Security Watch

Military, Media and the Economy in Sri Lanka

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Mon, 01 Sep 2008 15:02:00 +0000

Summary:

A year after the offensive began in the North of the country, the 'Peace through War' strategy continues in the North. The Tigers have lost the capability of fighting a conventional war but retain the ability to mount sporadic terrorist attacks. In the present situation, the LTTE does not seem to agree on disarming and neither is the Government inclined to halting the military operations. This issue of Security Watch takes stock of military operations in the North and discusses the situation of human rights, specifically media freedom and the state of the country's economy and its correlation with the war. Tens of thousands of civilians in the entire LTTE controlled territory are being displaced and humanitarian agencies are unable to cope with the demands for more aid. A sharp rise in the number of attacks on journalists is giving credence to the widespread feeling that Sri Lanka has a serious human rights problem. The Sri Lankan economy has grown at 6 percent for the past three years in the midst of the war but is this growth real or 'phantom'? In the current phase military successes are sustaining the public support in spite of a high cost of living. The Government claims that the people have to pay this cost in order to eradicate terrorism and the people are buying this argument. Much of the public support depends on being able to sustain these successes well into the heartland of the LTTE held territory. The Sri Lankan forces are fighting attrition warfare, which will stretch the war over a long period, and Army Chief Gen. Fonseka has admitted that a low-level insurgency could last indefinitely.

Introduction

The Sri Lankan Government has driven the Tigers from the East, held an election in that province and now claims to be close to victory. The 'Peace through War' strategy continues and it has now been a year since the offensive began in the North of the country. As articulated by the country's defence Secretary, the Government has a once-in-a-generation chance to crush the LTTE, perhaps one of the reasons why the Government did not accept the LTTE's ceasefire proposal for the period of the SAARC summit. Army Chief Gen. Sarath Fonseka claims that the LTTE lost 9000 fighters since 2006 and will lose its control over large areas and the population in the North by mid 2009. Left with only 4000 to 5000 cadres, the Tigers have lost the capability of fighting a conventional war. In that sense, Fonseka says, the LTTE has already been defeated. Does this mean that the conflict will be totally over? Although the LTTE has lost men, material, conventional military capability and many claim, its Diaspora support, it retains the ability to mount sporadic terrorist attacks.

In the present situation, the LTTE does not seem agreeable on disarming and neither is the Government inclined to halt the military operations. In addition a poll by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) in March 2008 has shown that a majority of the Sinhalese support the war with only a marginal 16 percent in support of negotiations. Contrary to the common belief that a rising cost of living would reduce support for government policies- in this case the military offensive- the CPA poll shows that support for negotiations has reduced. The long-drawn out war is continuing to the detriment of other essential issues such as basic human rights, the economy and the well being of the citizens.

Military Operations: The Northern Front

The present military offensive in the North began in July 2007. The two theaters of operations include Jaffna and the Wanni. The Army initially deployed 2 divisions and a Task Force to lead the offensives on three fronts in the Wanni namely: Mannar, Vavuniya and Welioya. With the progress of the battle, the Army increased its strength up to four divisions and two Task Forces.

The Fall of Mannar

In the Mannar sector, the SL Army was within six- seven kilometers of the Madhu Church in the beginning of the year. Troops advanced into the district on two different flanks, one west and the other east of the Giant's Tank. Most of the battles in this sector have been largely through the exchange of artillery and mortar fire and the advancing troops have had to clear improvised mines and other explosive devices. Although the advances were initially slow, perhaps almost static, the forces captured key LTTE bases in Mannar. The area around Madhu Church was captured in April followed by LTTE's One-Eight Base in Kallikulam. Two major LTTE bastions in Mannar- Adampan and Palampiddy-were captured in May. The area surrounding Periyamadu fell in June. Another LTTE stronghold, Parappakkadantan, also fell in June. With this capture, the Sri Lankan Army claimed to have cleared some of the most fertile regions in Mannar district, also known as the "Rice Bowl", including a total of 18 villages. The two divisions that were moving North from the East and West flanks of the Giant's Tank merged and moved towards Vidattaltivu. The capture of the Sea Tiger Base in Vidattaltivu and an LTTE military base further North in Illuppaikaddavali in July were one of the major successes for the Army. After the capture of Silvathurai Sea Tiger Base in October 2007, Vidattaltivu had become a landing point for military and medical supplies for the guerillas from across the Gulf of Mannar and its loss is a major set back for them. Moving further northwards, the Army claimed to have liberated the entire Mannar district by capturing LTTE's last bastion in the district, Vellankulam on August 2. Operations have now shifted to Kilinochchi district and the Army is focusing on capturing the A-32 highway and other Sea Tiger bases in the district in order to deny sea access to the rebels. Equally important is closing in on the A9 highway and troops have penetrated rebel defences in Tunukkai and Uyilankulam. In early September the rebel town of Mallavi was captured taking the SL Forces closer the strategic A9 highway.

Map showing Giant's Tank and ' Rice Bowl' area
Source: Daily Mirror Sri Lanka

Map showing Vellankulam, last LTTE bastion in Mannar. The shaded part shows area under the control of LTTE as of the last week of July 2008. The Army has been able to advance further North since then. Source- Daily Mirror, Sri Lanka

Operations in Welioya sector North of Janakapura as of July 2008 showing the thickly forested areas of the Mullaittivu district, Source: Daily Mirror, Sri Lanka

The Thrust from Vavuniya

In Vavuniya district, the Army was able to penetrate into the Vavuniya-Omanthai defences of the LTTE in February. Since then Army divisions have moved ahead in the Eastern and Northern direction towards Mankulam. In July the Army progressed north of Vavunikulam after capturing the village of Navvi. In the Welioya sector North of Janakapura, the Army captured large areas of no man's land since the beginning of this year and troops have been advancing towards Mullaittivu. Some of the major successes came in the form of capturing key Tiger bases. In May the critical Munagam base was captured while troops carried out operations in some of the thickly forested areas. Advancing further the Army captured the "Michael Base" in July. On August 18 the troops captured another base called 'Jeewan' in Andankulam. As the troops progress further into the jungles, more rebel bases are expected to be captured.

Impregnable Muhamalai

In the Jaffna Front, the Army has tried to break into the rebel defences south of Muhamalai entry-exit point but has not been successful in moving southwards. The Government and the media have had different versions of the fighting in Muhamalai. According to the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry, the Muhamalai FDLs (forward defence lines) came under attack in April 2008 from the LTTE who attempted to infiltrate into Government controlled areas in the North. But the Army thwarted the attack. On the other hand, according to the Sunday Times the Army launched an offensive operation in the region to thrust southwards. The Sri Lankan defences in Jaffna stretch from Kilali to Muhamalai to Nagarkovil spanning around eight kilometers. The offensive southwards was attempted along this eight kilometer stretch. The Tigers have been able to thwart their advance and the SL Forces are said have suffered severe losses even in two of the previous southward thrusts in October 2006 and November 2007.

Air and Sea Power

Throughout the military operations, the role of the SL Air Force has been crucial to the Army's advance. The Air Force pounded rebel positions and ground movements were supported by helicopter gunships. Similarly, the Navy has been able to restrict the rebel movements at sea and has consolidated the capture of Sea Tiger bases. The LTTE at its end has claimed to have thwarted several advances by the Army and inflicted severe losses on the security forces. Such news has hardly found place in some of the mainstream Sri Lankan newspapers. There were no air strikes by the LTTE since April 2007, until recently, leading to speculation of the total destruction of its air capability. But attacks in late August this year on the Trincomalee Naval Base have revived concerns of LTTE air activity. Government officials suggest that the attack by the rebels was merely a propaganda tactic to boost the sagging morale of its cadres but what is more worrisome is their capability to penetrate Sri Lankan defences and escape once again. According to latest casualty reports from the Government, 5,859 rebels and 536 soldiers have lost their lives since January. There has always been a mismatch between the casualty figures put out by the Government and the LTTE and it has been difficult for journalists or researchers to independently verify the death toll on both sides.

Battlefront Progress in Sri Lanka

Areas in blue indicate SL Army advance and areas in red indicate LTTE strongholds
Source: Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka, URL: http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20080623_02

A Long War

An important element of the Government's strategy needs to be noted. While earlier the Government sought to militarily weaken the LTTE to coerce its leaders to opt for a political solution, the present strategy seems to be one where there is no room for the LTTE in the politico-military equation. As articulated by the country's leaders, the strategy is not to merely 'grab land' but to go for the kill and remove the absolute enemy (LTTE). The thinking that peace will be impossible as long as this obstacle (LTTE) is not removed, has set in deeply in the psyche of not only the Government but also a majority of the Sri Lankan people. The victory of the coalition Government in the North-Central Provincial elections in August has been viewed as an endorsement of this strategy. Another interesting factor is the claim of finishing the war within a stipulated time period. While earlier, Sri Lankan leaders claimed to finish the war by 2008, now they claim it could take mid-2009. The Sri Lankan forces are fighting attrition warfare, which will stretch the war over a long period. One is reminded of Sun Tzu's writing on Waging War: "When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men's weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be dampened. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength, and if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain. Never forget: When your weapons are dulled, your ardour dampened, your strength exhausted, and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue."

Why the Offensive will be Difficult

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Janaka Perera, who has led Sri Lanka's previous attempts to break into LTTE defences, said in an interview to The Sunday Leader that although military offensives against the LTTE held Wanni started in July 2007, there has been little tangible progress until recently. He also said that the Government's self imposed deadlines were not realistic and questioned the veracity of massive claims of LTTE casualties made by the defense establishment. Noting that it would be a nightmare if the war drags on, he said that if the fighting spreads over a year, the soldier suffers from both mental fatigue and physical exhaustion. These factors combined with home problems are going to impact his quality of focus and in September with the north-east monsoon, the weather will add to the physical and mental exhaustion. This in turn will delay the progress and such delays work in the favour of the LTTE. Speaking on grounds of anonymity to the Sunday Times correspondent, Iqbal Athas, Army officials said that the unexpected enemy- incessant rains- had hampered offensive operations against the Wanni. In some areas, flood waters were knee-high and they faced an unexpected problem of soldiers falling sick due to dengue or malaria. These soldiers had to be hospitalized for treatment and could not serve on the fronts. Bad weather also meant that the crucial air activity, like surveillance, close air support, casualty evacuation, among others was being hampered. Besides roads were muddy and deployment of armoured vehicles was posing a problem.

Another problem faced by the Army is that of desertions. Low morale and suicides have been reported especially amongst young recruits in Jaffna. In June, the Government launched a campaign to track down 12,000 deserters who failed to take advantage of the government amnesty. Around 5000 are said to have returned during the month long amnesty in May. The government is now trying to get back the deserters by threatening criminal action. The SL Air Force has also announced that it is going to recruit 2500 commandos. The LTTE is also short of fighters. Having suffered heavy attrition since the war began and with the Sri Lankan forces closing in on their territory, the LTTE is on an urgent recruitment drive. Ex-cadres are undergoing re-training and around 1000 civilians have joined the People's Army (Makkal Padai). About 30 percent of the people conscripted by the LTTE this year have died. Most of them are boys and girls under the age of 17. According to a report by the UTHR-J (University Teachers of Human Rights- Jaffna) a boy or girl turning 17 and failing to report to the LTTE can expect press gangs at their door step within two or three days. Many of those dying on the frontlines are new conscripts according to the report.

LTTE Down But Not Out

The current phase of the conflict is decisive for both the LTTE and the Government Forces. The LTTE will fiercely defend its territory and the terrain is such that both the adversaries will take casualties. Successes in the battlefront have lent credibility to the Government's strategies. Much of the public support depends on the Army being able to sustain these successes well into the heartland of the LTTE held territory. In recent times the war has seen a change in tactics by both sides. The SL forces have adopted LTTE's hit and run tactics. In one such operation, an Army division made a foray into the LTTE' defences in Kilaly in Jaffna and claimed to withdraw after killing 15 LTTE cadres. These tactics have helped the Government conserve their men while depleting the enemy. Similarly the LTTE is said to be no longer withdrawing that easily and has replaced inexperienced cadres with their elite regiments. According to P. K. Balachandran, New Indian Express correspondent, the LTTE is counter attacking with a ferocity seen very rarely in the past two years. Currently, fighting continues in Kilinochchi, Vavuniya, Welioya and FDLs in Jaffna. Gen. Sarath Fonseka believes that the LTTE is weakened to such an extent that it will very soon lose control of its territory and the population. He no doubt exuded the confidence and motivation of his fighters but what is also noteworthy is that he admitted that a low-level insurgency could last indefinitely. While speaking to foreign news correspondents he said "Even if we finish the war, capture the whole of the north, still the LTTE might have some members joining them (as) there are people who believe in Tamil nationalism. The LTTE might survive another even two decades with about 1,000 cadres… but we will not be fighting in the same manner (having defeated the rebel group's conventional warfare capability).It might continue as an insurgency forever."

Humanitarian Situation and Media Freedom

Human rights violations continue with impunity in different parts of the country including Colombo according to the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka (NPC). The ongoing fighting in the North is displacing tens of thousands of civilians in the entire LTTE controlled territory who are fleeing from place to place. UN aid agencies have said that 1,12,000 people have been internally displaced in the months of June and July and the figure is expected to increase. Humanitarian agencies admit that they are unable to cope with the demand for emergency shelter, water and sanitation as a result of the growing displaced population. The capability of these agencies is affected in part due to the restrictions laid on them by the Government. The Government's stated concern is that humanitarian aid is being usurped by the LTTE to strengthen its war machine. It was also reported that LTTE is restricting the movement of even those civilians wounded in combat areas. Amnesty International's Yolanda Foster said that "the Tigers are keeping them (civilians) in harm's way and the government is not doing enough to ensure they receive essential assistance" She further said that "measures (adopted by the LTTE) seem designed to use civilians as a buffer against Government forces."

The dire situation of the civilians has recently prompted the Bishop of Mannar to request the Government to urgently permit UN and other NGOs to reach the affected population. He has also proposed the establishment of 'No-Conflict Zones' in each of the three districts in the North. The NPC has proposed the establishment of a humanitarian corridor with cooperation from UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross, whereby people who wish to leave the areas of combat are permitted by both the Government and the LTTE to do so in accordance with the basic human right of freedom of movement. This proposal echoed the concerns of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sri Lanka. He said that "if we are able to have continued access in terms of humanitarian supplies to these people, if there is safe space for the civilians in that area (North), if both sides respect their responsibility to allow displaced people to move where they want to move, then I think a crisis can be avoided." The current fighting in Kilinochchi has seen more civilians fleeing from their homes into LTTE held territory. The Government estimates that 1,75,000 people are currently in the city of Kilinochchi. Despite denials by the Government, civilians are being killed in air attacks and artillery fire and these civilian deaths are grist for LTTE's mill.

Free Media?

