Artificial intelligence is making its way into courtrooms around the world, and not always for the better. Judges have been caught embedding AI-generated fictitious case references in judicial decisions, in Canada and internationally; and there are no doubt other, more subtle, machine delusions slipping into case law undetected. Judicial misuse of AI tools has profound consequences for the administration of justice and for public confidence in the courts. But a less obvious threat also deserves our attention: a growing body of research indicates that large language models (LLMs) have a homogenizing effect on writing and analysis, meaning that judges’ increasing reliance on AI may stifle the common law’s development.

Judges in Canada are prohibited from delegating their decision-making authority to AI tools. Short of that, some judges are using AI tools to assist with judgment writing. This could involve, for example, asking a tool to generate text summarizing the facts of a case or synthesizing the relevant law. Some or all of this text may then make its way into a judgment. This marks an important shift: the judge moves, by degrees, from author of a judgment to editor of machine-generated text. The concern is that if judges increasingly start from machine-generated text, the arguments, ideas, and language of their decisions may start to become overly influenced by AI and converge on certain tendencies found in these tools. And with such convergence, the future horizons of the common law, as a whole, may start to narrow as well.

A growing body of research suggests this risk is real. A recent study comparing human-written essays and AI-generated essays found that “essays generated by different LLMs…converge to a smaller set of main arguments, sub-arguments, and paragraph-level structures.” In other words, the study found a “tendency of different LLMs, built by different frontier industry labs, to return to the same small set of plausible arguments rather than span the broader range of arguments humans make.” The researchers coined the term “argument collapse” to describe this effect.

Another recent set of studies, again looking at AI-generated essays in comparison to human-written essays, found that “despite their potential to enhance individual creativity, the widespread use of LLMs could diminish the collective diversity of creative ideas.” Over three studies, human-written essays were found to have, collectively, two to eight times more creative content than the AI-generated ones. The researchers noted that “this homogenizing effect persisted even after a range of enhancements to the diversity of the GPT-4 writings, including prompt and parameter modifications”, leading them to conclude that “even as AI tools continue to improve and produce ever better and more creative output, they may still contribute to an overall homogenization of ideas.”

Relying on AI tools not only risks narrowing the arguments and ideas that users engage with, it can also have a homogenizing effect on the language used to describe these arguments and ideas. The opening paragraph of a recent New York Times article paints a vivid picture:

In the quiet hum of our digital era, a new literary voice is sounding. You can find this signature style everywhere — from the pages of best-selling novels to the columns of local newspapers, and even the copy on takeout menus. And yet the author is not a human being, but a ghost — a whisper woven from the algorithm, a construct of code. A.I.-generated writing, once the distant echo of science-fiction daydreams, is now all around us — neatly packaged, fleetingly appreciated and endlessly recycled. It’s not just a flood — it’s a groundswell. Yet there’s something unsettling about this voice. Every sentence sings, yes, but honestly? It sings a little flat. It doesn’t open up the tapestry of human experience — it reads like it was written by a shut-in with Wi-Fi and a thesaurus. Not sensory, not real, just … there.

As the article summarizes “[o]nce, there were many writers, and many different styles. Now, increasingly, one uncredited author [AI] turns out essentially everything.”

Inspired by these research studies and observations, my suggestion here is that judicial use of AI tools for judgment writing risks narrowing and flattening how the common law is described and developed, and that this is a risk we should strive to avoid.

Moves to a more singular, algorithmically driven judicial voice run contrary to the very nature of our common law system and our commitments to a diverse, independent judiciary. It is widely acknowledged and accepted that judges bring their own “conceptions, opinions [and] sensibilities” to their work and that this is a strength of our justice system. Multiple and diverse perspectives facilitate the fullest development of the common law. The common law grows precisely because different judges reason by different routes and in different terms, and the law is richer for having different paths through complex legal problems.

To be sure, judicial decisions are not a place where we want unbridled creativity, as we might in the realms of fiction or poetry or art. Some conformity in judgment writing is a good thing. Judges are, of course, necessarily constrained by precedent as well as formal and informal norms about legal reasoning and judicial writing. Judicial writing has been criticized when it veers outside of perceived conventions, for example, by inserting pop culture references or literary flourishes in legal decisions. In his recently published PhD dissertation, Canadian lawyer Jon Khan makes a compelling case that Canadian common law could benefit from even more standardization in written judicial reasons.

Even so, where judges converge on shared analytical and linguistic practices, there are good reasons to want those alignments to be products of human judgment exercised by thoughtful judges, not a byproduct of machine defaults. The priorities embedded in LLMs are not chosen with justice system values or the public interest in mind. The argument structures and turns of phrase these tools favour are artifacts of training data and developer choices, not a considered view about how a judicial decision should be built to serve the parties, the profession, and the public it speaks to. In other words, to the extent that approaches to judicial decision-writing converge, they should converge around the values and priorities of the legal community, not around the preferences an AI model happens to favour.

The tendencies of AI tools may not only differ from the priorities of the legal community; they can sometimes be actively harmful. Take, for example, a study published earlier this year wherein ChatGPT was used to generate over 140,000 legal memos and the model was found to exhibit “a prosecutorial default bias…systematically recommend[ing] prosecution–even when prompted from a defense perspective, confronted with minimal evidence, or presented with clear constitutional violations.” AI technologies, like all technologies, are not neutral.

No doubt, the severity of the risks raised here scales with the depth of reliance. The risk of undue homogenization is far greater for the judge who lets an AI tool draft a decision, or significant parts of one, and then simply edits the result than for the judge who turns to AI only to check grammar or work through a stubborn sentence. The risks also depend on which tool is used. Some tools are now being built specifically for judges, designed—at least in principle—to better reflect the demands of judicial work. Whether they deliver on that promise remains to be seen.

The ultimate plea of this column echoes one I’ve made before: judges must be careful about using AI in the judgment-writing process, even when they are using it in ways that might be thought of as merely “assistive” and therefore low-risk. The subtlety of the risks raised in this column, as compared to those arising from fake cases, requires, in my view, a heightened vigilance. The types of changes described will not necessarily be immediately obvious and will not happen overnight. As a senior English judge recently observed: “[t]he danger is not a dramatic coup by machine. It is of a gradual drift: standardised prompts, standardised summaries, standardised risk scores and eventually standardised dispositions. A court system may appear formally independent while its informational architecture has been captured by technology we cannot inspect, challenge or control.”

It is easy to be seduced by the ease with which generative AI tools produce seemingly high-quality text; but in the judgment-writing context, there’s a lot at stake when writing is outsourced to machines. A body of common law written by judges who all lean on the same handful of models is a common law that stops sounding, and reasoning, like many minds and starts sounding like one. And that one voice is not oriented toward the values of our justice system. Worse, it gravitates toward a synthetic, flattened and sometimes biased default. This is a future we can, and should, resist.

The post Resisting the Echo Chamber: AI-Assisted Judgment Writing and the Risk of Homogenization appeared first on Slaw.

Artificial intelligence has become, in one way or another, a part of many dispute resolution practices. Counsel use AI to prepare mediation briefs, assess litigation risk, test settlement ranges, or draft suggested terms. Parties use it to understand the process or evaluate options. Some mediators may use it to organize information, draft correspondence, test language, or reflect on process choices.

The discussion about AI in mediation has also become more urgent and comprehensive. Much of it properly focuses on confidentiality, neutrality, party autonomy, disclosure, competence, and human judgment. For working mediators, however, the next step is practical: distinguishing between lower-risk and higher-risk uses of AI and deciding what safeguards are needed in ordinary mediation practice.

My view is that whether mediators are “for” or “against” AI is not a useful question. It is whether a particular use of AI is consistent with the process we have been asked to conduct.

In some parts of a mediator’s work, AI is potentially quite useful. It can summarize long documents, compare position statements, organize chronologies, identify apparent points of agreement and disagreement, suggest agenda structures, generate possible questions, and help reframe inflammatory language. It can also assist with generic role-plays, training simulations, plain-language explanations, and first drafts of routine communications. For busy mediators, this is not insignificant. Preparation is often the invisible work of mediation, and, in complex disputes, the volume of material can be substantial. Anyone who mediates regularly knows that preparation is not just reading the brief. It is trying to understand the best approach to mediation for each particular dispute.

But we must remember that mediation is not simply information processing. Mediators know that some of the most important information in the room is not in the documents. It is in tone, timing, hesitation, anger, fatigue, mistrust, and the particular way a party says, “That is not what happened.” It is in what counsel does not say. It is in the gap between a stated position and an underlying concern. It is in the practical, emotional, relational, and reputational dimensions of conflict.

One of the most important question facing mediators is whether AI can be used without weakening the qualities that make mediation valuable to disputants: confidentiality, neutrality, party self-determination, balanced participation, trust, and judgment.

Start with the IBA Guidelines

The International Bar Association Mediation Committee has issued Guidelines on the use of generative artificial intelligence in mediation. They are helpful because they do see AI in binary terms as either prohibited or harmless. They recognize the potential benefits of AI while grounding its use in mediation values.

The Guidelines are broad. They contemplate AI use by mediators, parties, representatives, and institutions, from administrative support and document synthesis to risk analysis, settlement drafting, mediator selection, and institutional administration.

In many ways the most important contribution of the guidelines to the AI debate is the development of a safeguard framework. The IBA focuses on party autonomy, privacy and confidentiality, neutrality, impartiality, independence, and balanced process. It also includes a sample AI usage statement that may be adapted where disclosure of AI use is required or helpful. In other words, the Guidelines do not ask only, “What can AI do?” They ask, “What does AI use to do to the process?” and this is the question mediators should also be asking.

At the time of writing, I am not aware of any Canadian ADR organization having issued mediation-specific guidelines on the use of generative AI. Existing Canadian materials appear to consist mainly of general professional standards, online mediation guidance, arbitration-focused commentary, educational programming, and broader AI resource lists. That makes the IBA Guidelines a useful reference point, while still requiring Canadian mediators to apply them through Canadian privacy law, mediation agreements, institutional rules, professional standards, and the circumstances of the particular case.

A Practical Risk Matrix

A useful way to start is by separating the proposed uses of AI in mediation. The risk changes depending on whether the tool is being used for generic learning, administrative drafting, confidential document review, live-session transcription, risk modelling, option generation, or settlement drafting. A mediator does not need the same safeguards for every use but does need a well thought out and organized way to decide which safeguards are appropriate. Using a generic role-play in training is one thing. Uploading the parties’ actual mediation briefs is another.

Obviously, not all AI use carries the same risk. The risk depends on the tool, the information entered, the purpose of the use, the level of review, the sophistication of the participants, and whether the use affects the mediation process itself. A simple risk matrix may help mediators think about the issue more clearly. The point is not to create a fixed taxonomy, but to encourage mediators to identify the specific use before deciding on the safeguard.

This is not a set of definitive rules. It is a way of slowing down and that is one of the most important safeguards available to mediators: pause before using the AI tool, identify the risk, and decide what protection is needed. It also helps avoid the common mistake of discussing AI as though all uses are equally risky or equally benign. They are not.

Party Autonomy and Risk Analysis

Mediation is a consensual process. The parties make the decisions. Used carefully, AI can support that decision-making through helping parties and counsel organize information, consider options, and test risk. Used carelessly without thought, it may create the appearance of authority without the substance of judgment.

This warning is particularly important when AI is used for litigation risk analysis, BATNA or WATNA assessment, settlement modelling, concession analysis, or the generation of possible resolution options. A litigation risk analysis generated by AI may look objective. A settlement range may appear data driven. A proposed compromise may seem neutral because it was produced by a machine rather than by a person. A number can change the conversation, even when the number is only as good as the assumptions behind it.

Settlement decisions are rarely based only on legal merits or expected value. They may involve cost, delay, uncertainty, business needs, family dynamics, reputation, enforcement risk, emotional exhaustion, and the desire to move on. In a commercial case, for example, a range generated from legal costs, probability of success, and possible damages may still miss the reason the file is difficult: an ongoing business relationship, reputational concerns, or a party’s need for an acknowledgement that has no obvious monetary value. These factors do not always fit neatly into a model. That does not make modelling a waste of time, but it does mean that mediators should be careful about how AI-generated analysis is used and described.

It should be treated as a prompt for discussion, not as an answer. Some common questions questions are often:

• What assumptions are built into this analysis?
• What facts are uncertain?
• What risks are missing?
• What non-monetary interests are not captured?
• How would the other side see this?
• What would change the assessment?

Mediators must be particularly cautious about presenting AI-generated analysis as though it represents a fair, correct, or objective outcome. AI may help structure a conversation, but it must not decide the destination.

Confidentiality & Privacy Come First

For mediators, confidentiality is central to the service we provide. The convenience of AI creates a real temptation. It is easy to paste a mediation brief, chronology, expert report, email conversation, or draft settlement document into a generative AI tool and ask for a summary. The easier that becomes, the more disciplined mediators must be.

Before using AI with matter-specific information, mediators should ask practical questions:

• Is the information confidential?
• Does it identify the parties directly or indirectly?
• Has it been properly anonymized?
• Could the parties still be identified from the factual context?
• What are the tool’s terms of use?
• Is the information retained or used for training?
• Where is the data stored?
• Is the tool public, proprietary, open-source, or enterprise-grade?
• Do the parties or counsel need to know or consent?

Anonymization is important, but it is not always enough. In a specialized industry, a small community, a unique dispute, or a matter involving public events, parties may be identifiable even after names are removed. Confidentiality analysis, therefore, has to include contextual identifiability, not just whether obvious names and addresses have been deleted.

The safest starting point is conservative: do not place identifiable confidential mediation information into a general-purpose AI tool unless there is a clear, informed, and defensible basis for doing so. That basis may include secure terms of use, appropriate privacy protections, informed consent where required, and a careful judgment that the proposed use is actually necessary.

Your Neutrality Is Not Necessarily Prompt Neutrality

Mediators occupy a different role from advocates. Counsel may use AI to test arguments, strengthen submissions, prepare clients, or draft persuasive language. That is advocacy. Mediators must be more careful. Our credibility depends on the parties’ confidence that we are not adopting one side’s framing as our own.

This creates a risk when AI is used to summarize materials or generate possible options—inputs shape outputs. If one party’s brief is more detailed, more polished, or more forcefully written, the resulting summary may give that party’s version disproportionate weight. If the prompt is framed in a way that assumes one side’s narrative, the output may appear neutral while embedding that assumption.

Prompting in neutral terms helps. So does varying prompts and comparing outputs. But the deeper point is that neutrality cannot be delegated to a tool. A mediator should not ask AI to decide who is right, determine the fairest result, or generate the best settlement. Better uses include asking it to identify issues, summarize competing positions, list areas of agreement and disagreement, suggest questions, or generate a range of possible options for further discussion.

The mediator’s experience and judgment must remain essential. AI may help test whether language sounds neutral, but the mediator must decide whether it is neutral in context. That context includes the history of the dispute, the relationships in the room, the information asymmetry between the parties, and the possible impact of the mediator’s words.

A Balanced Process

To be fair, mediation requires a balanced process. Each party must be given an opportunity to fully participate, express their views, understand the process, and make informed choices. AI can support that goal. It can help with language translation, plain-language summaries, information organization, accessibility, and preparation. It may help a mediator identify unresolved issues or participation barriers.

The same tools may also create an imbalance. One party may have access to sophisticated AI tools and technical support while the other does not. One party may use AI during the mediation without the other party understanding how it is being used. A represented party may rely on AI-assisted analysis in a way that pressures an unrepresented party. A mediator may unknowingly rely on outputs that reflect cultural, linguistic, or social assumptions.

The process question is therefore important: are the participants comfortable with the use of AI, do they understand what it is being used for, and can they raise concerns? In some cases, AI use may need to be disclosed. In others, disclosure may not be legally required but may still be good process.

The IBA’s sample AI usage statement helps us because it encourages users to identify the tools they are using, refer to their terms and conditions, acknowledge their data protection responsibilities, protect confidentiality, and confirm that AI outputs will not be treated as final authority. That should be kept in mind at all times because the issue is not the technology’s novelty. The issue is whether participants can still have confidence in the process.

Developing Your Policy

Mediators do not need a complex AI policy for every file. A practical protocol should begin by identifying the proposed use of AI and deciding whether confidential or identifying information is involved. If it is, the mediator should consider whether the use is necessary, whether the information can be limited or anonymized, what the tool’s privacy terms and data use policies provide, and whether disclosure or consent is required or appropriate.

The protocol should, at a minimum, address the mediation values engaged by the proposed use of AI:

• Does the use preserve neutrality?
• Does it support or undermine party autonomy?
• Could it affect balanced participation?
• Are the outputs being treated as prompts for professional judgment, or as conclusions?
• Is any factual or legal content being independently verified?

These are not simply technical details. They go to the integrity of the mediation process.

A simple clause for a mediation agreement might begin along these lines:

The mediator may use generative artificial intelligence tools for limited administrative, organizational, drafting, or professional support purposes in connection with the mediation. The mediator will take reasonable steps to protect confidentiality, including limiting and anonymizing information entered into such tools where appropriate. The mediator will not rely on AI-produced content as a final authority and will independently review any AI-assisted output before using it in the mediation process. Participants may raise any concerns about the use of AI tools in the mediation.

Please note that this is only a starting point and there are more comprehensive examples available online. Whatever precedent that is used must be adapted to the mediator’s practice, the dispute, applicable law, institutional rules, and the expectations of the parties. It may also be too narrow for some cases and unnecessary for others. Its value is not that it solves every issue. Its value lies in requiring the mediator and participants to think about AI use before a problem arises.

Be Mindful

The risk is not that AI will replace mediators. The more immediate risk is casual use. These tools may help us prepare, draft, train, and organize complex information. In some settings, they may reduce costs and improve access to dispute resolution.

But mediation is not valuable simply because it is efficient. It is valuable because it creates a structured process for difficult conversations, informed decision-making, and negotiated resolution. The process depends on trust, confidentiality, neutrality, timing, judgment, empathy, and the parties’ confidence that they remain responsible for their own decisions.

The practical task is to stop asking whether AI in mediation is good or bad in the abstract. Much more useful questions are:

• What is the proposed use?
• What is the risk?
• What safeguards are needed before the tool becomes part of the process?

That requires more than a general comfort or competence with technology. It requires attention to the specific file, the specific parties, and the specific use being proposed. The tool is not the process. The mediator’s judgment and the parties’ informed choices and consent must remain central.

The post AI in Mediation. the Tool Is Not the Process: Using the IBA Guidelines to Evaluate Risk in Mediation Practice appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. ReconciliAction YEG 2. Robeside Assistance 3. Canadian Privacy Law Blog 4. Barry Sookman 5. Double Aspect

ReconciliAction YEG
Alberta Justice Finds that Alberta Independence Would Contravene Treaties with First Nations (Chief Electoral Officer of Alberta v Sylvestre, 2025 ABKB 712)

On December 5, 2025, Justice Feasby of the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta, issued his decision in Chief Electoral Officer of Alberta v Sylvestre, 2025 ABKB 712 regarding whether a referendum on Alberta Independence proposed under the Citizen Initiative Act, SA 2021, c C-13.2 would contravene the Constitution Act, 1982 . Justice Feasby found that Charter rights would no longer be guaranteed, and thus Alberta independence would contravene the Constitution. Justice Feasby also found that Alberta independence would contravene Treaties 6, 7, and 8, which combined cover virtually all of Alberta. …

Robeside Assistance
Recently Published Ottawa Decisions

Family Matters: Saucier v. Lafrance-Dion (2026 ONSC 3370) In a custody dispute, the Court granted the mother sole decision-making authority and primary residence of the child, with supervised parenting time for the father, transitioning to unsupervised visits upon completion of anger management. Child support was recalculated based on the father’s updated income.
Justice R. Maranger …

Canadian Privacy Law Blog
PIPEDA Replacement Tabled in House of Commons

The proposed new privacy law includes order-making powers, penalties but completely sidelines the existing Privacy Commissioner: On June 15, 2026, the Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation Even Solomon tabled in the House of Commons Bill C-36, called “An Act to enact the Protecting Privacy and Consumer Data Act, to amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and to make amendments to other Acts”. This is the long-awaited privacy bill that is slated to replace the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), which has regulated the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in the course of commercial activity in Canada since 2001. …

Barry Sookman
Artificial Intelligence, Access to Justice, and the Future of Law

For more than half a century, access to justice has been one of the most persistent challenges facing legal systems in Canada. Governments have funded legal aid. Courts have simplified procedures. Law societies have promoted pro bono services. Legal clinics have expanded their reach. Yet despite these efforts, legal services remain unaffordable for many people and legal processes remain inaccessible to many Canadians. In Hryniak v. Mauldin,[1] Karakatsanis J. writing for the Supreme Court of Canada stated …

Double Aspect
You Can’t Have a Pony

This is, I hope, the lost post in the sort-of-series occasioned by the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent unprincipled and inconsistent decisions on constitutional interpretation. In my comment on Alford v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 SCC 14, I wrote that, despite my harsh criticism of the Supreme Court’s majority, “I have no time for the populist clowns demanding that Supreme Court judges be removed from office in case they dare make decisions that the clowns dislike”. …

_________________________

*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

In previous articles, I introduced the RECLAIM model as a cultural operating system for law firms and explored the first four elements: Respect, Equity, Clarity, and Learning. This month, I turn to A: Autonomy.

