According to the US State Department, Eritrea has been subject to a non-immigrant travel ban since January 2018. ((https://er.usembassy.gov/visas/)) The US non-immigrant travel ban on Eritrea has been instituted because Eritrea does not cooperate with the US in the forced repatriation of Eritreans (e.g., by issuing travel documents, etc. when an Eritrean national is subject to a forced removal order). “Eritrea maintains a policy of voluntary repatriation of its nationals wherever they may be. And it opposes any forced repatriation or expulsions.” ((Responses to Information Requests, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada)) Eritrea has not changed its policy to allow forced return of Eritrean nationals.

Consequently, because Eritrea does not accept forced returnees, the Trump administration bars certain non-Immigrant visas to be given to Eritreans (as of January 2018), including B1, B2, F1, F2, J1, J2, M1, and M2 visas. This bars essentially all visa types, save for diplomats, crew members, au pairs, various cultural and athletic persons, etc. and is consistent with the Trump “Muslim travel ban” in spite of the fact that Eritrea is not a Muslim-majority country.

Because the prior ban is not appreciably different from the ban reported by Politico, it should not be considered significant. In spite of this, the basis of the visa travel ban should be reconsidered.

Within less than a year of the signing of the Eritrea Ethiopia Peace and Friendship Agreement, Eritrea’s regional detractors have made an about face in terms of their relations with Eritrea, including: Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan. Consequently, many analysts have changed their perception of the Horn of Africa region in general, and Eritrea specifically.

Recently, the French President, Emmanuel Macron visited Djibouti and followed with a trip to Ethiopia. During President Macron’s visit to Ethiopia, he signed a defense cooperation agreement where France would cooperate on aerial operations, joint operations, and provide opportunities for training and equipment purchases as well as in establishing an Ethiopian naval component. ((https://www.janes.com/article/87195/france-ethiopia-sign-defence-accords-to-create-navy)) Coupled with Ethiopia’s Prime Minister’s statement that Ethiopia planned to re-establish a navy, ((https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-02/landlocked-ethiopia-plans-to-build-navy-prime-minister-says)) speculators have tried to determine where this would be located. Social media (read: Facebook and Twitter) users were in a state of hysteria at the suggestion that Eritrea would be the home to the new Ethiopian naval base. Some background would give some calm to the issue.

Djibouti was France’s last colonial subject and is the site of its largest overseas military posts. Djibouti also hosts numerous foreign military bases (including, the United States, France, Japan, and China). ((https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/35604/MILITARY-China%E2%80%99s-Djibouti-naval-base)) Djibouti is also the largest outlet for Ethiopian exports, and conversely the largest customer of the port is Ethiopia. ((https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-new-coastal-rail/3537554.html)) Consequently, Djibouti and Ethiopia have a special relationship.

Formerly, Eritrea’s port of Assab served as the primary outlet for Ethiopia. With the recent declaration of peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia, it is anticipated that substantial trade will return to the port of Assab. In the past, Ethiopia has claimed Assab as Ethiopian territory. Based on the Eritrea Ethiopia Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement, both the Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission decision and decision to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of both States, ((http://www.shabait.com/news/local-news/27076-agreement-on-peace-friendship-and-comprehensive-cooperation-between-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-and-the-state-of-eritrea-)) this claim has effectively staunched. With that claim having been extinguished, Eritrea and Ethiopia have moved forward building new relations.

Assab is already home to a military facility for the UAE ((https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/uae-joins-exclusive-club)). Similarly, the UAE has engaged with Somaliland to build a port and facility in Berbera, Somaliland. ((https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-06/u-a-e-military-base-in-breakaway-somaliland-seen-open-by-june)). Ethiopia has invested in the Berbera port as well. ((https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/ethiopia-invests-in-its-neighbors-ports))

Some speculation even leads to Kenya as a future home to an Ethiopian naval base. ((https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-08/landlocked-ethiopia-may-establish-naval-base-at-kenyan-port)) A southern home for the Ethiopian navy, in a relatively stable, affluent neighbor, such as Kenya may be strategically valuable. There is little economic advantage however, though it could be a benefit to the troubled “Lapsset project – a transport corridor that envisions linking Ethiopia and South Sudan to Kenya.” France however, has little background to the Lapsset project and Ethiopia/Kenya relations.

