Skeptical Science

Check out the brand-new hurricane ‘cone of uncertainty’ graphics arriving this season

Mon, 8 Jun 2026 15:28:38 EST

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Bob Henson

It might have seemed exotic when it first appeared, but the forecast “cone of uncertainty” used by the NOAA/NWS National Hurricane Center (NHC) is now a familiar part of tropical cyclone readiness in U.S. states and territories. For 2026, NHC has made a couple of key tweaks to its standard cone product. It’s also testing an expanded version of the cone – one made feasible by a new way of understanding how and where forecast errors arise.

Since its debut in 2002, the cone has become what a University of Miami writer called “arguably [the center’s] most iconic graphic,” a mainstay of TV coverage and weather apps. Prior to the cone, hurricane maps simply showed a line depicting the official multi-day forecast for the storm center, as issued every six hours by NHC. Experts urged the public not to “focus on the skinny line,” keeping in mind that a hurricane’s path can easily deviate from the forecast track and that impacts will typically extend far beyond that center.

When you see a cone graphic, that ‘skinny line’ may or may not appear (NHC provides both versions), but the cone itself has gone a long way to fix the skinny-line problem.

However, just as a hurricane’s impacts do not just lie along a narrow line, a hurricane’s damage doesn’t stop when it comes ashore. Some of the worst U.S. hurricane disasters in recent years have occurred well inland, including billions of dollars in wind-driven destruction across Georgia in 2018’s Michael, and the catastrophic, deadly flooding from 2024’s Helene, which killed more than 100 people in and around western North Carolina.

Up through last year, NHC’s cone graphics only showed watches and warnings along the coastline. Starting this year, the full extent of inland watches and warnings will be portrayed. In the example shown in Fig. 1 below, the revised graphics make it crystal clear that the hurricane warning for 2024’s Milton extended almost completely across the entire Florida Peninsula, including the Orlando area.

Another improvement shown in Fig. 1 is the addition of a crosshatched area to denote locations that are under both a hurricane watch and a tropical storm warning. It’s an important way to show that being in a tropical storm warning doesn’t mean you are necessarily off the hook for potential hurricane-level impacts.

Figure 1. A comparison of the original forecast cone for Hurricane Milton issued at 4 a.m. CDT October 8, 2024 (left) and how the same forecast would look in the revised cone graphic being used this year (right). The area crosshatched in blue and pink lines is under both a hurricane watch (pink) and a tropical storm warning (blue). The revised cone graphic will also use gray shading for the entire length of the cone, rather than for only the first three days of the five-day forecast period. (Image credit: NOAA/NWS/NHC)

When bad stuff happens outside the cone

Maybe because it’s so visually intuitive, the cone can deceive. The most common way to misinterpret the cone is to assume that it includes all possible hurricane tracks and that all serious hurricane impacts will fall inside the cone. It’s a problem that experts across disciplines have dubbed the “containment effect.”

The misunderstanding has led to some painful lessons. One of the most dramatic was in 2022, when Hurricane Ian veered toward the right-hand edge of the cone. Ian made a high-end Category 4 landfall near Fort Myers less than 36 hours after the official skinny-line track forecast had projected a strike near Tampa Bay. Because Ian was such a large and potent hurricane, its storm surge extended well to the right of the cone, delivering major flooding as far south as Naples. Ian took at least 161 lives and inflicted $112 billion in damage (USD 2022).

Multiple lines of social science research confirm that many laypeople make the mistake of assuming hurricanes simply don’t stray outside the cone. One survey of more than 2,800 Floridians led by Scotney Evans (University of Miami) and published in 2022 by the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society found that nearly half of respondents assumed that the cone showed all of the potential tracks for a hurricane.

“Our analysis suggests that many residents have difficulty interpreting several aspects, suggesting a rethink on how to graphically communicate aspects such as uncertainty; the size of the storm; areas of likely damage; watches and warnings; and wind intensity categories,” Evans and colleagues wrote. In some cases, better-educated respondents were actually more likely to misinterpret certain aspects of the cone.

READ: Building a better hurricane cone of uncertainty

The issue is especially acute because of the cone’s sheer popularity. “The cone is one of the most, if not the most, commonly shared hurricane visuals,” said Robert Prestley (NSF National Center for Atmospheric Research).

A 2020 overview of hurricane risk communication in the journal Weather, Climate, and Society, led by Barbara Millett (University of Miami), noted that during the five days as Hurricane Irma approached Miami in 2017, the cone map accounted for more than 70% of independent pageviews at the NHC website. In a 2023 study published in the same journal, Prestley and NCAR’s Rebecca Morss found that cone graphics were retweeted more often than watch/warning graphics on Twitter.

With all this in the mix, “it was taking people by surprise when the hurricane would move outside the cone,” said Robbie Berg, warning coordination meteorologist at NHC.

In fact, the cone’s width is calculated for each storm based on the previous five years of track locations in the official NHC forecasts, rather than on how well or poorly behaved a particular storm might be. Based on average track errors from those preceding five years, the cone width is calibrated to include about two-thirds (67 percent) of all potential storm positions. This means that by design, one would expect the center of a hurricane to stray outside the cone margins about one-third of the time.

Making the cone substantially wider might seem like an obvious fix, but this approach carries its own hazards. Evacuations are based largely on storm surge risk rather than the cone itself, and storm surge warnings can extend well beyond the cone. However, a greatly expanded cone could mean a larger number of people finding themselves in a cone year after year, perhaps without significant impacts each time.

“Research shows the public perceives the cone as an area of concern – an indication to continue monitoring the forecast,” said Gina Eosco, director of NOAA’s Weather Program Office and a pioneering researcher on how people interpret the cone and other forecast products.

Since 2007, forecasters at NHC have used the two-thirds index for the cone width as a working compromise between overly narrow and overly broad. But a new way of analyzing errors from past years has paved the way to an experimental cone that would alert more people without including all that much more territory.

The key, according to Berg, was to decompose the total track error. A track forecast can make mistakes that are either “cross-track” (erring in the direction of motion) or “along-track” (moving the system too quickly or too slowly). Standard practice is to draw the cone’s edges along each side of a series of circles straddling the forecast track, with the radius of each circle set to include 67 percent of potential positions and the circles growing larger with each forecast day.

As it turns out, timing mistakes (along-track) tend to produce bigger errors than do directional mistakes (cross-track), as shown in Fig. 2 below. Using circles to pool all of these errors obscures the difference between the two types, thus making the cone wider and less elongated than it ought to be.

Figure 2. Schematic showing a circle that denotes absolute error, pooling the along- and cross-track errors into a single value, and the ellipse that results when the two types of errors are assessed separately rather than pooled. (Image credit: NOAA/NWS/NHC)

When NHC examined the two types of error, they discovered that only a minor widening and lengthening of the cone could enclose 90 percent of possible positions, as opposed to the current 67 percent. This 90-percent cone is being used in experimental mode for the first time this season (see Fig. 3 below), alongside the traditional 67-percent version. The center will solicit comments and feedback before any move to finalize and adopt the experimental version. It’s been well received at conferences, according to Berg.

“Especially as we get out toward day 4 or 5, most of the error is in the along-track part of the storm,” said Berg. “Going to 90% doesn’t increase the width of the cone much. It’s more that you’re increasing the length.”

Figure 3. Comparison of the current operational cone (dashed red line) with the slightly larger experimental version (white shading). The dashed red line is only for illustrative purposes, so that the two versions can be compared here in one graphic. (Image credit: NOAA/NWS/NHC)

Another benefit of the 90% cone: some other NHC products already use the same threshold. For example, peak storm surge forecasts depict the maximum inundation one would expect from a given tropical cyclone approaching a given stretch of coast. These forecasts are calibrated so that a value higher than the maximum shown would be expected only 10% of the time. “So we’re trending in this direction: reasonable worst case, trying to capture as much of the risk as possible,” Berg said.

“The changes to the cone show remarkable scientific advancement,” said Eosco.

Meanwhile, the traditional version of the forecast cone will slim down a bit this year. Because of reduced error in the forecasts for 2021–2025 compared to 2020–2024, the two-thirds probability circles for 2026 will be 4 to 8 percent smaller on average in the Atlantic and 3 to 8 percent smaller in the Northeast Pacific. Such incremental improvements over the past couple of decades have led to striking reductions in cone size (see embedded post from 2025 below).

A timely year for new storm surge products in Hawaii

With El Niño boosting the odds that tropical cyclones will affect Hawaii this season, it’s fortuitous that NHC is now launching the same type of storm surge products for the main Hawaiian Islands that are regularly issued for the U.S. East and Gulf Coasts, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. These will include the peak storm surge forecasts noted above.

Behind the storm surge forecasts are exhaustive calculations carried out across more than 20 years of work using the P-Surge (probabilistic storm surge) model. The resulting datasets show the potential inundations at coastal points separated by 2.5 kilometers (about 1.6 miles) based on winds and atmospheric pressures from as many as 1,000 simulated tropical cyclones. As this work continues, NHC is looking to expand storm surge forecasts more broadly through the Caribbean in the coming years.

As stressed by Eosco: “Regardless of the cone’s shape or size, monitoring the forecast is a critical first step in assessing personal risk and empowering personal decision-making.”

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #23

Sun, 7 Jun 2026 10:17:31 EST

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, May 31, 2026 thru Sat, June 6, 2026.

Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Policy and Politics (8 articles)

Scilencing The Trump Administration would just as soon we didn't know stuff, especially about our planet The Crucial Years, Bill McKibben, May 31, 2026.
Companies No Longer Report Greenhouse Gas Emissions And Climate Risk Progressive lawmakers and environmental groups strongly condemned the decision, arguing that it leaves investors in the dark regarding trillions of dollars in hidden climate liabilities and systemic economic risks. Climate News Now, Climate News Now, May 31, 2026.
DOE restarts home efficiency rebates, and electrification is the biggest loser New rules for the $8.8 billion in program funding no longer promote electric home heating. The Daily Climate, Dan Gearino, Jun 02, 2026.
Dismay as Trump officials to dismantle key ocean monitoring system Ocean Observatories Initiative, $368m network that has provided crucial climate data, latest victim of Trump cuts The Guardian, Maya Yang, Jun 02, 2026.
USDA revamp of `climate smart` program left farmers reeling With dubious DOGE savings, the agency has left farmers with fewer tools to address the climate crisis. Civil Eats, Lisa Held, Jun 04, 2026.
The wasting disease threatening US science and ‘Patient Earth’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scienctists, Benjamin Santer, June 4, 2026.
California and New York weaken climate rules as red states ramp up green energy Republican-led states growing renewable capabilities at faster rate as Texas emerges as clean-energy leader The Guardian, Dharna Noor and Oliver Milman, Jun 04, 2026.
Scientists warn Trump plan to axe US ocean monitoring system will leave world `flying blind` Experts say dismantling the ocean observation system will ‘severely degrade’ the accuracy of weather predictions Environment The Guardian, Karen McVeigh, Jun 05, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (7 articles)

Current and Future Changes in Earth's Outgoing Infrared Spectrum Study finds fingerprint of global warming on infrared energy spectrum emitted by Earth. Geophysical Research Letters, Shaw et al., May 30, 2026.
Antarctic climate change is coming: this will help us prepare Dr Gilbz on Youtube, Ella Gilbert, May 30, 2026.
Trump Administration to Dismantle Ocean Monitoring System The $368 million network of instruments collecting data in both the Atlantic and Pacific has been critical to climate and ocean research. New York Times, Eric Niiler, June 1, 2026.
Climate-based tool predicts coral bleaching months in advance, offering critical lead time for reef protection Phys.org, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Jun 02, 2026.
Extreme weather is making Antarctic research harder, but new technology is providing some answers - new study The Conversation, Katharine Hendry, Jun 02, 2026.
Skeptical Science New Research for Week #23 2026 Skeptical Science's weekly survey of newly published academic climate research and select government/NGO climate-related reports and analysis. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Jun 04, 2026.
Satellite images reveals mangroves rebounding worldwide - but here's why they could still 'drown' A new study finds mangrove forests are no longer shrinking worldwide and offering hope for coastal protection and climate resilience, but sea level rise remains a threat. Live Science, Kenna Hughes-Castleberry, Jun 04, 2026.

Climate Change Impacts (5 articles)

They call it stupid hot for a reason: Heat muddles animal brains As temperatures rise, some creatures pick fights while others struggle to learn. Ars Technica, Marta Zaraska, May 31, 2026.
Coral Reefs in French Polynesia Are Stuck Between Life and Death Scientists’ discovery of hollowed coral skeletons after a 2019 bleaching event reveals a reef that isn’t coming back. Inside Climate News, Ryan Green, Jun 01, 2026.
Colorado River faces `devastating consequences` if another dry winter lands, experts warn Even a huge snowpack during the coming winter would only give the river basin states less than two years of storage before reservoirs returned to historic lows. Inside Climate News, Jake Bolster, Jun 03, 2026.
Climate change may shift hailstorms towards Earth`s poles - new study Two studies point to increasing risk from hail damage in a warming world, even though the details of where this will be experienced are still not clear. The Conversation, Timothy H. Raupach, Jun 03, 2026.
School in a hot world: what research is saying about children`s health and learning While much attention has focused on climate impacts like droughts, floods and food insecurity, another crisis is unfolding quietly inside classrooms, where research has shown that some schools are becoming dangerously hot places for children to develop, learn and play. The Conversation, Caradee Yael Wright and Natasha Naidoo, Jun 04, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (4 articles)

As Seas Rise, Louisiana Faces a Choice: Plan for Movement or Let Crisis Decide Coastal Louisiana may be ground zero for climate migration in the U.S., but a new study argues that planning now could turn displacement into agency. Inside Climate News, Avery Schuyler Nunn, May 30, 2026.
How methane policy will make or break the climate crisis While some countries are introducing abatement policies, key gaps remain in current policies. The Conversation, Helena Wright, Executive Director, Climate Policy Monitor, University of Oxford, Jun 03, 2026.
Electric vehicles cut pollution in China – and prevent 260,000 premature deaths Having fewer fossil-fuel powered cars on the road is reducing some pollutants, but not others. Nature, Claudia Steiner, June 5, 2026.
UK urged not to further weaken EV rules as CO2 impact revealed British vehicles will emit extra 17m tonnes of CO2 by 2030 due to loophole allowing sale of more PHEVs, data suggests. The Guardian, Jasper Jolly, Jun 06, 2026.

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

A Rule That Would Rewrite the Terms of U.S. Science A new rule promulgated by the US executive branch would give political appointees veto power over peer review, allow the government to cancel active grants mid-project with minimal justification, ban entire categories of science from federal funding, and restrict researchers’ ability to publish their work and attend scientific conferences. American Geophysical Union, Brando Jones, May 4, 2026.
2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #22 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, May 24, 2026 thru Sat, May 30, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, May 31, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (1 article)

Irish people's lack of concern over climate action due to mixed messaging from politicians What is clear from the Irish Examiner climate poll is that the gap between the intensifying global climate crisis and public concern is still very wide Irish Examiner, John Gibbons, Jun 02, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 article)

Fact brief - Do electric vehicles almost always have a lower carbon footprint than gasoline-powered cars? Analysis indicates that electric vehicles nearly always end up with a net benefit for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, Jun 02, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

Skeptical Science New Research for Week #23 2026

Thu, 4 Jun 2026 08:06:02 EST

Open access notables

Historical Volcanic Eruptions Mitigated the Expected Rapid Arctic Sea Ice Decline Prior to 2000, Wang et al., Geophysical Research Letters

Arctic sea ice has declined at sharply contrasting rates over the past four decades—modest before 2000 and rapid thereafter. Using observational and model evidence, we show that large tropical volcanic eruptions can trigger decade-long Arctic sea ice recoveries, and that without the 1982 El Chichón and 1991 Pinatubo eruptions, Arctic sea ice would have declined approximately 1.5 times faster before 2000. We further show a model's sensitivity to volcanic aerosol forcing scales with its sensitivity to GHG forcing across CMIP6 models, offering a new strategy to identify models with realistic climate response to radiative forcing. Following this, a selected subgroup of models that accurately simulate long-term warming trend and decade-long post-Pinatubo recovery project ice-free Arctic summer up to 20 years earlier than the full ensemble. These findings underscore the critical, yet underappreciated, importance of evaluating climate models against anthropogenic and volcanic forcing when projecting the future of Arctic sea ice.

Legacy wells supporting net zero by screening carbon storage and geothermal potential in the United States, Rajput et al., Communications Earth & Environment

Depleted oil and gas reservoirs provide an opportunity to repurpose underperforming wells and reuse existing subsurface infrastructure to support Net Zero transitions. Here we present a United States wide screening analysis of underperforming wells to estimate upper bound technical potential for carbon storage and geothermal heat. Using public well inventories, county level carbon removal cost datasets, national scale storage resource maps, and geothermal resource data, and accounting for well integrity attrition and field scale constraints, we estimate carbon storage potential of approximately 0.024–1.17 gigatonnes per year and geothermal heat potential of approximately 1–35 gigawatts thermal across high potential regions. Avoided drilling and deferred abandonment may indicate upper bound cost benefits, although repurposing costs remain site-specific. Key constraints include well integrity and cooling during injection; a retrofittable downhole choke is evaluated to mitigate this during startup. These results highlight conditional potential and the need for site-specific assessment.

Northern permafrost represents a limit on the northward shift of climatically feasible agricultural frontiers under future warming, Xu et al., Communications Earth & Environment

Global warming is expected to shift crop suitability northward, but the role of permafrost remains unclear. Here we integrate permafrost degradation impacts to project the suitability of seven major crops across the Northern Hemisphere (30°N–83°N). By the end of the century, the northern boundary of crop climatic suitability zones shifts northward by ~331 km and ~739 km under the SSP1–2.6 and SSP5–8.5 scenarios, respectively. Considering this shift and permafrost degradation, zones with persistent near-surface permafrost remain limited (~5%) but vary widely (3–19%) across different permafrost degradation assumptions. By the end of the century, newly emerging frontiers of climatically feasible agriculture reach 4.86 and 11.64 million km² under SSP1–2.6 and SSP5–8.5, respectively, of which 29% and 18% may remain unsuitable for cultivation due to persistent permafrost thaw disturbances. Our results indicate that permafrost is a non-negligible constraint on the northward shift of climatically feasible agricultural frontiers.

Caught in the Fray. How Climate Scientists Navigate the Public Sphere, Abramov et al., Environmental Communication

Climate scientists are increasingly drawn into a polarized public sphere, challenging relations between science and society. In this study, we interviewed thirty-five climate scientists – diverse in discipline and seniority – working in the Netherlands about their perceptions of, and experiences with public engagement. Based on our empirical material, we construct an analytical framework with a politization and participation axis on which we position their statements. Demarcating their public activities along these dimensions, climate scientists highlight concerns for scientific credibility, political efficacy, normative responsibility and individual capacity. While there is a clear opposition between those compelled to advocate for stringent climate policies or tackle misinformation and those who believe their main role is to provide solid knowledge and leave the normative choices to activists or politicians, only few scientists collaborate with stakeholders. Letting different stakeholders speak and participate in knowledge productions, we argue, may provide a solution to the science vs politics stranglehold.

Widespread intensification of global river hydrograph flashiness under climate change, Zhu et al., Communications Earth & Environmen

Flooding poses an increasing threat to lives and infrastructure worldwide, yet how river flow responds under climate change remains uncertain. Here we assess future changes in river hydrograph flashiness, defined as the rate of increase in streamflow normalized by time and drainage area, using a numerical hydrological model driven by multiple climate model projections. We analyze 520 major river basins globally. Results show that flashiness is projected to increase by about 14%, 30%, and 79% by the late twenty-first century under low-, intermediate-, and high-emission scenarios, respectively, relative to 2014. Increases are greater in low-latitude basins than in high-latitude regions. These changes are mainly associated with larger differences between peak and base flow and shorter times to reach peak discharge. Overall, our findings suggest that river floods are likely to become faster and more intense in a warming climate, posing growing challenges for flood risk management and infrastructure design.

From this week's government/NGO section:

UPDATE: Colorado River Basin Storage Continues Slide Toward System Crash, Castle et al., Getches-Wilkinson Center, University of Colorado Law School

If the Colorado River Basin (Basin) experiences another dry year, similar to Water Year 2025, it is likely that reasonably accessible storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead would be mostly depleted, even if consumptive uses and losses are at or near historic lows. Run-of-the-river operations would shortly ensue. This would be an outcome with devastating consequences. In contrast, if next year is very wet, similar to Water Year 2023, the Basin’s largest federal reservoirs would recover somewhat, but would provide only about two years of cushion before we find ourselves again in the same position we are in today, unless consumptive use decreases further. This recovery would be welcome but would provide only a brief reprieve from crisis. Both scenarios demonstrate the need to adopt significant additional measures to permanently decrease consumptive uses across the entire Basin.

Americans Are Increasingly Pessimistic About Avoiding the Worst Effects of Climate Change, Brian Kennedy and Isabelle Pula, Pew Research Center

About six-in-ten Americans say countries around the world, including the U.S., will not do enough to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Among Democrats, this share has increased from 51% in 2022 to 69% in 2026. About half of U.S. adults say tech companies can do a lot to address climate change, but few expect technology to actually solve problems caused by climate change in the future. A majority of Americans, especially Democrats, say the federal government is doing too little on climate change. This overall share is slightly higher than it was during the Biden administration.

117 articles in 63 journals by 940 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Canadian wildfires are losing their climate-cooling influence from postfire snow albedo, Gerrevink et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1073/pnas.2600434123

Observed Linkages Between Marine Heatwaves and Extreme Weather Over Land: A New Zealand Case Study, Chinappa et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70457

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Divergent Impacts of Evapotranspiration by Plant CO₂ Physiological Forcing on the Mean and Variability of Water Availability, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2023jd040253 2 cites.

Observations of climate change, effects

An attribution study of the impactful extreme heat across Asia in 2024, Marghidan et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100919

Asymmetric warming and rising atmospheric water demand in southern Zambia: long-term temperature change in the Ngwezi River Basin, Wankie et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1837008

Deoxygenation in inland freshwater systems, Shi et al., Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 10.1038/s43017-026-00795-x

Historical Increase in Hourly Heavy Precipitation Across Japan and Its Attribution to Anthropogenic Climate Warming, Sato et al., Atmospheric Science Letters Open Access 10.1002/asl2.70036

Warming and Aridification Amplify Extreme Fire Weather Elevating Population Exposure in China, Bai et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70440

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change impacts on Central Asia: Trends, extremes and future projections, International Journal of Climatology, 10.1002/joc.8519 51 cites.

Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Direct observational evidence from space of the effect of CO ₂ increase on longwave spectral radiances: the unique role of high-spectral-resolution measurements, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-6375-2024 6 cites.