Let me introduce you to Priya.

Priya is a fifth-year associate with a busy corporate practice at a mid-sized firm. She is capable, hardworking, and well-liked by clients. She has recently found her work coming from one partner, and the working relationship follows a pattern. He hands her a file and tells her it is hers to run. Then he rewrites her drafts, not for substance, but for style. He asks to be copied on every client email. When opposing counsel sends over a question, he often answers it before she has seen it.

Priya has noticed a change in her own work lately. She no longer asks herself what the best approach to a problem is. She asks what the partner would want.

She has stopped doing her best thinking. She is guessing at his. She is also feeling increasingly demotivated to the point that she has started talking to a recruiter about options.

Autonomy.

Why Autonomy Is Not Optional

A quick reminder about how this fits into our human operating system. Neuroscientists describe the brain as a prediction machine. At every moment it is forecasting what will happen next and checking those forecasts against what arrives from the environment, the body, and the social world. The more accurate the predictions, the more efficiently the brain manages its energy budget and the safer we feel. Security enhances cognitive capacity. That is the deep logic our brains operate from.

Autonomy is a social input our brain is alert to. It is one of the five social domains in David Rock’s SCARF model. When we have meaningful control over our work, our choices, and our environment, we can predict more of what happens to us, and the brain reads that control as reward. When control is stripped away, the brain registers threat. Attention narrows. Stress rises. The quality of thinking, which is the product law firms actually sell, degrades.

This is why micromanagement is so reliably corrosive, and why the cost runs in both directions. The associate (or staff member) disengages, and the supervising lawyer stays trapped in work the firm hired other people to do. Nobody reclaims their time by doing everyone’s thinking for them.

More Than “Stop Micromanaging”

The usual prescription for autonomy is simple: stop micromanaging. The advice is correct. It is also incomplete.

Telling a supervising lawyer to let go of a file is like telling a conscientious driver to take their hands off the wheel. A lawyer who hands a matter to a third-year with “it’s all yours” and disappears has granted abandonment not autonomy.

Autonomy is not the absence of structure. It works because of structure.

Build the Sandbox

The sandbox metaphor usually gets used in business as a play area: a consequence-free corner where people can experiment. I want to use it differently.

Think about why a sandbox works. The walls. The walls hold the sand in. They mark the edge between where the child decides and where the parent does. And they are precisely what allows the parent to sit on the bench instead of hovering, because everything inside the walls is safe.

The walls do not constrain the play. The walls are what make unsupervised play possible.

That is what autonomy needs in a law firm. The walls are the defined edges of a piece of work: what done looks like, when it is due, when you will talk about progress and answer questions. Inside the walls, the how belongs to the person doing the work. Build the sandbox well and three things happen at once: autonomous action becomes safe, errors surface while they are still small, and files become opportunities for learning.

Three walls matter most.

First: A delegation process that sets everyone up for success

Delegation is where autonomy is granted or withheld, and most firms leave it to individual habit. A sound process is not complicated: clear instructions about the outcome and its context, a timeline, genuine availability for questions, and check-in points agreed at the moment of handoff.

That last element is crucial. A check-in agreed in advance is structure. Structure provides a sense of security. A check-in imposed midstream can come across as surveillance. “Is it done yet?” “Have you started?” These questions signal distrust and aren’t simply annoying. They are motivation killers.

Second: Ownership of the how

Once the metaphorical sandbox walls are set, team members decide how they tackle their work and are held accountable for the quality of the product and timely delivery. Define outcomes, not methods, unless necessary. If a precedent is to be followed or a firm convention applies, say so at the handoff; that is a wall, and walls are fair. What is not fair is leaving the method open and then rewriting the work to match an unstated personal preference.

The same principle applies to change. When firms roll out new technology or workflows, leaders rightly decide the destination, but the people who live inside those systems every day need to have genuine input and real choices about how to get there. Autonomy during change is the difference between a team that adopts and a team that complies and grumbles.

Third: A shared discipline of feedback

Autonomous work is best supported by a feedback system that flows smoothly in both directions. The associate running a file, or staff member taking on a task, needs to know how the work is landing. The supervising lawyer who has stepped back needs confidence that problems will be surfaced fast. Both depend on feedback, and at many firms feedback is left to individual personality: some partners give it well, some give it harshly, and others barely give it at all.

The fix is to train every lawyer in one consistent approach to giving and receiving feedback. On the giving side: specific, behavioural, tied to the work, and oriented to progress, catching what is working as well as what needs to change. On the receiving side, the half that is almost always skipped: how to ask for feedback, how to listen without mounting a defence, and how to turn a vague “this needs work” into something usable.

When everyone at the firm gives and receives feedback along the same lines, feedback stops being an event and becomes a regular part of the work. Course corrections feel routine rather than personal. Errors get surfaced while they are easily remedied. The sandbox stays safe, and the learning never stops.

Operationalizing Autonomy

Here are three actions a supervising lawyer can put in motion this quarter:

1. Adopt a delegation protocol. Put it in writing and follow it. When assigning work, provide background information, the outcome and why it matters, the deadline, and check-in points. Provide feedback on the work product. Use this protocol for every significant delegation for ninety days to firmly establish the walls of your sandbox.
2. Make effective delegation and feedback and essential part of your firm’s operations. Train the whole firm in one consistent. Not just partners. Lawyers and staff, giving and receiving. Develop a simple model, run a working session, and practice with real examples.
3. Audit your own redlines. For two weeks, choose some opportunities to review your edits. Notice, what were the substantive edits, and what was a stylistic preference. Send the substance back with your reasons. Let the preference go, or name it once as a convention you like followed. Then watch what happens to the next round of drafts.

Watch out for these Autonomy undermining moves

• Rewriting a draft for personal style rather than substance, without explaining the difference
• Taking back a task at the first wobble instead of coaching through it
• Requiring a cc on every email after handing over a client relationship
• “It’s faster if I just do it myself”
• Announcing changes to systems and processes with no input from the people who use them daily

Each of these examples is small. Each one teaches the same lesson: this is not really yours. People who learn that lesson stop bringing judgment to work and start bringing compliance. Compliance does not develop nor produce the thinking clients pay for.

Returning to Priya

Nothing Priya’s supervising lawyer does is malicious. He is careful, his standards are high, and every override feels to him like quality control. But each one lands in Priya’s brain the same way: as a threat to her control over her own work. And the work product he gets back is shrinking to fit the space he leaves for it.

Now picture the same partner and the same files with a sandbox in place. A clear handoff. Check-ins agreed in advance. Feedback flowing both ways in a shared language. The how belongs to Priya. Errors surface at the check-in, while they are small and fixable. Priya is learning at full speed, and the partner is sitting on the bench, free to do the work only he can do.

One parting thought: While AI will throw a spanner into how we develop lawyers in the future, the need for autonomy and the feedback that supports learning and growth will remain a dependable constant. Start honing your leadership approach now.

The post RECLAIM: A Is for Autonomy appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : La peine de 21 mois d’emprisonnement avec sursis infligée à un jeune homme de 23 ans n’est pas manifestement non indiquée; celui-ci, par le biais d’un média social et d’une fausse identité, a eu une liaison avec une adolescente de 15 ans, laquelle a comporté plusieurs relations sexuelles.

Intitulé : R. c. Bourque, 2026 QCCA 723
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Québec
Décision de : Juges Marie-France Bich, Jocelyn F. Rancourt et Myriam Lachance
Date : 29 mai 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions de nature sexuelle — infractions sexuelles contre des enfants — leurre — média social — fausse identité — contacts sexuels — victime âgée de 15 ans — accusé âgé de 23 ans — facteurs atténuants — jeune âge de l’accusé — absence d’antécédents judiciaires — plaidoyer de culpabilité — thérapie — soutien familial — facteurs aggravants — mauvais traitement à l’égard d’une personne âgée de moins de 18 ans — abus de confiance — manipulation — lien étroit entre le risque de récidive de l’accusé et son isolement social — nombre de contacts sexuels — faits contestés — absence de preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable (art. 724 (3) e) C.Cr.) — dénonciation — dissuasion — réhabilitation — condamnation avec sursis — ordonnance de purger sa peine dans la collectivité — probation — appel — absence d’erreur de principe ou de peine manifestement non indiquée.

Appel de la peine. Rejeté.

L’intimé (23 ans) est entré en contact avec la victime (15 ans) par l’intermédiaire d’un média social. Il a utilisé un faux nom, mais a révélé son âge véritable. Ces derniers se sont rencontrés et ont eu des relations sexuelles. L’intimé a plaidé coupable à des infractions de leurre et de contacts sexuels. Une peine de 21 mois d’emprisonnement avec sursis, assortie de 2 ans de probation, lui a été infligée.

Décision

La juge de première instance n’a pas erré en retenant 4 événements de contacts sexuels, alors qu’il y en aurait eu 7 selon la poursuite. Les avocats ne pouvaient modifier les faits qui ont servi d’assise à la reconnaissance de culpabilité, sans approbation de l’intimé à cet effet. Or, personne ne s’est enquis de son opinion. Si la poursuite souhaitait introduire en preuve un tel élément aggravant, elle devait en faire la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable (art. 724 (3) e) du Code criminel). Ensuite, s’il est vrai que la différence d’âge importante ainsi que la très grande vulnérabilité de la victime sont des facteurs aggravants, il serait erroné d’évaluer la notion d’«écart d’âge» de façon purement quantitative sans tenir compte de la dimension contextuelle de l’affaire. Soulignons aussi que la poursuite n’a jamais proposé à la juge de retenir la différence d’âge à titre de facteur aggravant; elle lui a plutôt suggéré de considérer le jeune âge de la victime et l’abus de confiance, ce qui a été fait.

L’appelant ne convainc pas non plus la Cour que la peine est manifestement non indiquée. La gravité de l’infraction est certes un facteur pertinent quant à l’analyse, mais elle ne doit pas supplanter la culpabilité morale de l’accusée. Dans une décision soignée, la juge a estimé dans un premier temps que les circonstances de l’affaire ne justifiaient pas une peine de pénitencier. Le juge possède la latitude suffisante pour infliger une peine adaptée aux circonstances de l’infraction ainsi qu’à la situation de l’accusé, et la présence de circonstances aggravantes, même si elle augmente l’importance de la dénonciation et de la dissuasion, ne permet pas d’écarter d’emblée la possibilité de l’attribution du sursis à l’emprisonnement pour cette seule raison.

Dans un deuxième temps, la juge n’a pas erré en concluant à l’existence d’un lien étroit entre le risque de récidive de l’intimé et son isolement social, compte tenu de la restriction totale d’utilisation d’Internet imposée à celui-ci pendant plus de 2 ans et du contenu des rapports; elle a évalué qu’il était moins risqué pour la société que l’intimé poursuive son chemin déjà bien entamé sur la voie de la réhabilitation plutôt que de l’incarcérer pendant 21 mois (ou encore de lui imposer la peine de 4 ans de pénitencier que propose la poursuite). La peine comportait en outre de nombreuses conditions, en plus d’une période de probation de 2 ans. L’intimé sera ainsi sous la surveillance et le contrôle de l’État pendant 45 mois et l’a déjà été pendant plus de 2 ans avant l’infliction de sa peine. On ne saurait donc dire qu’il s’agit d’une peine indûment clémente.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

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As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeal

Civil Litigation/Elections: Collateral Attack; Abuse of Process; Parliamentary Privilege; Immunity
Resler v. Anglin, 2024 ABCA 113, 2026 SCC 23 (41298)

Election claim not barred by collateral attack, abuse of process, privilege, immunity.

Leave to Appeal Granted

Elections: Returning Officer Appointments
Canada (Attorney General) v. Drover, 2025 ONCA 468 (42005)

Constitutionality of Canada Election Act re returning officer appointments.

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The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia was released on May 15^th to much press and discussion. For many, it was a relief that a significant and precedent-setting case sought to tackle a pervasive and insidious social problem: intimate partner violence. There will no doubt be much commentary on the substantive content of the case, the scope of the tort of intimate partner violence, the manner of its proof in family law cases, and the implications for individual litigants going forward.

However, there is another thread weaving through the fabric of this case in its journey from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to the Supreme Court of Canada. This thread engages several interwoven themes that include the prevalence of self-represented litigants (SRLs) in family law, the power-dynamic often at play in family litigation (particularly in cases involving family violence), and the role of lawyers and trial judges.

In Ahluwalia, Kuldeep Ahluwalia originally represented herself. In the course of so doing, she claimed damages for the abuse and violence perpetrated against her by her former spouse. This is, in itself, an inordinate undertaking. At the trial level, there was one lawyer involved – her ex-spouse’s counsel. When her ex-spouse appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal, there were three lawyers now representing her ex-husband, and seven lawyers representing Kuldeep; at this stage there were also five lawyers representing a variety of intervenors, for a total of 15 lawyers.

As this matter progressed to the Supreme Court of Canada, Kuldeep Ahluwalia (now the Appellant) had five lawyers, while the respondent had four. In addition, there were thirty-nine lawyers representing a host of intervenors from across the country, for a total of forty-eight lawyers. This headcount is by no means to suggest that there were too many lawyers, however it does raise a very difficult question: why is it that Ms. Ahluwalia had no lawyers when she really needed it at the beginning of her case, and an abundance of lawyers at the later stages?

Again, to contextualize her case, originally she was a self-represented litigant facing an ex-spouse who had subjected her to years of family violence and coercive control – and he had legal counsel. The power dynamic here is profound. And, while I understand quite clearly the complexity of appellate litigation and the need for experienced litigation counsel who are able to make the submissions necessary to be successful in such a case as this, I also cannot help wondering – how many other Kuldeep Ahluwalias could use counsel much earlier in the game, and what might be lost by them not having this support?

SRLs in family law face significant challenges, both legal and extra-legal, for which there are a dearth of supports. This is often made more pronounced when there is a self-represented litigant facing a represented party who has subjected them to years of violence and control. The consequence of this phenomenon includes re-traumatization, negative outcomes impacting families, including children, and financial impoverishment. Moreover, as is now evident with the jurisprudential hindsight offered by Ahluwalia, there is the potential loss of important contributions to the evolution of the common law. This last point forces us to reflect: what other issues raised by SRLs may fall through the legal cracks?

A related theme in this case is the role of the judge. In the case of Ahluwalia, there were a variety of judges involved, from Justice Mandhane at the Ontario Superior Court, and Justice Benotto at the Ontario Court of Appeal, to Justices Kasirer, Karakatsanis, Jamal, and Rowe at the Supreme Court. While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to touch on all of the judges’ impacts, I will draw attention to three judges who in turn highlight particular issues in access to justice.

To begin with, Justice Mandhane took the time to understand an SRL’s claims in a broader social context. While Ms. Ahluwalia’s pleadings may have failed to signal the introduction of a novel tort that might in other cases have been clearly and explicitly articulated by legal representation, Justice Mandhane did the work to understand and engage with Ms. Ahluwalia’s claims and the facts that underscored them. This is, in itself, noteworthy, given again the challenges SRLs often face in articulating and presenting their cases.

However, at the Supreme Court, Justice Rowe expressed great concern about Justice Mandhane’s efforts. He suggested that she had, in undertaking this work, entered, “into the arena” (14:51 of the SCC webcast). For him, the consequence was that Justice Mandhane engaged in judicial legislation that served to undermine the role of the judge in the adversarial process. While I understand Justice Rowe’s consternation respecting a continued commitment to the adversarial process (it is the system we have), and the role of the judge within that process, there are two concerns respecting his consternation.

First, my understanding is that Justice Mandhane did request further submissions from the parties respecting the development of the novel tort of family violence before completing her decision. Thus, even where there is a legally unsophisticated self-represented party who had been subject to years of family violence by a legally represented ex-spouse, Justice Mandhane remained committed to the tenets of the adversarial process. Second, Justice Rowe’s comments reflect a continued disconnect between the assumptions made about the operation of the adversarial system, and the practical realities on the ground. SCC counsel for Ms. Ahluwalia reminded Justice Rowe of these realities when she suggested that approximately 40% of family law cases involve a self-represented party. Thus, what Justice Mandhane did was identify and amplify the SRLs’ case. Ms. Ahluwalia’s counsel went on to rhetorically ask what a judge is to do in such situations, but justice. In light of all else that this case represents, this is not unimportant, because it signals a continued disconnect between what our adversarial system intends, and what is happening in individual courtrooms across the country. It also signals a tension respecting what we ought to do about this disconnect. Presumably Justice Mandhane and Justice Rowe see the answer to this question differently.

However, there is also a third judge whose decision is thematically connected to this particular discussion on access to justice. In her concurring decision, Justice Karakatsanis raises a specific access to justice concern, recognizing, of course, that other judges also considered the impact of access to justice. Specifically, she expressly links the ideas of self-representation in the family law context, access to justice, and the corresponding need to develop ‘one-stop shopping’ law that reduces complexity and increases litigation efficiency. She continues to identify the need for law to move beyond a patchwork of torts to a single tort of intimate partner violence that is reflective of the practical realities of family litigation: namely, that victims of intimate partner violence need to be able to seek redress for the harms they suffered, and that a significant number of these individuals will travel this road without legal representation.

Requiring SRLs who are also victims of violence to navigate multiple torts with varying legal tests and evidential requirements does not promote access to justice. In fact, it hinders it. By contrast, one-stop shopping makes sense, when it is acknowledged that a significant proportion of this particular group of litigants will have very few legal resources. Thus, Justice Karakatsanis’ concurring decision contextualizes the vulnerabilities associated with self-representation in family law, the practicalities facing SRLs, and the connection to the broader development of law that is consistent with promoting access to justice. However, it also signals a broader need to think of the development of law in terms of who needs to avail themselves of its protection and support and how they might do so. While Ahulwalia is a good start, such thinking ought to extend beyond the development of one tort.

Where does this leave us?

The substantive law developed in Ahluwalia will likely be far-reaching for family litigants. But it is also important that, as the dust settles on the tort of intimate partner violence, we do not lose sight of the access to justice issues raised in this appeal. First and foremost, there is the incredibly challenging position of family SRLs who are also victims of violence, the majority of whom continue to navigate the system without a single lawyer, let alone teams of lawyers. We need to think about these litigants’ needs both in terms of their individual cases, and the implications for the development of law more broadly.

Second is the need to continue to confront the disconnect between what we think the adversarial system is or ought to be doing, and what the experiences of many litigants actually are within that system. If we are, as counsel for Ms. Ahluwalia suggests, to do justice, it is imperative that we confront the realities of self-representation, the stigmatization of SRLs, and the ways in which much law remains inaccessible to the very people most in need of its protection. This is a continuing and pressing responsibility for all participants in the legal process.

The post Issues of Self-Representation in a Landmark Decision: Reflecting on Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia appeared first on Slaw.

Take a moment to thank Eric Appleby, founder of Maritime Law Book, because the Canadian legal AI future announced today by Clio is only possible because Eric was sufficiently frustrated by the lack of access to New Brunswick case law in the 1960s that he decided to start a legal publishing company. No Eric, no MLB. No MLB, no Canadian case law in Clio and no next wave of Canadian legal AI.

You know the saying attributed to Nelson Mandela that begins “the best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago?” Well, the tree now bearing fruit is one that Eric planted over 60 years ago.

Eric Appleby founded Maritime Law Book in 1965 and ran it with style and grace until 2016. His regional and national print publications were essential resources in every court, law library, government legal department and major firm across the country (not to mention major universities around the world), with most of them achieving semi-official case reporter status in their specific jurisdiction. His MLB Key Number System was an (often preferred) alternative to the Canadian Abridgement, and his digital initiatives (including first Canadian legal publisher accessible through a public website – 1997, and first commercial publisher to provide free, unedited access to its full case law collection – 2008) were pretty groundbreaking for their day.

An innovator through and through. There’s no question in my mind that had he started his career in the 90s or early 2000s, we’d be regularly reading about his legal AI scale-ups and international impact.

Consider just his free access move (called Raw Law). This is the kind of audacious, structurally disruptive gesture that Silicon Valley would have turned into a keynote. He practically considered it an obligation, writing in 2011 that judicial decisions are part of the legal commons and reminding readers that since 1995 MLB never claimed copyright over judicial decisions, just their own headnotes.

Why did he start MLB? It surely wasn’t because he had an AI strategy that needed decades to mature, no, it was to respond to an urgent need for access to law.

In Eric’s own words published here on Slaw:

In 1965 the Maritime Provinces Reports (a Carswell publication) published one volume per year and the volume contained 40 to 50 cases from the four Atlantic provinces. The Dominion Law Reports (a Canada Law Book publication) was very selective and contained very few cases from the Atlantic provinces.