If France were to cooperate with Ethiopia to provide naval capabilities, it would likely be from a position that France was already equipped to provide substantial assistance. Similarly, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and France are privy to a special relationship with one another (less so between Ethiopia and France). Consequently, because of France’s deep interest in Djibouti, Ethiopia’s deep relationship with Djibouti and France’s agreement to assist Ethiopia in the establishment of the navy, Djibouti is the most likely home to Ethiopia’s future naval component. Less likely is Assab, Eritrea (a base for Ethiopia’s navy during Ethiopia’s occupation of Eritrea) or in Berbera, Somaliland.

Presently the average wheat yield in Eritrea stands at about 1.1t/ha. The new wheat varieties represent an increase in yields between 200 to over 400 per cent compared to the prevailing national average.

In the United States, the average winter wheat yield (2010-2015) is between 40-45 bushels per acre while average spring wheat yields (2010-2015) are between 37-45 bushels per acre. (USDA) These are equivalent to 2.7-3.0 t/ha and 2.5-3.0 t/ha, respectively for winter and spring wheat yields respectively. The new wheat varieties developed by NARI-Eritrea represent a 22-83% and 32-83% yield increases relative to the US winter and spring wheat respectively.

The wheat yields in the United States are the result of over 100 years of agricultural research and outreach. Most farmers in Eritrea operate without the benefit of irrigation – generally based on rain-fed – similarly, most Midwestern US farmers rely on rain-fed agriculture but more reliable and dependable rainfall quantity distribution in time and space. The US yields offer a reasonable comparison for yield targets by Eritrean farmers.

It should be noted that the substantial yield increases of the new wheat varieties in Eritrea are grown in model fields and regular farm yields may be lower. Nevertheless even if the low end yield (3.3 t/ha) of the new wheat varieties is widely produced in Eritrea the country could achieve food security in no time.

In 2002 projected demand for grains in Eritrea amounted to nearly 600,000 tons, while the amount of cultivated land in the country was about 200,000 hectares. With only 3.3t/ha yield of the new wheat varieties produced as opposed to producing the maximum yield of 5.5 t/ha, Eritrea will be considered as one of the highest producers of wheat when measured on per hectare basis.

Some may ask if this characterization is relevant to reporting and understanding the region. A seminar conducted at the London School of Economics (LSE) bringing together members of government, academics, and others concluded, “[these labels] affect the local political marketplace, influence analysis and access, and can lead to badly calibrated or polarized responses.” ((The ‘Spoiler’ Concept, Conflict and Politics: who ’spoils’ what, for whom?; Seminar held March 2010; London School of Economics)) (Emphasis added) Thus, if we are truly to understand the region and its politics, we must first use proper labels.

What is the Horn of Africa?
The Horn of Africa is often described as the eastern portion of Africa resembling a “horn”, thus leading to its name. The countries that make up the Horn typically include (in alphabetical order): Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. These are the countries reviewed here. In some descriptions, a “greater” or “outer” Horn of Africa includes: Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. The “core” Horn of Africa countries are reviewed here for a more direct comparison with respect to Eritrea.

How do you Identify a Spoiler?
There is no clear definition of a “spoiler” or “regional spoiler”. Of the many definitions a combination resulting from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs ((https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/GermanForeignSecurityPolicy_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf)) and papers resulting from the LSE seminar described above ((The ‘Spoiler’ Concept, Conflict and Politics: who ’spoils’ what, for whom?; Seminar held March 2010; London School of Economics)) lead to several important factors. Although other analysis may weight each of these factors, in this analysis they have been given equal weight while each factor is described such that the quantity of instances is recorded.
In general, the key aspects reviewed below are based on breaches of international norms and domestic violence that may affect the region:

1. Active military adventure (non-peacekeeping; legitimated)
2. Active military occupation (breach of international sovereignty)
3. Support or harboring of militants (non-state armed groups; including terrorists)
4. Commit acts of genocide
5. Use weapons of mass destruction
6. During war – targeting of civilians
7. Current domestic armed conflicts

It is necessary for this analysis that as many objective characteristics be identified to reduce both criticism as subjective analysis but also to be reproducible. Of course, this brief analysis only represents a brief snapshot in time (September 2016).

What is the Verdict?

Based on the chart above it is clear that the greatest regional spoiler is Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s regional spoiler score is nearly double that of the nearest state, Eritrea. This seems to contradict most literature – how did we get here?

