Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : La Cour accueille en partie une requête de la poursuite en rejet d’appel, l’accusé ayant, après le dépôt de son appel, mais avant l’imposition de la peine, quitté le Canada pour se soustraire à la justice.

Intitulé : Malo c. R., 2026 QCCA 1266
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Julie Dutil, Geneviève Marcotte et Benoît Moore
Date : 23 septembre 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — procédure pénale — procédure fédérale — rejet d’appel — voies de fait graves — déclaration de culpabilité — appel de peine — rétention de biens saisis — pouvoir discrétionnaire — accusé ayant fui le Canada dans le but de se soustraire à l’autorité des tribunaux — répudiation de la compétence de la Cour — omission de produire le mémoire d’appel.

Requête en rejet d’appel dans les dossiers n^os 500-10-008076-232 et 500-10-700233-255 (n^os 232 et 255) et demande pour faire déclarer l’accusé forclos de plaider dans le dossier n^o 500-10 008456-251, portant sur la peine. Accueillies en partie. Appel de l’ordonnance en rétention de biens saisis (dossier n^o 232) et appel de la déclaration de culpabilité (dossier n^o 255). Rejetés.

Dans les dossiers n^os 255 et 251, l’accusé interjette appel de sa déclaration de culpabilité pour voies de fait graves; pour sa part, la poursuite interjette appel de la peine de 57 mois d’emprisonnement prononcée à l’endroit de l’accusé. Quant au dossier n^o 232, il s’agit de l’appel d’un jugement de la Cour supérieure ayant rejeté la demande de l’accusé d’ordonner la restitution des documents électroniques saisis dans le cadre d’une enquête pour fraude qui le concerne et la destruction de tous les exemplaires en la possession de l’État.

Décision

La Cour possède le pouvoir discrétionnaire de rejeter un appel ou de le déclarer abandonné lorsque l’appelant se soustrait à la justice canadienne. Ce pouvoir peut être exercé à toute étape de l’appel et non seulement lors de l’audience au fond.

En l’espèce, après le dépôt de son appel, mais avant l’imposition de la peine, l’accusé a quitté le pays pour se soustraire à la justice. Il a fui le Québec en utilisant un jet privé à la veille de l’imposition de sa peine et a tenté de se rendre ensuite au Venezuela. Il était en possession de documents falsifiés, ce qui indique qu’il avait planifié sa fuite. Il appert par ailleurs de la transcription des conversations avec l’huissier que l’accusé ne souhaite pas revenir au Canada. Il a d’ailleurs acheté une propriété en Martinique, où il se trouve actuellement, et soutient que sa famille viendra s’y installer avec lui. Il s’oppose en outre à son extradition. Par ailleurs, dans les dossiers n^os 232 et 255, l’accusé est en défaut de produire ses mémoires. Il soulève de nombreux moyens d’appel et ses dossiers pourraient s’avérer complexes. Les ressources judiciaires étant limitées, elles ne peuvent être utilisées par une personne qui répudie l’autorité des tribunaux. Dans le présent cas, aucune circonstance exceptionnelle ne justifie la tenue d’une audience au fond.

La Cour est d’avis qu’il y a lieu de rejeter les 2 appels de l’accusé. Toutefois, puisque la poursuite n’a que très récemment déposé son exposé dans le dossier sur l’appel sur la peine, il s’avère prématuré de déclarer l’accusé forclos de plaider dans ce dossier.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeals

Criminal Law: Admissibility/Use Re Complainant Sexual Activity
R. v. A.M, 2026 SCC 33 (41528)

s. 276 screening regime not automatically apply re sexual services/trafficking.

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Aboriginal Law: Title
British Columbia v. Nuchatlaht, 2026 BCCA 137 (42379)

Aboriginal title to island.

Class Actions: Airlines
Davies v. Air Canada, 2025 QCCA 1344 (42161)

Arbitrator jurisdiction in labour law context.

Environmental Law: Plastic
Responsible Plastic Use Coalition, et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), et al., 2026 FCA 17 (42277)

Toxic plastics ban.

Labour Law: Arbitrator Jurisdiction
R.W. Tomlinson Limited, et al. v. Labourers’ International Union of North America, et al., 2025 ONCA 861 (42209)

Arbitrator jurisdiction in labour law context.

Tax: Assessment Appeals
Estate of the late Borys Srebrnik, Kristina Rezner Srebrnik, et al. v. Agence du revenu du Québec, 2025 QCCA 1492 (42186)

Assessing renovation deductions and corporate payments to family members.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

This column presents excerpts from a student paper, completed under the University of Toronto’s Community Research Partnership in Ethics program; the full paper will be published by the National Self-Represented Litigants Project later this year.

Over the past 20 years, Alberta’s family justice system has distinguished itself from other jurisdictions by implementing mandatory forms of assistance. In 2005, the Alberta government launched mandatory meetings for SRLs in provincial court, pursuant to the Intake and Caseflow Management Regulation.[1] Building on this, and recognizing the inherent difficulties associated with an SRL’s journey through the family law system, the new Family Justice Strategy (FJS) has since implemented a mandatory assistance program for self-represented litigants in family law in certain cities.[2] The program was rolled out in Edmonton and Calgary in December 2023, and expanded into Red Deer in March 2025.[3] Since its inception, the strategy has reportedly assisted over 69,000 Albertans in accessing pre-court services.[4] The FJS focuses on four main goals:

1) Resolving legal matters earlier and outside of court;
2) Focusing on the well-being of children and families;
3) Providing Albertans with necessary tools and services before court proceedings begin;
4) Reducing the emotional and financial costs to families by assisting them in navigating the family justice system.[5]

In addition to the above objectives, the FJS has sought to streamline the court system, assuage parents’ worries, and make the family law process easier for children.[6]

Under this initiative, each SRL is required to keep in close contact with a Family Court Counsellor (FCC) throughout the duration of their case. FCCs typically have a background in social work, domestic violence, mediation, or another related field, and they provide guidance to SRLs on court matters, including (among other services):

• Resolution options;
• Court processes information;
• Assistance with arranging court dates;
• Referrals to resources;
• Support in presenting their case to the Provincial Court;
• Guidance in document completion, including stamping official documents for submission to courts;
• Help with negotiating agreements.[7]

Litigants without counsel are required to work with an FCC. Exceptions to this requirement include litigants who do not have dependent children impacted by the family law proceeding, or those who are responding to an action without filing a cross-application.[8] The program also allows for the deferral or waiving of requirements for SRLs where there is significant violence or non-compliance on the part of the other party. These exceptions must be approved by a judge.[9]

An SRL’s work with an FCC is required from the outset of their case. The FCC will book an intake appointment with the SRL as a form of triage, and assess what the litigant is seeking to achieve.[10] The FCC will then undertake a safety screening process, identify the issues involved within the case, and discuss possible dispute resolution options;[11] their role is to explain the entire mediation or judicial process to the SRL, enabling them to make an educated and informed decision on how to proceed.[12] Notwithstanding this, FCCs are generally not lawyers and cannot give legal advice.

This research project included a literature review and several one-on-one interviews with participants in the Alberta program. The scope of the qualitative portion of the work was modest, and the project is therefore modest in its ability to generalize, but the experiences participants described are nonetheless worthy of analysis, and hopefully, further study.

Although the program aims to provide a better and more efficient experience for SRLs in family law, significant questions do arise. Concerns about autonomy versus paternalism are at the forefront, along with questions regarding whether mandatory assistance creates barriers for particular groups. Further, in attempting to divert family law cases from the courts, there is a question of whether the judicial process is being usurped by administrative policies and direction.

While there is not necessarily an inherent problem with implementing mandatory initiatives, challenges may and do arise when the requirements disproportionately affect one group of litigants and do not allow for flexibility in accommodating different contexts. The issues lie in the practical implementation, where delays, limited capacity, increased burdens, and inconsistent application undermine any prospective effectiveness.

In Alberta’s mandatory assistance program there appears to be some discrepancy between its intention and its application. For example, the time commitments associated with communicating with FCCs raise issues about delay, as well as perceptions that SRLs are discouraged from proceeding to court.[13] SRLs could also feel targeted and singled out in the implementation of a mandatory program that does not apply to represented litigants.[14] Additionally, the inability of FCCs to provide legal advice leaves SRLs without meaningful direction in navigating court processes, something they are often seeking.[15] Lastly, the prioritization of disseminating general information and the corresponding inability of a mandatory program to provide individualized assistance means there is a risk that the program becomes more of a “cookie cutter” system.[16]

Ultimately, these challenges raise concerns about procedural fairness and the equity of programs meant to support vulnerable populations. Unlike the mandatory parenting education programs or mediation processes that exist in other jurisdictions, Alberta’s system imposes ongoing and individualized responsibilities specifically on SRLs, without imposing equivalent requirements upon parties who are represented. Because of this distinction, SRLs may actually face an increased workload, while lacking the practical resources needed to meet these expectations. This ultimately risks reinforcing existing inequalities, especially for individuals who experience financial hardship, disability, or family violence.

In the context of family law, there is a reasonable argument for moving family law cases away from the courts and out of the hands of lawyers by involving more skilled social workers who have an understanding of the situation and can help parties reach a resolution.[17] A commonly held perspective notes that the adversarial court process is not necessarily best suited to the resolution of family disputes, as many SRLs may find more value in discussion and agreement, when it is conducted safely and appropriately. Thus, a mandatory system should incorporate augmented out-of-court resolution options that allow parties to reach agreements more effectively and securely. Alberta has directed people away from the courts with its mandatory assistance program, but would benefit from continuing to expand the supports meant to replace judicial resolutions.

More fundamentally, supportive systems should be ones that seek to empower SRLs, not control them. This would include guidance as well as meaningful direction, should court be necessary. Though mandatory assistance is aimed at guaranteeing a valuable source of knowledge for those in need of support, its compulsory nature may undermine certain intended purposes by restricting autonomy and enforcing increased procedural barriers. Ultimately, according to the SRLs interviewed, a more effective approach might reframe services as accessible, supportive, individualized, and voluntary, allowing litigants to seek supports they need without qualifying their admission to the judicial system upon participation in mandatory programs.

Finally, a robust user-feedback process is highly recommended, especially in a mandatory assistance program, so that the honest experiences of individuals engaged with the system can be collected, analyzed, and used to inform ongoing improvements. By gathering this representative data, policymakers can properly identify and address the specific needs and concerns that participants in the program have, thereby ensuring meaningful access to justice.

_____________

[1] “Alberta Family Court Counsellors,” Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, 9 August 2012, https://cfcj-fcjc.org/inventory-of-reforms/alberta-family-court-counsellors/.

[2] J.A. Hunter, “Edmonton and Calgary Practice Directive: Family Pre-Court Practice and Procedure Changes,” Practice Directive, Alberta, 2025, https://albertacourts.ca/docs/default-source/pc/Family_Pre_Court_Practice_and_Procedure_Changes.pdf?utm_source=PC+Announcements&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=Practice+Directive%2c+Family+Pre-Court+Practice+and+Procedure+Changes.

[3] Jacqueline So, “Alberta government inject $3.2 million more into Family Justice Strategy,” Canadian Lawyer, 24 July 2025, https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/general/to-come/392806.

[4] Jacqueline So, “Alberta government inject $3.2 million more into Family Justice Strategy”.

[5] An interview was conducted with Family Justice Services Staff on December 3, 2025, through Zoom (FJS 1).

[6] Jacqueline So, “Alberta government inject $3.2 million more into Family Justice Strategy”.

[7] J.A. Hunter, “Edmonton and Calgary Practice Directive”.

[8] J.A. Hunter, “Edmonton and Calgary Practice Directive.”

[9] FJS 1.

[10] An interview was conducted with a Family Court Counsellor on December 3, 2025, through Zoom (FCC 1).

[11] FCC 1.

[12] FCC 1.

[13] SRL 1. SRL 3. SRL 5.

[14] SRL 2.

[15] SRL 2.

[16] Ian Burns, “‘Cookie cutter’ solutions almost never work, a lawyer says in response to Alberta family law changes,” Law360, 18 January 2024, https://www.law360.ca/ca/articles/1787415.

[17] SRL 1. SRL 2. SRL 4.

The post The Utility of Mandatory Assistance for Self-Represented Litigants in Alberta appeared first on Slaw.

Your mid-sized firm invested $500,000 recruiting four to five new students last year. By year five, 91 percent are gone. Your per-person investment was roughly $100,000 to $125,000. Add salary, training, and mentorship. Then they leave.

The question worth asking is whether you hired the wrong people, or whether you didn’t integrate them.

The data suggests the latter. When the National Association for Law Placement Foundation surveyed departing Canadian associates, 29 percent cited work quality concerns. Sixteen percent pointed to productivity standards they felt they weren’t meeting. Thirteen percent said the advancement path was unclear. Thirteen percent mentioned fit. Another 13 percent were hired away by clients. These reflect integration challenges, not recruitment failures. Something breaks between arrival and departure, and it’s fixable.

What Happens the First Week

A new student or associate arrives on a Monday. There’s an IT orientation, a tour, introductions. By Wednesday, they have their first assignment. A research memo for a transaction closing in three weeks. The partner provided minimal context.

By Friday, they’ve produced an oversized memo. The partner reads it in twenty minutes. “Good start. Let’s talk Monday.” On Monday, it’s clear the partner wanted a three-page executive summary, not exhaustive analysis. The work gets written off. The recruit makes a mental note. Don’t overdeliver. But another thought settles in too. Maybe they’re not good at this. By month three, no one has checked in. By month six, they’re looking elsewhere.

Firms can design this differently. Deliberately. With support.

The Three Problems

Over the last three columns, I’ve traced three connected problems in how firms develop juniors.

Recruitment investment. Your firm spends half a million dollars getting people in the door, yet many don’t find a pathway to build careers. Hiring well matters. What happens next matters equally.

Delegation. When work instructions are rushed or vague, juniors overwork assignments and get discouraged. Most firms apply delegation frameworks inconsistently. Some partners frame assignments carefully. Others expect juniors to reverse-engineer what they need.

Judgment-building. AI eliminated much of the unglamorous work that taught lawyers to think critically. Firms haven’t deliberately replaced it, leaving a gap. Most firms haven’t made this a priority.

When a new recruit arrives, they step into a loose delegation process and vanishing judgment-building work. Without something intentional to guide them, they leave despite your investment.

One Missing System

Most firms try to fix one problem in isolation. They invest more in recruitment. They create a delegation framework. They launch a mentorship program. Each solution addresses one symptom, but the root is different.

These three challenges are expressions of one missing thing. A planned, intentional onboarding system.

Create that system and something changes. Retention improves. Delegation write-downs decrease. Judgment-building happens. You retain more talent, improve ROI on recruiting dollars, develop mid-level lawyers faster, and narrow an equity gap. Associates of colour experienced a 24 percent attrition rate in 2024, compared to 19 percent for white associates. That gap doesn’t close on its own.

Three Essential Ingredients

Competence Definition – Most firms never articulate what success looks like. A competence profile gives a clear picture of what a successful associate should do at specific intervals.

Legal skills matter. Reasoning, research, writing, judgment. Professional skills matter. Understanding workflow, requesting assignments, building relationships. Firm-specific skills matter. How your organization operates, what your practice areas require.

A competence profile says, “By month three, you’ll do these things. By six months, this. By twelve, this.” It converts vague feelings into measurable expectations.

Intentional Integration – Structure the first year around meaningful work and escalating responsibility.

Week one covers operational basics. By Friday, your new hire understands the workflow, has technology configured, knows their mentor, and has their first assignment queued.

Weeks two through four bring substantive work paired with observation. They draft memos, organize discovery, or prepare summaries. They shadow their supervising lawyer on client calls and depositions. By week three, reverse shadowing begins. By week four, they’ve completed a solo draft, revised it, and understand what quality looks like.

Month two shifts to co-ownership. They have a lead assignment with defined deliverables. They attend their first client call as an active participant. “This is Alex, managing the timeline on this for us.” They’re building client relationships.

Month three and beyond, they have standing client responsibilities. They manage document review, prepare status memos, field routine questions. They have direct client correspondence. By months four through six, clarify what comes next. What work should they lead? Which relationships develop? What area should they deepen? Some first-generation and internationally trained lawyers need this spelled out explicitly. Without this roadmap, people drift.

Structured Mentorship – Assigning a principal isn’t mentorship. Pair associates with different lawyers at different career points. One per year for three years. Regular meetings. Active feedback. Clear assessment of readiness.

Most firms hesitate at one juncture. Mentors need compensation and recognition. Mentorship has been invisible labour for decades. If it’s now doing much of what AI eliminated, it warrants investment.

What Gets in the Way

Culture is first. If partners claim credit for associate work or normalize harsh feedback, onboarding won’t overcome it. Culture must be willing to evolve.

Billable hours are second. You can’t ask a junior to learn and hit 1,600 billable hours in year one. If you want genuine development, your ceiling is lower. You choose one. And law students shouldn’t have serious billing targets, but they should record their time.

First-generation lawyers are third. They navigate a system where unwritten rules govern advancement. They need someone to say directly. “Here’s how you ask for work. Here’s how you build client relationships. Here’s what success looks like.”

AI creates a fourth barrier. Juniors need to interrogate AI output, not just prompt for it. They need practice reviewing answers against source documents.

The fix

Start by observing what really happens when a junior arrives. Track retention by cohort. Below 70 percent at three years signals an onboarding problem, not a recruitment one.

Define competence at your firm. Put it in writing and share it. Create a week-by-week and monthly plan for year one.

Train your mentors. Clarify their role. Measure results.

Move client-facing work earlier. By month two, they’re in client calls. By month three, they have standing responsibilities.

Address culture directly. If certain partners undermine the effort, fix it or accept the cost.

Make onboarding deliberate. Treat it like recruitment or billing. Invest in a plan, design the workflow, apply discipline, measure the outcome and recalibrate as needed.

You’ve already invested $100,000 to $125,000 per person. The 91 percent departure rate isn’t inevitable. It reflects choices.

The real question is whether you’ll choose differently.

The post Beyond Day One: The Onboarding System Firms Still Haven’t Built appeared first on Slaw.

Last November, I found a job posting for a part-time law librarian position. My hopes were low; I was still a Master of Information (MI) student, and I had no law library experience. Regardless, I applied. I could not believe my luck when I secured the position. To say I was elated would be an understatement. That feeling lasted about a day, then panic set in… What did I know about the law and law librarianship?

Desperate to weave an informatic safety blanket, I scoured the internet and library catalogues for information on early career law librarianship. I was desperate to find a neatly packaged resource on the very basics, such as what a legal information professional does on a day-to-day basis and how to perform legal research. I was unsure about the expectations surrounding my role considering the dynamic legal information industry.

In this piece, I will offer my perspective on some of these basics. I would like to note that my trajectory and position are unique. I have the title of law librarian, but titles range from legal information professional, knowledge manager, and so on. I would not yet consider myself an authoritative voice on law librarianship. I still have much to learn as I am at the advent of my career. My aim is to add to the collection of knowledge that attempts to bridge the gap between legal information education and legal information practice within a law firm.

What I Do as a Law Librarian at a Law Firm

In my frenzied search for information on law librarianship, I found myself confused about law librarians’ day-to-day responsibilities. Roles and responsibilities will look different for every position. Below are some of my core responsibilities:

• Managing online library resources: I manage our Thomson Reuters (Westlaw + Practical Law) and LexisNexis (Lexis+ AI) legal research platform subscriptions. I oversee renewing the contracts at year-end, which requires a deep understanding of the platforms. I spend time understanding what resources we currently have and identifying what we need. I organize training for staff, which is especially relevant with the advent of AI on these platforms. I liaise with vendors about new offerings and changes to the platforms.
• Managing the print collection: I order and catalogue our print collection based on lawyer needs. I manage our internal cataloguing system.
• Answering research queries: I answer lawyers’ research queries. I locate print and/or electronic resources. I often locate material on Thomson Reuters or Lexis platforms, but my search sometimes leads me to CanLII, JusticeLaws, or the Nova Scotia Legislature website.
• Creating and delivering internal training: I organize training for staff. This year, I coordinated and provided library training for articled clerks. The training I created focused on legal research using our vendor platforms, as well as a session on critically using AI.
• Loose-leafing: I update loose-leaf books.

Additional Responsibilities I Have Taken On/Explored:

• AI vendor evaluation: I try to keep up with AI developments in the legal space. I assist management with exploring different AI vendors.
• Policy writing: I wrote the AI policy.
• Legal assistant/paralegal work: I assisted the Personal Injury team this summer with various duties when I was working full-time.

Professional Associations and Legal Literature

Joining professional associations provided me with a wealth of knowledge at the very start of my journey. If I could go back in time, I would have started my quest for information by joining the Canadian Association of Law Librarians (CALL), as well as reviewing previous editions of the Canadian Law Library Review (CLLR) on CanLII. The articles and tools published in the CLLR are highly practical.

Beyond CALL, I subscribe to updates from legal literature sites. I receive SLAW publication notifications to my email. I gain a ton from reading these articles, though I mostly focus on the ones related to law librarianship and artificial intelligence (AI).

Some of the most formative experiences have been attending conferences. I learned so much from last year’s CALL conference in Moncton. I felt far more confident in what I should be doing in my role, as well as how my role could evolve after attending this conference. Additionally, the conference allowed me to make connections with other law librarians. I was blown away by the librarians’ willingness to impart their knowledge. I also attended Nova Scotia Libraries Association (NSLA) Conference last year before I joined the firm. Attending that conference felt like a low-stakes way to practice for the real thing.

A tip on conferences: Do not be afraid to ask if the firm will pay for your conference attendance. Prepare a short pitch in advance to explain how your attendance will bring value to the firm. The worst thing they can do is say no.

Education and Legal Research

I was completely new to legal research when I started, and I still have lots to learn in this area. For this reason, I will not share a “how-to” strategy for performing legal research. Instead, I will recommend the Law Librarians Institute course offered by CALL. The course aims to help librarians and other legal professionals develop the Competencies of a Legal Researcher in Canada. It is a flexible and affordable way to develop knowledge of Canadian legal information environment. In the course, I learned how to perform legal research by finding and using primary (legislation and cases) and secondary sources (writing about the law).