A New Brunswick lawyer might find less than five New Brunswick cases published in a 12 month period. In 1965 all New Brunswick Supreme Court judgments were filed in the Registrar’s office in Fredericton. But most of these judgments were not published anywhere.

Eric operated Maritime Law Book well into his late 80s, and contributed to Slaw into his 90s, with his last contribution extolling the virtues of digital books. This was a man made for all eras.

Before any of this, Eric Appleby was a championship hockey player and spent time in banking and big law in Manhattan and Baltimore. As a defenseman for the Montreal Royals in 1949, he helped win the Memorial Cup in an eight-game series against the Brandon Wheat Kings. His teammates included a young Dickie Moore, future six-time Stanley Cup winner and Hockey Hall of Fame inductee. I like to imagine Eric’s potential roads-not-taken, and given his size and lifelong fitness, the prospect of him lacing up the skates alongside Dickie, “Rocket” Richard, “Boom Boom” Geoffrion, Jean Beliveau and Jacques Plante is not that far fetched. Lucky for us he chose law and chose New Brunswick.

We can also be grateful that he did not limit his contributions to creating a competitive legal information market to the work he did throughout his career. His choice in 2016 to pass the stewardship of the MLB collection and court relationships to a startup instead of allowing them to be absorbed into the CanLII, Westlaw or Lexis collections was the only way we would be stepping into a future where a powerful Canadian player like Clio would be able to enter the Canadian legal publishing market in 2026.

It was my great pleasure to know, collaborate and correspond with Eric for a decade. We shared a passion for supporting access to legal information and for converting that access to understanding (my passion informed in large part by his example).

While serving as CanLII’s CEO, Eric and I collaborated in 2012 to connect MLB headnotes to CanLII’s case law, again in 2014 when MLB was a founding (and major!) contributor to the launch of CanLII Connects, and a third time in 2015 when MLB allowed CanLII to apply topical overlays from the MLB Key Number System to CanLII’s cases (complete with links to related cases on MLB).

After he announced in 2016 the planned closure and liquidation of Maritime Law Book, he graciously took my call and entertained a pitch I developed with my long-time business partner and friend Warren Tkachuk. I can guarantee you that up against Thomson Reuters, LexisNexis, CanLII and whoever else came knocking, ours was the riskiest and certainly far from the most lucrative proposal Eric would have received. Every bit as much as the decision he made in the 60s to start, and in the decades that followed to innovate and persevere, the decision to keep his legacy independent created the conditions that will allow Clio to deliver on the vision we’ve all had for a competitive and innovative legal knowledge environment in Canada.

From launching Compass in 2016, collaborating with vLex through 2017 to 2023, launching Jurisage with AltaML in 2021, merging Jurisage with CiteRight in 2023, to receding into the background role of supportive Jurisage shareholder since 2024, I’ve held out hope for the idea of delivering on a future that honours the foundation he created. Through Clio’s commitment and energy, that future feels like it’s really happening.

Thank you, Eric, and thank you to everyone who built and sustained the original Maritime Law Book, for making this possible.

The post The Next Wave of Canadian Legal AI Began in 1965 appeared first on Slaw.

Recently, I was invited to be a guest speaker at a Law and Literature Course here at my workplace, University of Arizona College of Law. As part of our Law Library Team and Professor of Legal Research, the invitation to speak came to my desk almost naturally. Perceptions on the voracious reading habits of librarians permeate even in the hallways of academia. Given my close connections with our Faculty colleagues as well as law students, I was not surprised at all at the speaking request. I have indeed shared with students and colleagues alike my lifelong obsession with reading world fiction and my hilarious story of moving from NYC to Tucson years ago in an RV full of books (Think mobile library!). Therefore, I gladly accepted the invitation with one condition: I wanted to discuss Law and Literature in Latin America.

[ Photo by Patrick Tomasso on Unsplash]

Therefore, for my Law and Literature guest lecture, I intentionally chose three short stories all from writers in Latin America and each of them navigating legal and society considerations on control, gender, morality, guilt or censorship. Reading Latin America is a conscious act to connect our law students in a Border area dividing Anglo and Latin; Common and Civil Law; Us and Them. I believe the stories helped students to be aware of borders and divisions in order, not to divide us, but to take the “other” as an opportunity to connect us even further.

These are the three stories I chose for discussion:

Rosario Castellanos (México) “Lección de cocina” (Cooking Lesson, 1972) located in the Anthology, Album de Familia or Family Album.

Clarice Lispector (Brazil) “O crime do professor de matemática” (The Crime of the Mathematics Professor, 1960) located in the Anthology, Laços de Familia or Family Ties.

Luisa Valenzuela (Argentina) “Los censores” (The Censors, 1979) located in the Anthology, Los Censores or The Censors.

Besides analyzing the text themselves, I wanted to give students some important context as to why I chose these stories and what specific historical moments in their countries as well as in Latin America as a whole these stories were set in. In preparation for the class, the students were asked to provide written reflections to help me prepare my guest lecture. Their reactions ranged from apathy to some of the writers’ style to full identification with the characters and seeing tremendous parallels with the students’ personal lives nowadays. Immediately, I understood that context was crucial and my guest lecture had to center around the external layers giving life to these stories.

First, I began my conversation with Geography. Nothing like maps to help law students situate themselves as well as the materials we’re about to cover. When it comes to Latin America as a region, geography is an incredibly important piece of the puzzle. How do you define the boundaries of Latin America on a map? Do you include the Caribbean islands? Do you focus only on Spanish and Portuguese speaking America? Who is in and who is out, geographically speaking? Would you also include French and Dutch speaking America?

In relation to these three stories, it’s important to keep in mind that they are all speaking from three countries both at the margin and centers of the idea of Latin America as a geographical region. In the context of Mexico, it exemplifies the Border of Latin America in all its complexity and chaotic as well as ever-changing nature. Given its unique linguistic identity, Brazil occupies another Border which disconnects the country from the rest of Latin America. However, it’s the same linguistic border which connects the country with other Lusophone speaking countries around the world. Lastly, geographically-speaking, Argentina is at the edge of the Border of Latin America and Antarctica with the city of Ushuaia at the center of that frontier. Despite these peripheral contexts, you learn from these short stories that each country is centrally located in national narratives which evoke complicated and contradictory feelings of being inside and outside, center or border.

Due to the legal nature of the course and the readings, it’s incredibly important to talk about yet another relevant piece of the context puzzle: Legal Systems. Teaching a guest lecture such as this one in a law school in the United States means that law students are, for the most part, unfamiliar with Civil Law which is the most predominant legal system in Latin America and around the world. On a theoretical level, civil law systems work with extensive and detailed oriented codes attempting to cover every single area there is to know about a particular area of the law. In the context of legalities and the presence or hand of the law in these stories, you do notice a pressing need to define, to categorize roles and functions which, in very general terms, tends to go to the deductive nature of civil law systems.

Another incredibly important contextual layer to consider is History. The 1960s and 1970s when these stories were written and the decades they are depicting are politically charged and threatening world geopolitics using the region as their playground. Military juntas, dictatorship and authoritarian regimes of all political strides dominated the political landscape of Latin America. Through the renowned Boom Latinoamericano, important writers such as Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Julio Cortázar and Carlos Fuentes gained worldwide recognition and their works served as at times the sole testimony of the atrocities of the times. Furthermore, the region gave birth to the sub-genre of the Dictator Novel, which depicts the role of authoritative and abusive leaders which have plagued Latin America throughout history. Important examples of the Dictator Novel include Augusto Roa in Paraguay, Alejandro Carpentier in Cuba and in more recent times Mario Vargas Llosa in Peru.

The last layer of context which I decided to discuss with students centered around the idea of the Other in Latin America. Personally, I believe it’s a layer which does not get the importance it deserves within scholarly and literary circles in Latin America itself. The construction of societies and legal systems in Latin America was primarily based on European conceptions of nation-states which thrive on family-like understanding who is in and who is out. These short stories vividly reflect on these issues and how the law in the countries reinforces these ideas in their treatment of women, political dissidents or people who dare to diverge from the preconceived of who they are supposed to be and their role in their respective societies. Beyond the stories themselves, it’s important to be aware that the three women who wrote these short stories saw in their personal lives the struggle to authentically be yourself in these societies. From her wealthy background, Castellanos wrote mostly about indigenous peoples in the State of Oaxaca or about women recently acquiring their right to vote in the 1950s. Lispector was the ultimate outsider in a Brazilian society and military government which was uncomfortable with her immigrant background, Jewish heritage and “opinionated” demeanor. Throughout her life, she was regularly accused of writing like a man. Finally, Valenzuela fought to gain recognition not only from oppressing political forces in Argentina, but also from the same revolutionary forces which were not so accommodating to the struggles of women and their role in any movement.

Can you think of other important layers to contextualize Law and Literature? Can you think of other important examples of Law and Literature specifically in Latin America?

The post Law and Literature in Latin America: Context in the Classroom appeared first on Slaw.

In late 2025, facing public criticism and scrutiny from a scandal involving its Registrar and a registered real estate brokerage, iPro Realty Ltd. (“iPro”), the Government of Ontario exercised its statutory powers to appoint an Administrator over the Real Estate Council of Ontario (“RECO”). The province’s intervention was dramatic throughout the fall of 2025, but it has since faded from daily headlines. Despite its absence from our daily news feeds, the iPro matter warrants analysis and should serve as a cautionary tale for the hundreds of professional bodies across Canada that operate under delegated administrative authority. If your organization has (1) a powerful decision-maker, (2) discretion-heavy enforcement tools, and (3) public-facing responsibilities and/or responsible for trust accounts, your organization may have the same risk profile as RECO, even if your sector isn’t real estate, which means that it may be time to stress-test your organization’s ability to protect against public scrutiny and avoid your own iPro scandal.

[ Image by Amy Lloyd ]

iPro Scandal – In Short

RECO administers its mandate under the Trust in Real Estate Services Act (2002), which includes the registration and oversight of agents and brokerages across Ontario and consumer protection within the industry. According to RECO’s website, part of this mandate includes the requirement to, “hold real estate agents and brokerages accountable, make unbiased decisions to protect the public, and maintain trust in the real estate services market.”[1] However, that trust was eroded publicly in 2025 and led to the provincial government’s take-over.

The iPro scandal can be encapsulated in a comment once made to me by a fellow lawyer: “the number #1 rule is that you never ever mess with a client’s trust account!”[2] This lawyer may have used more colourful language, but the point is clear and can be applied to the iPro matter because iPro ‘messed’ with trust funds, but RECOs response was messy.

Dentons was retained by RECO to investigate this matter and based on its Confidential Report and news reports, the following is a high-level summary of the key facts:[3]

• May 2025 – iPro advised RECO that it was engaged in discussions about the potential sale of its assets to another brokerage
• May 19 – iPro disclosed a trust account shortfall of approximately $10M to RECO[4]
• 21 minutes later, the Registrar sent an internal email suggesting negotiating an Undertaking Agreement between RECO and iPro. RECO had not yet completed an on-site inspection and this approach deviated from standards applied previously by the Registrar in other situations. At the same time, the Registrar did not take other proactive steps to protect client assets or preserve the funds
• May 28 – the Registrar attended a RECO Board Meeting but did not disclose the iPro matter in his written or oral reports
• August 8 – the Undertaking Agreement was executed between RECO and iPro, approximately 11 weeks after the RECO inspection concluded. This is the first time the CEO learned of the Undertaking Agreement
• August 13 – Once the Board was informed, it ordered an immediate freeze of iPro trust accounts

One final fact to consider is that the iPro principal had previously served as a member of RECO’s Board from 2019-2023 while the Registrar was in his existing position.[5] [6]

Once the matter became public the fallout was swift, culminating in the Province’s appointment of an Administrator, Jean Lépine, under the Safety and Consumer Statutes Administration Act, 1996 on December 1, 2025.[7] The Minister’s Order justifies the appointment to, “prevent serious harm to the interests of the public and consumers by ensuring that the serious concerns identified with RECO’s culture and governance processes are fully addressed.”[8] Mr. Lépine has been busy since his nomination in December 2025 appointing a new RECO executive and making some substantial changes. Mr. Lépine is reportedly working on some initiatives that include a “cultural renewal plan” and a “renewed governance approach.”[9] The government’s effective take-over of RECO reflects the loss of public confidence that RECO can effectively regulate its own industry and protect consumer funds.

Time for a Stress-Test

Organizations always seem to get tripped up when it comes to conflicts of interest. It happens often, regardless of the industry. Board Members and Directors, along with most professionals follow legislation that addresses conflicts of interest and how they should be avoided. Outside of legislative requirements, many organizations address conflicts of interest through their policies or codes of conduct, but it is common to assume that individuals will be able to recognize a conflict of interest when it pops up, address it and understand when to report that conflict of interest. The iPro matter illustrates that that’s not always the case.

As discussed above, the iPro principal was a former RECO Board Member and knew the Registrant. While Dentons found insufficient evidence of a personal relationship between the Registrar and iPro’s principal or direct influence on decision-making, the Registrar never sought advice from anyone else and his actions, which deviated from the norms, were described as ‘unique’ among reviewed cases.[10] The deviation from standard processes created a reasonable apprehension of bias.[11]

In the iPro matter, the Registrar may not have been unable to identify the conflict, or simply ignored it – who knows – but, given the Province’s swift response and the recommendations provided by the Dentons report, now is the time to conduct an organizational stress test (if your organization hasn’t done so already) – it all begins with understanding conflicts of interest within your organization.

1. Do you have a conflict of interest policy?

When conducting an internal audit, focus first on determining whether you have a conflict of interest policy. If you do, be sure it is current and provides examples of common conflicts faced within your specific industry. If conflicts of interest are built into another policy, ensure that this section is prominent and easy for employees to locate. Don’t bury information about conflicts deep in other policies.

2. Do you have a conflict of interest tracking system?

If conflicts of interest are common in your industry, consider a tracking system where employees can post their outside activities, when they’ve started those activities, and when they’ve ended. Conflicts can arise at any point with outside business activities and volunteer positions. Tracking those potential conflicts can also remind employees to avoid them in their daily tasks.

3. Do you educate your Management, Staff and Board Members at least annually?

Keep in mind that neither systems nor policies can cover every conflict of interest situation, which is why education is so relevant to support robust management of conflicts of interest. It is important to educate employees at least annually on conflicts of interest with practical, scenario-based training. Annual training and education helps to remind employees about their ongoing obligations and where to go to seek advice.

4. Do you have a process for escalating concerns about conflicts of interest?

Consider how employees or the public can escalate or report their concerns about conflicts of interest. A good whistle blowing program can support the organization’s conflict of interest policy allowing employees and outside sources to confidentially speak up when they see (or perceive) a conflict. In the iPro matter, an anonymous complaint was received by RECO about iPro trust irregularities in late May 2025, but that anonymous complaint was referred to the Registrar and does not appear to have been properly managed.[12] In its report, Dentons advised RECO to consider an external vendor to manage intake and reporting by whistle blowers. Not all organizations require an external vendor to have a successful whistle blower program, but it is important that there is a documented escalation process that includes effective challenge and oversight of any investigations, conclusions and remediations.

5. Are your policies up-to-date?

In RECO’s case, there is an Administrative Agreement requiring that they maintain up-to-date policies. While it is unclear if RECO’s policies were out-of-date, it is clear that some of them were deficient. Keep in mind that policies are ‘living trees’ and should grow with the organization. Annual or bi-annual policy updates are a fantastic time to challenge what works, to identify gaps, and improve processes to better the organization. Consider creating a mechanism to track all policy-deficiencies noted by employees between updates.

6. Don’t forget about perceived conflicts

Common conflicts of interest include self-dealing or participating in activities that benefit that individual or people close to them. This kind of conflict of interest is easier to identify, but this becomes harder when the conflict is unintentional or when there might be a perceived a conflict. In cases of perceived conflicts, the reputational risk of the organization can be significantly damaged, even if the conflict is not real. In the iPro matter, Dentons found that RECO could have benefitted from broadening their conflict of interest policy beyond self-interests.[13] In the iPro matter, the perceived conflict led to the intense reputational damage suffered by RECO eroding public faith and pushing the Province to intercede. Even a perceived conflict can have lasting impacts on an organization.

Conflict of Interest Stress Test Checklist

• Do you have a conflicts of interest policy?
• Is it up-to-date?
• Does it include clear definitions and scenario-based conflicts of interest? Is the definition broad enough to include all different kinds of conflicts (not just self-dealing)? Do you address perceived conflicts?
• Do you educate your staff on that policy at least annually?
• Can internal (and external) parties escalate concerns anonymously and confidentially within your organization? Is there a process to deal with complaints related to conflicts of interest? Do you have an escalation team?

Concluding Thoughts

The iPro matter fueled news feeds throughout the fall of 2025 and has since faded from headlines. However, the changes being made within RECO are newsworthy and provide some important lessons to professional self-regulated bodies who are the gatekeepers of their industry and also serve to benefit the public. Without fail, organizational reputational risk is always on the line when conflicts of interest are not adequately managed, when power goes unchecked and when governance is treated as an afterthought. Scandals are clickable but controls are durable.

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[1] RECO, Online: https://www.reco.on.ca/about/what-we-do.

[2] Lisa, the lawyer.

[3] Timeline pulled from: Courtney Zwicker, “The iPro timeline: Audit details RECO culture concerns, deviation from ‘standard process’” 17 November 2025, Real Estate Magazine (Online: https://realestatemagazine.ca/the-ipro-timeline-audit-details-reco-culture-concerns-deviation-from-standard-process/#:~:text=Secrets%20and%20a%20culture%20problem,board%20of%20the%20trust%20shortfall); Dentons, Confidential Final Report on the iPro Matters, 30 October 2025 (Online: https://www.reco.on.ca/getmedia/f9d52a01-5b78-4db6-991d-d4950d32c3c9/Confidential-Final-Report-to-RECO-from-Dentons-October-30-2025.pdf) (“Dentons”).

[4] The trust funds were to be held to pay Realtor Commissions and downpayments on properties but instead were used for operational expenses.

[5] To be clear, the Dentons report found no personal relationship between the Registrar and iPro principal.

[6] Subsequent financial audits determined that iPro may have used about $30M in trust funds for operational expenses: Shane Dingman, “iPro Realty’s debt exceeded its value, court documents show,” 19 September 2025, Globe and Mail (Online: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/real-estate/article-ipro-realtys-debt-exceeded-its-value-court-documents-show/).

[7] “Jean LÉPINE APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE REAL ESTATE COUNCIL OF ONTARIO”, 1 December 2025, Ontario One Call (Online: https://ontarioonecall.ca/news/jean-lepine-appointed-administrator-of-the-real-estate-council-of-ontario/).

[8]“Minister’s Order to appoint an administrator under the Safety And Consumer Statutes Administration Act, 1996: RECO,” 28 November 2025, Government of Ontario (Online: https://www.ontario.ca/page/ministers-order-appoint-administrator-under-safety-and-consumer-statutes-administration-act).

[9] “RECO announced major transformation initiatives, a new corporate structure, and a new executive team,” 28 January 2026, RECO (Online: https://www.reco.on.ca/news/reco-announces-transformation-initiatives-new-corporate-structure-new-executive-team).

[10] Ibid. Dentons at p. 14.

[11] Ibid. Dentons at p. 8.

[12] Ibid. Dentons at p. 40.

[13] Ibid. Dentons at p. 17.

The post The RECO-iPro Matter: Governance Lessons From a Regulatory Mishap appeared first on Slaw.

As of May 2026, millions of Canadians are navigating a significant legal deadline. They have until June 25 to file claims in the finalized 23andMe Canadian Data Breach Settlement—a multimillion-dollar resolution to one of the most consequential privacy failures in recent history. But as the legal files are closed, a more fundamental question remains: Can a single person’s consent ever truly be ethical when the data being signed away belongs to an entire family tree?

We are taught early on in law school that the individual is the ultimate unit of the law. We draft retainer agreements for individuals, seek informed consent from individuals, and guard the privacy of individuals. However, the 23andMe fallout has exposed this foundational “individualism” as a flawed legal fiction. While a compromised banking password impacts only the account holder, the disclosure of a genomic sequence effectively “outs” the biological secrets of children, siblings, and parents, most of whom never signed a terms-of-service agreement.

There is a growing frustration among Canadians that our legal safeguards are failing to keep pace with corporate data harvesting. While the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Reference re Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, 2020 SCC 17 was a victory for human dignity, it focused on preventing discrimination rather than addressing the core issue of relational privacy. In the world of DNA, there is no such thing as a solo act. When the state fails to recognize privacy as a collective right, it doesn’t just leave an individual vulnerable; it leaves an entire biological lineage exposed.

The Myth of Individual Consent

In Canada, our privacy framework, including the Consumer Privacy Protection Act (CPPA) and Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA), is built on the pillar of individual autonomy. The law assumes that a “data subject” is a silo.

However, genomic data is inherently relational. If a participant in a cancer study discovers a BRCA1 mutation, that discovery isn’t just a clinical data point for the patient; it is a high-probability warning for their sister and a 50% coin-flip for their daughter.