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

21st century change in precipitation on the Greenland Ice Sheet using high resolution regional climate models, Boberg et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-2947-2026

A strengthened and southward-shifted westerly jet mitigates warming-induced drying across Asian drylands, Jiang & Zhou, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed7890

AMOC slowdown amplifies North Atlantic salinity variability to unprecedented levels, Iwakiri et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73838-y

An Ensemble Projection of ENSO to the End of 21st Century, Zhou et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl121816

Anthropogenic climate change accelerates the onset of global flood timing, Qi et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73839-x

Changes in ENSO Oscillatory Dynamics Associated with Zonal Shifts in Air–Sea Coupling Region, Molina et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0074.1

Forced Response in the Mean State and Interannual Variability of the Indian Summer Monsoon in Future Projections, Nithya et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70449

Future changes of coastal extremes from the regional wave-ocean coupled model system for the Northern European continental shelf, Nguyen et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1782346

Future drought intensification and socioeconomic exposure in Pakistan under different SSP scenarios, Baig et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.019

Hailstorms are predicted to hit harder with climate change, [authors did not process], Nature Open Access 10.1038/d41586-026-01639-w

High-Impact and Low-Likelihood Compound Hot and Dry Extremes in India, Malik et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0277.1

Hybrid Model–Based Forecasting of Temperature and Precipitation Changes in Iran, Ezati et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106852

Lake sediment heatwaves under global warming, Woolway et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01986-3

Widespread intensification of global river hydrograph flashiness under climate change, Zhu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03681-y

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Heat index historical trends and projections due to climate change in the Mediterranean basin based on CMIP6, Atmospheric Research, 10.1016/j.atmosres.2024.107512 20 cites.

Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

A modified stratiform cloud microphysics parameterization: evaluation using the Community Atmosphere Model version 6 single-column model, Pant et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-7407-2026

Development of Grid Corrections to Mixing Parameterizations with Potential Application to Arctic Climate Change, McNider & Pour-Biazar, Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-25-0124.1

Exploring the impact of climate model accuracy and baseline conditions on estimates of future climate change, Power, Theoretical and Applied Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1007/s00704-026-06227-6

Machine learning workflows in climate modelling: design patterns and insights from case studies, Zheng et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rsta.2025.0254

Process-based evaluation of Eastern Mediterranean heatwave development in the CMIP6 models, KLIF et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100918

Sensitivity of Northern Hemisphere Extratropical Cyclone Properties to Atmospheric Resolution in the GFDL SPEAR Model, Lee et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0770.1

Soil Organic Matter Reduces Persistent Nighttime Surface Warm Bias in Convection-Permitting U.S. Simulations, Lin et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123274

Using Energetic Frameworks to Assess Artificial Heating in Coupled Model Sea Ice Loss Experiments, Kang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0746.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A perspective on the next generation of Earth system model scenarios: towards representative emission pathways (REPs), Geoscientific model development, 10.5194/gmd-17-4533-2024 39 cites.

Cryosphere & climate change

Climate Warming and Ice Weakening Trigger Alpine Glacier Collapses: The Marmolada Case, Baroni et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121279

Estimating the thermodynamic contribution of post-industrial warming to recent Greenland ice sheet surface mass loss, Preece et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-2871-2026

Historical Volcanic Eruptions Mitigated the Expected Rapid Arctic Sea Ice Decline Prior to 2000, Wang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123968

Identifying Energy Balance Drivers of Greenland Ice Sheet Surface Melt Using Causal Discovery, Yin et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119928

Increasing precipitation due to climate change could partially offset the impact of warming on glacier loss in the monsoon-influenced Himalaya until 2100 CE, Schlich-Davies et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-3151-2026

The anomalously warm summer of 2023 over Greenland as compared to previous record melt summers of 2012 and 2019, Mchedlishvili et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-2895-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Coupled ice–ocean interactions during future retreat of West Antarctic ice streams in the Amundsen Sea sector, cryosphere, 10.5194/tc-18-2653-2024 17 cites.

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

An ice-sheet modelling framework to determine vulnerable regions of the Greenland Ice Sheet in the past, Keisling et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-2961-2026

Limited early-industrial warming and strong volcanic imprints in the Caucasus: the first temperature reconstruction based on maximum latewood density, Dhyani et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-22-989-2026

Newly recovered series of meteorological measurements in SW Greenland (Nuuk) in the period 1806–1813, Przybylak et al., Climate of the past Open Access 10.5194/cp-22-957-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate extremes in Svalbard over the last two millennia are linked to atmospheric blocking, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48603-8 15 cites.

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Earlier spring onset reduces ecosystem resilience to drought across the Northern Hemisphere, Liu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111282

Impact of global change on the distribution of mountain mammals and birds, Dragonetti et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.18389762

Introduced species will not save Caribbean coral reefs, Ritson-Williams et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2610820123

Mapping the Future Afforestation Distribution of China Constrained by National Afforestation Plan and Climate Change, Song et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-21-2839-2024

Marine particles and their remineralization buffer future ocean biogeochemistry response to climate warming, Maerz et al., Biogeosciences Open Access 10.5194/bg-23-1897-2026

Meta-analysis reveals asymmetric root and microbial phenology shifts under global change, Zhao et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73761-2

Mountain Riparian Zones as Refugia for Rare and Endangered Plants Under Climate Change, Lei et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73769

Near-Term Climate Change Impacts on Kenyan Tree Cover, Warrier et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006647

Predicting the range expansion of larger benthic foraminifera under earth’s changing climate, Amao et al., Open Access CRIS of the University of Bern Open Access 10.48620/98304

Resilience of Breeding Boreal Waterbirds to Harsh Wintering Conditions: Could Climate Warming Smooth Population Declines?, Pöysä et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73718

Satellite observations reveal a reversal trend in African woody cover around 2010, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111267

Stream Temperature Response to Increased Shading Due To Riparian Shrubification in Northern Latitudes, Szeitz et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2025jg009465

Thermal stress impairs survival and immune responses in ant founding queens, Silva & Monnin, Biology Letters Open Access 10.1098/rsbl.2026.0072

Tree Cover and Temperature Shape the Distribution of Epiphytic Pleurozia in Asia: Forest Havens in a Warming Climate, Huang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73657

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Biodiversity and Climate Extremes: Known Interactions and Research Gaps, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef003963 49 cites.

GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Below- and above-canopy methane and nitrous oxide fluxes in a subalpine spruce forest, Krebs et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111261

Divergent vulnerabilities of soil carbon fractions to warming magnitude and extreme drought in alpine semi-arid mountain forests of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, Yan et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111276

Evolution and future trend of household carbon footprints in aging Japan, Yang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03612-x

Geospatial life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of coal electricity in the United States, Fortier et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access 10.1088/2634-4505/ae6e6b

Human amplification of climate-induced greenhouse gas emissions from global small water bodies, Zhuang et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2537678123

Impact of air-ice CO2 fluxes on polar ocean carbon budgets from a bipolar data compilation, Crabeck et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73737-2

Large stocks of permafrost soil organic carbon and nitrogen in Arctic river deltas, Fuchs et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73092-2

Mangrove carbon dynamics: Sequestration potential and climate change resilience, Kumawat et al., Earth-Science Reviews 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105558

Melt period methane emissions in northern high latitude wetlands are governed by the length of the period and presence of permafrost, Hyvärinen et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-7555-2026

Methane Emission Reductions Slow Stratospheric Ozone Recovery by Amplifying the Potency of Ozone Depleting Substances, Weber et al., CentAUR (University of Reading) pmh:oai:centaur.reading.ac.uk:129449

Progressive release of long-stored carbon from tropical peatland disturbances, Koarashi et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72890-y

Satellite-based estimates of radiative forcing of long-lived halogenated gases from spectral observations, Whitburn et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03691-w

Season-dependent asymmetric responses of soil carbon emissions to long-term changes in precipitation timing in a semi-arid steppe, Wang et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111280

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Human activities shape global patterns of decomposition rates in rivers, Science, 10.1126/science.adn1262 31 cites.

CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Atmospheric CO2 removal via enhanced weathering of steel slag in soil examined by experiments and geochemical modeling, Nakamura et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1802538

Legacy wells supporting net zero by screening carbon storage and geothermal potential in the United States, Rajput et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03667-w

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Converging Findings of Climate Models and Satellite Observations on the Positive Impact of European Forests on Cloud Cover, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2023jd039235 6 cites.

Decarbonization

Aligning global shipping climate policies with life cycle perspective, Kanchiralla et al., Nature Energy Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41560-026-02080-z

Bird migration and wind-energy production across Western Europe, Bauer et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01853-4

Climate impacts of hydrogen emissions, Sun et al., Environmental Science & Technology Open Access pdf 10.1021/acs.est.3c09030

Driving a green energy transition with halide perovskite solar cells, Chen et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01844-5

Prospective environmental impact of solar energy communities in a decarbonised grid: insights from consequential life cycle analysis, Neves et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115415

Rethinking the economics and flexibility of U.S. nuclear power through hydrogen integration and policy support, Li et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73630-y

Systematic review of ferry decarbonization in the maritime sector, Kasepõld et al., Journal of Shipping and Trade Open Access pdf 10.1186/s41072-026-00241-7

When importance meets expectations: Determinants of local acceptance for wind and photovoltaic projects in Germany, Frank et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104765

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Demand-side strategies key for mitigating material impacts of energy transitions, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02016-z 86 cites.

Geoengineering climate
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Abrupt reduction in shipping emission as an inadvertent geoengineering termination shock produces substantial radiative warming, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01442-3 68 cites.

Black carbon
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Measurement report: Shipborne observations of black carbon aerosols in the western Arctic Ocean during summer and autumn 2016–2020: boreal fire impacts, , 10.5194/egusphere-2023-2315 1 citation.

Aerosols

Global mineral constraints on dust shortwave radiative effects, Li et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01996-1

Global Tropical Cyclone Response to Anthropogenic Aerosol Changes, Zhao et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045902

Highland Pathways Shape Global Dust Vertical Transport and Its Climate Effects, Liu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123758

Pacific Walker Circulation strengthened by tropospheric aerosol forcing, Ying et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01442-4

Uncertainty in Contrail Physics and Climate Impacts: Roadmap to a ContrailMIP, Eastham et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-26-0121.1

Vertically-resolved source contributions to climate-relevant aerosol properties in Southern Greenlandic fjord systems, Alden et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-7165-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Aerosol-induced closure of marine cloud cells: enhanced effects in the presence of precipitation, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-6455-2024 10 cites.

Climate change communications & cognition

Caught in the Fray. How Climate Scientists Navigate the Public Sphere, Abramov et al., Environmental Communication Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.32453978.v1

Climate action needs more than policy: The moral and spiritual foundations of sustainable change, Pinto & Vidal, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000946

Climate Change Reporting Frames and Discourse in African Media (2015–2025): A Mixed-Method Study, Xu et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2680140

Distinguishing climate change worry from state climate anxiety across 32 countries: implications for subjective wellbeing, Lee et al., Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1007/s13412-026-01120-0

Extreme weather salience as a climate crisis signal: Examining the role of extreme weather fear in adaptive and maladaptive responses to eco-anxiety, Lau et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103179

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Acting as we feel: Which emotional responses to the climate crisis motivate climate action, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 10.1016/j.jenvp.2024.102327 37 cites.

Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

A systematic review on the impact of climate smart agricultural practices adoption on productivity in Ethiopia, Molla, Journal of Disaster Science and Management Open Access pdf 10.1007/s44367-026-00036-4

Carbon-removal opportunities and constraints of bioenergy crops on marginal croplands in China, Hua et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03588-8

Climate-driven shifts in soil microbiomes: implications for plant resilience in agriculture, Bhagat & Mishra, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1803685

Flood-induced livelihood vulnerability and migration as an adaptation strategy: evidence from farm households of the flood-prone region of Eastern India, Nag et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1695726

Northern permafrost represents a limit on the northward shift of climatically feasible agricultural frontiers under future warming, Xu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03702-w

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change impacts on small pelagic fish distribution in Northwest Africa: trends, shifts, and risk for food security, Scientific Reports, 10.1038/s41598-024-61734-8 40 cites.

Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Emerging Importance of Compound Flooding in Future Tropical Cyclone Hazard Profiles, Gori et al., Open MIND pmh:10.17615/ggmz-8m83

Historical Increase in Hourly Heavy Precipitation Across Japan and Its Attribution to Anthropogenic Climate Warming, Sato et al., Atmospheric Science Letters Open Access 10.1002/asl2.70036

Inter-model differences in 21st century glacier runoff for the world’s major river basins, Wimberly et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-19-1491-2025

Warming and vegetation greening drive recent surge in flash droughts, J et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aea8452

Widespread intensification of global river hydrograph flashiness under climate change, Zhu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03681-y

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global groundwater warming due to climate change, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01453-x 109 cites.

Climate change economics

Incorporating air quality health impacts into the social cost of carbon, Kingdon et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02653-6

The impact of financial development on CO2 emissions in the framework of the environmental Kuznets curve, ÖNDES & KIZILGÖL, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1814255

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Economic quantification of Loss and Damage funding needs, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00565-7 10 cites.

Climate change mitigation public policy research

Does Decarbonisation lead to Psychological De-territorialisation? An Emerging Challenge for a Just Transition in Coal and Carbon-Intensive Regions across EU Countries, García-Mira et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103084

Emission ensemble approach to improve the development of multi-scale emission inventories, Thunis et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-17-3631-2024

Equitable transitions in ageing societies: how fairness perceptions transform carbon tax resistance, Ba et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2657445

Industrial decarbonization in a fragmented world: Carbon pricing with border adjustments using standardized values, Neuhoff et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115405

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
EU carbon prices signal high policy credibility and farsighted actors, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01505-x 69 cites.

Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Governing climate migration: the right to a livable space, Benveniste & Capisani, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2678013

Structural challenges to effective climate adaptation: a critical assessment of planned relocation as an adaptation strategy, Bertana et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100830

The unpredictability of community priorities in planning for water-scarce futures in the Goulburn-Broken River Basin, Grupper et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104407

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Building resilience in Asian mega-deltas, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00561-x 48 cites.

Climate change impacts on human health

Enhanced Heatwaves Exacerbate Survival Risks for Vulnerable Populations, Dou et al., Anthropocene 10.1016/j.ancene.2026.100554

Optimizing U.S. Heat Alerts: A Multimetric Analysis of Heat-Related Mortality, Alexander et al., Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0079.1

Quantifying the financial burden of heat-related hospital admissions in Switzerland under a changing climate: A scalable analytical framework, Vaghefi et al., BMC Global and Public Health Open Access pdf 10.1186/s44263-026-00275-w

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Health co-benefits and trade-offs of carbon pricing: a narrative synthesis, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2356822 6 cites.

Other

Future water constraints on United States lithium mining under climate change, Trost et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03643-4

How climate risk shapes corporate greenwashing: the role of supply chain disruption and digital governance, Fang et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1844699

Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Antarctic science operations must account for climate change and extreme environmental events, Siegert et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03629-2

The Transhumanist Anthropocene: From the climate crisis to upgrading humanity, Schütze & Latzer, The Anthropocene Review Open Access 10.1177/20530196261453840

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Toward an evidence-informed, responsible, and inclusive debate on solar geoengineering: A response to the proposed non-use agreement, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 10.1002/wcc.903 14 cites.

Book reviews

An Arctic community on the climate front lines, Boon, Science 10.1126/science.aeh0733

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Need for Speed: An Analysis of Speed to Market and Cost Results of Competitive Transmission, Kent Chandler and Olivia Manzagol, R Street

Over a decade ago, federal regulators overhauled the way transmission planning is conducted in the United States. As part of those changes, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determined it would no longer allow incumbent utilities to possess a right of first refusal (ROFR) to build all transmission traversing their state-determined service territories. Instead, certain significant regional transmission lines would be subject to competitive solicitations in which both incumbent and non-incumbent developers could submit proposals for inclusion in the regional transmission plan. This competition is notably different from merchant transmission, which recovers revenue from market prices or willing off-takers rather than through regulated rates. In order to determine the efficacy of FERC Order 1000’s removal of utilities’ federal ROFR to build transmission, the authors analyzed the length of time it takes to plan and develop competitive transmission. The authors compared competitive projects’ final results with the appropriate counterfactual: similar incumbent-developed transmission lines. While FERC’s initial rule opening up transmission development to competition was decided a decade and a half ago, most transmission planning regions have only seen a handful of competitive projects placed into service.

Split transition: BRICS breaks renewable records — and fossil records too, James Norman, Global Energy Monitor

2025 saw the largest power capacity expansion on record across the Brazil, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia and the United Arab Emirates (BRICS), with additions reaching new highs for coal, oil and gas, solar, and wind. Fossil power expansion accelerated, with 125 GW of new coal, oil, and gas capacity added and the largest net annual increase in fossil capacity on record (115 GW), after accounting for retirements. Renewable deployment also surged, with solar and wind additions totaling 497 GW in 2025, overwhelmingly concentrated in China and India. The BRICS’ utility-scale solar and wind project development pipeline expanded rapidly, growing by roughly one-quarter in 2025 to reach 2,317 GW — around 2.5 times the 927 GW fossil pipeline, which expanded by 12%.

Global Clean-Energy Trade Rebounds to $479 Billion in 2025 Despite Tariffs and Geopolitical Turmoil, BloombergNEF

Despite numerous tariffs targeting energy transition sectors and other global markets, US policy failed to stifle overall trade in products central to the energy transition. Persistent overcapacity, fueled by Chinese overinvestment, continues to compress margins for clean-tech manufacturers across batteries, solar and electric vehicles. Conflict in the Middle East has underscored the fragility of conventional fossil-fuel supply chains, and will likely accelerate the transition to lower-carbon technologies.

World Energy Investment 2026, Gould et al., International Energy Agency

World Energy Investment is the global benchmark for tracking investment trends across the energy sector. The authors present the latest data on capital flows to different types of energy projects, as well as the first set of full-year estimates for 2026. As energy security concerns continue to shape investment priorities, the authors explore the potential implications for different sectors and regions, particularly in light of the ongoing energy crisis stemming from the conflict in the Middle East. The authors highlight major investment milestones and opportunities from different energy sectors and regions. They also include expanded regional analysis and data on sources of investment and finance.

Pitches in Peril: A Climate Change and World Cup Analysis, Hosier et al., Comon Goal and Football for Future

Football is already on the frontline of the climate crisis. From flooded stadiums in Texas and Florida to unsafe heat in Mexico City, extreme weather is putting the future of the game at risk. Grassroots pitches where every legend took their first steps are even more vulnerable, especially in the Global South where resources for adaptation are scarce. 14 of 16 World Cup 2026 stadiums already exceed safe-play thresholds for major climate hazards, with nearly 90% projected to face unplayable heat by 2050. Two-thirds of grassroots pitches where icons like Messi and Salah grew up will face unsafe or unplayable heat conditions by mid-century. By 2050, Troost-Ekong’s childhood pitch in Nigeria will endure nearly five months of unplayable heat annually. Tim Cahill’s pitch in Sydney faces flood depths up to 7 meters during extreme events.

Enabling DOE Regional Energy–Water Technology Pilots, Committee on Enabling DOE Regional Energy–Water Technology Pilots, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

The authors present a vision for a Department of Energy pilot program grounded in regional realities, recognizing that challenges and solutions vary widely across the country. It emphasizes that while technological innovation is essential, it is not sufficient on its own. Successful solutions must incorporate a systems level perspective and consider governance, financing, regulatory, and institutional factors that shape implementation. Through a portfolio of regionally diverse pilot projects, the authors highlight the importance of proactive risk management, cross-sector collaboration, and strong partnerships among public and private stakeholders. They also underscore that collaboration, while essential, can be difficult within fragmented governance structures and requires intentional efforts to build alignment and trust. By embedding adaptive management, continuous learning, and knowledge sharing into program design, the proposed approach aims to evolve with changing conditions and scale effective solutions. Together, these strategies offer a pathway to reduce systemic risks, improve sustainability, and build a more secure and resilient energy-water future.

Americans Are Increasingly Pessimistic About Avoiding the Worst Effects of Climate Change, Brian Kennedy and Isabelle Pula, Pew Research Center

About six-in-ten Americans say countries around the world, including the U.S., will not do enough to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Among Democrats, this share has increased from 51% in 2022 to 69% in 2026. About half of U.S. adults say tech companies can do a lot to address climate change, but few expect technology to actually solve problems caused by climate change in the future. A majority of Americans, especially Democrats, say the federal government is doing too little on climate change. This overall share is slightly higher than it was during the Biden administration.

WMO Global Annual to Decadal Climate Update 2026 to 2035, World Meteorological Organization

Global average temperatures are likely to continue at or near record levels in the next five years, with Arctic temperature anomalies expected to continue to be higher than the global mean. The authors examine the observed climate over the past five years and provide regional predictions for temperatures and precipitation over the next five years. Annual global mean near-surface temperatures during 2026–2030 are predicted to vary between 1.3°C and 1.9°C above the 1850-1900 average. It is likely (86% chance) that one year between 2026 and 2030 will surpass 2024 as the warmest year on record, according to the update. It is very likely (91% chance) that the global mean near-surface temperature will temporarily exceed 1.5°C above the 1850-1900 average levels for at least one year between 2026 and 2030. This level was also temporarily exceeded in 2024.

Ruta Energetica (Energy Roadmap for Chile), Government of Chile

Chile se encuentra en una etapa decisiva de su transición energética, enfrentando el desafío de consolidar los avances alcanzados durante la última década y, al mismo tiempo, responder a nuevas exigencias en materia de seguridad energética, crecimiento económico y competitividad internacional. La presente Ruta 2026–2030 tiene por objetivo acelerar y robustecer la transición energética del país, promoviendo una agenda que combine seguridad del suministro, modernización institucional, competitividad económica, y desarrollo territorial equilibrado. Para ello, se busca impulsar una transición energética con foco en la seguridad, posicionando a la energía como un motor habilitante del crecimiento, inversión, empleo, productividad e innovación. En este marco, la Ruta define las prioridades estratégicas y lineamientos de acción que orientarán la gestión sectorial durante el período 2026–2030. (Chile is at a decisive stage in its energy transition, facing the challenge of consolidating the progress made during the last decade and, at the same time, respond to new demands in terms of energy security, economic growth, and international competitiveness. This roadmap 2026–2030 aims to accelerate and strengthen the energy transition of the country, promoting an agenda that combines security of supply, institutional modernization, economic competitiveness, and balanced territorial development. To this end, it seeks to promote a energy transition with a focus on security, positioning energy as an enabling engine growth, investment, employment, productivity and innovation. In this framework, the roadmap defines the strategic priorities and guidelines for action that will guide sectoral management during the period 2026–2030.)

Transforming food systems for a safe climate and health for all, Elisa Morgera, United Nations

The Special Rapporteur clarifies human rights obligations and responsibilities to transform food systems in order to effectively mitigate and adapt to climate change and respond to loss and damage. She recommends combining decarbonization, defossilization and detoxification of food systems to prevent localized and global human right harms. She also confirms that prioritizing Indigenous Peoples’ and peasants’ agroecology, small-scale ecosystem-based fisheries and pastoralism enhances the sustainability and resilience of food systems, planetary and human health, including nutrition, to the benefit of all.