Besides the human suffering, intimidation of those who seek to be an independent voice in the Sri Lankan society seems to have become an unfortunate feature in the country. The impunity with which the media has been targeted in Sri Lanka for the past two years is giving credence to the widespread feeling that Sri Lanka has a serious human rights problem. Amidst a raging controversy over a set of guidelines issued by the Defence Ministry on the norms to be followed in reporting the ongoing war, there has been a sharp rise in the number of attacks on journalists. The Defence Ministry in an article on its website said that "the Ministry stands affirm on its stance over the irresponsible defence reportage and will assure to take all necessary measures to stop this journalistic treachery against the country… the Ministry finds that certain sections of media and political interlopers continue to mislead the public over the issue." The four main issues of concern in defence reportage for the Ministry include criticizing military operations, promotion schemes, procurement and using unethical measures to obtain defence information. The article further reads "whoever attempts to reduce the public support to the military by making false allegations and directing baseless criticism at armed forces personnel is supporting the terrorist organization that continuously murder citizens of Sri Lanka. The Ministry will continue to expose these traitors and their sinister motives and does not consider such exposure as a threat to media freedom. Those who commit such treachery should identify themselves with the LTTE rather than showing themselves as crusaders of media freedom."

According to Amnesty International, 12 Sri Lankan media persons were killed in the past two years. Free Media Movement (FMM), a Colombo based NGO concerned with the welfare of the media community, said that the "Government bars photographers, censors news from the war front and believes that the right of the public to know information and news related to the ongoing war is severely undermined by the restrictions placed on journalists. Both the LTTE and the Government do not allow independent media to cover the war in a manner that accurately reports, amongst other things, the numbers dead and injured." The killing of journalists from Jaffna further restricts the free flow of information from the war zones of the North. Contradictory statements by the Defence Ministry- condemning the media- and the Media Minister- assuring that it is not a government policy- may be taken by various groups as a further license to behave with impunity towards the media. Sunanda Deshapriya, Head of FMM says that in the wake of abductions, physical assault, torture and even murder, free media may cease to exist in Sri Lanka.

The Economy

The Sri Lankan economy has grown at 6 percent for the past three years in the midst of a war in the North, terror attacks in Colombo and other parts of the country and a high cost of living. On the face of it, this sustainable growth rate is unprecedented but it is imperative to discern the sources of such remarkable economic growth rate to find out whether the growth is real or 'phantom growth' as Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, from the Point Pedro Institute of Development calls it. He attributes one of the primary sources of economic growth in the past three years (2005-2007) to the growth in government services. "Wanton recruitment to the public sector has been the hallmark of the new government that came to power in April 2004. In 2006 and 2007 increasing recruitment to the armed forces (including to homeguard and civil defence force services) has bolstered the public sector." The increased number of personnel, he says, has increased expenditure for government services and not necessarily enhanced in productivity of personnel. Thus, the growth experienced is mostly unproductive growth or phantom growth.

Reports of the Sri Lankan Government facing a financial crunch have been rife. The Government has estimated its total revenues for the year 2008 at LKR 750 billion (USD 7 billion). Out of this LKR 580 billion (USD 5.4 billion) will be used for compulsory debt repayment and the remaining will be used for defence and civil security leaving no money for other social and developmental expenditure. Public expenditure on social sectors (education and health) and economic infrastructure (power, roads, transport and railways) was just 11% of the total in 2005 and 2006 according to Sarvananthan. The fact that such a large amount of revenue will be spent on repaying debts means that the government is spending more for the past than the future. Sri Lankan imports have increased by 37.6 percent in the first quarter of 2008 while exports have increased only by 10 percent. Thus, the trade deficit had gone up by 107.2 percent. The increased public expenditure is financed by both domestic and foreign borrowings, but of late the share of domestic borrowings in financing public expenditure has increased as a result of shrinking foreign aid. However, foreign grants have reduced not because of the war but because Sri Lanka has now been recognised as a middle income country. The economic crunch is compounded further by the surging world price of crude oil and international prices of rice and wheat. At the domestic front, unprecedented rain and floods have slashed the seasonal paddy harvest and other food crops. In such a situation the cost of living is likely to increase further. Faced with such a crisis can the Sri Lankan economy continue to fund another protracted phase of war?

Defence Expenditure

Coming back to the numbers, defence expenditure in Sri Lanka has been rising since 2006 and has always over shot the budgeted expenditure. According to Dr. Saravananthan, in 2008, the Government expects to spend LKR 456 million (USD 0.4 million) per day on defence and public security. This figure is however, an underestimation because lot of the armament purchases are made on instalment basis. Therefore payments are spread for a number of years in the future with accrued interest. Since most of this expenditure is going to be financed by domestic and external borrowings the cost of interest payments in the future years has to be included. All of this would mean that the compounded cost of defence expenditures would be significantly greater than that shown in the annual budget outlays. Sri Lanka has been the highest defence spender in South Asia and among other internal conflict ridden countries both in terms of per capita and as a percentage of the GDP. According to the SIPRI military expenditure database, among developing countries and/or countries affected by civil war, Sri Lanka's military expenditure as a percentage of its GDP is highest after Eritrea (25%) and Israel (8%). High defence expenditure can also be advantageous to the economy but such advantages accrue only to countries that have a military industrial complex/ defence industry. In the case of Sri Lanka all defence procurements are imported and thus currency exchange rates have an enormous impact on the budgeted amount.

Sri Lanka's Direct Defence Expenditure 2006-2008

Year	Voted Expenditure	Actual Expenditure	Defence Expenditure as a % of the GDP
2006	LKR 96 billion	LKR 111 billion	3.8
2007	LKR 139 billion	LKR 160 billion	4.5
2008	LKR 166 billion	LKR 200 billion	5.3

Note: Actual defence expenditure and GDP for 2008 are estimates assuming 6% growth

Apart from direct costs related to the defence expenditure one has to also take stock of the indirect costs. The war has led to a loss of tourism earnings and local and foreign investment. In terms of earnings per capita, there is a loss of future earnings of dead and disabled combatants and civilians. Besides, a high military expenditure diverts public money from more productive expenditure and social sectors as mentioned earlier. Increasing military checkpoints/road blocks increase the transaction cost of businesses and lowers the productivity of ordinary civilians because of loss of time, fuel, etc. Last year the closure of the airport for three months at night-time has cost businesses such as airlines and export trade heavily.

With an inflation of 35 percent, why is the public not turning against the government? Is it perhaps the psychological boost or the 'feel good factor' from the gains in the Northern battlefront? In comparison to the situation in 2000 when economic problems were compounded by battlefield reverses, in the current phase, military successes are sustaining the public support in spite of a high cost of living. The Government claims that the people have to pay this cost in order to eradicate terrorism and the people are buying this argument, thinking perhaps this is the right way to go. A majority of the Sinhalese population feels that the Government will capture Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu but experts suggest that the Government's advance will be anything but smooth. Capturing LTTE area will not necessarily lead to ceasing LTTE activities. The approach that Sri Lanka faces a terrorist problem will not ensure a solution to the actual ethnic problem. Dr. Rajan Hoole of the UTHR-J wonders if the government and the forces will be able to ensure stability and human rights in the North and East.

by Tejal Chandan

The Political and Military Situation in Sri Lanka

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Sat, 17 May 2008 15:00:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan

Summary

The conflict in Sri Lanka, which has claimed over 70, 000 lives over the past two and half decades, has entered a difficult phase with the onset of 2008. The abrogation of the almost six year old Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in January confirmed the intensified character of the battle in the coming months and the urgency of a political solution. Since then several military and political developments in the country have had varied reactions from different quarters both within Sri Lanka as well as internationally. This edition of the Security Watch discusses the various developments since the onset of 2008 and provides an analysis of their implications. While the Government is engaged in a battle with the LTTE, it has to live up to the expectations of restoring democratic rights and development in the erstwhile LTTE strongholds. Elections will have to be followed by considerable devolution of powers to the Provinces. The capability of the LTTE to infiltrate into Government held areas, more so, into Colombo is of serious concern. Inhuman acts of targeting civilians with several blasts, like the incident of May 16, will continue to shake the island nation.

Introduction

When the New Year dawned in Sri Lanka, it marked the onset of a difficult year for the Government and its strategies in bringing an end to the conflict. The abrogation of the almost six year old Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in January confirmed the intensified character of the battle in the coming months and the urgency of a political solution. Thereafter, the submission of an interim report by the APRC, the increasing military thrust in the North and the elections in the Eastern Province have all had varied reactions from different quarters both within Sri Lanka as well as internationally. The first-ever election to the Eastern Provincial Council with a record number of 1342 candidates from 18 political parties and 73 independent groups is expected to put to test the theory that elections and the limited devolution that follows will meet the aspirations of the minorities.

The APRC Interim Report and the 13th Amendment

With fears of increased violence after the abrogation of the CFA, international pressure on the Government to expedite the process of finding a political solution grew enormously. The hopes of the APRC process delivering a solution acceptable to all quarters of the Sri Lankan polity seemed rather slim without the participation of the two largest opposition parties that quit the process on different accounts. The sudden environment of urgency created after the abrogation of the CFA led the APRC to submit an interim report to the Sri Lankan President. Pending consensus among all the parties on further amendments to the Constitution, the report recommended the full and faithful implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, holding Provincial Council elections in the East and the establishment of an Interim Provincial Council for the North. The implementation of the 13th Amendment continues to evoke a divided opinion among the Sri Lankan polity. Critics have argued that it is the inability of successive Governments to implement the Amendment that has kept the conflict alive. The process of implementation of the 13th Amendment, which has been part of the statute for over 20 years, could have been embarked upon by the present Government without the recommendations of the APRC but the Sri Lankan President insists that the report was necessary to ensure the 'consensus' that was lacking during the Governments of his predecessors. In a way, President Mahinda Rajapakse silenced the opposition from the UNP (United National Party) as it was the UNP President J.R. Jayewardene's Government that passed the amendment in 1987. As for the international community, it has for several years been insisting on the implementation of the Amendment and thus there was little to argue over the interim report.

Looking at the fine print, the APRC Interim Report recommends less than what was passed in 1987. The Committee in a four page report titled "Action to be Taken by the President to Fully Implement Relevant Provisions of the Present Constitution as a Prelude to the APRC Proposals" recommended measures that can be taken under the existing provisions of the Constitution. The temporary merger of the North and East which was the basic feature of the 13th Amendment was undone by a Supreme Court ruling that declared the merger illegal. Hence, the recommendations of the interim report are bereft of this basic feature. Again as envisaged in the amendment, the powers of finances, police, education and land are not to be devolved. On the issue of the Official Language, the interim report recommended immediate action for the full implementation of "Chapter IV- Language" of the Constitution. The Head of the APRC panel, Tissa Vitharana, has said that while a consensus document, which would be a basis for an appropriate constitutional arrangement, is being finalized, a course of action to achieve maximum and effective devolution of powers to the Provinces in the short term has been identified.

Until the APRC's own final proposals concretize, the implementation of the Interim Report is a pragmatic "first step" towards the prospect of a just political solution. President Mahinda Rajapakse and the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) have shown progress in accepting the implementation of the 13th Amendment as against the SLFP proposals of May 2007 that proposed devolution at the district level. The challenge is in maintaining the support for genuinely implementing the provisions of the 13th Amendment. In keeping with the recommendations of the APRC to constitute an Interim Provincial Council for the North, the Government set up a Special Task Force (STF) for the Northern Province to oversee development initiatives. The STF will provide advice to all ministries, departments and statutory bodies of the state and will help coordinate and oversee resettlement and rehabilitation work, facilitate coordination between Executive and Consultative board as proposed by the APRC and provide proposals and ideas to the Governor of the Northern Province. The three-member STF will be headed by the Cabinet Minister for Social Services, Douglas Devananda and comprise the Minister for Rehabilitation, Rishad Badiuddin and senior Presidential Advisor and MP, Basil Rajapakse.

Elections and the Political Scenario

Emboldened by victories on the battlefield, the Sri Lankan Government was keen on holding elections in the East. The decision to hold local council elections in the Batticaloa district was strongly contested by the key opposition parties including the UNP, TNA (Tamil National Alliance) and JVP (Janatha Vimukti Perumuna) on the grounds that conditions in the Eastern Province were not suitable for free and fair elections and the Government had failed to disarm the TMVP (TamilEela Makkal Vidhuthalai Pulikal). Nevertheless, the local council elections were held on March 10 in a peaceful environment and proved to be a success for the Government in more ways than one. The Government could now take the credit for bringing the breakaway faction of the LTTE into the political mainstream. It is said that the main purpose of these elections was to legitimize the TMVP as a political party. To the international community the elections were meant to prove the government's determination to usher in democracy in the formerly LTTE dominated areas. The TMVP won eight of the nine local body elections but the result was no surprise as the UNP, TNA and JVP decided not to contest.

This set the backdrop for the Provincial Council elections held on May 10. The run-up to the Eastern Provincial Council elections saw the opposing political parties gradually join the fray. The UNP aligned with the SLMC (Sri Lanka Muslim Congress) which is the strongest Muslim political party in the East and the ruling UPFA (United Peoples Freedom Alliance) coalition aligned with the TMVP. The TNA did not contest, as running in the election would amount to recognition of the demerger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. However, its appeal to voters to defeat the Government was construed as supporting the UNP-SLMC alliance. For the Mahinda Rajapakse led government this election had several larger objectives and higher stakes. Successful elections in the East would consolidate the separation of the East and North. Further, these elections will assuage the international community's concerns over the lack of a political solution. Interestingly, at a Seminar in Colombo, a Government Minister went so far as saying that a defeat for the Government in the elections would be an even bigger success as the Government would have proved that the conduct of the election was free and fair. Alternatively, it can also be said that an electoral defeat for the government would have meant that the people disapproved of the military strategy.

The May 10 elections had a 60 percent turnout and passed off without any major incident of violence amid unprecedented security measures. President Mahinda Rajapakse's UPFA won the elections and within hours, the President declared that the people had "given a clear mandate for peace through the defeat of terrorism, strengthening of democracy and development of the country" An important underlying message from the victory is the legitimization of the Government's strategy to militarily eliminate the LTTE. The elections were not bereft of controversies. The opposition parties refused to accept the results and questioned the free and fair character of the elections. Election monitoring groups have argued that although there were no major incidents of violence there were undercurrents of intimidation all through the election campaigning. On the day of the election, there were reports of large-scale impersonations and intimidations.

