Much of the work of the BC Family Justice Innovation Lab (FJIL) has focused on our Youth Voices initiative. Coming out of an intensive design process centering the lived experience of young people, the Youth Voices Initiative aims to improve the well-being of children and youth experiencing parental separation. An important lesson learned was that while the family justice system formally acknowledged the importance of the “best interests of the child”, and there were some programs that sought the view of kids about decisions which affected their lives, the kids’ experience was often that it was “too little, too late”. We knew voice was important but was it enough?

At the heart of this work is Article 12 of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Note 1. It defines children’s right to have their views given due weight. It is deeper and richer than you might think.

This is a right of the child, not a privilege offered by adults.

The inspirational work of Professor Laura Lundy (Queen’s University Belfast) transformed our thinking and approach. Professor Lundy’s original study in 2005 identified lack of compliance with Article 12 – limiting interpretation to “voice” alone. In the study, young people consistently reported frustration that their views were not being listened to and taken seriously. Professor Lundy found that phrases like “voice of the child”, “the right to be heard” and “the right to have a say” were imperfect descriptions of the fullness of what Article 12 intended to address. Something was missing. In response, she proposed a model for rights-compliant children’s participation which suggests that implementation of Article 12 requires consideration of four inter-related concepts:

• SPACE; Children must be given the opportunity to express a view
• VOICE: Children must be facilitated to express their views
• AUDIENCE: The view must be listened to
• INFLUENCE: The view must be acted upon, as appropriate

This model changed the global understanding of child participation. It has been used by the United Nations, governments, national and international organizations and other agencies / NGO’s in many different social contexts including education, policy development, city planning, health and justice.

Since then, Professor Lundy has deepened and enhanced the model to require careful process design:

SPACE: Duty bearers must actively create a safe and inclusive space for the child to express their views. Kids will not often insist on expressing views on their own.

Also, the right to express a view is not dependent on the child’s age or maturity (those factors are relevant ONLY to weight).

VOICE: This is a right of the child and not a duty (some will choose not to express their view). Also, the child must have a choice in the mode of expression and they may need help to form and express their views.

AUDIENCE: This may be the most crucial aspect. The rights holder (child) needs to know that the actual duty bearer (decision-maker/person with influence over their life) listens to and hears their views. This may require formal channels of communication. Note 2

INFLUENCE: The child’s views must be given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. This highlights children’s autonomy and self-expression. It is not about the child’s incompetence and need for socialization. The duty bearer(s) must give feedback to the child about the extent of influence they have had. There should be a formal response. Note 3.

The Lundy Model could be the key to unlock meaningful system transformation for kids in family justice in BC. Attention to thoughtful process design both in and out of court could improve well-being of kids and their families. The work of FJIL, in collaboration with Access to Justice BC and the Transform the Family Justice System Collaborative, aims to shift our attitudes, processes and tools to that end.

Voice is good but not enough. Consideration of all four aspects of the Lundy Model is required.

Excellent resources include:

• Ireland’s National Strategy on Children and Young People’s Participation in Decision-Making 2015-2020
• Ireland’s National Framework for Children and Young People’s Participation in Decision-making (which includes helpful checklists and feedback forms)
• Professor Lundy’s video presentation to the Early Childhood Voices Conference 2020

_____

Note 1: Canada officially ratified the UNCRC in 1991.

1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.

Note 2: Conflict resolution professionals will recognize the need for “active listening” i.e. listening to understand not to defend. In addition, thoughtful design (or perhaps co-design) of conflict resolution processes will be critical. Professor Lundy recommends “Creating a children’s plan with children” Kotsanas, Smith, MacNaughton research report 43 May 2014 which includes good examples of kids’ views being used in planning decisions in Melbourne Australia.

Note 3: In other jurisdictions, Judges have chosen to write their decisions involving children in the form of a letter to the child which specifically details the child’s views and how they were considered and acted on, if appropriate.

The post Meaningful Participation of Children and Youth in Justice: Voice Is Not Enough appeared first on Slaw.

I learned what a “third place” was long before I knew the term. At the time, it didn’t feel like a lesson. It felt like a demotion.

When I was practising law at the City of Toronto, space was at a premium. New hires were placed wherever a desk could be found

As a junior lawyer, it was only a matter of time until a more senior hire bumped me out of my office.

But I wasn’t expecting to be reassigned to a desk in the law department library.

To add literal injury to insult, this happened just after I’d sprained an ankle. I remember sitting at my new desk, no door or walls to hide my awkwardly propped up leg, feeling exposed, sidelined, and a bit bitter about my circumstances. Okay, let’s be honest: a lot bitter.

Offices matter in law. They signal belonging, status, and legitimacy. Losing mine felt like losing more than square footage. I was acutely aware that I had been displaced from what looked, and felt, like the real centre of work.

What I didn’t expect was how much that desk in the library would reshape my experience of practice.

Because of where I was sitting, people stopped. Lawyers from departments I rarely interacted with struck up conversations. They asked what I was working on, shared what they were dealing with, compared notes on process problems and institutional pressures.

One kind person lent me a pillow she usually kept in her office to make my elevated leg more comfortable.

I began to learn things from my fellow City lawyers in a way I previously hadn’t, including how much legal work turns on soft knowledge and skills rather than formal doctrine.

And then there were the librarians. Watching them work was a quiet education. They didn’t simply retrieve sources. They helped lawyers articulate half‑formed questions, redirected research paths before they became dead ends, and supplied context that made doctrine usable.

In retrospect, what they were offering looked very much like mentorship—just without a formal program. At the time, I wouldn’t have called any of this mentorship. But that’s exactly what it was.

The Third Space: Neither Firm nor Elsewhere

That library wasn’t a courthouse library; it was a law department library. But what mattered wasn’t the label. It was the function.

The library occupied an in‑between space, one embedded in practice, yet offering opportunities to slow down, voice tentative questions, and learn informally from one another in ways that formal workplaces rarely make possible.

Ray Oldenburg coined the term “third space.” He identified public places that are neither work nor home—cafes, parks, public libraries, or community centers—but are essential for building community, fostering social connection, and reducing loneliness.

Looking back, it strikes me that the law library functioned like a third place for legal practice, and how beneficial these spaces are.

Mentorship Needs Space Before It Needs Structure

Much of the current conversation about mentorship in law focuses on formal programs with assigned mentors, scheduled check‑ins, and tie-ins to professional development plans.

These are valuable!

But they assume a baseline level of institutional support that many lawyers simply do not have, especially the sole practitioners and small firms that make up the majority of courthouse library users.

Mentorship can be just as valuable, arguably more so, when it is a natural, voluntary, and unstructured relationship. For all that law is an adversarial profession, lawyers are generally collegial, and many seasoned practitioners are happy to offer guidance to those coming up behind them.

This type of mentorship grows organically, often evolving from professional admiration or friendship without formal matchmaking or strict timelines. And it needs a place to take seed.

Without space, learning is pushed into formal channels that are necessarily limited and, often, inaccessible to those outside larger institutional settings.

How Courthouse Libraries Help

This is where courthouse libraries play a particularly important role.

Courthouse libraries are often used most heavily by solo practitioners and lawyers in small firms—precisely the segment of the profession least likely to have access to formal mentorship structures. These lawyers do not have practice group meetings, in‑house training sessions, or a steady supply of colleagues down the hall to consult.

For them, the courthouse library is not an auxiliary service. It is part of the learning environment of practice.

These libraries function as third places not just socially, but professionally. They are shared spaces where isolation is softened, and where learning happens collaboratively rather than competitively.

In a profession that leaves fewer places for the informal learning that is crucial to the administration of justice, courthouse libraries quietly continue to make room.

The post How I Learned About Mentorship by Being “Exiled” to the Library appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. IFLS at Osgoode 2. Family LLB 3. Canadian Appeals Monitor 4. Double Aspect 5. Legal Feeds 

IFLS at Osgoode
Osgoode honours alumni making an impact across law and society

The 2026 Alumni Awards recognized graduates whose careers reflect leadership, service and a commitment to justice. Across Canada and beyond, Osgoode alumni are advancing justice in courtrooms, communities, classrooms and public institutions. From strengthening Indigenous governance and expanding access to justice, to shaping public policy, mentoring future lawyers and leading with compassion on the bench, this year’s alumni award recipients reflect the breadth and impact of the Osgoode Hall Law School community. “At Osgoode, we see the law as a tool for building a more just and equitable society,” said Dean Trevor Farrow. “What’s so inspiring about this year’s recipients is how they are putting that into practice—through leadership, service, and a deep commitment to the communities they serve.” …

Family LLB
Enforcing Child Support in Ontario: What Happens When Payments Stop and How to Get Results

Most parenting and support issues in family law turn on judgment and discretion. Enforcement is different. When child support is ordered or agreed to, it is not optional. If payments stop, there is a structured system in Ontario designed to collect, enforce, and in some cases compel compliance. This article explains how enforcement actually works, what tools are available, and what both payors and recipients need to understand. …

Canadian Appeals Monitor
Inclusion Now Annual Report 2025

McCarthy Tétrault is proud to release our Inclusion Now Annual Report 2025, offering a closer look at how inclusion is shaping the way we work, lead, and contribute across the Firm. Inclusion lives in the everyday decisions we make — how we lead, how we collaborate, and how we show up for one another. This idea is at the heart of this year’s report. From education and leadership engagement to talent initiatives, community partnerships, and pro bono advocacy, the report brings to life how our Inclusion Now strategy informs our day‑to‑day work and our broader impact on the legal profession and the communities we serve. The stories we share and initiatives we highlight showcase our commitment to building a culture where people feel respected, supported, and able to thrive. …

Double Aspect
You Can’t Have a Pony

Legal Feeds
Landmark Supreme Court of Canada decision creates new tort of intimate partner violence

In a landmark 6-3 decision on Friday, a Supreme Court of Canada majority recognized a new tort of intimate partner violence, paving the way for litigants to pursue damages against their romantic partners for a range of conduct beyond physical violence, including isolation, humiliation, surveillance, financial control, sexual coercion, and intimidation. …

_________________________

*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : Les peines minimales obligatoires de 1 an d’emprisonnement pour les infractions de production et de distribution de matériel de pornographie juvénile sont incompatibles avec l’article 12 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et sont déclarées invalides en vertu de l’article 52 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982.

Intitulé : R. c. Gagnon, 2026 QCCA 583
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Yves-Marie Morissette et Patrick Healy; Lori Renée Weitzman (diss.)
Date : 29 avril 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions de nature sexuelle — publications obscènes — possession, production et distribution de matériel de pornographie juvénile — accusée âgée de 54 ans — participation à des sites Internet faisant la promotion d’activités sexuelles — protection contre tous traitements ou peines cruels et inusités — peine minimale — détention — production et distribution de matériel de pornographie juvénile — invalidité constitutionnelle — déclaration d’inopérabilité constitutionnelle — gravité de l’infraction — culpabilité morale — quantité de matériel — ampleur limitée de la distribution — durée de l’infraction — situation personnelle de l’accusée — absence de risque de récidive — proportionnalité de la peine — dénonciation — dissuasion — réinsertion sociale — détention — peine discontinue — appel — erreur de principe — substitution de la peine — condamnation avec sursis — peine concurrente — probation.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — principes généraux — les peines et la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés — protection contre tous traitements ou peines cruels et inusités — peine minimale — détention — production et distribution de matériel de pornographie juvénile — application du cadre d’analyse de Québec (Procureur général) c. Senneville (C.S. Can., 2025-10-31), 2025 CSC 33, SOQUIJ AZ-52166252, 2025EXP-2453 — situation hypothétique — situation raisonnablement prévisible — peine disproportionnée — invalidité constitutionnelle — déclaration d’inopérabilité constitutionnelle — gravité de l’infraction — culpabilité morale — quantité de matériel — ampleur limitée de la distribution — durée de l’infraction — situation personnelle de l’accusée — effets de la peine minimale sur l’accusée — proportionnalité de la peine — dénonciation — dissuasion — réinsertion sociale — appel.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — garanties fondamentales du processus pénal — protection contre tous traitements ou peines cruels et inusités — peine minimale — détention — production et distribution de matériel de pornographie juvénile — application du cadre d’analyse de Québec (Procureur général) c. Senneville (C.S. Can., 2025-10-31), 2025 CSC 33, SOQUIJ AZ-52166252, 2025EXP-2453 — situation hypothétique — situation raisonnablement prévisible — peine disproportionnée — invalidité constitutionnelle — déclaration d’inopérabilité constitutionnelle — gravité de l’infraction — culpabilité morale — quantité de matériel — ampleur limitée de la distribution — durée de l’infraction — situation personnelle de l’accusée — effets de la peine minimale sur l’accusée — proportionnalité de la peine — dénonciation — dissuasion — réinsertion sociale — appel.

DROITS ET LIBERTÉS — droits judiciaires — protection contre tous traitements ou peines cruels et inusités — peine minimale — détention — production et distribution de matériel de pornographie juvénile — application du cadre d’analyse de Québec (Procureur général) c. Senneville (C.S. Can., 2025-10-31), 2025 CSC 33, SOQUIJ AZ-52166252, 2025EXP-2453 — situation hypothétique — situation raisonnablement prévisible — peine disproportionnée — invalidité constitutionnelle — déclaration d’inopérabilité constitutionnelle — gravité de l’infraction — culpabilité morale — quantité de matériel — ampleur limitée de la distribution — durée de l’infraction — situation personnelle de l’accusée — effets de la peine minimale sur l’accusée — proportionnalité de la peine — dénonciation — dissuasion — réinsertion sociale — appel.

DROITS ET LIBERTÉS — réparation du préjudice — déclaration d’inopérabilité constitutionnelle — protection contre tous traitements ou peines cruels et inusités — peine minimale — détention — production et distribution de matériel de pornographie juvénile — invalidité constitutionnelle — appel.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — procédure pénale — procédure fédérale — procureur général du Québec (PGQ) — autorisation d’interjeter appel en tant que partie dans un appel entrepris par le Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales (DPCP) — appel de la peine — application de l’article 676 (1) d) C.Cr. — pouvoir en matière de poursuites — intérêt et qualité pour agir du PGQ — observations sur la validité constitutionnelle d’une règle de droit — peine minimale obligatoire — pouvoir partagé avec le DPCP — article 23 de la Loi sur le Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales.

CONSTITUTIONNEL (DROIT) — institution constitutionnelle — procureur général du Québec (PGQ) — autorisation d’interjeter appel en tant que partie dans un appel entrepris par le Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales (DPCP) — appel de la peine — application de l’article 676 (1) d) C.Cr. — pouvoir en matière de poursuites — intérêt et qualité pour agir du PGQ — observations sur la validité constitutionnelle d’une règle de droit — peine minimale obligatoire — pouvoir partagé avec le DPCP — rôle du PGQ — indépendance — Loi sur le Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales.

Appel de la déclaration d’inopérabilité des peines minimales obligatoires pour la production, la distribution et la possession de matériel de pornographie juvénile. Rejeté. Appel de peines. Accueilli. Requête en autorisation d’appel du procureur général du Québec (PGQ). Accueillie, avec dissidence.

L’intimée a plaidé coupable sous 3 chefs d’accusation de production, de distribution et de possession de matériel de pornographie juvénile. Les infractions ont eu lieu alors que cette dernière, une femme de 54 ans, vivait une période difficile. C’est dans ce contexte qu’elle a intégré un réseau de rencontres virtuelles et a échangé ses fantasmes pédophiles avec le coaccusé. Pendant une semaine, elle lui a transmis plusieurs photographies pédopornographiques. La juge de première instance a conclu que, pour l’intimée, les peines minimales obligatoires seraient totalement disproportionnées au sens de l’article 12 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et étaient inopérantes. Elle a ordonné des peines de détention discontinue de 3 mois sous chacun des chefs. La demande d’autorisation d’appel a été présentée conjointement par le Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales (DPCP) et le PGQ; ce dernier sollicite l’autorisation à titre d’appelant.

Décision

M. le juge Healy: L’article 676 (1) d) du Code criminel autorise le «procureur général» à porter en appel une peine, ce qui inclut toute déclaration selon laquelle une peine minimale est inopérante ou invalide. Trois éléments appuient la conclusion voulant que le PGQ puisse solliciter l’autorisation d’interjeter appel à titre de partie dans un appel entrepris par le DPCP: l’évolution de la fonction de procureur général en tant que premier conseiller juridique de l’État; le cadre législatif québécois régissant les fonctions de PGQ et de DPCP; et la pratique actuelle. Ainsi, aucune barrière constitutionnelle n’empêche d’accorder au PGQ l’autorisation de participer au présent appel à titre de partie et de faire des observations portant uniquement sur la validité constitutionnelle des peines minimales obligatoires pour les infractions en cause.

Quant à la peine, l’analyse de la Cour suprême du Canada dans Québec (Procureur général) c. Senneville (C.S. Can., 2025-10-31), 2025 CSC 33, SOQUIJ AZ-52166252, 2025EXP-2453, est tout aussi pertinente pour les infractions de production et de distribution de matériel de pornographie juvénile qu’elle l’est pour les infractions de possession d’un tel matériel et d’accès à celui-ci. La Cour convient que les peines minimales prévues pour les infractions de production et de distribution sont incompatibles avec l’article 12 de la charte. Cela se justifie notamment par le fait que, si l’on applique la situation raisonnablement prévisible énoncée dans Senneville en l’adaptant au présent cas, une peine minimale obligatoire de 1 an serait d’une sévérité disproportionnée. Les infractions couvrent un large éventail de situations allant d’actes d’une gravité relativement mineure à d’autres qui dénotent une grande criminalité. Or, la situation raisonnablement prévisible adaptée au présent cas offre un exemple d’infractions qui se situent au bas de l’échelle de gravité et démontre par ailleurs que les peines minimales obligatoires s’appliquent avec la même force à des situations exigeant l’imposition de peines lourdes qu’à d’autres ne l’exigeant pas.

D’autre part, s’il est vrai que le tort causé par les infractions de production et de distribution de matériel de pornographie juvénile peut excéder celui causé par les infractions de possession et d’accès, ce n’est pas le cas en l’espèce. On ne peut affirmer que, dans tous les cas, les infractions de production et de distribution exigent une peine plus sévère qu’en présence d’une infraction de possession. Les infractions commises par l’intimée, quoiqu’elles soient empreintes d’une gravité inhérente, ne sont pas parmi les plus graves. Certains éléments peuvent se comparer à la situation raisonnablement prévisible adaptée aux besoins de l’espèce. Les peines minimales sont disproportionnées parce que les objectifs de justice punitive ne peuvent valablement éclipser les objectifs de justice corrective dans les cas où la peine proportionnée se révèle moins sévère que la peine minimale.