Current Canadian law allows the participant to keep that secret or share it. But what about the database itself? When an institution holds that data, they are holding the “shared secrets” of a family tree. As AI-driven re-identification becomes more sophisticated, the “anonymity” we promise participants is wearing thin. We aren’t just managing a patient record; we are managing a family’s digital inheritance.

The Canadian Shield: GNDA and Beyond

Canada took a massive leap forward with the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act (GNDA). It remains one of the world’s most robust protections, making it a criminal offense to require genetic testing or the disclosure of results as a condition for goods and services such as life insurance or even employment.

But the GNDA is a “shield” against discrimination, not a “cloak” for privacy. It doesn’t stop the collection of familial data; it only stops the misuse of it. As researchers, the question isn’t just “Will this person be fired?” but “Does the daughter have a legal right to not know what her father just uploaded to a cloud server?” This is addressed in the TCPS 2 (2022) – Chapter 13, which guides ethical research involving genetics in Canada, yet it still struggles to balance familial interests against individual autonomy.

A Global Perspective: Who is Leading?

The global community is fractured on this issue, but two jurisdictions stand out for their advanced, and often conflicting approaches. In The European Union the GDPR (Recital 34) explicitly classifies genetic data as a “special category” of personal data. European jurisprudence, notably in the landmark case of S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, has recognized that the retention of genetic samples constitutes a “disproportionate interference” with the right to private life because of the data’s unique ability to reveal a person’s biological lineage and future health.

Iceland is home to the world’s most advanced genomic database project (deCODE). Their Supreme Court provided the “most advanced” ruling on familial privacy in Guðmundsdóttir v. Iceland. The Court ruled that a daughter had the legal standing to prohibit the transfer of her deceased father’s medical records to a commercial database because those records contained information about her hereditary characteristics.

While the EU provides a clearer statutory framework (GDPR), Iceland holds the most advanced judicial recognition that genomic privacy is a “group right.”

The Path Forward: Relational Privacy

Maybe the path forward is focusing on research protocols that account for the familial reach of the data. The use of dynamic consent systems that allow participants to update preferences as the research evolves and, finally viewing institutions not just as “data controllers,” but as stewards who owe a duty of care to the entire biological line.

In our rush to cure disease, a noble and necessary pursuit, we must be careful not to bankrupt the privacy of future generations. DNA is the only record we cannot change and the only one we are forced to share. As lawyers and privacy specialists, our job is to ensure that the “shared secret” of the family remains a choice, not a leak.

The post The Shared Secret: Does Your Consent Violate Your Family’s Privacy? appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Official Clio Blog 2. Meurrens on Immigration 3. ABlawg.ca 4. Great LEXpectations 5. Canadian Class Actions Monitor

Official Clio Blog
How Time-Strapped Solo and Small Law Firms Can Get More Out of AI

Today, AI can do meaningful work in your practice. A demand letter can take months to gather all the details, and weeks to write once you do, but now the writing takes days. A long email chain gets distilled to its three actionable points. The motion you often lost a weekend to is in your outbox by Thursday. All of which raises a fair question: Where is the time it was supposed to save you? …

Meurrens on Immigration
Arguing Incompetence of Counsel in an Appeal

Many lawyers when they meet with clients often review rejected applications and/or appeals where it is obvious that the individual’s previous representative was incompetent. The examples of incompetence range from missed deadlines to ignorance of the law. Some specific examples include:former counsel being told by an Immigration Appeal Division member to “sit down” because they were incompetent; …

ABlawg.ca
Alberta Energy Regulator Makes Rule Changes Aimed At Gutting Participation by ENGOs

Last month (May 2026) the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) issued a Bulletin announcing changes to its Rules of Practice. The AER made these changes on February 5, 2026 and filed them April 30, 2026; they were gazetted “for information purposes” in the Alberta Gazette, Part 2, May 15, 2026. The AER Bulletin is dated May 5, 2026. The AER has the authority to make the Rules of Practice under s 61 of the Responsible Energy Development Act, SA 2012 c R-17.3 (REDA) but only, of course, to the extent that such Rules are consistent with the Act and with any regulations made under the Act (see REDA, ss 60 and 61). So far as I know, …

Great LEXpectations
Legislative Update – June 5, 2026 [Updated]

May 29, 2026. News Release. Report from Manitoba’s U.S. Representative on CUSMA Review – The findings of the report reiterate the importance of the agreement to Manitoba’s economy, which still relies heavily on exports to its North American partners, and underscores the need for stability and predictability in trade between the three countries, the premier noted. …

Canadian Class Actions Monitor
McCarthy Tétrault builds on Calgary momentum with addition of regulatory partner Elyse Bouey

McCarthy Tétrault is pleased to welcome Elyse Bouey as a Partner in our Business Law Group in Calgary. Joining us from another national business law firm, Elyse is an energy regulatory lawyer whose practice also focuses on environmental, administrative and Indigenous law. She advises proponents, operators and investors across the full lifecycle of major projects — from securing approvals through compliance proceedings, hearings and litigation. …

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*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : La Cour ordonne la tenue d’un nouveau procès dans une affaire d’infractions de nature sexuelle; elle est incapable de conclure que la preuve nouvelle, qui comprend 2 déclarations vidéo de la victime, n’est pas plausible, cette dernière livrant avec assurance les versions contradictoires contenues dans les 2 rétractations.

Intitulé : S.L. c. R., 2026 QCCA 600
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Québec
Décision de : Juges Suzanne Gagné, Geneviève Cotnam et Guy Cournoyer
Date : 30 avril 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — preuve pénale — recevabilité de la preuve — appel — nouvelle preuve — enregistrement vidéo — déclaration extrajudiciaire de la victime — victime affirmant avoir inventé les infractions, puis rétractant cette déclaration — rétractation de la victime survenue après la déclaration de culpabilité — critères établis dans Palmer c. R. (C.S. Can., 1979-12-21), SOQUIJ AZ-80113054, [1980] 1 R.C.S. 759 — diligence raisonnable — pertinence — crédibilité de la victime — commission des infractions — versions contradictoires — possibilité de soulever un doute raisonnable — critère de la plausibilité — influence sur la décision à rendre — infractions de nature sexuelle.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — infraction — infractions de nature sexuelle — agression sexuelle — déclaration de culpabilité — appel — recevabilité de la preuve — nouvelle preuve — enregistrement vidéo — déclaration extrajudiciaire de la victime — victime affirmant avoir inventé les infractions, puis rétractant cette déclaration — rétractation de la victime survenue après la déclaration de culpabilité — critères établis dans Palmer c. R. (C.S. Can., 1979-12-21), SOQUIJ AZ-80113054, [1980] 1 R.C.S. 759 — tenue d’un nouveau procès.

Requête en autorisation de présenter une nouvelle preuve. Appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité. Accueillis; la tenue d’un nouveau procès est ordonnée.

L’appelant a été déclaré coupable d’infractions de nature sexuelle commises à l’endroit de la fille mineure de son ex-conjointe. Il demande à la Cour de recevoir une preuve nouvelle comprenant notamment 2 déclarations vidéo de la victime: dans la première, elle affirme qu’elle a menti au sujet des infractions et qu’elle a agi par vengeance en les inventant; dans la seconde, elle rétracte sa première déclaration et explique que, à cette époque, elle subissait des pressions de l’appelant par l’entremise de sa mère.

Décision

Lorsque la rétractation d’un témoin survient après la déclaration de culpabilité, le premier critère énoncé dans Palmer c. R. (C.S. Can., 1979-12-21), SOQUIJ AZ-80113054, [1980] 1 R.C.S. 759, n’est pas en cause. Au regard du deuxième critère, la preuve est pertinente pour évaluer la crédibilité de la victime, et ce, même si la première déclaration n’est pas crue (comme le voudrait la poursuite). De plus, si cette déclaration est crédible, elle tend à démontrer que l’appelant n’a pas commis les crimes ou, à tout le moins, elle est susceptible de susciter un doute raisonnable. La rétractation d’un témoin doit être soigneusement considérée en raison du fait qu’elle peut facilement être fabriquée. Si une cour d’appel estime que la rétractation d’un témoin n’est pas crédible, elle retiendra que cette preuve nouvelle n’est pas recevable, le critère de la plausibilité n’étant pas rempli. Si elle n’est pas en mesure de déterminer que la preuve n’est pas crédible sans pouvoir non plus conclure qu’elle est crédible, elle doit évaluer le quatrième critère établi dans Palmer. En l’espèce, la nouvelle preuve établit que la victime a menti au moins 1 fois. Sans se prononcer sur la crédibilité de cette dernière, la Cour constate que celle-ci livre avec assurance les versions contradictoires contenues dans les 2 rétractations. Elle est incapable de conclure que la preuve nouvelle n’est pas plausible, et ce, même si elle la considère à la lumière de l’ensemble du dossier. Il s’agit d’une preuve recevable à plus de 1 fin et susceptible de susciter un doute sur la crédibilité de la victime, ce qui pourrait influer sur le résultat lors d’un nouveau procès.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeal

Constitutional Law: Charter; Language Rights
Société de l’Acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2024 NBCA 7, 2026 SCC 22 (41398)

Charter s. 16(2) requires N.B. Lieutenant Governor be bilingual.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

Ten or fifteen years ago, the professional who sent a newsletter, mailed a holiday card, and maintained an updated LinkedIn profile was considered ahead of the curve.

The bar was low. Showing up, in almost any form, was enough.

Today, that communication strategy blends into the background. This is not because newsletters stopped working, direct mail disappeared, or LinkedIn became oversaturated. It was because client expectations changed, attentions changed, the way we build trust changed. The shift was gradual, then sudden, and now permanent.

Where We Were Five to Ten Years Ago

In the mid 2010s, most mass communication followed a fairly predictable formula. Law firms, accounting firms, consultants, and professional service organizations typically relied on:

• General monthly or quarterly newsletters sent to the full contact database
• Direct mail pieces included as holiday cards and firm updates
• LinkedIn profiles served primarily as online résumés
• Email blasts with identical messaging sent to every contact
• Websites that acted more as digital brochures than business development tools

At the time, this worked reasonably well. Inbox competition was lower. Search driven content strategies were still uncommon in many professional sectors. Most importantly, clients were not overwhelmed by content.

The Pandemic Accelerated Everything

COVID did not create the communication shift but it accelerated it dramatically. In person networking disappeared overnight. Conferences stopped. Client lunches stopped. Informal relationship building became difficult or impossible.

Professionals who had invested in digital visibility and consistent communication suddenly had a major advantage. Their clients already knew them. Their networks continued hearing from them. Their visibility remained intact.

Clients became far more selective about what they paid attention to, and that shift never reversed.

What Actually Works in 2026

Fast forward a few years and the communication environment today is not necessarily more complicated, but it is far less forgiving. Generic communication gets ignored. Relevance matters more than volume. Consistency matters more than polish.

Newsletters Have Become Narrower and More Useful

Clients no longer want six unrelated updates bundled into a single email written in institutional language. Most do not have time for it. What performs better today is:

• Short emails focused on one issue
• Clear relevance to a specific audience or industry
• A recognizable human voice
• Commentary and perspective, not just information
• Consistent cadence without overproduction

In many cases, the highest performing emails barely resemble traditional marketing pieces at all. They read more like informed notes from an expert. The distinction matters.

LinkedIn Is No Longer Optional

For professionals, LinkedIn has evolved from a résumé platform into a visibility and credibility platform.

Clients check profiles before meetings, often before they read your website biography. Referral sources observe activity over time. Prospective clients form opinions long before direct contact happens.

The firms and professionals performing well on LinkedIn are usually not the loudest but they present, consistently.

What is trending:

• Sharing practical observations and informed opinions
• Engaging in conversations
• Publishing consistently rather than sporadically
• Speaking to client problems, not internal accomplishments

What is missing the mark:

• Award announcements as the primary content strategy
• Corporate sounding posts with no perspective
• Publishing only when there is something to promote
• Trying to sound overly polished or overly strategic

Interestingly, much of this is the same advice I would have given ten years ago. The difference is that today it is no longer optional.

The most important part of social media is “social.” The media platform is simply where the interaction happens. Once you have figured that out, you are ahead of the game.

Direct Mail Is More Intentional

Digital overload has made thoughtful physical communication more valuable again.

Mass printed newsletters and generic holiday cards still don’t work. However, highly targeted, timely outreach does.

A handwritten note tied to a client milestone, industry announcement, referral, or meaningful interaction can stand out precisely because so little communication feels personal anymore.

The key difference is thoughtfulness. It is easy to say “congratulations” on LinkedIn – LinkedIn practically does it for you. It takes effort to write a note, stamp it, and mail it and that is why it matters more.

Search Visibility Quietly Drives Business Development

One of the biggest shifts over the past decade is how professionals are discovered. Clients increasingly search before they reach out. They search for answers to specific problems. They search for industry expertise. They search for professionals who appear active, knowledgeable, and visible.

This is one of the biggest conversations I am having with clients right now. Many organizations are sitting on years of expertise, insight, and institutional knowledge that never becomes visible externally. Meanwhile, competitors who communicate more consistently are shaping perception in the market.

The Bigger Shift Behind All of This

The real evolution is not technology, it is behaviour. Professional communication used to be largely one directional. Today, communication is far more relationship driven.

Clients want to know how professionals think, not just what services they offer.

The Professionals Winning Attention Today

The professionals standing out in 2026 are rarely doing one dramatic thing differently. Most are doing several small things consistently. They publish useful insights regularly. They engage with their network. They communicate with specificity. They have a recognizable voice and sound like themselves. They understand that visibility compounds over time.

Most importantly, they recognize that communication is no longer separate from business development or relationship management.

What Happens Next

The next shift is likely not about producing more content. Artificial intelligence makes it easier to generate articles, emails, posts, and video content. That does not necessarily mean communication will improve, there will just be more of it. As content generation becomes easier, judgment, perspective, and strategic thinking become more valuable.

In a marketplace increasingly filled with automated communication, the professionals who will stand out over the next five years will be the ones whose communication feels informed, thoughtful, recognizable, and human.

They are the ones saying something worth paying attention to.

The post Mass Client Communication Has Changed Completely. Too Bad Many Professionals Are Still Using the 2016 Playbook appeared first on Slaw.

Several times each month, we are pleased to republish a recent book review from the Canadian Law Library Review (CLLR). CLLR is the official journal of the Canadian Association of Law Libraries (CALL/ACBD), and its reviews cover both practice-oriented and academic publications related to the law.

Fundamental Principles of Canadian Unjust Enrichment. By Mitchell McInnes. Toronto: LexisNexis, 2025. xvii, 422 p. Includes table of cases, table of statutes, and index. ISBN 9780433527749 (softcover) $120.00.

Reviewed by Melanie R. Bueckert
Legal Research Counsel
Manitoba Court of Appeal

For readers unfamiliar with the topic of unjust enrichment, it stands alongside contract and tort as a primary source of private law obligations in Canada, although it is generally less well known than those other grounds of liability. This book is a pared-down, introductory version of McInnes’s comprehensive text The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution, 2nd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2022), which weighs in at 2,534 pages. This basic text aims to introduce the subject without getting too bogged down by the details. It includes a preface, a foreword (written by former Supreme Court Justice Russell Brown, who comments that McInnes’s larger treatise “may be the best textbook on any legal subject in Canada”), and a table of contents, as well as a table of cases, a table of statutes, and an index.

This text has four parts: Basic Principles, Absence of Juristic Reason, Defences, and Restitution. Basic Principles includes the key topics of enrichment, corresponding deprivation, and absence of juristic reason. The Absence of Juristic Reasons section discusses non-purposive transfers, donative intent, contract, disposition of law, as well as other juristic reasons. The Defences section addresses change of position, estoppel, passing on, illegality, officiousness, and incidental benefits. The concluding part, a chapter on restitution, discusses personal and proprietary restitution, including restitutionary trusts and equitable liens.

Interestingly, the book also includes approximately two dozen figures or diagrams: “[s]ome illustrate the subject’s organization and structure; others trace the operation of particular restitutionary doctrines” (p. vii). For example, the first figure (p. 7) breaks down the old writ of indebitatus assumpsit. Later figures illustrate specific types of transactions captured by the law of unjust enrichment, such as indirect enrichment (p. 63) or sub-contracts (p. 65). Perhaps most beneficial to those unfamiliar with the intricacies of unjust enrichment is a figure explaining the difference between unjust enrichment (backward-looking) and contract (forward-looking). As the accompanying text explains,

[t]he cause of action consists of a benefit that passed between the parties without legal explanation. There is no agreement, no promise, no wrongdoing. The court is simply presented with a transfer that should not have occurred. The only possible measure of relief is restitution. The transfer is reversed and nothing more. (p. 292)

In agreeing to prepare this review, I did not realize the controversy I was stepping into. It is apparent that the author of this text fundamentally disagrees with the approach taken by John McCamus, the other leading author in this area. In his foreword, Russell Brown observes that “The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution is a comprehensive and uncharacteristically (in this subject area) agenda-free expounding of the doctrine of unjust enrichment and restitution” (p. ix). The primary point of disagreement appears to relate to the use of the terms “restitution” and “unjust enrichment” to describe the reversal of unjustified transfers between the parties and the stripping away of benefits obtained through civil wrongs (p. vi). In The Law of Restitution (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2004), Maddaugh and McCamus state,

[s]ome observers have taken the view, however, that the unjust enrichment principle does not simply provide an underlying justification for the existing liability rules and a basis for their reform and amendment, but that the principle in some sense replaces or supplants or suppresses the existing law of restitution. (§2:4)

In the corresponding footnote, the authors cite McInnes as the “principal proponent” of this view (§2:4).

McInnes, a professor at the University of Alberta, and McCamus, a professor at Osgoode, have both written lengthy treatises and shorter introductory texts in this area. Some law firms/organizations may already have access to The Law of Restitution through Westlaw. A quick search of CanLII indicates that 138 cases cite McInnes on the subject of unjust enrichment, with 47 of those cases arising in Alberta; meanwhile, 403 cases cite McCamus on the subject of restitution, including 137 in Ontario. Both have been cited multiple times by the Supreme Court of Canada.

I am not an expert in the area and so will not judge between the merits of these competing publications. Both are introductory texts, and both are similarly priced. McInnes’s text is newer. Students will be interested to note that a student edition of McInnes’s comprehensive text is available from LexisNexis at a significant discount ($210 versus $505), while McCamus’s loose-leaf is subject to the price uncertainty inherent in that publication format. Given the obvious differences of opinion between these two leading authors, it might be advisable for academic libraries to purchase both. Practitioners in the area may also wish to consult the work of both authors.

The post Book Review: Fundamental Principles of Canadian Unjust Enrichment appeared first on Slaw.

The Alberta legislature passed two bills in December 2025 that are particularly important to the regulation of the legal profession. The many separate ramifications of the Justice Statutes Amendment Act, 2025, some of which I have previously written about,[1] are important though perhaps not immediately obvious. The Regulated Professions Neutrality Act, in contrast, has a clearly unifying purpose that is readily apparent – but its nuances and details deserve more attention.[2]

My view has long been that the regulation of the extra-professional conduct of lawyers, including their expression, is an important aspect of the role of the provincial and territorial law societies.[3] Having said that, the overarching goal of the Regulated Professions Neutrality Act – to prevent professional regulators from policing expression, conscience, and extra-professional conduct by their members[4] – is a completely legitimate policy choice in the exercise of provincial jurisdiction over the practice of professions, including law. As it happens, it is a policy choice that fundamentally misunderstands the concept of professional responsibility, the role of professional regulators, and the maintenance of public confidence in the regulated professions.[5] Nonetheless, the regulatory power of the Law Society of Alberta, like all provincial law societies, is delegated from the provincial legislature by statute and that delegation can be changed by statute.[6] In other words, the Regulated Professions Neutrality Act may be a bad policy decision that fundamentally undermines professional regulation, but absent any constitutional constraints, that is the legislature’s legitimate decision to make.

However, the details of this Act seem problematic and overbroad in implementing that policy choice. While these problems may well apply to many if not all professions covered by the Act, I focus here on implications for the legal profession and the Law Society of Alberta.

Among other things, the Act targets training or educational requirements imposed by regulators.

Section 7(1) provides that a professional regulator “may require a regulated professional or person seeking to become a regulated professional to complete education or training only if that education or training relates to professional competence or ethical standards for the practice of the regulated profession.”[7] However, section 7(2) clarifies that such requirements may “addres[s] a political, historical, social or cultural issue” only if three conditions are met. Such material must “specifically addres[s] a matter of professional competence or minimum ethical standards for the practice of the regulated profession”, “[be] necessary to provide the regulated professional or person seeking to become a regulated professional with effective education or training with respect to” that matter, and “not seek to dictate, expressly or by implication, the range of acceptable or unacceptable opinions or beliefs on any political, historical, social or cultural issue or on a matter of conscience.”[8] These provisions seem to be a fairly reasonable implementation of the legislature’s policy choice, understanding that the overarching goal of the Act is easier to articulate than to implement precisely in legislation.