Energy Vampires: The AI data centres draining Australia, Greenpeace Australia

The frenzied rollout of AI data centers in Australia is rushing through massive new projects, which will derail Australia’s energy transition unless the government urgently intervenes. Australia’s biggest proposed data center, the 1GW Mamre Road Data Centre Campus in Western Sydney, will generate peak annual grid emissions equivalent to that produced by 560,000 petrol cars for a year or all domestic flights within NSW in 2023. Data centers already fail to cover their own emissions with new renewables and their rollout will dramatically hold back Australia’s energy transition. No data center operator analyzed in the report adequately proves their claim of driving Australia’s renewable energy growth. Claims they are doing this through truly “additional” new power purchasing agreements for renewable energy are unsubstantiated. There are early signs of a data center-fueled gas boom in Australia which will come with massive, nationally significant climate costs. For example, the Tamboran proposal for the Northern Territory would effectively double the state’s emissions. In NSW, Cloud Carrier’s proposed gas-fired project would wipe out NSW’s entire projected 2028 emissions cuts.

UPDATE: Colorado River Basin Storage Continues Slide Toward System Crash, Castle et al., Getches-Wilkinson Center, University of Colorado Law School et al

If the Colorado River Basin (Basin) experiences another dry year, similar to Water Year 2025, it is likely that reasonably accessible storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead would be mostly depleted, even if consumptive uses and losses are at or near historic lows. Run-of-the-river operations would shortly ensue. This would be an outcome with devastating consequences. In contrast, if next year is very wet, similar to Water Year 2023, the Basin’s largest federal reservoirs would recover somewhat, but would provide only about two years of cushion before we find ourselves again in the same position we are in today, unless consumptive use decreases further. This recovery would be welcome but would provide only a brief reprieve from crisis. Both scenarios demonstrate the need to adopt significant additional measures to permanently decrease consumptive uses across the entire Basin.

The Race for Net Zero: The UK net zero economy and the transition to a competitive future, CBI Economics and the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit

The UK’s transition to net zero is reshaping the structure of the economy. What began as a decarbonization challenge has evolved into a system-wide economic transformation, influencing how energy is produced, how industries operate, and where economic activity is located. The authors assess the net zero economy’s scale, structure and economic significance, and its contribution to competitiveness and regional investment.

Cost of living, health, housing eclipse climate issue in people's priorities – Irish Examiner poll, Irish Examiner

Some 59% of people think the Government is not doing enough with the resources it has on climate change, with less than one in five (18%) deeming the current efforts adequate. A total of 71% of adults identify as environmentally conscious, but only 14% make significant behavioral changes. There is less support for higher carbon taxes (11%), higher petrol/diesel taxes (11%), and reducing the national herd (15%). Some 61% of people say Ireland is not prepared for the impacts of climate change. Of these impacts, 42% rated storms as one of their top three concerns, followed by food insecurity (37%), risks to public health (32%), extreme heat (28%), and rising sea/water levels (26%).

The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal, 3rd edition, Edwards et al., German Institute for International and Security Affairs et al

Both carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and emissions reductions are needed to reach the Paris temperature goal. There are many CDR methods, and they span large ranges in costs, potentials and social acceptance. Current removal is almost entirely from land-based, conventional CDR; novel CDR is growing quickly but still comprises a tiny fraction of total removal. A large and growing gap exists between the amount of CDR in country pledges and that in Paris-compatible scenarios; both conventional and novel CDR are deployed in every scenario. CDR sits in a broader context of multiple goals and side effects. Demand for CDR is crucial to closing the CDR gap. While innovative activity has grown, expectations of large and growing demand have become fragile. Important aspects of the CDR system are highly concentrated, create vulnerabilities, and would benefit from diversification across methods, actors and countries. Closing the CDR gap is urgent because deployment is a gradual process. The period 2026–2030 is thus critical for establishing CDR’s role in limiting climate damages.

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Nobody knows the future of energy

Wed, 3 Jun 2026 14:57:01 EST

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Andrew Dessler

I’ve long been struck by how hard it is to predict the evolution of our energy system, even a few years in advance, never mind 25 or 30 years. I still remember the “peak oil” craze in the mid 2000s, when people were telling me the end of oil was nigh. It sounded convincing right up until it turned out to be wrong.

In this post, let me show you how bad previous predictions have been for the electricity sector.

evolution of our energy system in 6 charts

Each plot below shows annual predictions of how a particular source of electricity will evolve as well as what actually happened. The data come from the Energy Information Administration and cover the U.S. electricity sector.

We’ll start with coal. In the first plot, the black line shows actual U.S. coal-fired electricity generation. The colored lines are predictions made each year since 2008.

In 2008, coal was expected to produce increasing amounts of electricity into the future. Instead, it immediately started to decline and it took until 2023 before the EIA began to predict a long-term decline in coal, despite the fact that coal had been declining for 15 years.

Natural gas, by contrast, has generated an increasing share of U.S. electricity. This is largely due to the tidal wave of cheap natural gas from fracking. The predictions, on the other hand, did not anticipate this.

The takeaway here is that predicting the evolution of our energy system is not just hard in the long run, e.g., thirty years from now, but it’s hard even in the short run.

If we combine coal and gas, the forecasts look better. This reflects the fact that natural gas was replacing coal, so that the overestimate for coal was cancelled to some extent by the underestimate for natural gas.

But even for the combined category, the forecasts vary widely.

Here’s solar (including both utility and residential solar):

And here’s wind:

For both energy sources, predictions before 2015 were really bad.

Across all energy sources, the 2023 and 2025 forecasts differ sharply from the 2026 forecast. The predictions made for 2023/2025 assume Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, while 2026 predictions assume the reversal of those policies.

The difference between 2023/2025 and 2026 is an estimate of the role that politics plays in the future evolution of our electricity sector. Because we cannot confidently predict who will win future elections or what their policies will be, this is a very good reason why it’s so hard to predict the future of our energy system.

the cost of energy

Why is it so hard to predict the energy mix in our electricity system? One big reason is that it is hard to predict the future rate of innovation. We can see this in a plot of the cost of energy1:

You can see that the price of wind and solar plummeted in the early 2010s, reflecting enormous innovation in the production of renewable energy. That was not predicted by most mainstream forecasts (as confirmed by predictions of wind and solar above).

There has also been a lot of innovation in fossil fuel production, most importantly hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. These technologies drove down the cost of natural gas in the late 2000s and changed the economics of electricity generation almost overnight. Coal plants that had looked like safe long-term investments suddenly faced a cheaper competitor. Yet this, too, was largely missed. In the late 2000s, many utilities were still trying to build coal plants, unable to see that coal was entering a precipitous decline.

TXU didn’t see the end of coal coming. Most of these plants were never built.

And, as wind and solar costs fell, renewables began taking market share too. Coal was not beaten by a single technology; it was beaten by a sequence of technologies that forecasters failed to anticipate.

Based on economics, coal is now a stone-cold loser. Its remaining advantage is not cost, speed of construction, or flexibility. It is politics. The Trump Administration is forcing coal-fired plants to stay open and some recent reporting suggests these interventions are raising costs for consumers.

In the competition between solar, wind, and natural gas, solar and wind are the cheapest. The combination of low costs, short construction times, and natural gas’ price volatility gives wind and solar a huge market advantage, explaining their exponential growth. Yes, solar and wind are coming for natural gas.

The plot also shows the profound disadvantage nuclear faces. Nuclear energy costs nearly $200/MWh, around four times the cost of wind and solar. And it takes a decade or two to get it online. Without government mandates or heavy policy support, I believe there is little likelihood that we will see a nuclear renaissance.

what are the implications of this?

Much of the debate in climate policy centers on the cost, difficulty, and timeline for phasing out fossil fuels in order to achieve net zero. You constantly hear pundits and analysts throwing around eye-popping numbers, confidently claiming, e.g., that “it will cost XXX trillions of dollars to reach net zero in our economy by 2050.”

from McKinsey

But if the forecasting failures of the last twenty years have taught us anything, it’s this: we simply have no idea how much decarbonization will cost.

You should treat numbers like McKinsey’s estimate above as guesses. They could be right, but historically speaking, they probably aren’t. To summarize, here are the reasons why the true cost of reaching net zero remains so uncertain:

We can’t predict the foundational energy mix: As the charts above show, our ability to forecast the trajectory of the electricity sector even a few years out is abysmal. If forecasters cannot accurately predict the baseline scenario (how much wind, solar, or natural gas will be on the grid), it seems unlikely they will be able to make accurate predictions of how much additional solar and wind will be needed in 2050 to reach net zero.
Innovation shatters financial models: Long-term cost forecasts rely heavily on estimates of how fast innovation will occur. Such predictions are incredibly hard to make. Almost no one foresaw the exponential drop in the price of solar energy since the late 2000s, nor did experts predict the current plummeting costs of battery storage. Falling battery costs could reshape the electricity system.
Geopolitics rewrites the math: External shocks can alter energy economics overnight. Few energy forecasts anticipated wars in Ukraine and Iran, both of which are going to have an enormous impact on our energy mix going forward.

Overall, the uncertainty in these long-term forecasts is enormous. And if history is any guide, the errors are not random. They usually point in the same direction: they overestimate the cost of the energy transition.

One reason is that traditional forecasting models tend to assume slow, steady technological progress. But energy technologies do not always improve that way. Solar, wind, batteries, and fracking all show that costs can change fast when conditions line up. Most models, which assume gradual change, will miss these breaks.

Another problem is that fossil fuels are often treated as stable, low-risk alternatives. They are not. Their prices can swing wildly, and their supply chains are exposed to wars, political instability, and global market shocks. Those costs are real and hard to predict, so they are left out of these estimates.

That is the central point: estimates of the cost of the energy transition should be treated as conditional guesses built on assumptions about technology, fuel prices, politics, and geopolitics, all of which have repeatedly surprised us.

The lesson of the last twenty years is not that the energy transition will be easy or hard — we really don’t know. Anyone claiming to know the cost decades in advance should be treated with skepticism.

Code to reproduce the plots can be found here.

related things

Is nuclear energy the answer? Nope.

Is renewable energy cheaper than fossil fuels? Yup.

An explanation of how renewable energy saves you money. It’s not that complicated unless you’re being paid to push fossil fuels. Then it’s very complicated.

If you’re looking for a new Substack on energy, check out Bright Spots by Jan Rosenow. This recent post discusses how renewables change the price of energy.

Do you want to see how each U.S. state’s mix of electricity has changed? Brendan Pierpont has you covered here.

1 I’m using levelized cost of energy (LCOE) as my measure of the cost to produce power from each source. I understand the limitations of LCOE, but for an energy developer, LCOE is the number that counts. Yes, wind and solar are intermittent, but that’s a grid problem. All that matters to the developer is which low-LCOE energy source they can build.

Solar, wind, and EVs have knocked out a doomsday climate scenario

Mon, 1 Jun 2026 15:11:05 EST

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections

Thanks to the transition from fossil fuels to clean technologies, what used to be considered the worst-case climate change scenario now appears to be outside the realm of plausibility, climate scientists said in a recent study.

That study made headlines in May when President Donald Trump falsely claimed that climate scientists had admitted that their projections had been wrong, a claim akin to an anti-vaxxer gloating that the official end of the pandemic proved that COVID was never a problem.

And the study contained sobering news: The best-case climate scenario is close to slipping out of reach, and a business-as-usual scenario is still a very dangerous one, with high risks of widespread species extinctions, extreme heat-related illnesses and deaths, and expanding vector-borne diseases like malaria.

World makes progress on climate change

Scientists developed the worst-case climate change scenario known as RCP8.5 nearly 20 years ago.

A 2010 paper described RCP8.5 as representing the 90th percentile of plausible climate-warming emissions, cautioning that the RCPs “are neither forecasts nor policy recommendations, but were chosen to map a broad range of climate outcomes.” A 2011 paper summarizing RCP8.5 noted that this scenario envisioned a world with high population growth, slow improvements in energy efficiency, and a heavy reliance on fossil fuels, including a nearly tenfold increase in coal consumption.

Although the U.S. government under Trump favors high birth rates, has dismantled energy efficiency programs, and supports coal and other fossil fuels, policies implemented around the world over the past decade have shifted us away from the characteristics of RCP8.5, leading scientists to say it is now implausible.

Spurred by the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and dramatically falling costs of clean energy technologies, many countries have increasingly transitioned away from climate-warming fossil fuels. All global growth in electricity demand last year was met by clean sources – predominantly solar panels – European energy think tank Ember and the International Energy Agency recently reported.

Change in annual global electricity demand (blue line) and the amount met by fossil fuels (gray bars), solar power (dark green bars), and other clean sources (light green bars) between 2000 and 2025. (Graphic: Ember)

Clean energy has gotten a boost from the Iran conflict, which spiked prices of fossil fuels and spurred many countries to accelerate their efforts to wean themselves off oil and natural gas. China’s exports of solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles to many regions, including Southeast Asia and Latin America, have surged. And the International Energy Agency has said that the world has reached peak coal consumption.

Read: What the Iran conflict means for gas prices, clean energy, and the climate

Annual electric vehicle sales in China (red), Europe (dark blue), the U.S. (light blue), and the rest of the world (green). (Data: International Energy Agency. Graphic: Dana Nuccitelli)

New climate scenarios

Because the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is heading into its next cycle of climate change reports, a group of scientists called the Scenario Model Intercomparison Project was tasked with establishing an updated set of emissions scenarios. In the new paper, they outline six new scenarios ranging from a best-case “very low emission scenario” to a worst-case “high-emission scenario.”

Their scenarios show that meeting the climate targets set in the 2015 Paris Agreement is becoming increasingly difficult as the years pass and global emissions continue to rise. A middle-of-the-road scenario involving continued climate policies would result in high risks of dangerous outcomes like extreme weather-related deaths and widespread species extinctions.

And a new worst-case scenario involving a Trump-style rollback of climate policies would likely result in catastrophic climate change.

The good, the bad, and the ugly

The new high-emission scenario envisions that many countries could weaken or abandon climate policies. The researchers’ description of this scenario may sound familiar to some Americans, suggesting that “a rollback of climate policies could result from a lack of public support for the energy transition. This could be related to, for instance, local opposition to building new wind farms or concerns about impacts on fossil industries related to jobs and national energy security.”

Climate scientists Zeke Hausfather, Glen Peters, and Piers Forster described this scenario as “a more Trumpian future where current policy is rolled back and clean energy deployment slows.”

In this scenario, atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations rise from about 430 parts per million today to around 700 parts per million in 2100, when temperatures reach about 3.5°C above preindustrial levels, up from about 1.3°C today. That outcome would still likely represent a climate catastrophe, but it’s less severe than the 936 parts per million and nearly 5°C global warming that would have resulted from RCP8.5 by 2100.

The new medium-emission scenario and very-low emission scenario have fairly similar carbon dioxide and global warming trajectories to their previous counterparts, called RCP4.5 and RCP2.6, respectively.

Global average surface temperature change in the old scenarios (solid lines) and new scenarios (dashed lines). (Graphic: Dana Nuccitelli).

The new medium-emission scenario envisions that climate policies continue at the current level. Climate pollution declines slightly into the middle of the century and then remains flat thereafter, resulting in an extremely dangerous 3°C global warming by 2100.

And the new very-low emission scenario illustrates the increasingly difficult challenge of meeting the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to “well below 2°C above preindustrial levels.” Achieving that goal would require rapid reductions in global climate pollution starting today, reaching net-zero emissions around 2050. The previous best-case scenario allowed for a more gradual emissions reduction, not approaching net zero until the 2070s, because there was more time left when it was developed.

Fact brief - Do electric vehicles almost always have a lower carbon footprint than gasoline-powered cars?

Tue, 2 Jun 2026 10:20:57 EST

Skeptical Science is partnering with Gigafact to produce fact briefs — bite-sized fact checks of trending claims. You can submit claims you think need checking via the tipline.

Do electric vehicles almost always have a lower carbon footprint than gasoline-powered cars?

The EPA, IPCC, and many independent studies have found that electric vehicles have lower lifetime emissions than gas-powered vehicles in nearly all cases.

“Lifetime” calculations include emissions released during EV manufacture, as well as the generation of electricity used to charge the car. An average 300-mile range EV produces less than half the lifetime emissions of a conventional 30 miles per gallon car.

This is mainly because EVs are significantly more energy efficient than gasoline cars: over 77% of electricity input is converted to power at the wheels, compared to a conversion of 12-30% of energy in gasoline to wheel power. Meanwhile, the lack of tailpipe emissions offsets an electric sedan or SUV’s initial manufacture emissions within just 1.5-2 years of regular use.

As the U.S. power grid becomes increasingly renewables-based, EVs’ emissions superiority vis-a-vis gas-powered vehicles will continue to grow.

Go to full rebuttal on Skeptical Science or to the fact brief on Gigafact

This fact brief is responsive to quotes such as this one.

Sources

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Electric Vehicle Myths

U.S. Department of Energy Electric Vehicle Benefits and Considerations

IPCC Sixth Assessment Report Chapter 2: Emissions trends and drivers

U.S. Department of Energy All-Electric Vehicles

Environmental Research Letters The role of pickup truck electrification in the decarbonization of light-duty vehicles

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Power Sector Evolution

Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles

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About fact briefs published on Gigafact

Fact briefs are short, credibly sourced summaries that offer "yes/no" answers in response to claims found online. They rely on publicly available, often primary source data and documents. Fact briefs are created by contributors to Gigafact — a nonprofit project looking to expand participation in fact-checking and protect the democratic process. See all of our published fact briefs here.

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #22

Sun, 31 May 2026 10:47:55 EST

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, May 24, 2026 thru Sat, May 30, 2026.

Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (7 articles)

Malnourished Gray Whales of the Eastern North Pacific Are in `Serious Trouble` The population has plummeted over the past seven years as climate change triggers mass starvation in warming Arctic waters. Inside Climate News, By Blaine Harden, May 24, 2026.
An Unusually Early Heat Wave Breaks Temperature Records Across Western Europe 'This is an unprecedented event with a one in 1,000 chance of happening at this time of year based on the climate from 1979 to 2025 and virtually impossible in the preindustrial era,'' Christophe Cassou, a climate scientist, told Le Monde. Inside Climate News, Kiley Price, May 26, 2026.
UK heatwave has `fingerprints of climate change all over it` It’s clearly exceptional when the May temperature record falls not once but twice in two days’ The Independent News, Nick Ferris, May 26, 2026.
It's so friggin' hot Dr Gilbz on Youtube, Ella Gilbert, May 26, 2026.
`Mind-bogglingly crazy`: climate experts alarmed by deadly spring heatwaves searing Europe Scientists warn of ‘new reality’ of heat extremes that claim three times more lives than car crashes and 16 times as many as murderers The Guardian, Ajit Niranjan, May 27, 2026.
Western Europe is roasting in unprecedented spring heat - and it`s not alone Climate scientist Christophe Cassou said the heat in France would have been virtually impossible in the preindustrial era. Yale Climate Connections, Bob Henson, May 27, 2026.
An Arctic community on the climate front lines | Science The harsh realities of global warming are becoming difficult to ignore in Norway’s Longyearbyen Science, Sarah Boon, May 28, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (5 articles)

How the jet-setting commissaries of the climate change quango use dodgy statistics to peddle hysteria - and justify their own existence: MATT RIDLEY Op-ed is a display of classic climate-denier tactics intended to change the subject and swerve public attention from what's important. Mail Online, Matt Ridley, May 22, 2026.
Twenty Years After His Film, Al Gore Tweaks the Climate Script Mr. Gore is still giving the slide show that ''An Inconvenient Truth''” was built around, but with changes that reflect a shift in the discussion of climate change. NYT, Chico Harlan, May 25, 2026.
Which of your climate actions make the biggest difference? Here`s how to find out The Conversation, Charlotte A. Kukowski and Kimberly Nicholas, May 27, 2026.
Translating Climate Awareness Into Action at New York High Schools State of the Planet, Emma Kyzivat, Aynsley Kretschmar and Laurel Zaima-Sheehy, May 28, 2026.
Ask a Climate Therapist: Is it still `catastrophizing` if the threat is real? Psychotherapist Leslie Davenport breaks down some of the tools that can help manage anxiety in the face of mounting climate catastrophe. Grist, Leslie Davenport, May 29, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (4 articles)

UK bets on private investors to fill climate aid gaps after cuts Humanitarian organisations say the needs of private investors and developing countries are not always aligned. The Independent News, Nick Ferris, May 23, 2026.
When Will Emissions From Air Travel Start to Fall? Perhaps we will fly less when we accept that ''bored and restless'' is less important than ''don't cook the planet.'' NYT > Climate and Environment, Claire Brown, May 26, 2026.
Deadly Europe Heatwave Linked to Multiple Deaths as Temperatures Continue Rising Officials have warned that without major adaptation efforts, future heatwaves could place even greater pressure on health systems and urban infrastructure. IBT, Rosemarie Zamora, May 27, 2026.
Backlash is often swift when authorities try to plan retreat from the coast. There`s a better way Research shows why planned retreat can become divisely emotional and how planners and communities can tackle this backlash. The Conversation, Anne Maree Kreller, May 28, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (4 articles)

TikTok’s Climate Pledges Collide with Sponsorship of Climate Deniers By backing a right-wing Canadian conference featuring anti-climate speakers, experts warn TikTok has “abandoned” its commitments to combat climate misinformation. Desmog, Rei Takver, May 22, 2026.
Once A Climate Leader, Canada Is Now Doubling Down On Oil The reversal reveals a stark truth about the direction of global climate action: Despite the rapid deployment of clean energy, even countries and politicians once seen as climate leaders are turning to fossil fuels to protect against the turmoil of Trump’s trade disputes and the war in Iran. Grist, Jake Bittle, May 25, 2026.
Why Kate Marvel left NASA The former NASA climate scientist explains how pronouns have become more important than the planet at the nation's space agency. HEATED, Emily Atkin, May 28, 2026.
EPA rollbacks could raise air conditioning, refrigeration costs despite promise of lower prices A new Trump administration rule will likely cost consumers more money while creating higher emissions of climate-warming superpollutants, industry and environmental groups warn. Inside Climate News, EHN Curators, May 29, 2026.

Miscellaneous (4 articles)

The Paradox of AI and Climate State of the Planet, Renée Cho, May 21, 2026.
2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #21 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, May 17, 2026 thru Sat, May 23, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, May 24, 2026.
Document leak at Australia's richest company shows how it put off going green Mining giant BHP quietly shelved billions of dollars of green projects despite promising the public it was committed to cutting emissions, and telling its board climate action was "urgent" and any delays would "risk" its reputation. Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Angus Grigg, Alex McDonald, and Jade Toomey, May 25, 2026.
Environmentalists Turn Out in Force to Oppose Trump Coal Ash Rollbacks Proposed new regulations from the EPA would loosen requirements for protecting groundwater near power plants where the toxic residue from burning coal is stored. Inside Climate News, Arcelia Martin, May 28, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (1 article)

Solar, wind, and EVs have knocked out a doomsday climate scenario Explosive growth in clean technologies has pushed an old coal-heavy scenario out of the realm of plausibility, according to a recent study. But there’s more work to be done. Yale Climate Connections, Dana Nuccitelli, May 29, 2026.