The most controversial aspect of the elections has been the fact that the TMVP continues to retain arms on the grounds of self-defence. The PAFFREL (People's Action for Free and Fair Elections) Election Monitoring Report has rightly noted that "The basic requirement for a free and fair election is that all the contesting parties are unarmed and not in a position to intimidate both their political rivals as well as voters who will be fearful to cross the path of the armed party."[1] Adding to this problem was the fact that the TMVP was aligned with the Government which jeopardized the system of checks and balances on electoral malpractices. While the debate of fair or unfair will continue to preoccupy Sri Lankans, the Government will soon have to forge its success with the devolution of powers and development of the Eastern Province. The Eastern Province has seen no development since the 1980s when its agriculture, fisheries, industry and infrastructure were destroyed by the LTTE. The Government has given top priority to economic development in the province by allocating USD 56 million for the purpose. Although several development projects have been initiated, equal attention has to be given to reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. An important decision for Mahinda Rajapakse was the choice of a Chief Minister. The Eastern Province has an evenly balanced Tamil, Sinhala and Muslim population. Pillaiyan (Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan), leader of the TMVP, has secured the maximum number of preferential votes followed by M.L.A.M. Hisbullah who defected from the SLMC and is a UPFA ally. On May 16, Pillaiyan was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the Eastern Province but Hisbullah along with two other elected Muslim members decided not to support the appointed Chief Minister. The Hindu Editorial of May 13, 2008 had suggested that given the current and past tensions "a sound and progressive course will be to go for a rotating arrangement in which the Chief Ministership will be shared by the Muslim and Tamil Groups that have done well at the polls." The President has sought to resolve this tussle by appointing a Muslim candidate as Chairman of the Eastern Province. There are also indications that Muslims would get most of the ministerial portfolios.

Military Thrust in the North

The top priority of the Sri Lankan military forces has been the military weakening of the guerillas and recapturing of their heartland in the Wanni. Since July last year, the security forces have faced stiff resistance from LTTE owing to increased guerilla strength in the areas around the Northern Forward Defence Lines (FDLs). The military, however, is said to be carrying out three different thrusts into the rebel-held strongholds. The first thrust from Mannar led to the capture of the Sea Tiger base of Vidutaltiva which acquired added significance for the guerillas since the army recaptured Silavathurai. The second thrust from Muhamalai, southwards in the direction of Killinochchi, has maintained pressure on the guerillas with troops making incursions to attack guerilla defences and returning to their positions. The third thrust from the eastern side from Vavuniya has led to advances into the rebel stronghold from defence lines at Weli Oya. In the past, whenever the LTTE has faced pressure in the battlefields in the North and East, they have taken the battle outside the region and this time around also, it is not any different. With the CFA abrogated and the SLMM packed away, the LTTE had no qualms in openly targeting civilians outside the theatre of conflict. Attacks into the deep South have proven this tactic of the guerillas. An added concern for the security forces is the increased LTTE activity in the Central Province.

Further, with the elections in the East, the war assumed a new dimension. According to Sunday Times Defence Correspondent Iqbal Athas "Particularly in the Mannar sector, the re-capture of the Madhu shrine and its environs by the troops will bolster the ruling party's position at the polls. It could be argued, perhaps with some justification, that after re-capturing the East, troops were now making gains in the North. For the same reason, Tiger guerrillas would want to avoid loss of any territory dominated by them. They would want to offer stronger resistance at least until the polls are over."[2] While the security forces have continued to maintain pressure on the LTTE in the North from Mannar and Vavuniya, the FDLs from Kilaly to Nager Kovil in the Jaffna Peninsula have come under LTTE attack. The Muhamalai FDL came under a fierce attack by the LTTE on April 23. The attack, which was an attempt to infiltrate into government controlled areas claimed the lives of several Sri Lankan soldiers. According to Keheliya Rambukwella, Defence Spokesperson, 43 soldiers were killed and 33 were missing in action. A further 126 were injured. Contrastingly, Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka disclosed that over 300 soldiers were wounded. He also mentioned that the Army had advanced by 600 metres ahead of the original FDL. It has to be noted here that only 16 days ahead of this attack several media personnel were taken on a tour to leave no doubt about the formidable defensive positions in Muhamalai. Another aspect is that besides the loss of life, the loss of military hardware can prove to be very costly. The intensity of the attack can be gauged by the request for aerial support by the Army Headquarters. The security sorces have nevertheless been able to spring back into action and make slow but further incursions into enemy defence lines. The Sri Lankan troops are now in control of the sacred Madhu Church which is of great religious significance. The capabilities of the Tigers to infiltrate into Government held areas remains, as demonstrated by their under water operation that sank a Sri Lankan Naval troop and munitions vessel in Trincomalee Harbour just hours before the Provincial Council Elections. Overall, compared to the battles in the East, there are indications that the military offensive in the North has slowed down and that the military is following a Strategy of Attrition in the Wanni. This implies large scale use of mortars, guns and helicopter gunships with obvious consequences for civilians.

There have been several doubts raised on the issue of casualties in the battle. Iqbal Athas says that "If you add up all the figures given by the government from the beginning of the separatist war until now, it would have wiped out the population of the North twice over. Similarly if one were to adopt the figures put out by the Tamil Tiger rebels that would have depleted the ranks of the military considerably". The Government's Media Centre for National Security says that since the onset of 2006, 6867 Tiger fighters and 1501 Sri Lankan soldiers have been killed. Of the rebel losses, just over 2000 have taken place this year up to March 19 and the armed forces losses for the same period have been 186. According to Military Spokesman, Brig. Udaya Nanayakkara, the Tigers were down to around 5-6000 fighters at the beginning of this year from an estimated 12000. Interestingly, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka has at different occasions contradicted his own statements on the strength of the LTTE and the timeframe for defeating them. In December last year he was quoted as saying "My term of office is coming to an end this year and I will not leave this war to the succeeding army commander". Then in January he said that "LTTE has 3000 cadres remaining. Military plans to kill them within six months". In February again he said "I don't conduct the war looking at deadlines and timeframes. The LTTE has around 5000 fighters… We must realize that the offensive is going to take time". President Mahinda Rajapakse has also said that in a year or two the security forces might be able to clear the LTTE out of the remaining areas. When one looks at the area reclaimed by the security forces in the North, the progress has been slow as compared to the easy capture of large swathes of land in the East and the casualties reported from the battle in the North seem to be higher. It is unclear as to how timeframes can be set for a war of such uncertain nature. The doubts over the number of casualties are cast also due to the fact that journalists are barred from conflict areas and they have no independent means to verify the figures given to them by the Government or those mentioned on Tamil Tiger websites. To maintain high morale among the security forces and to sustain an aura of confidence seen as necessary to maintain the support of the majority ethnic group that is dominant in the South, it is suspected that the casualty figures may be quite different from the actuals.

The Issue of Human Rights

The International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) which was constituted by the Sri Lankan President in February 2007 (to monitor the work of the Commission of Inquiry (COI) appointed to inquire into 16 incidents of alleged serious violations of human rights since August 1, 2005) terminated its operations in the island in March.[3] The IIGEP was to comment on the transparency of the COI's investigations and their conformity with international norms and standards. However, since its formation relations between the Government and the IIGEP deteriorated to an extent where both developed distrust of the other's intentions. The IIGEP in its public statement on the termination of operations noted that "the proceedings of inquiry and investigation have fallen far short of the transparency and compliance with basic international norms and standards pertaining to investigations and inquiries. The IIGEP has time and again pointed out the major flaws of the process: first and foremost, the conflict of interest at all levels, in particular with regard to the role of the Attorney General's Department. Additional flaws include the restrictions on the operation of the Commission through lack of proper funding and independent support staff; poor organisation of the hearings and lines of questioning; refusal of the State authorities at the highest level to fully cooperate with the investigations and inquiries; and the absence of an effective and comprehensive system of witness protection." Justice P.N. Bhagwati, head of the IIGEP, further said that "There has been and continues to be a lack of political and institutional will to investigate and inquire into the cases before the Commission". The IIGEP statement further noted that it had submitted substantial suggestions and observations in several interim reports to the President but these were ignored and rejected.

In response to this statement, the Attorney General said that the IIGEP seeks to cater for an international agenda in releasing the Public Statements to coincide with the 7th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council. The Government has time and again charged the Group with pursuing an agenda tailored for external forces while harping on the lack of political will. The Public Statement noted that "IIGEP does not see how its continued engagement with the process could change this situation. The Eminent Persons hope, nevertheless, that their concluding observations and recommendations will assist the Commission of Inquiry and the Government of Sri Lanka". The Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights has noted that although the members of the IIGEP have relinquished their mandate, the concept of the IIGEP has not been dispensed with. The Government will exercise its right to appoint other experts who will be able to discharge the mandate given to the IIGEP. The outlook towards the international community in Sri Lanka needs to be underlined here. Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohana in an interview to The New York Times stated that Sri Lanka's "traditional donors", namely, the U.S., Canada and the E.U., had been replaced by countries in the East because the new donors are neighbours; they are rich; and they conduct themselves differently. He further stated that "Asians don't go around teaching each other how to behave." This increasingly anti-West worldview and a push towards building relations with China, Pakistan and Iran is a worrying aspect for the international community.

In another human rights controversy, the Sri Lankan military has been accused of abductions by the New York based Human Rights Watch (HRW) in its report released on March 6. The report said that it found the Government forces involved in 99 cases of abductions documented by the HRW. It further mentioned that most of them taken were Tamils with alleged ties to the rebels along with journalists, clergy, educators and human rights workers. The Government has however denied any involvement of the military in abductions. Separately, the University Teachers for Human Rights of Jaffna (UTHR) in it's special report No. 28 made public in December 2007 outlined the hardships of the people in Jaffna and made a scathing indictment on the armed forces, government and LTTE on the count of human rights. Random killings, extra-judicial torture and disappearances have become a norm in Jaffna and NGOs stay away from the touchy issue of human rights as it invariably leads to a confrontation with the Government and poses a problem to their ability to function in the area. Among other issues of serious concern, according to the report, are the signs that civilians have lost all right to dignity. In the case of the LTTE, it says that rights groups have not got around to seeing the practices of the Tigers who are said to maintain a register of children who are abducted as soon as they turn 17. The prevailing pressure maintained by the security forces in the battlefield has led to the LTTE increasingly conscripting women and children to fight in the frontlines. A UN report of January has said that the renegade outfit of the LTTE (Karuna Faction) continues to recruit children for combat purposes. A more worrying aspect is that these recruitments have been made from the Internally Displaced Persons camps. The issue of the large number of IDPs should be a cause of concern for the Government. The lack of security around refugee camps and IDP camps and the concentration of vulnerable children make these camps prime recruiting grounds.

Conclusion

The different facets of the conflict described above indicate that a difficult year lies ahead for the Government of Sri Lanka. While it is engaged in a battle with the LTTE, it has to live up to the expectations of restoring democratic rights and development in the erstwhile LTTE strongholds. Elections will have to be followed by considerable devolution of powers to the Provinces and the government will also have to respect the rights of the opposition and accommodate its legitimate demands. The considerable efforts of holding elections and devolving of power would be meaningless if an environment of fear and intimidation continues in the former battleground. The capability of the LTTE to infiltrate into Government held areas, more so, into Colombo is of serious concern. Inhuman acts of targeting civilians with several blasts, like the incident of May 16, will continue to take place and shake the island nation.

[1] PAFFREL Interim Election Monitoring Report, May 10, 2008
URL: http://www.paffrel.lk/pdf/paffrel_interim_report_10_may_08.pdf
[2] Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, The Sunday Times, 20th April, 2008
[3] B. Murlidhar Reddy, "Mission Failure", Frontline, Vol.25. Issue 7, March 29-April11, 2008.

PEACE OPTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Fri, 14 Dec 2007 15:00:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan

Much has been written, analysed and said about the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka. Many people have lost their lives, their livelihoods and are having sleepless nights. Be it the personnel of the Sri Lankan Security Forces, the LTTE or the common man, all of them have been exposed to extreme stress. Perhaps this is why it is said that conflict in any form or intensity brings insurmountable insecurity although it may be clad with occasional victories for either side. Years have been spent in combat even in the Israel-Palestine conflict but it does not seem to have reached a solution. If anything, it has been generating more fear, hatred and determination to fight back. The conflict in Sri Lanka is no different in this sense.

The air strikes by the LTTE earlier this year followed by the ouster of the Tigers in the East, the ongoing military operations in the North, LTTE's most recent attack in Anuradhapura and the death of LTTE's political head, all form a chain of retaliatory attacks that spell revenge and unending escalation. In the ongoing cycle of one side trying to outdo the other, it was doubtless that the LTTE Chief would vow to carry forward the liberation struggle and the Sri Lankan Defence Secretary would call the death of Tamilselvan a 'message' for more to come. Further, incidents such as the Anuradhapura attack are only adding to the already swelling war expenditure leaving behind a heavy burden for the future, acting as a serious check and constraint on the growth of the economy. The unchecked inflation- reaching 20 percent in spite of the declared 7 percent GDP growth rate has burdened the common man more than anyone else. The latest incident - death of Tamilselvan- has tremendously narrowed the space available for a meaningful political dialogue more because of the hardened determination to fight.

This grim situation nevertheless provides two opportunities that can widen the narrowing space for negotiations - the APRC and the restoration of normalcy in the East. The APRC was established to work out an acceptable proposal for power sharing with the minorities. The majority report of the multi-ethnic expert panel that was advising the APRC was a master piece that showed just how closely the three communities could work. The downfall of this entire process began with the Government distancing itself from the Majority Report, the JVP withdrawing from the APRC and the UNP abandoning it. The APRC has now been reduced to facing the challenge of staying active as a credible forum rather than meeting its original challenge of finding a political solution. The APRC made some progress even amidst opposition from the Sinhala hardliners and the divides that characterize the current Sri Lankan political scenario. According to Prof. Tissa Vitharana, Chairperson, "The APRC has been able to come to a consensus on about 85 percent of the core issues during deliberations, with participation from 13 political parties." The proposals for the powers to be vested with the Central Government have been finalised and work is in progress to finalise the power distribution for the provinces. The chairperson is positive about submitting a final proposal in the next few weeks but the President will have to keep his promise of abiding by the proposals of the APRC and create enough goodwill for the opposition to support the recommendations.

In the Eastern Province, the travails of the people continue even after the much hailed ouster of the LTTE. The Government has been blamed for "Sinhalisation" of the province and forced resettlement of people without ensuring a secure environment. The SLMM in its latest security assessment reported the growing fear in several communities in the East especially the Muslim community owing to the presence of the TMVP cadre. The Muslims, according to reports, have been repeatedly threatened to leave the 'Tamil areas' in the province and are not being allowed to return to their places of origin. The issue has cost the government the support of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress who withdrew stating the failure of the government to redress the grievances of the Muslims in the Eastern Province. The UN also reports the continuous presence of armed groups in the Ampara District while harassment, intimidation of the civilians and extortions continue. These incidents have been affecting the return of displaced persons and recent clashes between the two factions of the TMVP have prompted former IDPs to flee their homes again. The UNHCR has urged the government to strengthen the return process, build confidence among the returnees and ensure that the returns are voluntary, safe and in line with international standards. Besides the humanitarian issues, a growing challenge in the East is the presence of warlords (Pillayan and what remains of the followers of Karuna) which will eventually pose a greater threat than terrorism.