The glaring problem comes in section 8, which narrows the scope of section 7 on the basis of an open-ended list of three phrases that can be extended by regulation:

Despite anything to the contrary in section 7, a regulatory appeal body or regulatory body must not require a regulated professional or person seeking to become a regulated professional to complete education or training that addresses one or more of the following matters:

(a) cultural competency;
(b) unconscious bias;
(c) diversity, equity or inclusion;
(d) any other matter specified in the regulations.[9]

Although I have elsewhere criticized an apparent trend to broad regulation-making authority in Canadian statutes,[10] its use here seems unsurprising.[11] The problems with section 8 are that these prohibitions are absolute and these phrases are not defined. This problematic lack of definitions is by no means a groundbreaking critique, but to my surprise I have not seen it addressed elsewhere. While defining them may be difficult, not defining them seems more problematic.

Consider, for example, the Code of Conduct rule on “clients with diminished capacity”:

When a client’s ability to make decisions is impaired because of minority or mental disability, or for some other reason, the lawyer must, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal lawyer and client relationship.[12]

The ability of lawyers to recognize capacity issues, an understanding of the ways in which to maintain that “normal” relationship, and knowledge of the responsibilities of lawyers in that kind of situation would seem to go directly to “professional competence” and “ethical standards” under section 7(1). Consider, for example, defence counsel and representing criminal accused with severe Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, such as in the context of plea bargaining.[13] Although FASD and its impacts would seem to be reasonably characterized as “a social issue” under section 7(1), the requirements for such issues under section 7(2) would seem to be met. However, this training would reasonably seem to be within the scope of the term “equity, diversity, and inclusion” in section 8. Thus it would presumably be prohibited.

Likewise, some communities – including cultural communities but also geographic communities – may include different understandings of the role of the Crown attorney and the judge in criminal litigation,[14] the impact of incarceration on the needs of the family and the community, and the impact of a criminal record.[15] These considerations could be important for lawyers in the contexts of criminal law and family law, among others.[16] Despite being “addressin[g] a … historical, social or cultural issue”, they would likewise seem to meet the requirements of section 7(2). But they would reasonably seem to fall within the scope of “cultural competency” in section 8. Thus training on these issues would presumably be prohibited.

The definitional issues are less squarely engaged by the term “unconscious bias”, which seems to have a narrower and more discrete meaning. Nonetheless, if Crown attorneys are to fulfill their professional obligations – among other things, “to see that justice is done through a fair trial on the merits” and to “act fairly and dispassionately”,[17] then it is not immediately clear why an awareness of at least the possibility of unconscious bias – whether by Crown attorneys themselves, or by law enforcement, or by other justice system participants – is not relevant to fulfilling those obligations. Training on these issues would again presumably be prohibited by section 8 even though they would seem to be authorized by section 7(2).

The additional topics to be prohibited by regulation may of course be less problematic. That remains to be seen.

While these terms in section 8 might epitomize the mischief at which the legislation is directed, it is unclear to me, from a drafting and policy perspective, what the intended function of section 8 is given the presence of section 7(2). In other words, if section 7(2) allows for legitimate exceptions to the prohibition, what additional work is being done by section 8? In other words, why is the prohibition on “diversity, equity, and inclusion” or “cultural competency” – or even “unconscious bias” – absolute instead of being qualified by section 7(2)? This problem is exacerbated by the absence of definitions. If these particular umbrella concepts are so offensive, they should be defined reasonably clearly.

Moreover, it is difficult to examine whether the positive effects of section 8 outweigh these negative effects without knowing what those ‘positive’ effects of section 8 are meant to be.

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[1] Justice Statutes Amendment Act, 2025, SA 2025, c 22; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Revenge of Administrative Law? The Subtle Dismantling of the Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession” (3 February 2026), Slaw (blog), online: <https://www.slaw.ca/2026/02/03/the-revenge-of-administrative-law-the-subtle-dismantling-of-the-self-regulation-of-the-legal-profession/>; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Statutory Immunity of the Attorney General from Law Society Discipline in Alberta: A Comment on the Justice Statute Amendments Act, 2025” (2026) 64:1 Alberta Law Review [forthcoming], online: SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6498018>.

[2] Regulated Professions Neutrality Act, SA 2025, c R-13.3.

[3] I acknowledge that that appears to be a minority position within the Canadian legal ethics community. See e.g. Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Limits of Professional Regulation in Canada: Law Societies and Non-Practising Lawyers” (2016) 19:1 Legal Ethics 169.

[4] See Regulated Professions Neutrality Act, supra note 2, preamble.

[5] In particular, the idea that a professional is ever ‘off duty’ or that their ‘off-duty’ speech and conduct is irrelevant to their practice is fundamentally flawed. I am, of course, not an Alberta MLA or a legislator of any kind. But see Alberta Hansard, 31-2 (2 December 2025) 692 (Rhiannon Hoyle):” When you undermine regulators’ ability to enforce standards, you erode public confidence and trust in professions like law, engineering, and health care.” Several legislators emphasized that the concept of ‘off-duty’ speech and conduct does not capture the reality of professional responsibility.

[6] Likewise all provincially-regulated professions. For the few federally-regulated professions, these powers are delegated in statute by Parliament.

[7] Regulated Professions Neutrality Act, supra note 2, s 7(1).

[8] Ibid, s 7(2).

[9] Ibid, s 8 [emphasis added].

[10] Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Duty of Legislative Counsel as Guardians of the Statute Book: Sui Generis or a Professional Duty of Lawyers?” (2021) 44:3 Manitoba LJ 116 at 142-144.

[11] It is potentially problematic that the LGIC can, by regulation, narrow the scope of a provision of the Act, but that is beyond the scope of this column,

[12] Law Society of Alberta, Code of Conduct (2025), r 3.2-15, <https://documents.lawsociety.ab.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/14211909/Code.pdf> perma.cc/3VGR-MJCW [Code of Conduct].

[13] Ibid, r 5.1-8. See e.g. Palma Paciocco, “(How) Is Plea Bargaining Justified?” (2025) 58:3 UBC L Rev 737 at 755-756.

[14] See e.g. Code of Conduct, supra note 13, r 5.1-4: “When acting as a prosecutor, a lawyer must act for the public and the administration of justice resolutely and honourably within the limits of the law while treating the tribunal with candour, fairness, courtesy and respect.”

[15] See e.g. Amanda Carling, “A Way to Reduce Indigenous Overrepresentation: Prevent False Guilty Plea Wrongful Convictions” (2017) 64 Crim LQ 415.

[16] See e.g. ibid.

[17] Code of Conduct, supra note 13, r 5.1-4, commentary 1.

The post Why? the Details of the Alberta Regulated Professions Neutrality Act appeared first on Slaw.

Back in the day, when I was starting my mediation practice, I received the worst advice ever. It came from someone who, I believe, meant well. The advice was that I should let the world know I was a mediator by modelling neutrality. In everything I did.

Why was this bad advice? Because that is impossible! No human being can be neutral about everything, nor should they pretend that they can be.

Also, how can someone expect to successfully market themselves absent any personality? The individual who gave me the advice may have meant well but failed to grasp what makes mediators appealing to prospective clients and their representatives.

I quickly came to learn that the best mediators are their authentic selves. They lean into what makes them unique as they market, offer and deliver their services.

A mediator need not be opinion-less. They simply should not have an interest in the outcome of the dispute they are mediating. The key is remaining detached, not being impacted by any potential conclusion of the matter.

Suggesting a mediator should be without views is asking them to be inauthentic. Fake. Such an ask of mediators is really suggesting that they hide their opinions, because it is not possible to be without them. While mediators are often wise to heed the advice of Taylor Swift and think some things they never say, that applies to the conflict at hand. Not everything in life. The point is that human beings hold values, emotions and beliefs.

This concept of the role of neutrality in mediators gets confused when those with an interest in an issue attempt to step into the role of mediator. I have written about this previously, aging myself by offering an example from the television show Friends where Ross intervenes to make peace between Monica and Chandler for his own selfish reasons. Another example offers a realtor swooping in to help address an issue that risks de-railing a closing… to save their commission.

Mediation is designed to be facilitated by someone a layer removed from the dispute. It is that layer of distance that allows them to approach the matter from a place of impartiality and therein lies the benefit of bringing in the neutral facilitator.

The notion that a mediator should be impartial about everything, in addition to being impossible, is absurd. The very sentiment leads to ridiculous internal torment within many practicing mediators about the disputes that they experience personally and the sports teams they cheer for.

Mediators sometimes feel pressure to pretend that they live their lives conflict-free. Yet, conflict is a natural part of life for everyone.

At its worst, this offers folks opposing mediators in their personal conflicts the illusion that they have a “card” they can play against them. The idea that a vulnerability exists in exposing that a mediator has a personal conflict, based on the false belief that mediators should never. This type of ‘BS’ can cause new mediators a great deal of unnecessary stress.

Putting aside for a moment the fact that experiencing personal conflict actually helps mediators better empathize with their clients and appreciate the different perspectives and approaches that they encounter when rendering their services, allow me to state what should by now be obvious… mediators cannot be the mediator of their own personal conflicts because they have an interest in the outcome.

Mediators have drama, bad days and arguments. Mediators can throw down, call people names and get agitated. Mediators get divorced. They are simply not acting as a mediator as they do.

Note: Marc Bhalla is an instructor at Osgoode Hall Law School’s Master of Laws in Dispute Resolution Program and the York University School of Continuing Studies’ Certificate in Dispute Resolution. The views expressed in this column are from Marc’s capacity as a teacher and supporter of aspiring and new dispute resolution practitioners.

The post Mediators Are Human Too appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Condo Adviser/STACK Condo Law 2. SOQUIJ | Le Blogue 3. Welcome to the Food Court 4. BC Injury Law Blog 5. Know How

Condo Adviser/STACK Condo Law
Are Condo Owners Entitled to Access Legal Invoices?

Condo owners often want to know where their money is going. That is especially true when the corporation is spending money on lawyers and even more so when the fees are charged back to a specific owner. These situations often lead to records requests seeking access to legal invoices, leaving us with this question: “Can owners see the corporation’s legal invoices?”. Perhaps asked differently, are legal bills corporate records accessible to owners? …

SOQUIJ | Le Blogue
Devoirs des avocats: illustrations jurisprudentielles 2025-2026

Au cours des derniers mois, le Conseil de discipline du Barreau du Québec a rendu plusieurs décisions se voulant autant de rappels des obligations déontologiques des avocats trouvant notamment leurs sources dans le Code des professions (C.prof.), le Code de déontologie des avocats du Québec ainsi que dans le Règlement sur la comptabilité et les normes d’exercice professionnel des avocats. Dans ce billet, il sera plus précisément question des devoirs de l’avocat, tant envers sa profession que l’administration de la justice, ainsi que des exigences liées à l’utilisation d’un compte en fidéicommis. Usage des médias sociaux, choix de mots-clics, inspection professionnelle, mandat pro bono, charge de travail, compte en fidéicommis, voici, en bref, certains des sujets qui ont été abordés dans les décisions qui vous seront présentées. …

Welcome to the Food Court
The Credibility Problem with AI-Drafted Compliance Documents

For context, on April 2, 2026, the FDA issued what appears to be its first warning letter with a dedicated AI-manufacturing section, to Purolea Cosmetics Lab in Livonia, Michigan. The letter found that AI agents had generated drug specifications, procedures, and master production records, and that the firm used the AI-generated documents without the review CGMP requires. The firm’s owner told FDA investigators she had not known process validation was required because the AI agent had not informed her. FDA devoted a stand-alone section of the warning letter to “Inappropriate Use of Artificial Intelligence in Pharmaceutical Manufacturing.” In Canada, CFIA does not operate through warning letters in the same way as FDA does, and much of our work is learned through inspections, correspondence, enforcement files, and practice around CFIA decision-making. So, I thought we would address the Purolea question in a way that lands closer to home: when does a Canadian food operator’s preventive control plan become the subject of the same conversation? In our practice over the past year, we have started to read documents that we are confident were generated by AI. We see stylistic patterns that are immediately recognizable, particularly from less sophisticated users of LLM outputs. …

BC Injury Law Blog
Can the Government Be Negligent For Not Shutting Down A “Smoker”?

A smoker. In the combat sports world this is slang for an unsanctioned / unregulated fight. Cutting corners. Avoiding regulation. Exposing athletes to the dangers of a potentially neglectful environment. Last week the BC Court of Appeal released reasons for judgement addressing whether the government could be liable for not shutting down such an alleged event. The recent case (British Columbia Athletic Commissioner v. Simon Fraser University) involved a tragic outcome at an amateur level martial arts contest. …

Know How
House of Bills: May 25-28, 2026

Good morning, Bill enthusiasts. This is the second to last edition of House of Bills for this season – click through to see what was lost and gained last week in the Ontario Legislative Assembly. Bill 9, Municipal Accountability Act, 2026 Third reading vote, carried on division (May 26, 2026) …

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*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

RESPONSABILITÉ : Le fait qu’Air Canada ait contrevenu à l’article 6 (1) d) de la Loi sur la participation publique au capital d’Air Canada ne peut constituer, au sens de l’article 1457 C.C.Q., une faute dont elle serait redevable envers les membres du groupe qui étaient en poste dans ses centres d’entretien et de révision de Winnipeg, de Mississauga ainsi que de Dorval au moment de la fermeture de ceux-ci, en 2012, qui n’ont jamais été rouverts par la suite.

Intitulé : Air Canada c. McMullen, 2026 QCCA 650
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Yves-Marie Morissette, Marie-France Bich et Benoît Moore
Date : 12 mai 2026

Résumé

RESPONSABILITÉ — responsabilité du fait personnel — fermeture d’entreprise — Aveos Performance aéronautique inc. — ex-employés — cessation d’emploi — Air Canada — manquement à la Loi sur la participation publique au capital d’Air Canada — obligation de maintenir des centres d’entretien et de révision d’avions — absence de faute — interprétation de l’article 6 (1) d) de la Loi sur la participation publique au capital d’Air Canada — pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’employeur — protection d’un secteur d’activité — absence de garantie d’emploi personnelle — préjudice — absence de lien de causalité — prescription extinctive — action collective — appel.

ACTION COLLECTIVE (RECOURS COLLECTIF) — jugement au fond et mesures d’exécution — ex-employés — Aveos Performance aéronautique inc. — fermeture d’entreprise — cessation d’emploi — Air Canada — manquement à la Loi sur la participation publique au capital d’Air Canada — obligation de maintenir des centres d’entretien et de révision d’avions — responsabilité extracontractuelle — absence de faute — interprétation de l’article 6 (1) d) de la Loi sur la participation publique au capital d’Air Canada — pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’employeur — protection d’un secteur d’activité — absence de garantie d’emploi personnelle — préjudice — absence de lien de causalité — prescription extinctive — appel.

PRESCRIPTION EXTINCTIVE — délai — action collective — recours en dommages-intérêts — responsabilité extracontractuelle — point de départ du calcul du délai — absence de faute continue — absence de dommages continus.

TRAVAIL — responsabilité et obligations — divers — dommages-intérêts — dommage non pécuniaire — responsabilité extracontractuelle — fermeture d’entreprise — manquement à la Loi sur la participation publique au capital d’Air Canada — absence de faute — absence de lien de causalité — action collective — appel.

INTERPRÉTATION DES LOIS — intention du législateur — débats parlementaires — interprétation de l’article 6 (1) d) de la Loi sur la participation publique au capital d’Air Canada.

Appels de jugements de la Cour supérieure ayant accueilli en partie une action collective et ayant précisé les modalités du recouvrement. Accueillis.

En mars 2012, Aveos Performance aéronautique inc., qui effectuait des tâches en sous-traitance pour l’appelante dans ses centres d’entretien et de révision de Winnipeg, de Mississauga et de Dorval, a fermé ses portes. L’appelante n’a pas repris elle-même ces activités. En 2016, l’intimé a intenté une action collective au nom d’un groupe composé notamment des anciens salariés d’Aveos, reprochant à l’appelante d’avoir contrevenu à l’article 6 (1) d) de la Loi sur la participation publique au capital d’Air Canada en ne maintenant pas les centres en activité et d’avoir ainsi commis une faute civile qui avait définitivement privé les salariés en cause de leurs emplois respectifs, ce dont elle devait assumer les conséquences.

L’appelante ne conteste plus qu’elle a contrevenu à l’article 6 (1) d) de la loi et qu’elle n’a pas pris les moyens raisonnablement nécessaires pour s’y conformer. Elle fait toutefois valoir que cette violation ne constituait pas une faute donnant ouverture à une action en responsabilité civile extracontractuelle.

Décision

M^me la juge Bich: Le fait que l’appelante a contrevenu à l’article 6 (1) d) de la loi ne peut constituer, au sens de l’article 1457 du Code civil du Québec (C.C.Q.), une faute dont elle serait redevable envers les membres du groupe qui étaient en poste dans les centres au moment de la fermeture de ceux-ci, lesquels n’ont jamais été rouverts par la suite. L’article 6 (1) d) de la loi a été adopté en 1988, alors que l’industrie aérienne était en plein changement et que l’appelante faisait face à des défis d’où résulterait sa privatisation. Le législateur n’entendait alors pas la priver de toute latitude dans la gestion de ses activités d’entretien. S’il avait pour but, par la protection accordée aux centres, d’assurer la conservation et la promotion, au Canada, d’un secteur d’activité important ainsi que, implicitement, une protection générique et globale des emplois dans ce domaine, l’article 6 (1) d) de la loi, dans sa mouture avant juin 2016, n’offrait pas une garantie d’emploi personnelle aux titulaires de ces emplois dans les installations en question. Une lecture des débats parlementaires de 1988 démontre par ailleurs une préoccupation pour les salariés de l’appelante, et notamment ceux qui travaillaient dans les centres, mais pas au point d’inclure dans l’article 6 (1) d) de la loi une garantie d’emploi véritable et individuelle ni même une discussion directe du sujet. Subsidiairement, à supposer qu’il y ait eu faute, l’intimé ne démontre pas que le préjudice allégué — ne pas avoir été réembauché dans le cadre de la remise en exploitation des centres — résulterait de façon directe, immédiate et, surtout, certaine de la faute reprochée à l’appelante. En effet, s’il est exact que cette dernière a maintenu les centres ouverts de 1988 à mars 2012, et qu’elle aurait pu les garder en activité par la suite, on ne peut en déduire que tous les salariés licenciés par Aveos en 2012 auraient été réembauchés et qu’ils auraient continué d’y travailler jusqu’à la modification de l’article 6 de la loi, en juin 2016. En effet, depuis 2004, la trajectoire de l’appelante en matière d’entretien lourd a consisté en une évolution de ses activités et en une diminution des effectifs consacrés à cette tâche. Toujours à titre subsidiaire, et dans l’hypothèse où l’appelante aurait commis la faute retenue par la juge de première instance, il faudrait conclure que la prescription extinctive était entièrement acquise au moment du dépôt de la demande d’autorisation d’exercer une action collective, en 2016. Il n’est pas question en l’espèce d’une faute continue ou répétée qui ferait que, pour chaque journée pendant laquelle les centres sont restés fermés, une nouvelle contravention entraînait un nouveau préjudice aux salariés. La faute s’est produite en 2012, dès que l’appelante a annoncé qu’elle ne rouvrirait pas les centres et qu’elle ne réembaucherait pas de salariés pour effectuer les tâches qui y étaient exécutées.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeal

Criminal Law: Sexual Assault; Conflicting Evidence
R. v. Berg, 2026 SCC 21 (41980)

Clarification re judges considering conflicting evidence.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

In late April, two groundbreaking decisions concerning legal regulators in Canada were announced — one by a court, and one by a law society.

The first decision came from the British Columbia Supreme Court, which ruled that the provincial government’s proposed overhaul of legal regulation in BC was constitutional and could proceed. I thought this was the obvious outcome from the outset, as I wrote here at Slaw two years ago, and I’m very glad to see the issue resolved — for the moment, anyway.

At the heart of BC’s legislative overhaul (and the lawsuit that challenged its constitutionality) was the BC government’s plan to replace the Law Society of British Columbia (LSBC) with a new body called Legal Professions British Columbia (LPBC), incorporating the Society of Notaries Public of BC in the process. The government won’t win any awards for the way it went about consulting the profession on this change, and there were a number of aspects of both process and content (which I won’t address here) that raised serious concerns for legal system stakeholders.

But the heart of the overhaul, and the crux of the legal profession’s unhappiness with it, was a fundamental reconfiguration of legal regulation governance. The LSBC, like every other law society, is governed almost entirely by lawyers who are elected to board of director positions (“Benchers”) by other members of the profession. LPBC, by contrast, would be governed by a mixed board of appointed and elected directors, a bare majority of whom would be lawyers.

I supported the overhaul because I had formed the opinion that in practical terms, most law societies put the interests of the profession ahead of the public interest, especially when it comes to non-lawyer delivery of legal services. This isn’t because law societies are governed by cackling evildoers; it’s because a professional regulator whose governors are directly elected by and from the profession it’s supposed to regulate is inherently compromised. If you are elected to a position, you have a constituency, and you cannot help but prioritize that constituency and its interests in your work.

