Now in an era in which it is uncommon to find much discussion and newly written commentary on aspects of law publishing, as distinct from artificial intelligence technology, it was a pleasant surprise to encounter New Perspectives on the Legal Treatise. The content of the book was edited by Femi Cadmus, who, at the time, was law librarian and Professor of Law at Yale Law School and Nicholas Mignanelli, Assistant Dean and Director of the Mabee Legal Information Center [sic] and Associate Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law. Its contributions are based on the proceedings of the Second Yale Legal Information Symposium, held in 2023, since when it might be argued, of course, that the world of legal information is not as before. Certainly, just using my own published observations on law publishing as a measure, by 2023, while it was not possible or wise to ignore AI developments, since then, the scale, importance and extent of debate on the topic has increased exponentially; some might even say excessively.

The book considers how legal treatises have shaped US legal research and how they continue to function amid shifts in technology, access, and research practices. Published in late 2025 by William S. Hein & Co., it features essays by some sixteen distinguished North American legal academics and law librarians, all of whom deserve commendation for their contributions and insights.

My expectations about what the book would actually offer altered somewhat once I began to read it, as opposed to having initially seen promotional literature describing it. The headline “Why the legal treatise still deserves a closer look” caused me, perhaps erroneously, to imagine that it would be primarily an argument in favour of the printed treatise concept in an age of increasing artificial intelligence, and the risk of harm to scholarship which that might entail. Therefore, I assumed that I might skip through much of the historical content, on grounds that it is done, and is, so to speak, what it is, with history being incapable of being changed, and go, almost directly, on to what the future might hold, in the opinions of the learned writers. That I was wrong was in no sense a disappointment, as I found the historical accounts of the concept of legal treatises fascinating, focused, as they are, on the USA, with references to and comparisons with those of other jurisdictions, notably England, as important but somewhat peripheral. Hence, in my judgment, New Perspectives on the Legal Treatise is a well-edited collection of articles on legal and publishing history, which I might have otherwise entitled, in a more specific way, “A Retrospective Appraisal of Legal Treatise Publishing in and for the USA”. Its authors and editors are deeply knowledgeable on the subject matter and would appear to be, even today, enthusiastic about the concept under discussion, as should be expected.

My pleasure, in the year in which marks 200 years since the publication of the first edition of Chitty on Contracts, upon being given the opportunity to dwell on historical aspects, allowed a welcome and rare diversion from having to read incessantly about what are, to me, tedious technical tweaks, together with boasts about private equity investment in AI. Instead, the book humanises the story of the birth of the USA through the influence of the people who, and ideas which created its modern legal system. To non-US readers such as me, with a Northern Ireland undergraduate bachelor of laws and jurisprudence degree, and publishing experience acquired in London, initially in legal editing and subsequently commercial legal publishing management, while the US experience is familiar, the important differences which have served to bring about the evolutionary path of the legal treatise are thoughtfully brought into focus. The federal system of government, the mixing of common law and civil law traditions, the written constitution and partial codification of law sit alongside differing ways of teaching law at university and of providing pre-qualification professional training for attorneys, as well as barristers, solicitors, advocates, notaries and others, depending on the jurisdiction. These issues and many more, as explained by the writers, serve to make sense of how and why legal treatise publishing has developed differently in various jurisdictions, driven by the many variable factors.

For purposes of this review, the issue of dramatic developments in artificial intelligence presently and in the future, somewhat separately from historical perceptions on law book publishing, must be kept in mind, to the extent that they will affect the opinions expressed in the past. I am certain that, if written in 2026/2027 rather than 2023/2024, the book simply could not have ignored such questions as law treatises being licensed from publishers to populate and train large language models and with that, issues of the quality and reputations of the treatises in question. Likewise, ever important in a digital era, is the matter of real-time currency of treatises. To quote from the book, “to be a reliable statement of contemporary legal doctrine, a treatise must be updated at least once a year”. In contrast, it was shocking to read, in the midst of today’s weaponised and corrupt US official structures and once respected institutions, of Supreme Court Justices citing long out-of-date and superseded editions in determining legal cases before them. The disciplines of the best of modern treatise publishing serve to maintain good law.