The only “how-to” strategy I will share is a key takeaway from the Law Librarian’s Institute. When performing legal research, always start with a secondary source rather than attempting to locate a primary source such as a case or a piece of legislation. The secondary source will point you to the relevant primary source.

Taking any sort of legal or government information course in school will be an asset. There was no such course in my program, so I connected with a law librarian and conducted a supervised reading course. I was already in the position by this point, but the readings and discussions were useful for reinforcing the skills I had learned on the job and through CALL’s Law Librarian Institute.

One course I found particularly useful in the MI program is called Managing Information Literacy Instruction. I learned many practical tips I incorporate into my training sessions at work. Additionally, this course helped me confront my fear of public speaking. Exposure to uncomfortable situations can lead to massive growth, and challenging myself to take this course was a perfect example of this.

Networking

It is essential for any new professional to connect with experienced practitioners. During my first few months, I connected with some law librarians in my area. I prepared a list of questions in advance of our meetings, and I still refer to my notes months later. If I could go back in time, I would have tried to connect with more law librarians. It is still something I need to make more of an effort to do now. From negotiating with legal technology giants to the advent of AI, human connection is essential to navigating the complex legal environment.

The value of internal networking cannot be overstated. Although it was daunting, I am glad that I introduced myself to members of the firm when I first started. I asked lawyers and articled clerks to send me some of their research assignments so that I could improve my legal research skills using the firm’s platforms. I believe that building connections within the firm will help me continue to market the library internally.

Learning to Navigate Legal Research Platforms and Vendor Management

When I first arrived, I reviewed my predecessor’s notes and connected with my manager. I identified all the vendors I was responsible for, then reached out to my sales representative as soon as possible to introduce myself. I setup calls with them and asked for details about our subscription, when each product renews, and for training on each platform. It was crucial to understand which invoices I was responsible for and how they were paid each month. With the notes from my vendor meetings, I created a calendar with contract renewal dates and a listing of all our subscriptions to avoid any surprise renewals.

A few lawyers came to me right away expecting me to find resources, so I spent lots of time learning to navigate legal research products at the start. I arranged for training with my sales representatives, but I also looked for it on my own. The vendor training geared towards law students was useful in helping me learn to navigate the platforms. Once I did the training, I spent time reinforcing my skills by playing around on the platforms.

If I could go back in time, I would spend more time learning to navigate CanLII, a public access legal information platform, rather than focusing solely on LexisNexis and Westlaw products. I plan to prioritize learning CanLII inside and out in the next few months, and I am confident that I will become a better researcher as a result. However, I acknowledge that the field is always evolving and plan to maintain an openness to learning throughout my career.

Beginner legal research platform tips: Westlaw and Lexis have different content, including different cases. To perform comprehensive research, start on one platform, then perform your queries on the other. You can also double check using CanLII.

Consider All Legal Information

I look beyond the library and try to think of legal information holistically. I am always eager for opportunities to learn beyond the library, such as how the firm operates and what lawyers do. This summer, I worked with the firm’s personal injury team. Learning how files progress from start to finish helped me develop a greater understanding of my role in supporting the delivery of legal services.

Expressing interest and being proactive has benefitted my career thus far. During my interview, I expressed a critical interest in AI. Once I started, I wrote an AI policy even though it was not a part of my job description. After that, I was invited to meetings. Since I am the most junior person, I take and format notes to send to the team afterwards. This practice has led to interesting opportunities I may not have been considered for initially.

Conclusion

I hope that this piece can help clarify some expectations for any potential legal information professionals. The most valuable actions I have taken so far have been to do hard things, seek community, and actively pursue learning opportunities. Starting a professional career is terrifying and imposter syndrome is real. I still have lots to learn about the legal information profession; knowledge and confidence will come with time, and I will continue to lead with curiosity.

The post Law Librarianship for Beginners: Reflections on My First 6-Months as a Legal Information Professional appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : Dans une affaire de voies de fait commises par un père à l’endroit de ses enfants, le juge de première instance, qui a imposé à l’accusé une peine de 90 jours d’emprisonnement à purger de manière discontinue, a commis 3 erreurs de principe; la Cour supérieure, accueillant l’appel, sursoit au prononcé de la peine.

Intitulé : S.N. c. R., 2026 QCCS 3130
Juridiction : Cour supérieure (C.S.), Richelieu (Sorel)
Décision de : Juge Annie Émond
Date : 25 août 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions contre la personne — voies de fait — 2 enfants de l’accusé — victimes âgées de 12 et 13 ans — accusé âgé de 45 ans — détention — peine discontinue — appel — erreur de principe — omission de considérer des éléments de preuve pertinents et favorables à l’accusé — réhabilitation — gravité objective de l’infraction — procédure sommaire — principe de la modération — omission d’examiner la possibilité d’un sursis de peine ou d’un emprisonnement avec sursis — respect des conditions — facteurs aggravants — mauvais traitement à l’égard d’une personne âgée de moins de 18 ans — répétition — coups à la tête — position vulnérable — poursuite des infractions après l’intervention de la Direction de la protection de la jeunesse — facteurs atténuants — plaidoyer de culpabilité — absence d’antécédents judiciaires — remords — thérapie — actif pour la société — dénonciation — dissuasion — sursis de peine — probation — travaux communautaires.

Appel de la peine. Accueilli.

L’appelant a plaidé coupable sous 3 chefs d’accusation de voies de fait commises à l’égard de ses 2 enfants. Le juge de première instance lui a imposé une peine de 90 jours d’emprisonnement à purger de manière discontinue, avec un suivi probatoire. L’appelant soutient essentiellement que le juge a erré dans l’application des principes et des objectifs de détermination de la peine et qu’il aurait prononcé une peine manifestement non indiquée.

Décision

Le juge a commis 3 erreurs de principe ayant influé sur la peine imposée, lesquelles amènent le tribunal à réviser celle-ci. Premièrement, il a accordé peu de valeur aux raisons avancées pour expliquer le passage à l’acte, dont la discipline reçue par l’appelant dans son enfance et les tensions familiales. Il a aussi omis de considérer le fait que les accusations avaient été portées par voie sommaire de culpabilité, les remords et les regrets de l’appelant de même que les efforts de celui-ci pour comprendre la différence entre les normes canadiennes et camerounaises en lien avec l’éducation des enfants après la commission des infractions, en plus d’avoir minimisé à un tel point la réhabilitation que celle-ci n’avait plus de poids dans l’analyse finale. Sur ce dernier point, le juge a notamment estimé que les efforts de l’appelant étaient lacunaires, alors que ses démarches auprès d’un psychologue et d’un organisme avaient été entreprises de manière volontaire et que leur utilité avait été expliquée par l’appelant. En outre, le juge a considéré comme aggravant le fait d’avoir commis les actes après l’intervention de la Direction de la protection de la jeunesse (DPJ) et en l’absence de démarches entreprises par l’appelant pour l’éviter. Toutefois, il a tiré cette conclusion sans faire référence au témoignage de l’appelant ni à l’explication que celui-ci avait donnée sur le sujet. Il n’a pas non plus expliqué en quoi le souci de projeter une image positive, noté par l’agente de probation, pourrait être lié aux démarches effectuées par l’appelant avec l’organisme et, par conséquent, constituer un facteur positif, certes, mais avec un poids moindre. Le juge a donc omis de tenir compte d’éléments de preuve pertinents et favorables à l’appelant de même que de la gravité objective moindre des infractions. Il a, de ce fait, accordé erronément une valeur plus grande à la dissuasion spécifique.

Deuxièmement, le juge a omis d’appliquer le principe de la modération en négligeant d’examiner la possibilité de sanctions moins contraignantes avant d’envisager la privation de liberté. Il ressort clairement du jugement que, dès le rejet de l’absolution, le juge a considéré que l’emprisonnement s’imposait. De plus, même si la Cour suprême du Canada n’a pas encore expressément examiné le rôle du contexte social dans la détermination de la peine des délinquants non autochtones en lien avec le principe de la modération mentionné à l’article 718.2 e) du Code criminel, celui-ci peut fournir des indications utiles pour comprendre le vécu particulier de l’accusé et sa culpabilité morale, notamment dans le cas des accusés appartenant à des groupes racialisés.

Troisièmement, le juge n’a pas sérieusement envisagé l’emprisonnement avec sursis. Or, en lisant le jugement dans sa globalité, il n’est pas possible de savoir pour quelles raisons une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis ne respecterait pas les objectifs et les principes de détermination de la peine. En effet, hormis la dénonciation et la dissuasion, le juge n’a pas fait référence à ces principes ni à ces objectifs, pas plus qu’il n’a énuméré les facteurs aggravants et atténuants.

Quant à la peine appropriée, il va sans dire que rien ne peut justifier l’utilisation de la violence dans l’éducation des enfants et que de tels gestes doivent être condamnés. Les victimes, en plus du décès de leur mère, ont subi de mauvais traitements de la part de leur père, une personne de confiance, et ont ensuite été l’objet d’un placement en famille d’accueil. Les conséquences des infractions sont considérables et un retour en arrière n’est pas possible. La gravité subjective des crimes est élevée, mais elle ne se situe pas à l’extrémité la plus haute de l’échelle. On retient, à titre de facteurs aggravants, les éléments suivants: que les coups ont été portés envers des enfants; que les mauvais traitements ont été infligés de façon récurrente, répétée et réfléchie dans un cadre de discipline, et ce, alors que les enfants étaient dans une position vulnérable; que des coups ont été portés à la tête; et que le contexte éducationnel en cause a continué après l’intervention de la DPJ. Quant aux facteurs atténuants, on retient: le plaidoyer de culpabilité; l’absence d’antécédents judiciaires; les remords et les regrets formulés, de même que les excuses présentées; le processus thérapeutique et la reprise en main; et le fait que l’appelant est un actif pour la société. De plus, ses gestes relèvent plutôt de l’insouciance que d’une réelle volonté de causer du tort à ses enfants. Son vécu au Cameroun et la discipline utilisée par ses parents font partie de l’explication du passage à l’acte. Les infractions ont été commises alors que l’épouse de l’appelant, également la mère des enfants, souffrait d’une maladie grave, dont elle est décédée peu de temps après l’arrestation de l’appelant, et que cela créait des tensions familiales. Malgré la collaboration mitigée de l’appelant avec la DPJ, le risque de récidive est peu élevé étant donné que les enfants ne demeurent pas avec lui — il n’a plus leur garde légale —, qu’il a des contacts supervisés par la DPJ et qu’il s’est engagé dans un processus thérapeutique. Le tribunal considère qu’il est possible d’atteindre les objectifs de dissuasion spécifique, de dénonciation et de dissuasion générale, auxquels doit être accordée une attention particulière, en sursoyant à l’imposition de la peine et en ordonnant une période de probation, durant laquelle l’appelant devra accomplir 200 heures de travaux communautaires.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

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As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeals

Bankruptcy & Insolvency: Preferential Payments
R. v. Cope, 2026 SCC 32 (41431)

Protecting Indigenous women victims doesn’t displace Gladue.

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Is this a rabbit, or is it a duck? It’s both. (You’ll see the two animals after a few seconds if you haven’t already). Known as Jastrow’s rabbit/duck, this image has been amusing people ever since it first appeared in a German newspaper in 1892).

How much time and money should be spent trying to prove that Jastrow’s drawing is really a duck, or really a rabbit, or more one than the other? No time and no money at all.

Our civil justice system tries to search for truth, in order to bring each lawsuit to a just resolution on the merits. But how much time and money are spent searching for “truth” about questions which, like the rabbit/duck picture, have no truth that can be found?

The system should try to prevent public and private money being spent on evidence or advocacy that is predictably epistemically unproductive – unable to advance true knowledge.

The “Truth” about the Plaintiff’s Health

In many civil lawsuits, the primary dispute is about how injured or incapacitated the plaintiff really is. What amount of money would put them in the position they would have been in, had their injury or condition never arisen? Some numbers are certainly wrong because they are too low, others because they are too high. However, plaintiff and defendant often agree quickly that something will be paid by the defendant, and that the amount will be within a certain range.

After this point, they may spend tens of thousands of dollars on legal fees and expert evidence trying to persuade each other, and if necessary a judge and/or jury, that the correct number within the range is higher or lower.

The range in a garden variety case might run from a low number (if, as the defendant says, the plaintiff can soon get back to work) up to a much higher number (if, as the plaintiff says, they are experiencing debilitating pain that prevents ever returning to their old job).

Within this range, no number might be more correct than any other. The first problem is that pain is a subjective experience; no one else can know how the plaintiff “really feels,” and the plaintiff has an incentive to misrepresent it. The second problem is that, even if truth exists about whether the plaintiff will suffer debilitating pain 10 years from now, that truth may be inherently unknowable today.

It would follow that, even with godlike perceptiveness and unlimited evidence, a factfinder might have no hope of finding the true number, within the range. That fact should cap the time and money spent trying to better inform the factfinder.

The “Truth” about Negligence?

In other cases, experts are retained to opine about whether imperfect work fell below the standard of care. For example, in Vermilion v Binder, problems emerged with the flooring in a building that the defendants had constructed for the plaintiff. Water was getting in, and clearly the design and construction could have been better, but various other things went wrong that were not the defendants’ fault. Did their work fall below the standard of “reasonable care and skill?” The parties found and paid at least nine experts to testify “yes” and “no” in this case.

When vague legal standards such as “reasonableness” are applied to complex and idiosyncratic fact patterns, causing well-qualified and honest experts to disagree, it is possible that neither outcome on liability (negligent or not) is more “true” than the other.

Legal Ethics vs the Search for Truth

Do large sums of your client’s money hinge on questions such as personal injury damages or professional negligence? If so, your duty of commitment to the client’s cause might call you to recommend continuing investments of time and money into the case, so long as the expected payoff of the investments (for your client) exceeds their expected cost.

But just because paying a crackerjack expert to testify is likely to sway a jury doesn’t mean that the money will really advance the search for truth to which the civil litigation system is, in principle, dedicated. If large sums depended on convincing impartial observers that Jastrow’s drawing is really a rabbit or really a duck, then large sums of money would be invested to do so. And yet the expenditures would still be wasted.

Facts: Knowable and Unknowable

Radical scepticism holds that objective truth either doesn’t exist at all, or can’t be perceived by humans. That seems a step too far. Some facts investigated by the justice system – e.g. the defendant’s rate of speed just before the collision, or how much alcohol they consumed – do have precise right answers. On such questions, spending time and money searching for truth– with expert evidence or legal advocacy – can pay off with more substantively just outcomes.

However, some other questions, which add a lot of time and money to an already expensive and lengthy process, seem to basically be Jastrow rabbit/ducks.

The civil justice system probably can’t avoid having to label “ducks” and “rabbits.” It has to fix damages in personal injury cases and decide who was and wasn’t negligent. But it can limit the time and money spent by parties and the Court on epistemically unproductive evidence and advocacy.

Compensating for personal injuries, and pondering the reasonableness of professional judgment calls, seem a lot more important than trying to identify Jastrow’s animal. But the sensible course may be the same: move on to more productive inquiries, before much time or treasure is spent.

The post A Futile Search for “Truth”? Epistemically Unproductive Expenditures in Civil Lawsuits appeared first on Slaw.

Several times each month, we are pleased to republish a recent book review from the Canadian Law Library Review (CLLR). CLLR is the official journal of the Canadian Association of Law Libraries (CALL/ACBD), and its reviews cover both practice-oriented and academic publications related to the law.

Leading in the Law with Emotional Intelligence: The Path to Becoming a Twenty-First-Century Leader. By Rob Durr & Cliff Zimmerman. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2025. 342 p. Includes index. ISBN 9781531029654 (softcover) US$49.50; ISBN 9781531029661 (eBook) US$39.60.

Reviewed by Marnie Bailey
Manager, Knowledge Services
Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP

Emotional intelligence, or EQ, is the “capacity for recognizing our own feelings and those of others, for motivating ourselves, and for managing emotions well in ourselves and our relationships.”[1] As I read this book, I considered questions like: how might having emotional intelligence improve one’s lawyering and leadership abilities? Are we born with emotional intelligence, or can we learn it?

Leading in the Law with Emotional Intelligence: The Path to Becoming a Twenty-First-Century Leader is a workbook-style text that blends reflective writing exercises, self-discovery activities, and practice questions with scholarly discussion. Authors Rob Durr and Cliff Zimmerman both teach at an American law school. Zimmerman is a full-time law professor, and Durr, a licensed psychologist, serves as an adjunct professor. The back-and-forth between discussions of academic research into emotional intelligence and real-life examples takes a bit of getting used to, but overall, the book flows well. The writing has a conversational tone, and I could tell that the authors truly care about improving the emotional intelligence of their readers.

The first two chapters are an introduction to EQ and why it matters for lawyers, and the third discusses self-awareness and how it can improve your EQ. These three chapters and their corresponding self-discovery exercises set the stage for the remainder of the book, which discusses a four-domain model of emotional and social intelligence: self-awareness, social awareness, self-management, and relationship management. The last four chapters review these domains in detail.

While the book is geared toward lawyers, and all the situations and examples are specific to law firms, the research discussion can apply to any profession. Self-discovery breaks, images, and graphs forced me to slow down and think about what was written in the prior sections and actually use the tips provided.

The eBook comes with practice questions that pop up on the side of the screen. These are very literal; for example, the proper answer to one question was “authentic self” and my response of “true self” was marked as incorrect. These pop-up questions do not always make sense for the topic and can distract from the reading. They are created by the eBook’s AI technology and are not originally part of the book, so this would not be a problem if I were reading the print version.

I felt interspersing the workbook/self-discovery sections with the research and discussion on emotional intelligence was a good choice for this type of book. If the reader is truly following the suggestions and using the self-discovery opportunities to reflect (on things like the attributes of a good leader, their own personal triggers, and relationship management), they will come away with an overall improved understanding of their emotional intelligence. I think all relationships could benefit from this, whether they are workplace or personal ones.

As I was reading this book and working through the self-discovery exercises, I reflected on the leaders I have worked with throughout my career in special libraries and, previously, in hospitality. I realized that I have learned more from those who were not always empathetic to their employees, as they made me think at the time, “If I am ever a manager, I will make sure not to treat my team like this!” Now I am a manager of a small team in a law firm where I am also responsible for training summer and articling students in research methods. Doing the exercises in this book has shown me how I can grow my own emotional intelligence to ensure I am a positive force for all those who come to the library for assistance.

Leading in the Law with Emotional Intelligence is an interesting and insightful read for anyone in any occupation. It is written in an approachable manner and invites the reader to expand and grow their leadership and relationship skills. I highly recommend this book to everyone, not just those in a leadership position, as the practical steps explored for expanding empathy and self-awareness are something that can be used to help build relationships in all aspects of life.

________

[1] This is the definition given by Daniel Goleman, who coined the term “Emotional Quotient” in his 1995 book Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ (Bantam Books).

The post Book Review: Leading in the Law With Emotional Intelligence: The Path to Becoming a Twenty-First-Century Leader appeared first on Slaw.

Each month, we tell you which five English-language cases and French-language cases have been the most viewed* on CanLII in the previous month and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about using CanLII-published AI-generated summaries of the case or case excerpts.

For this past month, the five most-consulted English-language decisions were:

1. Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10

AI-generated summary:

Facts: Two unmarried partners cohabit for about 12 years and have two children together. The female partner leaves employment to relocate and assumes most childcare and domestic labour while the male partner builds a business. The business is sold for approximately $11 million, and the parties separate with starkly contrasting net worths. The female partner sues for spousal support, child custody, and unjust enrichment, seeking constructive trust interests in a home and investment assets. The male partner concedes enrichment during the period of childcare and domestic responsibility, but disputes deprivation and proprietary relief.

Procedural History: 2008 CanLII 35922 (Ontario Superior Court of Justice): Unjust enrichment found during a defined period; near-$1 million monetary award ordered. 2009 ONCA 595 (Ontario Court of Appeal): Trial judgment set aside; new trial ordered; quantum meruit valuation directed.

Parties’ Submissions: Appellant: A monetary award for unjust enrichment may be quantified by reference to accumulated wealth, not only quantum meruit. Respondent: Compensation must be quantified by quantum meruit, including set-off for the respondent’s non-financial contributions.

Legal Issues: Must a monetary award for unjust enrichment always be calculated on a quantum meruit basis? Did the trial judge fail to consider relevant evidence of the respondent’s contributions when quantifying the award? Should the trial judge’s monetary award be restored?

Disposition: Appeal allowed; Ontario Court of Appeal order set aside. Trial judge’s order restored. Costs throughout awarded to the appellant.

Reasons: By Cromwell J. (McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ. concurring): A monetary award for unjust enrichment is not invariably confined to a fee-for-services quantum meruit approach. A proportionate share of accumulated wealth may be appropriate where a joint family venture exists with a linked contribution. The trial findings support treating the relationship as a joint family venture rather than an employment-like arrangement. The evidentiary findings support collaborative pursuit of family goals and a domestic division of labour enabling business efforts. The findings support a link between the appellant’s domestic contributions and the accumulation of wealth. A monetary award is appropriate because a sufficiently direct and substantial link to specific property for constructive trust is absent. The quantified award is a reasonable assessment on this record, and damages assessments attract deference absent determinative error. The reasons reflect sufficient consideration of the respondent’s contributions, including by limiting unjust enrichment to the defined period.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. R. v. R.B.-C., 2026 SCC 30

AI-generated summary:

Facts: An offender is convicted of sexual assault, and the trial judge immediately begins sentencing steps, including a pre-sentence report. The defence requests an adjournment to obtain the trial-decision transcript, and sentencing is scheduled over multiple attendances. Sentencing submissions proceed in stages, including arguments about collateral immigration consequences and difficulties completing submissions within allotted time. The offender applies for a stay, alleging that post-verdict sentencing delay violates s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The trial judge dismisses the application and imposes a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by probation.

Procedural History: Ontario Court of Justice (Redgate J.): s. 11(b) application dismissed and a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed, followed by one year’s probation. 2024 ONCA 930 (Court of Appeal for Ontario): Conviction appeal dismissed; sentence appeal allowed; s. 11(b) breach found and conditional sentence reduced to 20 months.