But the LSBC, supported by the Trial Lawyers’ Association of BC and the Canadian Bar Association, said the proposed governance structure, which took away the supermajority of elected lawyers on the Board, constituted an unacceptable violation of lawyers’ professional independence. The government said it wasn’t, and in my article two years ago, I agreed. In his decision, so did BCSC Chief Justice Ronald Skolrood. He found much to dislike about the legislation and the government’s process, but he ruled that the proposed governance structure did not violate the Constitution.

This is a very shorthand summary of the story and the decision; you should read the whole ruling (as well as the organized bar’s dismayed reaction) to learn more. The plaintiffs are making noises about an appeal, which I hope they don’t pursue. Among other reasons, I fear that by the time an appeal snakes up through the BCCA and the SCC, legal regulation will have been overwhelmed by other horsemen of the regulatory apocalypse now coming over the hill (more on that below).

Less than 48 hours after Chief Justice Skolrood handed down this decision, the Benchers of the Law Society of Ontario dropped a smaller bombshell of their own. They voted to endorse the recommendations of the LSO’s Governance Review Task Force that Convocation should be significantly reconfigured. The LSO’s reforms don’t go as far as BC’s did, but they’re still very notable:

• The total number of directors is reduced from 53 to 37
• The total number of elected lawyer directors is reduced from 40 to 24
• The total number of public (lay) directors is reduced from 8 to 6
• Three new appointed directors (two of whom are licensees) are added

The upshot is that the percentage of elected lawyer directors drops from 75% to 65%, while the percentage of public directors very slightly increases (from 15% to 16% — I’d have preferred at least 30%, but I’ll take what I can get).

Thankfully, the overall size of the Board was also reduced 30%, marking a welcome change from bloated to merely overstuffed. Thirty-seven directors is still way too many — the State Bar of California’s Board of Trustees has 13 members, covering a jurisdiction with 225,000 lawyers— but it’s an improvement. The changes still have to be approved by the Ontario legislature, but I don’t foresee any difficulties there.

These two developments point towards the same conclusion: The longstanding custom by which Canadian lawyers elected lawyer-heavy boards to govern legal regulators is slowly but surely coming to an end. And that’s good.

To state the obvious: Lawyer independence from state interference is indispensable. Governments should not be able to direct, intimidate, or punish lawyers because of the clients they represent, the positions they take, or the causes they advance. The rule of law — which you might have noticed is under serious pressure these days — counts lawyer independence as one of its foundational pillars.

But elected-lawyer super-majority dominance of legal regulators is neither necessary to achieve that goal nor proportionate, in its impact, to achieve it. Other professions, including those that also take their independence seriously, have come to accept the value of boards that contain both professional and non-professional, and both elected and appointed, members. The LSO report itself describes appointed directors as a way to address structural gaps that elections don’t resolve, including expertise, competencies, and the presence of Indigenous and Francophone perspectives.

But I think there’s an even deeper issue at stake here: the public legitimacy of a self-regulating profession. Legal regulators are entering a period of extraordinary challenge. Generative AI will change everything we believe to be true about who can produce legal work and what legal competence requires. Increasingly ravenous private equity investors are circling law firms with buyout offers many will find hard to refuse. Meanwhile, the access-to-justice crisis is entering at least its fourth decade, and the profession hasn’t come close to offering up a workable solution yet. Governments across the country are watching the profession — some more closely than others.

In this environment, law societies that continue to pursue a super-majority of elected lawyers on their boards risk more than just wasting money and time while more wolves gather around the profession’s door. They also risk the possibility that the general public will perceive these efforts as the actions of a legal profession increasingly focussed on what lawyers want above everything else. If that belief ever becomes widespread and entrenched in the minds of Canadians, then no amount of regulatory governance reform will do much to help us.

The post The Legal Profession’s Weakening Grip on Law Society Governance appeared first on Slaw.

Each month, we tell you which three English-language cases and French-language cases have been the most viewed* on CanLII in the previous month and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about.

For this past month, the three most-consulted English-language decisions were:

1. Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16

[140] Intimate partner violence is more than the sum of its parts; it may involve physical violence, emotional abuse, or other methods of coercive control, but what the totality of that conduct produces takes a different meaning and quality in the context of an intimate partnership. In the context of intimacy, incidents of physical violence and emotional abuse that punctuate the relationship generally cause more than bodily and psychological harm. They can interfere with the victim’s autonomy and create an unequal partnership, which constitutes a dignitary harm. While certain existing torts may capture discrete incidents — or even patterns — of interference with one’s physical, psychological, or emotional integrity, they do not account for the wider and qualitatively different consequences of coercive control in intimate partnerships brought about by single acts of violence or by patterns of conduct over time.

[141] One may argue that, even though the victim’s subordination is offensive to their autonomy, it will nevertheless always correlate with, and emerge out of, physical and emotional incidents of wrongful conduct within the scope of battery, assault, and IIED. On this reasoning, a new tort is not necessary: by remedying the physical and emotional incidents of intimate partner violence, the deeper subordination that erodes dignity, autonomy, and equality, while a distinct harm, can nevertheless also be remedied as connected to those incidents. The aggravating effect of this violence between intimate partners as opposed to strangers could, on this view, be attended to through higher damage awards.

[142] I disagree. Indeed, on the facts here, Mr. Ahluwalia’s coercive behaviour towards Ms. Ahluwalia was broader in scope than physical and emotional abuse. Rather, it was the cumulative effect of multiple forms of controlling conduct that rendered Ms. Ahluwalia subordinate to Mr. Ahluwalia. The trial judge accepted that Ms. Ahluwalia “was completely subservient to [Mr. Ahluwalia’s] needs” (para. 75). While the deprivation of Ms. Ahluwalia’s autonomy did relate in part to Mr. Ahluwalia’s physical and emotional abuse, not all of it did. Separately, the trial judge found that Mr. Ahluwalia also used financial means to control Ms. Ahluwalia. He collected her earnings, monitored her spending and, upon separation, terminated her credit card and closed their joint bank accounts, both of which Ms. Ahluwalia used to cover her and her children’s basic needs (paras. 108-10). None of those instances of economic control transpired physically, nor was their design simply to cause her distress. Rather, Mr. Ahluwalia exercised a controlling hold over Ms. Ahluwalia financially and capitalized on her vulnerability as an immigrant woman in a new country by isolating her from others. Ms. Ahluwalia did not have access to extended family members who could “support her, financially or socially, if she left the relationship” (para. 75). The trial judge held that, because of her social positioning, Ms. Ahluwalia was “financially dependent on [Mr. Ahluwalia]” (para. 73).

[143] At the heart of intimate partner violence is a wrongful interference not just with physical or psychological integrity, as with the established torts, but with an intimate partner’s autonomy, rendering the victim unequal in the partnership. This is a qualitatively distinct harm from that caused, for example, by other forms of trespass to the person. The wrongful conduct interfering with autonomy may partly overlap with conduct that interferes with one’s bodily or psychological integrity. Abusive conduct often includes, as this case demonstrates, physical or emotional violence but extends beyond it. Individual incidents of physical abuse cause harm, as they would to anyone, but within an intimate partnership they also serve to subordinate the partner.

[144] Existing torts, whether separately or together, cannot remedy the full scope of the injury inflicted by intimate partner violence, specifically the coercive conduct at issue here. Although these torts capture conduct that may, in part, overlap with intimate partner violence, plaintiffs must adduce evidence of the abuse they experienced to fit into these existing legal categories only to obtain an incomplete remedy. This approach inevitably leaves aspects of the wrong and the injury unaddressed. Forcing facts into the strict confines of existing torts is both out of step with the incremental development of tort law and does not advance access to justice for victims of intimate partner violence.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation v Alberta (Chief Electoral Officer), 2026 ABKB 375

[235] I recognize that s 8.11(1) of the Referendum Act offers some protection to Aboriginal and Treaty rights. However, the case law suggests that once the referendum takes place we are in the realm of the non-justiciable. For example, in Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 CanLII 793 (SCC), [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Secession Reference) the Supreme Court noted as follows:

100 The Court has no supervisory role over the political aspects of constitutional negotiations. Equally, the initial impetus for negotiation, namely a clear majority on a clear question in favor of secession, is subject only to political evaluation, and properly so.

[236] The statutory framework only allows the Applicants to participate in secession once the process enters the realm of the political and is no longer justiciable. I conclude that the CEO Decision, i.e., the Crown conduct, has the potential to adversely affect Treaty rights.

[237] The third element of a duty to consult is the possibility that the Crown conduct may affect the Aboriginal claim or right. The claimant must show a causal relationship between the proposed government conduct or decision and a potential for adverse impacts on pending Aboriginal claims or rights (Rio Tinto at para 45).

[238] The Crown conduct, in this case the CEO Decision, triggers the subsequent steps that bind Government to implement the results of a referendum. For the purpose of this analysis, I must assume the Proponent will meet the signature threshold, a referendum will be held, and the results of that referendum are positive, from the perspective of the Proponent. In other words, the legislative scheme requires me to assume that the Government is required to implement the results of a referendum on secession. Given the findings in Sylvestre, and as a matter of logic and common sense, there can be no doubt that Alberta’s secession from Canada will have an impact on Treaties 7 and 8. I conclude there is a direct causal connection between the CEO Decision and the Treaty rights that are engaged. It follows that the CEO Decision has a potential adverse effect on those Treaty rights.

[239] I conclude that the CEO Decision triggers a duty to consult. All three elements of the Haida test are satisfied. The Crown has actual knowledge of Treaty rights that are engaged by the Second Proposal. The CEO Decision triggers a binding referendum on secession. Because of the sequence of events that are triggered by the CEO Decision, the CEO Decision constitutes Crown conduct. A requirement to implement secession without prior involvement of the Applicants has the potential to adversely affect Treaty rights. The CEO Decision therefore triggers a duty to consult.

[240] I hasten to add that while the Crown’s duty to consult is triggered by the CEO Decision, there is no requirement on the part of the CEO to engage in consultation, nor does he have the ability to do so. The CEO does not represent the Crown for the purpose of fulfilling the duty to consult. It is Government, as the party that would implement secession that must engage in consultation.

[241] Following the CEO Decision, the Amended CIA put in motion a series of required steps that engaged the duty to consult with the Applicants. No consultation occurred. Alberta breached its duty to consult with the Applicants.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. R. v. Cooney & Hamber, 2026 ONSC 2646

[418] In my opinion, in our case, to find Ms. Cooney and Ms. Hamber guilty of the first degree murder of L is certainly in keeping with what I perceive to be their very high degree of moral blameworthiness and is certainly in agreement or harmony with the punishment for first degree murder.

[419] In our case, I repeat that the Crown must prove the following:

(i) that the accused caused the death of L;

(ii) that the accused caused the death of L unlawfully, here – by failing to provide to L the necessaries of life;

(iii) that the accused had the state of mind required for murder, that is, that the accused either (a) meant to kill L or (b) meant to cause bodily harm to L that the accused knew was likely to kill L and was reckless as to whether L died or not;

(iv) that the accused committed an underlying crime of domination, here – the unlawful confinement of L;

(v) that the unlawful confinement of L and the murder of L were part of the same series of events; and

(vi) that the accused was an active participant in the killing of L.

[420] In my view, looking at the first two requirements together, I am sure that each of Ms. Cooney and Ms. Hamber failed to provide to L the necessaries of life and that the said failure was a substantial cause of L’s death.

[421] They failed to provide to L the necessaries of life in two respects: adequate food and medical attention.

[422] The medical attention relates most specifically to what happened with L at home in November 2022, the month before he died. There is no question that L almost died on that earlier occasion and that it was a crisis situation that required an urgent and immediate visit to the nearest hospital emergency room, but the accused did nothing to get their son that medical attention.

[423] The essential elements of the failure to provide the necessaries of life offence, in the context of the evidence at trial, were reviewed above in these reasons, with regard to J. They need not be repeated here. If they were made out regarding J, which they were, then they are most certainly made out with regard to L.

[424] In fact, the issue of whether the accused failed to provide to L the necessaries of life was not really contested by defence counsel in their closing submissions at trial.

[425] It was not conceded by the defence, however, that the said failure was a substantial cause of L’s death. I am sure that it was.

[…]

[428] L’s severe and chronic malnourished condition and his wretched and weakened physical state at the time of his death were not due to anything other than the actions and inactions of these two accused. There was no other medical condition, disease, or injury that caused those things, or either of them. I reject the evidence of the accused about any alleged eating disorder, whether rumination syndrome or otherwise. I reject the entirely speculative argument by the defence about the possibility of refeeding syndrome. In fact, that argument makes no common sense because there is no reason to believe that the accused would have increased L’s caloric intake after the November 2022 incident and no reliable evidence at trial that L’s body weight actually increased at all between the date of that incident in November 2022 and the date of his death.

[…]

[431] There was no break in the chain of causation. In fact, the accused continued to fail to provide to L the necessaries of life after the serious episode occurred when L almost died in November 2022 and right up to and including the date of L’s demise. Illustrative of that is the failure of the accused to even tell the medical professionals, including Dr. Duncan, about everything that happened during that clearly life-threatening incident in November 2022.

[432] In terms of the third essential element of the offence, the Crown has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Cooney and Ms. Hamber had the requisite mens rea for murder. I am sure that the accused intended to kill L.

[433] The electronic evidence is overwhelming in this regard. The accused loathed and hated their son. They resented him. They were tired of dealing with him. They relegated him to the basement and locked him up for much of the last two years or so of his life. They persisted with their forcible confinement of L, and with their isolation of him from everything and everyone including his own little brother, and with their failure to provide him with adequate food and with required medical attention, all even though they saw what their actions and inactions were doing to the boy – causing him to waste away into nothing. That persistence demonstrates an intention to kill the boy.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

***

The three most-consulted French-language decisions were:

1. Association des ressources intermédiaires d’hébergement du Québec (ARIHQ) c. Santé Québec – Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’Île-de-Montréal, 2026 QCCS 1360

[1] Les demanderesses, l’Association des ressources intermédiaires d’hébergement du Québec (« ARIHQ » ou l’« Association ») et 9342-4935 Québec inc., faisant affaire sous le nom de Centre de Santé Osman (« Osman ») (ensemble les « Demanderesses »), demandent l’annulation d’une sentence arbitrale (la « Sentence ») rendue le 8 août 2025 par le mis en cause, maître […] Jeanniot (l’« Arbitre »).

[2] La Sentence rejette le différend soumis à l’Arbitre au motif que les délais prévus à la procédure de mésentente convenue entre les parties n’ont pas été respectés et qu’aucune justification n’a été avancée pour expliquer ce retard.

[3] Les Demanderesses considèrent que la Sentence doit être annulée, puisque :

3.1. la Sentence est contraire à l’ordre public (article 646, alinéa 2 et article 648 C.p.c.) en ce qu’elle impose un délai de prescription contractuel inférieur au délai de trois ans prévu par la loi;

3.2. la procédure arbitrale n’a pas été respectée (article 646, alinéa 3 et article 648 C.p.c.) puisque la Sentence s’appuie sur de la doctrine et de la jurisprudence inexistantes, ce qui permet de croire qu’elle a été rédigée en recourant à l’intelligence artificielle.

[…]

[67] Les Demanderesses allèguent que la Sentence devrait être annulée, puisque la procédure arbitrale n’a pas été suivie. Ce motif d’annulation requiert de mettre l’accent sur « l’écart entre […] la procédure arbitrale dont les parties avaient convenu dans leur convention d’arbitrage […] et […] la procédure qui [a] dans les faits été suivi[e] ».

[68] Les Demanderesses affirment qu’il existe de forts indices que la Sentence a été rédigée en utilisant l’intelligence artificielle. Ainsi, la procédure arbitrale n’aurait pas été respectée, ce qui constitue un motif d’annulation.

[69] La Défenderesse fait valoir que l’utilisation de l’intelligence artificielle n’est pas un motif d’annulation énuméré à l’article 646 C.p.c. Bien qu’elle ait raison sur ce point, cela ne suffit pas pour trancher la question.

[70] En reconnaissant la possibilité d’annuler une sentence si « le mode de nomination d’un arbitre ou la procédure arbitrale applicable n’a pas été respecté », le législateur reconnait la primauté du choix commun des parties dans l’identification d’un mode privé de règlement des différends « qui leur convient et qu’elles considèrent adéquat ». La reconnaissance du principe de l’autonomie de la volonté des parties comme « pierre d’assise de tout le droit moderne de l’arbitrage conventionnel » entraine le respect de la décision des parties de soumettre leur différend à l’arbitrage et de la procédure qu’elles ont choisie.

[71] Ainsi, même si le législateur n’a pas spécifié chacune des violations procédurales susceptibles de justifier une annulation, il faut comprendre que toute violation « importante de la procédure sur laquelle les parties s’étaient entendues » et qui met en cause « l’intégrité du processus arbitral » peut entrainer une telle annulation. À l’inverse, « une irrégularité procédurale formelle et sans importance, qui n’a pu causer aucun préjudice ou aucune injustice grave et n’a pu avoir le moindre effet sur la teneur de la sentence ou l’issue du litige, ne donnera pas lieu à censure ».

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. Thermitus c. Protecteur du citoyen, 2026 QCCS 1481

[119] L’arrivée de la nouvelle présidente a bouleversé les opérations de la CDPDJ. Me Thermitus a constaté en 2017 plusieurs anomalies au sein de cet organisme, lesquelles, selon elle, exigeaient de passer à l’action. Les mesures qu’elle envisageait ou a tenté d’appliquer ont provoqué de la résistance de la part des cadres et, ultimement, les plaintes au PC. Alors qu’elle souhaitait réformer la CDPDJ, revoir sa structure et, rendre cette organisation plus agile et plus efficace, après avoir mené une carrière remarquable jusqu’alors, Me Thermitus a été plongée dans un maelstrom aboutissant à un rapport accablant et à sa démission.

[120] La transmission à la ministre de la Justice du rapport initial, lequel omet la version de Me Thermitus, est déroutante. Le processus s’en est trouvé vicié. Aussi, alors que la preuve était totalement contradictoire, le PC n’a pas motivé de façon suffisante pourquoi il juge prépondérante la version des témoins plutôt que celle de Me Thermitus. Sans faire de procès d’intention, la transgression par le PC des principes d’équité procédurale, mais aussi le caractère déraisonnable du Rapport final, tant individuellement que cumulativement, conduisent à l’annulation de ce dernier. Vu cette conclusion, il est inutile de répondre aux autres moyens proposés par Me Thermitus.

[121] Me Thermitus avance que c’est elle qui a été victime du mobbing de la part des employés de la CDPDJ et que les plaintes à son endroit ont été faites de manière malicieuse, pour lui nuire et pour s’en débarrasser. Les enquêteurs du PC concluent plutôt qu’elle a fait preuve de manquements graves dans le cadre de ses fonctions. Le présent pourvoi ne permet pas de trancher cette question. La Cour supérieure ne peut tenir une enquête à la place du PC et faire des recommandations qui auraient dû être émises. Il n’est pas possible en contrôle judiciaire, sur la base des résumés de témoignages uniquement écrits et documents divers, de trancher au vu du dossier, entre ces deux positions irréconciliables. Il est possible que le présent jugement ne soit pas tout à fait satisfaisant, car il ne confirme ni les conclusions de l’enquête du PC ni n’exonère Me Thermitus, mais le contrôle judiciaire en l’occurrence n’admet aucune alternative. Par ailleurs, Me Thermitus ne réclame que la nullité du Rapport final qui sera prononcée.

[122] Enfin, la confidentialité de certaines informations s’impose, mais non suivant l’étendue réclamée par le PC, car ce dernier ne convainc pas qu’il existe un privilège générique entourant le régime de protection des lanceurs d’alerte au Québec, ni que certaines procédures et pièces doivent être placées intégralement sous scellés. Il y a uniquement lieu de protéger la confidentialité des témoins, en fonction du test établi par la Cour suprême du Canada. Une ordonnance de caviardage suivra lorsque les parties présenteront leur position respective et détaillée sur celle-ci.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. R c. Desmeules, 2026 SKKB 86

[29] Dans l’affaire R c Kazemi, 2013 ONCA 585 au para 14 [Kazemi], la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, en examinant une loi similaire, a expliqué que, pour des raisons de sécurité publique, la disposition visait à interdire complètement l’utilisation d’un téléphone cellulaire au volant, afin de prévenir la distraction au volant. Dans l’arrêt Kazemi, les faits ont été brièvement résumés par Goudge J.A. au para. 1 :

[traduction]
[1] Les faits en l’espèce sont simples. Le 26 avril 2010, l’intimée rentrait seule de son travail en voiture. Alors qu’elle était arrêtée à un feu rouge, un policier a constaté qu’elle tenait un téléphone cellulaire à la main. Elle a déclaré que le téléphone cellulaire se trouvait sur le siège, mais qu’il était tombé sur le plancher de la voiture lorsqu’elle a freiné. Elle l’a ramassé lorsqu’elle est arrivée au feu rouge. C’est à ce moment-là que l’agent l’a observée.