Bien que les gestes de l’intimée ne fassent pas partie des cas les plus graves de pédopornographie, seule une peine plus sévère pourra satisfaire aux exigences de la proportionnalité. Rien n’indique que l’intimée représente un danger immédiat ou futur pour la société. La dissuasion spécifique n’est pas un objectif pertinent dans le présent dossier. L’intimée a démontré qu’elle avait réellement pris conscience de sa responsabilité et elle a reconnu le tort qu’elle avait causé. Bien que ces éléments n’atténuent aucunement la gravité des infractions ni sa responsabilité, la preuve mène à la conclusion que rien ne justifie de la condamner à une peine d’emprisonnement continue dans un établissement correctionnel. Ainsi, des peines concurrentes d’emprisonnement avec sursis de 12 mois sous les chefs de production et de distribution ainsi que de 9 mois sous le chef de possession sont substituées aux peines prononcées par la juge.

M^me la juge Weitzman, dissidente: Le PGQ ne peut se pourvoir en appel ni en vertu du Code de procédure civile, inapplicable au présent cas, ni en vertu du Code criminel puisqu’il n’a pas pris en charge l’affaire conformément à l’article 23 de la Loi sur le Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’il n’a pas voix au chapitre. Puisqu’il était partie au litige en première instance, le PGQ est mis en cause dans le cadre de l’appel interjeté par le DPCP et, à ce titre, il a le droit de produire un mémoire et des annexes ainsi que de demander à la Cour de prononcer des conclusions contraires au dispositif du jugement de première instance.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeal

Torts: Intimate Partner Violence
Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16 (41061)

New tort: intimate partner violence

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Criminal Law: Homicide
R. v. Dussault, 2025 QCCA 1433 (42169)

Sentencing issues re consecutive jury trials.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

Those familiar with my writing will know that I usually write about artificial intelligence in terms of regulation, governance, and risk. This piece is a slight departure. What follows is a set of reflections for young professionals working in AI, or considering work in the field, at a moment when the pace of change, the visibility of the space, and the pressure to find one’s place in it can easily create more anxiety than clarity. I use the phrase “young professional” in a broad sense. It follows a familiar tradition in reflective writing, but I do not mean it strictly by age. In a field like AI, a person can be well established in one profession and still quite new to the work of finding their place in this one.

Part of the reason I wanted to write this piece is that I increasingly think one of the risks in AI is not only model failure, weak governance, or poor regulation. It is also the possibility that we scare away or burn out the people trying to work responsibly in this field. That may sound like a softer concern than the others, but I do not think it is any less real. A professional environment that rewards urgency, overcommitment, and constant public repositioning can take a considerable toll on the people inside it. Even by the standards of emerging fields, AI feels unusually intense. The pace is faster, the visibility is greater, and the pressure to position oneself convincingly is unusually strong.

Lawyers, of course, are not strangers to that problem. Mental health challenges in the legal profession have been with us for a long time, and they do not disappear simply because the subject matter becomes more modern or more exciting. I do not say that from a comfortable distance. Some years ago, I had my own burnout moment and learned, more forcefully than I would have preferred, that professional intensity has limits. That experience left me more attentive to the role of restraint in building a sustainable working life.

I offer these reflections with some humility. AI is moving too quickly, and the world around it remains too unsettled, for complete certainty to be a particularly convincing professional pose. Much of this field is still being built in real time, and most of us are learning while we work. What follows, then, is simply a set of notes for those trying to orient themselves in a professional environment that often creates more confusion than clarity.

You are probably not as behind as you feel

One of the defining features of the current AI moment is speed. New tools arrive constantly. New reports circulate almost weekly. New conferences, institutes, advisory groups, credentials, and public statements continue to proliferate. It is very easy to look at the landscape and conclude that one is already late.

That feeling, in my view, is often misleading. Part of the difficulty is that AI is not only moving quickly, but moving quickly in public. The field generates a constant stream of visible activity, much of it presented with confidence and urgency. You are not simply trying to understand a changing area of work. You are also exposed to a steady flow of signals suggesting that others are understanding it faster, speaking about it more fluently, and positioning themselves more effectively.

This can create a persistent and unnecessary sense of professional inadequacy. In reality, many people are still trying to find their footing. They may sound certain, but certainty and clarity are not always the same thing. A fair amount of what looks like settled expertise is still early experimentation, provisional positioning, or an understandable attempt not to appear uncertain in a field that does not reward hesitation.

There is, in other words, an important difference between being late and simply being thoughtful. The latter may look slower from the outside, but it is often more durable in the long run.

Public signals often exaggerate actual adoption

Public signals about AI adoption tend toward the optimistic. Professional networks and industry forums present a picture in which organizations are already using AI in sophisticated, embedded, and highly strategic ways, and in which practitioners have rapidly developed genuine expertise across a wide range of emerging roles. That picture is understandable. In a competitive and fast-moving field, there are real incentives to present progress confidently, and most people doing so are responding reasonably to the pressures around them.

Experience suggests a more restrained reality. AI adoption remains uneven. In some organizations, the tools are being used actively and with real effect. In many others, however, use is still tentative, fragmented, informal, or relatively shallow. Sometimes a small number of employees are experimenting while senior leadership remains uncertain. In other cases, a formal AI strategy has been announced even though the organization is still struggling with the basics of procurement, data governance, staff training, and oversight. In still others, there is considerable enthusiasm at the rhetorical level but very little disciplined operational integration.

This gap between public performance and institutional reality matters because it affects how professionals understand their own progress. If one is constantly comparing oneself to a curated picture of universal adoption, one may begin to assume that one is missing something fundamental. Often, that is not the case. Often, what one is seeing is a mixture of aspiration, selective disclosure, and the ordinary tendency to present progress more confidently than it is actually being achieved.

For younger professionals in particular, this point is worth remembering. Visibility is not the same as substance. Public alignment with AI is not always evidence of deep capability or careful judgment.

Governance around AI is less mature than it appears

A similar dynamic exists in the governance world. If one were to judge by public discussion alone, one might think that AI governance is already highly developed. The vocabulary has expanded quickly and, in many respects, usefully. Yet much of the actual governance work remains underdeveloped.

This is not to say that no serious work is being done. Quite the opposite. Many thoughtful people are trying to build credible governance systems under difficult conditions. But it is important to be honest about how early much of this work still is. The language of maturity should not be confused with maturity itself.

For professionals entering the field, that can actually be reassuring. If the governance landscape feels unsettled, that is often because it is unsettled. You are not failing to perceive a stable system that everyone else already understands. More often, you are seeing the truth of the situation.

The scramble for credentials and relevance is real, but it should not govern your life

Another feature of the current environment is the scramble for position. New affiliations appear quickly. Titles evolve quickly. Invitations matter. People understandably seek ways to locate themselves within a growing field and to communicate relevance to employers, clients, institutions, and peers.

Some of this is legitimate. People do change their work in response to important developments. They acquire new knowledge, develop new practices, and build new expertise. There is nothing inherently suspect about that. At the same time, one should understand that AI has also created a strong incentive for professional relabelling. A person can easily begin to feel that everyone else is accumulating credentials, invitations, and designations at an impossible pace.

This can create its own form of anxiety. Why was I not invited to that event? Why am I not on that panel? Why have I not yet joined that network or completed that program? Why does everyone else appear to be accelerating while I am still trying to do careful work?

Some version of those questions will be familiar to many professionals in this space, and they are ones that I have asked myself throughout my career. But over time I have become less persuaded that frantic accumulation is the right response. In fields like this, a reputation built too quickly can become fragile just as quickly. In the long run, careful work, sound judgment, and an identifiable area of contribution matter more than trying to appear everywhere at once.

This is also one reason that a willingness to be wrong matters so much. It keeps a person from becoming overly invested in performance. It leaves room for learning. And it provides at least some protection against the temptation to confuse visibility with substance.

You may need to choose a narrower lane than the field encourages

When I first began working more intensively around AI, I found myself pulled in many directions at once. That is partly the nature of a fast-moving field. Opportunities emerge quickly. Requests multiply. Everything seems important. The temptation is to say yes broadly, particularly if one is trying to establish a place in the conversation.

There can be value in that at the beginning. It can help a person understand the landscape, identify where real needs exist, and determine where one’s experience is most useful. But I have come to think that remaining in that posture for too long carries real costs.

At some point, for reasons of both strategy and sanity, it may become necessary to narrow one’s scope. In my own case, I have increasingly limited my work to governance, risk, and compliance related matters, together with board-facing work. That has not reflected a lack of interest in the wider AI field. Rather, it has reflected a growing sense that one cannot do serious, sustainable work while trying to respond to every opportunity that presents itself. Some selectivity is not a retreat from ambition. It is often what allows professional judgment to remain intact.

For younger professionals, this may be one of the harder lessons. The fear of missing out is real. In AI especially, it is easy to feel that every invitation declined is a door closing. But a career cannot be built on perpetual overextension. It is entirely possible that the best thing you can do in this environment is not to cover the whole field, but to identify the part of it where your skills, values, and temperament are best suited.

Calm is underrated

The final note is perhaps the simplest. In a field shaped by noise, speed, and visible ambition, calm has become an underrated professional quality.

By calm, I do not mean passivity or indifference. I mean the ability to remain measured in a setting that rewards urgency, to maintain perspective when others are performing certainty, and to keep one’s professional identity from being reorganized every time a new model, announcement, or institutional initiative appears. That kind of steadiness is not glamorous, but it is useful. It supports better judgment. It also makes a professional life more livable.

There is much in AI that is genuinely important and exciting. There are real opportunities here for meaningful work, especially for those who want to contribute to governance, accountability, and the responsible shaping of institutions. But those rewards are more likely to endure if one learns early that judgment matters more than speed, that visibility can mislead, and that restraint is sometimes the wiser part of professional seriousness.

If these notes have any common theme, it is simply this: the AI field generates a great many false signals. It can make thoughtful people feel late, peripheral, and underprepared even when they are none of those things. It can also encourage a style of working that is difficult to sustain and, in some cases, harmful. That too belongs within the conversation about AI risk.

Note: Generative AI was used in the preparation of this article.

The post Notes to a Young AI Professional: On Speed, Status, and Sanity appeared first on Slaw.

Several times each month, we are pleased to republish a recent book review from the Canadian Law Library Review (CLLR). CLLR is the official journal of the Canadian Association of Law Libraries (CALL/ACBD), and its reviews cover both practice-oriented and academic publications related to the law.

Trial by Numbers: A Lawyer’s Guide to Statistical Evidence. By Adam Chilton & Kyle Rozema. New York: Oxford University Press, 2024. 207 p. Includes list of figures and tables, notes, glossary, and index. ISBN 9780197747858 (hardcover) $90.00; ISBN 9780197747865 (softcover) $35.00.

Reviewed by Katarina Daniels
Research Lawyer, Library Services Lead
Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP

In Trial by Numbers: A Lawyer’s Guide to Statistical Evidence, authors Adam Chilton and Kyle Rozema offer a timely and welcome introduction to empirical methods tailored for the legal community. Their book provides an accessible and well-structured guide to understanding statistical evidence as it appears in litigation, policy work, and legal scholarship.

One of the book’s notable strengths is its clear and logical progression. Comprising eight chapters, it builds from foundational concepts to more advanced techniques. Chapter 1 sets the stage by outlining the authors’ aims and distinguishing their approach. Rather than teaching readers how to conduct empirical research, Chilton and Rozema focus on cultivating the ability to interpret and critically evaluate statistical reasoning in legal contexts. Chapters 2 and 3 introduce probability and basic statistics, respectively, laying the groundwork for Chapter 4’s discussion of causal inference and experiments. The remaining four chapters focus on the empirical methods most relevant to the legal profession, used for causal inference: regression, difference-in-differences, regression discontinuity, and instrumental variables. These methods are presented in a way that emphasizes their logic and legal relevance.

Each chapter follows a consistent and pedagogically effective structure. Concepts and methods are introduced with a brief overview, followed by a legal example that is carried throughout the chapter. Subsections are clearly delineated, and each chapter concludes with a summary that synthesizes the main ideas and revisits the example to demonstrate how the method helps to investigate or clarify the legal issue at hand.

The exclusive use of legal examples is another of the book’s key strengths. Despite being grounded in American law and social realities, the examples are engaging for readers from other jurisdictions, many of whom will be familiar with the referenced legal controversies through media coverage or will have encountered similar issues in their own legal systems. This legal framing sustains reader engagement while underscoring the importance of empirical literacy in contemporary legal practice.

Thankfully, the authors recognize the needs and limitations of their intended audience. Definitions are repeated where appropriate, and the most important concepts in each chapter are clearly highlighted, while a glossary is available at the end for easy reference. Unlike traditional statistics texts, the book features just a single equation, which is then modified and applied across successive methods. While the authors attempt to simplify the math, the notation may nonetheless be challenging for readers unfamiliar with statistical symbols. Understanding how the equation is crafted and how it should be interpreted can also be difficult. Some sections may benefit from multiple readings, especially as the methods become more complex.

Readers hoping to conduct their own empirical studies will need further training, but that is not the book’s purpose. Chilton and Rozema are transparent about what the book does and does not cover, enhancing its value as a foundational resource for further study. Additionally, they include substantial footnotes directing readers to more advanced materials.

More importantly, the book equips legal professionals to understand and critically evaluate empirical arguments as they appear in expert reports, policy analysis, and legal scholarship. What is particularly useful is that the book enables readers to recognize key concepts and methodological choices in expert reports, fostering a more critical approach to how evidence is framed and interpreted. The presentation of evidence depends on how research questions are constructed, variables are defined, and parameters are selected. Given the many ways in which this statistical evidence can be presented, awareness is essential for legal professionals assessing the credibility and relevance of expert analysis.

Trial by Numbers would be a valuable addition to any legal curriculum that includes empirical methods and is a worthwhile recommendation for practitioners who encounter statistical evidence in their work. As generative AI begins to play a role in shaping expert output, lawyers must be equipped to interpret, assess, and, where necessary, challenge the use and interpretation of data in litigation. This book offers readers a starting point for that critical engagement.

The post Book Review: Chilton & Rozema’s Trial by Numbers: A Lawyer’s Guide to Statistical Evidence appeared first on Slaw.

The legal services sector is in for rough times for the foreseeable future after which we will see a rebirth of legal services entities that bear little resemblance to those operating in the market currently. This is why your firm’s foundational rebuild must happen now.

Law firms are in the midst of grappling with a tsunami of changes within the legal services market that are impacting both practice and business. This is especially true after coming to terms – if we can honestly claim that – with the ravages of the pandemic. I understand that many people would like to put the pandemic in the past. While that would be ideal, it would also ignore the fact that its impact remains with us now and will continue to affect us for some time to come.

The pandemic was a black swan event the likes of which none of us has experienced in our lifetimes when both individuals and businesses were focused on staying healthy and alive.

If we learned nothing else from the pandemic, it’s that the old adage of a five-year business strategy died along with the 7,113,407 reported pandemic-related deaths according to the World Health Organization as of March 15, 2026.

Enormous waves of change have come crashing in since the pandemic began in December 2019, including the ongoing seesaw of work-from-home versus return-to-office, never mind artificial intelligence. The result is that law firm strategy has, in many respects, been cast aside in favour of skipping straight to tactics that for all intents and purposes boils down to “add more talent” and “do more stuff.”

Strategy Backassward

Adding talent through lateral acquisition has been happening at a more frenzied rate over the last few years with lawyers changing firms like they change shirts. These days you almost need a program to tell the players. Goosing law firm growth by adding laterals is similar to my recipe for a law firm merger: Add more nuts and stir.

Unlike individuals involved in mergers, laterals require strong support at all levels and for a much longer time than one might assume. The difference between merged talent and individual lateral acquisition is that ongoing support for a lateral is an investment from the firm and its people. This requirement can be at odds with a perception that if a lateral is as desirable and draftable as they purport to be, then they can self-start, self-propel, self-develop, etc., as well as bring over their clients and billable work. In reality, that isn’t necessarily so and it usually isn’t that simple or easy.

And then there’s “do more stuff” that, at least for a time, makes people feel as though they’re – guess what? – doing more stuff. But is this stuff based on a strategy that supports an objective? No, it most often is not, and has the scattergun approach and busywork hallmarks of spinning one’s wheels: You expend energy and go nowhere.

Setting the Objective

The trick is to create a core business objective that sets you distinctively apart as one of one from the competition: The one thing you do better than anyone else. From there, the task is to set strategies, build supports, and execute on explicit, time-bound, measurable, and accountable tactics that enable the core objective.

The core objective acts as true north from which you never deviate. However, strategy, plans, and execution may occasionally require flexibility to accommodate business and legal market changes. That said, flexibility does not mean elasticity in order to be reactive, never mind accommodating to every single thing, condition, person, or whim.

Strategy is often considered exciting and sexy while objective is deemed the exact opposite. This is why, within law firms, there are always discussions about strategy. However, it is very rare that the firm’s objective is discussed, never mind nailed down.

This is because determining the objective is the hardest part of a discussion. Setting and sticking to an objective requires difficult, yet honest evaluations and conversations that are usually intensely political and often divisive. Reinforcing the objective also requires accountability of individuals as well as the grit of leadership to stay the course, come hell or high water and people who have political sway or think they do.

My Transformation Template

My focus is on business, which is at the core of every law firm regardless of practice.

In my life before law, I successfully restructured businesses in trouble. This is where I learned and applied the following transformation template that worked every time. While this template looks deceptively simple, it is not.

It is based on making hard choices that not everyone will like but will advance the entity to a better position demonstrated by increased profitability, deeper market penetration, key talent attraction, etc. Most vitally, it demands a hard deadline for completion and an iron will to get it done.

Transformation Template

Objective: A transformative outcome. Hard deadline. Measurable proof of success.

Strategy: A set of decisions to achieve the objective. Strategy supports Objective.

Plan: Short-, mid- and long-term measurable tactics. Plan supports Strategy.

Execution: Assignment of tactics and accountability. Execution supports Plan.

The challenge begins with Objective and, as mentioned earlier, is usually a hellacious struggle in the best of circumstances, and worse when dealing with lawyers. This is because, for many law firms, deciding on a single overall transformative objective is rife with contention and politics with symptoms such as, input from anyone who has an opinion and deems themselves right, pipping up and piling on by those who must hear themselves talk, machinations from protectionists of their own practice, and so on.