Parties’ Submissions: Appellant (Offender): A five-month presumptive ceiling for post-verdict sentencing delay should apply, and a s. 11(b) breach should yield a stay (or absolute discharge).
Respondent (Crown): The correct standard is whether sentencing time is markedly longer than reasonably necessary, and remedies under s. 24(1) should be contextual rather than an automatic stay.

Legal Issues: Does post-verdict sentencing delay infringe s. 11(b) of the Charter in this case? If s. 11(b) is breached, is sentence reduction the appropriate remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter?

Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Court of Appeal remedy maintained, reducing the conditional sentence to 20 months.

Reasons: By Martin J. (Wagner C.J. and Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer, Jamal, O’Bonsawin and Moreau JJ. concurring): Section 11(b) of the Charter applies through the imposition of sentence, but Jordan’s presumptive ceilings do not govern sentencing delay. A separate presumptive ceiling for post-verdict sentencing delay is not warranted because sentencing is variable and no comparable evidentiary basis exists. The governing test is whether sentencing takes markedly longer than it reasonably should have in all the circumstances. This inquiry is contextual, objective, and normative, and it considers overall duration, complexity, reasons for delay, party conduct, and comparable-case timelines. A new automatic stay remedy does not apply after conviction because the balance of interests differs, and remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter are discretionary. A sentence reduction ordinarily provides an appropriate and just remedy, and a stay is reserved for rare clear cases. Charley’s five-month presumptive ceiling is an error of law, but the delay is nonetheless markedly longer than reasonably necessary on this record. (para 81). Incremental handling of collateral immigration consequences and cumulative adjournments do not adequately explain the elapsed time. Reduction of the conditional sentence to 20 months is a proper and proportionate remedy in the circumstances.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53

AI-generated summary:

Facts: A mining company must pay a finder’s fee to a corporate finder after acquiring a molybdenum mining property. The parties agree the fee is US$1.5 million and payable in shares, cash, or both. They dispute which date sets the share price and therefore the number of shares owed. The finder relies on the agreement’s “Market Price” definition tied to the press release date. The mining company relies on a “maximum amount” proviso tied to the fee’s payable date. The dispute proceeds to arbitration under s. 31 of the Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 55.

Procedural History: 2009 BCSC 1079 (British Columbia Supreme Court), 2009: Leave to appeal the arbitral award denied. 2010 BCCA 239 (British Columbia Court of Appeal), 2010: Prior leave decision reversed and leave to appeal granted. 2011 BCSC 597 (British Columbia Supreme Court), 2011: Appeal on the merits dismissed and arbitral award upheld. 2012 BCCA 329 (British Columbia Court of Appeal), 2012: Appeal allowed and the result changed in favour of the mining company.

Parties’ Submissions: Appellant (Finder): The Court of Appeal wrongly granted leave because contractual interpretation raises mixed fact and law, not a question of law under s. 31(2) Arbitration Act. Respondent (Mining company): The leave issue is not properly before the Supreme Court, and the contract’s “maximum amount” proviso limits shares to US$1.5 million valued when payable.

Legal Issues: Is the propriety of the Court of Appeal’s leave decision reviewable in this appeal? Did the Court of Appeal err in granting leave under s. 31(2) Arbitration Act? What standard of review applies on appeal of commercial arbitration awards under the Arbitration Act? Did the arbitrator reasonably construe the agreement as a whole? Are appeal courts bound by leave courts’ comments on the merits?

Disposition: Appeal allowed, with costs throughout. Judgments of the British Columbia Court of Appeal dated May 14, 2010 and August 7, 2012 set aside. Arbitrator’s award reinstated.

Reasons: By Rothstein J. (McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ. concurring): Leave decisions under s. 31(2) Arbitration Act remain before the Supreme Court where leave to appeal is unrestricted and the issue was argued below. Appeals from commercial arbitration are narrowly circumscribed, and leave requires a genuine question of law. Contractual interpretation generally raises mixed fact and law because it applies interpretive principles to text in light of the factual matrix. An extricable question of law is rare and requires a legal error such as applying a wrong principle or ignoring a required element. The Court of Appeal’s leave decision rests on treating construction of the “maximum amount” proviso as a pure question of law, but surrounding circumstances necessarily inform that construction. No extricable question of law arises on this record, so leave should not have been granted. Even assuming a question of law exists, “may prevent a miscarriage of justice” requires materiality and arguable merit, which fail given the arbitrator’s treatment of the proviso. On the merits addressed in any event, the framework in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick is only partly helpful, and the Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45 does not apply to arbitrations under the Arbitration Act. Reasonableness presumptively governs legal questions in this commercial arbitration appeal. The agreement supports pricing shares by the Market Price definition while limiting the fee amount to US$1.5 million, and that reconciliation is reasonable. Comments on the merits made at the leave stage cannot bind the court deciding the appeal.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

4. Cycle Toronto v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 582

AI-generated summary:

Facts: The Ontario legislature enacts legislation requiring bicycle lanes removed from three Toronto streets. Cycle-lane users and an advocacy organization apply to declare the provision unconstitutional under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. After the application is filed, the legislature repeals and replaces the provision, directing the Minister to “reconfigure” target bicycle lanes. The application continues on the basis that the controversy remains live despite the amendment.

Procedural History: 2025 ONSC 4397 (Ontario Superior Court of Justice), July 30, 2025: Application allowed; original s. 195.6 declared unconstitutional, and certain reconfiguration steps declared Charter-infringing.

Parties’ Submissions: Appellants (Respondents): s. 7 only addresses deprivations caused by state coercion, does not create a positive right to harm-reduction measures, and does not render s. 195.6 arbitrary or grossly disproportionate. Respondents (Applicants): They seek to strike down legislation removing a road safety feature rather than assert a positive right to bicycle lanes.

Legal Issues: Does s. 195.6 deprive individuals of life or security of the person under s. 7? Does the Charter preclude legislative repeal or amendment of previously enacted measures where no Charter obligation existed to enact them? Is the removal or reconfiguration of bicycle lanes arbitrary or grossly disproportionate under the principles of fundamental justice?

Disposition: Appeal allowed. Costs submissions permitted within 21 days; no costs awarded to or against interveners.

Reasons: By Huscroft J.A. (Fairburn A.C.J.O. and Zarnett J.A. concurring): Section 7 analysis must remain consistent with the separation of powers in a Westminster parliamentary democracy. Policy choices and legislative judgments remain for the political branches, and constitutional review is confined to constitutionality. The Charter does not bind a legislature to maintain prior statutory measures that it was not constitutionally required to enact. Any breach from amendment or repeal must be established independent of the prior state of the law. An order preventing bicycle-lane removal necessarily implies a Charter right to bicycle lanes and improperly constitutionalizes a baseline created only by legislation. No Charter right to bicycle lanes exists, so their removal does not constitute a s. 7 deprivation. In any event, a rational connection exists between reducing congestion and increasing lanes for motor vehicles, and arbitrariness is not established by debate about efficacy. Gross disproportionality requires an extreme, “draconian” mismatch, and traffic regulation does not meet that threshold on this record.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

5. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 CanLII 793

AI-generated summary:

Facts: The Governor in Council refers three questions on Quebec’s unilateral secession to the Supreme Court under s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26. The questions address unilateral secession under the Constitution, unilateral secession under international law, and precedence in any conflict. The amicus curiae challenges the constitutionality and scope of the reference jurisdiction and argues the questions are not justiciable. The Reference requires consideration of underlying constitutional principles relevant to secession, including federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and minority protection.

Parties’ Submissions: Amicus curiae: Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize s. 53, the questions exceed s. 53’s scope, Question 2 is “pure” international law, and the questions are speculative, political, and not ripe. Respondent (Attorney General of Canada): Formal objections are raised to the amicus curiae advancing preliminary objections. Intervener (Attorney General for Saskatchewan): Secession negotiations implicate accumulated national commitments, compromises, guarantees, and solidarity that form a nation’s “fabric”. Interveners (Aboriginal peoples): Submissions raise rights and boundary concerns in the event of unilateral secession.

Legal Issues: Is s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26 constitutionally valid under s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867? Do the three questions fall within s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, including Question 2’s international-law component? Are the reference questions justiciable, and should the Court answer them? Can Quebec effect secession from Canada unilaterally under the Constitution of Canada? Does international law confer a unilateral right of secession on Quebec, and is any domestic–international conflict engaged?

Disposition: Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26 is constitutional. The reference questions fall within s. 53 and are justiciable, and the Court answers them. Quebec cannot effect secession unilaterally under the Constitution of Canada. International law does not confer a unilateral right of secession on Quebec’s institutions. No domestic–international conflict arises on the questions posed.

Reasons: By Lamer C.J. and L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache and Binnie JJ.: Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 authorizes Parliament to confer reference jurisdiction under s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26. An appellate court may exercise exceptional original jurisdiction and may render advisory opinions within Canada’s constitutional structure. The questions fit within s. 53(1) and s. 53(2), and addressing international law does not transform the Court into an international tribunal. The questions are justiciable because they concern the legal framework for political decision-making and are neither too imprecise nor unsupported by information. The Constitution includes written and unwritten rules, and four organizing principles—federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and minority protection—govern the secession context. Secession “under the Constitution” requires constitutional amendment and therefore negotiation, not unilateral action. A referendum has no direct legal effect, but a clear majority on a clear question confers legitimacy and triggers a reciprocal constitutional duty to negotiate. No party holds an absolute entitlement either to dictate secession terms or to deny negotiations following a clear democratic expression. Courts have no supervisory role over political aspects of negotiations, and political actors determine what constitutes “a clear majority on a clear question”. International law recognizes self-determination but confines a unilateral secession right to exceptional circumstances, which are inapplicable to Quebec under existing conditions. With no unilateral right under either legal order, no domestic–international precedence conflict arises.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

***

The five most-consulted French-language decisions were:

1. Communauté Droit animalier Québec – DAQ c. Festival Western de St-Tite inc., 2024 QCCA 1069

AI-generated summary:

Faits: La Communauté droit animalier Québec (DAQ), un organisme à but non lucratif, sollicite une injonction et un jugement déclaratoire visant à déclarer illégales et à interdire certaines épreuves de rodéo organisées par le Festival Western de St-Tite en vertu de la Loi sur le bien-être et la sécurité de l’animal (LBESA). Ces activités comprennent la prise de veaux au lasso et le terrassement de bouvillons, perçues comme cruelles. Le Festival Western de St-Tite est un événement annuel important attirant près de 600 000 visiteurs.

Historique procédural: Cour supérieure, 21 avril 2023 : La demande de la DAQ a été rejetée pour défaut de qualité pour agir dans l’intérêt public.

Prétentions des parties: Appelante (DAQ) : Selon elle, la Cour supérieure a appliqué de manière trop restrictive le critère de l’absence d’un autre moyen efficace de soumettre la question aux tribunaux. La DAQ fait valoir que l’action vise à faire respecter la LBESA, une loi d’intérêt public, et que le processus administratif du MAPAQ est inadéquat. Elle estime qu’une action entre parties privées peut être intentée pour faire respecter une loi d’intérêt public. Intimée (Festival Western de St-Tite) : Elle argue que le litige est de nature strictement privée et qu’il existe d’autres recours pour aborder les problèmes soulevés, notamment des recours administratifs ou pénaux selon le cadre prévu par la LBESA. Elle soutient également que la DAQ ne démontre pas d’absence d’un autre moyen efficace de traiter des questions soulevées.

Questions de droit: Une organisation tierce peut-elle se voir reconnaître la qualité pour agir dans l’intérêt public pour contester des activités présumées illégales menées par une partie privée ?
Le critère de l’article 85 du Code de procédure civile, notamment l’absence d’un autre moyen efficace de saisir la Cour, a-t-il été appliqué correctement ?

Dispositif: Rejet de l’appel avec dépens.

Motifs: Par le juge Simon Ruel (les juges François Doyon et Frédéric Bachand y souscrivant) : La Cour rejette l’appel pour trois raisons principales. Absence de qualité pour agir dans l’intérêt public : Le recours de la DAQ est dirigé contre une partie privée, et non contre les actions ou omissions de l’État. La qualité pour agir dans l’intérêt public se limite généralement au contrôle de la légalité des actes étatiques. Existence d’alternatives efficaces : La LBESA établit un cadre réglementaire exhaustif pour protéger les animaux, confié au MAPAQ. Ce dernier est doté des pouvoirs requis pour enquêter et proposer des ordonnances. Le MAPAQ, mieux équipé pour traiter les questions complexes soulevées par la DAQ, constitue une alternative raisonnable et efficace. Dérogation non justifiée aux principes d’accès à la justice et de légalité : Le recours ne visait pas à protéger les droits des catégories vulnérables ou marginalisées, comme le voudrait un recours d’intérêt public typique. En outre, la demande de la DAQ concernant des animaux, considérés comme des biens en droit civil, sort du cadre d’un tel recours. Ces éléments soulignent que le recours envisagé ne constituait ni une manière raisonnable ni efficace de soulever les enjeux en question devant les tribunaux.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. Lacroix c. Agence du revenu du Québec, 2026 QCCA 1149

AI-generated summary:

Faits: Des demandeurs intentent une demande en dommages-intérêts compensatoires et punitifs contre l’Agence du revenu et un de ses employés. Ils allèguent des fautes dans l’analyse et la gestion de dossiers fiscaux, liées à des cotisations et mesures de recouvrement. L’employé présente un moyen préliminaire, soutenant avoir agi dans l’exercice de ses fonctions. Le juge de première instance rejette la demande contre cet employé, la disant irrecevable et abusive.

Historique procédural: 2025 QCCS 5180 (Cour supérieure), 18 décembre 2025 : Moyen préliminaire accueilli et demande rejetée contre l’employé intimé.

Prétentions des parties: Appelants (Demandeurs) : Ils contestent le rejet préliminaire de leur demande en dommages contre l’employé intimé. Intimé (Employé) : Il soutient que le recours est mal fondé puisqu’il agit dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, et invoque l’art. 49 de la Loi sur l’Agence du revenu du Québec, RLRQ, c. A-7.003. ainsi que l’art. 1464 de la Code civil du Québec (C.c.Q.). Intimée (Agence) : Le procureur de l’agence propose au juge de déclarer aussi, d’office, la demande abusive envers l’employé pour les mêmes motifs.

Questions de droit: Le juge a-t-il commis une erreur révisable en rejetant préliminairement la demande contre l’employé intimé?

Dispositif: Appel accueilli, avec les frais de justice. Jugement de première instance infirmé. Requête en irrecevabilité et en rejet pour abus rejetée, avec les frais de justice.

Motifs: Par les juges Marie-France Bich, J.C.A., Michel Beaupré, J.C.A. et Myriam Lachance, J.C.A. : La norme de la décision correcte s’applique à l’examen de l’irrecevabilité fondée sur l’art. 168 al. 2 du Code de procédure civile (C.p.c.). Le rejet préliminaire exige une situation claire et évidente, sur la base des faits tenus pour avérés. Des allégations reprochent à l’employé intimé des agissements pouvant engager sa responsabilité si prouvés au fond (par 20). Le rejet au stade préliminaire escamote le principe de prudence et prive indûment les demandeurs d’un débat au mérite. La proportionnalité ne justifie pas, à elle seule, le rejet d’un recours valablement intenté. Une action visant à la fois le commettant étatique et le préposé, sur la base des art. 1463 et 1464 C.c.Q., n’est pas abusive du seul fait de cette mise en cause. L’interprétation selon laquelle un préposé de l’État ne peut jamais engager sa responsabilité personnelle dans l’exercice de ses fonctions constitue une erreur de droit. L’art. 1464 C.c.Q. sert à préciser le champ de l’« exécution des fonctions » pour l’application de l’art. 1463 C.c.Q., sans créer d’immunité. L’art. 49 de la Loi sur l’Agence du revenu du Québec, RLRQ c. A-7.003 impose à l’agence de prendre fait et cause, sans soustraire l’employé à une poursuite. Le jugement entrepris confère ainsi une immunité non prévue par la loi, ce qui commande l’intervention en appel.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. Monfiston c. R., 2026 QCCA 1203

AI-generated summary:

Faits: À la sortie d’un bar, l’accusée agresse violemment une inconnue pendant environ huit minutes. Elle frappe et mord la plaignante, alors qu’elle est fortement intoxiquée. La plaignante conserve des séquelles physiques et psychologiques importantes après l’agression. L’accusée, résidente permanente, est mère de cinq enfants et assume la garde exclusive de quatre d’entre eux.

Historique procédural: Cour du Québec, chambre criminelle et pénale (Laval), 10 avril 2025 : Condamnation et peine de quatre ans d’emprisonnement, notamment pour voies de fait graves.

Prétentions des parties: Appelante (accusée) : Elle soutient que la juge omet de considérer les conséquences collatérales, impose une peine manifestement non indiquée, et contrevient à Browne v. Dunn. Intimé (poursuivant) : Il réclame une peine globale de quatre ans d’emprisonnement lors des observations sur la peine.

Questions de droit: La juge omet-elle de tenir compte des conséquences collatérales dans la détermination de la peine? La peine imposée est-elle manifestement non indiquée, déraisonnable ou grossièrement disproportionnée? Le principe de Browne v. Dunn est-il enfreint, et une autorisation est-elle requise pour l’invoquer?

Dispositif: Appel accueilli. Jugement de première instance infirmé. Requête pour soulever un nouveau moyen d’appel déclarée sans objet. Peines concurrentes substituées de deux ans moins un jour d’emprisonnement avec sursis, avec conditions. Probation de deux ans, sans surveillance, ordonnée à l’expiration de la peine.

Motifs: Par les juges GENEVIÈVE MARCOTTE, J.C.A., SUZANNE GAGNÉ, J.C.A. et CHRISTINE BAUDOUIN, J.C.A. : Le corridor d’intervention en appel sur la peine demeure étroit, sauf peine manifestement non indiquée ou erreur de principe. Une erreur de principe justifie une nouvelle détermination de la peine, sans déférence envers la peine initiale. Le principe fondamental demeure la proportionnalité, conciliant individualisation et parité. Les conséquences indirectes peuvent être considérées pour individualiser la peine, sans en dénaturer la proportionnalité. La qualification des conséquences indirectes comme facteurs « neutres » constitue une erreur de principe. L’analyse doit intégrer véritablement l’incidence du statut migratoire et de la situation familiale sur la peine. Une peine d’emprisonnement s’impose, mais la question porte sur l’incarcération ou l’emprisonnement dans la collectivité. L’emprisonnement avec sursis demeure une peine de prison et peut porter un effet dénonciateur, sous réserve de la sécurité du public. Une peine avec sursis de deux ans moins un jour, avec conditions rigoureuses, demeure juste compte tenu des facteurs aggravants et atténuants. Il devient inutile de trancher le moyen visant la peine manifestement non indiquée et la requête liée à Browne v. Dunn.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

4. Walsh c. Dandurand, 2019 QCCS 1403

AI-generated summary:

Faits: Les demandeurs, un couple et leur société FMW inc., reprochent au défendeur d’avoir abattu leur chien, Maximus, sur un terrain voisin le 15 novembre 2015, pendant une partie de chasse. Maximus, un Berger de Maremme destiné à la reproduction, était libre sur leur propriété non clôturée. Le défendeur a admis avoir tiré sur Maximus, affirmant avoir cru être menacé, mais a dissimulé le corps, qui a été retrouvé plus tard. Les demandeurs réclament des dommages matériels, moraux et exemplaires ainsi que des frais extrajudiciaires.

Prétentions des parties: Demandeurs : Ils soutiennent que l’acte de tirer sur Maximus était négligent, qu’il a causé des pertes importantes pour leur entreprise d’élevage, et que ce préjudice repose sur des années de travail et d’investissements. Ils demandent une compensation pour ces pertes ainsi que des dommages pour la souffrance morale subie. Défendeur : Il plaide que les demandeurs ont contribué à leur préjudice en laissant leur chien errer hors de leur propriété, et réfute les réclamations pour dommages excessifs. Il argue également qu’il n’a pas agi de manière intentionnelle.

Questions de droit: Le défendeur a-t-il commis une faute en tirant sur le chien sans l’avoir correctement identifié ? Le laxisme des demandeurs en surveillant leur chien constitue-t-il une faute causale ? Les demandeurs peuvent-ils réclamer des dommages exemplaires, matériels et moraux dans les circonstances actuelles ? Quelle est la méthode appropriée pour évaluer les pertes économiques liées à l’abattage de l’animal ?

Dispositif: Le défendeur est condamné à verser : 7 250 $ à FMW inc. pour dommage matériel, 5 000 $ à demandeur M.W. pour dommages non pécuniaires, 5 000 $ à demandeur O.G. pour dommages non pécuniaires, avec intérêts et frais de justice exclusifs des frais d’expert.

Motifs: François Tôth, j.c.s. : Le juge conclut que le défendeur a agi de manière négligente en abattant le chien sans s’assurer de son identification, ce qui constitue une faute au sens de l’article 1457 du Code civil. Bien que les demandeurs aient laissé leur chien errer, cette faute a été jugée non causale par rapport au préjudice subi, suivant la théorie de la causalité adéquate. Concernant les dommages matériels, l’évaluation des réclamations des demandeurs est jugée excessive. La cour accepte plutôt le raisonnement défendu par l’expert du défendeur, se fondant sur le coût du remplacement de l’animal plutôt que sur des pertes extrapolées sur plusieurs décennies. Le tribunal a accordé les réclamations non pécuniaires, reconnaissant l’impact émotionnel important des circonstances autour de la perte du chien. Cependant, il rejette les dommages exemplaires, estimant que l’acte n’était pas malveillant ou intentionnel. Enfin, aucuns frais extrajudiciaires ou d’experts ne sont accordés, car aucune preuve suffisante pour justifier ces réclamations n’a été déposée et les réclamations de pertes matérielles étaient déraisonnables, ce qui a compliqué une entente préliminaire.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

5. Lac d’Amiante du Québec Ltée v. 2858-0702 Québec Inc., 2001 SCC 51

AI-generated summary:

Faits: Une société poursuit solidairement deux autres sociétés pour le remboursement de dépenses liées à des réclamations d’amiante. Elle intente aussi une seconde action réclamant un montant additionnel. Lors d’un interrogatoire préalable, les défenderesses exigent la production de nombreux documents, et la Cour supérieure rejette l’objection de pertinence. La demanderesse propose une entente de confidentialité avant la transmission des documents, mais les défenderesses refusent. La demanderesse demande ensuite une ordonnance de confidentialité visant certains documents et renseignements.