[30] La question était de savoir si Mme Kazemi « tenait » son téléphone cellulaire au volant. Le juge de paix a conclu que l’aveu de Mme Kazemi, selon lequel elle avait le téléphone cellulaire en main, établissait qu’elle le tenait aux fins de l’infraction. Le juge d’appel de la déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire a rejeté l’accusation, concluant qu’il devait y avoir une tenue physique soutenue de l’appareil pour satisfaire à l’exigence d’« en tenant » et qu’une manipulation momentanée n’était pas suffisante.

[31] En appel devant la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, celle-ci a statué que l’interprétation correcte de l’expression « holding » (« en tenant ») était d’avoir le téléphone cellulaire en main, sans tenir compte de la durée pendant laquelle la personne le tenait. Cette interprétation était conforme au sens courant du mot et assurait le mieux l’objectif de la loi, soit la protection des usagers de la route en Ontario : Kazemi aux paras 11-12.

[32] Dans l’arrêt Kazemi au para 14, la Cour d’Appel a jugé que l’objectif de la loi était d’interdire complètement la prise en main d’un téléphone cellulaire au volant, par mesure de sécurité publique, afin de prévenir la distraction du conducteur :

[traduction]
[14] La meilleure façon d’assurer la sécurité routière est d’interdire totalement la prise en main d’un téléphone cellulaire au volant. Une interdiction totale permet également de mieux concentrer l’attention du conducteur sur la conduite. Elle élimine tout risque de distraction du conducteur par les renseignements affichés sur le téléphone cellulaire. Elle élimine toute tentation d’utiliser le téléphone cellulaire au volant. En outre, elle empêche toute possibilité d’interférence physique entre le téléphone cellulaire et la capacité du conducteur à conduire. Bref, elle supprime les différentes façons dont la sécurité routière et l’attention du conducteur peuvent être affectées si un conducteur a un téléphone cellulaire à la main pendant qu’il conduit.

[33] L’arrêt Kazemi a été cité avec approbation dans l’affaire Lukic c R, 2021 SKQB 221 [Lukic]. Dans cette affaire, la juge MacMillan-Brown a conclu que l’appelant utilisait son cellulaire au volant, contrairement à l’art. 241.1(2) de la Loi, même si son véhicule était arrêté à un feu rouge. Elle a estimé qu’il conduisait puisque son véhicule était sur la voie de circulation et dans le flux de circulation, même s’il était brièvement immobilisé et en position de stationnement au feu rouge.

[34] L’infraction prévue à l’art. 241.1(2), soit le fait de tenir un téléphone cellulaire au volant, constitue une infraction de responsabilité stricte. Pour établir que M. Desmeules avait commis cette infraction, la Couronne devait prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que M. Desmeules avait commis l’acte prohibé (l’actus reus), lequel comprenait les éléments suivants :

a) M. Desmeules était au volant d’un véhicule à moteur ;

b) Il conduisait le véhicule sur une voie publique ; et

c) Pendant qu’il conduisait, il tenait, regardait, utilisait, ou manipulait un téléphone cellulaire.

[35] La version des faits de M. Desmeules a établi chacun de ces éléments hors de tout doute raisonnable. M. Desmeules a admis qu’il conduisait le RAV4 sur Idylwyld Drive, une voie publique de Saskatoon. Il a avoué que, lorsqu’il était arrêté à une intersection, il a ramassé son téléphone cellulaire à ses pieds, l’a tenu pendant cinq à sept secondes, puis l’a mis sur la console de son véhicule. Le témoignage de M. Desmeules à cet égard concorde avec celui de l’agent Fortugno.

[36] Bref, les faits de la présente affaire sont aussi simples que ceux de l’affaire Kazemi. Le 6 juillet 2021 à 14 h 45, M. Desmeules conduisait un véhicule sur la route Idylwyld à Saskatoon, en Saskatchewan. La route Idylwyld est une « voie publique » au sens de l’art. 2(k) de la Loi. Le véhicule de M. Desmeules a été arrêté à un feu rouge. Bien que son véhicule était immobile, il se trouvait sur une voie de circulation et conduisait : voir Lukic au para 65. Alors qu’il était arrêté, il a ramassé son téléphone cellulaire qui se trouvait sur le plancher à ses pieds. Il l’a tenu en main pendant cinq à sept secondes, regardant brièvement l’écran avant de le poser sur la console centrale. Donc, M. Desmeules a contrevenu à l’art. 241.1(2) de la Loi puisqu’il a tenu un appareil de communication électronique au volant d’un véhicule à moteur sur une voie publique.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

* As of February 2025 we measure the number of unique pageviews that a case gets; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.

The post Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII? – May 2026 appeared first on Slaw.

In my last column, I wrote about the hidden economics of law firm student recruitment and the substantial investment firms make in attracting and hiring students. The conclusion was relatively straightforward. Most firms devote enormous attention to recruitment, but the return on that investment is largely determined after students arrive.

That return is shaped through hundreds of small interactions that rarely receive much scrutiny. How work is delegated. How instructions are delivered. How drafts are reviewed. How students learn what is expected of them.

In most firms, these processes are informal and highly variable. That is understandable. Lawyers are busy. Each lawyer has a different working style, different expectations, and different levels of tolerance for detail. Some provide extensive context. Others provide very little and expect the student to work things out independently. Some review assignments line by line. Others make revisions quickly and move on to the next issue.

None of this is necessarily problematic.

But as someone who develops strategic plans for law firms and regularly reviews financial performance, I often see another side of the equation that receives far less attention. I see the amount of student and junior lawyer time that gets written down or written off entirely. I see the lost realization. I see how difficult it can be for firms to convert student effort into usable and billable work.

More importantly, I see how avoidable some of that inefficiency actually is.

The quality of a student’s work is often determined before the assignment even begins.

A student who understands how a piece of work will be used makes different decisions. Is the assignment intended for a client, a partner’s internal thinking, a chambers application, or a quick risk assessment? Is a short practical answer required, or more extensive analysis? How much time should reasonably be spent?

That last question matters more than many lawyers realize.

Students and new associates are typically trying to calibrate two things simultaneously: the quality of the work and the amount of time that should be invested in producing it. When neither expectation is made clear, students often overwork assignments in an effort to avoid disappointing the assigning lawyer.

The result is familiar.

A research memo that is technically strong but far too long for the issue at hand. An analysis that explores every conceivable argument when only a practical recommendation was required. Hours spent perfecting work product that was never intended to receive that level of attention.

Over time, those extra hours often reappear quietly through prebills, write downs, and reduced realization.

Most students do not understand the economics of this yet. They see their time entered, then reduced or removed. Repeated often enough, that can become discouraging. I hear from many students about how eager they are to make a real contribution. It can create the impression that their work has little value, when in reality the issue is frequently one of calibration rather than capability.

Rightly so law firms generally accept that students and junior associates are long term investments. Few expect new lawyers to become immediately profitable. But helping students develop sound judgment around scope, efficiency, and billing practices earlier in their careers benefits both the individual and the firm.

In many cases, five or ten additional minutes spent framing an assignment will save far more time later.

In practical terms, effective instructions tend to include:

1. Scope: what question is being answered and how it fits into the file
2. Purpose: who will read the work and how it will be used
3. Format: memo, email, bullet points, or something more informal
4. Level of detail: quick answer or more developed analysis
5. Timing: when it is needed and whether the deadline is fixed or flexible
6. Priority: how this assignment compares to other work
7. Effort: how much time it should reasonably take
8. Resources: where to find precedents or similar work, the client file, or other lawyers or staff who can answer questions
9. What a strong result looks like: a brief indication of the expected outcome
10. Check ins: when to follow up or confirm direction

None of this requires a formal training program. It simply requires making explicit what is often left unsaid.

There is also another dimension to this conversation that firms should not ignore.

Many senior lawyers were trained in environments where ambiguity, pressure, and minimal feedback were normalized. Younger generations of lawyers often enter the profession with somewhat different expectations around mentorship, communication, meaningful work, and workplace culture. Some senior lawyers may not fully relate to those expectations and perhaps do not need to.

But firms still need to develop and retain this generation.

These students and associates are the future successors of firms. The long-term health of most firms depends on whether these young professionals become capable, confident, productive lawyers who want to stay.

That does not mean lowering standards. It means recognizing that professional development is itself part of the investment firms are already making.

I still remember working with certain intimidating partners early in my own law firm career as a young marketing manager. I did not want to spend one unnecessary second in their offices. I was anxious, trying not to make mistakes, and likely absorbing only part of what they were saying.

Looking back, I probably left many of those conversations without the clarity I actually needed.

Most lawyers can likely remember some version of that experience from early in their careers.

Students who are uncertain or intimidated often do what many people do in high pressure environments. They guess. They proceed with partial understanding rather than ask another question or risk appearing incapable.

The consequences are usually not catastrophic. They are cumulative.

Across a summer, articling or internship term, patterns begin to emerge. Some students become easier to work with. Their work product aligns more closely with expectations. They require less revision. Lawyers begin returning to them with more assignments and better files.

Others may simply need more context, more feedback, or more opportunities to understand how the work is actually being evaluated.

This is why consistency matters.

Not rigid standardization. Not formalized scripts. Just slightly more intentionality around how work is delegated, reviewed, and explained.

Student recruitment will always matter. But once students arrive, the real opportunity lies in how effectively firms help them become productive, confident, and trusted professionals.

That is where much of the actual return on investment is either realized or quietly lost.

The post The Hidden Economics of Delegation to Law Students appeared first on Slaw.

On 6 May 2026, Nova Scotia Community College (NSCC) announced that it had eliminated 91 positions, including 45 layoffs, in response to a $15 million deficit. The deficit followed a $9.4 million reduction to NSCC’s operating grant by the Province of Nova Scotia earlier in the year and reduced international tuition revenue, due to previous federal and provincial caps on international students. The cuts included student advisers and other professional support workers, but a whopping 25% of those cuts were librarians. All campus librarians were eliminated. NSCC’s campus librarians partner with faculty to facilitate critical information and digital literacy instruction to students across programs. This partnership, in the words of the NSCC libraries, “enhances students’ information and digital literacy skills and fosters lifelong learning.” NSCC is not the only Nova Scotian institution facing these decisions. The Halifax Regional Municipality and the Halifax Regional Centre for Education announced the ratification of a new five-year supplementary education funding agreement on 13 May 2026 that phases out municipal funding for school librarians by August 2031.

Though these Nova Scotian examples spurred this post, in the context of Slaw, the topic is relevant to all Canadian legal professionals. The decision to cut librarians comes at exactly the moment when information reaches us through a wider range of channels and mediums than ever before, each carrying its own evaluative challenges. Cutting librarians who teach critical information and digital literacy skills may have downstream legal consequences. While there are many types of librarians who take on many different roles, most librarians who work in education teach these skills in some capacity.

I teach legal research, a field that requires a high level of critical information and digital literacy. In law, research is focused on the evidentiary value of a source. Lawyers are trained to interrogate authority explicitly. But the concept of information as evidence and the connected skillset is not specific to the legal profession. It is generalist in nature, highly valuable, and can reduce potential legal issues for everyone. The same questions lawyers ask of cases, statutes, and secondary sources are fundamentally the same questions we all must ask of our news, social media, advertising, AI-generated summaries, and more.

Information and digital literacy skills are taught by a range of educators in primary and secondary education, with librarians supporting that learning process. At the post-secondary level, librarians are often the ones leading and coordinating that instruction through one-off sessions, workshops, and curated materials. Librarians teach people how to identify what kind of source they are looking at. How to figure out who created the information and whether they have the standing to make the statement. How to identify the perspective being presented and what it might leave out. How to notice when a citing a source is missing, and how to follow a citation chain. How to flag when information has been removed from its original context. How to avoid plagiarism. How to tell a generated answer from a human one. How to verify sources within a generated output. How to recognize that articulate writing may not be factually correct. Essentially, librarians teach what questions must be asked of information to determine its reliability, or evidentiary weight.

Most people will never take a legal research class, but they will spend their lives encountering situations that require information be applied as evidence (the links in this paragraph are doing some heavy lifting, I recommend viewing them). They will access the news online. They will rent housing, pay utilities, and manage other costs. They will vote, requiring interpretation of competing voices presented via a range of mediums. They will work, often in fields where misinformation carries professional risk. They will navigate health care, and weigh options for treatments and products. They will sign leases, file their taxes, and review insurance policies and financial documents. They will be targeted with advertisements and marketing claims. Each of these involves at least one moment where the decision to act on the information depends on an individual’s ability to evaluate what they are reading, watching, or hearing. Many of those moments have legal stakes even when the person making the decision does not realize it.

Our daily lives are now flooded with plausible sounding but incorrect summaries, fabricated sources, and content in various mediums curated by an algorithm. This affects everyone. A high school student writing a paper on vaccines requires the same basic critical information and digital literacy skills as a law student evaluating a source in their medical negligence course, which is the same evaluative problem as a retiree trying to figure out whether a piece of medical advice is accurate. The skills are the same, and they are taught, deliberately, by librarians whose professional training is rooted in critical information and digital literacy. When librarians are cut, there is no guarantee that this teaching is redistributed elsewhere.

The NSCC libraries’ own framing of their role emphasizes “lifelong learning.” The information environment shifts continuously, and so do the skills required to navigate it. Several Master of Library and Information Studies (MLIS) programs in Canada have become Masters of Information (MI) programs in recent years, the title change emphasizing a focus on connecting people with information. The University of Toronto’s program acknowledges that “information penetrates all aspects of our digitally-mediated society,” creating “an increasing need for information professionals, who know how to handle the myriad forms of information in effective, innovative, and ethical ways, and who also understand the societal consequences of rapidly changing information practices.” Dalhousie’s program names digital and technological literacy, evidence-based practices, and lifelong learning as core competencies. These are precisely the qualifications required to teach critical information and digital literacy in our evolving information society.

Advances in information technologies may improve access to justice for those who cannot afford legal advice or are navigating the system without representation. But whether those gains will balance against the new issues they simultaneously create remains an open question. Those issues may result in an increased need for legal advice, small claims and class actions, and other legal recourse.

Cuts to library staff compound. Individuals who cannot evaluate sources may rely on bad ones, and bad sources, in aggregate, are likely to result in a population more vulnerable to fraud, manipulated content, misinformation, and other information distortions that carry downstream legal consequences. The law assumes a citizenry capable of distinguishing reliable information from unreliable information. Librarians, at every level of the education system, are a professional group continuously working to maintain that capacity at a pivotal time. Critical information and digital literacy are public-interest competencies, and the justice system will absorb some of the consequences if those skills erode. All levels of government and institutions should consider whether the savings, calculated against the librarian positions that are being cut, are savings at all.

The post The Legal Cost of Cutting Librarians appeared first on Slaw.

Canadian securities law has long resisted narrow or technical definitions of the term “security.” Instead, both legislatures and courts have embraced an intentionally expansive and purposive conception, one designed to capture a wide range of investment arrangements rather than a closed set of financial instruments. The oft‑invoked proposition that “a security is what the law says it is” reflects not interpretive casualness, but a deliberate regulatory strategy. Overbreadth in the statutory definition of “security” is not an accident of drafting; it is a conscious design choice that enables securities regulation to respond to evolving forms of capital formation and investment.

This article argues that Canadian securities legislation and jurisprudence work together to resist transactional formalism and regulatory circumvention. Legislatures employ open‑textured statutory language, while courts interpret that language purposively, focusing on economic substance rather than labels or private characterizations. The development of this approach can be seen in early judicial treatment of the definition of “security,” including the locus classicus test set by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pacific Coast Coin[i] and the more recent decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Stevenson[ii]. Together, these cases illustrate a coherent regulatory philosophy: securities law is concerned not with form, but with function and purpose.

The Statutory Architecture of “Security” in Canadian Legislation

Provincial securities statutes across Canada define “security” using inclusive, open‑ended language rather than exhaustive lists. While the specific wording varies by jurisdiction, the defining feature is consistency in technique. Legislatures enumerate familiar categories—such as shares, bonds, debentures, and notes—while also extending the definition to less formal instruments and arrangements. References to documents evidencing capital or indebtedness, profit‑sharing or participation interests, and investment contracts are common.

This drafting strategy is significant. By avoiding a closed or technical definition, legislatures preserve regulatory flexibility. New financial instruments and business models can be captured without constant statutory amendment. The definition of “security” thus functions not merely as a classificatory provision, but as a gateway into the regulatory regime. Once an arrangement is characterized as a security, the full apparatus of disclosure, registration, enforcement and other regulatory requirements becomes applicable.

The breadth of the definition also reflects the preventive and protective purposes of securities legislation. Securities law is not designed solely to police traditional capital markets, but to protect investors from informational asymmetries and abusive practices wherever they arise. A narrow definition would invite regulatory arbitrage, allowing promoters to structure transactions to evade oversight. Open‑textured statutory language minimizes that risk.

Overbreadth is a Feature, not a Flaw

Critics sometimes view broad statutory definitions as imprecise or over‑inclusive. In the context of Canadian securities law, however, overbreadth is best understood as a feature rather than a flaw. Securities regulation is inherently forward‑looking. It must anticipate financial innovation and respond to schemes that may not yet exist at the time of drafting.

Deliberate over‑inclusiveness serves this purpose. By casting a wide definitional net, legislatures signal that the focus of regulation is not the technical form of an instrument, but its economic function. The question is whether an arrangement involves the investment of capital with an expectation of profit, accompanied by risks that justify regulatory protection. This approach in statutory definition is particularly beneficial in the context of digital assets. Absent this feature, most digital assets would escape classification as securities, leaving regulators unable to exercise effective oversight. This would necessitate frequent legislative amendments, requiring securities regulators to repeatedly approach the Legislature for changes—an impractical approach given the dynamic and innovative nature of capital markets.

This approach stands in contrast to form‑driven or transactional conceptions of securities law, which risk becoming obsolete as markets evolve. Canadian legislatures have consistently chosen adaptability over precision, trusting courts to apply the definition purposively and contextually rather than mechanically.

Judicial Interpretation: Substance Over Form

Canadian courts have largely vindicated the legislative choice of breadth by adopting an interpretive approach that emphasizes substance over form. Courts routinely reject attempts by parties to contract out of securities regulation through characterization or structural design. Labels chosen by the parties—such as “private agreement,” “promissory note”, “membership interest,” or “joint venture”—are not determinative.

Judicial resistance to formalism manifests in several ways. Courts have rejected arguments that a transaction falls outside securities legislation merely because it is private or bespoke. They have declined to accept re‑labelling strategies designed to avoid regulatory scrutiny. Most importantly, courts have focused on the economic reality of the arrangement, asking whether it functions as an investment vehicle rather than whether it conforms to a traditional category.

A crucial doctrinal feature of this approach is the treatment of what constitutes a “security” as a question of law rather than a question of contract. By framing the issue this way, courts promote consistency and coherence across cases. The meaning of “security” does not fluctuate based on the intentions or descriptions of the parties but is anchored in statutory purpose and judicial interpretation.

Pacific Coast Coin: Supreme Court Confirmation of Regulatory Purpose

The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Pacific Coast Coin represents a definitive affirmation of the expansive, purposive interpretation of “security.” In this case, the Court situates the definition of “security” squarely within the broader objectives of investor protection and market integrity.

Rather than approaching the definition as a technical taxonomy, the Court emphasizes legislative intent and regulatory purpose. The decision underscores that securities legislation is designed to prevent harm before it occurs, not merely to remedy wrongdoing after the fact. Narrow or formalistic interpretations would undermine this preventive function. The Court set the following criteria used to determine when a scheme constitutes an “investment contract” under securities law:

• Investment of Money – Participants must contribute money (or money’s worth) into the scheme.
• Common Enterprise – The fortunes of investors must be interwoven with those of the promoter or other investors. This can include pooling of funds or a functional interdependence between investor and promoter.
• Expectation of Profit – Investors must enter the arrangement with the expectation of profit.
• Profit to Come Significantly from the Efforts of Others – The expected profit must depend primarily on the efforts, skill, or expertise of the promoter or a third party, not the investor.
• Substance Over Form – Courts look at the economic reality of the arrangement, not its label or formal structure.

Pacific Coast Coin was significantly influenced by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v. Howey[iii], but the Canadian Supreme Court adapted and expanded the U.S. approach to fit Canadian securities law. The language of the U.S. Howey test originally required profit to emanate solely[iv] from the efforts of others for a scheme to be deemed an investment contract. In contrast, Pacific Coast Coin requires the significant effort of others. In essence, Pacific Coast Coin while inspired by the core logic of Howey, reshaped it into a more flexible, substance‑focused test, with added determinative leverage. It is noteworthy that the requirement in the U.S. was replaced by the essential managerial effort requirement in latter cases[v].

Pacific Coast Coin also sends a clear signal that avoidance strategies will not be rewarded. By reinforcing the importance of substance over form, the Court discourages promoters from structuring transactions to skirt regulatory obligations. The decision confirms that definitional breadth is essential to effective securities regulation and not an interpretive anomaly to be corrected.