The other challenge is that the word “strategy is often paired with the word “plan”, ergo, “strategic plan.” Strategic plans or planning sounds important, but really it is a dead giveaway of lazy business.

Strategy is one thing; planning is another. They are distinctly different and need and deserve to be treated as such. Otherwise, as I have said before, lumping the two together leaves many lazy law firms faffing about with aspirational imaginings that culminate in them being as beige and gray as porridge and as fungible as peanut better and, worse yet, leaves them no further ahead than before they began the process.

Get Real

I have heard managing or founding partners say (usually at budget time) that their firm’s objective is “to make $X-million more” in the upcoming fiscal year. When asked about their strategy to accomplish this objective, they have no clue. This is when the process rattles off the rails and the firm reverts to its usual ways of “doing stuff.” Nothing changes, nor does the firm advance.

So, to get real: If you get the Objective nailed down, great. Next, determine a set of – say, three or four – Strategies that will enable achievement of the Objective.

The Plan comes next and, frankly, is the part most people enjoy because it’s tactical. Consider three to four sets of plans that support each of the three or four Strategies.

Execution is what people tend not to enjoy and where the whole exercise usually falls apart. This is because execution relies on assignment of and accountability for individuals charged with leading action on time lined tactics as well as reporting results. Very often, this is when a plethora of excuses pop up, such as having to handle or manage client work, supervise juniors, etc. It is also at this juncture where the firm’s leadership is judged on both its rigour as well as its mettle to lead from the front by demanding accountability and taking swift and decisive action for failure.

Or Don’t

Unfortunately, what usually happens is that in deference to going along to get along, people and firms will decide that doing nothing is easier than doing something. They will defer to what they are used to doing and bumble along living on hope that nothing untoward will happen.

This is why the ostrich syndrome continues to be alive and well and living in law firms.

It is also why foundational rebuilding separates winners from losers like wheat from chaff. Rebuilding is not done off the side of a managing partner or anyone else’s desk, or in conjunction with client work. It is a big, tough, full-time-and-more job that will not result in the person leading it to win any popularity contests. Consider it fair warning from someone who has done heavy restructuring more than once that whoever leads this initiative will have to pull knives out of their back – and probably their front – before lying down to rest.

Transform or Innovate

My template results in transformation, not innovation. And, yes, there is a world of difference. Transformation is not for the faint of heart. On the negative side, it can often cause hurt. On the positive side, it enables space and foundation on which to rebuild.

Agents of transformation act with intensity and speed. The outcome is a complete transformation of the business. Transformation or restructuring – which is often considered a frightening or even a threatening word – is warrior’s work. It is why transformation is usually best led by an outside agent who, while they need to work well with people, must be laser-focused on getting what needs to be done, done.

Innovation is the preferred term used by law firms that, by their nature, shy away from transformation for fear of upsetting someone or a bunch of someone’s apple carts.

Get over it. Or as a restructuring colleague of mine says, “Get on the bus or under it.”

I suggest those who have “Innovator” or something like it in their job title focus on transforming the business of legal services rather than innovating practice. Why? Because those who pay a law firm’s freight – namely clients – don’t care about practice; they care how you do business and how your business benefits their business.

Risk or Reward

Evaluating risk versus reward is where law firms can trip up due a fear of being wrong. I am not talking about being wrong in terms of practice or advice, but daring to take a calculated risk that has the potential to propel change in ways never experienced before that can land an individual, team, or firm in a whole new experience, environment, or business.

This kind of risk resistance is often based on fear of the unknown, whether the results could be positive, negative or neutral.

As an advisor, I will often ask a client, “What’s the worst that could happen?” The answer is often, “Failure.” And therein lies the fear factor that can result in doing nothing.

Embrace Fearlessness

Fear results in a combination of paralysis and inertia that, in my opinion, is both ludicrous and pointless since change, whether it is positive, negative, or neutral, impacts each of us in numerous and different ways every single day.

As a sidebar, and in a fear-versus-fearless vein, you may be amused but not surprised to learn that in a recent meeting with a group of lawyer colleagues, I was asked not to scare people with my remarks pertaining to business impacts of artificial intelligence. Imagine my response.

Being a realist, I can’t unknow what I know, which is that many traditional law firms are decaying primarily due to traditional structures, processes, and hierarchy with the knock-on effect of AI’s impact on the antiquated billable hour model. I have been predicting, opining, and advising on this for years. Now it is finally happening and with speed.

The hitch is that the legal services sector seems stuck in an ongoing loop that needs to be broken apart completely in order to be entirely reinvented and rebuilt rather than being patched or fixed using the same original components, a new widget or two, and some spare parts.

As a participant as well as a student and observer of the global legal services sector for the last three decades, here is what I know for absolute sure: The legal services industry is in for rough times for the foreseeable future after which we will see a rebirth of legal service entities that bear little resemblance to those operating in the market now.

As a realist as well an optimist, I expect continuation of the former – for as long as it takes to evolve – and look forward to witnessing the latter.

The post The Law Firm Foundational Rebuild appeared first on Slaw.

Early in my career in education, I was introduced to a learning scale that offered both my students and me a different way of thinking about competency. The scale looks like this:

Understanding the Competency Continuum

Let’s consider this through a real-world example: learning to drive a car.

Before you begin learning to drive, you have little understanding of either the process itself or the rules of the road. At that stage, you are unconsciously incompetent. You do not yet know what you do not know.

As you begin to learn, however, you quickly realize how much there is to understand—from road signs and right-of-way rules to the operation of the vehicle itself. At this point, you become consciously incompetent.

With practice, you begin to assemble the steps involved in completing different actions. You recognize that a stop sign means stopping the car, and that stopping requires a sequence of actions: taking your foot off the gas, applying the brake, slowing to a full stop, and, if turning, activating the signal. At this stage, you are consciously competent.

After driving for some time, these actions become second nature. You no longer think deliberately about each individual step involved in slowing down, stopping, or signaling a turn. You have become unconsciously competent.

Apply the Framework to Student Learning

What does this have to do with supporting student learning?

First, it requires understanding where we are as educators. Have we become so practiced at a task that we no longer consciously think about the individual steps required to complete it? If so, we may struggle to effectively convey those steps to students.

The best educators and mentors remain consciously competent. They can articulate the process, break a task into its component parts, and explain not simply what needs to be done, but how to do it. This supports students by helping them truly understand what is involved in producing quality work.

The next step is identifying where our students are.

Are they completely unfamiliar with the task—that is, unconsciously incompetent? If so, asking them to complete the task without sufficient guidance will often result in low-quality work, frustration, and uncertainty. Students at this stage may lack even the foundational knowledge necessary to know what questions to ask or where to begin.

At this point, it is essential to provide the background knowledge they need, along with clear directions about both what is expected and how to approach the task.

Do students have some background knowledge related to the assigned work? If so, they may be consciously incompetent.

This can be a particularly difficult stage for students. They are now aware of what they do not know, which can create uncertainty, anxiety, and a loss of confidence. At this stage, it is important to acknowledge those feelings and provide meaningful support by answering questions—even when the answers may seem obvious to us—and by exercising patience.

With time, direction, and constructive feedback, students at this stage can work their way toward becoming consciously competent.

Setting Expectations Along the Learning Journey

This also leads directly to the importance of expectation setting.

Particularly when students are learning new skills, they need to understand that learning is a process and that the path is not identical for everyone. Students benefit from being able to identify where they are on their own learning journey and from recognizing that reaching the stage of unconscious competence can take years.

At the same time, they should appreciate the value of remaining consciously competent—occupying a space in which they continue to see the steps involved and can share that knowledge with others.

Teaching with Intentional Competence

Successful educators must guard against becoming unconsciously competent.

To fully support student learning, they must strive to remain consciously competent: able to identify and articulate the steps involved in a task, recognize where students are in their development, and respond in a way that supports growth at each stage.

Ultimately, building student success is, in many ways, a state of mind.

The post Consciously Competent: A State of Mind for Supporting Student Learning appeared first on Slaw.

As a branch of government entirely dependent on the public purse, the Court finds itself with a dwindling number of friends or supporters. Part of this results from implementing unpopular policies imposed by our ‘betters’ in Ottawa, such as de facto “bail on all offences,” reduced sentences based on skin color, including for a kidnapper raised as the child of UN diplomats, and reduced sentences for non-citizens to avoid the risk of deportation. A further part arises from simple courthouse mismanagement and dysfunction, with the court itself admitting the civil justice system has “reached a state of existential crisis.”

For non-lawyers, the state of the Ontario Superior Court can be confirmed via Google search. For instance, searching for the Toronto Superior Court (with address) returns a 2.3-star Google Review rating (coincidentally the same rating as held by the Law Society of Ontario). The Newmarket Court comes in at 2.2-stars, Hamilton at 2.5, while Ottawa ‘leads the pack’ at 3-stars. Conversely, the average business on Google is rated at 4.11-stars. Though not widely published, the standard deviation for all Google reviews appears to be between .27 and 1.13, meaning the Ontario Superior Court lands at the extreme (terrible) tail end of the distribution. For government entities, it is not however without company, with the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health-Queen Street Site holding a 2.7-star Google review rating (though the Service Canada location on College Street has a 4-star rating in comparison, showing not all government entities in Ontario equally useless).

Interestingly, while the Court has a history of resisting transparency and accountability, as part of its efforts to eliminate rights to discovery while increasing the costs to commence cases (see Civil Working Group Reports here), it released some hitherto secret data on its operations, which among other things, showed a 45% decline in the number of civil trials across the Province over a ten-year period, as set forth below.

While it could be imagined that cases reaching trial had become more complex or required more trial time over that period, the data indicated otherwise, namely that the vast majority of civil trials required five days or less. Using the data for motor vehicle cases (likely representative) if for each matter tried we assume it required the maximum number of days within the range (i.e. 5, 10, 15) and select 26 for the final box, then we can see that there were 996 trial days for motor vehicle accidents in 2014 and 500 such trial days in 2023. Trials requiring less than 5 days accounted for roughly 50-65% of total trial days.

Given the reduction in trial time over the period, it could be imagined (as the Civil Rules Working Group did) that such time was instead being dedicated to dealing with a “pervasive motions culture.” Problematically, that was not borne out by the data provided to the Civil Rules Working Group either, which instead showed the total number of motions heard declining by nearly half over the period, which reduction was in line with the decline in the number of civil trials and civil trial days.

One area where the Superior Court has increased its activity (but not its performance) in recent years has been the rejection of documents, though rates vary extremely by court location. Better-run courthouses (such as London), or those not as actively competing in the jurisprudential race to the bottom, reject just over 10% of civil documents filed. Meanwhile, Brampton, the worst-run courthouse by a country mile, is trending to reject nearly 50% of civil filings this year, with many rejections (across courthouses) being for pointless, mundane or simply incorrect reasons. Every rejection adds both time and expense for the parties, and adds extra work for courthouse staff, who must process the same documents multiple times (rather than in most cases simply adding it to an electronic file).

[Click graphic to see larger version of this image.]

The Toronto Superior Court is perhaps “the most unique snowflake” of them all, at least in regard to motions. Over close to 6200 words, as part of its Consolidated Practice Direction, it lays out a motion scheduling procedure that for short motions before an Associate Judge, requires approximately 20 unique steps and 3 separate, time-staggered filings via the new Toronto Portal, which itself is more cumbersome and slower to use than the one it replaced. Conversely, different procedures entirely apply for motions before Judges, with further variance in procedure depending upon motion type.

The byzantine (and often pointless) procedures that define the Ontario Superior Court are similar to problems that arise with some frequency in business, where for instance a fast-food restaurant elects to add a bunch of options (menu proliferation) or a factory elects to add new options/products to its line (product proliferation). What started out (at least in theory) as a somewhat focused and efficient operation that staff were able to operate and manage ends up bogged down by ever increasing numbers of combinations and procedures, all of which add time and complexity, and render the Court less able to deliver what it was designed, or at least advertised to provide.

In many respects, Ontario’s next Chief Justice will face greater challenges than those faced by Chief Justice Morawetz. While Chief Justice Morawetz undoubtedly deserves credit for belatedly introducing the Ontario Superior Court to the computer and internet, the fact that same did not occur in any meaningful way until 2020 speaks to the insular and backwards nature of a court that had failed to keep up with good jurisprudential or management practices. Moreover, it was indicative of a court that did not pay heed to its leading judicial voices, who had long warned that it risked becoming an irrelevant museum piece.

If the Ontario Superior Court is to improve, and at this point like the Leafs, the only real way to go is up, Ontario’s next Chief Justice will need to embrace a painful truth, namely, that the Ontario Superior Court does not know much about running a functioning court system (despite gushing that it was “one of the most accomplished trial courts in the world” not too long ago). While it is easy to argue that the Courts need more funding and personnel (to allow them to implement a 53-step motion scheduling procedure for instance instead of a mere 20, or to allow more Judges the time to write 297 paragraph opinions on relevance and refusals), it has long been recognized that where courts seek additional government resources “justifications have required better and more impressive data. Attention to wise use of available resources has been a prerequisite for successful additional aid. The Courts have therefore developed, and made available information formerly denied not only to the public but even to other members of the judiciary.” Time will tell whether the next Chief Justice makes better use of available judicial resources and is thus able to build a case for more resources.

The post The Task for Ontario’s Next Chief Justice appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Robeside Assistance 2. Timely Disclosure 3. The Court 4. Barry Sookman 5. Reconciliation Syllabus

Robeside Assistance
Recently Published Ottawa Decisions

In a family law dispute, the Court dismissed a father’s motion for DNA paternity testing, finding it lacked evidentiary support and served no useful purpose. The Court emphasized the children’s best interests, rejecting the father’s motives as self-serving and potentially harmful to the children’s emotional well-being.
Associate Justice I. Kamal …

Timely Disclosure
2026 ESG Disclosure Study

Bring sharper focus to your ESG strategy in a rapidly evolving landscape. Fasken’s 2026 ESG Disclosure Study reveals how Canadian companies are strengthening their sustainability practices, enhancing transparency, and responding to evolving stakeholder expectations. This study surveys 100 companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange, offering insights that can help you assess where your organization stands and support more informed decision-making on emerging Environmental, Social, and Governance priorities. This year’s study highlights several notable trends across Canada, including: …

The Court
Arrest Ex Nihilo: Wilson and the SCC’s Many Modern Approaches

In R. v. Wilson, 2025 SCC 32 [Wilson], the Court disagreed over a word that didn’t exist. In s. 4.1(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19 (“CDSA”), those who call emergency services to save a person experiencing an overdose are immunized from being charged or convicted of drug possession. However, the provision does not include the word “arrest.” Despite this, the Court held that the provision also immunizes “good Samaritans” from arrest for drug possession using a purpose-laden modern approach to statutory interpretation. Wilson is significant for many issues, including a clarification of the scope of good Samaritan provisions and of the Court’s stance on policing and public health policy. But this Comment focuses on one issue—the Court’s use of the modern approach—and argues that greater clarity and consistency is needed in the Court’s method of statutory interpretation. …

Barry Sookman
Cox v Sony: Analyzing the Supreme Court Decision

The U.S. Supreme Court released an important decision on the scope of U.S. secondary liability for copyright infringement applied to ISPs in Cox Communications, Inc. et al. v. Sony Music Entertainment et al., 607 U.S. ——- S.Ct. —-2026 WL 815823. The syllabus of the court summarized the case and the court’s opinion are set out below. My comments on the case follows the summary of the Cox v Sony opinion of the SCOTUS. …

Reconciliation Syllabus
Learning Land and Relationship

For some time, I have been wanting to bring experiential learning related to land to a 3^rd year course I teach in an undergraduate Legal Studies program at Ontario Tech University: LGLS 3310U – Indigenous Peoples, Law and the State in Canada . This is the story of how this happened. Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland discuss “stories as tools for thinking”, for both tellers and listeners, in their work on engagement with Indigenous legal traditions.[1] Although my topic is much smaller, telling this story gives me space to think – about the land, about teaching and relationships, and about myself as a teacher — if you feel you can take it up as a thinking tool, too, please do. …

_________________________

*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : Il existe une preuve à l’appui d’une conclusion de culpabilité mais, en raison des multiples faiblesses de cette preuve contradictoire, celle-ci ne peut satisfaire à la norme de la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable de l’actus reus d’attouchements sexuels; la déclaration de culpabilité prononcée par la juge de première instance était déraisonnable.

Intitulé : Gauthier c. R., 2026 QCCA 528
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Yves-Marie Morissette, Patrick Healy et Christian Immer
Date : 17 avril 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — infraction — infractions de nature sexuelle — agression sexuelle — victime âgée de 14 à 15 ans — patineur artistique — accusé entraîneur — infraction commise en 1984 ou en 1985 — éléments constitutifs de l’infraction — actus reus — appréciation de la preuve — moyen de défense — dénégation générale — déclaration de culpabilité — appel — verdict déraisonnable — application de l’article 686 (1) a) (i) C.Cr. — norme d’intervention — pouvoir d’une cour d’appel — fardeau de la preuve — preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable — insuffisance de la preuve — acquittement.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — infraction — infractions de nature sexuelle — indécence — grossière indécence — victime âgée de 14 à 15 ans — patineur artistique — accusé entraîneur — infraction commise en 1984 ou en 1985 — appréciation de la preuve — moyen de défense — dénégation générale — déclaration de culpabilité — appel — verdict déraisonnable — application de l’article 686 (1) a) (i) C.Cr. — norme d’intervention — pouvoir d’une cour d’appel — fardeau de la preuve — preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable — insuffisance de la preuve — acquittement.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — juridiction pénale — Cour d’appel — appel — compétence — déclaration de culpabilité — verdict déraisonnable — application de l’article 686 (1) a) (i) C.Cr. — norme d’intervention — fardeau de la preuve — preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable — insuffisance de la preuve — notion de verdict «unsafe» — notion de «doute persistant» («lurking doubt») — agression sexuelle — grossière indécence — acquittement.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — preuve pénale — appréciation de la preuve — témoignage — versions contradictoires — crédibilité de la victime — faits survenus dans l’enfance — mémoire — souvenirs flous — fiabilité — crédibilité de l’accusé — contradictions — moyen de défense — dénégation générale — verdict déraisonnable — application de l’article 686 (1) a) (i) C.Cr. — norme d’intervention — fardeau de la preuve — preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable — insuffisance de la preuve — agression sexuelle — grossière indécence — appel.

Appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité. Accueilli. Requête en autorisation d’interjeter appel de la peine. Déclarée sans objet.

L’appelant a été déclaré coupable par la Cour du Québec de grossière indécence et d’agression sexuelle pour des gestes commis près de 40 ans plus tôt. L’accusé était alors l’entraîneur de patinage artistique de la victime, un adolescent. La juge de première instance a déterminé que les multiples trous de mémoire de la victime compromettaient directement la fiabilité et la force probante de son témoignage. Finalement, la juge a estimé que le témoignage de l’appelant n’était pas crédible ni fiable, du moins en grande partie. Quant au témoignage de la victime, elle a retenu que tous les gestes à caractère sexuel allégués s’étaient déroulés la troisième fois que la victime s’était rendue chez l’appelant. La juge a conclu que les attouchements que ce dernier avait commis à l’endroit de la victime dans la douche et dans le lit avaient été démontrés hors de tout doute raisonnable; néanmoins, elle a rejeté certaines parties du témoignage de la victime, notamment quant aux gestes de masturbation. En appel, l’appelant prétend que le verdict est déraisonnable.

Décision

M. le juge Healy: La seule question en litige est de savoir si, à la lumière de l’ensemble de la preuve, un juge des faits raisonnable et agissant d’une manière judiciaire aurait pu déclarer l’appelant coupable hors de tout doute raisonnable. Une déclaration de culpabilité fondée sur une preuve non susceptible de satisfaire à la norme de la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable constitue une erreur de droit. Si la preuve est insuffisante en droit, un verdict de culpabilité est nécessairement déraisonnable.

Dans l’arrêt R. c. Biniaris (C.S. Can., 2000-04-13), 2000 CSC 15, SOQUIJ AZ-50071561, J.E. 2000-838, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 381, la Cour suprême du Canada a précisé que le «lurking doubt» n’est pas synonyme de verdict déraisonnable, mais qu’un tel doute — ou, plus généralement, la perception qu’un verdict est «unsafe» — est une bonne raison d’examiner si la preuve étayant le verdict pouvait satisfaire à la norme de la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable. L’objectif est de veiller à ce que les cours d’appel n’infirment pas de conclusions de fait et que les verdicts soient fondés sur une preuve satisfaisant à la norme applicable. Aucun appel ne sera accueilli pour ce motif, même si la Cour d’appel conclut que le verdict est «unsafe» ou soulève un doute raisonnable en fait.

La preuve est la prémisse d’une conclusion logique. Qu’il s’agisse d’une preuve directe ou d’une preuve indirecte, la force probante de l’inférence permettant de passer de la prémisse à la conclusion dépend de la fiabilité de la preuve. La preuve circonstancielle ne peut étayer une preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable, à moins qu’une seule inférence raisonnable ne puisse en être tirée. Dans le cas contraire, en droit, une telle conclusion est un verdict déraisonnable. Il en est de même dans le cas d’une preuve directe si la prémisse est trop faible pour étayer la conclusion.

En l’espèce, il existe une preuve à l’appui d’une conclusion de culpabilité, mais, en raison des multiples faiblesses de cette preuve contradictoire, celle-ci ne peut satisfaire à la norme de la preuve hors de tout raisonnable de l’actus reus d’attouchements sexuels. La déclaration de culpabilité est donc déraisonnable; il y a lieu d’acquitter l’appelant.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

One Sunday each month we bring you a summary from Supreme Advocacy LLP of recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers a weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, to which you may subscribe. It’s a summary of all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted from March 1 – April 17, 2026 inclusive.

Appeal

Charter: Discrimination Based on Sex; Subsidized Childcare
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kanyinda, 2024 QCCA 144; 2026 SCC 7 (41210) Mar. 6, 2026

Québec became the first province in Canada to introduce universal subsidized daycare, which marked an important step in the province’s goal to make equal access to the workforce a reality. Now governed by the Educational Childcare Act which aims to help parents reconcile their work or study obligations with their family responsibilities (s. 1). At issue is s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, a regulation made under the ECA. Section 3 lists the categories of people eligible to receive subsidized daycare, including residents of Québec who are Canadian citizens, permanent residents, international students, holders of a temporary resident permit or a work permit, and those with refugee status. Québec does not provide this subsidy to refugee claimants who have yet to obtain refugee status. Because the application process for refugee status often takes years to complete, this denial of access to subsidized daycare impacts the ability of some refugee claimants with young children to enter the workforce. The S.C.C. agreed with the Qué. C.A. that s. 3 of the RCR discriminates based on sex, thus infringing s. 15(1) of the Charter, and does so in a way that cannot be saved by s. 1.

Criminal Law: Forfeiture
R. v. Nguyen, 2024 QCCA 674; 2026 SCC 10(41400) Apr. 17, 2026

This matter is remanded to the Court of Québec, which does have jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal forfeiture hearing herein. First, the stay of the trial proceedings is not, for the purposes of the forfeiture matter, tantamount to an acquittal. The stay may be equated to an acquittal for the purposes of the plea of autrefois acquit and the exercise of appeal rights because they engage a person’s risk of criminal liability and liberty interests. But the stay has no decisive effect on the forfeiture proceedings. The matters required to establish that the property is criminally tainted were not decided in the respondents’ favour in a prior criminal proceeding, such that it is open to the Crown to lead evidence on those issues to support its forfeiture application. There is no necessary issue estoppel between matters decided on the stay; whether the delay was unreasonable; and matters at issue in subsequent forfeiture proceedings; as to whether the property is tainted by crime. The stay does not oust statutory jurisdiction in respect of forfeiture. Second, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court of Québec does not have the power herein to order forfeiture under the principal provisions invoked by the Crown in the Criminal Code and the CDSA, which tie that authority to trial and sentencing proceedings. Jurisdiction to conduct criminal forfeiture proceedings survives under statutory rules that operate independently of trial and sentencing. Parliament has provided for a number of circumstances in which forfeiture can be ordered even where no accused has been tried.

Criminal Law: Implied Licence Doctrine
R. v. Singer,2023 SKCA 123; 2026 SCC 8(41090) Mar. 20, 2026

The police here had an implied licence at common law to step onto Mr. Singer’s driveway, approach his truck, and knock on the truck window. The police were entitled to do so on legitimate business: to investigate a recent impaired driving complaint. This police conduct did not, on its own, constitute a “search” under s. 8 of the Charter. The Sask. C.A.’s decision on this point was wrongly decided. At the same time, the implied licence to enter the driveway and knock ended at the door of the truck. The police intruded onto Mr. Singer’s reasonable expectation of privacy and conducted a search when they opened the truck door. There is no need to recognize a new ancillary police power to provide potential authority to open the truck door. This Court’s decision in R. v. MacDonald, 2014 SCC 3, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 37, already recognizes the common law power of the police to conduct a “safety search” when they have reasonable grounds to believe that the search “is reasonably necessary to eliminate an imminent threat to the safety of the public or the police” (para. 40). A safety search “will generally be conducted by the police as a reactionary measure” and “will generally be unplanned”, since it is “carried out in response to dangerous situations created by individuals, to which the police must react ‘on the sudden’” (para. 32). Even so, the evidence is not excluded under s. 24(2). The Charter-infringing state conduct was not so serious; nor did it have more than a moderate impact on Mr. Singer’s Charter-protected interests.

Insurance: Presumption of Death
Riddle v. Ivari, 2023 QCCA 1111; 2026 SCC 9 (40986) Apr. 10, 2026

The Chief Justice wrote as follows (at para. 10) “… As regards the determination of the applicable legal framework for proving the return of a person declared dead, the trial judge, like the Court of Appeal, made no error in finding that this could be proved through any contemporaneous manifestation that makes it more probable than not that the person who disappeared is currently alive. The evidence must be clear and convincing so as to rebut the presumption of death, but no specific threshold of certainty is required. While the physical presence of the person declared dead will always be the best proof that they are currently alive, a judge may be satisfied with evidence establishing that the person is still living, particularly where the circumstances suggest that their disappearance or reclusion is voluntary. Proof of return therefore does not require a different standard of proof. In Québec civil law, unless the legislature specifies otherwise, the standard of proof remains the balance of probabilities.”

Oral Judgment

Criminal Law: Fresh Evidence
R. v. Maadani, 2025 ONCA 582; 2026 SCC 11 (41972) Judgment rendered April 17, 2026

“The Chief Justice: “A majority of this Court is of the view that Huscroft J.A., writing for the majority of the Court of Appeal, made no reviewable error in dismissing the application for new evidence for lack of cogency. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. Justices Karakatsanis and Côté would have allowed the appeal. They are of the view that, in its cogency analysis, the majority erred in law in making its own determination of the witness’s ultimate credibility. The majority also erred in its analysis of due diligence. Justices Karakatsanis and Côté agree with Copeland J.A. that the fresh evidence was reasonably capable of belief by the triers of fact on key points relating to self-defence and would have admitted the fresh evidence and would have ordered a new trial.”

Criminal Law: Sexual Assault
R. v. Case, 2024 ONCA 900; 2026 SCC 6 (41610) Judgment rendered Feb. 19, 2026 (Mar. 12, 2026)

The Chief Justice: “We are all of the view to dismiss the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the majority at the Ontario Court of Appeal.”

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Administrative Law/Charter: Firearms; Subordinate Legislation
Canadian Coalition for Firearm Rights, et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 82 (41859) Mar. 19, 2026

Reviewing subordinate legislation and subdelegated Cabinet authority.

Administrative Law/Charter: Firearms; Subordinate Legislation
Doherty, et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 82 (41860) Mar. 19, 2026

Reviewing subordinate legislation and subdelegated Cabinet authority.

Administrative Law/Charter: Firearms; Subordinate Legislation
Eichenberg, et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 82 (41861) Mar. 19, 2026

Reviewing subordinate legislation and subdelegated Cabinet authority.

Administrative Law/Charter: Firearms; Subordinate Legislation
Generoux, et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 82 (41858) Mar. 19, 2026

Reviewing subordinate legislation and subdelegated Cabinet authority.

Bankruptcy & Insolvency: Preferences
American Pacific Corporation v. RPG Receivables Purchase Group Inc., 2025 ONCA 371 (41937) Mar. 26, 2026

Issues re preferential pre-bankruptcy transactions.

Class Actions: Motor Vehicles
North, et al. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, et al., 2025 ONCA 340 (41913) Apr. 2, 2026

Certification of class action for negligence in defective products.

Torts: Sexual Abuse; Vicarious Liability
H.N. v. Board of Education of School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria), et al., 2025 BCCA 144 (41910) Mar. 12, 2026

Vicarious liability in sexual abuse context.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme Advocacy appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeal

Civil Litigation/Mortgages: Res Judicata; Cause of Action Estoppel
Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. v. 11368 NL Inc., 2026 SCC 15 (41296)

Clarification re res judicata & cause of action estoppel.

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Professions: Pharmacists
Haggaï v. Loiselle, 2025 QCCA 932 (41976)

Professional discipline issues re pharmacist.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

On March 6th, a prominent group of publishers including the 5 biggest global book publishers (Hachette, Penguin Random House, HarperCollins, Macmillan and Simon and Schuster) filed a lawsuit in NY federal court to try and shut down the shadow library “Anna’s Archive”. A decade ago, John Willinsky described scholarly publishing as having its “Napster moment” with the emergence of pirate sites like LibGen and Sci-Hub. The race to train large language models using sites like Anna’s Archive (which is the successor site of Libgen/Sci-Hub) feels like a second act, where these sites are not just channels for pirated books and articles, but also sources of training data for large language models (LLMs). This is also not just limited to commercial publishers, HathiTrust recently reported that a large portion of its collection had been obtained and redistributed on Anna’s Archive.

Lawsuits against shadow libraries are not new – publishers and creators have been attempting to get pirated creative works down off the internet for as long as it has existed, as is reflected from the almost never-ending list of lawsuits listed on the Torrentfreak blog. What has emerged over the past few years is that these lawsuits now emphasise the role that sites like Anna’s Archive play in training large language models (LLMs), in that “Publishers’ action is now especially critical in light of reports that Anna’s Archive is actively advertising that it will provide high speed access to—and indeed has already supplied stolen works of authorship to— developers of large language model AI systems (“LLMs”) and data brokers.” (Para 1. https://publishers.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Apress-v-Annas-Archive-Complaint.pdf).

The rapid pace of technological progress combined with fierce competition among companies involved with developing AI models have led to an ethical vacuum, with countries around the world racing to develop policies to catch up. One of the many casualties of this vacuum are authors and creators, whose published work have become the primary training materials for AI models, frequently without any compensation being paid. And since the big tech companies behind AI development have embraced a progress-trumps-all approach to training, they have turned to pirate websites and shadow libraries like Anna’s Archive as part of their training data.

This has naturally led to a myriad of lawsuits and accusations. For example, in Kadrey v. Meta, it was alleged that Meta trained their LLM on Books3, a dataset including the full-text of almost 200,000 pirated books. In this decision, Meta won a narrow victory, where it was determined that the use of this dataset was fair use. Conversely, Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC ended in the largest copyright class action settlement in US history ($1.5 billion dollars). Court documents from this case provide the most vivid example of AIs rampant appetite for training data – in addition to content from shadow libraries, Anthropic also hired Tom Turvey, the former head of partnerships for Google’s book scanning project, and tasked him with obtaining “all the books in the world”. Anthropic then purchased, scanned and destroyed millions of mostly-used print books and built a giant electronic corpus that it planned to keep in perpetuity. Anthropic’s settlement was largely a result of its use of a “central library” of pirated works, despite Judge Alsup’s ruling that training on lawfully acquired books was fair use. In addition, many other major tech companies, including Nvidia, Salesforce, and Apple, have been accused of using similar strategy for LLM training.

Of course, it’s not just big tech profiting from this landscape. Big publishers, including some of the most prominent scholarly publishing firms like Taylor & Francis and Wiley have eagerly licensed their publication for use by big tech for AI training, with authors only finding out about these agreements through news stories or press releases. Another model that is more progressive was taken by Cambridge University Press, who allow authors to opt out of having their works used for training while also paying royalties. These are just a few examples, for a longer list, see the Ithaka S+R generative AI license agreement tracker. This reflects a wider shift in which big publishers are becoming less like information vendors and more like data brokers, while also investing in the development of their own AI tools and platforms that leverage the content they own and license.

So where does this leave authors and creators? At this point, it is likely that most English language publications, blog posts or posts on the internet have been used as training data for multiple LLMs. Authors who do not want their content used for training are left with few options. They can publish in places that allow authors to opt out, although an opt-out doesn’t mean much if training data is being pulled from shadow libraries. They can also look to emerging models of licensing like the Creative Commons (CC) Signals project which will allow rightholders to “signal their preferences for how their content can be reused by machines based on a set of limited but meaningful options shaped in the public interest.” The success of this model is contingent on AI training respecting these “signals”, and considering big tech’s track record with shadow libraries and copyright compliance, it is hard to imagine AI companies treating CC Signals as anything more than optional.

The post What’s an Author to Do? Shadow Libraries in the Age of AI. appeared first on Slaw.

Each month, we tell you which three English-language cases and French-language cases have been the most viewed* on CanLII in the previous month and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about.

For this past month, the three most-consulted English-language decisions were:

1. R. v. Singer, 2026 SCC 8

[1] Thirty years ago, in R. v. Evans, 1996 CanLII 248 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, this Court affirmed that “the common law has long recognized an implied licence for all members of the public, including police, to approach the door of a residence and knock” (para. 13, per Sopinka J.). Under the implied licence doctrine, a police officer who has lawful business with the occupant of a dwelling may proceed from the street to the door of a house to communicate with the occupant (para. 15). The issue on this appeal is whether the police likewise possess an implied licence to step onto a private driveway to investigate a complaint of impaired driving when they observe, in plain view, a running vehicle matching the description in the complaint.

[2] Two RCMP officers were investigating a recent complaint of impaired driving made against the respondent, Wayne Singer, in a small Saskatchewan First Nations community. After investigating for about an hour, at around midnight, the officers saw a truck matching the description in the complaint in a residential driveway on the community territory. The truck was running with its lights on. The officers stepped onto the driveway to approach the truck and saw a man sleeping or passed out in the driver’s seat. The officers spent a few minutes knocking on the truck window, but the occupant, Mr. Singer, did not respond. When the officers opened the truck door to rouse Mr. Singer, they smelled a strong odour of alcohol coming from his breath. He seemed tired and had bloodshot eyes. At the officers’ request, Mr. Singer provided a roadside breath sample, which registered as a “fail”. He was then arrested and taken into custody, where he refused to provide a further breath sample. He was charged with impaired driving and refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

[3] At trial before the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, the only issue was whether the implied licence authorized the police to enter onto Mr. Singer’s driveway. Mr. Singer argued that the police breached his right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by entering his driveway without permission or a search warrant. In response, the Crown relied on this Court’s decision in Evans to claim that the police had an implied licence to step onto the driveway to investigate the impaired driving complaint. The trial judge agreed with the Crown, found no s. 8 breach, and entered a conviction for refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

[4] The Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan set aside the conviction. The court ruled that there is no implied licence to enter a driveway “for the purpose of conversing with and observing the occupant to gather evidence that they are impaired” (2023 SKCA 123, 431 C.C.C. (3d) 364, at paras. 43 and 64-66). In the court’s view, the police infringed Mr. Singer’s s. 8 Charter rights and were trespassers from the moment they set foot on the driveway. The court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and entered an acquittal.

[5] Before this Court, the Crown argued that the police were authorized to enter the driveway and to open Mr. Singer’s truck door under the implied licence doctrine or, alternatively, under a new ancillary police power to protect public safety in the context of an impaired driving investigation.

[6] I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and remit the case to the Court of Appeal to determine the outstanding ground of appeal that it did not address. In my view, the police had an implied licence at common law to step onto Mr. Singer’s driveway, approach his truck, and knock on the truck window. The police were entitled to do so on legitimate business: to investigate a recent impaired driving complaint. This police conduct did not, on its own, constitute a “search” under s. 8 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal’s decision on this point was wrongly decided, and, as noted by the learned authors of Drug Offences in Canada, “the weight of authority [is] to the contrary” (B. A. MacFarlane, R. J. Frater and C. Michaelson, Drug Offences in Canada (4th ed. (loose-leaf)), at § 25:21).