I believe that it is important to judge a law book not only by its core content but also its signposting metadata, production values and price. In this case, the print size is generous, with good spacing, and I found the extensive footnotes, being properly positioned, to be a measurable benefit. The index is adequate to support the book’s 300 or so Executive/Super Octavo pages. However, perhaps it tries to do too much, being heavily populated by names, places and titles, and it is a little insufficient on the level of taxonomy that underpins the best of indices. I would have preferred to see a separate short table of reported cases, with citations, extracted from footnotes.

Factual and descriptive, thankfully, rather than overtly polemical in favour of or against the law treatise concept itself, this book reminds me that the purpose of the classic law treatise is to provide integrated and structured information, with subjective and objective opinions for lawyers, scholars and students. However, they are not, in and of themselves, substitutes for the work of the courts and legislative bodies. Its content offers different benefits for different people, partly thanks to the broad range of expertise underpinning its totality. A minor, perhaps predictable criticism, notwithstanding its overall character, is that the book might have been enhanced by the inclusion of a chapter written by someone with career-based, insider experience of US law publishing. So often, the perceptions of law publishers differ from those of authors, editors and other external scholars, particularly on the reasoning behind publishing decisions of one kind or another, and opinions about optimal quality standards and markets. That said, some chapters will appeal strongly to legal and publishing historians, while others will provide valuable insights for lawyers, law librarians and students examining these specialist subjects. However esoteric and limited might its appeal be, this interest should extend beyond the USA, to libraries and readers in obvious common law and some civil law jurisdictions, perhaps especially in Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, but much further afield than that, in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, including many of the 56 Commonwealth countries. I thoroughly recommend it.

New Perspectives on the Legal Treatise is published by William S. Hein & Co., Inc. Its ISBN is 9780837743325 and its price is US$130.00.

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At a conference of law teachers at Western in June, I took part in discussions among professors and lawyers about whether facility with AI should be a core competence in a Canadian law degree at this point in time. This gave rise to larger questions about whether law profs now have an ethical or pedagogical duty of some kind to familiarize themselves with AI and develop methods of teaching students how to use it effectively. This, in turn, pointed to the even larger question of what it means to be a competent lawyer in the age of AI.

Put another way, if you choose to forgo or even resist what some believe to be the many benefits and efficiencies that AI has to offer (as some at the conference said they’ve chosen to do), are you in some way — as a prof or lawyer — failing in your duty of competence?

Have we crossed a certain threshold where you can no longer be competent as a lawyer, can no longer practice or teach to an appropriate standard, given the way that technology has changed realities on the ground?

In 2019, the Federation of Law Societies of Canada amended its Model Code of Professional Conduct to address technological competence. Law societies across the country, including those in Ontario and BC, have since incorporated the Federation’s guidance into their own frameworks.

Briefly, our codes of professional conduct contain a duty of competence, or a duty to possess and apply relevant knowledge, skills, and other attributes described in various sub-rules. The final of these is commonly worded: “otherwise adapting to changing professional requirements, standards, techniques and practices.”

The Federation’s commentary adds:

To maintain the required level of competence, a lawyer should develop an understanding of, and ability to use, technology relevant to the nature and area of the lawyer’s practice and responsibilities. A lawyer should understand the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology…

And:

The required level of technological competence will depend on whether the use or understanding of technology is necessary to the nature and area of the lawyer’s practice and responsibilities and whether the relevant technology is reasonably available to the lawyer.

So, we have both a duty and a standard to meet. We have a duty to become informed about technologies relevant to our practice area, and even to develop an ability to use them.

And how informed must I be and able to use this technology? Well, it depends.

But wait a minute, that’s just what we all want to know!

Do I, as a family or criminal lawyer, an insurance defence litigator or corporate solicitor have to spend time sorting out how to use Harvey, Protégé, or Copilot and decide whether and when to use them in a given case?

Can I not just attend a brief seminar to get an overview of these tools and casually dismiss them as non-essential to the workflow that has served me well for over 20 years?

As a prof, am I not perfectly justified in saying that some of these tools might be quite useful, but my job is to teach students black-letter law, how to think like a lawyer, and so on — things more fundamental than how to use the technology of the day effectively?

Who decides what is necessary here? Are lawyers and profs (and students, for that matter) not free to decide that AI might be useful in some situations, might result in certain efficiencies, but that despite this, they don’t need AI?