Historique procédural: Cour supérieure du Québec, [1997] A.Q. no 3593 (QL) : Requête en confidentialité rejetée. Cour d’appel du Québec, [1999] R.J.Q. 970 : Jugement de première instance infirmé, règle de confidentialité reconnue.

Prétentions des parties: Appelantes : La règle de confidentialité n’a aucun fondement législatif, contredit la publicité des débats et demeure inopportune. Intervenantes (entreprises de presse) : La transparence des débats et dossiers judiciaires, garantie par la Charte québécoise et la Charte canadienne, s’oppose à une règle de confidentialité. Intimée : La confidentialité découle de l’évolution procédurale et de principes substantiels, car l’interrogatoire n’est plus une audience publique.

Questions de droit: Une règle implicite de confidentialité régit-elle le contenu des interrogatoires préalables au Québec? L’interrogatoire préalable constitue-t-il une audience de tribunaux au sens de l’art. 13 Code de procédure civile, L.R.Q., ch. C-25? Les tribunaux québécois peuvent-ils créer une règle positive de procédure civile sans base législative? Quelle est l’étendue de la règle de confidentialité applicable aux informations obtenues à l’interrogatoire préalable?

Dispositif: Pourvoi rejeté. Arrêt de la Cour d’appel confirmé. Dépens adjugés en faveur de l’intimée.

Motifs: Par le juge LeBel : Le C.p.c. demeure un droit codifié soumis à une méthode d’interprétation civiliste. Un tribunal québécois ne peut créer une règle procédurale seulement parce qu’elle paraît opportune. La procédure civile s’articule néanmoins avec le Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, ch. 64 et la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, L.R.Q., ch. C-12, qui expriment des valeurs pertinentes à la confidentialité. L’évolution de l’interrogatoire préalable le rend essentiellement exploratoire et, en règle générale, privé. En principe, l’interrogatoire ne constitue pas une audience au sens de l’art. 13 Code de procédure civile, L.R.Q., ch. C-25 ni de l’art. 23 Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, L.R.Q., ch. C-12. L’information obtenue ne fait pas partie du dossier tant qu’elle n’est pas produite au procès. La protection de la vie privée, reconnue à l’art. 5 Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, L.R.Q., ch. C-12 et aux art. 35–37 Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, ch. 64, justifie une obligation implicite de confidentialité à l’étape préalable. La règle limite l’usage des informations au litige, sauf autorisation du tribunal. La confidentialité ne vise que l’information obtenue uniquement grâce à l’interrogatoire et autrement non accessible au public.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

* As of February 2025, we measure the number of unique pageviews that a case gets; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.

The post Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII? – September 2026 appeared first on Slaw.

There’s plenty of evidence to suggest that outsourcing your cognitive processes to AI — whether by letting it do your writing or thinking or analyzing for you — is a bad idea. Partly, of course, this is because the AI might do a poor job of it, leaving you on the hook for badly reasoned arguments or banally worded text.

In the bigger picture, though, the worry is that by delegating your thought processes to a machine, your own cognitive muscles will atrophy, and you’ll be less able to apply acute reasoning when you don’t have the AI to rely on. This is especially a concern for newer lawyers, who are still developing their legal and analytical reasoning skills and are most at risk of losing their mental acuity before they’ve really begun to hone it.

I share these concerns. But I also accept that more and more people routinely turn to AI at least for assistance with thinking things through, and often for more. I also know that thinking things through is hard work — often frustrating, frequently draining — and that hard-working lawyers often feel they have only so much intellectual bandwidth available.

So I don’t think it’s realistic simply to tell young lawyers, “Never use AI to help you with your thinking.” The goal should be to help them do it carefully and wisely.

Here’s what I’ve been telling law students and young lawyers in my talks with them recently: Think of AI as a tennis partner, maybe even an instructor or coach. When you hit the ball over the net, they’re going to hit it back to you — often, especially when you’re relatively inexperienced, more skilfully than you did. Watching and learning from them, your return should be a little better than your first try.

Similarly, with AI, your initial attempt to explore an idea or generate some text should include a request to analyze and assess your position. The AI should then produce a response that highlights what’s strong, what’s merely okay, and what needs work. Your subsequent reply should reflect that feedback and improve on your thinking and writing, inviting further volleys from the AI as you strive to bring your idea or your phrasing to a point where you’re satisfied with it.

In this way, working with AI is an iterative process. Each back-and-forth should advance your progress, as you evaluate the AI’s feedback and decide which of it is helpful and which is not. It’s like engaging with a more experienced colleague who can help you get better each time you ask.

But here’s the critical point about seeing AI as a tennis partner: You have to serve. You have to be the one who comes up with the original idea or the initial draft for the AI to consider. If you let the AI serve first, then you’re just letting the instructor do all the work, and you’re not learning anything useful or producing anything original.

Worse, your finished “work” will be indistinguishable from that of any other lawyer who used AI for the hard stuff. The only truly distinctive feature of your legal service offerings in a post-AI world is your own originality, insight, and humanity. Surrendering your individual creative agency to a machine removes all those features and leaves you in a seriously uncompetitive position.

No good tennis instructor would do all the serving, and no player who’s serious about developing their game to its highest level would ask them to. As tempting as it might be to just give in and let the AI take the lead, it’s imperative that you hold fast and push yourself to come up with your own original insights and ideas at the start.

Let the AI be a helpful instructor. Make sure you remain the rising star.

The post Holding Serve With AI appeared first on Slaw.

Mediators are often asked by parties or their counsel to send them a copy of their “standard Agreement to Mediate” for review. But is there such a document?

If by “standard” we mean some prescribed form followed by all mediators, the answer is no. Virtually every mediator has his or her own Agreement. Some are based on agreements provided in mediation training, while others are quite customized.

This article has its origin in a recent mediation. One of the three lawyers attending had clearly not read the Agreement to Mediate, although it had been sent to him weeks earlier. When I asked for a signed copy, the “sticky note” was still where his signature should have been.

His client, who had not received the Agreement ahead of time, started to read it. The lawyer, an experienced litigator, told him: “Just sign it. It is a standard agreement.”

Well, was it? I had never worked with that lawyer before, so he could not know what was in my Agreement. Later, a question arose about the confidentiality of caucus. The answer was in the Agreement. It was an embarrassing moment and may have given the other parties the impression that this party had not properly prepared. As it happened, the mediation did not settle. I cannot say that the lack of preparation contributed to that result, but it certainly did not help.

In over 25 years as a mediator, I can only remember once when counsel asked me to change my Agreement. The request was to strengthen the confidentiality provision, which I was happy to do. That experience, and the incident above, tell me that Agreements to Mediate are too often treated as routine documents when they deserve more attention.

In the absence of a governing statute such as Ontario’s Commercial Mediation Act, 2010, there is no comprehensive statutory regime governing mediation. The Agreement to Mediate therefore matters. It sets out the terms on which the mediation will be conducted, including the parties’ contractual obligations concerning matters such as confidentiality. As a matter of good practice, no mediation, whether under the Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program or otherwise, should take place without a signed Agreement to Mediate.

Members of ADR organizations may also be subject to professional requirements. Section 10 of the ADR Institute of Canada’s (ADRIC) Code of Conduct for Mediators requires the mediator and the parties to prepare and execute a mediation agreement setting out the terms and conditions of the mediator’s engagement. ADRIC’s National Mediation Rules incorporate the Code and also include a Standard Form Agreement to Mediate. While ADRIC provides this standard form, that does not mean in itself that there is a standard Agreement to Mediate. Many mediators use agreements that go considerably beyond the ADRIC form.

So, what should be in an Agreement to Mediate? I reviewed quite a few agreements and found significant variation. Most deal with the mediator’s role, confidentiality and caucus, attendance, fees, settlement and termination. The question is not how many terms can be included, but which ones are needed for the mediator’s practice and the particular mediation.

The agreements I reviewed range from two to six pages. Some try to cover almost every contingency. Others are deliberately shorter or incorporate terms and conditions available elsewhere, such as on a website. Length by itself tells us very little.

There are differences in how agreements are signed as well. Some mediators require everyone attending to sign the Agreement. Others are content to have counsel sign on their client’s behalf. I use a hybrid approach: counsel sign the Agreement to Mediate and everyone attending signs a separate confidentiality agreement.

Whatever approach is taken, the Agreement should be understandable. Reducing the font size to keep it to a particular number of pages is not the answer either. It just makes the document harder to read.

More importantly, the Agreement should reflect how you actually conduct your mediations. There is little value in carrying forward provisions from an old form if they no longer describe your practice.

Confidentiality deserves particular attention. A mediator should not guarantee absolute confidentiality. Its scope depends on settlement privilege, applicable legislation and the terms of the Agreement itself. The Agreement should not promise more than can actually be delivered.

The courts have considered some of these provisions. In Rogacki v. Belz, 2003 CanLII 12584 (ON CA), the Court of Appeal of Ontario dealt with confidentiality provisions in what was described as a “standard form mediation agreement.” The agreement created contractual obligations but was not a court order enforceable through contempt. In Provisions dealing with confidentiality and the mediator’s notes and recollections became important when a party later sought the mediator’s evidence in Rudd v. Trossacs Investments Inc., 2006 CanLII 7034 (ON SCDC).

Union Carbide Canada Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., 2014 SCC 35, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 800, is particularly interesting in the context of this article. The Supreme Court of Canada described the mediation agreement as a “standard form contract provided by the mediator.” It nevertheless had to consider what the confidentiality provisions meant and whether they displaced an exception to settlement privilege. The Court confirmed that parties can contract for greater confidentiality than the common law provides, but clear language is required if they intend to displace a recognized exception.

The Supreme Court returned to these issues in Association de médiation familiale du Québec v. Bouvier, 2021 SCC 54, in the family mediation context, again considering the relationship between settlement privilege, confidentiality and the specific terms of the parties’ mediation contract.

These cases are useful reminders of the problems with the word “standard” and there are a number of others. Even so, cases tell us little about what should be in an Agreement or the overall impact of specific provisions. As a result, agreements must be reviewed from time to time. A provision that creates confusion in an actual mediation deserves another look. Court decisions help decide on particular provisions, but so does your experience in the field.

Exchanging agreements with colleagues for “peer review” can be very helpful. Some mediators are reluctant to do this because they are concerned that someone will “steal” their Agreement. But many of us put our agreements on our websites and routinely send them to parties and counsel, so I am not sure there is much to protect. A colleague may see something you have missed.

Familiarity creates its own problem. Counsel who regularly use the same mediator may assume they know what the Agreement says. If you make a significant change, let them know. But counsel still need to read it, as do their clients. Having worked with the mediator before is not a substitute. The mediator should also send the Agreement early enough that it can actually be reviewed before the mediation.

There may be such a thing as my standard Agreement to Mediate. There is no such thing as the standard Agreement to Mediate.

The post The “Standard” Agreement to Mediate appeared first on Slaw.

The Ontario Court of Appeal’s (“CA”) recent decision in Knauff v. Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal) (“Knauff”) sought to resolve two CA panels’ disagreement about the continuing relevance of the test for leave to appeal in Sault Dock Co. Ltd. and City of Sault Ste. Marie (Ont. CA) (“Sault Dock”). (I considered the two CA decisions, West Whitby Landowners Group Inc. v. Elexicon Inc. [“West Whitby”] and Davis v. Aviva General Insurance Company [“Davis”] in my January 7, 2025 Slaw post, “Tension on the Ontario CA: Thwarting a Judicial Coup?”.) My focus there was on whether West Whitby, by loosening the Sault Dock test, might have the effect of diminishing the independence of administrative tribunals by giving a greater scope to leave to appeal from the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal. None of the decisions have addressed this issue and I refer to it only briefly below.

West Whitby challenged the continuing relevance of the test under Sault Dock; the panel in Davis defended Sault Dock and suggested that the panel in West Whitby could have reached the result it did in the case without trying to change Sault Dock, downplaying what it saw as an attempt in effect to establish a new test without going through the proper process of a five-person panel.

Adam Knauff had brought a complaint to the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) that his employer, the Ministry of Natural Resources, had discriminated against him when he was an active firefighter in failing to provide vegan meals at times other meals were provided. He maintained that “ethical veganism” was a form of “creed”, a protected ground under section 5(1) of the Ontario Human Rights Code (“the Code”). He requested that the Divisional Court quash the Tribunal’s decisions relating to the complaint.

The parties settled the claim of discrimination before the Divisional Court heard the case; however, Knauff still wanted the Tribunal to determine whether ethical veganism is a protected ground under the Code and when the Tribunal decided it was not, he sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The Divisional Court found the matter moot, and held this was not a proper case in which to exercise its discretion to hear it anyway. Knauff sought leave to appeal from the Divisional Court’s decision not to hear the matter.

As I explained in my May 13, 2025 Slaw post “Joining Battle: Preparing to Determine the Test for Leave to Appeal (Or, the Fate of Sault Dock”), “[i]n Knauff v. Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal) (“Endorsement”), Zarnett J.A. (Case Management Judge) of the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that Knauff had indicated in his motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court that ‘he intended to ask the Court to clarify the test for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court and to that end, requested that this leave motion be heard by a five-judge panel’.” Subsequently, Fairburn A.C.J.O directed a five-person panel hear the case (Knauff, “Endorsement”, paras. 2, 3).

And so, having been nudged by West Whitby, adhering to the protocol urged by Davis and seizing an opportunity, a five-person panel of the Court of Appeal has now articulated what is in effect a refashioning of Sault Dock.

THE TEST IN SAULT DOCK

Before exploring the Court of Appeal’s new take on Sault Dock, a quick reminder of the original test.

An appeal from the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal requires the leave of the Court of Appeal “on a question that is not a question of fact alone” (Courts of Justice Act, s.6(1)). According to Sault Dock, the question must have an impact on the development of Ontario jurisprudence. In other words, the criterion is not the impact on the parties, but whether the decision will settle the matter of interest for the general public (or a large segment thereof).

Under Sault Dock, as a preliminary step in the analysis, the court determines whether the dispute raises one of the following kinds of questions: interpretation of a Canadian or Ontario statute, including whether it is constitutional; the interpretation or clarification of a general rule or principle of law; the interpretation of a municipal by-law where the issue is of public importance (but not all municipal by-laws); or interpretation of an agreement where the issue is of public importance (but not all agreements).

In addition, the court could grant leave if “special circumstances” related to the public interest (“such as the introduction of new evidence, obvious misapprehension of the Divisional Court of the relevant facts or a clear departure from the established principles of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice”) or if it seemed it was in the interests of justice to grant leave. Furthermore, “in cases in which there is clearly an error in a judgment or order of the Divisional Court, it is … the duty of the Court of Appeal to grant leave so that it might correct the error” but “the possibility that there may be error in the judgment or order will not generally be a ground in itself for granting leave”. (Sault Dock)

The Court of Appeal in Knauff summarized the framework in Sault Dock as first requiring a determination of “the importance of the question in issue viewed from the perspective of the development of Ontario law and the interest of the public, rather than from the perspective of the parties”. And second, requiring a determination of whether the question is arguable, “providing a short, non-exhaustive list of examples of cases that if arguable, might merit leave” (Knauff, CA, para. 11). The Court listed the examples in Sault Dock (see above) and then referred to Sault Dock’s “residual category of cases that might merit leave” (see above).

CHALLENGING SAULT DOCK

For the panel in West Whitby, one problem lay less with the Sault Dock decision itself than with its application. Litigants have lost sight of its flexibility and have tended to apply it “by rote”, missing the transcending question of whether determination of the issue at stake would contribute to the development of jurisprudence in Ontario.

What really seems to condemn Sault Dock, however, is that it is “old”, “so old … that it pre-dates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (“the Charter”). In the panel’s view, it would be difficult for the Divisional Court to assess cases that raise the Charter. One might be tempted to give credit to judges sitting as the Divisional Court that they could handle this challenge, but apparently one would be mistaken in doing so.

The proper test, from the West Whitby panel’s perspective, for granting leave to appeal from the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal is more or less that for seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: “Is the question on which leave is sought one that, by reason of its public importance, the importance of any issue of law or mixed law and fact involved, or for any other reason is of such a nature or significance that it ought to be decided by the Court of Appeal for Ontario?” (West Whitby, para. 13). This test effectively grants the Court of Appeal a very broad discretion to decide to grant leave unhindered by any pre-determined “categories”, with the potential to shift the relationship between the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal. And, not incidentally, that in Ontario, at least, it implies the Court of Appeal is of significance akin to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The common element in Sault Dock and in West Whitby is that the matter at the heart of the application for leave to appeal has a public significance; the former gives some guidance as to what that means, although it defines it broadly, while the latter gives a wide scope of discretion to the Court of Appeal in deciding what cases to accept. Indeed, how the panel in West Whitby applies its own test implicitly confirms that (see my Slaw post, “Tension on the Ontario CA….”, on this point), although one cannot ignore that the panel in Davis stated that the West Whitby panel could have achieved the same result by applying the Sault Dock framework.

KNAUFF

And so to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Knauff.

The Court of Appeal concluded that “the essential message of Sault Dock should be maintained,” although employing an “updated framework”, regardless of whether the Divisional Court was exercising original or appellate jurisdiction (Knauff, CA, para.5) (Neither the panel in West Whitby nor that in Davis was concerned with this issue but the Knauff court’s statement makes the irrelevance of the distinction clear; the CA in Knauff discusses the history of this distinction at paras.13-16 and why a distinction is not necessary at paras. 47-51.)

In the Court of Appeal’s view, an updated framework is warranted by Ontario’s changing legal landscape, resulting in parties raising issues that do not easily fit into the Sault Dock categories, the first two of which help illustrate the meaning of “public importance” and other two of which do not, complicated by the fact that there is not an evolving jurisprudence on the meaning of public importance; by Sault Dock‘s not explaining how arguability and public importance related to each other; by lack of development of the residual category; and by the desirability of settling the “uncertainty” of whether there is a distinction between cases involving the Divisional Court’s original and appellate jurisdictions (Knauff, paras. 28-31). (Of course, any evolution of leave to appeal jurisprudence must be gleaned from the resulting decisions, since the court does not usually give reasons for why it grants leave or not.) (The CA does not include the introduction of the Charter explicitly in its decision as necessitating an update to the Sault Dock test, but it does refer in fn.7 to several changes in the “legal landscape” that West Whitby, the parties and intervenors raised as having occurred or increased since Sault Dock, including the Charter, the greater importance of the administrative state, Aboriginal rights and quasi-constitutional human rights.)

For its “updated framework”, the Knauff Court retained the criteria of importance and “arguability”. These two criteria are interrelated: “While distinct concepts, arguability and public importance have overlapping features. A question that is not arguable in the circumstances of the case cannot rise to the level of public importance warranting leave, because public importance is not gauged in the abstract. On the other hand, what makes a question arguable can inform why it is one of public importance warranting consideration by this court.” (Knauff, CA, para. 7) The Court translates this as one “key consideration” in the updated framework: “whether the proposed appeal raises an arguable question of law or mixed law and fact that is of sufficient public importance to warrant consideration by the Court of Appeal“ (Knauff, CA, para. 32; emphasis in the original).

What does “arguability” and its consideration mean in this context?

The appeal cannot merely be on a question of fact; short of exceptional circumstances, the issue must have been raised before the Divisional Court and not before the Court of Appeal for the first time; if the Divisional Court is entitled to deference, arguability must be determined within a deferential framework; and the issue must not be moot (unless there is a reason to exercise discretion to hear it). (Knauff, CA, para. 37) Arguability also derives from the failure of the Divisional Court to apply the correct law or standard of review “in a way that was not harmless but instead may have affected the outcome”. However, the analysis is not closed even if the Divisional Court has applied the correct law, for there may be an arguable question

…if that law, or the general principles that underlie it, should be reconsidered, expanded, qualified, clarified or changed. Indicators of that type of arguable question may include whether the issue is a constitutional one, whether the legal rule applied by the Divisional Court is out of step with developments in that area of the law, whether the issue is novel or in any event is one lacking in authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada or this court, the nature or adequacy of the Divisional Court’s reasoning on a debatable point, a dissent in the Divisional Court, conflicting case law from other jurisdictions, and/or compelling academic criticism and other legal commentary on the subject. (Knauff, CA, para. 38)

Again, these reasons for arguability give an appellate court a wide field on which to conclude that the first criterion is met and almost certainly an arguable issue based on these factors will be one of public importance.

One apparent difference between Sault Dock and the Court of Appeal’s decision in Knauff is that in the latter, “[t]here is no finite or closed category of question that can qualify as being of public importance” (Knauff, CA, para.40). I say “apparent” because by the time one runs through the various categories in Sault Dock, one reaches more or less the same result. The real difference is that the two decisions start from the opposite positions: Sault Dock lists categories but recognizes they are not exhaustive, while Knauff starts with an open-ended appreciation of what constitutes public importance.

Considering whether a matter is of public importance, once it is determined to be arguable, requires assessment of two perspectives: who is affected beyond the immediate parties (the broader the affected persons, and the more fundamental the interest affecting them, the more likely the matter is of public importance); and whether the question “goes to the development, progress, coherence, stability and predictability of the law, and thus the law’s ability to deliver justice in Ontario”. (Knauff, CA, paras. 44-45) This approach takes care of the main categories or circumstances enunciated in Sault Dock.

In the end, the Court really decided Knauff on the basis that the issue was moot and that the Divisional Court had determined it was moot and had decided not to exercise its discretion to hear it regardless. Accordingly, since Knauff was concerned only with the Divisional Court’s refusal to exercise its discretion to hear the matter although it was moot, his challenge “does not raise an arguable question of public importance” (Knauff, CA, para. 59).

CONCLUSION

Knauff’s challenge constituted merely a hook, and a rather weak one at that, on which the Ontario Court of Appeal could “resolve” what appeared to be a dispute between the two appellate panels. In doing so, it acknowledged the need to reconsider the framework in Sault Dock, as claimed by the panel in West Whitby, but used Sault Dock as a cover for an updated framework.

