and allowance, pursuant to Section 1 Article XIII of the CBA providing for a faculty development scholarship for academic personnel. Petitioner denied her request, claiming that she is not entitled to grant-in aid, but granted her 12 months study leave without pay.

Legaspi then asked respondent Union KAMAPI to submit to the Grievance Committee petitioner’s refusal to grant her claim for grant-in aid, but the same was not settled. The union then filed a complaint for payment of grant-in aid against petitioner with the NCMB RO.

VA ordered petitioner to pay Legaspi’s grant-in aid benefits. CA affirmed VA’s Decision.

Issue: Whether or not Jean Legaspi is entitled to grant-in-aid benefits in the light of the CBA between the parties.

Held: YES. Any doubt or ambiguity in the contract (CBA) between management and the union members should be resolved in favor of labor. This is pursuant to A1702 CC: “…in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.”

The CBA provides that the “Management shall grant to all academic personnel a grant-in aid program, where the academic teaching personnel, whenever scholarship opportunities arise, be afforded a leave of absence to further their studies in Institutions of Higher Learning with a grant-in-aid equivalent to their salary and allowance.” The provision needs no interpretation for they are clear. Contracts which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning and not beyond their obvious intendment.

Honda Philippines vs. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda

2012-02-26T21:51:00.001-08:00

Facts: Honda Phils, Inc (company) and Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda (union) started renegotiations of their CBA. When there was a bargaining deadlock, the union filed a notice of strike. The company likewise filed a notice of lockout. SOLE assumed jurisdiction and ordered both parties to desist from their strike and lockout.

However, the union subsequently filed a second notice of strike on the ground of unfair labor practice, alleging that the company illegally contracted out work to the detriment of the workers. The union went on strike. SOLE assumed jurisdiction and certified the case to NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The striking employees were ordered to return to work and management accepted them back.

Honda then issued a memorandum announcing its new computation of the 13th and 14th month pay whereby the 31-day strike shall be considered unworked days for the purpose of computing said benefits. The amount equivalent to 1/12 of the employees’ basic salary shall be deducted from the bonuses (because they did not work for 1 month). Furthermore, Honda wanted a pro-rata payment of the 13th month pay.

The union opposed said computation because it was contrary to the Sections 3 and 6 in their current CBA which mandates that “the company shall maintain the present practice in the implementation of the 13th month pay” and that the 14th month pay shall be computed in the same way as the former.

The Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC) sided with the company. But the issue was unresolved by the grievance machinery, so it was submitted for voluntary arbitration. The Voluntary Arbiter invalidated Honda’s computation and ordered the computation of the benefits based on the full month basic pay.

CA affirmed, hence this petition.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not there is ambiguity in the CBA provisions concerning the 13th and 14th month pay

(2) Whether or not the proposed computation of Honda deducting 1/12 of the employee’s basic salary from the 13th and 14th month pay and its pro-rata payment are valid

Held:

(1) YES. A collective bargaining agreement refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. The parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties.

However, there are times when the CBA provisions may become contentious. In this case, Honda wanted to implement a pro-rated computation based on the “no work, no pay” rule. Honda argues that the phrase “present practice” in the CBA refers to the manner of payment of the bonuses (50% in May and 50% in December). The union, on the other hand, insists that the CBA provisions necessarily relate to the computation of the benefits.

As the voluntary arbitrator has correctly observed, there is ambiguity in the assailed CBA provisions because they did not categorically state whether the computation of the 13th and 14th month pay would be based on a one full month’s basic salary of the employees, or pro-rated based on the compensation actually received.

(2) NO. The ambiguity in the CBA provisions was correctly resolved by the arbitrator by relying on Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that “in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer.” CA is also correct in ruling that the computation of the 13th month pay should be based on the length of service and not on the actual wage earned by the worker.

PD 851 or the 13th Month Pay Law was issued to protect the level of wages of workers from worldwide inflation. Under the IRR of said law, the minimum 13th month pay shall not be less than 1/12 of the total basic salary earned by an employee within a calendar year. The Court has interpreted “basic salary” to mean, NOT the amount actually received by an employee, but 1/12 of their standard monthly wage multiplied by their length of service within a given calendar year.

The IRR also provide for a pro-ration of this benefit ONLY in cases of resignation or separation from work. In the present case, there being no resignation/separation, the computation of the 13th month pay should not be pro-rated but should be given in full.