Geoengineering (1 article)

With geoengineering, a fringe climate solution moves into the mainstream A decade before Exxon’s scientists warned the company’s executives about the likely fallout of burning fossil fuels, White House scientists were already advising then-president Lyndon B. Johnson on a theoretical technology that might curb the impacts of global warming: geoengineering. Atmos, Miranda Green, May 28, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (1 article)

Climate change could significantly worsen summer air quality in future decades The Conversation, Rebecca Kaarina Saari, May 25, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

One Nation says it`s the only party in Australia to question climate science. It should ask itself why | Temperature Check Climate change denial has become untenable yet Hanson’s party digs in – with conspiracy theories, cherrypicking and claims that are easy to refute The Guardian, Graham Readfearn, May 21, 2026.

Skeptical Science New Research for Week #22 2026

Thu, 28 May 2026 15:14:57 EST

Open access notables

Climate Change Communication in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, Schäfer et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Chang

Artificial intelligence (AI), and especially generative AI (GenAI), is rapidly reshaping climate change communication (CCC). Once dominated by news coverage and public campaigns, CCC now extends across scientists, NGOs, corporations, journalists, influencers, and citizens—all increasingly encountering and adopting AI tools. This article provides a comprehensive review of scholarship on the nexus of AI and CCC, synthesizing insights scattered across disciplines from social and computer science, and interdisciplinary fields like environmental and science studies. It identifies robust patterns alongside significant gaps, highlighting areas where future research is needed. Based on existing evidence, it shows that AI—as of now—functions less as a disruptive replacement of established communication and information-seeking practices rather than as an assistive layer in CCC: accelerating routine newsroom tasks, enabling personalized and multilingual outreach, and generating new textual, visual, and multimodal representations of climate change. Stakeholders use AI to monitor discourse, expose greenwashing, and broaden access to climate information, though systematic research on uptake and effects remains limited. Journalists experiment cautiously with AI, emphasizing human oversight, while influencers and content creators are understudied despite their growing role. The potential of AI-driven systems for fact-checking, policy analysis, and creative engagement has been explored, yet studies remain heavily English-centric and focused on text. Citizen studies reveal promises and risks: generative dialogues can reduce skepticism and foster engagement, but biases, misinformation, and equity concerns persist. Advancing the field requires comparative and interdisciplinary agendas that integrate computational and traditional methods, foreground transparency and inclusion, and address how AI can equitably support awareness, trust, and climate action.

Vacuuming the Sky? Metaphorical Framing in News Coverage of Carbon Dioxide Removal Methods, Bruggen et al., Environmental Communication

Discussions of proposed climate solutions, such as carbon dioxide removal (CDR), are multi-layered and contested. This study examines the role that metaphors play as frame devices in news coverage (2018–2024) about CDR. Using critical metaphor analysis, we examined 257 articles from major UK, US, and Canadian news outlets to identify and interpret contrasting metaphorical expressions from journalists and their sources, including industry, science, and civil society. We find that a wide range of source domains, including references to, e.g. historical events, household objects, crime, religion, and medical analogies, is used to metaphorically frame CDR. These metaphors reflect actors’ competing ideologies and interests, rooted in hopeful rational-optimist and socio-ecological visions. We also discuss how metaphor use could influence public engagement and policy and reflect on how language might oversimplify or obscure critical aspects of the technology.

Consensus Messaging Shifts Beliefs About Climate Change in a Field Experiment, Rode et al., Science Communication

Previous research on climate change consensus messaging has mostly taken place in controlled lab settings. In this field experiment, we engaged U.S. residents (N = 158) in brief doorstep conversations on climate change. Research assistants read a script about the scientific consensus (treatment) or basic facts about climate change (control) and then provided participants with a magnet containing the same information. The consensus message had a significant positive effect on consensus estimates (β = 0.45) and belief in climate change (β = 0.41), but not on other downstream attitudes or behavior. These results mostly align with theory and have implications for consensus messaging.

From this week's government/NGO section:

24/7 renewables. The economics of Firm Solar and Wind, Dardour et al., The International Renewable Energy Agency

The authors show that the cost of firm renewable electricity has declined rapidly across all major technologies and markets. In high-quality solar and wind resource regions, co-located hybrid systems can already deliver round-the-clock electricity at costs competitive with - and in many cases below - those of new fossil-fuel generation. China currently defines the global cost floor, while costs in Brazil, India, South Africa, Australia, and the Gulf region are declining rapidly towards fossil-fuel cost parity. The authors identify key drivers of firm renewable costs – technology performance, resource quality and system configuration – and examine the policy levers that are proving decisive in translating cost competitiveness into deployment at scale. They conclude that the technologies are maturing, the costs are falling and the commercial demand is growing. The pace at which firm renewable electricity is deployed will be among the most consequential determinants of the global energy transition in the decade ahead.

Climate Promises, Industry Handouts. Canada’s Fossil Fuel Funding in 2025, Environmental Defence Canada

The Government of Canada has provided at least $10.2 billion in fossil fuel subsidies and public financing in 2025. Since Environmental Defence began tracking fossil fuel subsidies in 2020, the federal government has provided at least $85.2 billion in subsidies to the fossil fuel industry. This figure includes government direct spending as well as public financing through Crown corporations, such as Export Development Canada. In addition to fossil fuel subsidies, the Government of Canada provided at least $405.53 million dollars in subsidies for carbon capture and fossil fuel hydrogen projects in 2025. These technologies have failed to deliver on their promises to reduce emissions and have instead locked in further fossil fuel production. Furthermore, this figure excludes the estimated cost of the carbon capture investment tax credit, which is estimated to cost Canadians up to $5.7 billion by 2028, and up to $12.4 billion by 2035. The changes introduced in the Budget 2025 could increase the cost to Canadians by an additional $3.75 billion. In 2025, the cost of pollution from oil and gas companies operating in Canada was an estimated $56.4 billion. This figure was calculated by taking the most recent oil and gas emissions figures and multiplying with the social cost of carbon. Climate pollution created by oil and gas companies has massive costs, including health costs, property damage from extreme weather events, and decreased agricultural productivity due to changing weather patterns. The social cost of carbon helps to estimate what those costs to society are.

76 articles in 46 journals by 755 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Intensified Stratosphere–Troposphere Ozone Transport over Asia under a High-End Climate Trajectory, Luo et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0426.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global aviation contrail climate effects from 2019 to 2021, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-6071-2024 68 cites.

Observations of climate change, effects

Abrupt stream acidification and metal mobilization from permafrost degradation, Skierszkan et al., Science 10.1126/science.aea2898

Increasing exposure to compound heatwave and drought events in China during 1961–2020, Qin et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109099

Two decades of urban heat intensification and exposure across 1400 cities, Naserikia et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03665-y

Wildfire Hazard in Poland in a Warming Climate: Past and Future Impact of Extreme Weather, Pi?skwar et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70439

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Multivariate extremes in lakes, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-49012-7 29 cites.

Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

Assessing winter climate change using cumulative sub-zero temperatures, HE et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.008

Critical dependence of global ocean heat monitoring on the ocean observing system, Zhu et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02661-6

Increasing Power When Controlling Multiple Hypothesis Testing with Climate Data via Covariate Smoothing, McEvoy & McKinnon, Journal of Agricultural Biological and Environmental Statistics Open Access 10.1007/s13253-026-00738-5

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Biogeographic patterns of daily wildfire spread and extremes across North America, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1355361 19 cites.

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Evolution of Compound Drought and Extreme Precipitation Events on the Tibetan Plateau, Sun et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0306.1

Statistical-dynamical downscaling of EURO-CORDEX projections to 50 m resolution: characteristic days for Baden-Württemberg under climate change, Kermarrec et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1778467

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Central-Pacific El Niño-Southern Oscillation less predictable under greenhouse warming, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48804-1 14 cites.

Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty quantification in weather and climate models, Mansfield & Christensen, Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society Open Access 10.1002/qj.70219

Evaluating Nex-GDDP CMIP6 Models for Extreme Wet and Dry Events Over Indonesia, Kurniadi et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70437

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Is Bias Correction in Dynamical Downscaling Defensible?, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2023gl105979 24 cites.

Cryosphere & climate change

An Extreme Antarctic Event; 2025 Was Record Low Seasonal Sea Ice and Record High Iceberg Scouring, Barnes et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70938

Abrupt stream acidification and metal mobilization from permafrost degradation, Skierszkan et al., Science 10.1126/science.aea2898

Constrained simulation of permafrost thermal changes from 1980 to 2018 on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, Ji et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105542

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Widespread seawater intrusions beneath the grounded ice of Thwaites Glacier, West Antarctica, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10.1073/pnas.2404766121 52 cites.

Sea level & climate change

Estimating the cost of sea level rise, Sugiyama et al., DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Open Access pdf pmh:oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/38529

Improved closure of the global mean sea level budget from observational advances since 1960, Zheng et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aea0652

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Diminished Ross Ice Shelf and West Antarctic Ice Sheet during Last Interglacial warming, Carter et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01988-1

Multi-model assessment of the deglacial climatic evolution at high southern latitudes, Obase et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-21-1443-2025

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Acute temperature effects on cilia beating increase coral deoxygenation, Pacherres et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeg0950

An Extreme Antarctic Event; 2025 Was Record Low Seasonal Sea Ice and Record High Iceberg Scouring, Barnes et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70938

Climate and land use change potentially drives southern range contraction and latitudinal shift in Caucasian Lynx, Shahsavarzadeh et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-54072-4

Climate change accelerates global forest deadwood dynamics, Edelmann et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03651-4

Climate-driven vegetation vulnerability in a monsoon-dominated dryland: a dual-index (kNDVI–VHI) assessment for Pakistan, Mehmood et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1745938

Flood events from climate extremes drastically shift prey energy densities, Nitschke et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108136

Hot days increase the risk of heat-stress-related deaths in endangered koala populations, Mella et al., Biology Letters Open Access 10.1098/rsbl.2026.0117

Resilient nekton composition in the face of climate-driven foundation species shifts, Leavitt et al., Ecology Open Access 10.1002/ecy.70397

Taxonomic and functional diversity of benthic foraminifera as a promising proxy for tidewater glacier retreat, Fossile et al., Boreas Open Access 10.1111/bor.70068

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Asymmetrical Impact of Daytime and Nighttime Warming on the Interannual Variation of Urban Spring Vegetation Phenology, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef004127 20 cites.

GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

An Upper Bound on Carbon Emissions of Drained Peat Soil Grasslands From Satellite Radar Interferometry, Conroy & Hanssen, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl115732

Forest carbon protocols underestimate climate-driven carbon loss risks, Wu et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10571-y

Lowland tropical forests remain a methane sink under warming and long-term hurricane disturbance recovery, Conte et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111225

Machine-learning-based estimates of global natural vegetated wetland methane emissions (2000–2025), Li et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-3507-2026

Reduction of tropical cyclone-induced ocean carbon outgassing since 1993, Ye et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01985-4

Widespread peat carbon losses driven by the 2025 Scottish megafire, Schoenecker et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01994-3

Winter Mixing Controls Carbon Sequestration by the Biological Pump in the Subpolar North Atlantic, Fogaren et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023822

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Whole-soil warming leads to substantial soil carbon emission in an alpine grassland, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48736-w 65 cites.

CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Concerns and Questions About Carbon Dioxide Removal Technologies, Luczak, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access 10.1002/wcc.70063

Determinants community involvement in a forest carbon sequestration initiative: a study case in Indonesia, Triana et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1770765

Economic costs of global forest protection may be overstated, Nepal et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73569-0

Impact on oysters in first-of-its-kind field trial of marine Enhanced Rock Weathering (mERW) with olivine as carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategy, Jankowska et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1851765

Vacuuming the Sky? Metaphorical Framing in News Coverage of Carbon Dioxide Removal Methods, Bruggen et al., Environmental Communication Open Access 10.1080/17524032.2026.2673348

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Taking stock of carbon dioxide removal policy in emerging economies: developments in Brazil, China, and India, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2353148 14 cites.

Decarbonization

An energy scenario for Japan towards 2040: Focused on efficiency improvements and renewable energy, Takase et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115398

Averting the steel carbon lock-in through strategic green investments, Bachorz et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access 10.1038/s41558-026-02635-8

High-impact weather effects on wind and solar power systems under future climate scenarios in China, Sun et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73427-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Biological fermentation pilot-scale systems and evaluation for commercial viability towards sustainable biohydrogen production, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48790-4 68 cites.

Geoengineering climate

Artificial Flooding Leads to Thicker and Brighter Arctic Sea Ice, Blanchard?Wrigglesworth et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007894

Contrasting Changes in Rainfall Structure Between Monsoon and Adjacent Dry Regions Under Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, Jiang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046329

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Rethinking the Susceptibility?Based Strategy for Marine Cloud Brightening Climate Intervention: Experiment With CESM2 and Its Implications, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl108860 13 cites.

Black carbon

Sediment records reveal elevated black carbon emissions potentially amplifying Arctic snowmelt, Gong et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03654-1

Aerosols
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Constraining effects of aerosol-cloud interaction by accounting for coupling between cloud and land surface, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adl5044 25 cites.

Climate change communications & cognition

Climate Change Communication in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, Schäfer et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access 10.1002/wcc.70073

Consensus Messaging Shifts Beliefs About Climate Change in a Field Experiment, Rode et al., Science Communication Open Access 10.1177/10755470261442409

From cognition to action: climate risk perception and corporate capital structure optimization, Fu et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1826872

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Trust in climate science and climate scientists: A narrative review, PLOS Climate, 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000400 34 cites.

Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Assessing rainfall and temperature trends to guide agricultural adaptation, Msangi & Deus, Discover Agriculture Open Access pdf 10.1007/s44279-026-00607-2

Contextualizing the marginal returns of regenerative agriculture on maize performance under climate change in Nigeria, Kolapo & Sieber, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1767448

Dolomite in conjunction with straw application increased straw-derived CO2 emission while depressed soil organic carbon mineralization in two acidic paddy soils, Xu et al., Biology and Fertility of Soils 10.1007/s00374-026-02017-4

Effect of organic mulches in vineyards: CH4 and N2O emissions and their contribution to the GWP and carbon balance, Rodrigo et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1846259

Evaluating the Intercropping Systems in the Context of Agroecological Resilience in the Current Era of the Changing Climate: A Scenario of Scientific Analysis of Last Decade Data, Maitra et al., Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access 10.1002/cli2.70050

Nonlinear temperature change responses shape soil organic carbon loss-gain transitions in global Mollisol croplands, Meng et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73759-w

Uncertainties in global hydrological and climate models challenge future estimates of crop water use and sustainability, Sun et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03621-w

Viral mediation of anaerobic methane oxidation to carbon sequestration in paddy soil, Tong et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01998-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate-resilient agricultural ploys can improve livelihood and food security in Eastern India, Environment Development and Sustainability, 10.1007/s10668-023-03176-2 21 cites.

Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Decoupling Between Heavy Precipitation Expansion and Population Exposure in a Warming World, Zhou et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007771

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Widespread societal and ecological impacts from projected Tibetan Plateau lake expansion, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01446-w 131 cites.

Climate change economics

Achieving climate justice: climate finance and income inequality in developing countries, Li et al., Open MIND Open Access pmh:10.6084/m9.figshare.31389871

Estimating the cost of sea level rise, Sugiyama et al., DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Open Access pdf pmh:oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/38529

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Has climate change promoted the high-quality development of financial enterprises? Evidence from China, Frontiers in Environmental Science, 10.3389/fenvs.2024.1332748 1 citation.

Climate change and the circular economy Climate change mitigation public policy research
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Integrated assessment modeling of a zero-emissions global transportation sector, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48424-9 99 cites.

Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

An institutional perspective on integrating climate and societal challenges in urban areas, Wöhler et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100829

Reframing climate adaptation and societal collapse: governance pathways for systemic risk in the Anthropocene, Granberg & Glover, Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1825767

The public mandate for equitable climate adaptation: Evidence from Aotearoa New Zealand, Parsons et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104398

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Multi-Scalar Inequities of Climate Adaptation Finance: A Critical Review, Current Climate Change Reports, 10.1007/s40641-024-00195-7 29 cites.

Climate change impacts on human health

Associations between climatic variables and dengue incidence in high-burden countries: a systematic review and meta-analysis, James et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1804553

Climate Change Elevates the Risk of Antibiotic Resistance in Global Surface Ocean, Yuan et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70929

Differentiated associations of daytime and nighttime heatwaves with long-term survival: A nationwide population-based cohort in China, Liu et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.009

Eroding heat resilience in South Asian cities under observed warming trends, Yadav et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-55172-x

Health Impact of Climate Change on Older Adults Living With Dementia: A Scoping Review, Gurung et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change 10.1002/wcc.70071

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate Change, Environment, and Health: The implementation and initial evaluation of a longitudinal, integrated curricular theme and novel competency framework at Harvard Medical School, PLOS Climate, 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000412 23 cites.

Climate change & geopolitics

Climate Legislation and Global Green Development Transition: The Role of International Environmental Engagement and Government Readiness, Liu & FENG, Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0140.1

Climate change impacts on human culture Other

Northern Hemisphere Wintertime Stratospheric Circulation Response to Smoke Injection From a Regional Nuclear Conflict, Yook et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122395

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Increasing frequency and lengthening season of western disturbances is linked to increasing strength and delayed northward migration of the subtropical jet, , 10.5194/egusphere-2023-1778 1 citation.

Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

The subnational wedge in Paris-aligned pathways, Hsu et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000921

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
‘Mind the Gap’—reforestation needs vs. reforestation capacity in the western United States, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1402124 28 cites.

Book reviews

Book Review: Loss and Damage in Climate Politics, Tirivangasi, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2677325

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Data Centers in California, Mark Specht and Vivian Yang, Union of Concerned Scientists

California already has many large data centers, and the state is expecting to see a surge of new data centers over the next decade. While data centers and the proliferation of AI pose a wide range of potential effects on the economy, the environment, and society, the authors focus specifically on the effects on the state’s electricity system and its ratepayers, along with policy solutions to mitigate those effects. If left unaddressed, data center growth could undermine grid reliability, slow the clean energy transition, and raise costs for ratepayers. Policymakers should require data centers to provide more transparency into their operations and pay their fair share of electricity costs. The state should additionally implement guardrails to minimize the harmful air quality effects from data center backup generation and ensure the growth of data centers does not stall clean energy progress or threaten grid reliability.

2026 State of the Market. Corporate Demand, Market Evolution, and Buyer Leadership, Corporate Energy Buyers Association

Corporate energy buyers continue to play a defining role in the evolution of clean energy markets. Despite higher power purchase agreement (PPA) and energy prices, reliability risks, and growing complexity, corporate demand for clean energy reached new heights in 2025 and early 2026. Since CEBA’s tracking began in 2014, corporate buyers have announced more than 143 gigawatts (GW) of new large-scale clean energy capacity in the United States, with back-to-back record-setting years in 2024 and 2025. Corporate buyers are no longer simply participating in the energy transition — they are shaping it.

Powering Canada Strong: A National Strategy for an Electrified Canadian Economy, Natural Resources Canada, Government of Canada

The national strategy will enable Canada to meet two initial challenges including building new infrastructure to double Canada’s electricity supply by 2050 and meet growing demand; and, accelerating electrification across the economy to support competitiveness and address climate change.

Boom and Bust Coal 2026. Tracking the global coal plant pipeline, Shearer et al., Global Energy Monitor

Boom and Bust Coal is an annual survey of the global coal fleet by Global Energy Monitor and partners. The authors analyze key trends in coal power capacity and track various stages of capacity development including planned retirements. This provides key insights into the status of the global phaseout of coal power and evaluates progress towards the world’s climate targets and commitments. The data come from GEM’s Global Coal Plant Tracker, an online database updated biannually that identifies and maps every known coal-fired generating unit and every new unit proposed since January 1, 2010 (30 MW and larger). In 2025, the world built more coal and used it less. New coal power capacity additions increased by 3.5% to reach one of the highest levels on record, even as coal-fired electricity generation declined by 0.6%. This gap was particularly pronounced in China and India, where wind and solar met most or all new demand, driving down coal generation even as coal plant commissioning reached decade highs. Coal capacity is increasingly maintained not as a primary source of generation, but as a form of system insurance. The U.S. stood out as the only major economy in 2025 to increase coal generation, and the total number of countries pursuing new coal development is shrinking. The central challenge heading into 2026 is not the availability of alternatives to coal, but the persistence of policy frameworks that continue to treat coal as necessary even as power systems move increasingly beyond it.

Proposed Amendments to the Cap-and-Invest Program, Legislative Analysts Office, California State Legislature

California has established statutory goals for reducing statewide GHG emissions—down to at least 40 percent below the 1990 level by 2030, and to at least 85 percent below the 1990 level by 2045. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) sets a declining, aggregate cap on the amount of GHGs allowed to be emitted under the program. CARB issues a set number of allowances each year equal to the annual cap. Entities covered by the program can comply with the program by (1) reducing their emissions, (2) purchasing allowances, or (3) purchasing offsets. Each allowance is essentially a permit to emit one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. In September 2025, the Legislature extended and made various changes to the cap-and-invest program. These changes: (1) modified the program’s design features and allowance allocations; (2) changed the allocation of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund revenues; and (3) added reporting, evaluation, and oversight provisions. April proposed amendments include establishing the total number of allowances through 2045, including removing 118 Million allowances through 2030, but adds back up to 118 million allowances above the cap for a larger and broader Manufacturing Decarbonization Incentive.

Build Here: How Targeted State Investment in Geothermal Can Fill California’s Clean Firm Gap, Wilson Ricks and Ann Garth, Clean Air Task Force

The authors found that next-generation geothermal energy could dramatically reduce the cost of achieving California’s clean energy goals, but only if the state acts now to remove critical development barriers. The authors call on California to fund an in-field testbed program to explore and map the subsurface across high-potential geologic regions, generating the data needed to unlock large-scale private investment in next-generation geothermal development. The authors point to a proven model for unlocking next-gen development: the U.S. Department of Energy’s Utah FORGE testbed drilled a series of wells in rural Utah and publicly released the resulting subsurface data. Billions of dollars in private investment followed, including the world’s first commercial-scale enhanced geothermal systems facility, Fervo Energy’s Cape Station project, located directly adjacent to the Utah FORGE site. California now imports that zero-emission power to satisfy its own electricity demand but does not receive the economic advantages. California has the opportunity, and the geology, to direct development inside the state.