After the ouster of the Tigers from the East, fighting has continued across the forward defence lines separating the Sri Lankan Security Forces (SLSF) and the rebels in the North. Coordinated operations are being carried out by the Sri Lankan Army and the Air Force in areas surrounding the LTTE held territory. In September 2007, the Army captured Silavathurai and Arippu areas south of Mannar where the LTTE had several transit camps used to unload shipments which were sent to Vanni. The capture allowed the Navy to effectively dominate the South of Mannar Sea. According to Iqbal Athas, greater significance lies in securing land north of Mannar which would prevent Sea Tiger movements across the Gulf of Mannar and restrict logistics supplies. Separately, the Navy destroyed three floating LTTE warehouses in the high seas south east of Sri Lanka. Since September 2006, the Navy has carried out several such attacks destroying LTTE arms shipments and significantly reducing the fighting capability of LTTE. In early November, in what is seen as retaliation to LTTE's Anuradhapura attack, Sri Lankan Air Force pounded a suspected LTTE hideout that killed the LTTE political head Tamilselvan and five other leaders. The rebels on their part have been equally responsible for escalating the war. While making public appeals to the international community to warn the Government on the futility of a military solution, the Tigers continue to carry out attacks against the Sri Lankan Forces and key government installations. On October 22, the LTTE carried out its first coordinated air and ground attack on the Anuradhapura Air Force base completely destroying eight aircraft and damaging 14 other aircraft costing the Government USD 30 Million.

Throughout the last two years, military victories and the subsequent crackdown on LTTE operatives in several countries have severely reduced the operational capabilities of the group. Its isolation and desperation could not have been expressed more clearly than in the 2007 Hero's Day Speech by the LTTE leader, indicating that the Sri Lankan Government's military and diplomatic maneuvers have been achieving their goals. The willing or unwilling propaganda of despair by the LTTE is giving no reason for the Government to backtrack on its successes.

Public Opinion

National surveys provide useful barometers to gauge public opinion in a country and the results of such surveys are pointers for future action. Two public surveys in the case of Sri Lanka merit a mention here, one by the Marga Institute in collaboration with the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka1 (NPC) and the other by the Centre for Policy Alternatives2 (CPA) . The Marga-NPC study was a one-time deliberative poll carried out in Ampara in the Eastern Province and 17 other districts from the rest of country in May-June 2007. The CPA survey called the Peace Confidence Index (PCI) is a periodic study conducted using a structured questionnaire and a randomly selected sample of 1300 people from 17 districts in the country. It is essential to note that both these surveys could not cover the North and East. The Marga Study represents the opinions of the Sinhalese and the Muslims and the CPA study represents the opinions of the Sinhalese, Muslims and Up-Country Tamils.

The NPC- Marga Study

This study covered issues regarding the fundamentals and preconditions for peace, the current military strategy, constitutional reforms and the future of the North and the East. According to the survey, 72 percent of the respondents agreed that regardless of the military action to end the war there has to be a political solution to the present conflict. 87 percent agreed that such a solution should provide a political system for equitable sharing of power between Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities while maintaining the unity and integrity of the country.

The responses to the question of whether the Government should continue the current strategy of weakening the LTTE highlight the sharp opinion shifts in the respondents. 68.4 percent stated that the government should continue its strategy of weakening the LTTE and 77.2 percent said that the government must act on the basis that the LTTE will not enter the democratic process. But when asked if peace can be achieved through an offer of a political solution that should be negotiated with all parties including the LTTE, a majority of 57.7 percent agreed. Interestingly 72.4 percent agree that lasting peace is possible through a political solution that all communities accept and that includes the LTTE in a negotiated settlement with a multiparty democratic system. Clearly, the responses indicate what is more desirable.
On the question of constitutional reforms, a maximum number of persons, i.e. 87.5 percent accepted a system of the Province as the unit of devolution, where the emphasis is on fundamental rights and equality of all citizens regardless of race and religion. On the North and East, 63.9 percent believed that in order to strengthen efforts for peace, people of the North and East should be able to exercise their rights and elect their representatives to provincial councils freely and fairly while 85 percent were of the opinion that special arrangements should be made to hold elections to the provincial councils of the North and East without further postponement.

The CPA Peace Confidence Index

The CPA study gives a clearer picture of community wise opinions with the responses graphed as those of the Sinhalese, the Up Country Tamils and the Muslims. On a question relating to the national issue of most importance, the Sinhalese (29.4 percent and 27.3 percent) and Up Country Tamils (27.2 percent and 25.1 percent) gave high priority to economy followed by the peace process and the Muslims gave a high priority to the peace process followed by the economy (33.1 percent and 30.5 percent). Again, a majority from all three communities, Sinhalese (52.9 percent), Up Country Tamils (95.4 percent) and Muslims (93.1 percent) believe that the best solution to the conflict is through peace talks. Support on this opinion among the Sinhalese increased by 7 percent from 46.3 percent recorded in CPA's February Poll. 27.9 percent of the Sinhalese also believe that the solution lies in the government defeating the LTTE.

Peace processes thrive on the level of commitment and capability of the parties involved. 62.3 percent of the Sinhalese agree that the government is committed to finding peace through talks. When compared to the February polls there has been an 11 percent decrease in this opinion among the Sinhalese. On the other hand, 44.1 percent of Muslims and 52.4 percent of Up- Country Tamils do not agree that the Government is committed to finding a solution through peace talks. 75.5 percent of the Sinhalese and 50.8 percent of the Muslims do not agree that the LTTE is committed to peace through talks, while 43.3 percent of the Up Country Tamils agree. On the question of foreign involvement which has been a highly debated issue 45.1 percent Sinhalese, 81.8 percent Up Country Tamils and 71.7 percent Muslims believe that an international-third party facilitator will have a positive impact on the peace process.

On the question of the cost of living, a majority of Sinhalese -57.4 percent said that they are willing to bear the rising cost of living for the sake of the Government's effort in fighting LTTE. Compared to the February polls there has been an 11 percent decrease in the number of Sinhalese having the same sentiment. The question is, how long will the nation continue to bear the rising costs?

The two surveys, although lacking a representative Tamil population, illustrate that a majority of the public in Sri Lanka desire an early peace with restoration of democratic processes in the North and the East and equality for all communities. As it appears now a favorable condition for peace is yet to be created. While the protagonists continue to work on a military solution, the country has been left polarized. The key problem in Sri Lanka, according to Jayadeva Uyangoda, lies in the conduct of the ethnic war with new determination but without a parallel political reform programme.3 The fact remains that without addressing the political root causes of the conflict, any other process cannot yield a meaningful and long-lasting solution. A change in the situation will depend on the swift de-escalation of the conflict and restoration of democratic processes, for the moment, at least in the Eastern province. There is an urgent need to speed up the process of resettling the IDPs in their original places and sincerely carrying out the necessary developmental and reconstruction activities such as post-tsunami rehabilitation, rebuilding schools, primary health care centres, hospitals and restoring water and power supplies. This would enable the revival of a process that can remove fear and gradually reverse the loss of trust and understanding between the Sinhala, the Muslim and the Tamil communities.

The SL government will have to prove to the majority of Tamils that their legitimate grievances will be addressed and that they can trust the Sinhala leadership. In a recent interview with the Sri Lanka Guardian, Mr. R. Swaminathan, Former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India has said that even if a comprehensive agreement with the Tamils cannot be reached the Government should be prepared to take initial steps unilaterally and hope that the Tamils will respond favorably.4 Sri Lanka cannot afford to continue on the war path. An indigenous solution arrived at through consensus will be more effective and durable than an imposed solution through military force.

Endnotes

1. The Marga Institute is a civil society initiative started in 1972 in Colombo. It focuses on the study and critical evaluation of past and ongoing developmental activities in Sri Lanka. The National Peace Council of Sri Lanka (NPC) was established in 1995. It focuses on strengthening public support for a negotiated political solution to the conflict and supports activities aimed at mobilizing the people towards peace and conflict transformation.

2. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) was formed in 1996 to strengthen institution- and capacity-building for good governance and conflict transformation in Sri Lanka.

3. Jayadeva Uyangoda, ' Beyond Redemption', Frontline, December 7, 2007, p 35-36

4. Interview with R. Swaminathan, Former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, Sri Lankan Guardian, http://lankaguardian.blogspot.com

THE PURSUIT OF PEACE IN SRI LANKA

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Sun, 30 Sep 2007 14:59:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan

The All Party Representative Committee (APRC) considered to be a potentially promising initiative for peace in Sri Lanka, has found an obstacle in the lack of consensus over the nature of the Sri Lankan State. The APRC was convened by the Sri Lankan President in July 2006. It was mandated with the task to find a political solution to the ethnic conflict through proposals for constitutional reforms with an aim to engage various political parties and arrive at a consensus through deliberations. After 42 meetings in 14 months, the decision to adjourn APRC meetings and no further progress there on has led to the prediction of its demise and the notion that the APRC has failed to evolve anything tangible. On the contrary, the APRC has made considerable progress and arrived at a consensus on various issues. (See Text Box). The issues that remain points of disagreement are the nature of the state i.e. unitary or federal and the re-merger or de-merger of the North and East provinces.

The fundamental question of whether Sri Lanka should continue to be governed from the centre or more power should be devolved to the provinces has remained a point of disagreement for decades denying a lasting negotiated solution. While a unitary government is synonymous to continued Sinhala domination for the Tamils, for the Sinhalese, it is seen as a guarantee for the unity of the country and their majority rule. The Chairperson of the APRC, Prof. Tissa Vitharana tried to bridge this chasm by proposing to leave out both the terms 'unitary' and 'federal' from the Sri Lankan Constitution and instead describing the State as "one, free, sovereign and independent State" which advances a Sri Lankan identity recognizing the "multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi cultural character of the Sri Lankan society". The Vitharana proposals adopted a large part of the Majority Report of the Experts1 Committee which promoted the need for maximum devolution and power-sharing at the centre.

As outlined by the APRC Chairman Prof. Tissa Vitharana the APRC decisions to date are:

-The province to remain the unit of devolution but the district to be strengthened as an administrative unit within the provincial framework and on this basis there should be devolution.
-The Concurrent List, provided for under the 13th Amendment, to be done away with. Central and provincial lists of devolved subjects to be clearly defined. Executive and legislative powers would be devolved on these levels of administration.
-Within this provincial framework there would be a 'pyramid of peoples representation' from the Village Committee and Ward Committee levels up to the Pradeshiya Sabha and district levels. These arrangements will be tied up with the existing administrative systems so that the GA will be the chief executive at the district set up charged with channelling central and provincial funds with corresponding functions for the Divisional Secretary at the divisional level.
- Reduce the danger of separation as a result of power devolution by reiterating the powers of the President as the Head of State - as set out in APRC Chairman's document. That is intervention by the President through the armed forces and police to defuse any separation threat or even dissolve any provincial government in the face of a separation threat.
- Strengthen the 'spirit of cooperative governance', as set out in the South African constitution, so that different tiers of government would work cooperatively strengthening and protecting national sovereignty

Source: The Island dated August 15, 2007

The current roadblock facing the APRC process reminds one of the fate of several past attempts at constitutional reforms, all of which became victims of chauvinistic politics and the lack of consensus among the Sri Lankan leadership. One of the first attempts was made with the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact and later the Senanayake-Chelvanayagam Pact. The abrogation of these pacts sowed the seeds of betrayal and mistrust and led even the Tamil moderates to demand for a free nation. The situation was only aggravated with the 1983 pogrom. J. R. Jayawardene's efforts, first in introducing proportional representation and incorporating Tamil language rights in the Constitution in 1978 and later in devolving powers to provinces and according an official status to the Tamil language under the India- Sri Lanka Peace Accord in 1987, faced extensive protest from the south and fuelled a Sinhala insurgency. In 1995, Chandrika Kumaratunga along with her constitutional architects, G.L.Peiris and Neelan Thiruchelvam presented a devolution package based on a federal constitution. The proposal was an unprecedented move from the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) but this process was also short lived. The LTTE on its part carried out political assassinations, virtually eliminating the moderate Tamil leaders, thus, weakening the democratic voices within the Tamils. The Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal was the only instance when LTTE presented a concrete proposal. The ISGA outlined the LTTE position regarding a framework for political solution which however did not refer to LTTE's plans to function within a united country. These proposals were also set aside on the grounds of being outside Sri Lanka's Constitution and laws.

In this dismal background, the positive outcome of the current APRC process amidst tremendous political activity has shown the possibility to evolve a consensus on key issues and propose safeguards against secession. Besides, the Majority Report is considered as the most progressive set of proposals since the Peiris-Thiruchelvam package. However, in seeking a final solution the political scene in Sri Lanka cannot be ignored. The APRC received a boost when UNP (United National Party) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the SLFP effectively bringing two of the largest political parties together in the process. However, the MoU fell apart with a mass cross-over of UNP members into the Government. The UNP stopped attending APRC meetings and set a deadline of August 31, 2007 for a final proposal. Later citing APRC's inability to submit a final proposal within the deadline, the UNP quit the process. Dissent within the SLFP also led to the formation of a break away faction SLFP (M) headed by Mangala Samaraweera, former Foreign Minister which has joined hands with the UNP, reportedly, to topple the Government.

The Government headed by Rajapaksa is supported by the pro-war JVP (Janatha Vimukti Perumuna) and JHU (Jathika Hela Urumaya) and its majority in parliament is based on ethnic minority parties such as the CWC (Ceylon worker's Congress) and SLMC (Sri Lanka Muslim Congress). The pro-war parties have a passionate commitment to the unitary state and their support therefore will come at a price of no accommodation with the forces of Tamil nationalism. The rising cost of living and coming to light of Government extravagances has frustrated several hardcore JVP activists and its core base of trade unions, prompting JVP to carry out protests against the government. The UNP is also said to be engaged in wooing the JVP. The recent announcement by UNP that it will deviate from federalism in resolving the national conflict is seen as a step to muster JVP's support in toppling the government. The military operations on the other hand have increased the sense of insecurity among the ethnic minority constituencies thereby reducing chances of steady support from the minority parties. The government has also to worry about the return of Chandrika Kumartaunga and is concerned that she may lure loyalists and disgruntled elements to break away from SLFP.

With regard to the military operations, Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa declared that a political solution will be possible only after a comprehensive military defeat of the LTTE and victories in the East need to be complemented with victories in the North. There has been a slow but sure military thrust by the Sri Lankan security forces. The Navy intercepted and destroyed three cargo vessels of the LTTE. The Army gained full control of the entire area south of Mannar including Sea Tiger bases in Silvathurai, Arippu and several other areas. The Army also captured LTTE's FDL near Yodha Wewa (Giant Tank) north of Mannar. The pressure may be mounting for the LTTE but the fact that it has not engaged in any major military attacks in the recent months indicates to the fact that they have also not expended vast quantities of ammunition. LTTE's Political Head S. P. Thamilchelvan in an interview to TamilNet stated that the outfit's patience was intentional and it was restricting itself to a defensive war. Incidentally, in the back ground the President's impending visit to New York to address the UN General Assembly Gothabaya Rajapaksa invited the LTTE to the negotiating table. Nevertheless the Government's commitment to a political solution has been questioned. Past experiences of military solutions in Sri Lanka have indicated that the impetus for political reform ends once the Government defeats its opponent.