Ironically, as the Davis panel said of the panel in West Whitby, the Court could have reached the same decision had it applied Sault Dock. Notably, despite heading the penultimate section of its decision “Application of the Updated Framework to This Case”, it did not even undertake the pretence of applying the new framework to the elements in Knauff’s claim. Indeed, one is tempted to venture that it could have dismissed the case on almost any other basis. Rather, the Court simply undertook an exegesis of sorts about the test for leave to appeal on the flimsiest basis. Or, put another way, it reformulated the test in a manner contrary to its own injunction relating to arguability when leave to appeal is an issue; it developed it in the abstract.

Freeing the test from the categorical strictures of the first part of Sault Dock may be a good thing. Generally speaking, checklists are somewhat confining. Yet even in Sault Dock, the apparent limitation of the test is countermanded by references to “special circumstances” and “interests of justice”. At the same time, guidelines can be very helpful. In Knauff, the Court of Appeal has listed examples of the kind of circumstances that might satisfy the requirements of arguability and public importance (see, for example, para.44 on public importance) and this could encourage assessments that circumstances akin to these would satisfy them.

Ultimately, however, the value of the more loosely defined test in Knauff and its impact on the viability of Divisional Court decisions (and in many cases, the tribunal decisions that had been considered by the Divisional Court) will be revealed only in its application. And some of us will see whether Knauff attains the venerability of Sault Dock.

Finally, as far as the title to this post is concerned, the Court of Appeal in Knauff implicitly rejected the test the panel in West Whitby proposed, analogous to that the Supreme Court of Canada employs (see above), and has more modestly provided a test that is more reflective of Sault Dock with some refinement of configuration rather than a new test.

The post The Court of Appeal’s Consideration of Sault Dock: A New Test, Refinement or More of the Same? appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : L’omission de la juge de première instance d’aborder le critère du consentement de l’accusé à la présence de l’arme à l’intérieur du véhicule dans lequel il était passager constitue une erreur de droit; il y a lieu d’appliquer la disposition réparatrice (art. 686 (1) b) (iii) C.Cr.).

Intitulé : Fleurilien c. R., 2026 QCCA 1139
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Michel Beaupré, Sophie Lavallée et Peter Kalichman
Date : 21 août 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — infraction — infractions relatives aux armes — armes à feu — possession d’une arme à feu prohibée — possession non autorisée d’une arme à feu prohibée dans un véhicule automobile — exclusion de la preuve — protection contre les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les saisies abusives — véhicule automobile — fouille accessoire — passagers — droit à la protection contre la détention ou l’emprisonnement arbitraires — port de la ceinture de sécurité — interprétation de «véhicule routier en mouvement» (art. 396 du Code de la sécurité routière) — véhicule immobilisé — refus de déclarer ses nom et adresse (art. 74 du Code de procédure pénale) — arrestation légale — appréciation de la preuve — preuve circonstancielle — possession conjointe (art. 4 (3) b) C.Cr.) — consentement — connaissance — contrôle — proximité avec l’arme — déclaration de culpabilité — appel — erreur de droit — application de la disposition réparatrice prévue à l’article 686 (1) b) (iii) C.Cr. — règle interdisant les condamnations multiples.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — preuve pénale — exclusion de la preuve — protection contre les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les saisies abusives — véhicule automobile — fouille accessoire — passagers — droit à la protection contre la détention ou l’emprisonnement arbitraires — port de la ceinture de sécurité — interprétation de «véhicule routier en mouvement» (art. 396 du Code de la sécurité routière) — véhicule immobilisé — refus de déclarer ses nom et adresse (art. 74 du Code de procédure pénale) — arrestation légale — appréciation de la preuve — preuve circonstancielle — possession conjointe (art. 4 (3) b) C.Cr.) — consentement — connaissance — contrôle — proximité avec l’arme — possession d’une arme à feu prohibée — possession non autorisée d’une arme à feu prohibée dans un véhicule automobile — appel — erreur de droit — application de la disposition réparatrice prévue à l’article 686 (1) b) (iii) C.Cr.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — garanties fondamentales du processus pénal — protection contre les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les saisies abusives — véhicule automobile — fouille accessoire — passagers — exclusion de la preuve — droit à la protection contre la détention ou l’emprisonnement arbitraires — port de la ceinture de sécurité — interprétation de «véhicule routier en mouvement» (art. 396 du Code de la sécurité routière) — véhicule immobilisé — refus de déclarer ses nom et adresse (art. 74 du Code de procédure pénale) — arrestation légale — possession d’une arme à feu prohibée — possession non autorisée d’une arme à feu prohibée dans un véhicule automobile — appel.

DROITS ET LIBERTÉS — droits judiciaires — protection contre les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les saisies abusives — protection contre les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les saisies abusives — véhicule automobile — fouille accessoire — passagers — exclusion de la preuve — port de la ceinture de sécurité — interprétation de «véhicule routier en mouvement» (art. 396 du Code de la sécurité routière) — véhicule immobilisé — refus de déclarer ses nom et adresse (art. 74 du Code de procédure pénale) — arrestation légale — possession d’une arme à feu prohibée — possession non autorisée d’une arme à feu prohibée dans un véhicule automobile — appel.

DROITS ET LIBERTÉS — droits judiciaires — personne arrêtée ou détenue — droit à la protection contre la détention ou l’emprisonnement arbitraires — port de la ceinture de sécurité — interprétation de «véhicule routier en mouvement» (art. 396 du Code de la sécurité routière) — véhicule immobilisé — refus de déclarer ses nom et adresse (art. 74 du Code de procédure pénale) — arrestation légale — possession d’une arme à feu prohibée — possession non autorisée d’une arme à feu prohibée dans un véhicule automobile — appel.

DROITS ET LIBERTÉS — droits judiciaires — vie, sûreté, intégrité et liberté — véhicule automobile — fouille accessoire — passagers — exclusion de la preuve — port de la ceinture de sécurité — interprétation de «véhicule routier en mouvement» (art. 396 du Code de la sécurité routière) — véhicule immobilisé — refus de déclarer ses nom et adresse (art. 74 du Code de procédure pénale) — arrestation légale — possession d’une arme à feu prohibée — possession non autorisée d’une arme à feu prohibée dans un véhicule automobile — appel.

INTERPRÉTATION DES LOIS — méthode d’interprétation moderne — sens ordinaire des mots — différence entre les versions anglaise et française — interprétation contextuelle — principe de l’uniformité d’expression — interprétation téléologique — conséquences absurdes — interprétation de «véhicule routier en mouvement» (art. 396 du Code de la sécurité routière).

Requêtes en autorisation d’appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité. Déclarées sans objet. Requête pour permission de présenter une nouvelle preuve. Rejetée. Appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité. Accueilli en partie.

Une nuit, les policiers ont été appelés à intervenir après qu’on leur eut signalé un véhicule immobilisé à un feu de circulation dont les occupants auraient été endormis. Au cours de l’intervention policière, une arme tronçonnée et des munitions ont été découvertes dans le véhicule. La Cour du Québec a déclaré l’appelant, qui était l’un des passagers, coupable d’avoir eu en sa possession une arme à feu prohibée et des munitions facilement accessibles pouvant être utilisées avec celle-ci, et ce, sans être titulaire d’une autorisation ou d’un permis, ainsi que d’avoir occupé un véhicule automobile où il savait que se trouvait une telle arme. L’appel porte aussi sur le rejet de la requête de l’appelant en exclusion de la preuve. Celui-ci et ses coaccusés prétendaient que leur arrestation était illégale puisque le véhicule n’était pas «en mouvement» (au sens de l’article 396 du Code de la sécurité routière) et, par conséquent, que l’obligation de porter la ceinture de sécurité ne s’appliquait pas.

Décision

M^me la juge Lavallée: D’après leur sens courant, les mots «en mouvement» excluent un objet immobilisé ou qui est statique; ils impliquent plutôt un déplacement immédiat et actuel ou un changement de position. À première vue, le libellé de l’article 396 du code est clair, mais il révèle une ambiguïté puisqu’il serait étonnant que le législateur ait voulu que le port de la ceinture de sécurité ne soit obligatoire que lorsque le véhicule roule, alors que le conducteur d’un véhicule temporairement à l’arrêt au feu rouge a l’obligation de reprendre sa route en vertu du code. Il faut conclure qu’un véhicule routier est en mouvement même si le conducteur a l’obligation de respecter les signaux de signalisation et de s’immobiliser avant de poursuivre sa route, selon les diverses obligations prévues en ce sens dans le code. L’expression «véhicule en mouvement» se trouve à plusieurs endroits dans le code et devrait avoir 1 seul et même sens en vertu du principe de l’uniformité d’expression. Un poids moindre doit toutefois être accordé à ce principe dans le présent cas. En effet, l’expression «véhicule en mouvement» dans le code est parfois traduite en anglais par «moving vehicle», alors que, à d’autres endroits, elle est traduite par «vehicle in motion». Le législateur ne parle pas pour ne rien dire, mais il est difficile d’expliquer cette différence. Enfin, interpréter l’expression «véhicule routier en mouvement» qui figure à l’article 396 du code comme excluant les véhicules qui sont immobilisés ou stationnés au milieu de la voie publique contrecarrerait l’objectif de la loi qui vise à prévenir le risque d’accidents et de blessures graves, lequel ne disparaît pas parce que le véhicule n’est pas en cours de déplacement physique, actuel et immédiat. Il faut éviter de retenir une interprétation de la loi qui produirait de telles conséquences absurdes.

Par conséquent, même si le véhicule occupé par l’appelant était immobilisé au feu de circulation depuis plusieurs cycles de lumières et que la transmission était en position de stationnement, le policier avait des motifs raisonnables de croire que Jean (un autre passager) avait commis l’infraction prévue à l’article 396 du code et il pouvait lui demander de décliner son identité en vertu de l’article 72 du Code de procédure pénale. Compte tenu du refus de Jean, son arrestation en vertu de l’article 74 du Code de procédure pénale était légale. La fouille accessoire qui en a découlé l’était également.

Quant à la prétention de l’appelant selon laquelle le verdict serait déraisonnable, les motifs de la juge de première instance indiquent qu’elle a considéré que la possession personnelle était en cause en l’espèce. Or, la possession de l’arme par l’appelant ne pouvait qu’être conjointe au sens de l’article 4 (3) b) du Code criminel (C.Cr.) puisque celui-ci n’est pas le seul à avoir été déclaré coupable de la possession de l’arme. De ce fait, l’omission d’aborder le critère du consentement de l’appelant à la présence de l’arme dans le véhicule constitue une erreur de droit. Il y a toutefois lieu d’appliquer la disposition réparatrice (art. 686 (1) b) (iii) C.Cr.). En effet, l’ensemble de la preuve circonstancielle permettait de conclure que la seule inférence raisonnable était que l’appelant consentait à la présence de l’arme et qu’il en avait la possession en vertu de l’article 4 (3) b) C.Cr. La crosse de l’arme dépassait de l’ouverture du coffre et était pointée vers l’habitacle du véhicule, de sorte que l’appelant et son coaccusé Jean pouvaient l’empoigner. Cela démontre que ces derniers exerçaient un certain pouvoir et une certaine autorité quant à la disposition ou à l’emplacement de cette arme et, donc, qu’ils avaient la capacité ou la faculté de consentir à ce qu’elle se trouve à quelques centimètres d’eux. Ils avaient plus qu’une connaissance passive de sa présence. La preuve révèle que les occupants du véhicule étaient ensemble depuis un certain temps, car ils dormaient profondément. La juge a ainsi rejeté l’argument voulant que l’appelant ait monté à bord du véhicule très peu de temps avant son interception, de sorte qu’il n’aurait pas remarqué l’arme et les munitions; l’arme était visible pour les passagers assis à l’arrière, dont l’appelant, lequel avait la possibilité de l’empoigner pour s’en servir. Le verdict n’est donc pas déraisonnable.

Il y a toutefois lieu de prononcer l’arrêt conditionnel des procédures sous le second chef d’accusation, compte tenu de la règle interdisant les condamnations multiples.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

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As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Criminal Law: NCR; High Risk
G. v. R., 2025 ONCA 873 (42341)

High-risk accused designation in NCR context.

Criminal Law: Restraint & Management Orders
Nest Exchange Limited (formerly known as Nest Services Limited), et al. v. R., 2025 ONSC 7113 (42220)

A.G. applications for restraint and management orders.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

Professional services firms spend a lot of time developing strategy. There are leadership retreats, partner interviews, market assessments, client discussions and competitive reviews. There are conversations about growth, succession, technology, culture, new markets and the future of the firm.

Once the strategic plan emerges and the most significant priorities identified, the plan is presented to the partnership, everyone agrees, and then everyone goes back to work.

So why do so many firms that created a perfectly good strategic plan, struggle so much with execution? This is typically because the strategy exists at one level of the organization while the work required to deliver it happens somewhere else.

For example, supposed the plan calls for “strengthening client relationships” with key clients. That sounds reasonable, but there are questions. Which clients? Where are the opportunities? Which practices should be involved? Who is responsible for the relationship? What should the relationship partner actually do differently? And on and on.

Without more information and discussion, “strengthen client relationships” will remain a strategic priority rather than a change in behaviour that is needed.

Everyone needs to be on board

For a strategy to work, it has to move from the executive team to practice groups, from practice groups to individual partners, etc. The broad objectives identified in the plan need to be connected with specific decisions.

Consider the following priorities examples and how they can easily get consumed by more questions before anyone is able to action it.

• Grow in priority markets: What markets? Which clients and prospects? What capabilities do we need?
• Deepen client relationships: Which clients matter most? Where is there genuine potential for growth?
• Improve collaboration: Which practices will benefit from working together?
• Develop future leaders: Who needs new responsibilities, experience or exposure to senior decision makers?
• Increase profitability: How?

Partners have considerable autonomy in professional services firms. Practice groups have their own priorities. Offices can develop their own ways of doing things. And client work will always take priority over internal initiatives. The challenge keeps getting bigger.

To overcome these challenges, firms need to translate broad priorities into practical actions. The answer will be different for every firm. But there has to be an answer.

The middle of the organization matters

As plans are developed there is typically a great deal of attention paid to the people at the top of the organization and the people expected to deliver the profits. This makes sense as it is the practice leaders, office leaders, sector leaders and other managers that play a critical role in execution. However in order to help each of them execute, leaderships needs to work with them to answer questions they may have such as:

• What does this priority mean for our practice?
• What are the opportunities for me and my group?
• What needs to change, if anything?
• What should we stop doing?
• How do we get help from other parts of the firm?

Without these conversations, it is impossible to know how the high-level strategy is interpreted and actioned across the firm.

Communication is part of implementation

Leadership often thinks about communication and execution after the strategy is complete. Whereas in actuality, these areas must be considered much earlier on.

Change does not come from a single announcement or a single meeting; it comes from daily actions. To be successful, people need to understand how the strategy affects them and see examples of what progress looks like. They need opportunities to ask questions and become vested in the results. They need to hear about the strategy often so that it remains connected with the decisions they make. And they need to see successes.

Marketing and business development can help

Marketing and business development teams have much more to contribute when empowered to do so. These groups often have more information about what is happening across the firm and can help translate strategy into actions. They know which clients generate revenue, which practices are involved, where relationships are strong or weak, what competitors are doing and where opportunities may exist. They can connect information across practices and offices that might otherwise remain in separate places.

This is when these functions become strategic contributors rather than simply support functions. These groups are experts at taking high level thinking and communicating in a manner for the masses.

The strategy is not finished when the plan is approved

A strategic plan is an important starting point. The harder work is implementing the plan. If the strategy only comes up once a year at a partner meeting, it is unlikely to influence what happens during the rest of the year.

The question is not whether people agree with the strategy, it is whether they know what to do with it to be successful.

The post When Strategy Is Not the Problem. Translation Is. appeared first on Slaw.

For Professor Seánna Howard, Director of the International Human Rights Advocacy Workshop, international legal research begins with a simple but important recognition: the most valuable sources are not always the most familiar ones. Her research has taken her to Tucson, where she joined the renowned Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy (IPLP) Program at the University of Arizona College of Law. Along the way, she has worked as an advocate, lawyer, researcher, independent expert, and educator on issues involving Indigenous Peoples, international human rights law, and social justice.

Her work also reflects the importance of developing research strategies for areas of law that may not fit neatly within traditional legal databases or pre-established research methods. For researchers working with the United Nations, treaty bodies, special procedures, regional human rights systems, and Indigenous Peoples’ institutions, finding the relevant material often requires persistence, creativity, and a willingness to look beyond the sources most familiar to domestic legal researchers. As the Associate Librarian for Comparative and International Law at the University of Arizona College of Law, I have had the pleasure to work closely with Prof. Howard on several different research projects. Therefore, I invited her to share on this post her career path, research tips and preferred legal databases with all slaw readers.

Professor Howard’s path to Tucson began in Hamilton, Ontario where she was born. After completing her LLB at the University of Ottawa, she developed an interest in global justice issues, including women’s rights, children’s rights, and the history and continuing effects of colonization at both the local and international levels.

Her legal education also helped shape her understanding of the importance of learning about Indigenous rights independently. As she explained, her law school experience did not provide a dedicated focus on Indigenous rights and International Law. She therefore pursued opportunities to learn more about the historical and contemporary dimensions of Indigenous Peoples, and international human rights.

A search for programs that combined domestic and global approaches to Indigenous rights led her to the IPLP Program at the University of Arizona College of Law. Tucson was nowhere in her long-term plan. In fact, Professor Howard explained that a simple online search helped her take one of the most consequential and transformative decisions in her career path: pursuing an LLM degree at the James E. Rogers College of Law IPLP program.

At the University of Arizona, she worked with Professor James Anaya, whose expertise in Indigenous Peoples’ rights and international human rights law was instrumental in shaping her professional path. Professor Howard eventually worked on cases and matters involving international mechanisms, first as part of the program and later as a staff attorney. She took directing Professor Anaya’s International Human Rights Advocacy Workshop in 2008 and his seminar course in 2016. Her career has since continued to combine advocacy, research, teaching, and international human rights work.

Researching International Law Beyond Traditional Databases

One of the central themes of Professor Howard’s work is the need to understand where international legal information is actually located. Unlike many domestic legal researchers, international legal researchers cannot always rely on a single comprehensive database. The materials may be distributed across the websites of international organizations, treaty bodies, special procedures, specialized agencies, regional institutions, and civil society organizations. In some areas, commercial databases such as Lexis or Westlaw may provide only a partial picture—or may not provide the relevant materials at all.

As a result, international legal research often requires researchers to develop their own research maps. Professor Howard described, for example, creating charts to organize sources relating to Indigenous peoples and international human rights law. These charts bring together materials from different parts of the United Nations system and help researchers identify relationships among institutions, procedures, reports, communications, and other documents.

[ Click the image to see a larger version of this chart.]

Treaty Bodies, Special Procedures, and International Mechanisms

Professor Howard’s research has involved cases and statements before international mechanisms, including UN treaty bodies and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. This work requires a researcher to locate formal cases, decisions, communications, reports, and related materials. The sources may not always be indexed in a way that makes them easy to find through a conventional keyword search.

The same is true of the UN special procedures system. Special Rapporteurs and other independent experts produce thematic reports, country visits, communications to states, and other materials. The letters sent by special procedures to governments, for example, can be particularly important sources of information about how international human rights concerns are raised and documented.

Professor Howard has worked with databases and collections of materials relating to these communications and has provided academic support for special rapporteurs. She has also worked on reports addressing specialized human rights topics at the highest levels of the United Nations system. For students working on these projects, research can involve much more than finding a single authoritative document. It may involve compiling resources, tracing an issue through multiple international institutions, identifying relevant country-specific materials, and understanding the procedural history of a matter. The research is often investigative.

The Importance of Institutional Websites

A major part of Professor Howard’s research method is working directly with the websites of international organizations and specialized agencies. These include institutions such as the International Labour Organization, UNESCO, UNDP, and other UN-related or independent international bodies. Their websites can contain reports, decisions, policy documents, guidelines, databases, country materials, and historical documents that may not appear in commercial legal research systems.

For researchers, this means that knowing how to navigate institutional websites is an essential international legal research skill. It also means that researchers must learn the organizational structure of the institution whose materials they are using. A report from a treaty body is different from a report by a Special Rapporteur. A communication from a special procedure is different from a General Comment of a treaty body. A report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples serves a different purpose from the work of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Understanding these distinctions is essential for evaluating the authority, purpose, and relevance of each source.

Foreign Legal Research and International Legal Research

Professor Howard’s work also illustrates the close relationship between foreign and international legal research. As part of the legal team that brought the Maya land rights cases in Belize, she had to research its relationship to other common-law jurisdictions while also considering the country’s international legal obligations and the capacity of its legal institutions. The two types of research often go hand in hand. International law does not exist in isolation from domestic or national legal systems. Human rights standards may be incorporated into domestic law, interpreted by domestic courts, or used by lawyers to advance arguments before national tribunals.

Professor Howard emphasized the importance of understanding international law not simply as something separate from domestic law or as a set of automatically superior rules. Rather, international legal standards can become tools for advancing legal arguments and developing domestic law. Lawyers may use international standards to persuade courts to interpret domestic law consistently with human rights principles. In this way, international legal research can directly influence domestic legal advocacy. The researcher therefore needs to understand both sides of the relationship: the international source itself and the domestic legal system in which the argument will ultimately be made.

Research as Advocacy

For Professor Howard, research is closely connected to advocacy. Whether working on a case before an international body, supporting a report, assisting students, or developing resources on Indigenous peoples’ rights, legal research is ultimately connected to a concrete purpose. That purpose may be to document a violation, support an argument, identify applicable international standards, provide evidence to an international mechanism, or help lawyers develop a case before a domestic court.

This connection between research and advocacy has shaped her career from the beginning. Her path to Tucson began with an interest in global justice and a desire to work on issues that had a tangible impact. Her work with international human rights mechanisms, Indigenous peoples, students, and legal researchers has continued that commitment. It has also made her an important resource for students learning how to conduct research in areas of law where the relevant materials are dispersed across institutions and jurisdictions.