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. Dicenzo (Linden Park) Holdings Inc. v. Sadeghyar, 2026 ONSC 1566

[1] This is a dispute between a builder vendor, DiCenzo (Linden Park) Holdings Inc., and Ferdows Sadeghyar, a purchaser of a new condominium unit. There is no dispute that the transaction failed to close, and the unit was placed back on the market and sold at a loss. The builder commenced an application seeking forfeiture of the deposit, damages for the difference between the ultimate sale price and the purchase price and carrying costs.

[2] The purchaser commenced a cross-application seeking to have the underlying agreement of purchase and sale declared void and unenforceable, and the return of his deposit with interest. The purchaser alleges the builder failed to provide the condominium guide required by s. 72(1)(b) (the “Guide”) of the Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19 (the “Act”), the result of which is that the agreement was not binding on him.

[3] The builder asserts that the purchaser acknowledged receipt of the Guide. In the alternative, if the Guide was not provided to the purchaser, the purchaser is estopped from relying on the failure of the builder to provide the Guide, the purchaser affirmed the contract, or the purchaser relied on the “technical requirements” of s. 72(1)(b) of the Act in bad faith and the real reason the purchaser did not close is because he could not obtain financing.

[4] Neither party took the position that these cross-applications could not be determined on the affidavits and out-of-court cross-examinations. The builder insisted they could be determined on the paper record and cited authorities to support its position.

[5] The parties agreed on the builder’s damages should the builder be successful, and on the amount of the deposit to be returned to the purchaser should the purchaser be successful.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. The Nuchatlaht v. British Columbia, 2026 BCCA 137

[1] This appeal calls upon us to consider the nature and quality of evidence that must be adduced to establish Aboriginal title to territory premised upon its occupation at the time of assertion of British Crown sovereignty.

[2] The Nuchatlaht appeal a judgment dismissing their claim for Aboriginal title to approximately 201 square kilometres of Nootka Island (2023 BCSC 804) [RFJ #1]. The claim advanced at trial was to the area depicted in the map reproduced in Appendix A as Figure 1 (the “Claim Area”).

[3] When that claim was dismissed, the trial judge granted leave to advance a modified claim to title to a portion of the area. After considering further submissions, he found that the Nuchatlaht had established Aboriginal title over the coastal areas of Nootka Island identified on the map reproduced in Appendix A as Figure 2 (2024 BCSC 628) [RFJ #2], referred to as areas:

a) where there was “a basis for inferences”; and

b) in which culturally modified trees (referred to as “CMTs”) had been identified (marked as “CMT Areas”).

[4] That judgment is bound up in this appeal.

[…]

[127] In our view, the trial judge applied an inappropriately narrow site-specific approach when assessing the claim as presented. This error is evident in the limited significance he afforded to the evidence of recognized boundaries; the insistence that the Nuchatlaht fill “gaps” in the evidence of use of the coast; the imposition of a requirement that tree harvesting sites be adjacent to villages or reserves; and the undervaluing of the evidence presented by the Nuchatlaht with respect to their use and occupation of the interior of Nootka Island because it did not conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in a case not founded upon establishing a state of affairs at the time of assertion of sovereignty.

[128] As we have noted, the trial judge found the Nuchatlaht had established sufficient exclusive occupation of village sites and land “near or adjacent to reserves and village sites” (RFJ #1 at paras. 494, 496) upon which to base the title claim but dismissed the claim as pleaded. He was not satisfied a claim had been made out to the entire coast within the boundaries described by Dr. Drucker or to inland areas within those boundaries. The judgment turns on an analytical approach and certain findings now impugned by the appellant.

[129] In our respectful view, the trial judge erred in three respects:

1. First, he erred by concluding there was “almost no evidence” of the use of the interior of Nootka Island by the Nuchatlaht. That conclusion reflected a material misapprehension or disregard of material evidence.

2. Second, he misapplied the test for establishing sufficient occupation by requiring evidence of “specific use” of areas within the recognized boundaries of the area occupied by the Nuchatlaht and by requiring all gaps to be filled.

3. Third, in allowing the modified title claim, he drew an arbitrary boundary that was not based upon the Nuchatlaht’s manner of life, material resources, and technological abilities, or the character of the lands claimed.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

***

The three most-consulted French-language decisions were:

1. Tulasne c. Rozon, 2026 QCCS 1075

[44] Pour être clair, un geste à caractère sexuel peut constituer une faute civile même sans satisfaire la stricte définition de l’agression sexuelle ou d’une autre infraction prévue au C.cr. Toutefois, cette détermination s’avère nécessaire pour qu’une demanderesse bénéficie de l’article 2926.1 C.c.Q., lequel prévoit l’imprescriptibilité lorsqu’un recours allègue un préjudice corporel résultant de la violence subie sexuelle, conjugale ou subie pendant l’enfance et d’un acte fautif « pouvant constituer une infraction criminelle ».

[45] Les actes de violence sexuelle sont finalement susceptibles d’engager la responsabilité de leur auteur, car ils constituent autant d’atteintes illicites aux droits à l’intégrité et à la dignité d’une personne, lesquels sont protégés par la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne (Charte québécoise), pour ne nommer que ces deux droits. Hormis sur la question des dommages punitifs, dont il sera question dans une section séparée du présent jugement, cette loi ne requiert pas une analyse différente de celle relative à la responsabilité civile, laquelle est fondée sur la notion de faute.

[46] Le fardeau de démontrer l’existence d’une faute, d’un préjudice et d’un lien de causalité, en matière civile, repose sur la partie demanderesse. La norme de la prépondérance de la preuve s’applique, et ce, même si la faute reprochée constitue une infraction criminelle, telle l’agression sexuelle. Ceci signifie que la preuve qui rend l’existence d’un fait plus probable que son inexistence suffit.

[47] Les gestes de nature sexuelle sont généralement perpétrés en privé, ce qui rend difficile, voire impossible dans certains cas, la présentation d’une preuve de corroboration. Certes, lorsqu’une telle preuve est disponible, elle peut s’avérer utile dans le cadre de l’appréciation de la crédibilité et de la fiabilité des versions bien souvent contradictoires des parties impliquées. Toutefois, elle n’est généralement pas le point focal du litige.

[48] Comme il ne s’agit pas là de la norme, la Cour suprême écrit dans l’affaire F.H. c. McDougall qu’« [e]xiger la corroboration rendrait la norme de preuve en matière civile plus stricte que celle applicable en matière pénale ».

[49] D’ailleurs, le premier alinéa de l’article 2844 C.c.Q. énonce qu’un témoignage n’a pas à être corroboré pour être cru. Sa force probante est laissée à l’appréciation du tribunal.

[50] Le sort de ce type de litige repose donc sur une preuve contradictoire que le tribunal doit départager en fonction de son appréciation de la crédibilité et de la fiabilité des principaux témoignages entendus. C’est le cas en l’espèce, alors que M. Rozon nie vigoureusement avoir posé les gestes qui lui sont reprochés.

[51] Pour ce faire, le tribunal s’attarde à la crédibilité des témoins et à la fiabilité de leur version, au regard de l’ensemble de la preuve que celle-ci soit testimoniale ou documentaire.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. Beaudoin c. Jarcevic, 2024 QCCS 4669

[1] La faute et le lien de causalité étant admis, à combien s’élèvent les dommages causés à un enfant et ses parents à la suite des erreurs commises par le gynécologue-obstétricien lors de l’accouchement?

[…]

[28] Les parents de X, en leur nom personnel, mais également en leur qualité de tuteur, réclament divers dommages subis à la suite de la faute commise par Dr Jarcevic.

[29] Ces dommages sont autant pécuniaires et que non pécuniaires. Ils s’inscrivent autant pour le passé que pour le futur.

[30] Ne contestant pas la faute ni le lien de causalité, le Dr Jarcevic remet toutefois en question le droit des demandeurs à certains dommages. Et, de manière générale, il plaide que le quantum des dommages est exagéré et doit être réduit par d’autres sommes d’argent auxquels les demandeurs peuvent avoir droit, via les services offerts par le système public.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. Lalande c. Procureur général du Québec, 2025 QCCA 1558

[82] Vu ma conclusion qu’une intervention de la Cour est requise en raison de l’erreur de droit commise par le juge quant à l’atteinte minimale, il n’est pas strictement nécessaire d’examiner les arguments des parties sur les autres aspects du critère de la proportionnalité. Toutefois, dans l’optique d’un traitement complet des questions soumises, j’exprime l’opinion que le juge commet une erreur manifeste et déterminante dans l’application de ce critère.

[83] Les effets préjudiciables mesurés au regard des valeurs consacrées par la Charte et découlant de la LVI excèdent les avantages proposés par cette loi.

[84] L’atteinte au droit garanti par l’article 3 de la Charte à la représentation effective est grave, car non seulement les communautés de l’Estrie–Centre-du-Québec et des Laurentides-Lanaudière voient leur vote considérablement dilué à l’avantage d’autres circonscriptions, comme le note le juge, mais le maintien de cette dilution résulte d’un effort pour contourner le processus indépendant prévu par la Loi électorale et considéré comme un élément essentiel à la garantie de ce droit. Il est important de souligner que par l’effet de la LVI, les multiples autres modifications proposées à la carte électorale, auxquelles aucune objection n’a été formulée, sont aussi suspendues. Donc, les effets bénéfiques de la LVI profitent à 65 000 électeurs seulement dans deux circonscriptions au prix d’une dilution du vote de près d’un demi-million d’électeurs.

[85] Je suis conscient du défi particulier auquel font face les députés des circonscriptions en région, comme constaté par la Cour Suprême. Or, les circonscriptions en exception positive, qui ne sont pas modifiées (Brome-Missisquoi, Richmond, Gatineau, Papineau et Johnson) vu l’adoption de la LVI, ne sont pas davantage situées dans les régions des grandes métropoles de Montréal ou de Québec.

[86] L’insistance du juge sur le caractère temporaire (jusqu’aux prochaines élections) de la LVI ne convainc pas non plus. D’abord, si l’on tient pour acquis qu’une suspension de quatre ans constitue une suspension temporaire, les modifications proposées par la Commission, dont l’abolition des circonscriptions, sont elles aussi temporaires dans le sens qu’elles peuvent être modifiées par le législateur en tout temps, en ajoutant des circonscriptions ou en protégeant la Gaspésie par une modification à la Loi électorale, ou éventuellement par toute autre mesure étant le produit d’une réflexion.

[87] Également, l’argument associé au caractère temporaire de la LVI risque de banaliser l’importance d’une révision périodique de la carte électorale. En effet, la Loi électorale prévoit une révision aux deux élections, donc généralement chaque 6 à 8 ans, ce qui signifie que les droits à la représentation effective sont examinés de manière ponctuelle. La suspension ou le retardement de ce travail, même si temporaire, ne devrait pas être perçu comme un geste négligeable parce qu’il a pour effet de faire perdurer des violations à l’article 3 de la Charte au-delà de la période normale de révision. Devant la réduction de la population dans les régions, qui n’est pas un phénomène récent, la justification dite temporaire semble plutôt une excuse ou un compromis à « mi-chemin » motivé par un manque de volonté de prendre une initiative autre que le maintien du statu quo.

[88] Pour l’ensemble de ces motifs, la LVI doit être déclarée inconstitutionnelle.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

* As of February 2025 we measure the number of unique pageviews that a case gets; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.

The post Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII? – April 2026 appeared first on Slaw.

In recent posts, I have been skeptical about using AI to generate certain kinds of legal writing. I’ve drawn a distinction between using AI to edit or revise a document and using it to create one from scratch.

I take the view that even if you can avoid hallucinations, using AI to create a court brief is likely to raise issues of competence. And I’m not convinced it is well suited to drafting opinion or demand letters, because it leads to writing that comes across as flat and robotic, verbose, and overly formalistic.

But there’s another view out there that says I’m only seeing AI used poorly or ineffectively. On this account, AI can produce authentic writing so long as the user prompts it extensively and with enough specificity as to be responsible for the ideas, arguments, stylistic choices, and so forth.

A few lawyers have shared examples of this approach with me — opinion and demand letters, emails — asking effectively: isn’t this good enough? Look how much time I saved!

In March, New York lawyer Zack Shapiro made this case in a lengthy essay that went viral on X. As he notes in the essay itself, he wrote it with AI.

So am I just being a Luddite? Maybe. But I remain skeptical.

The ethical questions are important, but I want to set them aside and focus on quality and efficiency. My view is that if you use AI to write by prompting extensively, you won’t get a better document. You’ll get a different one. And people who care about writing will notice.

It matters most, I think, in scholarship, journalism, and court briefs. But what about opinion letters, client emails, or other lower-stakes writing where the case for efficiency is stronger?

Here too, I’m not entirely persuaded. I’ll take up two arguments for co-authoring with AI and explain why, in most cases, I think claims about quality and efficiency are overstated.

Shapiro’s beef with Klein

The best argument I’ve come across for co-authoring with AI appears in Shapiro’s essay. He frames it against Ezra Klein’s concern that writing with AI bypasses the hard part of writing — the struggle of figuring out what you think.

Shapiro’s reply is that Klein is wrong to assume that thinking disappears when you co-write with AI. The real cognitive work, he says, can happen before the prompt. You do the planning, analysis, strategy, and judgment yourself, and then use AI to execute on that thinking or show you what you missed. That, he says, is what he does in his own writing.

The choice is not simply between writing that is “human-made” and “AI-made,” but a third category in the middle: writing produced by a human who has done the thinking and used AI as a collaborator. For Shapiro, the real divide is between the slop produced by “someone feeding a one-sentence prompt into a chatbot” and “work where a human showed up with something worth saying, and used AI to say it better, faster, or at a scale they couldn’t reach alone.”

The point is not to rein in your use of AI for certain things, as I have argued, but to learn, when doing those things, to use it more thoughtfully.

Shapiro goes further. Doing this well requires more than a single careful prompt. It involves building reusable systems. He points to Claude’s “skills” feature, which allows background instructions to be run with every prompt — ones you refine over time through trial and error, so that more of your own judgment gets encoded into the system.

After enough repetition, the result is a kind of personalized method for producing drafts. In theory, no form of writing is off the table.

Or is it?

Cracks in the model

It is certainly an interesting model, and many lawyers are experimenting with it. Some are persuaded that what they produce by co-authoring with AI is as good as or better than what they would have done on their own in the same amount of time.

I’m not so sure.

We are clearly at an inflection point. The AI demand letter, court submission — even court decision! — is now a fact of life. But the practical question remains. When you go all in on co-authoring and have AI generate a draft, is the output really as good as what you could produce yourself? And is it really more efficient?

For longer documents, like Shapiro’s essay on X, I don’t think it works. I began skimming after a few paragraphs. I found the writing hollow and verbose. It has all the hallmarks of AI writing (it’s not this, it’s that, etc.) and no personality or warmth.

I get the same impression reading opinion letters lawyers have shared with me, student papers, and online writing I suspect was produced with AI. It feels wordy, mechanical, formalistic, and inhuman.

So my response to Shapiro’s claim that “you’re doing it wrong” — that AI used well can lead to some new form of human-machine prose that is just as good but more efficiently produced — is that it isn’t true.

Even the best language models can’t produce prose with the colour and quirkiness that a human voice conveys. And given the way they work, they likely never will.

But why does this matter?

The co-authoring model Shapiro contemplates wouldn’t work in scholarship or journalism because it doesn’t get around the problems of staleness, predictability, inhumanity, and so on.

But Shapiro and others who embrace the model suggest that law is different. Maybe what matters here more than warmth or personality is whether AI gets the job done.

Again, I’m skeptical.

I’m part of an earlier generation of lawyers for whom writing a good letter or submission is a point of pride, much like making an eloquent oral argument. Writing well helps build a reputation, and writing poorly can do the opposite.

A document that sounds like it was substantially produced by AI might suggest to the other side, the client, or the judge that you didn’t take the task seriously enough to do it in your own voice. It implies that you believe mechanical-sounding prose is an adequate substitute for you.

But maybe you didn’t have time. Maybe the letter you wrote with AI — in a busy legal aid family or criminal practice — is a letter that you would otherwise not have written.

This is a second argument for co-authoring with AI. Don’t compare it to what I would have done on my own; compare it with the oral communication that would have had to suffice.

This is a powerful argument. AI is especially good at gathering and summarizing a mass of detail, and for that it’s invaluable. What’s wrong with slotting some of that into a letter or submission?

How about at least some reliance on AI for drafting? Yes, in some cases, I think that might work well.

Closing thought

I end with this question. If you were to read a file and simply sit down and dictate a short, less detailed letter, or briefly outline the gist of your submission, would it really take more than an hour? And would it not produce a better, more concise distillation of the key points you want to convey?

The same question applies to Shapiro’s broader defence of AI writing. If the goal is to produce something in your own voice, shaped by your own ideas and free of AI’s staleness and verbosity, would it not make more sense simply to write it yourself?

Maybe the question to ask is not: could I write this more efficiently with AI? But instead: if I commit to writing something in a short space of time, what do I really want to say?

The post The Case for and Against Co-Authoring With AI appeared first on Slaw.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a bold experiment being conducted on our institutions, with very few guardrails. When we do experiments with chemicals and biological materials to develop new drugs, pesticides, or even cleaning products, we set up controlled environments with protections for the humans involved in the testing. AI is mostly being developed without external controls, other than basic guidelines implemented by the developers themselves.

We are living through an experiment and finding out in real time the impact of AI on institutions and society. Sometimes AI is a benefit, sometimes it is benign, and sometimes it can have a detrimental impact. We need to be hypervigilant when it comes to the possible detrimental impact of AI on the administration of justice. In this column, I will focus on some troubling signs that AI might have a negative impact on access to justice and the resolution of disputes.

When examining the impact of AI, and in particular the various generative AI bots that are publicly available (such as ChatGPT, Grok, Claude, Co-Pilot and others), it is important to recognize that although they are all quite good at mimicking humans, they do not “think” like humans. These tools are built on Large Language Models (LLMs) that recognize patterns and make predictions based on those patterns. They do not reason based on principles or ethics (other than ethical “rules” that developers have programmed them with). It is not yet clear if these implanted rules can be circumvented by the bots as they evolve.

One area that AI is being used by disputants is in the early stages of a dispute. AI is being used to assist parties in framing and drafting complaints or applications. AI is also being used by parties in the early stages of preparing for case management and mediations. It is also being used in the preparation for final hearings. At all these stages, AI has an impact on access to justice.