Deterioration of the human rights situation, executions and rising abductions has also given rise to international pressure. On the eve of Mahinda Rajapaksa's address to the UN General Assembly Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitary Killings stated that the situation in Sri Lanka had erupted into a crisis and extra judicial killings need to be stopped. Earlier in August this year, Sir John Holmes, UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, called the record of the safety of humanitarian workers in Sri Lanka as one of the worst in the world. Currently the UN Special Envoy Manfred Nowak is in Sri Lanka and his visit will be followed by a fact- finding mission by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour.

Given the rising costs of living and the war against LTTE the need for a political solution is felt by all sides in Sri Lanka. Two recent opinion polls, one by the Marga Institute in collaboration with the National Peace Council and another by the Centre for Policy Alternatives highlight the growing acceptance of a political solution over the military option. They also indicate the space available for negotiations with the LTTE. The Marga survey was a deliberative poll conducted between May- June 2007 in Ampara in the Eastern Province and 17 other districts from all other provinces excluding the North. The survey largely reflects the positions of the majority and the Muslim community. According to the survey, an assessment of the efficacy of a military solution led 72 percent of the respondents to conclude that a political solution is the best guarantee for a lasting peace. The study further notes that this readiness of 72 percent to "envisage a future where LTTE is part and parcel of a restructured Sri Lankan polity reveals the space available for arriving at a political settlement that has public backing." On the question of devolution of powers, 44.7 percent support the Indian model while only 22.1 percent accept a fully federal system. The CPA opinion poll conducted as part of its study of Peace Confidence Index in June 2007 saw a majority 95.4 percent of Up-Country Tamils, 93.1 percent of Muslims and 52.9 percent of Sinhalas supporting a solution through peace talks. If at this moment in time, a political solution acceptable to ethnic minorities is accepted by the Government, the impetus for peace will lie on the LTTE. Such a proposal can lead to immense pressure on the LTTE from the Tamils and the International community.

Foot Note

1. The Experts Committee was a 17-member multi-ethnic panel of experts formed to provide advice and submit recommendations regarding power sharing and constitutional reform to the APRC. The expert committee produced four different reports. The Majority Report was submitted by 11 members representing the three major ethnic groups. Four other members submitted another report and two others submitted two separate reports.

Text of the APRC Chairperson's Report

CIVIL SOCIETY AND HUMAN SECURITY

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Tue, 18 Sep 2007 14:55:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan and Sankhya Krishnan

Human security in simple terms refers to the well being of the citizen and encompasses economic, environmental, social, political, food, health and community security according to UNDP. Various opinion polls in India seeking to prioritise the public perception of a wide range of security threats have consistently ranked threats relating to human security ahead of threats relating to the security of the state. Human security is not only freedom from war but also the freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom of choice. Safety leads to freedom from fear, while well-being results in freedom from want. Human security is thus also linked to human development.

Civil society plays a critical role in enhancing the various dimensions of human security both directly and indirectly by providing an interface between the public and the two other actors, state and market, and acting as a pressure point on them to display greater transparency and accountability. Civil society's vital role in developing, advocating, building and implementing human security is evident from its involvement in key issues such as governance, human rights, justice, poverty alleviation, empowerment of the underprivileged and peace and stability. Moreover, globalization coupled with enhanced media penetration has rapidly spread knowledge about civil society, which in turn has led to increased appreciation of its role. Conceptually, civil society has emerged as a subject of trans-disciplinary discourse. While community groups, churches, the media or political interest groups have long played an important role at the local and national level, it is the more proactive involvement of the civil society on the global landscape that has gained momentum in recent times. Transnational networks of civil society groups are raising a louder voice as to how governments run countries and how corporations do business. Developing countries are witnessing the growth of an active civil society, which has been beneficial not only for local and national governance but also for enhancing human security.

The Centre for Security Analysis (CSA) has been focusing on issues relating to Civil Society, Security and Governance. As a first step, the CSA organized public lectures from Indian and US perspectives on the subject of Religion, Civil Society and Governance. This was followed by a national seminar on the theme Civil Society and Governance in Modern India. In August 2007, the CSA organised a two day international seminar on the theme Civil Society and Human Security: South and Southeast Asian Experiences to bring together the experiences of civil society in enhancing human security in South and Southeast Asia. The state and civil society work towards providing human security but at different levels. This seminar explored questions such as: How has the relationship between the civil society and the state improved? How has this relationship improved human security? How has it influenced the civil society, the state and human security? How does the civil society cope with regional organisations such as ASEAN and SAARC? How is the relationship between the state and civil society likely to evolve in the age of information technology and the Right to Information? How has the civil society itself undergone a change? How has it coped with the reality of ethnic, religious and other conflicts in the region?

Mr. N. Vittal, IAS, (Retd.), former Chief Vigilance Commissioner, delivered the keynote address at the seminar. He defined civil society in the words of Peter Drucker as the space that exists between the family, the state and the market and that which is non-governmental in nature and is not against the welfare of the citizen. Security, in his words, is related to the needs of the citizens. Quoting from Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs, he noted the four most important needs are life; food (which includes not only providing food but also access to food); clothing and shelter (which includes environmental security); and employment (which includes economic and financial security). The insurance of these needs is the exercise of security. Religion was one of the first institutions to provide people the guarantee for these needs but as time went by there was a separation between religion and the state. Today when the state fails to provide the basic security the civil society takes over. In the context of globalisation, Mr. Vittal questioned whether the role of civil society was to supplant or supplement the state and set the tone for the deliberations that followed.

Dr. Yashavantha Dongre, Professor, University of Mysore, in his paper Civil Society in India: An Overview, posited that civil society in India is neither a well-defined terrain nor accessible to mere structural, operational and institutional definitions. The pre-colonial setting in India had much greater space for people's (civil society) initiatives and the colonial rule apart from many things brought the 'individual' to the centre stage and made 'rugged individualism' a virtue. The post-independence era has seen greater institutionalization of civil society. In the institutionalised space, the civil society came to include both formal and non-formal (incorporated and unincorporated) entities that play significant roles in reforming and reframing our societal space. In the non-institutionalized space, civil society in India needs to be juxtaposed in terms of religion, caste, class, language and regional contradictions and harmonies. Dr. Dongre addressed the basic questions regarding the contribution of civil society in India, how it brings compatibility between the State interest, individual interest and the interests of the space between the two and the future of civil society in India.

Dr. Joseph Liow, Head of Research, RSIS, Singapore, gave an overview of the civil society in Southeast Asia and explored the role of the civil society in Malaysia. In his paper "Uncivil Society?": NGOs and the Narrowing of Religio-Political Space in Contemporary Malaysia, Dr. Liow noted that the increasingly important role that the NGOs and civil society organizations play in Malaysian politics and society has, to some extent, compelled the Malaysian state to provide room for them to articulate their priorities. In the Malaysian case, it is noticeable that, paradoxically, the proliferation of voices has not really resulted in any discernible expansion of the parameters of debate. He added that obvious instances of this paradox can be found in the debates over apostasy, freedom of religion, and the primacy of shari'a in Muslim life as well as the question of moral policing, where a sizeable number of vocal Muslim civil society groups and NGOs have at times championed positions even more hard-line and conservative than those taken by the state. He explained that a close perusal of the dominant civil society agenda in Malaysia offers discourses that in fact impose limits on debates about Islam, unlike Indonesia where a "cultural Islam" emerged in the 1980s and offered a trenchant critique of the prevailing political agenda of the country's Islamist parties and sought to redefine Islam's relations with the state.

The session on civil society and social security covered the issues of social protection from poverty, disability, corruption and unemployment. Dr. Sharit Bhowmik, Professor, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, in his paper Civil Society and Urban Poverty, examined urban poverty in the context of the changing position of labour in the cities and covered the changing employment patterns in the large cities, especially Mumbai, and its effect on housing. Slum dwellers comprise a majority of Mumbai's population and they contribute to its economy in a number of ways. However when urban land is available at a high premium, it is these people who are targeted as the villains responsible for the growing urban crises. Slums are projected as the causes of most, if not all, urban problems. He noted that NGOs have emerged as powerful bodies in influencing the city's bureaucracy and its policies and they have been active in eviction of slums and street vendors, leading to greater insecurity and poverty among the marginalized. Dr. Bhowmik sought to examine how the situation can be altered to have world-class cities for all with inclusive planning for the working poor.

Dr. Mokbul Ahmad, Assistant Professor, Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand and Mr. Jeevan Thiagarajah, Executive Director, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Sri Lanka addressed the challenges to civil society in bringing peace in conflict situations. Dr. Ahmad posited that the failure of the state to assist the poor or reduce poverty led to a dramatic growth of NGOs to fill the gap. Some of the activities of the NGOs have been opposed by religious leaders and organisations. Most notably, NGOs involved in micro-credit have been the target of fundamentalists as charging interest is forbidden in Islam. Some NGOs have shown success in promoting human rights particularly women's rights but this too has been accompanied by a backlash from the local elite, religious leaders and organisations. In a country like Bangladesh with 90% of the laws being secular, 87% of the population being Muslim and Islam being the state religion, there are legal problems from unresolved conflicts in the law. Women's independence and women's empowerment programmes are against the beliefs of many orthodox Muslims, but 'gender-development' is a leading concern of Northern donors. Dr. Ahmad suggested that the donors and NGOs need co-operation or at least a non-conflicting attitude from the religious leaders and that the donors and the state in Bangladesh should formulate their policies keeping in mind this problem of the NGOs and their clients in Bangladesh.

Mr. Jeevan Thiagarajah noted that the conflict-affected regions lagged behind the rest of the country in key economic and human development outcomes. He enumerated four pre-conditions for political stability in Sri Lanka including a negotiated political settlement, demilitarization of the conflict, social and economic reconstruction and intercommunity reconciliation. Drawing on Amartya Sen, he said that an adequate concept of human security must place a clear focus on human lives, enlarge the understanding of human rights to include the social dimension, and encompass the role of social arrangements in enabling human security. He called for the development of a common civic culture that would transcend the various ethnic cultures and provide the meeting ground for people to interact across cultural borders, a key requirement for nation-building.

The civil society also plays a critical role in advancing human rights and catering to social justice. The session covering these issues included presentations by Ms. Braema Mathiaparanam, Visiting Research Fellow, ISEAS, Singapore and Dr. Lalit Kumar, Deputy Adviser (Voluntary Action), Planning Commission, New Delhi. Ms. Mathiaparanam noted the need for protection and empowerment of communities to occur from a rights-based approach. She gave an overview of the migrant workers phenomenon and the role of the ASEAN and the individual countries in promoting human rights and stated that although there has not been a clear response with regard to the rights of the migrant workers at the ASEAN level, responses from individual countries and groups within them have been more fruitful. Her presentation further exemplified the various civil society organisations (CSO) involved in securing the rights of migrant workers and highlighted the importance of not only public- private partnerships but also CSO unions, employer associations, recruitment agencies, foreign governments and off-shore NGOs. She further highlighted the challenges of tensions between the citizens and migrant workers.

Dr. Lalit Kumar noted that the civil society has been serving as an effective non-political link between the people and the state and has been providing innovative solutions to poverty, deprivation, discrimination and exclusion. Civil society organisations create social capital by binding the village communities as a whole, while working for common developmental causes in the areas of education, health, sanitation, environment or micro-credit. Further, CSOs enhance social justice through the mobilization of citizens to encourage changes in government policy and in business behaviour. In order to empower independent voluntary organisations (VOs), he noted the need for creating an enabling environment for VOs that stimulates their enterprise and effectiveness and safeguards their autonomy. This would enable VOs to legitimately mobilize necessary financial resources from India and abroad, encourage them to adopt transparent and accountable systems of governance and management, and identify systems by which the Government may work together with VOs on the basis of mutual trust and respect.

In the closing session on civil society and governance, Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan, Co-founder, Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy, Bangalore, noted that India's growing urban population, which would encompass a majority of the country within the next two decades, has brought with it a set of complex challenges, for which we are ill-prepared. In his presentation Civil Society: An Inflection Point in India he stated that in order to address these challenges, we must first come to terms with the phenomenon of urbanization rather than treating it with suspicion. He traced the political apathy of the middle class to the fact that democracy had preceded the emergence of the middle class in India which hence took political rights for granted. However, he suggested that middle class activism through the space of civil society could aggregate into a potent political force and encouraged the concept of the Area Sabha to bring citizens into a formal political process of collective decision-making. He argued that the role of the state as a regulator for the market could also be extended to regulating the functioning of civil society organisations to ensure that they are harnessed towards positive outcomes. He added that civil society organisations could be the catalysts for the deepening of democratic processes in India by adopting an approach of constructive engagement.

The seminar thus covered the subthemes of civil society and governance, social security, human rights and social justice and civil society in conflict situations. The proceedings of the seminar will be published as an edited volume. Keeping in view the growing importance of NGOs in bringing peace, the CSA will organise a seminar specifically covering the theme of Civil Society in Conflict Situations on October 5-6, 2007. India faces a number of internal security challenges across its entire land mass ranging from insurgency movement in Kashmir to the ethnic conflicts in the Northeast and the Naxalite inspired violence spread across various states in the so-called 'red corridor.' The Indian state has used various instruments to address these conflicts including military force, political negotiations and economic packages but with only partial success. If these conflicts are to have a chance of being resolved, a bottom-up approach involving the participation of civil society is equally important.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SRI LANKA: AN OVERVIEW

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Sat, 04 Aug 2007 14:56:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan

The Sri Lankan Government is now in control of the East after a year long battle that witnessed some of the most serious confrontations between the Sri Lankan Security Forces (SLSF) and the LTTE since the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). A low intensity conflict that raged since December 2005 blew up into a full scale war after the LTTE blocked water supply from the Mavil Aru Irrigation Channel which affected 15,000 families and 30,000 acres of paddy fields. The Sri Lankan Army (SLA) launched an operation to capture Mavil Aru in July 2006 and since then similar operations continued to push the LTTE out of the East culminating in the capture of Thoppigala on July 11, 2007. This issue of Security Watch summarises the military operations since the beginning of the offensive and gives an analysis of the current scenario in the Island nation.

Even as the SLA's operation in Mavil Aru was in progress, the Tigers launched an offensive in Trincomalee. They struck at Muttur, fired artillery at the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters and the Air Force base at China Bay and targeted civilian passenger ferry 'Jetliner' carrying over 800 off- duty security forces personnel as it neared Trincomalee harbour. The Tigers had been able to infiltrate into Muttur and occupy some of the government buildings until the SLA took control of the town. The attack was aimed at cutting off Army supply lines from military bases in Trincomalee and curbing ship movements from Trincomalee to Jaffna which is the lifeline of 40,000 troops and Police in the Peninsula. The sea line of communication between Trincomalee and Kankesanturai is of critical importance considering the absence of an overland supply route-i.e the Kandy-Jaffna A9 route which passes through Tiger controlled areas in the North. The SLSF secured Muttur by August 05 and were in full control of the sluice gates in Mavil Aru by August 10, 2006 even as the LTTE accused the Government of continuing the offensive, rejecting a SLMM brokered deal to lift the water blockade on August 06.