From Paper to Practice : A Practical Guide to Formulating and Institutionalizing Long-term Climate Strategies (World Bank), Sutherland et al., World Bank

This guidance note is designed to equip governments and practitioners with implementable insights and a practical how-to framework for formulating and institutionalizing long-term strategy. It focuses on formulating technically sound LTSs and addresses their institutional integration, which involves embedding long-term low-emission, climate-resilient pathways in planning, budgeting, and decision-making processes across the government so that they can be operationalized through existing policy and fiscal instruments.

Climate Promises, Industry Handouts. Canada’s Fossil Fuel Funding in 2025, Environmental Defence Canada

The Government of Canada has provided at least $10.2 billion in fossil fuel subsidies and public financing in 2025. Since Environmental Defence began tracking fossil fuel subsidies in 2020, the federal government has provided at least $85.2 billion in subsidies to the fossil fuel industry. This figure includes government direct spending as well as public financing through Crown corporations, such as Export Development Canada. In addition to fossil fuel subsidies, the Government of Canada provided at least $405.53 million dollars in subsidies for carbon capture and fossil fuel hydrogen projects in 2025. These technologies have failed to deliver on their promises to reduce emissions and have instead locked in further fossil fuel production. Furthermore, this figure excludes the estimated cost of the carbon capture investment tax credit, which is estimated to cost Canadians up to $5.7 billion by 2028, and up to $12.4 billion by 2035. The changes introduced in the Budget 2025 could increase the cost to Canadians by an additional $3.75 billion. In 2025, the cost of pollution from oil and gas companies operating in Canada was an estimated $56.4 billion. This figure was calculated by taking the most recent oil and gas emissions figures and multiplying with the social cost of carbon. Climate pollution created by oil and gas companies has massive costs, including health costs, property damage from extreme weather events, and decreased agricultural productivity due to changing weather patterns. The social cost of carbon helps to estimate what those costs to society are.

Building Europe’s alternative fuels industry for military resilience, Irina Patrahau and Ron Stoop, The Hague Center for Strategic Studies

Europe’s military readiness is increasingly tied to the resilience of its fuel supply chains. The authors warn that Europe risks replacing one strategic dependency with another unless it scales up domestic production of alternative fuels for defense. The authors examine how the 2026 Middle East oil disruption exposed Europe’s vulnerability to fuel supply shocks. Around half of the EU’s jet fuel imports originate from the Middle East, while military operations remain heavily dependent on liquid fuels such as jet fuel and diesel. The authors argue that “drop-in” fuels such as sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), hydrotreated vegetable oil (HVO), e-SAF and e-diesel offer the most viable pathway to strengthen resilience in the short to medium term because they can be integrated into existing military infrastructure without technical modifications. However, the study finds that current production levels remain far too limited to support military needs during crisis scenarios. Existing civilian-driven expansion plans would cover only a fraction of potential wartime demand, leaving armed forces exposed to shortages and competition with civilian consumers. The authors identify three priorities for policymakers including developing a coordinated civil-military strategy for alternative fuel scale-up; treating alternative fuel plants as dual-use strategic infrastructure eligible for defense and EU funding; and establishing minimum domestic production benchmarks for fuels critical to defense readiness.

Climate change makes Arctic operations ever more complex, Lin Alexandra Mortensgaard, Danish Institute for International Studies

Climate change is already making Arctic planning and operations more complex. The notion that climate change multiplies existing threats increasingly falls short when it comes to understanding the scale, processes and the unknowns of climate change. Drawing on ongoing knowledge exchange with climate scientists, security actors could instead practice thinking in terms of types of change to avoid assuming foresight of operational and infrastructural consequences based on existing, known threats.

Built to Endure. A Smart Guide for US Cities To Build Resilient Infrastructure That Lasts, Losos et al., Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability, Duke University

Resilience is needed for every community to thrive in a world at increased risk of natural disasters. But small and medium-sized communities do not need expensive analyses or teams of people to get started. Resilience is achievable—even for lean municipal teams—when people, sound governance, and systems thinking are supported by increasingly accessible digital tools that help inform decisions and strengthen community outcomes. The authors offer practical, step-by-step advice for small and midsized communities to integrate resilience into their infrastructure systems. Featuring eight case studies from cities in the United States and abroad, the guidebook is meant for immediate use in the real world. The guidebook also includes a separate section—Getting Started: Practical Entry Points for Local Governments—that will jump-start the systems thinking needed to truly achieve resilience.

24/7 renewables. The economics of Firm Solar and Wind, Dardour et al., The International Renewable Energy Agency

The authors show that the cost of firm renewable electricity has declined rapidly across all major technologies and markets. In high-quality solar and wind resource regions, co-located hybrid systems can already deliver round-the-clock electricity at costs competitive with - and in many cases below - those of new fossil-fuel generation. China currently defines the global cost floor, while costs in Brazil, India, South Africa, Australia, and the Gulf region are declining rapidly towards fossil-fuel cost parity. The authors identify key drivers of firm renewable costs – technology performance, resource quality and system configuration – and examine the policy levers that are proving decisive in translating cost competitiveness into deployment at scale. They conclude that the technologies are maturing, the costs are falling and the commercial demand is growing. The pace at which firm renewable electricity is deployed will be among the most consequential determinants of the global energy transition in the decade ahead.

The AI Data Center Race and Big Tech Monopoly Power. A Policy Framework for Community Self-Determination and Democratic Accountability, Stacy Mitchell and John Farrell, The Institute for Local Self-Reliance

To consolidate control over generative AI and deepen their monopoly power, dominant tech firms are driving a wave of hyperscale data center construction that is colliding with communities nationwide. In response, the authors developed a policy framework to help communities reassert public authority, curb monopoly power, prevent public cost-shifting, and ensure digital infrastructure is developed transparently and in the public interest.

A Water Renaissance for California, Restore the Delta et al., Restore the Delta et al

California must create a new urban water renaissance: a new approach to prioritize local water and local communities in developing the reliable water supplies needed for the future. To accomplish this, California must choose to invest in local water supplies, reject sending billions of ratepayer dollars to take an ever-diminishing supply of water from the San Francisco Bay and Sacramento-San Joaquin Bay-Delta (Bay-Delta) and the Colorado River, and ensure adequate water to restore the Bay-Delta ecosystem and protect water quality. Following these improvements, interested parties must be brought together to work towards solutions to repair the aging levees in the Delta and the aging infrastructure of the State Water Project (SWP). Southern California and the Bay-Delta must move from conflict to collaboration to create a sustainable and reliable water supply for people and the environment. Create local drought-resistant water supplies and create resiliency. Reject costly new imported water projects. Local water supplies provide numerous benefits.

Rethinking insects as alternative protein, Verkuijl et al., Stockholm Environment Institute

Insect farming often falls short of its environmental promise. Greenhouse gas emissions generated per kilogram of protein from insect production in temperate climates vary, but they can approach those of chicken and pork, and exceed those of soymeal and fishmeal. Favorable environmental results depend on conditions rarely met in practice. Low-emission insect farming requires organic waste as feed, minimal heating and renewable energy – a combination seldom achieved in temperate countries. Insect farming reinforces conventional animal agriculture rather than replacing it. A substantial proportion of insects are farmed for feed for farmed animals and aquaculture, not to substitute for meat in human diets. The sector poses underexamined risks. Insect farming introduces potential biodiversity threats from accidental releases and emerging animal welfare concerns, given growing evidence that at least some insect species may be capable of suffering. Investment in insect farming carries opportunity costs. To date, major companies, accounting for more than a third of total investment, have failed or have entered restructuring. Resources directed towards insect protein may divert funding, policy attention, and public goodwill from plant-based, fermentation-derived, and cultivated proteins: alternatives that may offer clearer sustainability benefits, with fewer drawbacks.

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The next era of Atlantic hurricanes could be far more destructive

Wed, 27 May 2026 15:48:50 EST

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Jeff Masters

In brief:

Scientists expect dramatic swings between active and inactive hurricane seasons in the future.
The risk of back-to-back hurricanes is growing.
Hurricanes are expected to get more damaging and deadly.

Wild year-to-year swings — from punishing hyperactive seasons to quiet years with little activity — could well become the norm for future Atlantic hurricane seasons, according to recent climate change research.

The latest science paints a complex but alarming future, as the unprecedented amount of heat that humans are supplying to the climate system disrupts the fundamental atmospheric circulation pattern in which we designed our civilization.

During the coming busy seasons, death and destruction from unprecedented hurricane catastrophes will probably grow much more commonplace, because even as risks grow, people have continued to build in risky flood-prone regions. But eventually, the coming hurricane catastrophes will pose an increasing threat to the viability of living in many coastal areas, particularly in the Caribbean.

Hurricane seasons will likely grow more erratic

The year-to-year variability of Atlantic basin hurricane activity already is the largest of any of the globe’s tropical cyclone basins. And climate change will make extreme swings between active and inactive hurricane seasons the norm, according to a 2024 paper, Projected increase in the frequency of extremely active Atlantic hurricane seasons.

The high-resolution climate models used in the study projected a 36% increase by 2050 in the variance of Atlantic tropical cyclone activity. The main causes: an increase in the variability of wind shear (strong upper-level winds that tend to tear a storm apart), and major swings in how stable the atmosphere is in the tropical Atlantic. One good thing is that the study found that the increased activity during hyperactive seasons would be focused farther from land over the eastern and central Atlantic, with less activity over the Caribbean.

A 2022 study, Extreme Atlantic hurricane seasons made twice as likely by ocean warming, found that ocean warming from 1982 to 2020 doubled the probability of extremely active hurricane seasons over that time period. However, the authors did not clearly separate out how much of that change resulted from increased heat-trapping greenhouse gases and how much was caused by a reduction in planet-cooling air pollution particles called aerosols. These particles are not likely to change much in the future, while greenhouse gases will be increasing, so it is important to know their relative impacts on ocean warming.

More double whammies: back-to-back hurricane threats are increasing

The worst sequential hurricane disaster on record for the Atlantic occurred in 2020 in Nicaragua and Honduras.

Hurricane Eta made landfall in northern Nicaragua on Nov. 3, 2020, as a Category 4 storm. Moving slowly at landfall, Eta lingered for three days over Central America and the adjacent waters, dropping catastrophic amounts of rain.

Just two weeks later, Hurricane Iota made landfall as a Category 4 storm in Nicaragua only 15 miles from where Eta hit. Iota brought torrential rains that inundated flooded regions still struggling to recover from Eta, with the combined tolls from the two storms exceeding 300 people dead or missing.

There was no precedent in the Atlantic for two such powerful hurricanes to make landfall so close together in space and time. The combined impact of the two hurricanes on Nicaragua was estimated at $738 million – about 6% of that nation’s GDP.

But the twin Category 4 hurricanes left behind an even more extreme catastrophe in Honduras. The U.N. estimated that total damages from Hurricane Eta and Hurricane Iota in Honduras exceeded $2 billion – 8% of the poverty-stricken nation’s GDP.

In the future, an increase in hyperactive hurricane seasons will boost the threat of two hurricanes striking the same place within a few weeks of each other. Overlapping disasters could threaten the Gulf of Mexico region with a cycle of “perpetual disaster recovery” — making communities vulnerable to worse outcomes with every subsequent event, researchers at the National Academies wrote in a 2024 report.

A 2022 paper, Increasing sequential tropical cyclone hazards along the US East and Gulf coasts, found that in the current climate, two named storms hitting the same location within 15 days along the U.S. East and Gulf coasts and bringing significant hazards (strong winds, heavy rainfall and storm surges) could be expected to occur once every 10 to 92 years. But under a moderate emissions scenario, this return period could be expected to shrink to just one to three years because of sea-level rise and a change in storm climatology. The odds of a Katrina-like hurricane and a Harvey-like hurricane impacting the U.S. within 15 days of each other — which was non-existent in the historical period they simulated — was projected to have a one-in-650-year return period (or a 5% chance over 30 years) by the end of the century.

A massive 633% increase in hurricane damages to come?

It is widely acknowledged that higher weather disaster losses result primarily from an increase in exposure: more people with more stuff moving into vulnerable places, including those at risk of floods.

Martin Bertogg, Swiss Re’s head of catastrophic peril, said in a 2022 AP interview that two-thirds, perhaps more, of the recent rise in weather-related disaster losses — including from hurricanes — is the result of more people and things in harm’s way.

But this balance will likely shift in the coming decades. For example, a 2025 study led by Avantika Gori of Rice University, Sensitivity of tropical cyclone risk across the US to changes in storm climatology and socioeconomic growth, looked at how damages from wind, rainfall, and storm surge would change under a moderate global warming scenario. The study found that the fraction of increased hurricane damages because of climate change would grow by the end of the century to be roughly equal to the increased damages from higher exposure (assuming a 2% annual growth in GDP). The combined increased costs for hurricane damage for the future (2070-2100) period compared to the historical (1980-2005) period would be truly extraordinary, if no additional adaptation measures are taken: a 633% increase, the paper said.

Gori’s prediction is by no means a worst-case outcome, because the study assumed a moderate global warming scenario. Even in a best-case scenario — which I’ll explore in a future post — development is going to continue in flood-prone places. And there are at least four ways that hurricane scientists are very confident that climate change will make hurricanes worse:

The strongest hurricanes will get stronger.
Hurricanes will rapidly intensify more quickly and more often.
Hurricanes will dump more rain.
Storm surge damage will rise because of rising sea levels.

Highest U.S. hurricane total death tolls (direct plus indirect deaths) since the National Hurricane Center began tracking indirect deaths in 1963.

Expect hurricanes to get more deadly

Accompanying the shocking increases in hurricane damages in our future will likely be sharply increased risks of high death tolls. Stronger, wetter, slower-moving storms will dump more rain, causing increased flood risk. Higher sea levels and stronger hurricanes will bring more dangerous storm surges and compound flood events. Post-storm power outages will coincide with heat waves more frequently, increasing heat mortality. More hurricanes will rapidly intensify just before landfall, leaving vulnerable populations unprepared, further increasing mortality risk.

Read: ‘Deadliest in generations’: The Texas floods are the latest in a disturbing pattern

Fortunately, steadily improving hurricane forecasts over the past 20 years have significantly lowered the risk of death, and the recent emergence of AI forecast models has been an exciting step forward. In some places, improved building codes have also reduced the hurricane damage and presumably, mortality risk. Nevertheless, it is concerning that the U.S. has suffered five hurricanes since 2005 that were deadlier than any hurricane since 1972.

A staggering indirect death toll from hurricanes: as high as 5% of the U.S. population?

In a stunning paper released in 2024, Mortality caused by tropical cyclones in the United States, Rachel Young and Solomon Tsiang found that the average U.S. hurricane that made landfall between 1930 and 2015 caused 24 direct deaths.

However, they observed an increase in excess deaths – mortality beyond what would otherwise be expected in that period – that lingered for 15 years, totaling 7,000-11,000 excess deaths per storm. This burden is 300-480 times greater than government estimates of direct deaths and was equivalent to an astounding 3.2-5.1% of all deaths across the contiguous United States.

The largest single category of deaths was from cardiovascular disease (36%), while 12% of the deaths were from cancer, “consistent with some evidence of stress from extreme weather affecting long-run health,” the authors wrote. Between 1950 and 1995, monthly excess tropical cyclone deaths ranged from 4,500 to 6,000, then rose to about 7,500 per month by 2003. In 2004, an onslaught of landfalling hurricanes brought a sharp rise in the death rate, which peaked at approximately 13,000 per month in 2013.

Read: The hidden health toll of hurricanes

a). Total incidence of tropical cyclone excess mortality in the contiguous U.S by month. Bar height is sum of average maximum wind speeds for all state-by-storm events. Colors correspond to decades. b) Stacked overlapping excess mortality responses to each storm for all of the contiguous U.S. Outline colors correspond to the decade when the storm occurred. The upper envelope is the total estimated mortality burden resulting from all tropical cyclones occurring during the prior 172 months (14.3 years). c) Official direct tropical cyclone deaths by month according to NOAA. The y-axis scale is the same for b and c. (image credit: Young, R., Hsiang, S. Mortality caused by tropical cyclones in the United States. Nature 635, 121–128 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07945-5, open access)

Young and Tsiang hypothesized five ways that hurricanes may have triggered excess mortality:

Economic disruption might change household economic decisions, eventually translating into worsened health outcomes. For example, a person who loses a job might lose health insurance, too. Or retirement savings could be drawn down to repair property damage, both of which could reduce future spending on health care.
Social network changes could affect future health. For example, working-age people might move away, changing the social support for older people who remain behind.
Fiscal adjustments by state or local governments in response to the disaster may impact future health outcomes. For example, restructuring budgets to support recovery might reduce spending on healthcare infrastructure.
Heightened physical and mental stress may alter health in the long term.
Changes in the natural environment could harm health — for example, ecological changes could redistribute disease vectors, or flooding may expose populations to harmful chemicals.

Many of these factors can be expected to grow worse in the future, resulting in higher hurricane excess mortality.

SkS Housekeeping: Updating the Comments Policy

Fri, 5 Jun 2026 10:13:40 EST

From time to time, we announce housekeeping items that cover various changes in the Skeptical Science (SkS) web site. Today, it's an important one for all people who are posting comments on our articles: an update to the Comments Policy.

Reasons for the Updates

The Comments Policy is an important document at SkS: not only does it provide guidance for the behaviour of commenters, but it also provides guidance to the moderators on how to deal with comment threads that are starting to go off the rails. The moderation team strives to apply a reasonably uniform level of moderation, and the Comments Policy is the set of rules we follow.

We have been discussing some updates internally over the past few weeks, and now it is time to have the changes go live. The changes have been prompted by a few recent comments that started to use AI to generate text. (We'll stick with the formal definition of AI as "Artificial Intelligence", although I am sure that readers will have their own favorite interpretation.) Moderators have been asking commenters to limit their use of AI, but there is nothing in the previous Comments Policy related to AI. That is now changing.

Essentially all of the previous Comments Policy (archived here) is still in force. There are a few changes in wording, and the order has changed slightly, but if it was in the old Comments Policy, it is in the new one. The updated Comments Policy groups the various policies under six headings, as follows:

The new material falls under the "Speak for yourself and back up your argument" heading. The main text in that section talks about the importance of providing links to relevant information, explaining what the reader should find at those sources, etc. SkS is about the science of climate change, and scientific discussion expects references to relevant material and proper citation of sources. Two items from the old Comments Policy are located here: "No sloganeering", and "No link or picture only". But there are two new items of importance, related to copying large blocks of text or images from other sources. The first item covers copying from regular sources such as journals, reports, web pages, etc. The second specifically covers the use of AI-generated text.

Using AI in comments

In essence, when you use AI to generate text and want to add it to a comment, you are no longer speaking for yourself - you are quoting a different source. Proper scientific citation rules require that you indicate that you are quoting a different source, and provide a reference to what that source is. To quote from the updated policy: "Quoting or copying material from other sources without a proper citation constitutes plagiarism, which is not allowed."

The use of AI is not banned, but we are placing strict limits on how it can be used. Full disclosure: after we wrote the new sections of the Comments Policy. we asked the Gemini AI to suggest if there were options to improve the sequence of the various items. Gemini suggested grouping the items into several categories. We had already grouped some items into the "Speak for yourself and back up your argument" category, but the remaining items were still in a simple list. Gemini suggested grouping the remaining items into a few categories. In the end, we went with different categories (and labels for the categories), but we did find the Gemini suggestion useful.

....and this demonstrates a reasonable use of AI: ask it for help, look at its suggestions, but apply your own judgement to the results. The SkS Comments Policy is an SkS product, and we need to be willing to stand behind it. It is the voice of SkS, speaking to all our readers.

Small change in wording

The astute reader will notice one key change in the Comments Policy, compared to the old one. In the old policy, we referred to "global warming". In the new one, we refer to "climate change". The second phrase is more all-encompassing with respect to climate science, and makes more sense in the broader view covered here at SkS. Before anyone gets their knickers in a knot over this change, we suggest they read the "Global Warming vs. Climate Change" rebuttal that sits at the number 89 spot on our Global Warming and Climate Change Myths list.

One last point: although "Moderation complaints are always off-topic", this is one blog post where limited discussion of moderation will be allowed. Behave yourselves, though.

And now, a copy of the full new Comments Policy:

Purpose

The purpose of the discussion threads is to allow notification and correction of errors in the article, and to permit clarification of related points. Though we believe the only genuine debate on the science of climate change is that which occurs in the scientific literature, we welcome genuine discussion as both an aid to understanding and a means of correcting our inadvertent errors. To facilitate genuine discussion, we have a zero tolerance approach to trolling and sloganeering. To that end:

All comments must be on topic

Comments are on topic if they draw attention to possible errors of fact or interpretation in the main article, or if they discuss the immediate implications of the facts discussed in the main article. However, general discussions of climate change not explicitly related to the details of the main article are always off topic. Moderation complaints are always off topic and will be deleted. To expand on this requirement:

Make comments in the most appropriate thread. Some comments, while strictly on topic, may relate to issues discussed in more detail in some other thread. Extended discussion of those points should be carried out in the more appropriate thread, with link backs to reference the discussion as needed. Moderator's directions to move discussion to a more appropriate thread should always be followed.
Comments should avoid excessive repetition. Discussions which circle back on themselves and involve endless repetition of points already discussed do not help clarify relevant points. They are merely tiresome to participants and a barrier to readers. If moderators believe you are being excessively repetitive, they will advise you as such, and any further repetition will be treated as being off topic.
No copying and pasting earlier comments. Comments repeated from earlier comments (or from other websites) will be moderated. However, short excerpts from earlier comments are accepted if making an on-topic point, preferably with a hyperlink. Note that with each comment, the date/time is a hyperlink. If you link to this URL, clicking on the link will take you directly to that part of the webpage.
No spamming. Spamming will result in deletion of comments and suspension of the account without warning.