Moreover, it has not been proven that Honda has been implementing pro-rating of the 13th month pay before the present case. It is not a company practice. In fact, there was an implicit acceptance that prior to the strike, a full month basic pay computation was the “present practice” intended in the CBA. It was the second strike that prompted the company to adopt the pro-rata computation.

Metro Drug Distribution vs. Metro Drug Employee Association (2005)

2012-02-26T21:47:00.002-08:00

Facts: Company and Assoc had a CBA with a grievance procedure. In a letter, the union president asked to grievable issues re: health insurance provider and the issue pertaining to the amendment to the salesmen’s incentive scheme which was implemented by Metro Drug. Even after grievance meetings conducted, both parties could not reach an agreement. According to union, it wanted to submit issue to a voluntary arbitrator (VA) as provided in CBA but the company despite notice, failed to submit its own nominees of VA such that union was prompted to file for ULP before the arbitration branch of NLRC.

Union: Company violated CBA a) economic provisions stemming from petitioner’s introduction of unilateral changes on the salesmen’s incentive scheme and health insurance provider; b) violations of the duty to bargain and non-observance of the CBA provision on grievance machinery.

Company: MTD filed for lack of jurisdiction should be with VA under Art. 217, 260, 261 of LC.

Labor Arbiter: MTD denied.

Company filed certiorari with CA which was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not certiorari filed directly with CA after MTD was denied by Labor Arbiter was proper? NO

Held: Certiorari was not proper.

Under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, for a certiorari proceeding to prosper, there should be a concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.

Under NLRC rules, no appeal may be made of an order denying MTD. The NLRC rule proscribing appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss is similar to the general rule observed in civil procedure that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and, hence, not appealable until final judgment or order is rendered. The remedy of the aggrieved party in case of denial of the motion to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose, as a defense or defenses, the ground or grounds relied upon in the motion to dismiss, proceed to trial and, in case of adverse judgment, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. In order to avail of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, it is incumbent upon petitioner to establish that the denial of the motion to dismiss was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.

Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s judicial intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action -The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly.

HERE, company's remedy from the order of denial of its motion to dismiss was to submit its position paper as ordered by the labor arbiter and raise the question of supposed lack of jurisdiction. In the event of unfavorable judgment, it could thereafter raise the case, including the issue of jurisdiction, via appeal to the NLRC as provided for in the Labor Code on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Marcos vs. Manglapus, [G.R. # 88211 September 15, 1989 ]

2012-02-26T21:40:00.003-08:00

Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquino’s ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines. Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And have the requirements of due process been complied with in the making of the finding?

HELD: Petition Dismissed.

The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country.

Another reason of the Court...“We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.”

Velasco vs. Villegas [G.R. No. L-24153 (120 SCRA), February 14, 1983]

2012-02-26T21:38:00.002-08:00

Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association. This is an appeal from the lower court's(LC) order dismissing their suit for declatory relief. They are challenging the constitutionality of Ord. No. 4964. They contend that it amounts to deprivation of properties and their means of livelihood without due process of law.

The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."

Respondent in its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964 is constitutional and such is just an exercise of the state's inherent power (police power).

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the petitioner's right to property and their means of livelihood.

Held: Ordinance is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed, LC decision affirmed.

Enactment of such (Ordinance) is a valid exercise of Police Power.

The objectives of the Ordinance are:

(1) To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the business of massage clinics, and;

(2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow from the construction of a separate room for massaging customers.

This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. And for that reason, the petitioners’ rights were not violated and they are not deprived of the due process of law.

Association of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, [G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989]

2012-02-26T21:34:00.003-08:00

Facts: These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

Held: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Manosca vs. CA

2012-02-26T21:32:00.001-08:00

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila (492 square meters.) When the parcel of land was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Which was approved.

So on on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation3 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity.

Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the said parcel of land is for the purpose of public use

Held: Petition is DENIED.

The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

US vs. Toribio

2012-02-26T21:26:00.001-08:00

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with personal liberties. To justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must appear (1) that the interest of the general public requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, For to do otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and the intent of the law makers. The act primarily seeks to protect large cattle against theft to make it easy for the recovery and return to owners, which encouraged them to regulate the registration and slaughter of large cattle.

Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the Philippine islands which threatened the survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces seventy, eighty and even one hundred percent of their local carabaos perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the prices of carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft became rampant due to the luxurious prices of these work animals. Moreover, this greatly affected the food production of the country which prompted the government to import rice from its neighboring countries.

As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for the production of crops, the government was prompted to pass a law that would protect these work animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilize the number of carabaos in the country as well as to redistribute them throughout the entire archipelago. It was also the same reason why large cattles fit for farm work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption. Most importantly, the respondent’s carabao was found to be fit for farm work.

These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power.

Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest. Thus, the demand for compensation of the owner must fail.

Saura vs. Agdeppa

2012-02-25T22:02:00.001-08:00

Facts: Two (2) complaints are related and arose from the handling of the respondent of a settlement case involving a piece of property owned in common by the petitioners with their other siblings, Macrina, Romeo and Amelita, all surnamed Saura, who were then the administrators of the said property of the late Ramon E. Saura who died intestate on May 15, 1992. Petitioners alleged that despite repeated demands, the vendors or their counsel, respondent herein, have refused to disclose the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. This case was referred to the Integrated Bar by the Supreme Court in a resolution dated November 20, 1995, after its earlier resolution dated June 19, 1995, was returned unserved with the Postmaster’s notation that the same was "unclaimed". Several notice of appearance were issued but to date, no response has been forth coming from Atty. Agdeppa. For her continued defiance of orders of this Court for her to answer the administrative charges leveled against her, respondent was recommended to be penalized with a fine of P10,000.00 and suspension from practice for one (1) year in each of the two (2) cases pending against her. Respondent Agdeppa filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the petitions should be dismissed because she was not accorded her right to due process and that she could not answer the administrative charges against her without divulging certain pieces of information in violation of the attorney-client privilege. Respondent does not convince.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Atty. Agdeppa violates the lawyer’s oath and disregard the Canons of Professional Ethics and subsequently was denied due process.

Held: For the refusal of Atty. Lalaine Lilibeth Agdeppa to comply with our Resolutions dated June 7 and 19, 1995 directing her to file an answer to the petitions, the Court hereby penalizes her with a FINE.

The respondent was given notice on various occasions but she chose to ignore them and failed to exercise her right to be heard. Since respondent repeatedly ignored the notices sent to her by this Court,the court cannot be expected to wait indefinitely for her answer. While respondent may have changed her address and did not, thus, receive the previous notices, still, on March 2, 1998, she came to know of the Supreme Court Resolution dated June 19, 1995. The prudent thing for her to do was to file an answer immediately and not to delay the matter any further. Sadly, the respondent ignored the Resolution of the Supreme Court ordering her to file an answer thus, the contention that respondent was denied of due process cannot prosper. Moreover, the request for the information regarding the sale of the property and to account for the proceeds is not a violation of the attorney-client privilege. The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The petitioners are only asking for the disclosure of the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have the right to ask for such information since they own the property as co-heirs of the late Ramon E. Saura and as co-administrators of the property. Hence, respondent cannot refuse to divulge such information to them and hide behind the cloak of the attorney-client relationship.

Gonato vs. Adaza

2012-02-25T22:00:00.001-08:00

Facts: Sometime in February, 1993, complainants engaged the services of respondent as their counsel in Civil Case No. 92-263 entitled Goking vs. Yacapin, et al." Complainants among others alleged that respondent demanded from them the sum of P15,980.00 to be used in paying the docket fee and other court fees in connection with the aforementioned case. Complainants asked for the official receipts evidencing the amount of court fees purportedly paid by respondent. However, only photocopies was provided to them. Dissatisfied, complainant personally went to respondent's law office at least three times, and asked for the original copies of the receipts, but to no avail. It was discovered that the triplicate original copies of the receipts did not reflect the same amount contained on the photocopies of the receipts given by respondent. to conform to the amount paid by complainant which was P15,980.00. Complainants demanded the return of P15,980.00 but respondent refused to do so. Thus, in April, 1993, complainants urged respondent to withdraw as counsel due to loss of trust and confidence. Respondent on the other hand, after a careful study contest that the counterclaim is compulsory and not permissive, and so, applied instead the aforesaid sum of P15,690.00 to his acceptance and appearance fees.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Atty. Adaza is guilty of malpractice and violation of trust.

Held: Respondent Atty. Cesilo A. Adaza is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.