The operations spread to Jaffna on August 11 with the LTTE's attack on the Muhumalai entry-exit point which is the divide between LTTE held Wanni and Government-controlled Jaffna. The defence lines at Kilaly and Nagerkovil along with the Palali Air Force base also came under attack from LTTE's artillery. The Palali airbase serves as a vital air-supply link for the troops as the route through sea often comes under attack by the sea tigers. Sea Tiger boats had also infiltrated into Mandaitivu and Kayts. The SLSF, although tactically withdrawing at first, managed to push back the LTTE and occupy their first line of defences south of Muhumalai. SLSF cleared Mandaitivu by August 12 and repulsed a sea borne attack on the Allaippiddi-Kayts defence lines on August 13, 2006. The closure of the A9 highway, which is the vital transport route linking Jaffna to the rest of the country, by the government led to a humanitarian crisis in Jaffna. The government acknowledged the existence of a crisis situation only much later and took steps to import essential goods directly to Jaffna.

......................................JAFFNA ISLANDS
..
Source: www.geoflueck.ch

The Trincomalee harbour continued to be vulnerable to LTTE attacks from Sampur town and its adjacent areas. Sampur has been critical for both the Government and the LTTE as it lies directly opposite to the Trincomalee Port and Naval Base. Overtime, Sampur acquired the position of a key LTTE base providing it the opportunity to deploy artillery pieces and bomb the area at will. In the event of continuous hostilities, the regaining of Sampur became an imperative for the SLSF in order to deny the guerrillas a stronghold from which they can disrupt the movement of armed forces. The battle to regain the town was launched by the military on August 28. The ground based military thrust was accompanied by aerial bombardment, artillery fire and naval gun boat shelling. After fierce fighting between the troops and LTTE, the SLSF managed to recapture Sampur on September 04. With the gains in Muhumalai and Sampur, the Security Forces successfully thwarted the LTTE from placing a siege on Jaffna. Fighting continued in Manikerni in the East and Jaffna in the North. Combined with ground operations backed by the Air Force, the Sri Lankan Navy launched operations to deny access to arms and ammunitions to the LTTE through the Palk Straits. On October 11, 2006 129 soldiers of the SLA were killed and another 300 were injured in a single day of fighting. The government claimed it killed 200 LTTE cadres while the LTTE said it lost only 22 fighters.

The operations to capture the next significant LTTE military base-Vaharai (also known as Vakarai) in Batticaloa began on October 29, 2006. The tigers have nurtured their bases in Batticaloa and Amparai through their control of Vaharai and also secured a free run in smuggling arms and narcotics to Sri Lanka from the neighbouring East Asian countries. Besides, the A-15 Batticaloa-Trincomalee road also passes through Vaharai. The capture of Vaharai was planned to put an effective check on LTTE forays into two of the three districts in the East and also end their direct access to the sea in the eastern province.

Part of the Eastern Province in Sri Lanka showing LTTE bases-Muttur, Sampur, Vakarai and Thoppigala that fell to the SLA
including the A5, A27 and A15 highways.

Source: www.lankamission.com

After three months of fighting that had resulted in swelling numbers of displaced persons, the Army captured Vaharai on January 19, 2007. For the first time in the last decade, the LTTE is said to have fled leaving behind a large haul of arms. Apart from the SLSF, the LTTE had to also face attacks from the Karuna faction. Sri Lankan Special Task Forces launched clearing operations in Amparai and cleared several bases in the district. As a result, the troops gained control of the A15 road. The LTTE is said to have withdrawn most of its troops from the East after the loss of Vaharai.

Inspite of heavy losses in the battle field, the LTTE continued to mount unconventional operations and carry out sporadic attacks on the security forces. The Tigers attempted to assassinate, albeit unsuccessfully, the Sri Lankan Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka in April 2006 and Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse in December 2006. Apart from opening fire at troops, they continued to detonate claymore mines and carry out grenade attacks. On March 26, 2007, the LTTE demonstrated its air strike capability by dropping bombs on the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) base in Katunayake in retaliation to a string of SLAF attacks in the North and East. In a month's time the Tiger aircrafts had struck thrice targeting the Palaly military base, oil installations on the outskirts of Colombo and an attempted second attack on Katunayake on April 26, thus, altering the course of the war. Although the physical damage from these air strikes was minimal, the economic costs were enormous, most notably, with the tourism industry bearing the brunt. Major international flights have just resumed their flights after discontinuing them for two to three months.

On the ground, with the control of Vaharai, the SLSF had cut off supply routes of the northern tigers to their cadres in east. Thoppigala remained the last bastion of the LTTE in the Eastern province and its capture was planned in two phases. Thoppigala, apart from being a safe haven, was the Eastern Headquarters of LTTE. The tigers used the difficult terrain around Thoppigala to build several camps and heavily mined the areas surrounding them. The first phase commenced on February 24, 2007 and ended on April 25, 2007. SLSF cleared the LTTE locations bound by the A5 road on the west and the A27 on the southwest. This area is said to have provided depth to LTTE's Thoppigala defences. With the peripheral bases captured, the SLSF commenced the second phase to capture the inner bases of Tharavikulam and Narakamulla. The Tigers on the other hand, having gained new confidence after a series of air strikes, carried out a successful strike on naval detachments in Delft Island. The island territories of Jaffna Peninsula are important outposts providing early warning on sea movements, infiltrations and impending attacks. Thus, they form a formidable barrier to sea borne infiltrations into the Peninsula. The LTTE has tried to infiltrate into these island territories on several earlier occasions. On July 11, 2007, the military declared its control of Thoppigala and the complete ouster of the Tigers from the Eastern Province. The year long offensive "to liberate the east from the clutches of the LTTE" has witnessed hundreds of civilians either killed or injured and thousands more displaced. With regard to the casualty count from both sides there has been a wide divergence in figures from the Government and the LTTE throughout the offensive.

For the island nation, the "Liberation of East" however does not mark the end of the war. Although not in control of territory in the East, the LTTE retains the capability to mount hit and run attacks and launch major strikes in government-held areas. LTTE's political head, Thamil Selvam has threatened that the group will attack Sri Lanka's economic interests. Besides, the military intelligence is said to have raised concerns on LTTE operations moving deep down south due to the loss of Batticaloa. LTTE's defeat in the east may seem irreversible at this time but at several occasions in the past, the group has been able to make a comeback by stealth. The trouble for the LTTE this time around also comes from the presence of cadres from the Karuna faction. According to Jehan Perera of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, the downside of rooting out LTTE structures in the North and East is the reduction in whatever influence the political wing may have exerted on the military wing. Peace talks may be unlikely at this time due to LTTE's own reluctance to negotiate from a militarily weak position and the government's militarily favourable position which might make it advantageous to press ahead with the military operation. The Sri Lankan Defence Secretary has estimated a time period of three years to completely defeat the LTTE. The question that lurks around this declaration is- Can the Sri Lankan economy sustain the war for three more years? Moreover, three years is a very long time period in politics. With new political alignments emerging in Sri Lanka the political situation is being watched keenly.

In the East, the government faces a mammoth task of demining the province before speeding up rehabilitation and development programmes and more importantly preventing an infiltration by the Tigers. A string of ambitious development programmes are under way with international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) resuming their work. The Government's development programme has tasked the Army and the Police with heading committees on development work in order to keep errant INGOs and NGOs under check and prevent Tiger guerrilla infiltration at the grass roots. With the current state of the people in the East, a sincere reconstruction programme can ensure a fall in the tide of LTTE sympathisers.

The battle ground is now shifted to the North even as the LTTE is still active in the East. Media reports suggest that incursions by the Government into the LTTE stronghold in the Northern Province will prove to be a costly affair in terms of men and material. The SLSF is said to be planning on a three pronged offensive into the North from Mannar, Jaffna and Vavuniya and the Sri Lankan President has said that his government will proceed with the "task of restoring freedom and democracy in all of Sri Lanka". While earlier in May 2007, the chief of the Army had said that "Our plan in the North is to weaken the LTTE militarily so that we are able to maintain our positions there". With possibilities of the situation deteriorating further, the impact on the civilians will be devastating. As for the consequences of continuing the war, in a strong remark, Gareth Evans, Head of the International Crisis Group said that the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE have repeatedly violated international humanitarian law and the impact of the war on civilians makes the country a potential case for "right to protection" or right to intervention by the international community. While delivering the Eighth Neelan Thiruchelvam Memorial Lecture in Colombo on July 29, 2007 he also noted that the government's strategy of "fight now to negotiate later" will only work if the government is ready with a package of political and constitutional reforms that appeal to non-separatist Tamils and Non-Tamil parties and advised the government to resist the temptation of taking the war to the North.

DIASPORA AND THE TAMIL TIGER MOVEMENT

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Mon, 18 Jun 2007 14:55:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan

A critical factor accounting for the sustenance of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the world's most dreaded separatist organisation proscribed in several countries, has been the international support infrastructure it has established over the years. This support base includes not only fund raising but also wide ranging propaganda and publicity, thus becoming a source of both financial and political support for the Tamil cause. It is no surprise that the LTTE enjoys unquestioned support in certain sections of the vast and vocal Tamil Diaspora. These supporters believe that LTTE is the only chance for a Tamil Eelam and the only answer to Sinhalese chauvinism. At the same time, there are others in the Diaspora who desire an independent nation but do not approve of the violent and terrorist methods of LTTE. Then, there are those who nurse nothing but hatred for the LTTE and blame the leadership for the unending suffering of the Tamils in their homeland. This widespread Tamil Diaspora established itself in countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Scandinavia (Norway, Finland and Sweden), Switzerland, the United States, Canada and Australia in the midst of a spiralling conflict between 1983 and 2002.

The LTTE leadership had realised the importance of developing an overseas network much before some of the other Tamil militant groups. As early as 1978, Prabhakaran had a dedicated group of supporters in London. However it was only after having lost considerable Indian support in the aftermath of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination that Prabhakaran turned to the world Sri Lankan Tamil community and gradually integrated certain sections of the Diaspora into a strong support structure.

The LTTE publicity and propaganda has targeted the Tamil expatriates and host governments mainly in western countries and harnessed support through front organisations such as the United Tamil Organisation (UTO) in the United Kingdom, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT) in Canada, The Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations in Australia, the French Federation of Tamil Associations in France, the World Tamil Movement (WTM) and the Swiss Federation of Tamil Associations in Switzerland.1 In the late 90s, the FACT and WTM among other organisations were declared as Tiger fronts and brought under anti-terrorism legislations in the US and Canada. Altogether the publicity mechanism integrates sympathetic pressure groups, media units, charities and benevolent non-governmental organisations which galvanise support through publicising Tamils as innocent victims of Sinhalese discrimination and the government's military repression. The single and most important message of these activities is that the LTTE is the only capable Tamil force to fight for an independent nation without which the rights of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka cannot be obtained.

The LTTE also runs a sophisticated fund raising operation which includes voluntary contributions from the Diaspora, funds diverted from non-governmental organisations and other charities, investments in legitimate businesses of Tamil expatriates and human trafficking. Money from the Diaspora is procured through a 'tax' on all families. Funds are also procured through non-governmental organizations where money is collected for the development and rehabilitation of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Tigers usually collect these funds voluntarily relying on the effectiveness of their propaganda. But when this fails, intimidation, coercion and threats are resorted to. Details of the extortion drive were brought out in an in-depth report by the Human Right Watch. Influential people among the Diaspora live in a constant fear for their lives. According to the report, "In Sri Lanka, there is nothing scarier than being a Tamil person of influence-whether you are a teacher, a school principal, a doctor, a journalist, a politician, or a successful businessman. Ordinary Tamils have learned to keep their heads down, do exactly what their neighbors do, and not make waves. These lessons traveled with them to Toronto and London and Paris-where the LTTE and its supporters continued to take over and monopolize social structures, from refugee relief in the 1980s to newspapers, shops and temples. A few threats, a few smear campaigns, a murder or two, and the lesson is reinforced" 2

Actions against LTTE activities have most prominently included the banning of the organisation in several countries. India banned the LTTE in 1991 followed by the US in 1997. The United Kingdom, Canada and the 27 Member-States of the European Union followed suit in declaring the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. Inspite of these actions Diaspora support, both political as well as financial, continues to remain strong.

Recent Activities

As armed violence escalated since late 2005, the fund raising drive gained momentum around the globe and LTTE activities once again came under the scanner in several countries. French Police raided several Tiger offices and shops and arrested 19 Tamil Tiger agents; police in Germany began discreet investigations into the activities of suspected LTTE activists in Germany; the Australian Federal Police arrested two Sri Lankan Tamils with terrorism related charges and accused them of being LTTE members. Similar crackdowns have been carried out in Canada and Italy has also reassured the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister that it will continue to keep a close tab on the flow of funds and weapons to LTTE. In the wake of these events, the Sri Lankan Ambassador to Washington alleged that the LTTE sold nearly 1,30,000 Norwegian passports, stolen over a period of time, to the highest bidders and also to Al-Qaeda operatives. The Ambassador also indicated narcotic sales and credit card frauds as some of the other methods used to earn money. The Norwegian Police have however denied the reports on passport thefts.

Taking stock of the international activities of the LTTE over decades, one must be careful to not overstate the effect of recent arrests. Inspite of sophisticated intelligence and monitoring of LTTE activities it is difficult to differentiate the LTTE run businesses from the other legitimate establishments. It is also difficult to draw a line between funds collected for humanitarian purposes and the funds being siphoned off to LTTE coffers. Interestingly, the funds accrued from these activities are at times used to fight costly legal battles for those being prosecuted. The motivation of the Diaspora is something that cannot be measured either. Usually success is followed by more voluntary support while failures may amount to reduced support. The reported increase in the flow of funds to LTTE after the fall of Elephant Pass is just one example supporting this success-failure relationship. The recent air strikes probably have had the same impact. Similarly, the recent eviction of Tamils from Colombo may prove to be another powerful propaganda tool in the hands of the LTTE.

With around 7,00,000 refugees from the current conflict now among the Diaspora and with growing dissent against the policies of the Sri Lankan government mobilisation of support may become easier. Even in Sri Lanka, the Tamil moderates, having given little to hope for from the Government and having no reason to love Prabhakaran, may end up either supporting him or otherwise tolerating his activities. Eventually, for the people in the North and East of Sri Lanka, the crackdown on LTTE activities abroad may mean the discontinuation of funds even for genuine humanitarian purposes while for the Diaspora, demands for support to the LTTE may not come to an end as yet.