Speak for yourself and back up your argument

When you are posting comments, it is expected that you are speaking for yourself and are willing to back up your argument with relevant information. We encourage you to provide links to relevant scientific papers and reports, images available on the Internet, and sources of information that provide additional detail regarding the points you want to make. You need to explain in your comment why such sources are relevant, and what a reader should expect to find in that source. You are the one making the argument, and the reader should not have to spend large amounts of time trying to figure out your point. As a consequence of this policy, we also state the following:

No sloganeering. Comments consisting of simple assertion of a myth already debunked by one of the main articles, and which contain no relevant counter argument or evidence from the peer reviewed literature constitutes trolling rather than genuine discussion. As such they will be deleted. If you think our debunking of one of those myths is in error, you are welcome to discuss that on the relevant thread, provided you give substantial reasons for believing the debunking is in error. It is asked that you do not clutter up threads by responding to comments that consist just of slogans.
No link or picture only. Any link or picture should be accompanied by text summarizing both the content of the link or picture, and showing how it is relevant to the topic of discussion. Failure to do both of these things will result in the comment being considered off topic.
No cutting and pasting of large blocks of text or images from other sources (journal articles, reports, web pages, etc.). It is reasonable to include one or two paragraphs or images in your comment from a scientific source such as a peer-reviewed paper or report, but this should only represent a portion of your comment. Provide a link to or a clear identification of the original source - this is the standard approach to scientific citation. Quoting or copying material from other sources without a proper citation constitutes plagiarism, which is not allowed. The reader must be able to find the original source, in order to verify the material. If the source you want to refer to has a lot of material that you think is relevant, provide a summary of what you want the reader to see and provide a link so that the reader can easily access the full material. If you are unwilling or unable to read the source and provide a summary, then there is little reason to think that the source is on-topic or relevant. Moderators may delete such posts as off-topic.
The above ban on pasting large blocks of text also applies to AI-generated content. If you want to use AI to help you understand the topic, then that is your choice. Keep in mind, however, that AI sources are energy-intensive and you should ask yourself if that cost really provides a value-added contribution to the conversation. AI-generated content should be kept to a minimum, identified as such, with indications of the source and key words or questions used to feed it. As is the case for any other links, images, quotes, etc., provide a summary of the AI content to demonstrate that you understand it and see it as relevant. When you add AI-generated content to your comment, you are no longer speaking for yourself - you are quoting someone (something?) else, and need to cite the source.

Civil conduct

All participants are expected to conduct themselves in a civil manner. More specifically:

No accusations of deception. Any accusations of deception, fraud, dishonesty or corruption will be deleted. This applies to both sides. You may critique a person's methods but not their motives.
No ad hominem attacks. Personally attacking other users gets us no closer to understanding the science. For example, comments containing the words 'religion' and 'conspiracy' tend to get moderated. Comments using labels like 'alarmist' and 'denier' as derogatory terms are usually skating on thin ice.
No politics. Rants about politics, religion, faith, ideology or one world governments will be deleted. Occasional blog posts on Skeptical Science touch on issues intimately related to politics. For those posts this rule may be relaxed, but only if explicitly stated at the end of the blogpost.
No ALL CAPS. You can't have a civil, constructive discussion if you're shouting.
No profanity or inflammatory tone. Again, constructive discussion is difficult when overheated rhetoric or profanity is flying around.
No cyber stalking. Posting personal details of another user results in your account being banned from Skeptical Science.
No dogpiling. In the interests of civility and to enable people to properly express their opinions, we discourage 'piling on'. If a comment already has a response, consider carefully whether you are adding anything interesting before also responding. If a participant appears to be being 'dog piled', the moderator may designate one or two people from each side of the debate as the primary disputants and require that no other people respond until further notified. On topic comments on other matters not being discussed by the primary disputants will still be welcome.

Account creation and usage

No multiple identities. Posting comments at Skeptical Science should use only one registered screen name. Use of more than one account will result in all accounts being banned.

You are not allowed to use two different identities at the same time.
You are not allowed to create a second identity to replace an identity that has had its posting rights revoked due to an inability or unwillingness to follow the Comments Policy.

Commenters must register a valid email address. To register and confirm a user account at Skeptical Science requires a valid email address.

Summary

Please note that posting on Skeptical Science is a privilege, not a right. We try to avoid harsh application of the comments policy in the interests of a free flowing discussion, but expect your cooperation in return. If that cooperation is not forthcoming, moderators will resort to a very strict application of the comments policy to your posts, and if persisted with, it will result in deletion of your posts, or the suspension of your posting privileges. If we all followed these guidelines in any discussion, perhaps the world would be a calmer and more constructive place.

The Comment Policy page was already updated on June 4, 2026 in preparation for this housekeeping blog post's publication on June 5. Any comments posted after this announcement will be moderated based on the new Comment Policy.

On the death of RCP8.5

Tue, 26 May 2026 15:02:32 EST

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Zeke Hausfather, Glen Peters, and Piers Forster

With the release of the new van Vuuren et al 2026 paper on the emissions scenarios that will be used in the upcoming IPCC 7th Assessment Report, the internet has been abuzz with debate over the implications of the formal retirement of the RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 scenario. The president of the United States even weighed in over the weekend in his own unique style, posting that “the United Nations TOP Climate Committee just admitted that its own projections (RCP8.5) were WRONG! WRONG! WRONG!”.

van Vuuren et al justify this move by noting that “the CMIP6 high emission levels (quantified by SSP5-8.5) have become implausible, based on trends in the costs of renewables, the emergence of climate policy and recent emission trends,” citing the paper that we published in Nature back in 2020.

Actual global CO2 emissions (black) compared to different generations of emissions scenarios featured in IPCC reports. Updated by Glen Peters through 2025.

Others have pointed out that RCP8.5 was never particularly plausible, and have criticized claims that the move away from using these scenarios reflects actual progress on reducing emissions.

So what actually happened here? It turns out that two things can be true at the same time:

RCP8.5 (and its successor SSP5-8.5) were designed to be a worst case emissions scenario, not the most likely outcome even in a world that did nothing to address climate change. We were probably never headed to a tripling of global emissions by 2100 (to say nothing of a five-fold increase in coal use), even in the absence of climate policy.
Rapid declines in clean energy costs have bent the curve of future emissions downward, with new scenarios designed to reflect current policies notably lower than most baseline scenarios in the literature. The 21st century is now unlikely to see a continued expansion of fossil fuel use globally, with current policy scenarios reflecting relatively flat global emissions going forward.

Beyond business as usual

Emissions scenarios can broadly be categorized as “baseline” scenarios or “mitigation” scenarios. Baselines represent worlds where there are no additional efforts to address climate change (or in some cases turn back the clock to some earlier period and assume no policy after that point), while mitigation scenarios explore concerted efforts to reduce global emissions.

When RCP8.5 was first published global emissions were skyrocketing, having increased 30% in just the past decade. Clean energy sources were quite expensive, electric vehicles largely non-existent, and the idea that we would continue to increase our use of coal, oil, and gas through the end of the century was not seen as far-fetched.

Even in that context, RCP8.5 was chosen to represent the high end of the baseline scenario range available to the researchers at the time – around the 90th percentile. It was never a likely outcome even in a world that did not address climate change; rather it was always intended to represent a worst case scenario that pushed fossil fuel expansion to the max.

There are many other baseline scenarios with lower emissions, which were equally plausible as RCP8.5, even in the absence of climate policy. The original article that published the baselines, shows total CO2 emissions can be as low as RCP4.5 depending on the socioeconomic assumptions and the model used.

However, in part due to a breakdown in communication between the energy modeling community that develops the scenarios and the climate science community that uses them, RCP8.5 came to be incorrectly portrayed by many as the most likely “business as usual” scenario.

Around a decade ago the scenario started to garner more criticism. Justin Ritchie and Hadi Dowlatabadi published a paper in 2017 questioning whether the extremely high use of coal in RCP8.5 – which envisioned things like turning coal to oil for vehicles when oil reserves ran dry later in the century – was even possible given the world’s recoverable coal reserves. Ritchie and I (Zeke) wrote in 2019 that a 3C world was now “business as usual”, reflecting that:

Our business-as-usual projection of 3C of warming – rather than 4 or 5C – is a testament to the progress in global decarbonization over the last few decades. It also reflects the fact that rapid growth in coal use during the 2000s was not necessarily characteristic of longer-term energy use trends. The world has taken concrete steps to move away from coal in the past decade, and this progress should be reflected in our assessment of likely emissions pathways – and their resulting climate impacts – going forward.

In 2020 we published our Nature piece, arguing that we should “stop using the worst-case scenario for climate warming as the most likely outcome”, and that outcomes like RCP8.5 had become increasingly implausible with every passing year as clean energy costs fell and coal use plateaued.

Identifying real progress

So if we were likely never heading for a world of RCP8.5, with its tripling of global CO2 emissions by 2100 (and five-fold increase in coal use), where were we actually headed? How much has the energy transition to-date (which has grown to over $2 trillion annual global spending) actually changed our future trajectories?

This is an impossible question to precisely answer given that it relies on an inherently unknowable counterfactual scenario. It is not correct to state or assume that RCP8.5 was the baseline; we simply do not know the baseline and can only estimate it. But one way to approach the question is to look at where the scenario literature thought we were headed – what the actual range of baseline scenarios were.

The figure below show the CO2 emissions between 2000 and 2100 in the old RCP8.5 scenario, the full range of baseline scenarios published in the IPCC AR6 WG3 scenario database,1 and the new CMIP7 medium illustrative scenario published by van Vuuren et al 2026.2

Global CO2 emissions (left) and 2100 warming relative to preindustrial (right) for RCP8.5, the range of IPCC AR6 WG3 baseline scenarios, and the new CMIP7 medium illustrative scenario from van Vuuren et al. Future warming ranges based on FaIR model calculations.

We don’t actually know where in the baseline range (or outside of it!) we might have been heading in this counterfactual world. But the average of the baseline range – with its approximately 3.5C warming by 2100 – is a much more justifiable counterfactual than the high-end RCP8.5 baseline. This suggests that progress on policy and technology has reduced expected 2100 warming by around 0.7C, rather than the full 1.7C difference between RCP8.5 and the new medium scenario. A plausible reduction of ~0.7C warming represents enormous progress and a large reduction in future damages, even as a 2.8C world under current policies remains far from acceptable.

The mid-range of the baseline scenarios back in the late 2010s when most of those scenarios were developed is roughly analogous with the CMIP7 high illustrative scenario today (~3.3C), which envisions a roll back of policies that have been enacted over the past decade as well as slower technological progress on clean energy going forward.

The mid-range baseline scenario warming is also consistent with baseline warming estimates published by both the IEA (3.5C) and Climate Action Tracker (3.6C) prior to the signing of the Paris Agreement. Climate Action Tracker has also tracked the changes in its “policies and action” scenario over time, which has declined from 3.6C in 2015 to 2.6C in 2026, finding a similar ~1C decline in expected future warming.

Climate Action Tracker’s evolution of 2100 warming projections under different policy assumptions between 2009 and 2025.

It is hard to gauge the “impact of the Paris Agreement” or any other specific climate policy intervention in isolation. In a world without Paris we would still likely have seen a reduction of future emissions projections associated with continued cost declines of clean energy technologies. Similarly, even if coal use did continue to grow, it is not at all obvious it would have grown at the scale and rate as in RCP8.5. But this does not mean that these declines are divorced from other policy decisions made by countries over the past few decades.

Technology is, after all, not exogenous; it does not arise solely from spontaneous innovations. Rather, it reflects an interplay between the government and the private sector over cycles of research and development, early stage deployment, and eventual economies of scale.

Let’s take the example of solar energy, which is covered in depth in Greg Nemet’s excellent book “How Solar Energy Became Cheap”. Here formative R&D work done by Bell Labs in the 1950s and by the US DOE in the 1970s helped develop and commercialize the technology, while subsidies in Germany and Japan helped drive down costs with larger scale deployments in the 1990s and 2000s. More recently, dramatic cost declines have been driven at least in part by enormous investments in both domestic and export markets by China.

High warming outcomes can still occur

When we try to estimate how much the world will warm this century and beyond, we run into three fundamental uncertainties: our future emissions, the sensitivity of the climate to increasing forcings, and the carbon cycle feedbacks that determine the portion of our emissions that remain in the atmosphere.

While we tend to give the central estimate of future warming in 2100 associated with a given emissions scenario (e.g. 2.8C), this single number hides a pretty wide range of actual possible climate responses. For example, the figure below shows probability of reaching different temperature outcomes under the CMIP7 medium illustrative scenario. While the median is 2.8C, the 5th to 95th percentiles span 2.1C to 3.7C, and there is even a small (~2%) chance of 4C or more warming.

Likelihood of different 2100 warming outcomes in the CMIP7 medium illustrative scenario based on 841 different FaIR climate model runs that include both climate sensitivity and carbon cycle feedback uncertainties.

The new medium scenario is designed to be in-line to current policy scenarios in the literature. But current policies represent neither a ceiling nor a floor on future emissions. Future emissions are in society’s hands. Indeed, it is ironic to see President Trump criticizing climate science for its past use of high emissions scenarios when his administration actively supports a roll back of existing climate policy, the restriction of new clean energy development, and mandating that coal plants remain operating despite their high costs.

The new CMIP7 scenarios include a “High” emissions scenario that explores a more Trumpian future where current policy is rolled back and clean energy deployment slows. The high illustrative scenario finds 2100 warming of closer to 3.3C (with a range of 2.5C to 4.4C).

It is important to emphasize that the world doesn’t end in 2100, even if many of our past emissions scenarios and climate model simulations did. One of the major advances in the IPCC AR7 is a plan to extend scenarios through 2150, since 2100 is not nearly as far away as it used to be.

Illustrative CMIP7 emissions scenarios and modeled 33rd-67th percentile of warming outcomes, 2000-2150, from van Vuuren et al 2026.

The brutal math of climate change is this: as long as CO2 emissions remain above zero, the world will continue to warm. The medium scenario ends up closer to 3.7C by 2150, while the high scenario ends up more or less matching the warming in the old RCP8.5 scenario despite an assumption of flattening or modestly declining emissions after 2100.

It is also wrong to say that the worst predictions of climate impacts this century can now be ruled out by this revision. High-end temperature projections for the end of the century are reduced compared to earlier IPCC assessments. Yet, the IPCC WGII report found that risks across the five “reasons for concern” it examines have all risen for a given level of global warming. So, even if the high-end emissions in RCP8.5 won’t materialize, the damages projected in these earlier climate simulations remain very much in play.

A tripling of global CO2 emissions by 2100 may never have been particularly plausible even back in 2011 when RCP8.5 was originally published. But a 21st century of increasing fossil fuel use leading to a doubling of emissions was within the realm of the possible. The fact that we are no longer heading toward that is a sign of progress, rather than somehow undermining the edifice of all of climate science as both President Trump and some overly excited internet pundits claim. And of course, we still have a long way to go to get emissions down to (net) zero and stabilize global temperatures.

After all, as we wrote back in 2020, “This admission does not make climate action less urgent. The need to limit warming to [well below 2C]3… does not depend on having a 5C counterpoint.”

1. This will likely slightly underestimate emissions in baseline scenarios when the RCPs were published in 2011, as the WG3 scenario database was published in 2022 (though many of the scenarios were run much earlier, with the SSP baselines dating back to before 2017) and at least some clean energy cost declines since 2011 are baked in.

2. Note that these are illustrative placeholder scenarios; the final CMIP7 emissions scenarios will be published in September 2026 (and we will have much more discussion of them then!). That being said, van Vuuren et al are clear in the paper that “the final emission trajectories will depend on the finalized IAM runs but are expected to be roughly consistent with the illustrations provided here.”

3. We had originally said “limit warming to 1.5C”, but that ship has unfortunately sailed. In addition to lowering the high emissions scenarios, the new van Vuuren et al paper also more or less eliminates scenarios that keep warming to 1.5C without overshoot and subsequent drawdown.

RCP8.5 Update

Mon, 25 May 2026 15:59:54 EST

This is a re-post from And Then There's Physics

If you’ve been paying attention to the climate debate on social media you might have noticed the RCP8.5 debate rearing it’s ugly head again. This is because a new set of emission/concentration projections have been developed for the climate modelling community (CMIP7). These new projections no longer include an RCP8.5-like projection and so all of those who have been critical of its use are now crowing about this proving them right.

I’ve written about RCP8.5 numerous times before. My views have probably evolve somewhat over time, but my previous posts are probably a reasonably good reflection of them. So, if you do want to know them, you could read some of these earlier post. I don’t want to delve too much into the re-invigorated “debate” but instead thought I’d post links to other posts/articles that I think explain the situation pretty well. If you want to read alternative takes, they’re not all that difficult to find. You can probably guess the authors.

I will, though, repeat the sub-heading of Gavin’s Realclimate post:

The fantasy version of the normal updating of scenarios for a new round of CMIP simulations doing the rounds is bad faith BS.

Links to other posts:

Scenarios, Schemarios – Gavin Schmidt at Realclimate.
On the death of RCP8.5 – Zeke Hausfather, Glen Peters and Piers Foster at Climate Brink.
Factcheck: Trump’s false claims about the IPCC and ‘RCP8.5’ climate scenario – multiple authors at Carbon Brief.
IPCC does not create scenarios – Reto Knutti at Linkedin
Sorry, climate change is still dangerous, no matter what nonsense Trump emits – Bulletin article by Genevieve Guenther

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #21

Sun, 24 May 2026 10:44:39 EST

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, May 17, 2026 thru Sat, May 23, 2026.

Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Policy and Politics (6 articles)

What the US Would Lose If It Eliminates the National Center for Atmospheric Research 'I think there's a great loss for the wrong reasons. There's no good reason for dismantling this or tearing it down,'' a former NASA chief scientist says. Inside Climate News, Interview by Steve Curwood, Living on Earth, May 16, 2026.
`Green card for the planet`? Fifa`s World Cup is on pace to be a climate catastrophe The 2022 World Cup failed to deliver on its environmental promises. From air travel emissions to heat-related dangers, the 2026 edition will be even worse The Guardian, Jules Boykoff, May 17, 2026.
EPA claims `overwhelming rejection` of EVs as it moves to loosen air pollution rules Administration creates conditions to slow EV adoption and then uses the results to promote fossil fuel consumption. Inside Climate News, Anika Jane Beamer, May 19, 2026.
Trump Officials, Billionaires and the Quiet Reshaping of America`s Public Lands A controversial land swap orchestrated by the megarich could be “a harbinger of what’s to come” for public lands under Trump. Inside Climate News, Evan Simon and Ames Alexander, May 21, 2026.
Colombia`s climate crossroads: Trumpism casts shadow over presidential battle Colombia is a global leader in climate activism. Could US influence drag country to a future of mining and fracking? The Guardian, Jonathan Watts, May 21, 2026.
The network watching the world`s oceans is under pressure - just when it`s needed most The Conversation, Kevin Trenberth, May 22, 2026.

Climate Change Impacts (5 articles)

Wild Blueberry Farms Across Maine Suffer as Climate Change Upends Growing Seasons Like lobster rolls, wild blueberries are iconic in Maine. But heat and drought have set the plants back to a point where many small farmers are struggling against reduced yields and increased costs for mulch and irrigation. Inside Climate News, Sydney Cromwell, May 11, 2026.
Scientists warn that the world`s rivers are running out of oxygen Rivers around the world are quietly running out of oxygen — and climate change is emerging as the main culprit. ScienceDaily, CAS press release, May 17, 2026.
`It`s no longer exceptional`: Karachi struggles under brutal new reality of extreme heat Experts say the unseasonably hot weather across south Asia shows the impact of the climate crisis. The Guardian, Asad Mumtaz Rid, May 17, 2026.
Global warming is accelerating 5,000 times faster than rice can evolve Climate change is pushing rice-growing regions into temperatures beyond those at which rice has been cultivated in the past 9,000 years of human history. Live Science, Stephani Pappas, May 19, 2026.
The outlook for a climate-regulating ocean current is…not good A key ocean current that warms Europe is weakening, spurring a controversial megadam proposal Science News, Carolyn Gramling, May 20, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (4 articles)

Factcheck: Trump`s false claims about the IPCC and `RCP8.5` climate scenario Among a flurry of posts on social media last weekend, US president Donald Trump declared “good riddance” to a specific emissions scenario used in global climate projections. Carbon Brief, Carbon Brief Staff, May 19, 2026.
Climate Denier Group Pushes States to Embrace Coal Power for Data Centers The Heartland Institute used the American Legislative Exchange Council’s 2025 annual meeting to spread climate disinformation and tout coal to power AI. Desmog, Sharon Kelly, May 20, 2026.
Scenarios, schmenarios… The fantasy version of the normal updating of scenarios for a new round of CMIP simulations doing the rounds is bad faith BS. RealClimate, Gavin Schmidt, May 20, 2026.
Climate Scientists Were Wrong... That's a good thing Climate Adam on Youtube, Adam Levy, May 21, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (3 articles)

New Zealand Moves to Ban Tort Liability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Damage New Zealand’s government has announced that it plans to amend the country’s signature climate law to prohibit liability arising from climate change damages, a controversial move that critics say would shield polluters from climate lawsuits and undermine the rule of law. Inside Climate News, Dana Drugmand, May 19, 2026.
A Youth-Led Campaign Claims a Win For Climate Justice A new U.N. resolution reinforces a landmark court opinion tying fossil fuel use to human rights abuses and legal responsibility for climate change. Inside Climate News, Bob Berwyn, May 22, 2026.
As Communities Warn of Health Risks, New York Will Weaken Its Landmark Climate Law As part of ongoing budget negotiations, New York Gov. Kathy Hochul is pushing to delay emissions-reduction targets established in the state’s climate law. Inside Climate News, Lauren Dalban, May 23, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (3 articles)

The Mediterranean sea is capable of generating hurricanes and climate change will make them worse Unsurprisingly and in keeping with hurricanes occurring in other larger oceanic basins, cyclonic storms in the Mediterranean known as ''medicanes'' present increasing threats as sea surface temperature rises. English, Emmanouil Flaounas & Davide Feranda, May 16, 2026.
On the death of RCP8.5 We should celebrate progress, but not overstate it The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Glen Peters, and Piers Forster, May 18, 2026.
Sea Level Rise is Accelerating, Scientists Confirm New research has helped close the ''sea level rise budget gap''' by including more recent sea level observations, reconciling measurements by different instruments, and integrating recent estimates of sea level rise and its components. Eos, Kimberly M. S. Cartier, May 20, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (2 articles)

Declare Climate Change a Public Health Emergency, EU Experts The World Health Organization (WHO) should declare climate change a “public health emergency of international concern” to recognize the “catastrophic threat” it poses to human health, experts from the Pan-European Commission on Climate and Health (PECCH) have said. Medscape Medical News Headlines, Sophie Cousins, May 20, 2026.
Climate change could make picking tobacco even more dangerous Farmworkers, including kids, can suffer from nicotine poisoning when they handle tobacco leaves – a threat that’s growing in a warming climate. Yale Climate Connections, YCC Team, May 21, 2026.

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

A detailed look at offshore wind in the US and globally AP News, Jennifer McDermott, May 17, 2026.
2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #20 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, May 10, 2026 thru Sat, May 16, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, May 17, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (1 article)

The Pennine hills are full of holes - here`s how they`re helping fight climate change Thousands of holes are appearing in the Pennine hills, as part of efforts to improve carbon storage by restoring damaged peatland. The Conversation, Adam Johnston, May 18, 2026.

International Climate Conferences and Agreements (1 article)

DeBriefed 22 May 2026: UN adopts landmark resolution | Trump takes on `RCP8.5` | Climate migration UN vote produces a peculiar and seemingly transactional result on legal obligation to address climate change, with the US, Israel, Iran, Russia, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Liberia voting ''no.'' Carbon Brief, Ayesha Tandon, May 22, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 article)

Does electromagnetic radiation from wind turbines pose a threat to human health? No - Electromagnetic fields (EMFs) from wind turbines are well below international exposure safety limits. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, May 19, 2026.