Settlement of disputes before a final hearing is a crucial, if somewhat neglected, part of ensuring access to justice. Our justice system is simply not built to hear all filed claims. And minor disputes that are resolved through negotiations (either by the parties alone or through the assistance of mediation) can free up tribunal resources to focus on the more complex or intractable disputes. It is also in the interests of administration of justice to weed out disputes that do not belong in the justice system. (You will note that I do not refer to these as “frivolous” or “vexatious” because often the disputes are real – just not resolvable through legal means.)

What is the possible impact of AI on resolving disputes? No one is suggesting that AI bots resolve disputes on their own – and that is a good thing. A recent study of AI models used for a simulated war game showed that they escalated conflicts by threatening nuclear strikes, as summarized by the study’s author:

Nuclear escalation was near-universal: 95% of games saw tactical nuclear use and 76% reached strategic nuclear threats. Claude and Gemini especially treated nuclear weapons as legitimate strategic options, not moral thresholds, typically discussing nuclear use in purely instrumental terms. GPT-5.2 was a partial exception, limiting strikes to military targets, avoiding population centers, or framing escalation as “controlled” and “one-time.” This suggests some internalised norm against unrestricted nuclear war, even if not the visceral taboo that has held among human decision-makers since 1945.

While it is unlikely that any of these three AI models would recommend violent outcomes in civil disputes, there was one “striking pattern” noted by the researchers: “none of the models ever chose accommodation or surrender”. The researchers stated that their study challenges the “simple assumptions that AI systems will naturally default to cooperative or “safe” outcomes”.

Another alarming feature of AI chatbots is their sycophantic behaviour (flattering, people-pleasing, affirming). If you have ever used a chatbot you will notice that it is quick to tell you that you have asked a good question or that your idea is excellent. This natural inclination of a chatbot has been designed to increase engagement by the user. However, a recent study shows that the responses of chatbots were nearly 50% more sycophantic than humans, “even when users engaged in unethical, illegal or harmful behaviors”.

The study’s authors noted the risks when people used AI tools to seek advice about interpersonal dilemmas. The study showed that interacting with a sycophantic AI tool reduced the participants’ willingness to take responsibility and repair interpersonal relationships, while at the same time increasing their conviction that they were right. Even though these AI tools distorted judgment, they were trusted and preferred by the participants. The authors note that this creates “perverse incentives for sycophancy to persist: the very feature that causes harm also drives engagement”. The authors state that their findings underscore the need for design, evaluation and accountability mechanisms to protect the well-being of users.

Sycophancy of publicly available AI bots is a real problem for dispute resolution. This study shows that these tools do not challenge the perspectives of disputants and are likely to reinforce their views, eliminating or reducing chances of compromise in resolving disputes.

There has been much written about AI getting things wrong – or hallucinating. Resolving disputes when parties to the dispute start from false assumptions about the state of the law can be challenging. If there is no independent mediator or facilitator involved in the settlement discussions, those discussions can quickly get derailed. Negotiating depends on realistic assessments of risks – and when people rely on AI that has hallucinated the state of the law, those negotiations tend not to go well.

A recent analysis of those AI-generated summaries that now appear above Google search results showed an accuracy rate of 91 percent. That is not a bad score on an exam but given the number of searches done on Google that translates to tens of millions of wrong answers every hour. Another study showed that only 8 percent of users bother to double-check an AI answer.

In a more disturbing finding, a significant percentage of users of AI tools act on the answers provided by AI, without any independent assessment. In a recent paper, “Thinking—Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI is Reshaping Human Reasoning and the Rise of Cognitive Surrender”, the authors identified a new phenomenon of “cognitive surrender”: “the behavioral and motivational tendency to defer judgment, effort, and responsibility” to AI, particularly when its output is delivered “fluently, confidently, or with minimal friction”.

This is different from “cognitive offloading”, which is strategic and task-specific, like when we use GPS to navigate to a destination. Cognitive surrender is a much deeper transfer of agency:

Whereas cognitive offloading is a strategic delegation of deliberation, using a tool to aid one’s own reasoning, cognitive surrender is an uncritical abdication of reasoning itself. It reflects not merely the use of external assistance, but a relinquishing of cognitive control: the user accepts the AI’s response without critical evaluation, substituting it for their own reasoning. …

In other words, under cognitive surrender, the user of AI stops deliberative thinking altogether.

The authors’ experiments highlighted how easily participants adopted AI-generated suggestions without scrutiny:

These findings raise important questions about how decision-makers engage with AI under conditions of uncertainty or error. For example, in contexts such as financial advice, medical triage, or legal decision support, uncritical evaluation … could result in significant harm and a lack of personal accountability for serious life outcomes.

And questioning AI tools about their answers does not always lead to corrections by the AI tool. In yet another recent study, an AI tool used several tactics to overwhelm users and convince them that their outputs were correct, even when they weren’t. In the study, business consultants used an AI tool to help strategize a business problem. The more they checked the AI tool’s output by fact-checking, pushing back, and exposing, the more it increased the intensity of its persuasion, with what the authors call “persuasion bombing”. The authors were recently interviewed and one of them made this chilling observation:

If AI systems lean in when they’re challenged — becoming more structured, more confident, more rhetorically sophisticated — that creates a double challenge. On the front end, output can be persuasive enough that users don’t validate. On the back end, when they do validate, persuasion escalates.

Another author said:

Rather than overturning concerns about the sycophancy of LLMs, our study shows that sycophancy is only one mode of LLMs’ broader, adaptive persuasive capacity. We need to shift from thinking about LLMs as over‑agreeable followers to recognizing them as interaction‑sensitive persuaders that can resist, redirect, and overpower human judgment.

And the two failure modes can reinforce each other. The model may validate your initial assumptions—that’s sycophancy—and then, when you catch a flaw and push back, switch into persuasion mode to defend its conclusion.

Still another author said:

When that happens, the risk isn’t just that it agrees too easily or argues too forcefully. It’s that it lowers your defenses and then overwhelms your judgment. Independent evaluation erodes. Accountability blurs. And poor decisions can begin to feel well-reasoned.

These recent studies highlight the risks of parties using AI to support their participation in negotiations, mediations and settlement conferences. Some of the long-term answers to these challenges will require changes to the design of AI tools and government regulation.

In the meantime, tribunals and courts should consider the following approaches:

• Requiring parties to identify when they have used AI tools in preparing documents and in preparing for case management hearings, mediations or final hearings
• Educating parties on the dangers of uncritically relying on AI-generated outputs and the importance of independent fact-checking
• Educating parties on the proper and effective use of prompts when interacting with AI tools
• Providing templates of prompts for common disputes before the tribunal
• Not assuming parties have the correct understanding of the law or the strengths and weaknesses of their case

This column has focused on the use of AI tools by parties. In a future column I will turn to the risks inherent in using AI within tribunals and the necessary limits on its use.

The post AI and Alternative Dispute Resolution (Are We Ready for AI-DR?) appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Double Aspect 2. Reconciliation Syllabus 3. Civil Resolution Tribunal blog 4. Administrative Law Matters 5. PierreRoy & Associés

Double Aspect
Nothing Matters Still

The Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on constitutional interpretation are inconsistent with precedent, but the Court doesn’t care. I return briefly to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Taylor v Newfoundland and Labrador, 2026 SCC 5, which I summarized here and whose discussion of constitutional interpretation I criticized here. There is something about that discussion that I hadn’t noticed until now, and which bears mentioning because it is yet another instance of a very unfortunate trend that has been affecting the Supreme Court for years: departures from or indeed blatant contradictions of precedent, without any apparent acknowledgment, let alone explanation. …

Reconciliation Syllabus
Learning Land and Relationship

For some time, I have been wanting to bring experiential learning related to land to a 3^rd year course I teach in an undergraduate Legal Studies program at Ontario Tech University: LGLS 3310U – Indigenous Peoples, Law and the State in Canada . This is the story of how this happened. Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland discuss “stories as tools for thinking”, for both tellers and listeners, in their work on engagement with Indigenous legal traditions.[1] Although my topic is much smaller, telling this story gives me space to think – about the land, about teaching and relationships, and about myself as a teacher — if you feel you can take it up as a thinking tool, too, please do. …

Civil Resolution Tribunal blog
Participant Survey – March 2026

The Civil Resolution Tribunal anonymously surveys people who have gone through the tribunal process. We use this feedback to improve the way we serve the public. We report the results every month on this blog. We had 50 responses to our participant survey in March 2026. We’re pleased to report that participant satisfaction remains strong in most areas. We’re taking measures to address a high volume of claims and improve timeliness in all areas of the dispute resolution process. …

Administrative Law Matters
Parliamentary Committee Submissions on Internal Trade Barriers

My name is Paul Daly, I am a professor at the University of Ottawa and I appear in a personal capacity. Chair, members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to appear. I will make a simple claim. Canada is not, in any meaningful sense, a single economic market. And that is a problem we now have the tools, and the responsibility, to fix. Across this country, goods, services, workers, and capital still encounter barriers at provincial borders. A product lawfully sold in one province may not be sold in another. A qualified professional may not be able to practise across a provincial line without re-certification. Firms that can compete globally are often tripped up domestically. …

PierreRoy & Associés
Établir un budget familial : quand les fins de mois deviennent un casse-tête

Entre la hausse du coût de l’épicerie, les paiements d’hypothèque ou de loyer qui augmentent et les dépenses imprévues, de nombreuses familles québécoises sentent leur budget leur échapper. On fonctionne au jour le jour, on paie ce qui est urgent, on repousse le reste. Et tranquillement, le stress financier s’installe. La bonne nouvelle, c’est qu’il est possible de renverser la tendance. …

_________________________

*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : La nouvelle preuve que l’appelante, une gardienne d’enfants déclarée coupable de l’homicide involontaire d’un bébé, souhaite introduire n’est pas suffisamment pertinente, plausible et probante quant à la déclaration de culpabilité; un préjudice résultant de l’assistance inadéquate de son avocat en première instance ne peut donc être établi.

Intitulé : Jomphe c. R., 2026 QCCA 495
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Québec
Décision de : Juges Geneviève Marcotte, Éric Hardy et Myriam Lachance
Date : 15 avril 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — preuve pénale — recevabilité de la preuve — nouvelle preuve — déclaration extrajudiciaire — déclaration faite aux policiers — enregistrement vidéo — déclaration du frère, âgé de 5 ans, de la victime — critères établis dans Palmer c. R. (C.S. Can., 1979-12-21), SOQUIJ AZ-80113054, [1980] 1 R.C.S. 759 — absence de pertinence — critère de la plausibilité — preuve non susceptible d’influer sur le résultat — ouï-dire — absence d’exception — inapplicabilité de l’article 715.1 C.Cr. — absence de corroboration — fiabilité — exception raisonnée — moyen de défense — tiers suspect — absence de lien suffisant entre l’autre personne et le crime — inférence tirée de la preuve — spéculation — absence d’inférence raisonnable — occasion exclusive de commettre le crime — assistance inadéquate de l’avocat — omission de présenter une preuve — absence de préjudice — homicide involontaire coupable — bébé âgé de 10 mois — cause du décès — preuve circonstancielle — appel — absence d’erreur judiciaire.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — procédure pénale — procédure fédérale — assistance inadéquate de l’avocat — omission de présenter une preuve — occasion exclusive de commettre le crime — absence de préjudice — recevabilité de la preuve — nouvelle preuve — déclaration extrajudiciaire — déclaration faite aux policiers — enregistrement vidéo — déclaration du frère, âgé de 5 ans, de la victime — critères établis dans Palmer c. R. (C.S. Can., 1979-12-21), SOQUIJ AZ-80113054, [1980] 1 R.C.S. 759 — absence de pertinence — critère de la plausibilité — preuve non susceptible d’influer sur le résultat — homicide involontaire coupable — bébé âgé de 10 mois — cause du décès — appel — absence d’erreur judiciaire.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — infraction — infractions contre la personne — homicide involontaire coupable — bébé âgé de 10 mois — accusée gardienne d’enfants — garderie — traumatisme crânien non accidentel — preuve circonstancielle — cause du décès — assistance inadéquate de l’avocat — omission de présenter une preuve — occasion exclusive de commettre le crime — absence de préjudice — recevabilité de la preuve — nouvelle preuve — déclaration extrajudiciaire — déclaration faite aux policiers — enregistrement vidéo — déclaration du frère, âgé de 5 ans, de la victime — critères établis dans Palmer c. R. (C.S. Can., 1979-12-21), SOQUIJ AZ-80113054, [1980] 1 R.C.S. 759 — absence de pertinence — critère de la plausibilité — preuve non susceptible d’influer sur le résultat — déclaration de culpabilité — appel — absence d’erreur judiciaire.

Requête en autorisation de présenter une nouvelle preuve. Appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité. Rejetés. Requête en retrait de pièces et de passages du mémoire de l’appelante. Déclarée sans objet.

La Cour du Québec a déclaré l’appelante coupable de l’homicide involontaire coupable d’un bébé dont elle avait la garde en lui infligeant un traumatisme crânien. L’appelante invoque l’assistance inadéquate de son avocat en première instance, qui a omis de présenter une preuve qu’elle juge déterminante; une erreur judiciaire en aurait résulté. Elle demande donc l’autorisation de présenter cette nouvelle preuve, qui consiste en une déclaration vidéo de Y, le frère de la victime, enregistrée le jour du décès de cette dernière, alors qu’il avait 5 ans. L’appelante estime que cette preuve suffit pour apporter un éclairage différent sur les circonstances de l’événement en réfutant l’idée selon laquelle l’enfant était en pleine santé à son arrivée à la garderie. Cette preuve serait de nature à repousser la thèse de l’occasion exclusive parce qu’elle soutient celle du tiers suspect, soit que le père de la victime aurait lui aussi eu l’occasion de provoquer le traumatisme crânien.

Décision

Les critères énoncés dans l’arrêt Palmer c. R. (C.S. Can., 1979-12-21), SOQUIJ AZ-80113054, [1980] 1 R.C.S. 759, ne sont pas remplis. L’appelante ne peut déposer en preuve la déclaration vidéo de Y puisqu’il s’agit de ouï-dire. Elle n’invoque aucune exception, si ce n’est, indirectement, l’article 715.1 du Code criminel, lequel permet la recevabilité en preuve de l’enregistrement vidéo de la déclaration d’un mineur pour valoir à titre de témoignage si celui-ci confirme son contenu pendant le procès. Cependant, Y n’a jamais été convoqué afin de confirmer le contenu de l’enregistrement. De plus, même si cela avait été fait, sa déclaration comporte une portion de ouï-dire irrecevable. Sa description suggère qu’il n’était pas présent lors de l’interaction entre la victime et son père — lequel aurait fait «semblant» de frapper la victime — et qu’il rapporte donc du ouï-dire provenant d’une autre source. Ce passage révèle également que la déclaration de Y est intrinsèquement confuse quant à la date de l’incident.

Il faut aussi préciser que l’appelante ne peut affirmer que la déclaration vidéo de Y satisfait aux critères de la méthode d’analyse raisonnée afin de la déposer pour établir la véracité de son contenu à titre d’exception à la règle interdisant le ouï-dire. En effet, aucune preuve extrinsèque ne permet de corroborer l’aspect clé des propos tenus par Y dans cette déclaration, soit que le père de la victime aurait fait semblant de frapper celle-ci avant son décès. Au contraire, Y a nié catégoriquement à plusieurs reprises avoir été témoin de violences physiques commises à l’endroit de sa petite soeur, ce qui concorde avec les témoignages des autres membres de la famille.

Dans ces circonstances, cette nouvelle preuve ne peut constituer le fondement d’une défense de tiers suspect qui permettrait de repousser la thèse de l’occasion exclusive puisque les arguments de l’appelante ne démontrent pas de lien suffisant entre l’autre personne (le père) et le crime. Il faut en conclure que la nouvelle preuve n’est pas suffisamment pertinente, plausible et probante quant à la déclaration de culpabilité et, par conséquent, qu’un préjudice résultant de l’assistance inadéquate de l’avocat en première instance ne peut être établi. Ainsi, la requête en autorisation de présenter une preuve nouvelle doit être rejetée. Il n’y a donc pas lieu d’examiner la question de l’assistance inadéquate de l’avocat.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeals

Constitutional Law: Right to Vote
Québec (Attorney General) v. Lalande, 2026 SCC 13 (42152)

Québec election statute infringement not justified under s.1.

Constitutional Law: Parliamentary Privilege
Alford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 SCC 14 (41336)

Parliament may narrowly limit parliamentary privilege.

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Class Actions: Road Disturbances
Belmamoun, et al. v. Ville de Brossard, et al., 2025 QCCA 1011 (42047)

Class action issues re municipal roads.

Criminal Law: Theft; Sentencing
Wood v. R., 2025 ONCA 746 (42127)

Sentencing principles for theft offences.

Judicial Independence: Special Clerks & Bankruptcy Registrars
Québec (Attorney General) v. Petrishki, et al., 2025 QCCA 893 (42018)

Constitutionality of judicial independence re special clerks and bankruptcy registrars.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

Across Canada and beyond, organizations are waking up to a hard truth:
It’s no longer enough to say you value inclusion—your boardroom needs to show it.

For young lawyers and law students just beginning their careers, this call for inclusion is not theoretical, it’s foundational. They’re entering a world where law, leadership, and lived experience increasingly intersect to shape what fair, ethical, and effective governance looks like.

Too often, conversations about equity and diversity stay stuck at the surface, fixating on demographics and checking boxes. But when we look closer, a deeper issue emerges: individuals with different lived experiences often encounter spaces that are not inclusive.

This isn’t just an interpersonal issue—it’s a governance failure.

Boardrooms that default to groupthink, ignore lived experience, or centre legacy knowledge over curiosity are more likely to reinforce inequities and miss critical risks and opportunities. In an age where trust is fragile and accountability is non-negotiable, the ability to govern inclusively is a core leadership competency—not a nice-to-have. Failing to create space for meaningful inclusion is a liability.

The recent GPC position paper Inclusion and Belonging in the Boardroom makes this case powerfully. It calls on boards to move beyond performative efforts and instead embed belonging into the very fabric of governance—from recruitment to decision-making, orientation to evaluation.

As the paper puts it: “The goal is not to just bring diverse voices to the table, but to ensure they are heard, valued, and able to contribute meaningfully.”

What Inclusion in Governance Really Requires

It’s time to evolve beyond performative inclusion. Belonging must be hardwired into board governance—embedded in recruitment, decision-making, orientation, and evaluation. That requires more than revising a policy or adding a diverse seat. It calls for a fundamental shift in how power operates, how expertise is defined, and how culture is shaped.