End Notes

1. Daniel Byman and Peter Chalk et.al, "Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements" RAND Monograph Report, 2001, URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf
2. "Funding the Final War: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora", Human Rights Watch, Volume 18. No.1 (C), March 15, 2006, URL: http://hrw.org/reports/2006/ltte0306/1.htm

HUMAN RIGHTS IN LANKA

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Wed, 16 May 2007 14:52:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan

In the recent months, the conflict between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE has worsened, putting the country into the throes of war. Even as the military consolidates its operations in the east, the security of the Sri Lankan people continues to deteriorate with a rash of human rights abuses. Hundreds of civilians have been killed or injured and thousands more have been displaced. Abductions and disappearances are on the rise and arrests and detentions are being made without formal legal charges. Human rights groups have appealed to the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil Tigers to bring a halt to human rights violations. Reports have alleged that both LTTE and the Karuna faction continue to abduct children especially in the island's restive east and use them as fighters. The Sri Lankan military has also been accused of being complicit in the forced recruitment of children by the Karuna faction.

The escalation in fighting, especially in the east, has left over 2,00,000 persons displaced. The protection of the internally displaced by the government has become even more important in the wake of abductions by armed groups using 'White Vans' without number plates. Furthermore, the plight of the displaced continues to worsen in the absence of adequate supplies. Persons in Batticaloa, who are used to three meals a day, are now forced to survive on 100 to 200 gms rice a day. The children are worst affected due to lack of milk food. More disturbingly, human rights reports have said that the Sri Lankan authorities are using threats and intimidation to force civilians, who fled recent fighting, to return home in order to portray a scene of normalcy. The Government has vehemently refuted these claims. The Civil Monitoring Committee, an organization documenting disappearances, has recorded 51 abduction cases in and around Colombo alone over the previous year. During the past 16 months a staggering number of 3000 people have been killed and on an average 5 to 8 such incidents take place daily particularly in Jaffna, Vavuniya and in the East.

The most worrying factor for Sri Lanka is the existence of multiple perpetrators. LTTE has a terrible record of human rights violations and is responsible for a large number of killings, abductions and recruitment of children. Even as recently as March 2007, both the Karuna faction and the LTTE continued to abduct children. According to UNICEF there were 45 cases of Karuna child abductions in three months (10 in December, 24 in January and 11 in February). UNICEF also documented 19 cases of LTTE child recruitment in January and nine in February. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published in January details how Karuna cadres operate with impunity in government-controlled areas and abduct boys and young men with state complicity. While the Government has said that it would investigate the allegations of state complicity, Karuna has denied allegations of abducting or recruiting children in an interview to the BBC.
Despite who the violators are, the Sri Lankan Government, as a democratically elected authority of the country has the responsibility to protect the rights of its citizens. The Sri Lankan Government has appointed a Commission of Inquiry (CoI) consisting of eight commissioners to look into 15 serious violations beginning in August 2005 including the massacre of 17 NGO aid workers. The Commission will be supervised by an International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP), nominated by Australia, Britain, Canada, the EU, Japan, the Netherlands, the United States, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has welcomed the decision but has also stressed the need for a broader international mechanism to monitor and prevent human rights violations.

Several critiques have been published on both the CoI and the IIGEP raising concern over their mandate, powers and practical output. The warrant issued by the President in November 2006 does not provide judicial powers to the CoI or the IIGEP and their mandate is only to make recommendations to the government. Adding to the cynicism the warrant does not specify that reports of the CoI be made public. The restrictions imposed on receiving information and issuing statements by IIGEP is a matter of particular concern. Civil society actors and human rights groups have highlighted the importance of making all reports and findings of CoI public, lifting the restrictions on the members of IIGEP to ensure its professionalism, independence and neutrality and a comprehensive follow up to ensure that perpetrators are held accountable. The CoI can challenge the culture of impunity in the country provided it remains impartial and independent.

According to a media release by the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, there has been a noticeable decline in the freedom of media and the accuracy and responsibility of media expression in Sri Lanka. HRW, which has been highly critical of the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, has said that all sides in the civil war had interfered with and sought to restrict the exercise of free speech and freedom of the media in areas under its control. "The LTTE does not allow a free media while in other areas it has intimidated, attacked and sometimes killed journalists critical of its policies and actions" it said. The Karuna group has also interfered with the media by blocking the sale of Tamil-language dailies which are critical of the armed group, such as Virakesari, Thinakurral and Sudar Oli. Referring to the closure of a Sinhalese-language weekly Mawbima, HRW alleged that the Sri Lankan Government was abusing anti-terrorism legislation to clamp down on journalists who expose human rights abuses, official corruption or otherwise question the government's handling of the civil war with the LTTE. Tamil-language newspapers have often come under government pressure but Mawbima is the first Sinhalese language newspaper to be shut down in three decades. Recently threats have been levelled against the editor of Daily Mirror and her staff for their reportage of the human tragedy in the east. The Government has also been criticising diplomatic missions in Sri Lanka in the wake of public statements by some of them regarding the human rights situation in the country.

NGOs are operating in a climate of fear, threat and intimidation and the situation is not helped by a campaign to discount the human rights crisis. Every human rights organization that is critical of the current scenario is accused of colluding with the LTTE. Analysts have said that the government's strategy of crushing opposition may by default end up equating a democratically elected government to a terrorist group with absolute intolerance of any opposition. While the international community is involved in quiet diplomacy with the Government of Sri Lanka insisting on higher human rights standards, some politicians, Government ministers and elements of the media have embarked upon a dangerous campaign either denying the existence of violations or arguing that human rights violations are expected in times of war.

It is in this difficult situation that the European Union, senior United Nations officials and local and international human rights groups have urged the Sri Lankan government to allow the establishment of an international human rights monitoring mission in Sri Lanka. While the monitoring mission cannot end all abuses, it can help reverse the deterioration in the human rights situation and deter some atrocities. The Sri Lankan Government has been called on not to equate seeking of international help and expertise to a compromise of sovereignty or an admittance of guilt. Analysts have said that the establishment of such a mission will display an honest commitment to tackle the deteriorating situation and ensure security for Sri Lankan citizens.

References
'A Commentary on the Commission of Inquiry and the International Independent Group of Eminent Persons', CPA Policy Brief No. 1, 2007, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sri Lanka

'Complicit in Crime: State Collusion in Abductions and Child Recruitment by Karuna Group' Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 19. No.1(c), January 2007

'Displaced seek refuge with Army', Daily News.lk, Monday, April 16, 2007

'Human rights concerns need to be urgently addressed', Media Release, National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, Monday, March 19, 2007

'Human Rights Council: Act to end serious abuses in Sri Lanka', Human Rights Watch, Tuesday, March 13, 2007

'Sri Lanka: Antiterrorism laws used to muzzle the press', Human Rights Watch, Thursday, April 12, 2007

'Sri Lanka: Civilians who fled fighting are forced to return', Human Rights Watch, Friday, March 16, 2007

'Sri Lanka: Karuna group and LTTE continue abducting and recruiting children', Human Rights Watch, Friday March 29, 2007

'Undemocratic government pressure on media is unacceptable', Media Release, National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, Thursday, April 19, 2007
Jayasinghe Uditha, 'Disaster looms for displaced?' Daily Mirror e-Edition, Tuesday, April 10, 2007

Joint UN North East Situation Monitoring Report- February 2007

Mihlar, Farah, 'Highlighting HR violations must not be seen as an attack against the State', Daily Mirror e-Edition, Tuesday, April 17, 2007

Mylvaganam K., 'A Humble Appeal', TamilCanadian, Saturday, April 14, 2007

Renner, Michael, 'Sri Lanka establishes commission of Inquiry into civilian killings a s violence continues', World Watch Institute, November 9, 2006,
URL: www.worldwatch.org

Ross, James, 'Why a United Nations monitoring mission will benefit Sri Lanka', Daily Mirror e-Edition, Thursday, March 22, 2007

Rutnam Easwaran, 'Govt. Warns Foreign Diplomats', Daily Mirror e-Edition, Thursday April 19, 2007

Rutnam, Easwaran, 'Lankan journalists under threat, claims HRW', Daily Mirror e-Edition, Friday, April 13, 2007

Inferring from the LTTE Air Strikes

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Tue, 15 May 2007 14:54:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan

The latest of the LTTE air strikes on April 29, 2007 yet again highlighted the seriousness of the escalating conflict in Sri Lanka and the inability of the Sri Lankan armed forces to prevent such attacks. The embryonic air force of LTTE has within a month attacked the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) base in Katunayake, an Army Engineering Unit in Palaly, oil installations on the outskirts of Colombo and also attempted a second attack on Katunayake on April 26. It is therefore significant to assess LTTE's strategy behind the successive air strikes. Though the physical damage from these incidents is minimal, the political and economic costs are enormous. Further, despite reported Sri Lankan military successes in the East, the LTTE has continued to show its prowess to fight back. Apart from this, the killing and kidnapping of Indian fishermen adds another dimension to the spiralling conflict.

Some similarities of these attacks can be pointed out at this time. All the attacks were carried out at night on key government installations by using improvised ordnances. Flight paths were chosen over thinly held areas or over sea and the attacks were carried out with thorough insider knowledge of the working of Sri Lankan air bases. While the previous attacks were military targets, the most recent one was an economic target. Though the SLAF has carried out several air strikes on LTTE air assets, it has not been able to put them out of action. The Sri Lankan defence ministry has been examining measures to counter the air threats. One such measure is to acquire state of art MiG-29 aircraft from Russia and to discuss an overhaul of the SLAF with assistance from Ukraine. There have also been some suggestions to acquire air capability for the Sri Lankan Navy. However, the acquisition of fighter aircraft or other equipment would involve colossal sums of money. Stressing that the country cannot afford the cost of war, analysts have said that the Sri Lankan Government can either raise the defence tax which has already over burdened the people with a sky rocketing cost of living; print more money or get indebted to private lenders; or move into defence agreements with several countries.

The first attack on March 26 prompted Cathay Pacific to suspend its flights to Sri Lanka for a few weeks. In the aftermath of the latest attack, Emirates and Cathay Pacific suspended flights while Singapore Airlines decided to fly to Colombo only during the day. The repercussions for the already suffering tourism industry have become worse with foreign governments issuing alerts with travel advisories. Compounding the situation further was the decision to shut down Bandaranaike International Airport from 10:30 P.M to 4:00 A.M for three months when most of the flights to and from Colombo operate at night. With the stock market falling and the Sri Lankan rupee touching a new low against the dollar, the flow of investments to the country could be significantly affected. A possible hike in war-risk insurance rates could be devastating for exporters as it will raise freight costs and further pursuit of war and its consequences on human rights may lead to fall in international aid.

On the other hand, military advances into the LTTE bases in the North and East indicate that the air strikes are acts of desperation. Right through July 2006 the army has penetrated into the rebels' strongholds in the East. With the security forces establishing control over all highways and coastal zones in Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai districts, LTTE has been confined to Thoppigala in the East. With the loss of Batticaloa, LTTE has virtually lost its major source of recruits and resources. Given the fact of a tremendous loss in manpower and a sagging morale of the remaining cadre, the air strikes may be an attempt to draw local and international opinion away from the LTTE's military reserves. While the LTTE's pursuit for arms and finance continues, actions against its support infrastructure in countries like Australia, Canada, France and the US have been successfully restricting Tamil Diaspora activity. This in turn, has made the procurement of arms and ammunitions much more difficult. The Sri Lankan Navy has also been successfully intercepting and destroying LTTE vessels believed to be carrying arms, ammunitions and aircraft parts. The SL Navy successfully repulsed a Tiger attempt in Kayts Island to create mayhem in the peninsula by penetrating into Jaffna islands. In a cordon and search operation carried out on April 29 the troops claimed to have gunned down five LTTE cadres including the Kayts LTTE leader Eeeramavaran. In the wake of these and many other losses, could it be that the air strikes are perhaps the last gambit?

While the air strikes have succeeded in instilling fear in the minds of the Sri Lankan citizens and eroding faith in the capabilities of the security forces, they have also acted as a catalyst for rising international support for the government's clamp down on terrorist activities. US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher was quoted stating that the Government has every right to neutralise Tiger air power. On the ground, the army is said to be preparing for an offensive in the North with operations to begin in June or July and one of the first targets appears to be the Madhu areas in the North. The LTTE, in the meantime, is reportedly contemplating the capture of Jaffna. Intelligence reports have indicated possible attacks on targets in the East and vital economic centres in Colombo mainly, the Colombo Port.

The Fishermen Episode

The incident on March 29, 2007 off Kanyakumari coast that left five Indian fishermen dead caused widespread indignation in Tamil Nadu with almost all political parties accusing the Sri Lankan Navy of carrying out such attacks. On April 27 the Tamil Nadu Police in a press release stated that the Sea Tigers were directly involved in the firing on the Indian boat based on the interrogation of six Sri Lankan Tamils captured on April 11 who were later identified as Sea Tigers. The Sea Tigers revealed that they had opened fire as they suspected the Indian fishermen of spying after the latter tried to stall their boat demanding fish. The interrogations also revealed that 12 other fishermen who were abducted from the Kollam district in Kerala were in custody of the Tigers at one of their camps.

Since the incident, there have been speculations regarding the intentions of LTTE. Was the incident plainly unintentional or part of a larger design? Does the LTTE want to force the Indian hand in Sri Lanka by deliberately attacking Indian interests? Or could it be a lesson for the fishermen who refuse to cooperate? Further, were the killings carried out with the LTTE leadership's knowledge? If not, is this an initiative of lower level Sea Tigers indicating a crack in the LTTE command and control? These speculations aside, in the aftermath of the incident, the LTTE may be losing whatever little sympathy it might have from elements in Tamil Nadu. In this connection it is significant to note the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister's strong statement against the LTTE. "The LTTE has no place in Tamil Nadu" he said making it clear that the DMK Government will allow no room for the banned terrorist outfit and its activities in the State.

THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW DEVELOPMENT

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Tue, 10 Apr 2007 14:51:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan

The LTTE air strike on Sri Lanka's principal Air Force (SLAF) base in Katunayake on March 26, 2007 worsened the prevailing volatile security environment in the strife torn country and added a new dimension to the conflict whereby the Tigers now possess the capability to select a target anywhere in the country and access it by air. In the aftermath of the event, the Sri Lankan government was quick to report no damage to its Israel built Kfirs and Ukranian MIG-27s and stage a series of furious attacks on LTTE targets. From the propaganda perspective, the LTTE attack received extraordinary media attention worldwide. Several websites sensationalised the event as a major Tiger triumph and the Tiger leadership declared the raid as a mere demonstration of what was to come. Analysts in Sri Lanka and abroad perceived in the event an onset of a horrendous new phase of the Sri Lankan conflict.

While some analysts have claimed that the Sri Lankan security forces were unaware of LTTE's attempts since late the 1990s to develop air-strike capability, others have stated that the Government has been aware all along of the Tigers' attempts. Apart from installing anti-aircraft guns at several strategic spots in late 1990s, intelligence reports submitted to India in 2001 seeking the installation of the present radar system refer specifically to LTTE's possession of several light aircraft. The fact that an aircraft or two could take off from Wanni, travel 400 kilometres, bomb the SLAF and return unchallenged speaks poorly of the defence preparedness of Colombo. The Sri Lankan Government has ordered an investigation in this context. Moreover, the event has exposed the holes in the Sri Lankan security system at a time when the security forces claimed to have put the LTTE war machine out of action.