The facts and evidence obtaining in this case glaringly reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon 16 which provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." As a member of the Bar, respondent was and is expected to always live up to the standards embodied in said Code particularly Canons 15, 16, 17 and 20, for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. The Court believes that a longer period of suspension than that recommended by the IBP is called for under the circumstances.

Buted vs. Hernando

2012-02-25T21:59:00.001-08:00

Facts: In an action for partition instituted by Generosa as compulsory heir of the deceased Teofilo Buted, respondent was counsel for Luciana Abadilla and a certain Angela Buted. Respondent ultimately succeeded in defending Luciana Abadilla's claim of exclusive ownership over Lot 9439-B. When Luciana died, respondent withdrew his appearance from that partition case. It appears that Luciana Abadilla sold the lot to Benito Bolisay and a new Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot was issued in the name of complainant spouses. When an action for specific performance was lodged by a couple named Luis Sy and Elena Sy against Benito Bolisay as one of the defendants, the latter retained the services of respondent Atty. Hernandor and claims that he rendered his services to Benito Bolisay free of charge. It appears that the Sy's were claiming that the lease extended to the aforementioned lot. Respondent avers that the relationship between himself and Benito Bolisay as regards this case was terminated on 4 December 1969. , Respondent Hernando, seeks the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of complainant spouses over the lot. Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco were Luciana's registered co-owners in the original certificate of title covering Lot No. 9439-B. respondent Hernando testified that if the petition for cancellation of TCT was granted, Lot 9439-B would no longer be owned by complainant spouses but would be owned in common by all the heirs of Luciana Abadilla. Complainant, upon learning of respondent's appearance against them in the cadastral proceeding, manifested their disapproval thereof in a letter dated 30 July 1974. respondent Hernando admitted his involvement in the cadastral case as counsel for the Abadillas but denied having seen or taken hold of the controversial Transfer Certificate of Title, and having availed himself of any confidential information relating to Lot 9439-B.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Hernando had a conflict of interests under the circumstances described above.

Held: Although the first and second cases handled by respondent, does not constitute conflict of interest, the same cannot be said with respect to the action for specific performance and the cadastral proceeding. By respondent's own admission, he defended the right of ownership over Lot 9439-B of complainant Benito Bolisay in the action for specific performance. He assailed this same right of ownership when he subsequently filed a petition for cancellation of complainants' Transfer Certificate of Title over that same lot. Respondent Hernando was in a conflict of interest situation. It is clear from the Canons of Professional Ethics that in cases where a conflict of interests may exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent of all the parties concerned are necessary. The present Code of Professional Responsibility is stricter on this matter considering that consent of the parties is now required to be in written form. In the case at bar, such consent was wanting. Moreover, the absence of monetary consideration, as what the respondent contests, does not exempt the lawyer from complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases where a conflict of interest exists. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship.

Ramos vs. Rada [A.M No. 202 July 22, 1975]

2012-02-25T21:54:00.002-08:00

Facts: Moises R. Rada is a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines, Norte

He was charged with violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as follows:

Sec.12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the government…

Respondent Rada was extended appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation on December 15, 1972 as representative to manage and supervise real properties situated in Camarines Norte which were foreclosed by the corporation.

His acceptance of such appointment was the basis of the administrative complaint against Rada which was filed with the Department of Justice on October 3, 1973.

Later, on October 27, 1973, Rada requested permission to accept appointment.

It was not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of the duties as administrator has at all impaired his efficiency as messenger, nor has it been shown that he did not observe regular office hours.

Issue: Whether respondent Rada is guilty of violation of sec.12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII

Held: Rada was adjudged guilty of technical violation (lack of prior permission) of Sec 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII and meted a penalty of reprimand.

The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that his entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the government. Such being his situation, it would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor to augment his income, and to award premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from engaging in or being connected with a private undertaking outside of office hours and without forseeable detriment to the Government service.

His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated, but he must secure a written permission from proper government authority.

De Bumanglag vs. Bumanglag [A.M. No. 188 November 29, 1976]

2012-02-25T21:50:00.002-08:00

Facts: Esteban T. Bumanglad, the respondent, was found by the Court in its decision of September 24, 1973 guilty of gross immoral conduct and ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years;

Respondent filed several motions for reconsideration but the same were denied;

As a result of such denial, the respondent wrote a petition to the President of the Philippines that he “promulgate(s) a decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that your humble self be allowed to become an active member of the New Society”.