And what about AI’s notorious unreliability? How could a tool like Protégé ever become necessary when its research memos and opinions are wrong so much of the time? And isn’t AI like this more broadly?

For that matter, is any technology — aside from pen and paper — really ‘necessary’ to practice law competently? Couldn’t I do a perfectly competent job without even cracking open my laptop if I really wanted to?

Take email. Is it optional at this point? Could you offer a client competent service as a family or employment lawyer if you refused to use it and insisted on writing letters? Probably not. Why? It’s worth spelling out: because your service would be so slow as to risk a failure to resolve a client’s issue in a timely fashion, which it is your duty to do.

So we can point to cases where recent technology becomes necessary; which is to say, where the tech changes realities on the ground and standards of competence shift accordingly.

Is AI one of these cases? Is AI as fundamental to the practice of law as word processing or email?

Can you render legal service competently, that is, in a reasonably timely, efficient, and effective manner, with no reliance on it at all?

Or is it, like email or word processing, something that creates efficiencies so significant as to change the nature and pace of the practice itself?

My sense: not yet, but soon, in some areas, possibly even most, it will be.

Yes, certain AI tools are unreliable for certain purposes. But there are more or less reliable and effective ways of using AI. And some of the more reliable ways of using AI can lead to huge efficiencies. Examples include large document review in litigation, contract drafting when carefully prompted to produce a first draft, case law research done with a frontier model using an MCP, and generating meeting transcriptions and summaries of audio kept on file as a backup.

The efficiencies AI can provide here are so striking that they may soon render the technology necessary to doing a competent job, in the sense that failing to use it would mean wasting a client’s time and money without justification.

But AI is more powerful than email or word processing. If harnessed effectively, it could lead to a higher level of service, raising the bar across the board. I’m thinking here of workflows that lawyers at the frontiers of experimentation with AI in practice have come up with, ranging from automating intake memos and generating draft agreements or routine correspondence, to more elaborate tools for analyzing litigation strategy.

At this point, there is at least a basis for thinking that professional standards of competence may be shifting. The bar may be rising.

We may be approaching a point at which you can no longer be competent in many areas if some portion of your work on a file — research, opinion or contract-drafting, document review — is not in some way aided by AI.

We may not be there yet. We lack clarity about what is ‘necessary’ when it comes to the use of AI in a given practice area. Law profs might continue to ignore the place of AI in the curriculum or remain indifferent to whether facility with AI is, or should be, a core competence in law school.

But soon, I suspect, our collective thinking about this will change. There is at least a real possibility, if not a likelihood, that in the near future we will all need to use AI in some capacity to practice law competently — to deliver service at a level of timeliness and efficiency that clients will be entitled to expect given the general pace at which practice will have evolved.

Again, we may not be there yet. But it’s clearly on the horizon.

The post What Does It Mean to Be a Competent Lawyer in the Age of AI? appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Canadian Class Actions Monitor 2. Know How 3. Canadian Appeals Monitor 4. David Whelan 5. Welcome to the Food Court

Canadian Class Actions Monitor
Submission to Finance Canada as part of its Pre-budget Consultations in Advance of the upcoming 2025 Fall Federal Budget

There has been a new development in a class action that we previously covered (see: Recklessness as a Willful Violation of Privacy: B.C. Court of Appeal Decision has Implications for Private and Public Sector Organizations). The development is G.D. v. South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority, 2026 BCSC 773 and it has implications for public and private sector organizations that collect, store, or manage sensitive personal information in British Columbia. The decision suggests that plaintiffs may be able to advance statutory privacy claims beyond certification based solely on allegations of inadequate safeguarding, with “access” being interpreted broadly at the certification stage. It also reinforces the possibility of aggregate damages awards despite the absence of individualized proof of loss. …

Know How
Legal Research Lifelines in the Age of Information Overload

We are revisiting an older post in our Legal Research Survival Guide, Part 10 – Lifelines and Last Tips, and it occurred to us that Tip #4 is especially worth highlighting in today’s context of information overload. Tip #4 – Use a lifeline has only become more relevant since the Guide was written in 2020. With the sheer volume of legal information now available, and the pressure students and junior lawyers face to find reliable answers quickly, it’s easy to lose time going down the wrong research path. …