With regard to the aircraft used in the raid, the photographs released show that the aircraft was a Czech manufactured Zlin-143, single engine trainer with a maximum flying speed of 267 kph, a wing span of 6.95m and a length of 8.8m, requiring a runway of at least 500m for a normal takeoff and landing. According to a Situation Report in the Sri Lankan 'Sunday Times', the Zlin-143 aircraft is said to have a range of 630 nautical miles and is capable of carrying an ordnance load of 240 kilograms. The LTTE is reported to be in possession of a few other light aircrafts including PC7 and PC9 from the Pilatus Company. With the present range, Indian cities like Chennai, Bangalore and Thiruvanantapuram, the nuclear reactors at Kalpakkam and Kudankulam (under construction) fall into the LTTE strike range. The Tigers are said to have an air strip at Iranamadu and at Pudukudurippu (about 26 kilometres North of Mullaitivu) which the SLAF claimed to have bombed on more than one occasion in 2005-2006. Despite this the fact remains that the Tigers now have air, land and sea forces with intelligence, artillery and commando wings being significantly the only militant group after the Nicaraguan 'Contras' to acquire air power.

In an interview to the BBC, Colonel Karuna, who broke away from the LTTE in 2004, stated that the Tiger leader Prabhakaran was never sincere about the peace talks and signed the Ceasefire Agreement merely to buy time and rearm for more war. The LTTE used lax security of the ceasefire period for rejuvenating its fighting capacity. As pointed out by a JVP MP in 'The Hindu' dated April 5, 2007, the LTTE had imported parts for helicopters and light aeroplanes in the guise of emergency relief in 2005 and majority of the consignments were allowed to pass through the country's main ports of entry to the Tamil areas without the usual customs checks.

However, given the general trend of losses and setbacks suffered by the LTTE since mid 2006, the attack has been called an act in desperation. The Sri Lankan forces, having evicted the LTTE from most of its bases in the East, are now nearing the final stages of their consolidation operations. The Sri Lankan Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka has stated that the LTTE rank and file is only between 3500 and 4000 cadres in the North and East. In the context of these failures and losses it has been speculated that the deteriorating morale within the ranks of the LTTE is likely to have provided one of the main impulses for the airbase attack.

The Sri Lankan President warned that the LTTE's air strike capability was a threat to the entire South Asian region. The Indian Government has voiced serious concerns over the escalation of violence and conveyed its readiness to help Sri Lanka find a solution. While the Indian Air Force has set up eight radars as a precautionary measure to monitor the skies and the Indian Navy has began round the clock patrolling, the Chief of the Southern Air Command, Air Marshal Y.R. Rane has said that the air combat capability of the LTTE poses "little or no" threat to India. The Tigers are unlikely to strike India and incur its wrath. Indian Air Chief Marshal Fali Major has called the air strike more of an irritant than a threat.

Perturbed by the security related developments in the country, the Sri Lankan President is seriously considering holding a referendum to decide whether the government should continue to abide by the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), according to the state-run Sunday Observer Newspaper. The LTTE in the meantime has expressed its readiness to resume peace talks under a pre-condition that the CFA should be fully implemented and future talks should be based on it. While the Government is ready to resume talks and will submit its proposals on devolution to the All Party Representative Committee on May 1, Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama asserted that the LTTE would continue to be considered a terrorist outfit and dealt with accordingly.

Whether the air strike was successful or not, it definitely has taken the toll on the Sri Lankan Economy, especially the tourism industry. Following the air strike Asia's third biggest airline, Cathay Pacific suspended daily flights in and out of Sri Lanka and hoteliers have voiced concern over the inability to achieve peak season targets. Sri Lanka Tourist Board Chairman Renton De Alwis has said that "Tourism is always a casualty, the first casualty in a situation like this".

References

'IAF Radars to Monitor Southern Sector', The New Indian Express, March 29, 2007, p-1
'LTTE Air Power a Global Threat- Defence Secretary', Daily Mirror e-Edition, Tuesday, March 27, 2007
'LTTE Air Power No Threat to India', The Hindu, Thursday, April 5, 2007, p-9
'LTTE Cadres Down to 4000', Island Online Edition, Thursday, April 5, 2007
5. 'Simultaneous Air Strikes Destroy LTTE Bases-North and East', Ministry of Defence, Government of Sri Lanka, Wednesday, March 28, 2007, URL: www.defence.lk
Athas, Iqbal, 'Lanka Moves to Clip Tiger Wings', Situation Report, The Sunday Times Online, Sunday, March 6, 2005
Baruah Amit, 'Ready to help Sri Lanka', The Hindu, Thursday, March 29, 2007, p-1
Buerk Roland, 'A Date with a Renegade Rebel Tiger', BBC News, Thursday, April 5, 2007
Gunatilleke, Nadira and Rasika Somarathne, 'Govt. Proposals to APRC on May 1', Daily News Online Edition, Friday April 6, 2007
Hariharan R., 'LTTE uses Air Power to Make a Statement', The Hindu, Wednesday, March 28, 2007, p-14
Manoharan N., 'Threat Potential of Air Tigers', The New Indian Express, Monday, April 2, 2007,
p-8
Peiris, G.H, 'An Aerial Bombardment : Impulses and Implications', South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments and Briefings, Vol.5, No.38, April 2, 2007
Radhakrishnan, R.K, 'JVP MP for Peace Process "Without External Interference"', The Hindu, Thursday, April 5, 2007, p-15
Raman B., 'Air Terror', Outlook India.com, March 27, 2007
Reddy, Muralidhar B, 'Colombo May go in for Referendum on Cease-Fire Pact", The Hindu, Monday, April 2, 2007, p-16
Reddy, Muralidhar B, 'Threat to others too: Rajapaksa', The Hindu, Wednesday, March 28, 2007, p-16
Reddy, Muralidhar B, 'Tigers Launch First Air Strike', The Hindu, Tuesday, March 27, 2007, p-1
Rutnam, Easwaran, 'Govt. Open for Peace Talks with LTTE', Daily Mirror e-Edition, Tuesday, April 10, 2007
Rutnam, Easwaran, 'LTTE Ready for Talks', Daily Mirror, e-Edition, Monday, April 9, 2007
Sirilal, Ranga, 'Sri Lanka Tourism a Casualty of Escalating War', Reuters UK, Monday, April 9, 2007
Wickremesinghe, Ranil, 'The Way to Resolve Sri Lanka's Political Crisis', The Hindu, Friday, April 6, 2007, p-14

THE ALL PARTY REPRESENTATIVE COMMITEE-AN OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Mon, 19 Mar 2007 14:50:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan

As Sri Lanka struggles to find a way forward in the peace process there is hope for a political solution through a new initiative by the Sri Lankan President. The formation of the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) in July 2006 was a significant step towards creating a political consensus on the Tamil question. The mandate of the APRC was to produce proposals for constitutional reforms in Sri Lanka with an aim to engage various political parties and arrive at a consensus through deliberations.

The APRC has representatives from the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), United National Party (UNP), Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, National Unity Alliance, Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), Lanka Sama Samaja Party, Communist Party of Sri Lanka, All Ceylon Muslim League, Eelam Peoples Democratic Party, National Muslim Congress, Up Country People's Front, and Western Peoples Front. In a bid to gain all-party support for a political settlement, the ruling SLFP and the UNP signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in October 2006. The MoU spells out ways and means by which the two parties will cooperate on six high priority national issues - conflict in the north and east, electoral reforms, good governance, economic development, nation building and social development. The UNP which initially kept away from the APRC began participating as a result of the MoU.

A 17-member multi-ethnic panel of experts was formed to provide advice and submit recommendations regarding power sharing and constitutional reform to the APRC. In December, after much deliberation the expert panel produced four different reports. 11 of the 17 members representing three major ethnic groups submitted a majority report promoting the need for maximum devolution and power sharing at the centre with a bicameral legislature. Four Sinhala members against this idea submitted another report calling for strengthening of the unitary state while two other members submitted separate dissenting reports.

The majority report recommended the name of "Republic of Sri Lanka" for the State. The report suggested the development of in-built mechanisms to discourage secessionist tendencies and to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. With regard to power sharing, the report recommended two directly or indirectly elected Vice Presidents belonging to two different communities distinct to that of the President and the establishment of a second chamber elected by provincial legislatures. In addition the report carried suggestions on distribution of power, judiciary, fiscal devolution, defence, national security and law and order and centre-provincial relations among other issues. The APRC Chairperson, Prof. Tissa Vitharana, presented his own report based on the deliberations at various meetings. His report is considered to be a diluted version of the majority report and an attempt to reconcile the majority and minority reports. Although the majority report along with the APRC Chairperson's report are said to form the key documents for consideration in drafting the APRC's final proposal it remains to be seen as to how much of each report will be reflected in the final outcome which is said to be due in April 2007.

The fate of these reports is said to be unclear as the Sri Lankan President has also distanced himself from them. Analysts have suggested that it is highly likely that the proposals that finally emerge will be decisively conditioned by what has happened and is intended to happen on the battlefield following military successes. In a recent lecture, Prof. Santasilan Kadirgamar (Formerly Jaffna College, University of Colombo and University of Jaffna and Meiji Gaikuin University, Tokyo) noted that the main issue of disagreement will be the unit of devolution and welcomed the APRC Chairperson's suggestion that the issue should be left for negotiations with the LTTE. It also remains to be seen as to how the LTTE will respond to the final decision and how the APRC will approach the tigers. The pro-tiger political party Tamil National Alliance (TNA) is not participating in the APRC. Further, the mass cross-over of the UNP cadre into the ruling SLFP ranks has deepened a rift between the UNP and SLFP and jeopardized the MoU between the parties.

While the inability of the expert panel to produce a single report mirrors the ethno-political divide in Sri Lanka that has been so prominently playing the role of a 'spoiler' in the peace process, the majority report was a demonstration of the ability of Sri Lankans to arrive at creative solutions to the ethnic problem. There is some scepticism concerning the sturdiness of the APRC process given the collapse of the MoU between the Government and the UNP and in the face of an escalating undeclared war. But the APRC process provides an important opportunity for the Sri Lankan Government to lay the groundwork for a political and peaceful solution as it forms a concrete proposal for negotiations with the LTTE.

Link to Full Text of the Expert Panel (Majority) Preliminary Report

References

Ahilan Kadirgamar, 'Sri Lanka on the Precipice: Political Solution or Sweeping Debacle?' Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLII, No.8, Feb 24- March 2, 2007,
URL: http://www.epw.org.in/articles/2007/02/11108.pdf

D.B.S Jeyaraj, 'Divided Lanka Expert Panel Members Submit Four Different Reports',
URL: http://transcurrents.com/tamiliana/archives/245, December 6, 2006

D.B.S Jeyaraj, 'Majority Expert Report Should Not Be Abandoned'
URL: http://transcurrents.com/tamiliana/archives/date/2006/12/

Full Text of the Expert Panel (Majority) Preliminary Report,
URL: http://transcurrents.com/tamiliana/archives/244

Santasilan Kadirgamar, 'Sri Lanka: Power Sharing Proposals', Observer Research Foundation-Chennai Chapter Interaction, 17 March 2007

Sri Lankan Government's Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), www.peaceinsrilanka.com

War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka: Overview and Trends 2006, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sri Lanka, January 2007,
URL: http://www.cpalanka.org/research_papers/War_Peace_Governance.pdf

The conflict in Sri Lanka

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Mon, 26 Feb 2007 15:43:00 +0000

by Tejal Chandan

The civil war in Sri Lanka has killed an estimated 67000-68000 people since 1983 and displaced thousands of people. Political assassinations, abductions, disappearances, human rights violations, internal displacement of people, air strikes, suicide bombings and land, air and sea battles have marked the completion of five years of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE. The initial optimism after the Ceasefire soon dwindled when several rounds of negotiations failed to reach a political solution. Amidst political competition, economic backwardness and ceasefire violations on both sides, the peace process ground to a halt in mid 2003. Anticipations for peace grew with the talks restarting in February 2006. The Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai held a seminar on Peace Process in Sri Lanka: Challenges and Opportunities in Colombo around the same time to explore the potential for peace in Sri Lanka. However, talks in February and October 2006 failed to restart any discussion on a political solution.

Recent developments in the Sri Lankan political scene have led to the Government securing a long-elusive parliamentary majority after 25 opposition party MPs defected to its ranks. This cross-over has deepened a rift with the main opposition United National Party (UNP) and jeopardized a pact between the Government and the UNP aimed at finding a consensus approach to end a two and a half decade old civil war. Securing this majority meant that the Rajapaksa government will not be hostage to volatile hardline Marxist and Buddhist monk allies who have repeatedly conditioned support for the Government and are against a political deal with the Tigers.

Soon after a cabinet reshuffle which led to allotting ministerial posts to 10 of the defected MPs, President Rajapakse dismissed three key ministers who had apparently criticized the appointment of the defected ministers into the Cabinet. Since then allegations regarding human rights violations and 'mud-slinging' have characterized communications between the dismissed ministers and the Government. In the meantime, the JHU (National Heritage Party), a hardline Buddhist monk's party holding nine seats in the parliament also joined the Government.

The conflict on the other hand has intensified with the Government pursuing the possibility of a military solution. A string of military successes over the past few months have emboldened the chasing out of the Tigers from its remaining strongholds in the East. With thousands fleeing for their lives amid heavy artillery fire in northern and eastern Sri Lanka this weekend; analysts say that the Government, LTTE and Norway are clinging to a dead truce. The Oslo backed peace process suffered another blow with the Tigers warning to resume their struggle for independence and statehood. Blaming the international community of bias and inaction, the Tigers stated that the Ceasefire Agreement has been left meaningless and contributed to war-like conditions.

The international community is now getting restless over the inordinate delay on the part of the Government in coming forward with a political package for devolution and power-sharing. The All-Party Representative Conference (APRC) initiated by the President for a southern consensus on recommendations for constitutional reform and power sharing has suffered a blow even as it serves as an important opportunity to achieve peace. While pledging another 4.5 billion US Dollars for development, donors at the Development Forum in Galle last month have warned of foreign aid cuts unless the country showed signs of moving towards a peaceful end to the bloodshed. While some analysts suggest that the government will pay little attention to constitutional reforms with its military euphoria, others say that the Government is merely underestimating the rebels. The US Ambassador to Sri Lanka has said that his country 'respectfully disagreed' with those in the Sri Lankan Government who felt that a military solution was possible to end the Tamil separatist campaign. He added that a purely military strategy will have costs to pay and a solution is possible only through a parallel political strategy.

Government officials and diplomats in Colombo have agreed that neither the Government nor the LTTE will formally withdraw from the CFA as both would not want to antagonize the international community. While the Sri Lankan government is pursuing a military strategy, the LTTE is also preparing for a war. This is evident from the recent arms hauls and captures in Tamil Nadu. In the current situation with widespread violence, peace for the island has moved farther away.