The respondent alleged in the same petition that he was deprived of due process of law;

The Clerk of Court, by way of an indorsement from the Assistant Executive Secretary, received a copy of the petition and was requested to “comment and/or appropriate action” on the subject matter;

However, in a subsequent letter to the President the respondent retracted and acknowledged his non observance of protocol of separation of powers;

In the end, the respondent asked for an apology from the members of the Honorable Court.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not respondent may be disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in not observing the protocol of separation of power by asking the President to set aside by decree the decision of the Court imposing suspension upon the respondent

(2) Whether or not a decision duly promulgated by the Supreme Court may be set aside by a Presidential Decree

Held:

(1) Respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any transgression in the future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with.

(2) Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now appreciates that under the fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, a decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President, the Court is disposed to view his misconduct and/or ignorance with liberality and will administer a reprimand with warning of severe action on any future transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable record.

People vs. Alconga

2012-02-25T21:32:00.001-08:00

Facts: On May 27, deceased Silverio Barion, the banker of the card game, was playing black jack against Maria De Raposo. De Raposo and Alconga were partners in the game, they had one money. Alconga was seated behind Barion and he gave signs to De Raposo. Barion, who was suffering losses in the game, found this out and he expressed his anger at Alconga. The two almost fought outright this was stopped.

The two met again on May 29. when Alconga was doing his job as a home guard. While the said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse, Barion came along and said “Coroy, this is your breakfast” followed by a swing of his “pingahan”, a bamboo stick. Alconga avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse. A second blow was given by Barion but failed to hit the accused, hitting the bench instead. Alconga managed to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While Barion was about to deliver the 3rd blow, Alconga fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and hit the ground. The deceased stood up, drew forth his dagger and directed a blow to the accused who was able to parry the attack using his bolo. A hand to handfight ensued. The deceased, looking already beaten and having sustained several wounds ran away. He was followed by the accused and was overtaken after 200 meters.

A second fight took place and the deceased received a mortal bolo blow, the one which slasehde the cranium. The deceased fell face downward besides many other blows delivered. Alconga surrendered.

Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be used as a defense by Alconga

Held: No. Self-defense cannot be sustained. Alconga guilty of Homicide

The deceased ran and fled w/o having to inflicted so much a scratch to Alconga, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded with one revolver shot and several bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict injury upon him has ceased absolutely/ Alconga had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. He could have only attacked if there was reason to believe that he is still not safe. In the case at bar, it is apparent that it is Alconga who is the superior fighter and his safety was already secured after the first fight ended. There was no more reason for him to further chase Barion. The second fight will be treated differently and independently. Under the first fight, self-defense would have been valid, but that is not the case in the second fight. In the second fight, there was illegal aggression on the part of Alconga and as a result, he is found guilty of Homicide with no mitigating circumstance (MC) of Provocation

Note – Provocation in order to be an MC must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. “It should be proportionate to the act committed and adequate to stir one to its commission”

Castanares vs. CA [August 6, 1979]

2012-02-25T21:30:00.001-08:00

Facts: Accused Castanares was charged before the CFI under 2 separate information for homicide for the deaths of the brothers, Manual and Felizardo Pacheco. The CA modified its judgment in favor of the accused because o the mitigating circumstance of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. Accused filed for a motion for reconsideration praying that he be acquitted but the same was denied.

Version of the Accused:

Felizardo demanded from the accused that he be given fish. The Accused denied so Felizardo boxed the appellant who ducked the blow. Manuel said “May araw ka rin!” After 10 minutes, Manuel (standing near the toilet) appeared before the appellant and asked “Bkt mo sinuntok kapatid ko?” and while accused was approaching him while explaining, Manuel drew his .45 pistol. Accused grabbed the gun. Manuel was pushed back sitting against the toilet wall. Accused saw Manuel picked up something from the floor which appeared to be an iron bar. Accused fired at Manuel. Felizardo (who was standing near the truck) drew a knife charging against accused and swung to stab accused. Accused fired which Felizardo’s right arm which cause Felizardo to drop the knife. Felizardo tried to get the knife back. Accused said “Bitawan mo iyan” but Felizardo didn’t. So appellant fired at felizardo.