The characteristics of regional spoilers are primarily focusing on violence (including that associated with militants). Because these factors generally focus on violence, Djibouti large escapes identification. Djibouti hosts many military bases and does not attempt to secure its sovereignty militarily. Somalia meanwhile is largely unable to engage in many of these acts based on the domestic siege situation. As a consequence, the most difficult factor associated with Somalia, is the domestic violence which may affect the rest of the region. This is certainly true as Al Shabab (the Somali militant group) has attacked targets outside of Somalia.

Meanwhile, Eritrea and Ethiopia do support and shelter the militant groups opposing the other. Ethiopia has supported a fractious group of militants against Eritrea, primarily focused on creating an ethnically fractured Eritrea. Meanwhile, Eritrea has sheltered militants attempting to loosen the Ethiopian government’s hold on governance. Finally, unlike any other state in the region, Ethiopia has maintained a decades long occupation of Eritrean territory, flouting treaties and international norms of state behavior. Each of these acts has led to a higher spoiler score, however, due to the magnitude and scale of Ethiopia’s behavior – it has earned the title of greatest regional spoiler.

Hopefully, this brief analysis can be the beginning of a more rational discussion about affairs in the Horn of Africa region. By discarding the unrealistic characterization of Eritrea, a new focus can be shed on dispelling the spoiling behavior of the Horn of Africa’s regional spoiler.

Eritrean Federal Flag

The current flag of Eritrea shares elements with the flag representing Eritrea under the Federal arrangement (the Eritrean Federal Flag) with Ethiopia and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front flag (the EPLF Flag). ((The High Hoisted Banner Of Pride And Glory by: Meron Abraha)) The Eritrean Federal Flag was devised and voted upon by the Eritrean Assembly. The Eritrean Assembly was subordinate to the Emperor of Ethiopia. ((Constitution of Eritrea, Article 3 (1952) )) “The proposal for the [Eritrean Federal Flag] was fiercely debated upon in the Eritrean [Assembly], whose members finally voted [for the Eritrean Federal Flag] unanimously.” ((ref:1)) When the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) launched the Eritrean Struggle for Independence on September 1, 1961 the only symbol of Eritrea that was recognized was the blue Eritrean Federal Flag. At the time there was no other flag that represented the Eritrean identity while also being distinct from the subordinate position of Eritrea to the Emperor of Ethiopia. In spite of the ELF being driven from the field in 1981, the blue Eritrean Federal Flag continued to fly along a new flag, the EPLF Flag, until independence. ((ref:1))

EPLF flag

The EPLF Flag represented Eritrea’s second liberation organization, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). The EPLF, formally created at its First Congress in 1977, resulted from the consolidation of various groups that left the ELF. ((Eritrea by: Edward Denison)) For some time, both the ELF and EPLF were represented in the field and the EPLF needed a new symbol to distinguish itself from the ELF and from the subordination of Ethiopia. The EPLF flag’s distinct design is deep with meaning: the green stands for the fertility of the country; blue stands for the sea; the red for the blood lost in the fight for freedom; and the yellow star has meaning in its shape and color the color represents the mineral resources of Eritrea while the five corners of the star stand for Equality, Unity, Liberty, Justice and Prosperity. ((ref:1)) The EPLF ultimately brought independence to Eritrea but carried both flags throughout the country afterwards.

Flag of Eritrea

After the Referendum which brought de jure independence to Eritrea, the new government ultimately proposed a new flag which combined both the Eritrean Federal Flag and the EPLF Flag, both of which had represented Eritrea’s fight for independence. The five-pointed star of the EPLF Flag was replaced with a wreath, in the model of the Eritrean Federal Flag, but it was modified such that, “The yellow wreath symbol in the red triangle has 12 leaves on each side, with six more on the upright branch in the middle, totaling altogether to 30, which is the number of years of the armed struggle for liberation that the Eritrean people had to endure.” ((ref:1)) The current national flag of Eritrea is not just a symbol of an independent Eritrea, but embodies that concept.