Stevenson: Sustaining Judicial Signals of an Expansive Approach

The decision in Stevenson illustrates how courts engage with the statutory definition of “security”. While the factual and doctrinal specifics of the case can be developed in greater detail elsewhere, its analytical significance lies in the court’s methodology.

In Stevenson, the court demonstrated a willingness to look beyond the parties’ descriptions of their arrangement and to assess its economic substance. Rather than treating the transaction as immune from securities regulation based on its form or context, the court examined the nature of the interest being offered and the expectations of the participants.

The reasoning in Stevenson aligns closely with the broader legislative purpose of securities law. The case reflects an understanding that the statutory definition of “security” is designed to be elastic, and that judicial interpretation must preserve that elasticity.

Myths vs. Truths About the Definition and Nature of a “Security”

Stevenson decisively dismantled several recurring arguments advanced in attempts to constrict the statutory definition of a “security.” The Court’s reasoning exposes these misconceptions and reaffirms the key legal principles, which are summarized in the table below.

The Definition of “Security” as a Tool of Regulatory Adaptability

Taken together, statutory drafting and judicial interpretation reveal that the definition of “security” functions as a dynamic regulatory instrument. It allows securities law to adapt to financial innovation, evolving business models, and hybrid investment schemes that defy traditional categorization.

This adaptability is particularly important in an era of rapid financial change. New technologies, unconventional financing arrangements, and novel asset classes continually test the boundaries of existing regulatory frameworks. An expansive definition, coupled with purposive interpretation, ensures that securities law remains effective without requiring constant legislative intervention.

Courts’ reluctance to narrow the definition preserves the integrity of the regime. By maintaining a broad gateway into securities regulation, courts support the legislature’s preventive and protective objectives and reinforce public confidence in capital markets.

Conclusion: Regulatory Purpose Over Transactional Formalism

Canadian securities law embraces an intentionally broad conception of “security.” This breadth reflects a principled commitment to substance, consistency, and investor protection rather than a failure of statutory precision. Legislatures have chosen open‑textured definitions to preserve regulatory flexibility, and courts have responded with purposive interpretations that resist formalism and evasion.

The decisions in Stevenson and Pacific Coast Coin exemplify this approach at different stages of the jurisprudence. Together, they demonstrate judicial fidelity to legislative purpose and confirm that overbreadth in the definition of “security” is not merely tolerated, but essential. In Canadian securities law, a security is indeed what the law says it is—and what regulatory purpose requires it to be.

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed by the authors of this article are solely theirs and do not necessarily reflect the those of their employer and/or colleagues.

— Ronke Balogun and Solomon Ngoladi

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[i] Pacific Coast Coin Exchange v. Ontario Securities Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 112

[ii] R. v Stevenson, 2017 ABCA 420

[iii] SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)

[iv] Justin Henning, “The Howey Test: Are Crypto-Assets Investment Contracts?” (2018) 27:1 University of Miami Business Law Review 68. – The main reason for the change from solely to essential managerial efforts was due to the “policy of affording broad protection to the public and the U.S. Supreme Court’s admonition that the definition of securities should be a flexible one”.

[v] SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. is 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989)

The post “A Security Is What the Law Says It Is”: Legislative Breadth and Judicial Purpose in Canadian Securities Law appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Meurrens on Immigration 2. Legal Post Blog 3. Employment & Human Rights Law in Canada 4. Family LLB 5. Canadian Securities Law

Meurrens on Immigration
Duress and Inadmissibility to Canada

The Supreme Court of Canada has “clarified” the elements of the duress defence. The defence is important because it can affect admissibility. For example, in Guerra Diaz v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 88, the Federal Court of Court determined that the Immigration and Refugee Board improperly applied the test of whether duress applied, and ordered a new hearing by a different member. Duress and Inadmissibility It is basically trite law that where there is duress, then a person does not have the mens rea do either commit a crime or be a member in a group that renders the individual inadmissible to Canada. In Jalloh v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 317, the Federal Court stated that: In my view, …

Legal Post Blog
How workplace investigations quietly stripped power away from CEOs

Howard Levitt: What I see in my board advisory work is that the most influential voices are external investigators. Twenty years ago, the most powerful people inside major corporations were obvious. The CEO. The board chair. Perhaps the founder. Occasionally the CFO. Today, during moments of internal crisis, the balance of power inside many organizations is very different. What I see in my board advisory work is that the most influential voices are external investigators, HR executives, employment lawyers, reputational advisors, governance consultants and communications strategists. Quite a team — and not often for the better. …

Employment & Human Rights Law in Canada
Mentoring in the Age of AI

Mentoring has always required a deliberate and intentional approach. It is not something that happens automatically, even in traditional workplaces. In a virtual environment, that becomes even more apparent. Without the benefit of informal, in-person interaction, mentoring has to be built into how the organization operates. That includes recurring check-ins that are actually scheduled, as well as peer buddy systems so people have someone they can go to with day-to-day questions, brain-storming and support. It also means ensuring access to more senior team members in a way that feels natural, not overly formal and that removes the mentee’s fear of “bothering” the mentor. …

Family LLB
When Family Heirlooms Become Legal Battles

Family heirlooms often carry deep emotional significance, but when relationships end, they can also become sources of legal conflict. Understanding how Ontario law treats gifts, inherited property, and sentimental items can help prevent disputes and protect both financial and emotional value. This overview guides you through key considerations when family treasures are on the line. …

Canadian Securities Law
Proposed Amendments to Canadian Issuer Bid, Take-over Bid and Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules

The Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”) have published for comment proposed amendments to Canada’s issuer bid, take-over bid and beneficial ownership reporting regimes (the “Proposed Amendments”). If adopted, the Proposed Amendments would be the first material amendments to these regimes in over a decade and, among other things, address issues that have arisen in practice and regulatory hearings during the past 10 years. The CSA have stated that the Proposed Amendments are also intended to provide issuers with greater flexibility to repurchase their own securities, enhance transparency of ownership of derivative interests in certain circumstances and reduce regulatory burden through clarifying amendments and supplemental policy guidance. Comments on the Proposed Amendments are due by August 12, 2026. …

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*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : Le juge de première instance a soupesé tous les aspects du dossier pour déterminer la peine à infliger, soit une absolution conditionnelle, à une jeune femme ayant commis des vols d’argent totalisant une somme considérable à l’égard de 11 personnes âgées; la poursuite ne démontre aucune erreur autorisant l’intervention d’une cour d’appel.

Intitulé : R. c. Benbouhoud, 2026 QCCA 632
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Martin Vauclair, Mark Schrager et Stephen W. Hamilton
Date : 8 mai 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions contre les biens et la propriété — vol — complot — plus de 5 000 $ — «fraude grand-père» — accusée ayant collecté l’argent auprès des victimes — 11 victimes — personnes âgées — accusée âgée de 20 ans — vulnérabilité des victimes — mauvais traitement à l’égard d’une personne vulnérable (art. 718.04 C.Cr.) — gravité de l’infraction — implication opportuniste de l’accusée — facteurs atténuants — preuve de réhabilitation convaincante — changement de style de vie — actif pour la société — formation en soins infirmiers — jeune âge de l’accusée — absence d’antécédents judiciaires — absence d’équivalence mathématique entre les heures de travaux communautaires et le temps d’incarcération — arrêts rendus à la suite d’une conférence de facilitation pénale — absence de valeur de précédent — réinsertion sociale — dénonciation — dissuasion — absolution conditionnelle — intérêt véritable de l’accusée — accès à la profession d’infirmière — appel — erreur sans incidence.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions relatives aux armes — divers — possession d’une arme prohibée — arme à impulsion électrique — poivre de Cayenne — accusée âgée de 20 ans — facteurs atténuants — preuve de réhabilitation convaincante — changement de style de vie — actif pour la société — formation en soins infirmiers — jeune âge de l’accusée — absence d’antécédents judiciaires — absence d’équivalence mathématique entre les heures de travaux communautaires et le temps d’incarcération — arrêts rendus à la suite d’une conférence de facilitation pénale — absence de valeur de précédent — réinsertion sociale — dénonciation — dissuasion — absolution conditionnelle — intérêt véritable de l’accusée — accès à la profession d’infirmière — appel — erreur sans incidence.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions contre l’ordre public — divers — possession de pièces d’identité qui concernent d’autres personnes — 24 pièces d’identité frauduleuses — «fraude grand-père» — accusée âgée de 20 ans — facteurs atténuants — preuve de réhabilitation convaincante — changement de style de vie — actif pour la société — formation en soins infirmiers — jeune âge de l’accusée — absence d’antécédents judiciaires — absence d’équivalence mathématique entre les heures de travaux communautaires et le temps d’incarcération — arrêts rendus à la suite d’une conférence de facilitation pénale — absence de valeur de précédent — réinsertion sociale — dénonciation — dissuasion — absolution conditionnelle — intérêt véritable de l’accusée — accès à la profession d’infirmière — appel — erreur sans incidence.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — principes généraux — facteurs à prendre en considération — absence d’équivalence mathématique entre les heures de travaux communautaires et le temps d’incarcération — dissuasion spécifique — dissuasion générale — dénonciation — exemplarité — arrêts rendus à la suite d’une conférence de facilitation pénale — absence de valeur de précédent — appel — erreur sans incidence.

Appel de la peine. Rejeté.

L’appelant estime que l’absolution conditionnelle, assortie d’une ordonnance de probation de 2 ans et de plusieurs conditions, n’est pas la peine indiquée, compte tenu de l’infraction commise par l’intimée, soit des vols d’argent totalisant une somme considérable auprès de 11 personnes âgées et vulnérables, de même que d’autres infractions constatées au même moment. Le rôle que jouait l’intimée dans le stratagème consistait à recueillir l’argent extorqué auprès des personnes âgées. Une victime ciblée avait préalablement été jointe par un tiers qui lui faisait croire que son petit-fils était détenu et qu’une somme d’argent était nécessaire pour payer une caution afin d’obtenir sa libération.

Décision

M. le juge Vauclair: Le juge de première instance a soupesé tous les aspects du dossier pour déterminer la peine, et l’appelant ne démontre aucune erreur autorisant l’intervention de la Cour. Tout d’abord, le juge n’a pas omis de tenir compte des autres infractions. La preuve ne permet cependant pas de leur donner un effet aggravant aussi important que le souhaite l’appelant. Si les fausses cartes d’identité pouvaient servir à l’intimée afin de tromper les victimes et avaient donc un lien avec le crime de vol, le juge a accepté que l’arme à impulsion électrique et la bonbonne de gaz irritant qui étaient en la possession de cette dernière lui servaient pour sa sécurité personnelle lorsqu’elle fréquentait les boîtes de nuit et qu’elles étaient donc sans lien avec le vol.

Ensuite, la pondération des objectifs de la peine relevait du juge. Puisque les victimes étaient des personnes vulnérables, celui-ci a accordé une attention particulière aux objectifs de dénonciation et de dissuasion. De plus, il était bien conscient de la gravité générale des gestes commis par l’intimée (même si sa participation semblait davantage opportuniste et n’allait pas au-delà de la mission de récupérer les enveloppes). Or, l’appelant ne démontre aucune erreur révisable du juge dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire en raison des circonstances particulières révélées par la preuve, en particulier les efforts de réhabilitation entrepris par l’intimée. Cette dernière a fait des acquis importants, notamment en obtenant son diplôme en sciences infirmières, qu’une condamnation anéantirait. Elle témoigne qu’elle a changé ses fréquentations et son style de vie, soit, dans les circonstances, 2 changements porteurs de sa réintégration sociale.

Même s’il est vrai que l’infraction en cause choque la décence et interpelle en principe une peine conséquente pour tenir compte de sa gravité et des effets sur les victimes vulnérables, l’analyse soignée du juge ne permet pas à la Cour de conclure que la peine est manifestement non indiquée.

Cependant, l’équivalence qu’a établie le juge entre des heures de travaux communautaires et une période d’incarcération constitue une erreur. Celui-ci s’est appuyé notamment sur l’arrêt Grondin c. R. (C.A., 2018-03-15), 2018 QCCA 429, SOQUIJ AZ-51478750, et il n’aurait pas dû le faire. En effet, cet arrêt est le résultat d’une conférence de facilitation, soit une procédure consensuelle qui permet de solutionner des affaires méritant d’être résolues sommairement, en dehors de la procédure normale. Par conséquent, les débats ne sont pas aussi exhaustifs que dans le cadre d’un appel contesté et contradictoire. Généralement, il existe une multitude de raisons qui motivent les parties à rechercher une issue prévisible à un appel en se fondant sur des erreurs commises et l’arrêt ne cherche pas toujours à exprimer de façon exhaustive l’ensemble de ces considérations. C’est la raison pour laquelle les arrêts rendus à la suite d’une conférence de facilitation pénale n’ont aucune valeur de précédent.

La Cour d’appel n’a jamais avalisé quelque équivalence mathématique que ce soit entre les travaux communautaires et le temps d’incarcération. On constate néanmoins que cette mesure peut ajouter un poids à la peine; au mieux, l’ajout de 240 heures de travaux communautaires exprime une composante de contrainte et d’exemplarité. Cela rejoint en quelque sorte l’idée que l’absolution conditionnelle peut être adaptée et encadrer des situations plus sérieuses.

En l’espèce, le juge souhaitait avant tout appuyer l’idée de donner à la peine une sévérité accrue. Dans ce contexte, compte tenu de l’objectif de préserver la réinsertion sociale de l’intimée, l’appelant ne démontre pas que l’erreur du juge a eu un effet sur la peine.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeal

Criminal Law: Delay; Joint Trials
R. v. Jacques-Taylor, 2024 ONCA 458, 2026 SCC 20 (41430)

Joint trials re Jordan.  

Criminal Law: Delay; Case Complexity Analysis (Clarified Test)
R. v. Vrbanic, 2026 SCC 19 (41741)

Clarified Jordan test re complexity.

[Appeal Reasons released 05/29/2026. Judgment rendered Dec 4, 2025]

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Agriculture: Fertilizers
Biogénie Canada Inc. v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2025 FCA 150 (42060)

Federal regulations re fertilizer composition.

Charter: Language Rights
Forum des maires de la Péninsule acadienne Inc. v. Minister of Justice and Public Safety, 2025 NBCA 99 (42073)

Language rights re court services.

Corporate Litigation: Derivative Actions
Hougen Co. Ltd. v. Su, et al., 2025 BCCA 164 (41946)

Issues, including limitations, in derivative action.

Criminal Law: Failure to Blow
R. v. Emereuwa, 2025 SKCA 83 (42075)

Offence elements of failing to blow.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

If you think civil lawsuits take way too long in Canada, you’re in good company. But one high-profile suit recently went from claim to final hearing in less than 30 hours. Ontario v Doe was certainly an unusual case, and one that has been widely debated for reasons that have nothing to do with civil procedure. And yet it also offers three important lessons for people who care about making justice speedier in mainstream civil litigation.

The Facts: A Last-Minute Injunction

A rally was planned for the afternoon of Saturday March 14th, on University Avenue in downtown Toronto. Just before 3pm on the day before (March 13), Ontario Premier Doug Ford announced that he would instruct the Attorney General to seek an injunction forbidding the rally.

Ontario’s application record and factum were sent to the Superior Court of Justice at 10:52 a.m. the next morning. Responding materials from the event organizers arrived at 11:44 a.m.

The Hearing: in a Hurry

The oral hearing started before Justice Robert Centa at noon, just three hours before the rally was planned to begin.

An awkward moment occurred early on. The law is clear that Attorneys-General are to act independently, and yet the Premier had told the Province the day before that he had “instructed” the AG to bring the application that was now being brought. Justice Centa asked about this, and accepted the representation of the AG’s lawyer that the decision to bring the application was the AG’s alone.

After two hours of submissions and questions, Justice Centa dismissed the Attorney General’s application at 2:05 pm. His Honour’s written reasons were released before the end of the day.

The Decision

Justice Centa found “no evidence” in the record that the rally would attract or encourage violence, or that it would create any material risk of injury (at para 21). Freedom of peaceful assembly is guaranteed by section 2(c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the police were already mandated to respond to any criminality that might occur. For these reasons, the application to pre-emptively cancel the rally was dismissed.

The premise of the decision — that the police would be able to handle any problems arising from the rally — seems to have been vindicated. Two individuals involved in a counter-protest were arrested for relatively minor offences, but media accounts of indicate no injuries or damage to property.

Why Ontario v. Doe Matters: not for Con Law, but for Civ Pro

The case will not make it into any constitutional law books. No new law was developed, and it wasn’t a “close call” delineating the boundaries of the law. A quia timet injunction against Charter-protected assembly requires strong evidence, and according to Jutice Centa’s reasons the applicant’s record came nowhere close.

However, I do plan to teach Ontario v. Doe in my civil procedure class, for two reasons.

1. A Minimum Viable Product for Civil Procedure?

First, it proves just how quickly a case can get from “glimmer in the client’s eye” to final adjudication. Slowness is considered by many to be the biggest problem with the civil justice system in Canada.

Ontario’s Civil Rules Review is trying to cut the timeline-to-trial for the average civil case in half, from the current 4 or 5 years down to 24 months. Some observers doubt this is possible, without a major infusion of new judicial resources.

Ontario v Doe demonstrated that justice can be done in about 30 hours, or roughly 1/700th of the average time-to-trial sought by the Civil Rules Review. Of course it was an exceptional case, a purported emergency, and the procedure applied to it was not as thorough as it might have been. And yet, this procedure might be considered a “minimum viable product” for those trying to devise a workflow for civil lawsuits that is both quick and just.

In software development, the minimum viable product is the version stripped down to only its most essential elements. After an MVP is developed, more features can be added, if and only if their benefit can be proven to justify the costs they add in time and money.

Ontario v Doe included the essential bits of civil procedure: pleadings, evidence, argument, adjudication, and written reasons.

An interesting experiment would be to start with Ontario v Doe’s 30-hour procedure and then determine the necessary additions to make it viable for a broader variety of cases, instead of trying to find stages that can be cut from the current five-year timeline.

2. A Benchmark for Quick Work?

The blistering pace of Ontario v Doe might also be a useful benchmark, for evaluating the more leisurely efforts of justice system participants in other cases.

• Justice Centa drafted written reasons, which seem reasonably thorough to this reader, in six hours after the hearing on March 14th. Must we really allow six months (730 times as long) as the timeline for judges to release written reasons, as do the Canadian Judicial Council’s Ethical Principles (at page 27)?
• If the lawyers in Ontario v Doe prepared serviceable factums overnight, should any factum require dozens of billable hours, stretching over many weeks, for counsel to prepare?

The answer to both these questions might be “yes.” And yet this model of speedy justice switches the onus to justify more time-consuming efforts, in a provocative and helpful way.

3. Why People Litigate

The third lesson from Ontario v Doe, for students of civil procedure, is about why civil claims are brought in the first place. Civil procedure assumes that, in general, a party litigates because they believe their position has legal merit. It also assumes that parties are interested in settling, and will welcome opportunities to do on a reasonable basis.

Ontario v Doe is a reminder that some civil claimants don’t want to settle, may not believe they are correct in law, and may not even want to win. They may be litigating mostly to send a message to a group or constituency not directly involved in the case.

Starting a lawsuit can:

(i) Garner political or material support from other opponents of the defendant,

(ii) Make the claimant appear to be a victim of wrongdoing or agent of justice, and/or

(iii) Deflect critical attention away from the claimant’s own conduct, toward the defendant.

Pursuing such goals is more attractive if, as in Ontario v Doe, the legal fees can be paid by someone else (i.e. the taxpayers of Ontario). Such a litigation strategy would also be made more attractive by the fact that, for reasons that not entirely clear to the author, Justice Centa made no costs award against the unsuccessful applicant.

Going to Court in Good Faith?

There are a few reasons to question whether this particular application might have been not only unfounded in law, but also brought in less-than-impeccable-faith:

• If Ontario genuinely believed the rally posed a threat to public safety or fostered hate speech, it could have brought its injunction application much sooner than 24 hours beforehand. The timing of the March 14 rally was predictable, given that its predecessor events had occurred every year in Toronto for over a decade.
• If seeking in good faith to protect public safety, Ontario would probably have sought to negotiate with the rally organizers to address its concerns on a consensual basis, before resorting to litigation.
• It could also have introduced legislation to refine the balance between Charter freedoms and public safety or the prevention of hate speech, not only for this protest, but for all others going forward.

The loss in court might not have been unanticipated or even unwelcome. The Premier was able to declare himself “extremely disappointed” in the outcome, and file the government’s “effort” to prevent the rally for future highly targeted political communications. The entire episode seemed to be complete in one news cycle, until a new chapter unexpectedly dropped in May of 2026. The organizers of the rally are now suing the Premier for defamation, based on the March 13th news conference which started it all.

For civil-proceduralists, the good news from Ontario v Doe is that it is possible in principle to do civil justice much faster than we are doing it in the average case today. The bad news is that starting civil lawsuits will always be appealing to some whose motives are far indeed from the legitimate purpose of civil procedure.

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