Skeptical Science New Research for Week #21 2026

Thu, 21 May 2026 13:58:17 EST

Open access notables

Attribution of UK Temperature Changes to Anthropogenic and Natural Factors, Amos et al., Atmospheric Science Letters

Understanding the extent to which human activities have influenced regional climate is a key scientific and policy challenge. The UK is one of the world's best observed regions climatically, with a long and reliable temperature record that makes it an important test case for regional detection and attribution. Here, for the first time, we apply optimal fingerprinting to UK mean 2-m air temperature changes using the Estimating Equations method, HadUK-Grid observations, and CMIP6 simulations. We assess the extent to which observed UK temperature changes can be explained by natural internal variability, anthropogenic forcings, and natural external forcings. We detect a significant anthropogenic influence on warming in recent decades and identify greenhouse gases as the main driver. We also detect a cooling contribution from other anthropogenic influences in the mid-twentieth century, likely dominated by sulphate aerosols. These results update earlier UK-focused work and demonstrate that human influences, both warming and cooling, are detectable even at the national scale.

Sustained deoxygenation in global flowing waters under climate warming, Guan et al., Science Advances

Dissolved oxygen (DO), as a vital material sustaining aquatic ecosystems, has declined markedly in oceans, lakes, and coastal waters, yet unbiased understandings of changing DO concentrations in each individual river segment globally remain a challenge. Here, we estimate DO concentrations in 21,439 rivers globally between 1985 and 2023, based on Landsat observations and climatic data, and examine their patterns and trends. We find sustained deoxygenation in global rivers, at a rate of −0.045 mg liter−1 decade−1, with 78.8% experiencing fluvial deoxygenation, driven mainly by oxygen solubility and temperature. Moreover, short-term heatwaves and dam impoundment exert non-neglecting influence on these changes. Future projections demonstrate that global fluvial DO concentrations decline by 1.1% ± 1.6% under SSP1–2.6 and 4.7% ± 2.7% under SSP5–8.5 throughout the 21st century. Our study provides an unbiased baseline for escalating deoxygenation in global fluvial ecosystems that underscores targeted measures to mitigate deoxygenation threats and protect ecosystem health.

Emergent constraints on future methane emissions from global wetlands, Zhang et al., Nature Geoscience

Future methane (CH4) emissions from natural wetlands are predicted to increase due to global warming, leading to positive feedback on climate change. However, the magnitude of this increase remains highly uncertain. Here we present novel ensemble simulations of seven state-of-the-art terrestrial biosphere models to estimate wetland CH4 emissions (eCH4) during the twenty-first century. Our estimates suggest that for every 1 °C increase in global land surface temperature, there is a 24 ± 10 Tg CH4 yr−1 increase in eCH4. We also identify an emergent relationship between contemporary temperature dependence and projected eCH4. When constrained by 163 site-year eddy-covariance measurements of eCH4, we show that wetland emissions can increase by 50–60% by the 2090s relative to the 2010s under a high-warming scenario. The projected decadal increase in eCH4 from the 2010–2019 baseline to the 2030s would very likely (90% probability) offset an amount equivalent in scale to 8–10% of anthropogenic eCH4 at the 2020 level, comparable to the reductions committed under the Global Methane Pledge. However, the constraint is dominated by mid- and high-latitude observations, with limited tropical coverage, and uncertainties in projected wetland inundation contribute substantially to uncertainty in eCH4. Our findings reduce the uncertainty in projected wetland methane–climate feedback and highlight its potential impacts on methane mitigation efforts to slow global warming.

Challenges and opportunities of the full phase-out of fossil fuels under the 1.5 °C goal, Mori et al., Nature Communications

The COP28 decision called for transitioning away from fossil fuels, sparking a growing interest in their full phase-out. However, energy system transformation pathways towards a phase-out of fossil fuels, which may reduce the reliance on carbon dioxide removal to meet the 1.5 °C goal, remain unclear. Here, we employ two global energy system models to explore energy system transformations and the challenges and opportunities associated with attaining a full phase-out of fossil fuels. We found that phasing out fossil fuels by 2050 would require accelerating direct and indirect electrification, involving 1.6–1.8-fold increases in power generation compared to the conventional cost-effective 1.5 °C pathways. This transition from cost-effective to fossil fuel phase-out pathways would increase energy supply investments by up to 34% over this century and require accelerated deployment of solar and wind power, as well as electrolysers. Despite opportunities including lower reliance on carbon dioxide removal and increasing probability of returning to 1.5 °C after temperature overshoot, these additional requirements imply that international society must approach the transition towards zero-fossil energy systems with strong determination.

Scientific authority cues increase the spread of misinformation, Harrando et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Misinformation continues to circulate on social media, often because people unintentionally share posts without verifying their accuracy. We show that references to scientific entities, what we call Scientific Authority Cues, play an important role in this problem. Analyzing 8.7 million posts on Twitter (X), we find that these cues are associated with an increase in sharing, especially when sharing low veracity content, and when users lean politically to the right. A preregistered experiment with U.S. adults shows that attributing claims to scientific entities increases people’s willingness to share them by making claims seem more accurate. These findings reveal an important tension: Signals of scientific authority can also make misinformation more credible and thus easier to spread.

From this week's government/NGO section:

The AI Climate Hoax: Behind the Curtain of How Big Tech Greenwashes Impacts, Ketan Joshi, Beyond Fossil Fuels, Standearth, Climate Action Against Disinformation et al

The analysis collected the most prominent AI climate claims and determined a) what types of AI were referred to and b) what evidence was presented to back up those claims. The author found that 1. Most claims of climate benefit relate to ‘traditional’ AI, which has a much lower environmental impact than consumer generative AI tools. Even if these benefits are real, they are unrelated to - and dwarfed by - the massive expansion of energy use from the generative AI industry. 2. Where claims of traditional AI climate benefits are made, they tend to rely on weaker forms of evidence, such as corporate websites, rather than published academic research. Only 26% cited published academic research while 36% did not cite any evidence at all. This analysis shows that to bring the deployment of digital services in bounds with the physical limits of the planet, tech companies investing in AI should implement actual sustainability measures rather than masking ever-worsening damage to the climate and environment with vague terms and weak evidence.

Survey: U.S. and Canadian Business Confidence in Climate Action Remains Strong, Melissa Fifield, BMO Climate Institute

The fourth edition of the BMO Climate Institute Business Leaders Survey was conducted in January 2026 and included 741 respondents, including 370 in Canada and 371 in the U.S. Survey respondents include individuals in a senior role at their company (e.g. C-suite, President, Vice-President, Executive Director or General Manager) and who consider themselves to be senior decision makers. Companies range from those with at least five employees to more than 500 employees. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of respondents say they have or are developing plans to address climate-related risks, up from 69% in 2025. Extreme and unpredictable weather is a top concern for business leaders considering the impact of climate-related risks on their companies. Competitive pressure, customer expectations, and regulatory change are expected to drive further climate action. Three?fifths of respondents say AI is already used in daily operations or climate planning. Costs remain the most frequently cited obstacle to developing an effective climate plan.

101 articles in 48 journals by 751 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Future changes of upscale ocean kinetic energy transfer under greenhouse warming, Wang et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01429-1

Mean State Change-Induced Differential Responses Between Strong Positive and Negative Events Reduce Indian Ocean Dipole Asymmetry Under Greenhouse Warming, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045190

Transitions of the Atlantic Ocean circulation, Castellana et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-019-56435-6

Variable Sensitivity of Lake Surface Temperatures to Short- and Long-Term Atmospheric Warming, Chen et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122409

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A likely role for stratification in long-term changes of the global ocean tides, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01432-5 15 cites.

Observations of climate change, effects

2024 global temperature record is consistent with model-predicted warming, Mann et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2600021123

Attribution of Recent Change in the Stratospheric Temperature and Its Application to Future Projection, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120757

Attribution of UK Temperature Changes to Anthropogenic and Natural Factors, Amos et al., Atmospheric Science Letters Open Access 10.1002/asl2.70040

Nighttime warming amplifies the synergistic effects of snowmelt and rain on floods in arid northwestern China, ZHU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.003

Sustained deoxygenation in global flowing waters under climate warming, Guan et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aef3132

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Steady threefold Arctic amplification of externally forced warming masked by natural variability, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01441-1 79 cites.

Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

Anthropogenic radionuclides as tracers of climate change in the Pacific Ocean, Povinec et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03639-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
GloUTCI-M: a global monthly 1 km Universal Thermal Climate Index dataset from 2000 to 2022, Earth system science data, 10.5194/essd-16-2407-2024 34 cites.

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Diagnosis of the Contribution of Internal Climate Variability to Global Surface Temperature Projection Under Future Warming, Oh et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122593

Dual Regimes of North American Heatwaves and Their Future Change, Yeo et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100912

Extreme Climate Events in Morocco: Historical Analysis and Future Projections Based on CMIP6 Simulations, Hakam et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70433

Future Change in the Moist Wave Activity and Its Potential Impact on Local Extreme Precipitation Under a Warming Climate, Xue et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd044844

Future Changes to Rainfall Extremes Over Puerto Rico in a Convection-Permitting Model, Dougherty et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007833

Projected Evolution of Climatic Aridity in Spain: Robust Signals and Model Uncertainties, Trullenque?Blanco et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70316

Quantifying Uncertainty in the Perceived Risk of Unprecedented Rainfall, Sigid et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008121

Quantifying Very Extreme Precipitation and Temperature Using Huge Ensembles Generated by Machine Learning–Based Climate Model Emulators, Paciorek & Cooley, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0178.1

Robust intensification of projected regional precipitation extremes over Africa, Akinsanola et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73246-2

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Rising risks of hydroclimatic swings: A large ensemble study of dry and wet spell transitions in North America, Global and Planetary Change, 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2024.104476 21 cites.

Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Attribution of Recent Change in the Stratospheric Temperature and Its Application to Future Projection, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120757

Diagnosing Error Sources in Historical CMIP5 and CMIP6 Simulations of Surface Air Temperature and Precipitation, Seo et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122096

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Why Do CO₂ Quadrupling Simulations Warm More Than Twice as Much as CO₂ Doubling Simulations in CMIP6?, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2023gl107320 3 cites.

Cryosphere & climate change

Antarctic ice-shelf basal melt shaped by competing feedbacks, Youngs et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01975-6

How temperature seasonality drives interglacial permafrost dynamics: implications for paleo reconstructions and future thaw trajectories, Nitzbon et al., Climate of the past Open Access 10.5194/cp-22-377-2026

Modeled Greenland Ice Sheet evolution constrained by ice-core-derived Holocene elevation histories, Lauritzen et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-19-3599-2025

Topography-albedo feedback reinforces the transition to a younger Arctic ice pack, Gluckman et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03636-3

Winter seal-based observations reveal glacial meltwater surfacing in the southeastern Amundsen Sea, Zheng et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-021-00111-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
CMIP6 Models Rarely Simulate Antarctic Winter Sea?Ice Anomalies as Large as Observed in 2023, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl109265 34 cites.

Sea level & climate change

Adapting to sea level rise and storms, Young et al., EGUGA mag:3022614940

Antarctic ice-shelf basal melt shaped by competing feedbacks, Youngs et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01975-6

Future changes in seasonal sea-level variability could reshape coastal ecosystems, Hermans et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02631-y

Projecting extreme sea levels for Northwest Ireland under future climate scenarios, Ahmed et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1745732

Sea-level-driven land conversion amplified by coastal agriculture, Molino et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access 10.1038/s41893-026-01835-6

Subpolar North Atlantic heat flux drives projected U.S. East Coast sea-level trend in a climate model, Wang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03632-7

Subsidence more than doubles sea-level rise today along densely populated coasts, Oelsmann et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72293-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Establishing flood thresholds for sea level rise impact communication, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48545-1 20 cites.

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Past warming climates promoted expansion of seagrasses to high latitudes, Tuya et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03647-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Temperature of the Deep Ocean Is a Robust Proxy for Global Mean Surface Temperature During the Cenozoic, Paleoceanography and Paleoclimatology, 10.1029/2023pa004788 16 cites.

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Alpine Grasslands Are Not Moving Upslope Despite Strong Warming Trends Across the Tibetan Plateau, Vanneste, Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70921

Decoding hotter-drought impacts on canopy activity and tree growth to diagnose forest die-off, Camarero et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111238

Extensive Alpine Shrubification Revealed by Systematic Resampling Across Europe, Elmendorf & Criado, Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70922

Fresh Phytoplankton Bloom Growth in the Fall and Its Control on Ocean Heating in the Pacific Arctic Region, Gaffey et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc022895

Functional Traits Mediate the Interactive Effects of Climate and Human Disturbance on Non-Native Plant Diversity, Liu & Li, Diversity and Distributions Open Access 10.1111/ddi.70180

Increased climatic seasonality promotes coupling between NDVI and tree rings in seasonally dry tropical forests, Aragão et al., Dendrochronologia 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126533

Limiting future warming reduces drought exposure for terrestrial vertebrates, He et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73229-3

Macroalgal community transformation during successive marine heatwaves in southern California kelp forests, Michaud et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03599-5

Morphological responses to climate change, Hardiman et al., Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 10.1002/qj.2258

Neotropical ants are at greater risk from global warming in savanna than in adjacent forest, Zuanon et al., Ecology Open Access 10.1002/ecy.70413

Overwinter Warming Effects of Shrub Expansion in Arctic Permafrost Region, Li et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008573

Regional dynamics drive differences in future heat stress and reveal where Hawaiian corals are most likely to persist, Feloy et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-47781-3

Spatiotemporal Distribution Patterns and Conservation Priorities of Castanopsis eyrei in China Under Climate Change, Xiang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73681

Warming erodes climate connectivity for terrestrial vertebrates, Wu et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02658-1

Wind stilling shapes grassland water use efficiency by enhancing soil moisture retention, Wu et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aee4995

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global plant responses to intensified fire regimes, Global Ecology and Biogeography, 10.1111/geb.13858 51 cites.

GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Autogenic Shoreline Migration and Its Effect on the Storage of Carbon in Marginal Marine Successions, Silvestre et al., AGU Advances Open Access 10.1029/2025av002067

Drivers of Extreme Carbon Sources and Sinks Across Diverse Ecosystems in the Western USA, York et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70926

Emergent constraints on future methane emissions from global wetlands, Zhang et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01987-2

Global patterns of stabilized soil organic carbon and their potential implications for climate mitigation, LI et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03634-5

Greenhouse Gas Dynamics From Created Wetlands of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia (Canada), Plant et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2025jg009321

Groundwater depletion contributes to an increase in global carbon emissions, Sun et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73521-2

Increasing atmospheric dryness and storms accelerates biomass turnover in Amazonian forests, Wu et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02639-4

Inorganic carbon fixation by deep prokaryotes as an unaccounted-for CO2 sink in Antarctic waters, Celussi et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03610-z

Multi-Decadal Dynamics of Wetland Methane Emissions Revealed by Knowledge-Guided Machine Learning, Zhu et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70899

Role of Earth system processes in the relationship between climate change and cumulative carbon emissions, Liddicoat et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72930-7

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Biodiversity loss reduces global terrestrial carbon storage, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-47872-7 136 cites.

CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

East Asian summer rainfall changes in carbon dioxide removal scenarios simulated by nine Carbon Dioxide Removal Model Comparison Project (CDRMIP) models, DONG et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.05.001

More Pronounced El Niño–like Warming in Boreal Autumn and Winter under CO2 Removal Scenario, Huo et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-24-0406.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Carbon storage through China’s planted forest expansion, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48546-0 133 cites.

Decarbonization

A multilayered framework for advancing rapid and cost-effective electric power system decarbonization, Shi et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag139

Challenges and opportunities of the full phase-out of fossil fuels under the 1.5 °C goal, Mori et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72841-7

Coal plants persist as a large barrier to the global solar energy transition, Song et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access 10.1038/s41893-026-01836-5

Decarbonizing global steel production, Wang et al., Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 10.1016/j.rser.2022.112367

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Bandgap-universal passivation enables stable perovskite solar cells with low photovoltage loss, Science, 10.1126/science.ado2302 159 cites.

Geoengineering climate
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Public engagement for inclusive and sustainable governance of climate interventions, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48510-y 66 cites.

Aerosols

Large Particle Size and Thick Coating Influence Pyrocumulonimbus Smoke Radiative Forcing and Stratospheric Warming: Insights From the 2019–2020 Australian Megafires, Chen et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119099

Climate change communications & cognition

Climate Change Communication in Pakistan: Analyzing Media Frames on Social Media Platform, Ali & Ali, Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2674235

Climate change judged more harmful for future generations than for oneself: Cross-cultural evidence from 110 countries, Milfont & Klebl, Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103079

Personal experiences matter for climate action, Wong-Parodi, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02640-x

Scientific authority cues increase the spread of misinformation, Harrando et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2535823123

Understanding and reducing the intention–behaviour gap in climate action, Fielding & Hornsey, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02630-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Eco-anxiety and climate-anxiety linked to indirect exposure: A scoping review of empirical research, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 10.1016/j.jenvp.2024.102326 31 cites.

Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Continental-Scale Evidence of Farm Management Impacts on Soil Carbon, Helfenstein et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70913

Field data challenge predictions of universal crop pest proliferation under warming, Lippey et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 10.1073/pnas.2606726123

Funding options for climate change adaptation in forestry: a five-country expert survey in Southern Africa, Nikodemus et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1820808

Global potential of fishery–photovoltaic integration for sustainable energy and climate mitigation, Ding et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03606-9

Sea-level-driven land conversion amplified by coastal agriculture, Molino et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access 10.1038/s41893-026-01835-6

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Effects of alternate wetting and drying irrigation on yield, water-saving, and emission reduction in rice fields: A global meta-analysis, Agricultural and Forest Meteorology, 10.1016/j.agrformet.2024.110075 58 cites.

Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Accelerated Himalayan river meandering and dynamics due to climate change, Lin et al., Science 10.1126/science.adg8401

Anthropogenic global warming increases the risk of record-breaking extreme precipitation events in low-income countries, Nguyen et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03649-y

Long-Term Regional Hydroclimate Modeling for Communities and Decision-Makers across Alaska and Northwestern Canada, Newman et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-24-0131.1

More concentrated precipitation decreases terrestrial water storage, Lesk & Mankin, Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10487-7

More unpredictable river floods at the most glacierized Third Pole basin, Liu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03623-8

River dynamics in a warming climate, Hollingsworth et al., Canadian Journal of Forest Research 10.1139/x10-094

Robust intensification of projected regional precipitation extremes over Africa, Akinsanola et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73246-2

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Characteristics and changes of glacial lakes and outburst floods, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00554-w 102 cites.

Climate change economics

Understanding loss and damage in West African climate policies: a comparative analysis of national approaches in five countries, Okunola & Ekoh, Climate Policy Open Access 10.1080/14693062.2026.2675272

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Estimation of useful-stage energy returns on investment for fossil fuels and implications for renewable energy systems, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01518-6 111 cites.

Climate change and the circular economy
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Economic and carbon emission assessment of compostable plastics as a substitute for petrochemical plastics: a case study in Yunnan Province, Environment Development and Sustainability, 10.1007/s10668-024-05000-x 2 cites.

Climate change mitigation public policy research

Synergistic action on mitigation and adaptation pilot policies to enhance low-carbon transition of Chinese cities, Zeng, Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102942

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Systematic review and meta-analysis of ex-post evaluations on the effectiveness of carbon pricing, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48512-w 123 cites.

Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Adapting to sea level rise and storms, Young et al., EGUGA mag:3022614940

Applying a climate information distillation framework to support a climate resilient hydropower sector in Nepal, Oakes et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1789662

Empowering policymakers decision making through navigating IPCC AR6 insights, Tomassi et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100825

Future Changes in Power Grid Exposure to Urban Flooding Over Eastern Coastal China, Luo et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007502

Indigenous climate mobilities governance: The case of the Vaitupu-Kioa international migration route, Kitara et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104394

Urban heatscapes and environmental injustice: Structural drivers and governance pathways for equitable climate adaptation – A scoping review, Lyra et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104399

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Beyond carbon: Unveiling vulnerabilities of the transportation fuel system for climate resilience, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103585 8 cites.

Climate change impacts on human health

Accessing sexual and reproductive health services during climate change-related environmental disruptions in coastal Ghana: a privilege or human right for young women with disabilities?, Gbagbo et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1762744

Climate change and social health, Sellers et al., Environmental Health Perspectives Open Access pdf 10.1289/ehp4534

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Severe drought exposure in utero associates to children’s epigenetic age acceleration in a global climate change hot spot, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48426-7 10 cites.

Climate change & geopolitics

Water in COP processes and future climate action through the Baku water declaration, Antwi, Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100826

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Conflict mitigation as a means of climate change adaptation: Lessons for policy and development practice, Environment and Security, 10.1177/27538796241246409 7 cites.

Other

Accounting for Extremes in Modeling the Size and Likelihood of Large Fires in the United States, Asadian et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007485

Climate change exacerbates disparities of energy resilience in New York City, Xu et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-73247-1

Educational policies can strengthen climate coalitions, Bradley et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1073/pnas.2533821123

Global and regional climate modes modulate armed conflict risk, Bagwell et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2532935123

Regional inequity in top-tier climate change research, Sharma et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03585-x

Revisiting ENSO Regime Shift Around 2000: A Perspective From Recharge Oscillator-Based Linear Inverse Model, Sun et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121498

“We don't have other options”: Academic air travel practices in southern Taiwan, Cheng et al., Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104757

Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The 2024 Europe report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: unprecedented warming demands unprecedented action, The Lancet Public Health, 10.1016/s2468-2667(24)00055-0 247 cites.

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

The State of Renewable Energy Dashboard, Johanna Neumann and Tony Dutzik, Environment America Research & Policy Center

Wind, solar and geothermal accounted for 21.4% of national retail electricity sales in 2025, a jump from 8% in 2016. South Dakota once again led all states by producing the equivalent of 95% of its retail electricity sales from wind, solar or geothermal. More states than ever – 32 in total – now get 10% or more of their electricity from renewables. South Dakota, Iowa, Wyoming, Kansas and New Mexico were the top five states for total renewable electricity generation as a percentage of retail sales in 2025. America had 77 times as much utility-scale battery storage in 2025 as it did in 2016, with a 58% increase in 2025. There were more than 4.5 million electric vehicles on American roads at the end of 2024 – a 15-fold increase from 2016. America produced enough solar energy to power 36 million homes in 2025 – seven times as much as in 2016, largely thanks to a 28% increase in 2025.

A Reliable Grid for an Electric Future (update), The National Electrical Manufacturers Association

The authors project U.S. electricity demand will rise more than 55% by 2050 – with the steepest growth concentrated in the current decade. Data centers alone are projected to account for 38% of net electricity consumption through 2037, driven by aggressive hyperscaler capital expenditure and the accelerating energy intensity of artificial intelligence workloads. Electric mobility electricity consumption is projected to grow 2,000% through 2050, and electricity’s overall share of final energy delivered is expected to grow from 18% to 28% over the same period.