A Researcher Who Maps the International Legal Landscape

Professor Seánna Howard’s career demonstrates that international legal research requires more than familiarity with legal databases. It requires knowing how international institutions work. It requires identifying the organizations that produce relevant information. It requires understanding the differences among treaty bodies, special procedures, expert mechanisms, regional institutions, and civil society organizations. And it often requires building research tools to bring scattered information together.

Most importantly, it requires curiosity. For students and researchers working in Indigenous peoples’ rights and international human rights law, Professor Howard’s approach offers a valuable model. The best research may begin with a database search, but it rarely ends there. Sometimes the relevant source is located on the website of an international organization. Sometimes it is hidden in a treaty body document, a Special Rapporteur communication, a country report, or the work of an Indigenous organization. Sometimes the researcher must create the chart, database, or research guide that makes the information visible to others.

That combination of persistence, institutional knowledge, and creative research is at the heart of Professor Howard’s work—and provides an important introduction to the scholar and advocate who has made Daniel F. Crachiolo Law Library her intellectual home and Tucson her professional home.

Her most recent scholarship includes the following titles:

Howard, Seánna, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Regional Human Rights Systems’ (25 June 2026), in Gautham Rao (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies in Legal History (New York, NY, online edn, Oxford Academic, 25 June 2026 – )

Howard, Seánna, ‘Regional Bodies and Indigenous Peoples’ (22 Apr. 2026), in Mattias Åhrén, and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Indigenous Peoples and International Law (online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 May 2024 – )

Osborne, T., Cifuentes, S., Dev, L. et al. Climate justice, forests, and Indigenous Peoples: toward an alternative to REDD + for the Amazon. Climatic Change 177, 128 (2024)

The post Researching Beyond the Familiar: An Interview With Professor Seánna Howard appeared first on Slaw.

Can a lawyer be disbarred for misconduct that is directly caused by mental illness? Until recently, my educated guess would have been no.

In May and June of 2026, a Hearing Panel of the Ontario Law Society Tribunal issued an important pair of decisions that carefully and deliberately resynthesize the role and impact of mental illness in lawyer regulation.[1] These decisions set out and apply a “unified approach” to alleged misconduct by lawyers where mental illness may be a factor.[2] At first glance, this new approach seems to reject case law, including case law by the Appeal Panel that was binding on the Hearing Panel. The approach actually clarifies – and to some extent, distinguishes – these precedents.

The conduct at issue included practicing despite an indefinite suspension for incapacity.[3] The Hearing Panel explicitly accepted expert evidence that the lawyer’s mental illness precluded him from recognizing the authority of the law society, including the suspension, and was a but-for cause of the conduct.[4] Nonetheless, the Hearing Panel found professional misconduct and revoked the lawyer’s licence.[5]

This approach and result appear to reject a long line of cases holding that, where a lawyer’s problematic conduct is caused by mental or other illness, that conduct cannot constitute professional misconduct. As recently as 2024 – as the Hearing Panel in these decisions recognized – an Appeal Panel re-affirmed that “[o]ur jurisprudence establishes that it is a defence to professional misconduct if the licensee is unable to comply with their obligations because of physical or mental illness.”[6] A 2002 decision by a Hearing Panel likewise held that “it simply cannot be misconduct where the licensee’s behaviour is explained by a physical or mental illness”.[7]

Despite the explicit and broad language in these precedents, the Hearing Panel held that such defences had only been recognized “where the misconduct has been at the lower end of severity”, and had not been recognized where “it was likely that the misconduct would continue”.[8] The Panel interpreted these precedents as meaning that there was merely a “discretion” to not find misconduct.[9] The Hearing Panel recognized a nuanced role for mental illness as a sometimes defence:

[M]ental illness cannot result in effectively unregulated conduct. Where mental illness is ended or is in remission or can be addressed by rehabilitative capacity orders, treating mental illness as a defence in a conduct application can advance the purposes of regulation of the professional conduct of lawyers and paralegals.

Accordingly, we conclude that mental illness is not invariably a defence to an allegation of professional misconduct but that it can be accepted as a defence taking into account the important personal rights and interests of licensees, the values of rehabilitation and respect for human dignity together with the need for effective conduct regulation of legal services in the public interest.[10]

This multifactorial and discretionary approach is in sharp contrast to the spirit of previous cases in which conduct caused by mental illness could never be professional misconduct.

The Hearing Panel also clarified the distinction between mental illness as a potential defence and mental illness as merely a potentially mitigating factor as to penalty where there was misconduct. Mental illness could be, but was not necessarily, a defence where the misconduct was “a result of their disability” (i.e., a but-for cause of the misconduct).[11] In contrast, mental illness could be, but was not necessarily, a mitigating factor as to penalty where “there is a connection between the misconduct and the disability” but not causation.[12]

The Hearing Panel, however, was noncommittal as to when mental illness would actually be a mitigating factor: “Where there is a finding of misconduct and there is a connection between the misconduct and disability, the disability and its connection to the proven misconduct may be considered at the penalty stage as may be appropriate.”[13] (In fairness to the Hearing Panel, since the mental illness in the matter before them was a but-for cause of the conduct, it was unnecessary to consider this mitigation issue any further.)

While the Hearing Panel rejected the submissions of the Law Society that the burden was necessarily on the lawyer to establish the mental illness and its relationship to the conduct,[14] it was not explicit as to who instead bears that burden:

As this case demonstrates, mental illness can interfere with a person’s ability to recognize disability and to show that a disability is connected to impugned conduct. The salient issue is not how, and by whom, a connection between a mental disorder and misconduct is shown, but rather whether the panel concludes that the required connection exists. As well, and as this case also demonstrates, the Law Society and the Tribunal can play a role in addressing the question of connection.[15]

In doing so, the Hearing Panel rejected a binding Appeal Panel decision that the lawyer bears the onus: “the onus is on the licensee to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the disability precludes compliance”.[16] The Hearing Panel was explicit that “the panel must determine” these issues and that that is “ordinarily based on expert evidence”.[17] It remains unclear whether the Law Society or the Tribunal have some burden to inquire and what triggers that burden. (Again, in fairness to the Hearing Panel, it was unnecessary to consider this issue any further.)

In its penalty decision, the Hearing Panel explicitly found that the lawyer was ungovernable and that the cause of that ungovernability did not affect that finding or disbarment as the necessary consequence of that finding: “That his belief is the result of mental illness does not change the fact that he is ungovernable. Being a licensee requires being governable as such…. It is unfortunate that mental illness has caused [the lawyer] to be ungovernable, but we conclude that [the lawyer] cannot continue to be licensed.”[18] Intriguingly, the Hearing Panel explicitly recognized that this was an unusual kind of ungovernability, because it was not a failure of the culmination of progressive discipline, but nonetheless it was clear that the lawyer did not recognize the authority of the law society.[19] The Hearing Panel explicitly and very importantly recognized that, if the lawyer’s illness and its impact improved in the future, the lawyer could apply for re-admission.[20]

Subject to further clarification about when and why mental illness connected to the conduct will be an “appropriate” mitigating factor, as well as when and how the Law Society or the Tribunal should raise the possibility of mental illness, this new framework provides a clear, if open-ended and multifactorial, way forward.

With great respect to the Hearing Panel, however, I am not convinced that it was necessary to distinguish the precedents – stating that conduct caused by mental illness cannot be misconduct – so drastically. The facts of this matter were very particular. There would appear to be viable alternatives that would allow for the necessary result in this case without such a pronounced change in the law. For example, the Hearing Panel could have held that conduct caused by mental illness will only constitute misconduct in exceptional circumstances. Or that there is a strong but rebuttable presumption that conduct caused by mental illness cannot be misconduct. Or even that a misconduct finding is only appropriate when the remedy from a capacity application has proven inadequate (or more narrowly, where there is non-compliance with a suspension). The Hearing Panel is correct that “whether a capacity application is brought, or not, is for the Law Society to decide under the Act. Neither the Tribunal nor the licensee can divert to the capacity stream if the Law Society does not agree.”[21] But the Tribunal could nonetheless make it clear to Law Society counsel that where the conduct is caused by a disability, a Panel will only find misconduct if they are satisfied that a capacity proceeding would not have been sufficient in the circumstances. (Amendments to the Law Society Act may be appropriate or necessary for this last approach.[22])

Ultimately, the test adopted by the Hearing Panel can be applied in a manner consistent with compassion and understanding for licensees with mental illness.[23] However, it is not obvious that it must or will be applied in such a manner. (I am by no means suggesting that this Hearing Panel lacked compassion and understanding.) The invocation of rehabilitation and dignity is important, but on its own its impact is difficult to predict. Moreover, while the protection of the public must always be paramount, a different framing of the test would continue to protect the public while sending a strong and valuable signal about mental illness – not only to licensees with mental illness, but to all licensees, the courts, the public, and the media.

More generally, the language used by the Hearing Panel appears to be more tentative that it needed to be. For example, the Hearing Panel observes that “[w]here mental illness is ended or is in remission or can be addressed by rehabilitative capacity orders, treating mental illness as a defence in a conduct application can advance the purposes of regulation of the professional conduct of lawyers and paralegals.”[24] Again with respect, in those circumstances such a defence does advance the purposes of regulation, except in the situation where the licensee refuses treatment.

I understand that where misconduct is caused by mental illness, disbarment cannot be absolutely impossible and will sometimes be necessary. The unusual facts in this case demonstrate that reality. I nonetheless hope that such disbarment will be rare.

________________

[1] Law Society of Ontario v Bogue, 2026 ONLSTH 91 [Bogue merits], 2026 ONLSTH 109 [Bogue penalty].

[2] Bogue merits, supra note 1 at para 128.

[3] Ibid at para 9. There was also a citation around civility, which was also established, but seemed to play little role in the analysis: paras 38-48.

[4] Ibid at para 32.

[5] Ibid at para 147; Bogue penalty, supra note 1 at paras 15-16.

[6] Law Society of Ontario v McLennan, 2024 ONLSTA 10 at para 21 [McLennan], quoted in Bogue merits, supra note 1 at para 81.

[7] Law Society of Ontario v Phillips, 2022 ONLSTH 2 at para 38, quoted in Bogue merits, supra note 1 at para 81.

[8] Bogue merits, supra note 1 at para 112.

[9] Ibid at para 82.

[10] Ibid at paras 115-116 [emphasis added].

[11] Ibid at paras 128, 129 (quotation is from 128)

[12] Ibid at para 129.

[13] Ibid at para 129 [emphasis added].

[14] Ibid at para 119.

[15] Ibid at para 122.

[16] McLennan, supra note 6 at para 21, quoted in Bogue merits, supra note 1 at para 81.

[17] Ibid at para 128.

[18] Bogue penalty, supra note 1 at paras 12, 15.

[19] Ibid at paras 10-12.

[20] Ibid at para 16.

[21] Bogue merits, supra note 1 at para 124.

[22] Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8.

[23] Bogue merits, supra note 1 at para 129: “Where misconduct results from disability, this approach permits, but does not require, a determination other than a finding of professional misconduct. This approach permits, but does not require, diversion to the capacity stream where misconduct results from disability. Where there is a finding of misconduct and there is a connection between the misconduct and disability, the disability and its connection to the proven misconduct may be considered at the penalty stage as may be appropriate.”

[24] Ibid at para 115 [emphasis added].

The post The Role of Mental Illness in Lawyer Regulation (In Ontario) appeared first on Slaw.

Preoccupation with the ongoing armed conflict in Iran has diverted attention from the grim aftermath of Iran’s nation-wide protests that began on 28 December 2025, during which tens of thousands of protestors were killed, arrested, or disappeared.

Lawyers were prevented from reaching their detained clients. Lawyers themselves were among those detained simply for trying to do their jobs. Protestors are now being tried without legal representation before courts that lack any semblance of independence or impartiality. Frequent executions are now being carried out following hasty and grossly unfair proceedings.

Dissidents who flee Iran may be subjected to transnational repression in countries where they seek refuge, including the United States (US) and Canada.

The first fifty days of Iran’s protests: Mass arrests, massacres, and executions

By the fiftieth day of Iran’s nation-wide protests, 15 February 2026, there had been 53,552 arrests and 7,015 confirmed deaths in 210 cities across all 31 of Iran’s provinces, according to the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA). Iran engaged in mass extrajudicial killings on 8 and 9 January 2026 as security forces reportedly massacred thousands by opening fire on protestors and bystanders.

Dozens of lawyers were among those arrested during and after the protests, merely for carrying out their lawful professional duties. Many other lawyers face charges that carry long prison terms.

The exact number of arrested lawyers remains unclear. Documentation efforts were impeded by Iran’s 88-day disruption of international internet access starting 28 February 2026 when large-scale US and Israeli bombing of Iran began. While internet connections were partially restored on 26 May 2026, restrictions remain nationwide, with internet traffic at around 40 per cent of pre-blackout levels.

Detained lawyers have reportedly been tortured and ill-treated, including prolonged solitary confinement, beatings during interrogation, and denial of medical treatment. A sample list of lawyers arrested before and during the nation-wide protests appears in a written statement dated 15 August 2026 to the UN Human Rights Council, issued by Lawyers for Lawyers and co-sponsored by Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada (LRWC) and the Centre for Supporters of Human Rights (CSHR).

US and Israeli bombings: Prisoners at risk

Detained lawyers are among those facing increased danger from US and Israeli bombings near prisons. On 9 March 2026, Amnesty International reported that Iran had refused to release arbitrarily detained prisoners and had transferred some detainees “to undisclosed locations or areas close to potential military targets.”

In an oral statement to the UN Human Rights Council on 23 March 2026, LRWC (with other NGOs) highlighted the grave risks posed by bombings to detained lawyers and prisoners of conscience in Iran. The statement called on Iran to activate its laws providing for “emergency furloughs, temporary release, or transfer of prisoners to safety during conflict.”

LRWC’s joint statement also condemned “all unlawful uses of force, including actions by the United States and Israel against Iran and Iran’s retaliation across the region,” and urged “an immediate cessation of hostilities consistent with obligations under the UN Charter and international human rights and humanitarian law.” Since then, President Trump has on several occasions threatened war crimes and atrocity crimes against the Iranian people, including a 22 September threat at the UN General Assembly that he may “annihilate the Islamic Republic” if the Iranian authorities refuse to “make a deal.”

Gendered repression of women lawyers

While threats and arrests of lawyers tend to escalate during periods of widespread protest, human rights advocates in Iran have faced longstanding threats. Women’s rights advocates are at particularly high risk.

Women lawyers in Iran face both professional persecution and gender-based discrimination. In addition to facing security threats, they must contend with discriminatory laws, mandatory dress codes, and pervasive institutional bias. Research by CSHR and IBAHRI, published in November 2025, details how mandatory hijab laws, gender-based dress-codes, and entrenched social biases constrain women lawyers’ professional opportunities and subject them to humiliating scrutiny and arbitrary restrictions. For example, the CHRS and IBAHRI report describes a situation in which a woman lawyer was barred from an imminent court hearing because she wore nail polish. She was forced to “rush through nearby streets in search of nail polish remover… [and] returned just in time to remove the nail polish and attend the session.”

When women are detained in Iran, they experience added dangers, including threats of sexual violence.

An unknown number of women were arrested during the nationwide protests. Among them were several women lawyers. For example, Shima Ghoosheh was arrested in January 2026 after publicly indicating her willingness to represent detained protesters. She was held in solitary confinement and released on bail of approximately US$40,000.

Human rights lawyer and women’s rights advocate Nasrin Sotoudeh was arrested on 1 April 2026, in part for a statement condemning the January 2026 massacre of protesters. She reported torture and ill-treatment during her arrest and detention. She has been charged with “propaganda against the state” and was released on bail on 13 May 2026. Ms. Sotoudeh has for over a decade been subjected to repeated arrests, prosecutions, arbitrary detentions, and repeated ill-treatment in retaliation for her human rights work and the legitimate exercise of her professional responsibilities. Ms. Sotoudeh deals with constant monitoring, travel restrictions, and reprisals against her family linked to her international advocacy.

Astareh Ansari was arrested on 3 May 2026 for representing persons detained during the nationwide protests. She is charged with “assembly and collusion against national security” and “propaganda against the state.” During interrogation she was subjected to beatings and ill-treatment, including denial of medical care, before being released on bail on 22 July 2026.

Bahar Sahraian was arrested on 16 May 2026, reportedly after appearing at the Shiraz Revolutionary Court in connection with a client’s case. She was released on bail on 21 July 2026. Ms. Sahraian faces charges of “assembly and collusion with intent to act against national security,” “propaganda activity against the state,” and “publishing falsehoods.” She was previously arrested in 2022 as part of a group of 30 lawyers in connection with the nationwide protests that began the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement after 22-year-old Mahsa Amini was beaten to death on 12 September 2022 by the morality police for “improper hijab.”

A “full spectrum” of transnational repression targeting exiles

Iranians who flee the country continue to face significant threats abroad. Freedom House reports that Iran deploys a “full spectrum” of transnational repression targeting Iranians in exile. According to the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, as of March 2026 exiles in at least 14 countries have reported such repression in retaliation for their advocacy or reporting on human rights in Iran.

Tactics include assassination attempts, kidnapping, forced renditions to Iran, smear campaigns, convictions in absentia, abuse of Interpol red notices, cyber-attacks, and coercion of family members. Women exiles have been subjected to online harassment, including threats of rape and death. Pressure on exiles often extends to their family members in Iran, who may lose their employment, or may be summoned, interrogated, detained, or have their homes raided. To shield families from retaliation, many exiles self-censor or sever contact with their families.

Iranian lawyers facing repression around the world include Shirin Ebadi, a former Iranian jurist and Nobel laureate living in exile in the UK, who has continued to experience state-directed threats and defamation. Iranian-Canadian legal professional and human rights advocate, Ardeshir Zarezadeh, has been threatened by Iranian authorities for his work in support of victims of Iran’s human rights violations. Lawyer and former Canadian Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotler, founder of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights was subjected to threats of assassination by agents of Iran in 2024.

Transnational repression has been documented in Europe, Asia, and North America, including Canada. Iran is among the top three countries engaged in transnational repression of people in Canada, according to Canada’s Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions, conducted by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue (Hogue report).

Violation of international law and standards

Iran’s actions against dissenters grossly violate its longstanding international obligations, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which Iran ratified in 1975 (long before Canada acceded to it in 1976 and the US in 1992).

In relation to lawyers, Iran is also in violation of the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (Basic Principles), which provide that governments must ensure that lawyers can perform all professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment. or improper interference. The Basic Principles are firmly grounded in the ICCPR, which requires fair trials before impartial courts, prohibits extrajudicial killing, enforced disappearance, torture and ill-treatment of prisoners, and requires humane treatment for detainees.

ICCPR, Article 2, requires States Parties to ensure that victims of human rights violations are afforded a remedy. So far, Iranian lawyers, rights defenders, and dissenters have been afforded no remedies for Iran’s severe and systematic violations of their rights.

Canada and the US, along with all other countries, are obligated by international law to ensure that individuals are not subjected to refoulement; people must not be sent to countries where they are at risk of serious human rights violations. The US has been engaged in refoulement of many immigrants and asylum seekers.

Iranians seeking asylum in the US face risks of deportation, and in some cases, have been sent back to Iran on chartered flights. Notably, one such flight took place in 2026, even after the Iranian regime began to violently crack down on peaceful protesters. A lawsuit launched by the Iranian American Legal Defence Fund alleges that asylum seekers have been present on mass deportation flights from the US since early 2025, including members of Iran’s 2022 Women, Life, Freedom movement.

Iranians who first arrive in the US and later attempt to seek asylum in Canada are often prevented from doing so by the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA), which denies access to Canada for individuals who have already landed in the US. When Canada sends asylum seekers back to the US pursuant to the STCA, it may be facilitating US violations of international refugee law.

Need for increased protection needed for those fleeing Iran: US and Canada 

Canada has no embassies in Iran itself, as diplomatic relations with Iran were cut off in 2012. At the same time, Canada declared Iran a “state sponsor of terrorism under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.”

Canada has regularly expressed concern about Iran’s human rights violations, including its transnational repression practices. In July 2025, Canada was among 14 countries, including the US, that issued a joint statement condemning the expanding transnational repression within their territories by agents of Iran. The statement highlighted that “attempts by the Iranian intelligence services to kill, kidnap, and harass people in Europe and North America [are] in clear violation of our sovereignty.” On 10 June 2026, Canada was among 21 countries making another joint statement that “[a]ttempts to kill, kidnap, harass, intimidate, or otherwise attack people on our soil, undermines national sovereignty and international norms. These actions must stop immediately…” Notably, the US joined the 2026 statement, while simultaneously engaged in deporting Iranians to unsafe third countries.

Words that are not matched by actions ring hollow. Canada’s current laws, policies and practices are insufficient to ensure protection and remedies for Iranian lawyers, defenders, and dissenters at home or in exile abroad. A number of actions have been recommended, including the following. 

Revoke the Safe Third Country Agreement

In no case should any Iranian asylum seeker be returned to the US pursuant to the STCA. By maintaining the illusion that the US is a “safe third country” for Iranian exiles, Canadian authorities could be complicit in unlawful US refoulements. Amnesty International and other organizations, including the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, Rainbow Railroad, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, have repeatedly sought Canadian government termination of the STCA. In our opinion, Canada is required by international law to do so and to ensure that all asylum laws, policies, and practices fully comply with international law on asylum.

Conduct criminal law investigations and prosecutions

The UN Human Rights Council’s Fact-Finding Mission on Iran recently recommended that countries:

Promptly open criminal investigations into any allegations of transnational repression against human rights defenders, activists, and journalists on Iran, in their territory or jurisdiction, including into the responsibility and role of entities or officials of the Government of Iran, and prosecute those responsible; regularly inform victims of the progress of the investigation and legal proceedings…

Implement a human rights-based approach to transnational repression

Canada already has a policy to protect human rights defenders. Remedies for Iranian lawyers and defenders at risk would include active implementation of Canada’s “Voices at Risk” policy, offering asylum to Iranian defenders facing transnational repression in other countries.