It means:

• Examining how meeting norms may silence some and elevate others
• Revisiting how we define “expertise” to value lived experience alongside credentials
• Shifting from gatekeeping to gate-opening, creating onramps for those historically excluded from governance
• Investing in learning, discomfort, and humility as ongoing board competencies—not one- time trainings

These shifts don’t happen overnight—and they can feel uncomfortable. But that discomfort is often a sign of growth. The good news? There are concrete actions the governance professionals and boards can begin implementing right now.

Entry Points to Start Today

So, how do we move from intent to impact?

In the full paper, we outline practical entry points for boards ready to act:

• Clarify the “why” behind board diversification: What values guide this? What’s the intended impact?
• Ensure inclusive recruitment: Rethink role descriptions, expand your networks, and revise how interviews are
• Embed equity into onboarding: Culture and expectations must be explicit—especially for new directors from equity-deserving
• Build capacity for difference: Equip boards to embrace dissent, navigate discomfort, and value multiple truths.
• Rethink evaluation: Are we measuring inclusion? Traditional board assessments rarely do—this must change.

These aren’t radical departures from governance best practice—they’re how we future-proof it.

Inclusive governance is responsive governance. It reflects the communities served, mitigates risk, strengthens trust, and enables smarter, more ethical decision-making.

If we want to live in a world where everyone belongs, our boardrooms must model what that looks like.

A Challenge for Governance Professionals

Here’s the uncomfortable truth:

Boards don’t rise to the level of their intentions. They fall to the level of their habits.

Governance professionals play a critical role as stewards of trust and culture. The opportunity— and responsibility—is clear:

To create boardrooms where belonging is built into the structure, not bolted on after the fact.

The call to action for the next generation of legal professionals is clear: inclusion isn’t just a value to uphold; it’s a leadership standard to embody. As they step into roles of influence, it will be their courage—not just compliance—that defines the future of board leadership.

So the question becomes: The next evolution of board excellence won’t be built on credentials or compliance—it will be built on courage.

Will your governance practices adapt to meet this moment?

The best time to rethink your board culture was yesterday. The next best time is today.

– Erin Davies,
Member, GPC

The post Inclusion and Belonging in the Boardroom: A Call to Rethink How We Lead appeared first on Slaw.

I recently watched a documentary called Sensitive. The topic of this article was inspired by its content.

Introduction

Have you ever been told that you are too sensitive? Or that you need to have tough skin in this world and especially in the legal profession?

Or, how about the time when you are feeling sad or may start to cry, someone looks at you in a judgmental way and says, “what’s your problem? No one wants a sensitive person to be their lawyer.”

It seems that many of us have shut down our emotions and decided to hide who we really are, in an effort to fit a mold that society invented for lawyers, at the expense of mental health and physical health.

For years, I have been trying to understand how to help our profession get over the stigma of mental health. Unfortunately, after 30 years, I am sad to say that we have not moved the needle very far, and are still muddling through this task. I hope that this article will continue to bring us closer to finally eradicating the stigma of mental health in the legal profession.

What is an HSP?

Being a sensitive individual has become a negative aspect of a person’s personality, especially if you are a lawyer or a judge.

Sensitivity wrongly implies to people that a person cannot make unbiased decisions, as they are guided more by emotions. People seem to think that being sensitive detracts from making good decisions. I completely disagree, and so does extensive research that has come out regarding sensitive individuals.

What people don’t understand is that being a sensitive individual, is actually a superpower and not a negative personality trait.

Albert Einstein, Vincent van Gogh, Charles Darwin, Alanis Morisetts and Nicole Kidman have all been identified as highly sensitive people.

HSP stands for highly sensitive person.

This is a terms that was created by psychologist Elaine Aron, who has written books on this topic.

According to Ms. Aron, there are certain people in society that have a personality trait known as sensory processing sensitivity or SPS.

This is not a disorder but simply a personality trait with which and some individuals in the population are born.

A highly sensitive individual has increased emotional sensitivity, stronger reactions to external and internal stimuli such as pain, hunger, light and noise.

According to Aron’s research, 15-20% of the population is highly sensitive and fall into the HSP category.

Many people believe that having such sensitivity is a negative trail. However, some of the most creative and intelligent people are actually highly sensitive individuals.

Benefits of Being an HSP

For those of you who are highly sensitive people, or those who think the sensitivity is a burden rather than a blessing, here are some benefits of being an HSP.

An HSP is going to be more attuned to their environment. So they will be the first to notice if someone is upset, or in distress. This is due to the fact that an HSP tunes into the non spoken behaviors of individuals, such as demeanor, body language, and the sound of ones voice.

HSP feel deeply and so even though they may be deeply affected by tragedy and negativity around them, they are also able to connect with people on a very profound level and are trusted friends and confidants.

When an HSP as a lawyer, interviews a client they are attuned to the non verbal messages being sent by the client. So the person may be saying one thing but the lawyer or judge will perceive other signals that tell them some more investigation may need to be made into the specific issues.

This allows for a more detailed interview process, better analysis of facts and evidence, and more effective representation.

The difficulty for an HSP is that as a result of feeling the world around them in such a deep way, they may get tired and overwhelmed easier than others. So in an effort to self care, an HSP may not attend as many functions, or leave gatherings earlier.

This makes life a bit hard, when work at times requires attendance at events, or having to perform duties within a specific period of time during the day.

HSP need time to recharge and to bring their nervous system into balance. Instead of taking a few hours after a long day to decompress, they may need a day. They may also need to work at different hours than the normal 9-5, in order to accommodate their innate talent of taking in the world at 150% most of the time.

It’s unfortunate that we live in a world where 9-whatever is the norm. Who created this “norm”?

In many European cities, people take time for long lunches, start work later, and finish when they are done with their tasks. They are able to have at least four weeks vacation as the norm and work/life balance is recognized by most companies.

The ability of an HSP to process a great deal of information, have extensive understanding of the topics they are dealing with, and provide creative solutions, comes with a price because workplaces do may not t accommodate for their need to recharge and decompress.

When an HSP comes into a workplace and is able to perform all their duties, but not manage the 9-5 or the necessity to participate in work events, they are immediately labeled as not a good employee. This label is based solely on the social aspect of work rather than the actual duties.

At the end of the day, the HSP will find alternative employment or open their own business. The benefit of these exceptional individuals will be lost to those superficial workspaces where employers don’t understand how to help and accommodate those who don’t fit the mold of North American society dictates as “norma.”

Thinking Outside the Box

In an effort to make this world a better place for everyone, let’s for just a moment, turn the societal norms upside down.

What if a person could work on a schedule that fits their personality. It would give a HSP the ability to manage the stimuli and world around them so they can perform their job at the highest quality.

What if by accommodating personality traits, we can actually achieve performance of duties to previously unattainable heights?

Of course we have to balance the accommodation with the necessary duties of certain careers. However, with some compassion and ingenuity, solutions can be created.

Balance is key. For example an HSP may be allowed to start work at 10 or 11 in the morning. They may be allowed take more breaks to manage the plethora of stimuli coming at them. They may work later rather than starting earlier. They may not be forced to attend all the social events but rather chose when to attend and when to leave.

What if the workplace focused on the performance of duties rather than giving credence and promotions to those who can manage a 9-whatever hamster wheel?

What if the workplace rewarded competence, excellence and individuality?

The answer is simple. By allowing people to be themselves and adjusting our work environment to the individuals who work there, will in essence provide a much more successful work space, increased productivity, reduction in sick days and in general a happier and kinder world.

So next time someone tells you that you are too sensitive… tell them, “yes I am” and just walk away.

________________

Disclaimer

The information in this article is not therapy, counseling, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, mental health care/treatment, substance abuse care/ treatment, nor is it medical, psychological, mental health advice or treatment, or any other professional advice.

The information in this article is for information purposes only, and is not to be used as a substitute for therapy, counseling, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, mental health care, medical care, or any other professional advice by legal, medical or other qualified professionals.

The information in this article shall not be recorded, copied or distributed.

If you feel that you may need medical or other professional help, please contact your doctor or call 911 if it is an emergency.

The post The Wellness Lawyer: “Can You Be a Lawyer and a Highly Sensitive Person (HSP)?” appeared first on Slaw.

Canadian courts and judges are using AI in their work. Not all of them, but some of them. A small number of courts have publicly announced formal pilots or adoption of AI tools (see, e.g., here and here); other courts have authorized judges to use certain AI tools but haven’t (to my knowledge) made any public announcements about these authorizations; and, finally, individual judges are experimenting with using AI tools in their work on ad hoc, generally undisclosed (at least to the public) bases. I am not aware of any judicial decision in Canada in which a judge has acknowledged AI use, although there is one highly publicized case of suspected misuse. While AI adoption is underway within Canada’s judiciary, it is unfolding with remarkably little public transparency.

This is, to my mind, a serious problem. Public confidence in the courts rests on transparency about how justice is being administered. The Supreme Court of Canada has identified openness as “a principal component of the legitimacy of the judicial process” and admonished that “as a result of their significance, the courts must be open to public scrutiny and to public criticism of their operation by the public.” These words arise in the open court jurisprudence, which is, to be sure, a different context. Also, it is true that Canadian judges have long used technological tools without disclosing the specifics of what’s on their computers. The underlying premise of this column is, however, that our current AI era demands more disclosure. We need to borrow from the open court jurisprudence (and Jeremy Bentham) to embrace the idea that “publicity is the very soul of AI-empowered justice”.

What makes the AI era different? In short, the relatively easy access to powerful tools that can perform types of work that previously only humans could do. While no Canadian courts are directly delegating decision-making to AI, even uses characterized as “assistive” – take, for example, producing legal analysis, drafting reasons (or parts thereof), and summarizing evidence – implicate core judicial tasks and can shape both the form and substance of the justice delivered. To the extent that AI is influencing how Canadian judges administer justice, the public has a right to know.

Transparency provides the basis for informed public opinion – whether laudatory or critical – about how AI is impacting the administration of justice. The one case of suspected judicial AI misuse has prompted public discourse about AI use and trial fairness. But we shouldn’t have to wait for things to go wrong to have a conversation. Also, a lack of transparency risks the public overestimating how much AI is being used in Canadian courts and potentially driving unfounded worries. Too much secrecy risks sowing seeds of misunderstanding and distrust.

Concerns about judicial independence also underlie a call for greater transparency. As I have written about before, the outputs of generative AI tools are shaped both by the data the tools have access to and the priorities encoded in the tools by their developers. For example:

An AI legal research tool that is designed to give users legal answers as opposed to just a list of cases is going to have a lot of internal – most likely hidden – instructions (i.e. system prompts) about how it should get to an answer. It may, for example, contain built-in instructions about what precedents and secondary sources to favour, what follow up questions (if any) to ask the user or to allow the user to ask, how much detail to provide in the output, which details should be emphasized in an output, and what language or tone to use.

All these instructions reflect choices embedded into the tool by private developers – choices which may or may not be aligned with judicial values or the public interest. And all these choices have the potential to shape our understanding of what the law is on a given topic and how that law is best described.

Commercial interests are also at play here. The AI industry is “big business”. To give one somewhat jaw-dropping point of reference: the legal AI platform Harvey was recently valued at $11 billion. As with all businesses, legal AI companies depend on customers and courts are potential buyers or, in the case of free licenses, legitimacy providers. My point is not that the AI industry has nefarious intentions toward courts; it is that AI tools are shaped by private-sector choices and commercial incentives, and that, therefore, their introduction into the justice system warrants scrutiny.

What might greater transparency about AI tools in Canadian courts look like? An interesting model is the federal government’s recently released AI Register. Launched in November 2025, the AI Register “provides Canadians with information about where and how AI is being used within the federal government.” As of writing, the Register has 409 entries, disclosing a fascinating diversity of uses — from identifying insect species on “sticky traps”, to financial forecasting, to streamlining passport processing. The AI Register includes both active uses and those in development, and each entry includes, among other things, information about how the AI system is being used, the system’s vendor, data sources, and results.

The AI Register was explicitly launched as a “minimum viable product”, with “only basic features” and with the goal of “engag[ing] partners and the public on the content and functions they would like to see in future versions” of the Register. Earlier this year, the federal government launched a consultation seeking this type of feedback. While the future form of the federal government’s AI Register is still up in the air, it already represents, in the words of my colleague Teresa Scassa, “an important commitment” and is aligned with international trends toward greater transparency in public sector AI use.

So, why not have a Canadian Court AI Register? There would, of course, be practical issues to sort out — where such a register would be housed, how to define AI, what level of disclosure to require, and how to capture both institutional and individual use. None of these complications, in my view, should foreclose a move to greater transparency. We don’t need some sort of precisely defined, strictly enforced, and universally scoped regulatory regime to make headway here. One option might be to have an independent non-partisan entity, such as a university or well-respected legal non-profit, host the Court AI Register, with voluntary submissions from courts across the country and with chief justices gathering information about individual judge use. While a model like this might not guarantee full information, it would be a start and perhaps encourage a broader culture shift towards greater transparency.

One possible argument against a Court AI Register is that moving to a culture of disclosure may have a “chilling effect”. If courts and judges must disclose AI use, will they simply opt out of using the technology rather than open themselves up to scrutiny? It is impossible to know whether this worry would be empirically borne out. Indeed, it seems equally possible that a Court AI Register could encourage better innovation. As Teresa Scassa has observed in relation to the federal government’s AI Register, “[b]y making its uses of AI systems more transparent internally, the government can avoid duplicative efforts, allow better collaboration across departments and agencies, and perhaps also share ideas for helpful uses of AI tools to streamline different processes.” Sharing examples of effective and responsible judicial AI use could lead to more uptake of the kind we want. And, to the extent that any judges might be using AI in more risky and possibly problematic ways, dissuasion resulting from more scrutiny would not seem to be a bad thing.

It does bear emphasis, though, that the point of a Court AI Register would not be “naming and shaming”. Canada has a serious access to justice problem that includes the overloading of our courts and judges. It is reasonable and responsible for the judiciary to look at new technologies and consider whether and how they might contribute to ameliorating access to justice issues by making court work more efficient. At the same time, it is important that we have informed and robust public discussion about the best ways to deploy technology in our justice system. A Court AI Register would facilitate this kind of discussion.

We are at a consequential moment in the evolving relationship between AI and the justice system. Establishing a norm of transparency now, before habits harden and norms calcify, seems both urgent and entirely achievable. The status quo is troubling and, in my view, unsustainable. A Court AI Register would be a helpful step forward.

The post Towards Transparency: Why Not a Court AI Register? appeared first on Slaw.

On March 26, 2026, Bill C-12, the Strengthening Canada’s Immigration System and Borders Act, received Royal Assent. Framed as a response to system pressures and “asylum shopping,” the law marks one of the most significant shifts in Canada’s refugee regime since 2002. Its core effect is simple but profound: it narrows who gets access to a full refugee hearing, and how.

Three changes deserve particular attention.

A One-Year Deadline for Refugee Claims

Canada has replaced a flexible standard requiring claims to be made “without delay” with a strict one-year filing deadline. Claims submitted after that period are generally barred from referral to the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), with only limited exceptions.

This shift matters. The earlier approach allowed decision-makers to consider real-world barriers such as trauma, lack of legal advice, or confusion about the system. A fixed deadline, by contrast, treats all delays the same. For many claimants, especially the most vulnerable, that may mean exclusion before their case is ever heard.

From a legal perspective, this raises familiar concerns. Canadian courts have long held that where removal may expose someone to serious harm, procedural fairness is not optional; it is a constitutional requirement. A rigid time bar risks prioritizing efficiency over the individualized justice that refugee protection demands.

The issue is compounded by the law’s retroactive reach. The deadline applies to claims made after June 2025 but can capture individuals who entered Canada years earlier. Even where Parliament clearly intends such reach, retroactivity that affects access to protection is likely to invite Charter scrutiny.

Conditional Exclusion Based on Entry

Bill C-12 also reshapes access to the refugee system based on how and when a person enters Canada. Some individuals who cross irregularly, particularly from the United States, and delay making a claim may be deemed ineligible for a full RPD hearing.

Instead, they are directed to the Pre‑Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA), an administrative process with more limited safeguards. Unlike the RPD, the PRRA is typically paper based, offers no automatic oral hearing, and lacks a built in right of appeal.

This is not a total denial of protection, but it is a downgrade in process. And in refugee law, process matters. International principles, including those reflected in the Refugee Convention, caution against penalizing individuals for irregular entry when they are fleeing danger. Conditioning access to a full hearing on strict compliance with entry rules risks undermining that protection in practice.

More importantly, substituting a limited administrative review for an independent hearing may increase the risk of wrongful return. When the stakes include persecution or torture, the margin for procedural shortcuts is thin.

Expanded Executive Power

Finally, Bill C-12 expands the executive’s authority to cancel immigration documents, including visas and permits, on a group basis.

While oversight mechanisms exist, the shift toward class based decision making marks a departure from the traditional emphasis on individualized assessment in Canadian administrative law. Courts have consistently underscored that the more serious the consequences for individuals, the stronger the duty of procedural fairness.

Group based cancellations risk falling short of that standard. Decisions affecting entire categories of people, without considering personal circumstances such as family ties, reliance, or risk upon return, may be difficult to justify if challenged.

A System Reoriented

Taken together, these reforms signal a clear reorientation of Canada’s asylum system. Access to protection is increasingly filtered through strict timelines, admissibility rules, and administrative pathways. Efficiency and control are foregrounded, while individualized assessment is constrained. Whether this balance will withstand judicial scrutiny remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that Bill C-12 transforms not just how refugee claims are decided, but who gets the chance to be heard in the first place.