Climate Change Big Player at FIFA World Cup 2026, World Weather Attribution

The 2026 FIFA World Cup will be played from 11 June to 19 July 2026 across three host countries: the United States of America (USA), Canada, and Mexico, with matches spread over 16 cities and the final to be held in New York on the 19th of July. In this study we approximate wet bulb globe temperature (WBGT) using temperature and humidity – which means results apply best to a sheltered and shaded area, without the heating effect of direct sunlight or the cooling effect of wind. Guidance from the global players’ union (FIFPRO) recommends that when WBGT reaches 26°C or higher, heat strain becomes a real risk and therefore matches must include cooling breaks. At 28°C WBGT and above, FIFPRO says it is unsafe for play and postponement is advised. This contrasts with current governing body regulations for the FIFA World Cup, which only consider postponement at WBGT levels exceeding 32°C, indicating a far higher threshold for intervention under official rules. Using a statistical model applied to observations the authors say that in this year’s World Cup 26 games would be expected to take place in conditions of at least 26°C WBGT, of which 9 are in stadiums without cooling. In 1994 it was expected that 21 games occurred under these conditions, and only 6 without cooling.

The Geothermal Supply Chain Is America’s to Gain — or Lose, Feshback et al., RMI

Next-generation geothermal energy shows growing promise as a source of firm, reliable power. Investment in the sector has grown a hundredfold in seven years from $22 million in 2018 to $2.2 billion in 2025; pilot projects are successfully delivering electricity; and the first phase of a large-scale commercial plant, a 500 MW project in Utah, will come online this year. A growing body of evidence suggests that the geothermal opportunity is particularly large for the United States, which holds the world’s largest technical resource and much of the expertise needed to unlock it. There is growing recognition that, at least in the United States, the sector’s long-term viability depends heavily on progress achieved through the early 2030s, technology transfer from oil and gas, and equipment standardization. These factors make understanding supply-chain readiness, both domestic and global, crucial.

ELECTROTECH MONEYBALL: An Industrial Strategy for Ranking Risk and Opportunity in Energy & AI Supply Chains, Benich et al., Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy & Technology

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) dominates much of what many experts call the “electrotech stack”—the integrated set of hardware and software components central to this buildout that are transforming electricity from a physical flow into something that also can be digitally generated, stored, and directed. That dependence is not only creating a supply vulnerability, but also threatening to undermine the very security advantages that a modernized grid is supposed to deliver.

Germany’s battery opportunity, Petrovich et al., Ember

A long-awaited package will determine whether Germany’s electricity backup power is secured entirely by new fossil gas power plants or whether clean flexibility solutions, such as batteries, are allowed to compete on an equal footing. Germany has a strong grid-scale battery pipeline, but the lack of an ambitious clean flexibility strategy and the preferential treatment of gas in forthcoming auctions risk slowing deployment, causing the country to forego the benefits of batteries and remain locked into gas import dependency for decades.

Role of Climate Change on Infectious Diseases, Almagro-Moreno et al., American Society for Microbiology and the American Geophysical Union

Anthropogenic climate change is a fundamental threat to human health. Altered temperature and precipitation levels, sea level rise and more frequent and intense weather and climate events associated with climate change can negatively affect human health and health systems, especially with respect to infectious diseases. These changes impact the ecology, evolution, distribution and prevalence of infectious disease reservoirs, hosts, vectors and pathogens in ways that lead to the emergence of disease. Understanding and quantifying the relationship between climate change and infectious diseases are crucial for informing mitigation and adaptation strategies that strengthen public health responses. The report is based on the deliberations of experts in epidemiology, microbial ecology and evolution, infectious diseases and climate science who participated in a colloquium on Oct. 9-10, 2025, organized by the American Academy of Microbiology, the honorific leadership group and think tank within ASM, and the American Geophysical Union (AGU). These experts came from diverse disciplines and sectors to articulate opportunities to build on climate, microbial and attribution science to promote proactive public health preparedness and response. The participants highlighted the need for long-term attribution studies, proactive workforce training, development of novel diagnostics and treatments, and improved surveillance systems so that health systems are capable of rapidly responding to a changing infectious disease landscape.

Impacts of Large Loads on Electricity Rates: A Primer, Lam et al., Energy Systems Integration Group and Brattle

The authors identify five key determinants that most often drive whether large load additions increase or decrease rates for existing customers. These determinants are (1) when sufficient available capacity exists, a new large customer can be served with minimal incremental capital investment; rates for existing customers fall when revenue from new large customers exceeds the incremental infrastructure cost, and rise when it does not; new large loads can increase capacity prices in tight markets, with customers without long-term price protection bearing the impact; existing customers may bear the cost of underused or stranded assets if expected large load growth does not materialize; and requirements such as take-or-pay, minimum bills, contribution-in-aid-of-construction, reservation charges, collateral, and exit fees can reduce cost shifts and stranded-cost risk.

The State of Clean Energy Manufacturing in Q1 2026, Tom Taylor and Katherine Shok, Atlas Public Policy

In Q1 2026, manufacturers canceled four facilities, resulting in a loss of $1.4 billion in previously announced investment. Several facilities announced pauses in manufacturing resulting in reductions in labor demand that contributed to a loss of almost 8,100 jobs. However, across 12 states, 12 companies announced $2.5 billion in investment and 2,200 jobs tied to 21 projects. Altogether, companies announced a net $1.1 billion increase in investment and net loss of 5,900 jobs in Q1 2026. Electric vehicle (EV) manufacturers continue to face challenges. EVs have seen the greatest proportion of canceled investments at 15 percent of announced investments, followed by batteries (12 percent).

A world on the edge. Priorities for a pandemic-resilient future, Global Preparedness Monitoring Board

The authors found that as infectious disease outbreaks become more frequent they are also becoming more damaging, with widening health, economic, political and social impacts, and less capacity to recover from them. This report uses the GPMB Monitoring Framework to assess how the impacts of the six new Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEICs) of the past decade have evolved and identifies the areas where they are now most acute. To rebuild trust and advance equity, the world requires independent pandemic risk monitoring, equitable access to countermeasures, and sustainable financing, enabled by sustained political attention.

Full assessment. 2026 National Climate Change Risk Assessment for Aotearoa New Zealand, He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission

The authors of the assessment identify the most significant risks to Aotearoa New Zealand's economy, society, environment, and ecology. They assess the nature of the risks, their severity, and the need for coordinated actions to respond to them. This will help inform the government's next national adaptation plan, due in 2028.

A Plan for American Electricity Affordability, Center for American Progress

The authors propose an American Electricity Affordability Plan to expand the supply of energy by building more capacity to generate electricity and by building better grid infrastructure to ensure the American people can afford to heat and cool their homes. This includes major reforms to break down permitting and siting barriers that obstruct or slow good decision-making, boost public and private investment, and realign incentives for utilities to build the most cost-effective projects rather than the costliest. Three new policy approaches are needed including (1) a program to expand supply by building a better, bigger power system, including reforms to accelerate permitting of new transmission and generation capacity, align utility incentives for lowering costs, and make public investments in manufacturing and construction of both clean energy and grid infrastructure; (2) a rate relief fund to provide public funding for cost-effective electricity system improvements to states that choose to freeze or lower residential electricity rates for four years, immediately taking the cost pressure off households while the better, bigger power system is built; and (3) a national AI data center fair share policy that sets standard rules for all data centers to pay their fair share of the costs of the energy and grid infrastructure they impose on the electricity system and makes sure residential consumers do not foot the bill while avoiding creating an incentive for data centers to be built off-grid.

2026 Summer Reliability Assessment (Final), The North American Electric Reliability Corporation

The 2026 Summer Reliability Assessment (SRA) identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American bulk power system (BPS) for the upcoming summer season. In addition, the SRA presents peak electricity demand and supply changes and highlights any unique regional challenges or expected conditions that might affect the reliability of the BPS. As electricity demand continues to rise and the resource mix changes, the North American grid is being called on to adapt in real time. The 2026 Summer Reliability Assessment finds that record resource additions have strengthened readiness for the summer season, even as elevated risks remain in some areas.

Global Status Report for Buildings and Construction 2025-2026, UNEP and the Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction, United Nations Environment Programme

The authors review the status of construction/building policies, finance, technologies and solutions to monitor alignment with the Paris Agreement goals. The authors benchmark progress through the Global Buildings Climate Tracker across emissions, building energy codes, renewable energy, green building certification, and investment in energy efficiency, covering climate resilience, housing affordability, and the 2050 Buildings Breakthrough and Déclaration de Chaillot. Despite a decade of progress, the sector remains off track, accounting for 37 per cent of global emissions and nearly 50 per cent of global material extraction, as decarbonization stalls and construction outpaces climate action.

Survey: U.S. and Canadian Business Confidence in Climate Action Remains Strong, Melissa Fifield, BMO Climate Institute

The fourth edition of the BMO Climate Institute Business Leaders Survey was conducted in January 2026 and included 741 respondents, including 370 in Canada and 371 in the U.S. Survey respondents include individuals in a senior role at their company (e.g. C-suite, President, Vice-President, Executive Director or General Manager) and who consider themselves to be senior decision makers. Companies range from those with at least five employees to more than 500 employees. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of respondents say they have or are developing plans to address climate-related risks, up from 69% in 2025. Extreme and unpredictable weather is a top concern for business leaders considering the impact of climate-related risks on their companies. Competitive pressure, customer expectations, and regulatory change are expected to drive further climate action. Three?fifths of respondents say AI is already used in daily operations or climate planning. Costs remain the most frequently cited obstacle to developing an effective climate plan.

The AI Climate Hoax: Behind the Curtain of How Big Tech Greenwashes Impacts, Ketan Joshi, Beyond Fossil Fuels, Standearth, Climate Action Against Disinformation et al

The analysis collected the most prominent AI climate claims and determined a) what types of AI were referred to and b) what evidence was presented to back up those claims. The author found that 1. Most claims of climate benefit relate to ‘traditional’ AI, which has a much lower environmental impact than consumer generative AI tools. Even if these benefits are real, they are unrelated to - and dwarfed by - the massive expansion of energy use from the generative AI industry. 2. Where claims of traditional AI climate benefits are made, they tend to rely on weaker forms of evidence, such as corporate websites, rather than published academic research. Only 26% cited published academic research while 36% did not cite any evidence at all. This analysis shows that to bring the deployment of digital services in bounds with the physical limits of the planet, tech companies investing in AI should implement actual sustainability measures rather than masking ever-worsening damage to the climate and environment with vague terms and weak evidence.

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What’s a ‘super El Niño’? And other El Niño questions, answered

Wed, 20 May 2026 15:29:23 EST

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Bob Henson

The odds are in El Niño’s favor right now.

This natural weather phenomenon, part of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, or ENSO, occurs when warmer-than-average water extends throughout most of the equatorial Pacific Ocean just below the surface. That’s happening now. And powerful bursts of westerly wind have pushed immense amounts of warm water eastward, toward the Niño3.4 region where sea surface temperature, along with other atmospheric conditions, is used to assess the state of ENSO.

On May 14, in its monthly ENSO outlook, the NOAA/National Weather Service Climate Prediction Center gave an 82% chance that El Niño will be in place for the period May through July, which implies that it’ll be here within weeks.

How do experts know when El Niño has arrived?

El Niño conditions are declared when the atmosphere and ocean are in sync and the Niño3.4 sea surface temperature is at least 0.5 degrees Celsius (0.9°F) warmer than the seasonal average.

But just as hurricanes can and do stray from the “cone of uncertainty” at times, it’s vital to remember that El Niño can do much the same. Preparing for the prototypical outcomes is a smart move, as long as you keep in mind that forecasting the El Niño-Southern Oscillation is more a matter of probabilities than certainties.

NOAA now uses a Relative Oceanic Niño Index, or RONI, in which the Niño3.4 value is adjusted relative to the world’s tropical oceans as a whole; the goal is to keep global warming from smudging the signal of El Niño and La Niña events themselves.

Read: A new and better way to keep tabs on El Niño and La Niña

Nearly all seasonal forecast ensembles used to predict ENSO at agencies around the world now concur that the imminent event is likely to bring Niño3.4 warming of at least 1.5°C, which would push it into the “strong” category. And some of the ensemble averages are now going well above 2°C, even for the adjusted RONI index. That would put it in the ballpark of the biggest El Niño events in the NOAA database going back to 1950.

Individual ensemble members still cover a fairly broad range, with outcomes varying from a weak event to a record-stomping one, but as shown below, they’re about as close to being unanimous on a significant El Niño as you’re likely to see. (This output is mainly using the traditional pre-RONI index, which tends to run slightly hotter on recent El Niño events.)

What’s a ‘super El Niño’ – and will we get one?

Back in 2003, a group of researchers from Australia’s national science agency, CSIRO, invoked the term “super El Niño” in a Monthly Weather Review paper. They used it to describe events where the Niño3.4 departure from average was at least 3°C. The phrase has since been used more loosely around the world, especially in news articles and social media, but it’s not part of the toolbox of most professional ENSO forecasters.

“While ‘Super El Niño’ is sometimes used informally, it is not a scientific term,” said senior climatologist Felicity Gamble in a statement from Australia’s Bureau of Meteorology, which avoids the “super” moniker in its products.

The same is true of NOAA, which is going with “weak,” “moderate,” “strong,” and “very strong.” NOAA’s monthly ENSO outlooks now include month-by-month odds that a predicted El Niño event will fall into each of these four brackets. The odds of a “very strong” event peak at 37% in the November-to-January period.

Summing these categories, the odds that we will have El Niño at any strength are now greater than 90% from this summer through winter 2026-27, according to NOAA.

Figure 1. Probabilities from NOAA’s May 14 outlook that the expected El Niño event of 2026-27 will fall into various strength categories during each overlapping three-month period through December-February. El Niño events typically build in northern summer and fall, peak in the winter, and fade by spring. Unlike La Niña, El Niño rarely persists or recurs for two or more years in a row, though that occasionally happens. (Image credit: NOAA/NWS/CPC)

Jan Null of Golden Gate Weather Services, a California-based forensic meteorologist and former National Weather Service forecaster, began using “very strong” when the 2015-16 event arrived, so he’s happy to see NOAA doing the same. As Null puts it, “Everyone sees a forecast plume that looks like the liftoff of Artemis and goes crazy, and somehow early on attached the ‘super’ superlative to it.”

Does a stronger El Niño event lead to more extreme impacts?

Whether it’s super, very strong, mega, whiz-bang, or something else, the approaching El Niño could certainly land in the uppermost tier of what we’ve seen in recent decades. So does that mean the impacts would be correspondingly intense?

Alas, it’s not that simple.

“A strong El Niño event doesn’t always mean stronger impacts on our weather,” the Australian climatologist Felicia Gamble said in a statement released by that nation’s Bureau of Meteorology. “Sometimes a weak El Niño can lead to significant impacts on Australia’s rainfall and temperature, while a stronger event may have less noticeable impacts.”

ENSO expert Nathaniel Johnson, a meteorologist at NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, noted in an email that a stronger El Niño event does raise the odds of the most prototypical outcomes. However, it’s not the only thing involved.

“In any given season and region, there are many large-scale patterns that help to shape our local weather,” said Johnson. “El Niño is just one of those factors, but it happens to be the most predictable on timescales of months to seasons. If the El Niño event is very strong, then it is more likely that the El Niño influence will dominate over those other, less seasonally predictable factors.”

That said, there are places where a strong El Niño event can lead to distinctly different outcomes than a weak or moderate one. In the eastern tropical Pacific, for example, surface waters – normally chilled by upwelling – are often too cool to support showers and thunderstorms even in moderately strong El Niño conditions. Beyond a certain threshold of strength, though, the normally dry eastern tropical Pacific will warm up enough to support heavy rainfall, Johnson said: “This would essentially indicate a shift of the entire tropical Pacific warm pool to the eastern Pacific, which would immediately impact regions like coastal Ecuador and Peru.”

The very name El Niño, which means the Christ child in Spanish, came from Peruvian fishers who noticed that their anchovy catches – typically some of the world’s largest – took severe hits from unusually warm water during certain years around Christmas. (Earlier this year, Peru’s anchovy fisheries called for a proactive early start to get ahead of the possible El Niño.)

The Galápagos archipelago and its distinctive food chain are also highly vulnerable to the heavy rains and warm waters of a strong El Niño event.

What might we expect with this El Niño event, and where?

El Niño’s impacts occur as the global atmospheric circulation is rearranged by the massive zone of rising, warm air (often as large as the United States) that develops over the eastern tropical Pacific. These impacts can be remarkably far-flung, but they’re typically strongest across the tropics – from the Indian and Pacific Oceans to the Atlantic and into Africa – and over the midlatitudes of North and South America, the land masses closest to the Niño3.4 region.

Read: Five things you need to know about El Niño’s likely comeback

In a nutshell, El Niño tends to bring dry (and often hot) conditions in and around Southeast Asia, parts of Africa, and the Amazon and Central America, while relatively cool and wet conditions often prevail over East Africa and the southern tier of the United States. The timing of these common repercussions (called teleconnections) varies a bit. For example, North American impacts are triggered largely by interactions with the midlatitude jet stream, so they’re normally strongest toward winter, when the jet stream is more active. On a global scale, the heat transferred from ocean to atmosphere during El Niño tends to cause record-warm years in our human-warmed climate.

Figure 2. Typical El Niño influences, or teleconnections, on precipitation. (Image credit: NOAA)

In some parts of the world, the El Niño playbook is higher-confidence than elsewhere. One of those is the northern tier of the United States and much of adjacent Canada, where El Niño reliably delivers warmer-than-average winter weather. Emily Becker and Michael Tippett analyzed this connection as part of their deep dive into North American temperature responses to ENSO in a 2024 paper published in the Journal of Climate. This region sits hundreds of miles poleward from the broader-scale warming and drying that afflicts much of the tropics, but it’s part of the same web of El Niño teleconnections.

El Niño’s blunting of the usual big swings in winter temperatures across this region is noteworthy. “Not only does this warm zone experience many mild days during El Niño, but it also gets fewer cold snaps,” said Tippett (Columbia University). And while La Niña winters in the northern U.S. and Canada can be either warmer or colder than average, El Niño is more consistently on the warm side, Becker and Tippett found.

Sometimes, even a fairly dependable seasonal-scale tendency driven by El Niño can hide important smaller-scale details. The Indian monsoon tends to be drier than average during El Niño, but a 2025 analysis in Science found that amid these drier-than-usual monsoons, the occasional rainfalls that do occur seem to be turbocharged, dropping more extreme short-term rains than usual.

Likewise, hurricane activity tends to decrease in the Atlantic and ramp up in the Pacific during El Niño events. This may well pan out in 2026, based on sea surface temperatures and other ocean and atmosphere signals already showing up in seasonal models. But even in an otherwise quiet year, there could be periods of atmospheric alignment when dangerous Atlantic hurricanes still emerge.

One bright spot with El Niño is that it tends to suppress U.S. tornado activity during the winter and subsequent spring (see Figure 3 below). La Niña events sometimes but not always lead to major spring tornado outbreaks, whereas the suppressive effect of El Niño appears to be a bit more reliable. The big exception is in and around Florida: Some of the state’s worst tornado outbreaks on record outside of tropical cyclones occurred near the tail end of the powerful El Niño events of 1982-83 (on March 16-17), 1997-98 (on February 22-23), and 2015-16 (on February 23-24).

Figure 3. Seasonal tornado activity (height on the vertical axis) for each February-April from 1979 through 2023 versus the state of ENSO (La Niña on the left, El Niño on the right) based on the Relative Oceanic Niño Index. (Image credit: NOAA Climate.gov graphic, adapted from original by Kelsey Malloy, now at the University of Delaware.)

And what about climate change?

Very strong El Niño events are rare enough birds on their own, so it’s tough to assess how these events, and their impacts, will evolve as human-caused warming continues to grow.

Not that long ago, the 2023-24 El Niño event was expected to cause major global repercussions. And indeed, on the “traditional” Oceanic Niño Index, or ONI, it ended up in the “very strong” range, peaking at 2.1. However, the impacts didn’t play out as expected, especially in midlatitudes, where the connections to El Niño were unusually weak. As it happens, record heat was swaddling much of the world at the time, including tropical oceans, and that appears to have blunted the effects of El Niño.

In a 2025 Journal of Climate paper, a team led by Clara Deser, a senior scientist at the National Science Foundation National Center for Atmospheric Research, carried out a set of model experiments showing that long-term warming in the Indian and Atlantic tropical oceans, together with long-term cooling in the eastern tropical Pacific, can lead to a counteracting large-scale circulation that almost completely negates the effects of an El Niño event.

As Deser and colleagues wrote, “historical precedent may no longer be a reliable guide to ENSO teleconnections as anthropogenic warming patterns intensify.”

In a recent New York Times roundup of potential El Niño impacts, Deser said: “We are now in a different baseline climate.”

In a similar vein, Australia’s Felicity Gamble said: “The increasing warmth in our oceans, both globally and in the Australian region, mean that history is now a poorer guide for seasonal prediction.”

The 2023-24 event helped turn attention toward using the Relative Oceanic Niño Index, with the idea that RONI might work better than ONI in factoring out periods of intense tropics-wide heat (such as 2023-24) from the assessment of El Niño. Sure enough, the 2023-24 event reached the strong range in RONI, topping out at 1.5 (borderline strong) rather than landing in the more rarefied very-strong range on the traditional scale.

“The weakened impacts of the 2023-24 El Niño compared to expectations can be reconciled, at least in large part, by its substantially weaker amplitude based on RONI instead of the traditional ONI,” said NOAA’s Johnson.

If there’s a poster child for counterintuitive El Niño behavior, it’s the bizarre dryness that plagued Southern California during the winter of 2015-16, one of the strongest El Niño events on record. El Niño is often wet across much of California, but there’s ample variability, as documented by Jan Null. In a website post, Null described the 2015-16 case as the “poster child for ‘All El Niños are not the same!’ ”

Michelle L’Heureux, a physical scientist who leads the ENSO team at the NOAA/NWS Climate Prediction Center, encourages thinking of El Niño as shifting the odds of various seasonal outcomes (e.g., wetter, drier, hotter, cooler). If those odds are expressed as a bell curve, then the stronger the event, the further El Niño pushes that curve to one side.

L’Heureux points to the 2015-16 California case as a cautionary tale on how El Niño forecasts should be treated as guidance rather than a guarantee.

“This doesn’t mean a major El Niño didn’t happen or it did not have a considerable influence on the global circulation (it did). It means that, in southern California, even a very strong El Niño was not able to nudge the distribution over enough to the point where drier outcomes were impossible.”

Looking ahead, L’Heureux added: “In 2026-27, I am confident we will see at least some locations in the U.S. that will not align with the expected El Niño impact.”

Jeff Masters contributed to this post.