Between 1998 and 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia fought a border war over their 1,000+ km border. An estimated 100,000+ soldiers were killed and another 80,000+ Ethiopian civilians of Eritrean descent were expelled from Ethiopia because of “the color of their eyes.” The armistice and later treaty signed by Eritrea and Ethiopia created a neutral arbitration commission located at the Hague to determine (delimit) and mark (demarcate) the border between the two countries. This Commission released its Delimitation Decision on April 13, 2002 ((http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1150)) (with clarifications in 2003). In November 2007 the Commission declared the boundary fully demarcated and having concluded its mandate, dissolved itself. ((http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1023))

The press release by the Government of Ethiopia asserts half truths. I have identified some of these issues and provided some resources that reveal some more of the truth:

• Ethiopia fully accepts the delimitation decision of the Boundary Commission and has made all possible attempts to implement the decision in accordance with internationally accepted practice.
  • The question here is no longer one of the delimitation decision, but rather the demarcation decision. The Commission in its November 30, 2006 press release ((http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=107)) stated: ” the locations now established by the Commission will take legal effect and will constitute the final demarcation of the boundary … the Commission hereby determines that the boundary will … stand as demarcated,” ((http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1023)) guided by State practice followed in 1993. ((http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=109)) The Permanent Representative’s argument that Ethiopia has attempted to implement the decision in accordance with international practice is contrary to the facts as described by the Commission. To the contrary, Ethiopia’s troops remain present on Eritrean territory, and Ethiopia continues to reject the Commission’s demarcation, contrary to its prior acceptance. ((http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1011))
  • Similarly, Eritrea has continuously called for Ethiopia to respect its treaty obligations and immediately withdraw from Eritrean territory.

• Two years ago, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn even made an unprecedented peace overture to Eritrea, offering even to go to Asmara to initiate a bilateral dialogue.
  • Over two years ago, Eritrea’s Permanent Representative to the African Union, headquartered in Ethiopia, relayed the following message to the African Union from the Government of Eritrea: “if Ethiopia withdraws its army from occupied sovereign Eritrean territory … in the morning, dialogue between the two countries will start in the afternoon.” ((http://www.tesfanews.net/wp-content/uploads/Eritrea_Statement_AU_Summit_28_Jan_13.pdf))

• The problem between Eritrea and Ethiopia is not a border problem; it is rather that Eritrea’s leadership refuses to enter into dialogue.
  • As mentioned above, it is very clear that Eritrea is dedicated to normalization of relations with Ethiopia, once Ethiopia’s government respects its treaty obligations.

I hope the corrections above will help anyone reading the Government of Ethiopia’s “release” find the appropriate context.

The Algiers Agreement of 2000, in Article 15 states that the decision of boundary commission would be “final and binding.” ((http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ER%20ET_001212_AgreementEritreaEthiopia.pdf)) Since the “final and binding” decision of the EEBC, Ethiopia has called for variances which have been soundly rejected by the Commission owing to the “final and binding” nature of the decision. ((http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Statement%20271106.pdf)) Ultimately the Boundary Commission grew so frustrated with the intransigence of the parties in allowing the physical demarcation, that they discharged their duties using the method of “virtual demarcation.” ((http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1023))

Until such time as the boundary is finally demarcated, the Delimitation Decision of 13 April 2002 continues as the only valid legal description of the boundary.” ((http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1023)) Since this virtual demarcation, it is abundantly clear where the boundary between the two countries lie. Ethiopian troops continue to occupy lands belonging to Eritrea, raising tensions throughout the region and complicating any rapprochement.

In a unique bid to raise awareness for the border demarcation and the ongoing occupation of Eritrea, twenty-five cyclists from ten different countries (Eritrea, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) will cycle more than 1700 km from Sweden to Switzerland. Cyclists also ask the end of the sanctions on Eritrea, which can be an added value that will strengthen peace and stability back around the horn of Africa. ((http://www.tesfanews.net/solidarity-from-the-italian-cycling-federation-f-c-i/#f29LjJCmK6mlYpH9.99))

To understand the conflict, it may be helpful to understand the events that immediately led to the conflict.

The Federal arrangement (the Federation) between Eritrea and Ethiopia was the ultimate result of a UN Commission Report on Eritrea which was reduced to UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 390 (V). In general, the Federation was to be a pairing of two domestic governments under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Emperor. In other words, ultimately the Ethiopian Emperor was the sovereign of Eritrea, in spite of the fact that the Federal arrangement was to be one of equals.