The Hogue report remains one of Canada’s main official actions on transnational repression. Although the Hogue report’s mandate was to address foreign interference and national security related to Canada’s elections, it did find that transnational repression has been used to curtail human rights activism in Canada. Regarding Iran, the report notes that transnational repression is “used to discourage advocacy and activism in Canada for human rights in Iran and against the Iranian regime.”

Canada’s Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics published a 2024 report on foreign interference, which recommended that the Canadian government “ensure that any legislative mechanisms developed to counter foreign interference take into account how they might affect individuals and communities already victimized or targeted by foreign interference in Canada.”

Canada’s 2024 Countering Foreign Interference Act focuses primarily on national security, protection of Canadian interests, and “democratic rights.” In Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, “democratic rights” refer to the right to vote. The Act provides no protection of other individual rights that could be violated through transnational repression.

The Canadian government tends to frame transnational repression primarily as a “foreign interference” or “national security” issue rather than as a violation of exiles’ human rights and well-being. The Citizen Lab noted that Canada’s approach to transnational repression is a “far cry from taking specific measures that effectively protect targets – particularly women human rights defenders in exile…” The Citizen Lab report mentioned an Iranian women rights defender in Canada who “experienced online threats and sexual harassment originating from the social media accounts of other Iranians, some of whom she believed were based in the same city. She reported this to the police, who made her feel dismissed when they explained that these posts would be protected under Canadian human rights law.”

Conclusions

On 18 September, the UN’s Fact-Finding Mission on Iran (FFMI) found that the Iranian authorities’ response to the nationwide protests, including the crackdown on lawyers, cannot be understood as a mere continuation of its well-established pattern of suppressing dissent. It represents a significant escalation from the past – in the scale of violence and killings, in efforts to sever contact between communities and with the outside world, in the use of repressive laws and in the ever-increasing use of the death penalty as a tool of intimidation and control.

The violations are now so widespread and systematic that the FFMI found that many of them amount to crimes against humanity.

Not addressed in this article is the impact of the unlawful armed conflict between the US, Israel and Iran, which has spread to other countries in the region. The FFMI has found that the US and Iran have committed war crimes and has urged that “allegations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by all parties are independently investigated and those responsible held to account.” The FFMI also called on all UN member states to “guarantee protection and assistance for those fleeing or at risk of persecution…”

Protection of Iranian lawyers requires a full spectrum of actions at the international and domestic levels, with all countries taking concrete actions to protect lawyers, human rights defenders, and dissenters – and indeed all civilians, both in Iran and in exile.

___

This article is based in large part on research by co-author Paria Saremi, JD, LLM, an international human rights lawyer who served as the principal drafter of a written statement submitted to the UN Human Rights Council by Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada (LRWC) and others regarding arbitrary detention of lawyers in Iran. Paria Saremi conducts advocacy and research on Iran for LRWC and the Zagros Human Rights Center in Geneva.

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As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Arbitration: Same-Issue Estoppel; Standard of Review
Vancouver School District No. 39 v. Kingsgate Property Ltd., et al., 2026 BCCA 98 (42350)

Same-issue estoppel & standard of review in arbitration context.

Family Law: Common Law Relationships
Tanguay v. Zicat, 2025 QCCA 1255 (42126)

Cohabitation agreement precluding later unjust enrichment claim.

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Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : Dans une affaire de voies de fait graves commises à l’endroit d’une inconnue à la sortie d’un bar, en se limitant à énoncer les conséquences indirectes de la peine et en les qualifiant de facteurs neutres, sans les analyser véritablement dans l’exercice de détermination de la peine, la juge de première instance a commis une erreur de principe justifiant de substituer à la peine de 4 ans de détention une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis de 2 ans moins 1 jour.

Intitulé : Monfiston c. R., 2026 QCCA 1203
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Geneviève Marcotte, Suzanne Gagné et Christine Baudouin
Date : 14 septembre 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions contre la personne — voies de fait — voies de fait graves — femme — intoxication — accusée âgée de 37 ans — conséquences indirectes de la peine — conséquences sur le plan de l’immigration — statut de résident permanent — mesure de renvoi — perte du droit d’appel — situation familiale de l’accusée — conséquences pour les enfants de l’accusée — facteur lié à la situation personnelle et particulière de l’accusée — facteurs atténuants — remords — plaidoyer de culpabilité — démarches de réhabilitation — proportionnalité de la peine — dénonciation — dissuasion — réinsertion sociale — fourchette des peines — détention — appel — norme d’intervention — erreur de principe — substitution de la peine — condamnation avec sursis — ordonnance de purger sa peine dans la collectivité — peine concurrente — probation.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — principes généraux — facteurs à prendre en considération — conséquences indirectes de la peine — conséquences sur le plan de l’immigration — statut de résident permanent — mesure de renvoi — perte du droit d’appel — situation familiale de l’accusée — conséquences pour les enfants de l’accusée — facteur lié à la situation personnelle et particulière de l’accusée — proportionnalité de la peine — voies de fait graves — vol qualifié — détention — appel — erreur de principe — substitution de la peine — condamnation avec sursis — ordonnance de purger sa peine dans la collectivité.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions contre les biens et la propriété — vol — vol qualifié — téléphone cellulaire — femme — intoxication — accusée âgée de 37 ans — conséquences indirectes de la peine — conséquences sur le plan de l’immigration — statut de résident permanent — mesure de renvoi — perte du droit d’appel — situation familiale de l’accusée — conséquences pour les enfants de l’accusée — facteur lié à la situation personnelle et particulière de l’accusée — facteurs atténuants — remords — plaidoyer de culpabilité — démarches de réhabilitation — proportionnalité de la peine — dénonciation — dissuasion — réinsertion sociale — fourchette des peines — détention — appel — norme d’intervention — erreur de principe — substitution de la peine — condamnation avec sursis — ordonnance de purger sa peine dans la collectivité — peine concurrente — probation.

Appel de la peine. Accueilli; une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis de 2 ans moins 1 jour est substituée à la peine d’emprisonnement de 4 ans ayant été prononcée en première instance.

L’appelante se pourvoit à l’encontre d’un jugement de la Cour du Québec l’ayant condamnée notamment à une peine de 4 ans d’emprisonnement à la suite de voies de fait graves commises à l’endroit d’une inconnue à la sortie d’un bar. Durant environ 8 minutes, l’appelante, qui était fortement intoxiquée, a asséné à cette dernière de violents coups répétés au visage et au corps en plus de la mordre au front et au bras. Même si la juge de première instance a reconnu que sa situation familiale et les conséquences potentielles sur son statut d’immigration pourraient militer en faveur d’une peine d’emprisonnement à purger dans la collectivité, elle a estimé que le processus de détermination de la peine exigeait l’imposition d’une peine d’emprisonnement de 4 ans.

Décision

La juge a commis une erreur de principe en qualifiant les conséquences indirectes propres à l’appelante de facteurs neutres. En effet, si les conséquences indirectes ne constituent ni un facteur aggravant ni un facteur atténuant, elles ne sont pas non plus un facteur neutre, mais plutôt un facteur lié à la situation personnelle et particulière de l’appelante, et peuvent avoir une répercussion sur le processus d’individualisation de la peine et le principe de parité.

Par ailleurs, le poids à accorder aux conséquences indirectes d’une peine varie d’une affaire à l’autre et dépend des circonstances propres à chaque accusé. Or, dans les circonstances particulières de l’espèce, ces conséquences revêtent une importance considérable au regard de la situation de l’appelante, qui est résidente permanente et a 4 enfants à sa charge. La peine d’incarcération qui a été imposée emporte des effets beaucoup plus importants sur l’appelante que sur d’autres délinquants qui auraient commis des gestes semblables puisqu’elle a notamment pour effet de lui faire perdre son droit d’appel devant la Section d’appel de l’immigration (SAI), de sorte qu’elle ne pourrait y faire valoir des considérations d’ordre humanitaire, y compris l’intérêt supérieur de ses enfants directement touchés, afin de militer contre son renvoi du Canada. Ainsi, l’omission de la juge d’intégrer véritablement ces conséquences à son analyse a eu pour effet de rendre la peine imposée plus sévère pour l’appelante, compte tenu de sa situation particulière, ce qui justifie l’intervention de la Cour.

Une peine d’emprisonnement de 2 ans moins 1 jour avec sursis, assortie de conditions rigoureuses, respecte les objectifs pénologiques en l’espèce. Au regard des facteurs atténuants et aggravants retenus par la juge, c’est la deuxième catégorie médiane de la fourchette des peines qui doit guider l’intervention de la Cour. En effet, les facteurs énoncés, qui militent en faveur de la réinsertion sociale de l’appelante, comprennent le fait que celle-ci est décrite par son entourage comme une mère aimante et dévouée, qu’elle a exprimé de vifs remords et de l’empathie envers la victime, qu’elle a enregistré un plaidoyer de culpabilité, qu’elle a entrepris une formation en gestion de la colère et qu’elle fréquente un organisme communautaire offrant des services de soutien aux familles. Par ailleurs, le rapport fait également état de certaines difficultés persistantes sur le plan de la régulation émotionnelle, de comportements parfois mésadaptés et d’un historique de toxicomanie. Enfin, comme il a été mentionné, les conséquences indirectes d’une peine d’incarcération dans le présent cas ne sont pas négligeables. Alors que la peine infligée par la juge prive l’appelante de la possibilité d’interjeter appel d’une éventuelle mesure de renvoi devant la SAI et d’y faire valoir des motifs d’ordre humanitaire, une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis lui permet de préserver cette possibilité. Il y a lieu d’accorder un poids accru à l’objectif de réinsertion sociale, tout en maintenant une peine conforme aux objectifs de dénonciation et de dissuasion.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

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A perpetual question from clients is whether a new development should be protected by filing a patent application or kept as a trade secret?

Patents are granted by national patent offices for new, useful and not obvious inventions. Patents require a full and public description of the idea and the details needed by a skilled person to put that idea into practice. For example, Section 27(3)(c) of the Patent Act requires that for machines, the patent “explain the principle of the machine and the best mode in which the inventor has contemplated the application of that principle”.

This quid pro quo is described as being at the heart of the patent system – in return for disclosure of the invention, the inventor gets a time-limited exclusive period to practice the invention.

On the other hand, trade secrets are ideas that are kept confidential, and maintain their value because of this confidentiality. A new process or technique may have value to a company that can use it, however, the value may be lost if all its competitors learn of it. Trade secrets are not registered but can be identified and maintained as confidential. This is usually done through a combination of legal measures (such as non-disclosure agreements), electronic systems (such as passwords and encryption), and physical protection (such as locked doors and need-to-know sharing). A claim for breach of confidence can be brought in provincial superior courts under the common law – see for example Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. [1989] 2 SCR 574. There is also a criminal code prohibition (see Section 391) against anyone, who, “by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, knowingly obtains a trade secret or communicates or makes available a trade secret.”

Depending on the nature of the development or idea, either patent protection or keeping it as a trade secret can make the most sense.

A key factor is whether the idea can be reverse engineered. For example, if the idea is for a mechanical part that is going to be sold to consumers, then patent protection is usually favoured. As soon as the first part is sold, any consumer (or competitor) can buy it, and take it apart to see how it works. If the intention was to keep the idea as a trade secret, the confidentiality would be lost and competitors could copy the design and move into the market.

However, if the idea relates to a manufacturing process or server-side algorithm where it can be used without disclosure, then keeping it confidential as a trade secret may be advantageous. New manufacturing processes can provide significant benefits but at the same time be kept away from competitors using factory walls, and NDAs for employees. Similarly, algorithms used deep inside a server may not be discernible to customers even if the inputs and outputs are readily apparent.

For trade secrets, the primary risk is that the secret will be learned by competitors. This can occur inadvertently during a factory tour, sloppy discussion at a trade show, or poor security practices on a website. More nefarious disclosure by hackers, a former employee sharing their secrets or espionage could also result in the secrets getting out. And most innocently, a third party could develop the idea independently. While there are some legal mechanisms to pursue breaches of confidence or violation of trade secrets, these can have limited impact if the secret is already out. If the trade secret is independently developed, then there is no recourse at all.

For patent protection, a key factor is the publication of the detailed description of the idea in the patent application. This description can provide a roadmap to competitors interested in replicating the idea and making their own (potentially patentable) improvements. While frustrating for the patent filer, this disclosure is a core feature of the patent system.

However, because patent applications are typically published prior to grant, the detailed description is shared publicly even if the patent application is refused by the patent office. The statistics for each jurisdiction differ (and most particularly if a patent agent is involved!) but only 40-60% of patent applications are granted. For computer-implemented inventions where the patent office carefully considers if the invention is ‘patentable subject-matter’, the risk that the patent application will be refused can be high. If the patent application is refused, then the invention has been disclosed to the public and competitors, without any ability to stop the idea from being copied.

A key benefit of patent protection is that a patent can be enforced against anyone that infringes the patent, whether they copied the idea or developed it independently. There is no need to show that the infringer “stole” the idea to establish infringement.

Another important factor in favour of patents is that they provide an external validation of the invention since the patent office has considered the patent application and found the invention new and inventive. Patents (and even patent applications) can therefore be a consideration for potential investors in a start-up and customers. It is more difficult to use trade secrets, being secret and not registered in any way, in the same way. However, for cost sensitive companies, the out-of-pocket costs to prepare, file and prosecute a patent application may push them towards trade secrets, that do not have same immediate costs.

Another important difference between patents and trade secrets is the duration. Patents have a maximum term of 20 years from the filing date. However, the time that a patent can be enforced does not usually start for 3 to 5 years until it is granted by the patent office (although financial remedies may be available for pre-grant activity). Trade secrets can be kept confidential indefinitely with suitable procedures.

Often an intellectual property strategy considers a mix of patent and trade secret protection. For example, a key feature of the product may be addressed in a patent application, but the manufacturing process is considered a trade secret. A careful analysis is required early because both trade secrets and patents benefit (or require) that steps be taken prior to any public disclosure.

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The new federal omnibus bill on the economy – Bill C-39, the Building Canada Strong Act – contains in Part 2 (“Keep Canada Moving”) Division 8, the Enabling Digital Trade Act.

This text implements for international trade in Canada the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records (MLETR). It allows, though does not require, the use of electronic versions of transferable records. Transferable records transfer title to the goods or sums mentioned in them by the transfer of the records themselves. Bills of lading are a common example, promissory notes another.

The provisions are a pretty straighforward reproduction of MLETR. They are consistent with the recently adopted Commonwealth Model Law on Digital Trade. Slaw had a note on the Commonwealth Model Law here.

Essentially, MLETR (and the federal bill in Canada) allow parties to international transactions to use electronic transferable records (ETRs) if the electronic versions are “reliable” in several ways.

The ETR must satisfy these rules (found in s. 8(1) of the new statute):

(b) it can be identified, by means of a reliable method, as being distinguishable from any copies of it;

(c) it is capable of being controlled, by means of a reliable method, from the time that it is created until the time that it ceases to have any effect or validity;

(d) it is protected, by means of a reliable method, against unauthorized alteration;

Further, “[a] paper trade document may be replaced by an electronic record if a reliable method is used for the change of medium.” (s. 8(2))

There are in MLETR seven different elements that must be reliable for the records to be legally effective.

The key question for those wanting to use ETRs is “what is reliable?” This question does not have a simple answer. UNCITRAL’s Guide to Enactment of MLETR, found at the same link (above) as the Model Law, says that the standard of reliability for each element of the ETR may be different, depending on the circumstance and the user’s needs and practices.

To assist the evaluation, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Digital Governance Council (of Canada) have developed reliability assessment tools. The ICC’s own announcement is here.

MLETR has become since its adoption in 2017 the global standard for digital trade. The federal government can apply it only to cross-border trade, or other areas in federal legislation. Its application to commerce within provinces will presumably await satisfactory experience with the federal law.

Whether smaller businesses will be able to evaluate the reliability of the several elements of ETRs remains to be seen. In due course practices will develop and professional advisors (lawyers, insurers, technology consultants) will be able to give guidance to keep things safe.

The bill is a good first step in bringing Canada into this element of digital trade.

[Slaw has discussed ETRs in the past, most recently when UNCITRAL adopted MLETR. Previous articles were mentioned in this summary.]

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Several times each month, we are pleased to republish a recent book review from the Canadian Law Library Review (CLLR). CLLR is the official journal of the Canadian Association of Law Libraries (CALL/ACBD), and its reviews cover both practice-oriented and academic publications related to the law.

How to Succeed (and Stay Human) in Law School: Pathways to Happiness and High Performance in the Study and Practice of Law. By Lynda Collins. Toronto: Emond, 2025. 160 p. Includes appendices and selected resources. ISBN 9781774625590 (softcover) $31.00; ISBN 9781774625606 (eBook) $31.00.

Reviewed by Katarina Daniels
Research Lawyer, Library Services Lead
Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP

In How to Succeed (and Stay Human) in Law School, Lynda Collins, a professor at the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Law and the creator of Ontario’s first full-credit law school course in “happiness and the law,” provides a much-needed handbook on the human side of legal education. Drawing on scientific research, decades of personal experience, and student reflections, Collins advances the thesis that a happy law student is more likely to be a successful law student. She argues that prioritizing well-being while navigating the stress, self-doubt, and emotional toll of law school contributes to one’s academic excellence. The book spans eight chapters, ranging from “The Wellbeing Advantage” and “The Physical Foundations of Wellbeing and High Performance” to “Advanced Learning Strategies for Law School” and “The Wellness-Informed Legal Job Search.” Supplementing these chapters are four appendices that include a law school to-do list, reading group activities, a sample exam grocery list, and selected resources.

I echo Professor Adam Dodek’s comment in the foreword that he wishes he had this book when he was in law school, and I suspect it will resonate with anyone who has lived through that experience. While reading, I recognised several strategies I had instinctively adopted during my own time in law school, although I lacked the scientific grounding to understand why they worked. Other suggestions were entirely new to me and, upon reflection, would have meaningfully helped my stress levels (and quite possibly my academic performance as well). This blend of validation and discovery makes the book both comforting and genuinely useful. What struck me most was how Collins seemed to anticipate my reactions as I read. More than once, I found myself thinking “Easier said than done!”, only to find a few paragraphs later Collins acknowledging precisely that same objection and offering practical ways to overcome it. Her awareness of her audience is one of the book’s greatest strengths. Collins does not simply prescribe: she engages in a dialogue with the reader, anticipating and addressing pushback with empathy and evidence.

Chapter 6, “Advanced Learning Strategies for Law School,” deserves special mention. The study tips Collins offers here are among the most practical advice in the book, covering everything from effective study breaks and regular review to how to actively study—and, just as importantly, how not to study—for exams. Her advice on social media usage is particularly realistic: rather than prescribing an unsustainable digital detox, Collins recognizes that social media is simply part of life and suggests structuring study breaks to still allow for checking one’s feeds. I especially appreciated her suggestion that students switch their laptops to airplane mode during study sessions, a deceptively simple act that acknowledges both the reality of distraction and the students’ capacity to manage it. That said, some of Collins’s advice will not be equally applicable across all law schools. At McGill, for instance, professors generally create their own course materials rather than using standard casebooks, and these materials usually do not include quizzes or practice problems for students to work through. Similarly, in my experience, professors did not make old exams available as preparation tools. Students at different schools may therefore need to adapt some of Collins’s more specific recommendations to their own contexts.

One of the more innovative aspects of the book is its workbook format. Collins leaves space throughout for readers to reflect and develop personalized strategies. I particularly appreciated the reading group activities and discussion questions in Appendix B, which encourage students to team up with classmates and apply the book’s suggestions collectively. The idea of transforming what can be an isolating experience into a collaborative one is both clever and entirely consistent with the book’s emphasis on social support as a pillar of well-being.

Also commendable is Collins’s willingness to recognise the limits of her expertise. When discussing topics such as mental health conditions, she does not overreach but instead refers readers to appropriate specialists and resources. This restraint lends credibility to the text and reflects a genuine concern for readers’ well-being.

Collins makes effective use of empirical research to support her arguments about the importance of self-care and happiness. For those of us trained to equate success with long hours and cramming, and who may be instinctively skeptical of wellness-oriented advice, being provided with clear studies supporting these claims is definitely persuasive. That said, as someone who routinely procrastinated—sometimes preparing course summaries up until just a few hours before an exam—and yet still excelled, I occasionally found myself wondering whether the studies cited were selectively chosen or whether contrary evidence exists. A more balanced engagement with the broader literature, or at least an acknowledgement of the potential limitations, would have helped quell my skepticism.

All in all, How to Succeed (and Stay Human) in Law School is an accessible and engaging read that encourages its readers to rethink their approach to law school, their legal careers, and their future happiness. Collins has produced a thoughtful and practical resource that fills a significant gap in legal education literature at a time when students and young lawyers are struggling with mental health concerns. This book should be made available in all academic law libraries, and I would highly recommend it to anyone entering or currently in law school.

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This is the final article in my series on RECLAIM, a cultural operating system for law firms. Having worked through Respect, Equity, Clarity, Learning, Autonomy and Inclusion, I finish with M for Meaning. You can find the full list of articles here.

I began this series in January 2026, in response to what I was reading about culture, and to hearing about law firms exploring culture at long last as an important part of their operations.

In strategic planning work with Carina Bittel, we have come to understand the relationship of culture to legal business this way: Strategy is the guiding path. Culture is the driving force, providing the energy to power the firm forward.

Healthy cultures generate trust. They generate engagement, energy and proactive attention. They foster higher performance.

I think back to a tour I did of Clio’s headquarters in Burnaby many years ago. I was greeted by a welcoming receptionist. As they talked to me about their culture, and their mission to transform the legal experience for all, I could feel how alive they all were to the meaning of their work. Anyone who has attended ClioCon understands the sense of commitment that Clions (as they call themselves) have for what they do, for the organization, for the mission and for serving clients. It is a tremendous example of a positive workplace culture, and a great deal of the company’s success comes from the culture they built.

The Human Operating System

To really understand what is happening with culture, it helps to understand our human operating system.

In the first article in this series, I shared some information on how our brains work. Thanks to the work of many neuroscientists over the last twenty years, we now have a much clearer understanding of our human operating system.