Version of Prosecution:

Felizardo went to the riverside where he met appellant who boxed him. Felizardo returned to the gate of the compound. The Pacheco brothers went to the riverside to inquire why he hit Felizardo. Instead, accused went down by the outriggers of the boat then fired at Manuel. Felizardo saw Manuel was sot so he run away, but the accused still fired at him. When he was faced down, accused fired at him twice.

Issue: Whether or not Castanares is guilty of homicide

Held: Castanares is ACQUITTED. Reason: self-defense

From the facts established by the defense, it is clear that the brothers initiated the unlawful aggression.

The second element of self-defense is reasonable necessity for the means employed in repelling the unlawful aggression. This is present. It’s not true that after the accused grabbed the gun for Marion, he was no longer in peril. It is because Manuel was about to pick something from he floor. In addition, regarding Felizarde, the accused only fired when he was trying to retrieve the knife he had dropped.

Although the general rule is that the presence of motive in the killing of a person is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the assailant is duly established, in this case, he absence of such motive is important in ascertaining the truth as between 2 antagonistic versions. Herein, the 2 victims have reason to harm the accused.

People vs. Jaurigue [C.A. No. 384, February 21, 1946]

2012-02-25T21:26:00.001-08:00

Facts: Inside the chapel of the 7th day Adventist Church, Amado Capina sat beside the appellant and with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out a fan knife and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck’

Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later.

Appellant Avelina Jaurigue was subsequently tried and convicted of the crime of Homicide.

Issue: Whether or not appellant Jaurige acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and that she should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility

Held: No. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .

As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor in the defense of her honor.

When the deceased sat by the side of the appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound and causing his death a few moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability.

US vs. Look Chaw, December 16, 1911

2012-02-25T21:23:00.000-08:00

Facts: Several persons (including the internal-revenue agent of Cebu) went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo. Note that steamship Erroll is of English nationality and it came from HongKong bound for Mexico via the call ports of Manila and Cebu. These persons found sacks of opium (exhibits A, B, and C.)

The complaint filed against defendant stated that defendant “carried, kept, possessed, and had in his possession and control 96 kg of opium” and that he “he had been surprised in the act of selling P1,000 worth prepared opium.” However, since there was more than 1 crime charged, the fiscal just filed for “unlawful possession of opium”

Defense admitted that Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found on board Erroll and that it was true that the defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his and that he had them in his possession. (There was an exhibit D but exhibit D was the opium bought from the defendant.)

According to the testimony of the internal-revenue, the opium seized in the vessel had been bought by the defendant in HongKong, at P3.00 for each round can and P5.00 for each of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that the vessel arrived at Cebu and on the same day he sold opium.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction

Held: Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction.

Mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Philippines. However, in the case at bar, a can of opium is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the Philippine laws.

People vs. Oanis

2012-02-25T21:20:00.000-08:00

Facts: The accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively after due trial were found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence.

Captain Godofredo Monsod, a Constabulary Private Inspector, received a telegram of the following tenor: “Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive”. Monsod instructed Oanis and Galanta to find Balagtas. After inquiring about the whereabouts of Irene, defendants immediately went to the room of Irene and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. It turned out that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named, Serapio Tecson, Irene’s paramour.

Both appellants gave different testimony. According to Galanta, when Oanis inquired where room of Irene was, Brigada indicated the place and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said, “If you are Balagtas, stand up.” Tecson, the supposed Balagtas sit up in Bed, and Oanis fired at him. Oanis the shouted “That is Balagtas.” Galanta then fired at him. Oanis testified as he was opening the curtain and after having said “if you are Balagtas, stand up.” Galanta at once fired at Tecson while Tecson was still lying on bed. That it was only after seeing Balagtas picking something from the floor that he fired at him.

Issue: Whether or not they may, upon such facts, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson

Held: “We are of the opinion, however, that under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder though specially mitigated by circumstance.”

Appellants rely on the case of Ah Chong. The maxim is ignoratia facti excusat, but this applies only when mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.

In the instant case, appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end has been made, as the victim was unarmed.

The doctrine in the new Rules of Court states that “No unnecessary or unreasonable forces shall be used in making an arrest and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest.

It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, but the facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when he offers no resistance for he was asleep.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.

According to Article 11, No. 5 of the Revised penal code, “A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. “There are two requisites in order that the circumstance maybe taken as a justifying one (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office

In the case, the first requisite is present. The second requisite is absent. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chance, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without inquiry about his identity.