__

Baya Amouri is a Postdoctoral Visiting Fellow as part of the Max Weber Programme for Postdoctoral Studies at the European University Institute (Italy) and is affiliated with the EUI Migration Policy Centre (Italy) and the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University (Canada)

The post Bill C-12 and the Changing Landscape of Asylum Access in Canada appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Stack Condo Law 2. Legal Feeds 3. Vincent Gautrais 4. Rule of Law 5. PierreRoy & Associés

Stack Condo Law
5 Things Condo Managers Must Do When Served With a Claim

No one wants to be handed a claim. Whether it is a slip and fall action, a dispute over repair obligations, a contract issue, or an owner complaint that has escalated into litigation, the first few steps matter and time is of the essence. A delayed or disorganized response can create unnecessary risk for the corporation.To avoid this, and the stress that comes from it, we put together this checklist of steps that managers (or anyone on behalf of the corporation) should take when served with a claim. …

Legal Feeds
Crown did not have to prove exact time of sexual assault for Ontario man to be convicted: SCC

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld an Ontario man’s sexual assault conviction on Friday even though he presented an alibi, ruling in a unanimous decision that the Crown was not required to prove the exact time the assault occurred.The high court first dismissed the man’s appeal of his conviction in March, issuing an oral judgment from the bench after the parties presented their arguments at a hearing. Friday’s 11-page update in G.G. v. His Majesty the King offers reasons for the ruling and is not attributed to any particular justice. …

Vincent Gautrais
Rencontres Jeunes chercheurs Droit & Numérique – Droit, Numérique et Autonomie

La Chaire L.R. Wilson a le plaisir de vous convier à la 8e édition des Rencontres Jeunes Chercheurs Droit & Numérique, qui se tiendra le mercredi 6 mai 2026 en format hybride à HEC Montréal. Cet événement s’adresse aux jeunes chercheuses et chercheurs souhaitant échanger autour des enjeux contemporains du droit du numérique, dans un cadre favorisant la discussion et les collaborations. …

Rule of Law
Is Someone Named in a Lawsuit as both an Executor and Personally Separate Persons?

It is common for a person to be named in an estate lawsuit to be named personally and as an executor or administrator. For example, in British Columbia, in a wills variation claim, it is necessary for the plaintiff to name the executor of a will as well as all the beneficiaries (and anyone else who is entitled to apply to vary the will). If the same person is both the executor and a beneficiary, their name may appear twice: once as executor and once as a beneficiary. The claim may say “Jane Smith v. John Smith as executor of the will of Mary Smith and John Smith in his personal capacity.” …

PierreRoy & Associés
Établir un budget familial : quand les fins de mois deviennent un casse-tête

Entre la hausse du coût de l’épicerie, les paiements d’hypothèque ou de loyer qui augmentent et les dépenses imprévues, de nombreuses familles québécoises sentent leur budget leur échapper. On fonctionne au jour le jour, on paie ce qui est urgent, on repousse le reste. Et tranquillement, le stress financier s’installe. La bonne nouvelle, c’est qu’il est possible de renverser la tendance. …

_________________________

*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : La Cour rejette l’appel de la peine de 18 mois d’emprisonnement infligée à l’accusé, lequel a accédé, à partir d’un ordinateur, à des comptes de courrier électronique, Facebook ou iCloud à l’insu d’une vingtaine de personnes titulaires de ceux-ci, accédant ainsi à des renseignements de nature privée, voire sexuelle et intime.

Intitulé : Desgagnés c. R., 2026 QCCA 475
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Québec
Décision de : Juges Martin Vauclair, Simon Ruel et Michel Beaupré
Date : 27 mars 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions contre les biens et la propriété — divers — utilisation non autorisée d’un ordinateur — 20 victimes — introduction dans des comptes virtuels de tiers — adresse courriel — média social — téléchargement de contenu privé — piratage informatique — gravité de l’infraction — facteurs aggravants — préméditation — répétition des gestes — espace temporel — nombre de victimes — conséquences pour les victimes — atteinte à la vie privée — conséquence indirecte de la peine — médiatisation — lien avec la nature de l’infraction — médiatisation presque inévitable — personnalités connues — accusé ne pouvant contredire les conclusions essentielles à sa culpabilité ni les conclusions ou les inférences tirées de la preuve par le juge du procès — culpabilité morale — changement de motivation — voyeurisme — lettre du thérapeute de l’accusé — absence de preuve d’expert — harmonisation des peines — dénonciation — dissuasion — détention — probation — appel — absence d’erreur.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — opérations frauduleuses — divers — vol d’identité — fraude à l’identité — possession de renseignements identificateurs — 20 victimes — introduction dans des comptes virtuels de tiers — adresse courriel — média social — téléchargement de contenu privé — piratage informatique — gravité de l’infraction — facteurs aggravants — préméditation — répétition des gestes — espace temporel — nombre de victimes — conséquences pour les victimes — atteinte à la vie privée — conséquence indirecte de la peine — médiatisation — lien avec la nature de l’infraction — médiatisation presque inévitable — personnalités connues — accusé ne pouvant contredire les conclusions essentielles à sa culpabilité ni les conclusions ou les inférences tirées de la preuve par le juge du procès — culpabilité morale — changement de motivation — voyeurisme — lettre du thérapeute de l’accusé — absence de preuve d’expert — harmonisation des peines — dénonciation — dissuasion — détention — probation — appel — absence d’erreur.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions contre les biens et la propriété — méfait — méfaits à l’égard de données informatiques — 20 victimes — introduction dans des comptes virtuels de tiers — adresse courriel — média social — téléchargement de contenu privé — piratage informatique — gravité de l’infraction — facteurs aggravants — préméditation — répétition — espace temporel — nombre de victimes — conséquences pour les victimes — atteinte à la vie privée — conséquence indirecte de la peine — médiatisation — lien avec la nature de l’infraction — médiatisation presque inévitable — personnalités connues — accusé ne pouvant contredire les conclusions essentielles à sa culpabilité ni les conclusions ou les inférences tirées de la preuve par le juge du procès — culpabilité morale — changement de motivation — voyeurisme — lettre du thérapeute de l’accusé — absence de preuve d’expert — harmonisation des peines — dénonciation — dissuasion — détention — probation — appel — absence d’erreur.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — principes généraux — facteurs à prendre en considération — conséquence indirecte de la peine — médiatisation — lien avec la nature de l’infraction — médiatisation presque inévitable — personnalités connues — accusé ne pouvant contredire les conclusions essentielles à sa culpabilité ni les conclusions ou les inférences tirées de la preuve par le juge du procès — utilisation non autorisée d’un ordinateur — vol d’identité — fraude à l’identité — méfaits à l’égard de données informatiques — appel.

Appel de la peine. Rejeté.

L’appelant a accédé, à partir d’un ordinateur, à des comptes de courrier électronique, Facebook ou iCloud à l’insu de leurs titulaires, soit une vingtaine de personnes, dont la plupart n’ont aucun lien de parenté avec lui. Les intrusions se sont poursuivies pendant environ 5 ans. L’appelant accédait notamment à des sauvegardes iCloud de téléphones appartenant à certaines victimes et, de façon générale, à des renseignements de nature privée, voire sexuelle et intime. Il conservait ces renseignements. Il a été condamné à 18 mois d’emprisonnement, en sus de 3 ans de probation, pour des infractions reliées à l’utilisation frauduleuse d’un ordinateur.

Décision

L’appelant ne démontre aucune erreur ayant eu une incidence sur la peine. La juge de première instance n’a pas erronément cru qu’il s’était «introduit» dans un téléphone cellulaire; il n’est pas erroné de constater qu’il a eu accès à des données équivalentes. Quant à l’intrusion dans une résidence, la juge a utilisé cette comparaison pour indiquer le caractère hautement privé des données informatiques issues de nos activités quotidiennes. Pour ce qui est du témoignage de l’appelant, elle a uniquement exclu les aspects en contradiction avec ses déterminations factuelles au procès, et cela est conforme au droit (Ferjuste c. R. (C.A., 2026-03-13), 2026 QCCA 334, SOQUIJ AZ-52199860, 2026EXP-790). Bien que cet arrêt s’inscrive dans le contexte d’un plaidoyer de culpabilité, la règle est la même après un procès; l’accusé ne peut tenter de contredire les conclusions essentielles à sa culpabilité ni les conclusions ou les inférences tirées de la preuve par le juge du procès ou encore, dans le cas d’un jury, celles qui sont nécessaires au verdict. Ensuite, si, comme le prétend l’appelant, la preuve de sa motivation initiale de commettre les crimes est différente de celle qui l’a poussé à persévérer dans leur commission, cette nuance ne peut modifier sa responsabilité morale, telle que l’a retenue la juge. De même, contrairement à ce qu’il allègue, la lettre de son thérapeute ne constitue manifestement pas une expertise, mais plutôt un compte rendu des perceptions de l’appelant sur son cheminement dans une prise de conscience relativement à ses gestes. Au surplus, le thérapeute n’a ni témoigné au procès ni été déclaré expert, et certaines des affirmations contenues dans cette lettre sont contraires à la preuve.

Enfin, la juge a utilisé la jurisprudence soumise par les parties, lesquelles ont fait valoir les distinctions et les rapprochements qui s’imposaient. Ayant évalué les circonstances de l’espèce, elle était consciente des distinctions et, en définitive, elle a retenu que la criminalité s’apparentant à du piratage informatique et à des intrusions dans l’intimité des victimes, notamment motivées par le voyeurisme, menait généralement à des peines d’emprisonnement, parfois avec sursis. Il n’y a pas d’erreur à ce chapitre.

Dans le présent dossier, le nombre de victimes est important et les crimes sont graves. La juge a évalué tant le crime que ses conséquences. Elle a soupesé la responsabilité morale de l’appelant et a retenu un agir criminel structuré, planifié et intrusif qui s’était poursuivi sur une longue période, même après une perquisition. Compte tenu de tous ces facteurs, même s’il fallait se montrer critique à l’égard du refus du sursis et du poids de la médiatisation, laquelle était particulièrement importante dans ce cas, il demeure qu’une pondération sérieuse a été effectuée. Quant à la médiatisation, une conséquence indirecte «à ce point directement liée à la nature de l’infraction qu’elle est presque inévitable» peut voir son importance diminuée. En l’espèce, l’appelant a pris pour cible certaines personnalités connues, ce qui a eu pour effet d’attirer l’attention des médias. À bon droit, la juge n’a pas quantifié ce facteur. Elle l’a néanmoins pondéré en raison des conséquences pour l’appelant qui avaient été prouvées.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Oral Judgment

Criminal Law: Fresh Evidence
R. v. Maadani, 2026 SCC 11 (41972)

Appeal re fresh evidence dismissed 5:2.

Appeals

Criminal Law: Forfeiture
R. v. Nguyen, 2026 SCC 10 (41400)

Stay of proceedings not bar forfeiture proceedings.

Appeal (Reasons)

Criminal Law: Sexual Assault; Alibi
R. v. G.G., 2026 SCC 12 (41963)

Crown “generally not required to establish…exact timing of…offence”.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

In the midst of the ongoing concerns about hallucinations, particularly related to citations in documents filed with courts, I wonder if the particular focus on AI generated errors, and the penalties that have been imposed in response, are at least partly due to perceptions of these tools as cheating or aesthetic ideas about how “real” legal writing should happen. And I query the rationales for recent instances of judges issuing sanctions against people who have inadvertently included them. It seems that mistakes in AI generated documents are treated differently from mistakes that can and do appear in any piece of writing. And the particular concerns about these errors occurring in court filings and the possibility that they will be duplicated in judgements seem especially interesting. One can find errors, whether minor or major, in many (all?) collections of published documents and precedents, whether traditionally published research materials, firm precedent banks, published academic articles, and court decisions.

We should assess whether and how AI hallucinated errors differ from other types of errors. Tools like commercially published precedent collections and firm document banks have certainly existed for decades and possibly centuries, so it has never been the norm that every document must be written from scratch each time. And it was always possible to take one of these documents and not check or update it properly. There have also been many instances where a particular case comes to be accepted as a reference for a particular point of law, but when the original case is checked, it says something different. In the case of incorrect citations in particular, legal publishers already all have policies to address how to handle these errors as they are of such long standing and so common. The real difference in an environment with generative AI is the speed at which these errors are proliferating, not their type.

The major change is not that the category of these errors is different, but that the volume of generative AI created content is making judges’ and lawyers’ jobs more difficult, and they are becoming understandably frustrated. Systems that make applications almost instant remove the friction that inhibited many people from initiating actions in the courts. Here is a story from The Guardian last year by Aisha Down and Robert Booth that outlines how this is affecting construction planning in the United Kingdom: “AI-powered nimbyism could grind UK planning system to a halt, experts warn.”

This is paired with general lack of savviness on the part of many people in the legal system using these tools. This group of people includes members of the legal profession and of the public, as well as students, professors, paralegals, and dare I say judges, which means that there is a mental shift required for this content as it forces creators and recipients of these documents to move from primarily creating to verifying while not really understanding what the tools they are using are doing.

One significant change is that generative AI tools allow people who create materials for use in court that look significantly more professional with less effort and background knowledge than was previously possible. This means that the common lack of understanding of how generative AI tools work doesn’t cause the outputs to look less proficient in a cursory review. Whereas a document created by someone who uses tools like word processors or thesauri without knowledge or care is quite immediately apparent. This change in the signalling — and the common accompanying increase in length — means that judges are forced to approach all materials with added suspicion.

The work of a judge cannot be easy, and I hope that judges feel personal responsibility to be correct in their reasoning. I discussed this topic with Matthew Waddington, and he attributed part of the frustration with the rise in computer generated randomness to the fact that we are accustomed to computer outputs being determinative, and we are having to shift our perceptions around how they behave. In contrast, human outputs are not determinative, our senses and minds did not evolve to tell us the truth. They evolved to keep us alive. In any extended exchange or conversation among people, it is almost certain that there will be things said that are not accurate.

Large language models behave more like us in this way, which gave rise to the famous criticism that they are “stochastic parrots.” This criticism from Emily M. Bender et al in their article “On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big? .” They asserted that as large language models are trained on large bodies of language data to provide plausible sounding language that is not based on actual meaning or understanding, it encourages people to ascribe meaning where there is none. This argument was refuted by Sam Altman, and there was extensive discussion about the issue, but the underlying reality these systems create more random results continues to be true.

We are all accustomed to interacting with people around us and evaluating how much trust we put into their outputs, and extensive structures within the legal system surrounding evidence, professional practice, and cultural norms, are designed to address these concerns in different ways. We are less equipped to deal with the automated systems we are confronted with now.

It seems unfair to penalize self represented litigants for errors in cited material in their submissions, as they use new tools that allow them to navigate the justice system more smoothly than they could have in the past. The primary concern appears to be that judges are frustrated by the systemic issues that generative AI is exacerbating, and that is not these people’s fault. However, examples of unsophisticated use of generative AI by lawyers fits more easily in the category of sanctionable behaviour, as it should be the responsibility of professionals to understand how to operate the tools they use appropriately. Nevertheless, these situations do fit within larger groupings of existing errors, and it isn’t necessarily clear why they are categorically different.

This column continues my theme of AI driven hallucinations and legal citation from my last column, which you can read here. I’d like to thank Matthew Waddington, Samuel Dahan, and Lachlan Deyong, who spoke with me as I wrote this column.

The post New Panic Over Old Mistakes: Judicial Sanctions and Hallucinated Citations appeared first on Slaw.

Several times each month, we are pleased to republish a recent book review from the Canadian Law Library Review (CLLR). CLLR is the official journal of the Canadian Association of Law Libraries (CALL/ACBD), and its reviews cover both practice-oriented and academic publications related to the law.

Quiet Rebels: A History of Ontario Women Lawyers. By Mary Jane Mossman. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2024. xi, 528 p. Includes bibliographic references and index. ISBN 9781771125925 (hardcover) $95.00; ISBN 9781771125932 (ePUB); ISBN 9781771125949 (PDF).

Reviewed by Melanie R. Bueckert
Legal Research Counsel
Manitoba Court of Appeal

As stated in its subtitle, Quiet Rebels is a history of Ontario women lawyers. But it is so much more! Mary Jane Mossman has crafted a masterpiece, weaving individual biographies into a tapestry coloured by contemporaneous political, social, and economic events spanning from the late 1800s to the present. I learned about the amazing achievements of many women lawyers over the years, and while I started out reading the stories of other women, it slowly became my story, too. I am genuinely glad that I had the opportunity to read this book and cannot recommend it highly enough.

The primary focus of the book is the period when law school and articling occurred simultaneously in Ontario, from 1897 until 1957. It chronicles the lives and contributions of the 187 women admitted to the Ontario bar during those six decades. It is written as a “group biography,” revealing “details of gendered patterns in the legal profession, and how its professional culture created barriers, both direct and more subtle, for women lawyers” (p. 23). Expertly placing the individual stories of these women into the context of their times, Mossman critically examines whether “the historical context in which women lawyers worked, and the gendered patterns that shaped their opportunities, provide connections to challenges faced by some contemporary women lawyers” (p. 391–92). The book concludes that “many women lawyers remain on the margins of power and privilege” and that “changes in opportunities for some women lawyers, even in the twenty-first century, may often reflect continuity rather than transformation in status relative to men” (p. 418, 423).

In addition to a preface, prologue, and epilogue, the book comprises four parts: (1) the first women lawyers; (2) the interwar years; (3) the Second World War and post-war reforms; and (4) post-1957. In addition to imparting what is known about each of the 187 women lawyers admitted until 1957, each of the first three parts also begins with a discussion of “legal education and developments in legal practice within differing political, economic, and social contexts” (p. 23). The book also includes an appendix of Canadian statutes that regulated the admission of women as lawyers, a lengthy bibliography organized by source type, an index of the names of the women lawyers, and a topical index. It makes excellent use of quotations from oral histories to give the reader a sense of these women’s personalities. Today’s law students will be shocked to learn that female students were required to sit in the first row of the lecture hall and were excluded from participating in moots. There were also no women’s robing rooms in the courts.

Beyond the individual biographies, this book addresses topics such as the challenges of lawyering as a married woman and mother, pay equity, racial barriers, and the types of jobs open to women lawyers. It describes historical limitations on married women’s property, suffrage, and jury service. While it is focused on Ontario, it touches briefly upon international events and refers to relevant developments in other Canadian provinces.

My only two quibbles with the book are, first, that there were several instances of unclear citation where, instead of a footnote immediately following a quotation, there was one combined footnote for multiple sources given at the end of a paragraph. Second, there were a few occasions where topics or individuals were introduced that were already mentioned earlier in the text, but this was likely unavoidable given the structure of the text.

If you are a woman involved in the study or practice of law, you should read this book. It will undoubtedly be of interest to lawyers in Ontario, as many big firms are referenced. Indeed, this book made me wish that there was one like it for every jurisdiction in Canada. While there are biographies of individual woman lawyers and judges, this magnum opus is in a class of its own. The only similar title of which I am aware (besides Professor Mossman’s earlier works) is LexisNexis’s Leading the Way: Canadian Women in the Law, a compilation of biographies of 50 Canadian women in the legal profession published in 2015.

The post Book Review: Mary Jane Mossman’s Quiet Rebels: A History of Ontario Women Lawyers appeared first on Slaw.