We know what our minds are alert to beneath the level of consciousness. We know the social cues the brain responds to with positive outputs, and which ones heighten stress and a sense of threat. A great deal of work has been done translating the neuroscience into the social sphere, and there I depend very much on David Rock and the team at the NeuroLeadership Institute.

Each letter of RECLAIM relates back to a social cue that our brain is actively alert to in its environment. When we sprinkle those cues into a firm’s day to day operations, we create a positive workplace where people are motivated to get things done.

Meaning and Mattering

Today we arrive at Meaning, the last letter in the series.

Meaning’s place in the RECLAIM model originates from the work of the Positive Psychologists, led by Martin Seligman and his team at the University of Pennsylvania and their colleagues of researchers and practitioners from around the world. Meaning is what people reach for once the essentials are covered: food, water, shelter, safety. Seligman and his colleagues place it at the centre of what makes work sustaining rather than depleting.

They pair it with something they call mattering. The M of meaning is also the M of mattering.

Mattering is the belief that you are needed, and that your contribution makes a difference to somebody. It shows up in the research on job satisfaction and on whether people stay.

Mattering sits very close to Inclusion in the RECLAIM model. Both are about the sense of being part of something important.

What Does Meaning Look Like in a Law Firm?

There are many opportunities to create a sense of meaning in a workplace.

Name the mission

Start with the overall mission that your firm, your practice group or your small team is there to achieve. It can be said plainly:

With care and compassion, we help our clients transition out of broken marriages to a new beginning.

We help families decide what happens to everything they have built, so the people they love are provided for and not left to fight over it.

We clear the legal path from raw land to finished building, so housing gets built in the communities that need it.

Talk about outcomes, not finish lines

Turn successful client work into stories that highlight meaning. Talk about client wins and successful outcomes. It is easy to report that we closed the deal, or that five divorces were finalized this month. The meaning is in the result for the people who were served.

Anyone can report that the power project closed. The meaning is that it will light five neighbourhoods.

Instead of announcing that the development financing closed, tell the story that the development will create fifteen below market homes, a hundred rental suites and a new daycare for the families in our community.

Explore what comes after the file closes, and why it matters.

Spotlight every role

Then talk about the team, and everyone’s part in making it happen.

The receptionist who greeted the clients so warmly every time they came in, who handled that very first call, and who remembered that one of them liked a particular kind of muffin. The legal assistant who kept the scheduling smooth, who worked the late nights when someone had to go the extra mile, and who stayed a steady, cheerful presence when things got rocky in the middle. The paralegal’s work. The associate’s work.

Spotlight all of it.

Centre roles on the mission, not the reporting line

When people join the firm, when you sit down for annual reviews, when you talk about compensation, describe the role in terms of the mission it serves. A role is best understood by its connection to the real work of the firm.

Centre people’s roles around the meaningful outcomes the team is working together to produce, rather than around who they report to.

Celebrate the small things

Celebrate small wins, small contributions, small pieces of meaning.

A colleague must work from home because their child is sick, so a paralegal steps up to take on a piece of work that had to be done to move the client’s case forward. That is a contribution worthy of recognition and an opportunity to sprinkle champagne, as we like to say at the Flourishing Law Centre.

Catch and recognise people doing small and large meaningful things. That is how you bring meaning to life in a workplace.

Where to Start

The best part is that none of this costs anything. It does take some thinking and planning to build it into the processes and systems you already have in place.

I would also encourage you to go back and look at the RECLAIM model and this series of articles. Print it out and keep it on your desk as a handy reference, to turn to when you are wondering how a new policy is going to land, or how to communicate something to the team, or what should be on the agenda at the next firm meeting, or what belongs in a performance review. The answers are in there.

Start with meaning this month. What can you do to bring it to life with your small legal team, your practice group or your firm?

Putting energy and care into building a culture that works in alignment with our human operating system will pay dividends. You end up with a place where people want to come to work and do the work.

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One of the recurring themes of this column has been the extent to which the governance of artificial intelligence in Canada is increasingly being shaped by institutions outside the country while regulatory action within the country is largely stalled. Anthropic’s recent announcement that future versions of Claude will place an invisible watermark in generated text offers the most recent example of this phenomenon. A transparency requirement enacted in the European Union will alter the operation of Claude globally and may therefore leave a detectable signal in legal work prepared in Canada, including work produced through specialized legal-focused AI platforms that incorporate Claude within a broader and increasingly complex collection of models. The announcement from Anthropic was published on August 14, 2026, shortly before this column was written. Accordingly, there remains a genuine lack of information about how the watermark will operate across the products and workflows through which professionals actually use Claude. In my view, the announcement warrants attention beyond its immediate technical details because it raises some more challenging questions about disclosure as well as professional competence.

Anthropic describes the watermark as a statistical pattern created through the ordinary process by which a large language model selects one word or token at a time. When Claude reaches a point at which several words would be equally appropriate, a secret key, together with the words that precede the choice, influences the source of randomness used to select the next word. Repeated over a sufficiently long passage, these choices create a pattern that someone with access to the key can evaluate to determine the likelihood that Claude participated in producing the text. The technique is based on Google DeepMind’s SynthID-Text approach and, according to Anthropic, does not require hidden characters, additional metadata, extra tokens, or changes that would be apparent to a reader. It also carries no information capable of identifying the user, organization, or particular conversation. The more significant issue lies in what the watermark can establish. A detected signal indicates a probability that Claude was involved at some point, which may include drafting, translating, summarizing, or substantially editing material that originated elsewhere. It provides no conclusion about authorship, ownership, accuracy, the degree of human contribution, or the responsibility of the person presenting the finished work. Detection will also be less reliable in short passages, factual text, source code, and proofreading, where there are fewer discretionary choices available to the model, while extensive rewriting or paraphrasing may weaken or remove the signal. Anthropic has announced that a detection API will be made available but has not yet explained who will have access to it, what confidence thresholds will be applied, or how results should be understood in professional, disciplinary, or evidentiary settings. For the moment, the watermark remains a potentially useful provenance signal whose practical significance is still unsettled.

The explanation for this change is found in Article 50 of the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act. Article 50(2) requires providers of generative AI systems to ensure that synthetic text and other generated content are marked in a machine-readable format and detectable as artificially generated or manipulated. The legislation requires these measures to be effective, interoperable, robust, and reliable as far as technically feasible, while recognizing limitations arising from the nature of the content and an exception for systems performing standard editing that does not substantially alter a user’s input. Anthropic has also signed the EU Code of Practice on Transparency of AI-Generated Content, a voluntary compliance framework developed to support the implementation of these binding obligations. Approximately 190 organizations have signed the Code, including Google, Meta, Microsoft, Mistral, and OpenAI, although the particular marking and detection methods adopted by each provider may differ. Anthropic has stated that its watermark will be deployed globally because the company does not currently possess a durable means of limiting the change by region. The result is a clear example of European regulation exerting practical influence well beyond Europe. Canada remains without comprehensive federal AI legislation, yet a European transparency rule is already changing the technical environment in which Canadian professionals work. The watermark itself will not reduce hallucinations, prevent inappropriate reliance, or ensure responsible use, although it forms part of a broader regulatory effort to improve transparency and accountability around generated content.

For Canadian lawyers, the issues become more complicated when Claude is accessed through a specialized legal sector focused AI product rather than directly. For instance, Harvey has integrated models from Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI and has explained that its platform may automatically route different legal tasks, or different stages of a workflow, to the model considered best suited to the work. Thomson Reuters describes CoCounsel as having a multi-model architecture that includes Claude, OpenAI GPT, Google Gemini, and proprietary technology, while its next generation of CoCounsel Legal has been built on Anthropic’s Claude Agent SDK. LexisNexis Canada offers Claude alongside several OpenAI models through Protégé General AI. Even as this article was being prepared, that landscape became more complex. On August 20, Harvey announced Tenet, a research-stage model and four days later, Thomson Reuters formally launched Thomson, its own proprietary model. Thomson will initially power CoCounsel’s Tabular Analysis, although CoCounsel remains a multi-model system and its next-generation agentic architecture continues to use the Claude Agent SDK.

As of the date of the writing of this article, I have been unable to locate public guidance from these providers addressing what Claude’s watermark will mean within their respective platforms. It is unclear whether the signal will remain detectable after a legal product retrieves authorities, inserts citations, combines responses from several models, applies a firm template, or otherwise transforms the underlying output. It is similarly unclear whether a lawyer will know which model generated a particular portion of a document, whether vendors will provide access to detection results, and what audit record will remain after a multi-stage workflow has been completed. These questions fall comfortably within existing concepts of professional competence and technology oversight. Most Law Societies in Canada now provide some form of guidance that addresses competence, confidentiality, candour, supervision, information security, reasonable fees, and the lawyer’s continuing responsibility for technology-produced work. In this environment, competence may increasingly require an understanding of the technological supply chain beneath a legal product, sufficient to determine how the work was produced, what records exist, and whether the lawyer can comply with obligations owed to clients, courts, and regulators.

At this early stage, firm conclusions about the professional impact of Claude’s watermark would be premature. Anthropic’s detection tools have not yet been released, previously launched models are still being brought within the marking system, and the operation of the watermark inside multi-model legal platforms remains largely unexplained. Once detection tools become available, there is also a risk that a probabilistic signal will be asked to bear more weight than it reasonably can, particularly if courts, clients, employers, or professional regulators rely on detection results without a careful appreciation of their limitations. The fact that features of two leading legal AI platforms changed while this article was being prepared illustrates both the pace of development and the difficulty of governing products whose underlying models and architecture may change after they have been adopted. The broader significance of Anthropic’s announcement lies in what it reveals about the changing structure of AI governance. A European transparency obligation has reached Canadian professional work through the technical design of a foundation model, while the legal products that mediate access to that model have yet to explain fully how the change will appear within their own systems. For law firms and legal departments, a sensible response will include seeking information from vendors, reviewing internal disclosure and record-keeping practices, and ensuring that lawyers understand which models are contributing to consequential work. This oversight must continue after a product has been approved, particularly as vendors introduce proprietary models and alter the allocation of work among them. If a client, court, or regulator later asks how artificial intelligence contributed to a particular document, the relevant professional should be able to provide an account grounded in more than the appearance of the finished work and more complete than the probability reported by an invisible watermark.

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Note: Generative AI was used in the preparation of this article.

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Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Canadian Combat Sports Law Blog 2. PierreRoy & Associés 3. Canadian occupational health & safety law 4. Legal Feeds 5. ABlawg.ca

Canadian Combat Sports Law Blog
Study – Brain Damage in Strikers vs Grapplers

A recent study conducted neuropsychological testing on a group of strikers and grapplers. Unsurprisingly the strikers had worse outcomes than the grapplers. The strikers “scored significantly lower in processing speed and verbal learning and memory“. The strikers were broken down into two groups. Professional fighters (boxing, kickboxing or MMA) and amateur athletes in the same disciplines. Interestingly “no significant cognitive differences were found between professional and amateur impact sport athletes”. …

PierreRoy & Associés
Dépenses d’été : comment profiter de la saison sans compromettre sa santé financière

L’été multiplie les occasions de dépenser. Et contrairement à la période des Fêtes, où l’on sait d’avance que le portefeuille sera sollicité, les dépenses estivales arrivent souvent de façon graduelle — sans qu’on réalise l’ampleur du total. Chez Pierre Roy & Associés, nous constatons chaque automne une hausse des consultations liées à un endettement qui s’est accéléré pendant l’été. La bonne nouvelle? Avec un peu de planification, il est tout à fait possible de profiter de la belle saison sans compromettre sa santé financière. …

Canadian occupational health & safety law
Alberta’s Bill 11: What every employer needs to know about the new health benefits rules

Bill 11, formally the Health Statutes Amendment Act, 2025 (No. 2), was introduced in late October 2025 and received Royal Assent on December 11, 2025. Once in force, it will amend the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, RSA 2000, c A-20 to change how health coverage is coordinated in Alberta. ...

Legal Feeds
SCC explains why it annulled Terrebonne election over uncounted mail-in ballot

ABlawg.ca
Intimate Image Abuse in the Age of Deepfakes: Reforming Alberta’s Civil Legislation: Part 2

The Canadian Centre for Child Protection reported that non-consensual distribution of intimate images (NCDII) involving Canadian youth increased by approximately 21% between 2024 and 2025, from 436 to 527. Despite the growing prevalence of intimate image abuse, Alberta does not provide a dedicated process for obtaining an expedited intimate image protection order or expressly authorize orders requiring online platforms to remove intimate images. Victims seeking protective relief must instead navigate ordinary civil proceedings or pursue voluntary removal through online platforms. …

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*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

FAILLITE ET INSOLVABILITÉ : La créancière hypothécaire est autorisée à poursuivre l’exécution du jugement ayant autorisé la vente sous contrôle de justice d’un immeuble, principal actif de la débitrice, qui a été rendu avant que celle-ci ne dépose son avis d’intention; exerçant le pouvoir discrétionnaire que lui reconnaît l’article 69.4 de la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité, le tribunal ordonne que l’avis de surseoir du syndic ne lui soit pas applicable.

Intitulé : Proposition de AZ Recrutement inc., 2026 QCCS 3025
Juridiction : Cour supérieure (C.S.), Montréal
Décision de : Juge Céline Legendre
Date : 13 août 2026

Résumé

FAILLITE ET INSOLVABILITÉ — procédure — suspension des procédures — levée de la suspension — créancier — immeuble — recours hypothécaires — préavis d’exercice — délaissement forcé — vente sous contrôle de justice — détenteur d’un jugement — avis d’intention de faire une proposition — application de l’article 69.4 de la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité — pouvoir discrétionnaire — préjudice sérieux — frais engagés — conduite du débiteur.

Demande de bene esse visant à faire déclarer la suspension des procédures non applicable et à obtenir la levée de celle-ci. Accueillie en partie.

La requérante est devenue créancière hypothécaire d’un immeuble constituant le principal actif de la débitrice, à la suite d’une cession, en sa faveur, de l’ensemble des droits, titres et intérêts détenus par une société de fiducie à l’égard d’un prêt intervenu avec la débitrice. Le seul actionnaire et président de cette dernière s’est porté caution des obligations. La requérante a obtenu, en février 2026, un jugement ayant condamné solidairement la débitrice et la caution à lui payer la somme de 1 445 021 $ et ayant autorisé la vente sous contrôle de justice de l’immeuble avec une mise à prix minimale de 602 250 $. Le 7 avril suivant, avant que ne soit écoulé le délai qui lui avait été accordé pour délaisser l’immeuble, la débitrice a déposé un avis d’intention de faire une proposition en vertu de la loi. Le syndic nommé au dossier a informé les huissiers de la requérante et leur a demandé de surseoir à toutes les mesures d’exécution.

Au soutien de sa demande, la requérante allègue que le préavis d’exercice prévu à l’article 2757 du Code civil du Québec est équivalent à un avis suivant l’article 244 de la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité et produit les mêmes effets. De façon subsidiaire, elle demande au tribunal d’exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire en vertu de l’article 69.4 de la loi et de lever la suspension des procédures à son égard.

Décision

L’article 69 (2) a) de la loi ne trouve pas application en l’espèce puisque la requérante n’a pas pris possession de l’immeuble. Quant aux paragraphes b) et c) de cet article, ils traitent du préavis en vertu de l’article 244 de la loi, qui fait référence à des biens d’une personne insolvable acquis ou utilisés dans le cadre des affaires de cette dernière. Or, la preuve ne permet pas de conclure que l’immeuble a été acquis ou utilisé dans le cadre des affaires de la débitrice. Par ailleurs, même s’il est vrai que le préavis d’exercice hypothécaire contient toutes les exigences de celui prévu à l’article 244 (1) de la loi, en ce qu’il a été signifié et contient l’information exigée par le formulaire prescrit par le surintendant, l’article 69 (2) b) ne peut trouver application en l’espèce, l’immeuble n’étant pas visé par l’article 244 (1) de la loi.

La loi est d’ordre public et constitue un régime complet en soi. Ses dispositions doivent être rigoureusement observées en raison de leurs conséquences pour les droits respectifs des débiteurs et des créanciers. Dans le présent cas, la preuve justifie que le tribunal exerce le pouvoir discrétionnaire qui lui est conféré par l’article 69.4 de la loi puisque la requérante subit un préjudice sérieux au sens de cet article. En effet, en plus de demeurer impayée depuis septembre 2023, elle acquitte, depuis des années, les taxes scolaires et municipales afférentes à l’immeuble et elle continue d’engager des frais, et ce, alors même que la débitrice n’a pas contesté sa demande introductive d’instance dans le dossier civil, qui date de 2024, et que le jugement a été rendu en février 2026.

La débitrice indique qu’elle tente de mettre en vente l’immeuble au bénéfice de l’ensemble des créanciers, dont la requérante. Or, la preuve indique qu’il n’y a pas eu de progrès considérables. La chronologie des faits au dossier démontre que la débitrice cherche à créer des délais et à frustrer les droits de la requérante et ne permet pas de conclure qu’il est probable qu’une solution puisse être trouvée rapidement par la débitrice.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

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As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeals

Elections: Irregularities
Sinclair-Desgagné v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2026 SCC 31  (42076)

Federal election irregularities; annulment.

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The Society for Children and Youth of BC (SCYBC) recently published a series of research papers on child capacity in the context of children’s participation rights [Note 1]. The papers examine capacity generally and in four specific contexts: health care, mental health, family law, and child welfare and adoption.

Why does this matter? Traditionally, we have tended to assume that a child must first demonstrate sufficient “capacity” before being permitted to meaningfully participate in decisions affecting their life. And capacity has often been assessed primarily through the lens of cognitive ability.

The SCYBC reports challenge both assumptions.

I found them eye-opening. Although I have studied children’s meaningful participation for some time, I realized that I had been looking at capacity largely through the lens of my own experience in the legal system. The research paints a much more nuanced and multidimensional picture.

It also busts some persistent myths.

Myth 1: Capacity depends on cognitive ability

There is no universally agreed-upon definition of capacity. Importantly, capacity encompasses more than cognitive or developmental ability. It also includes “legal capacity” which recognizes that a child is a person with rights.

Developmental capacity itself has multiple dimensions: physical, relational, emotional and cognitive. It evolves over time, at different rates, and within the complex contexts in which a child lives. A child’s capacity to participate may also be different from their capacity to make a particular decision.

Most importantly, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) does not require a child to pass a cognitive test before having a right to be heard. Article 12 requires only that a child be “capable of forming his or her own views.” [Note 2]

That is a significantly different starting point.

Myth 2: Age tells us whether a child has capacity

Age alone is not a reliable indicator of capacity.

The UNCRC emphasizes that children can form views from a young age, even when they cannot yet express those views verbally. Adults, including professionals, tend to underestimate children’s capacities or to rely too heavily on age while overlooking their rights and other developmental factors.

In family law, I still hear variations of the statement that children can “decide with their feet” once they turn 12. This is an oversimplification of both the law and the social science research.[3]

There is no magical birthday on which a child suddenly acquires capacity.

Myth 3: Children must prove they have capacity before they can participate

This may be one of the most important shifts in thinking.

The research supports a presumption that children have capacity to express their views and preferences. As the introductory report puts it: “It is not up to the child to first prove her or his capacity.” [Note 4]

In other words, perhaps we have been asking the wrong question. Instead of asking, “Does this child have the capacity to participate?”, the family law report suggests asking: “How can we support this child to uphold their right to participate? What changes do our practices require?”

That reframing shifts responsibility from the child to the adults and systems around them.

Myth 4: “Best interests” should always trump participation

The best interests of the child remains a fundamental principle, but it should not eclipse the child’s separate right to be heard.

The two rights are distinct but interconnected. Problems arise when adults use their own assessment of a child’s best interests to justify excluding the child from participation, particularly when “best interests” are understood primarily through the perspectives of parents or other adults.

A determination about what is best for a child should be informed by the child, not used as a reason to silence them.

Myth 5: Parents can adequately represent their children’s views

Parents usually know their children extremely well and play an essential role in their lives. But that does not mean a parent’s perspective is the same as the child’s.

This is particularly evident in family law. Parents may be in court precisely because they disagree about what is best for their child. Relying exclusively on the parents to communicate the child’s views in those circumstances can leave the person most affected by the decision without an independent voice.

Myth 6: We protect children from family conflict by excluding them

The instinct to protect children from the turmoil of family breakdown is understandable. But protection and participation do not have to be in conflict.

The family law report cites research confirming that greater harm can result from excluding children, hindering their participation and disempowering them. [Note 5] Children generally know that important decisions are being made about their lives. Preventing them from expressing their views does not necessarily protect them from the conflict and may increase their distress.

This does not mean children should be forced to participate. Participation is a right, not an obligation. Children need information about their participation rights, appropriate choices about whether and how to participate, and supports that allow them to communicate in ways that work for them.

A different starting point

Perhaps the most important message from these reports is that we need to reconsider where we place the burden. Rather than requiring children to demonstrate that they are sufficiently mature, articulate or cognitively capable to earn a place in decisions affecting them, we might begin with a presumption that they have a right to participate, and then ask what we need to do to make that participation meaningful.

That is more than a subtle change in language. For lawyers, judges, mediators, parenting coordinators, health professionals, social workers, parents and others who make decisions affecting children, it invites us to examine our own assumptions, practices and systems.

The question is no longer “Is this child capable of participating?” It is “What are we doing to make their participation possible?”

The SCYBC reports are well worth reading.

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Notes

[1] The research was funded by the Office of the Representative for Children and Youth of BC (RCYBC). The SCYBC series includes an introductory report on child capacity and participation and reports addressing health care, mental health, family law, and child welfare and adoption.

[2] Article 12 of the UNCRC. As the research notes, meaningful expression may include non-verbal forms of communication such as play, body language, facial expressions, drawing and painting.

[3] The misconception may arise in part from references to age 12 in BC’s Child, Family and Community Service Act, many of which concern procedural rights such as notification or service of documents.

[4] UNCRC Article 12, UN General Comment 12.

[5] For example, the report cites Jackson and Martinson (2020), Implementing Children’s Participation Rights in Family Law and Child Welfare Court Proceedings: A Literature Review, (prepared by the FREDA Centre, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, for the BC Office of the Representative for Children and Youth), and important research by Rachel Birnbaum and Nicholas Bala.

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