UNGA Resolution 390 (V) was known as the Federal Act and called for the creation of the Eritrean Constitution, which was approved in 1952. Article 21 of the 1952 Constitution of Eritrea identified that there would be a “Federal Flag” to be respected in Eritrea. ((Constitution of Eritrea (1952) )) In the same year the Eritrean Parliament adopted a flag representing Eritrea under the Federal arrangement. ((Lionel Cliffe & Basil Davidson, The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace)) In 1958 the Eritrean flag was permanently barred by Federal authorities. ((Roy Pateman, Even the Stones are Burning)) This was just one of the many disgraces that led to the Eritrean War for Independence.

The Eritrean War for Independence began on September 1, 1961. In that same year,  the nascent Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) adopted the former flag of Eritrea, representing Eritrea in the Federation. It was likely adopted because it was the most easily recognizable symbol of Eritrea. As the most recognizable symbol of the Eritrean political unit, its selection would be able to draw Eritreans to the cause. This was particularly important because in a place of low literacy rates, visual symbols are key to quickly transmitting information.

In the early 1970’s an alternate vision for an independent Eritrea split the ELF into numerous organizations, some of which recombined into the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1977. At the first organizational Congress, the EPLF adopted a new flag to represent their vision for an independent Eritrea. (It should be noted that although holding different visions for Eritrea, both pursued the promise of an Eritrea free of foreign intervention) The new EPLF flag bore no resemblance to the earlier flag (at the time then used by the ELF, but having its origins in the Federal period).

Both flags represented the struggle for Eritrean independence throughout the remainder of Struggle for Independence. In 1993 when Eritreans, through a referendum declared (what was already clear) independence, a new flag was raised. The new flag symbolically merged the various fronts working towards Eritrean independence. From the Eritrean flag subject to the Federation, the wreath was modified with 30 leaves (and bathed in yellow while each leaf represents each year of the Struggle for Independence) while from the EPLF’s flag, complementary triangles of green, red and blue form the balance (respectively representing the fertile land, blood spilt for independence and marine resources of the country). ((The High Hoisted Banner Of Pride And Glory))

A beautiful, richly colorful banner, combining Eritrea’s past with it’s future. Eritrea’s first post-Independence flag embodies a future free from foreign occupation and a secure future where its people can enjoy its land and sea. To raise an alternative banner in Eritrea’s name must be done with the recognition of its purpose. The Federation flag can represent little more than the Federal arrangment with Eritrea or the ELF’s purpose (a moot purpose as its ultimate agenda was the Independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia which has been achieved). Similarly, the EPLF-cum-PFDJ (the EPLF absorbed the ELF Central Committee at its Second, Unity, Congress in 1987-1988 and absorbed still others in 1994 at its Third Congress where it converted to the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) ((See generally, Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, 1997)) ) flag, should only be raised to further the agenda of the PFDJ (embodied in the “six basic goals”) ((National Charter for Eritrea)).

With this knowledge and understanding every one should raise their flag and know where they stand at will!

“Yeah but that’s just a label if my name is Danny [Eritrea] and your Olivia [Ethiopia] we got the same parents but different names does that not mean we’re not related?

The point of confusion hidden within  this comment is that Eritrea and Ethiopia share a common ancestry. The problem with that comment is that it hides a lot of deeper misunderstandings about the cultures of Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea recognizes its varied cultures based on the concept of ethno-linguistic group. These are essentially “nations” in the sense that they have a distinct language. These ethno-linguistic groups are not differentiated by anything but their language (i.e. they are not distinguished on dialect, religion, etc.). This is one of a number of ways that ethnographers (those who research cultures) have defined ethnic groups. Similarly, Ethiopia has scores of ethno-linguistic groups. Of these ethno-linguistic groups, Eritrea and Ethiopia share the following:

• Tigrinya (Eritrea) & Tigrayan (Ethiopia),
• Saho (Eritrea) & Irob (Ethiopia),
• Afar (Djibouti, Eritrea & Ethiopia), and
• Kunama (Eritrea & Ethiopia).