Canadian Appeals Monitor
Civil Appeals by the Numbers: The Court of Appeal for Ontario Releases a Decade of Data

On July 2, 2026, the Court of Appeal for Ontario released its first annual report in over a decade. The report, covering the period 2023–2024, provides insights on how Canada’s busiest provincial appellate court is functioning and what parties who come before it can expect. The report also highlights several practical takeaways for parties considering or engaged in an appeal, including how long the appeal process typically takes, how often civil appeals typically succeed, how rarely leave to appeal is granted, the growing presence of self-represented litigants, and the court’s continued move toward digital filing through its new portal. …

David Whelan
Like A Good Neighbor

I had the lawn mower out over the weekend. We had a brief respite from the heat and the rain and the new sod we’d put down needed a trim. As I was finishing up, my neighbor came out with his mower and a similar mindset and we got to chatting. We’ve lived here for over a year now and we are fortunate to have good neighbors. I picked up a bit of scuttlebutt about the neighborhood and what his family was up to, swapped opinions on lawn hardware, and then both got back to our chores. I’m grateful for a good neighbor. We are constantly in contact with people in our lives and we can’t always choose who we live next to and work beside. When those relationships are sour, they can rot everything else. …

Welcome to the Food Court
Codex CCFL49: What Came Out of Five Days in Ottawa

Allergen statements, bilingual claims, country-of-origin language, and joint-presentation rules for multipacks are some of the rules that decide whether a product can sit on a shelf in Canada, or whether the company selling it is exposed to enforcement, recall liability, or a Competition Bureau referral. Many of those rules arrived in Canada through the Codex Alimentarius Commission years before they appeared in the Food and Drug Regulations or the Safe Food for Canadians Regulations. Codex sets international labelling standards through its Committee on Food Labelling. Canada hosts that committee, has done so for decades, and chairs its sessions. The 49th Session of CCFL met in Ottawa from May 11 to 15, 2026. …

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*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

One Sunday each month we bring you a summary from Supreme Advocacy LLP of recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers a weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, to which you may subscribe. It’s a summary of all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted from April 18 – June 25, 2026 inclusive.

Appeal

Civil Litigation/Elections: Collateral Attack; Abuse of Process; Parliamentary Privilege; Immunity
Resler v. Anglin, 2024 ABCA 113; 2026 SCC 23 (41298)

Can an unsuccessful election candidate bring a civil claim against an elections officer for the tort of misfeasance in public office? The claim herein does not constitute a collateral attack on the 2015 election result or an abuse of process, there is an arguable case for the non-application of parliamentary privilege and statutory immunity, and the rigorous test for striking out a claim is not met. Accordingly, the order of the majority of the Court of Appeal is upheld. The civil claim, with the exception of the malicious prosecution claim that was struck and was not the subject of a cross-appeal, may proceed.

Civil Litigation/Mortgages: Res Judicata; Cause of Action Estoppel
Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. v. 11368 NL Inc., 2024 NLCA 11; 2026 SCC 15 (41296) May 8, 2026

Because cause of action estoppel provides a full answer to this appeal, it is unnecessary to address 11368’s arguments respecting the applicability of issue estoppel and abuse of process by relitigation to the facts herein. The test for cause of action estoppel: (a) There is a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction in the prior action; (b) The parties to the subsequent litigation were parties to or in privy with parties to the prior action; (c) The cause of action in the prior action is not separate and distinct; and (d) The basis of the cause of action and the subsequent action was argued or could have been argued in the prior action if the parties had exercised reasonable diligence.

Constitutional Law: Charter; Language Rights
Société de l’Acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2024 NBCA 7; 2026 SCC 22 (41398)

Section 16(2) of the Charter enshrines a mandatory guarantee of substantive equality for the two official languages in New Brunswick’s institutions. Section 16(2) protects both the possibility of using either official language in the province’s institutions and the equality of status of these two languages. This equality cannot be preserved when the position of Lieutenant Governor of the province, a unipersonal and highly symbolic institution, is held by a unilingual person, a situation that necessarily gives predominance to the majority language, English. The appropriate remedy is to issue a declaration affirming that the appointment of a Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick who does not have the ability to understand, communicate in and perform their functions in both official languages infringes s. 16(2) of the Charter.