The Tigrinya and Tigrayans share a language, Tigrinya, although it is spoken differently. The different way in which Tigrinya is spoken in Eritrea from Tigray is called a dialect, where the Eritrean dialect is called Asmara Tigrinya (the “de facto standard”) while the Ethiopian way of speaking Tigrinya is known as Tigray Tigrinya. ((Language Centre Resource – Tigrinya, Language Centre University of Cambridge, http://www.langcen.cam.ac.uk/resources/lang-t/lang_t.php?c=1)) ((Taddese Beyene, Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, 20)) In fact, the way Tigrinya is spoken in Eritrea was recognized over a quarter century ago, as being substantially different and the “de facto standard” for Tigrinya. ((Taddese Beyene, Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, 21)) Do these differences however identify a current distinction or an ongoing distinction between the Asmara Tigrinya speakers and Tigray Tigrinya speakers? To make such a distinction one would have to go beyond the linguistic discussion above and continue with a historical discussion. Of course in such discussion, the distinctions made would have to include a discussion of cultural and official distinctions between the two. The most emblematic distinction is that describing the area that was historical north of the the Ethiopian Empire. This region was self-identified (by the peoples living there) as Midri Bahri. This region was identified as early as the 14th century and lasted until the colonization of the region by the Italians at the end of the 19th century. ((Okbazghi Yohannes, Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics, University of Florida Press, 1991 (31) )) ((Lionel Cliffe & Basil Davidson, The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace, Red Sea Press, 1988 (13) )) By those in the Ethiopian Empire however, this region was known as “Mereb Mellash” which translates to “beyond the Mereb [River],” the traditional central boundary between Eritrea and Ethiopia. ((Dan Connell & Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, Scarecrow Press, 2010 (355) )) As described above, the geographical boundary between central Eritrea, and the distinction between the States has existed for nearly half a millennium.

Habesha

Another frustrating comment I’ve heard is “Don’t separate Eritrea & Ethiopia … because they are both Habesha.” The idea of “separating” Eritrea and Ethiopia was already discussed above, while the second part of the comment is the subject of this section. What does the term Habesha mean? In short, it was a term used to refer to the people living in the Eritrean highlands and northern Ethiopian highlands by those living in the southern Arabian peninsula. ((Dan Connell & Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, Scarecrow Press, 2010 (279) )) The term is therefore only inclusive of the Tigrinya (50% of Eritreans), Tigrayans (6.1% ((Ethiopia, The World Factbook, CIA, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html)) Ethiopians) and Amharas (34.5% ((Ethiopia, The World Factbook, CIA, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html)) of Ethiopians). The term was used as far back as the first century  AD. ((Dan Connell & Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, Scarecrow Press, 2010 (279) )) Therefore, although an ancient term of reference for those living in the highlands of northeast Africa, it is inaccurate as a reference to Eritreans and Ethiopians as barely 50% of Eritreans qualify and even fewer Ethiopians qualify (less than 41%). The term Habesha thus, is a short hand reference to a non-majority culture in both countries.

I hope these clarifications are helpful. If there are more clarifications needed please feel free to ask in the comments!

The key to understanding why Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia was not a change of “boundaries” is to understand the Federal arrangement. The Federal arrangement was established passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 390 (V) and its ratification by the Empire of Ethiopia. ((UN Resolution 390 (V) )) The territory of Eritrea was defined as all the territory of the former Italian colony of Eritrea. ((Federal Constitution of Eritrea: Article 2)) This definition of the boundary remains in effect to this day. Additionally, it should be recalled that the Federal Act (and the constitution that resulted from it) identified Ethiopians and Eritreans seprately, as not being identical.

The most substantial error the author, Mr. Dowden, makes is asserting that “Only Ethiopia – for its own political reasons – gives the right to all its ‘nations’ to secede if they want to. That clause was created to allow Eritrea to become independent.” Of course, even a cursory knowledge of the matter would dispel this idea. The Ethiopian constitution to which he is referring was brought into effect in 1995. ((Library of Congress Country Profile: Ethiopia)) Meanwhile, Eritrea’s de facto independence was established in 1991 (de jure independence followed in 1993 after the Eritrean Referendum – 99.8% voted for independence). The timeline clearly dispels any idea of “secession” according to the Ethiopian Constitution.

The question of the justice done to Eritrea by the UN federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia is a question for another time, although it would be appropriate to quote John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, “From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless the strategic interest of the United States in the Red Sea basin and the considerations of security and world peace make it necessary that the country has to be linked with our ally Ethiopia.” ((Eritrea and the United Nations and Other Essays, by Bereket H. Selassie))