Constitutional Law: Parliamentary Privilege
Alford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 306; 2026 SCC 14 (41336) May 1, 2026

In 2017, Parliament enacted the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15 (“NSICOP Act”) for the purpose of setting up a statutory committee of parliamentarians to oversee Canada’s national security and intelligence apparatus (“Committee”). Section 12 of this Act contains a provision that prohibits parliamentarians who sat on the Committee from claiming immunity based on parliamentary privilege in a proceeding against them related to the disclosure of national security information obtained through their Committee membership. Due to the nature of parliamentary privilege in Canadian constitutional law; the interpretation of s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867, in light of its text, historical and constitutional context, and purpose; and considering whether s. 12 of the NSICOP Act falls within the scope of s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867; the S.C.C. held that s. 12 of the NSICOP Act was validly enacted under the legislative authority conferred on Parliament by s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 18 gives Parliament the authority to define its privileges, subject only to the limits of its text and purpose, as understood within the broader context of the Constitution. This authority includes limiting these privileges. When Parliament does so, it exercises a legislative authority conferred by the Constitution; it does not amend the Constitution itself.

Constitutional Law: Right to Vote
Québec (Attorney General) v. Lalande, 2025 QCCA 1558; 2026 SCC 13 (42152) Apr. 22, 2026; May 1, 2026

The determination made by the first instance judge concerning the infringement of s. 3 of the Charter has not been appealed to this Court. The appeal by A.G. Qué. relates solely to the justification for this infringement under s. 1 of the Charter. Since the appellant has not shown any reviewable error by the Qué. C.A. the appeal is dismissed. Contrary to what the appellant argues, the Qué. C.A. did not unduly narrow the pressing and substantial objective accepted by the first instance judge and did not depart from the factual findings derived from the evidence relating to what the appellant describes as a [translation] “persistent phenomenon of devitalization of certain remote regions” (outline of argument, at para. 3.2b)). Moreover, the pressing and substantial objective urged by the appellant would not meet the further rational connection requirement. At the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes test, the appellant argued that the alternative solution identified by the Qué. C.A. would not render it possible to achieve the legislature’s objectives in a real and substantial manner. The S.C.C. rejected that argument: it is true that the state is accorded a measure of deference at the minimal impairment stage (Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 53); in addition, depending on the circumstances, the unanimity of a legislative assembly may help to demonstrate that electoral reform was enacted in good faith rather than for purely partisan purposes. However, the mere fact that the ATI was passed unanimously by the National Assembly is not here a determinative consideration that shields the ATI from constitutional scrutiny and relieves the appellant of his burden, under s. 1 of the Charter, of demonstrating that the law has been “carefully tailored so that rights are impaired no more than necessary” (RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 160, cited by Qué. C.A., at para. 78).

Criminal Law: Delay; Case Complexity Analysis
R. v. Vrbanic, 2025 ONCA 151; 2026 SCC 19(41741) Dec. 4, 2025; May 29, 2026

To the extent that jurisprudential and legislative developments in the past decade have increased the complexity of criminal trials, the Jordan framework can comfortably respond. This is not an appropriate case in which to consider more fundamental changes to the Jordan ceilings or to revisit the remedy for a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter. Instead, this appeal offers an opportunity to clarify how the exceptional circumstance of particular complexity can justify delay in excess of a Jordan ceiling.The case complexity exception recognizes that certain cases, because of their inherent time requirements, cannot reasonably be completed within the presumptive ceilings. The exception applies to cases that are “particularly complex” because the nature of the evidence or issues requires an inordinate amount of preparation or trial time (Jordan, at para. 77). However, the exception will not apply where the Crown has failed to develop and follow a concrete plan to minimize delay associated with a case’s complexity (para. 79). Case complexity involves a qualitative rather than a quantitative assessment; it does not result in the deduction of any specific period of delay (R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 659, at para. 64). Where net delay exceeds the relevant presumptive ceiling after defence delay and any discrete exceptional circumstances have been accounted for, a case’s particular complexity may justify the time it has taken. The case complexity exception is sufficiently flexible to account for changes in the average complexity of criminal trials.

Criminal Law: Delay; Joint Trials
R. v. Jacques-Taylor, 2024 ONCA 458; 2026 SCC 20(41430) May 29, 2025

Delays flowing from the Crown’s decision to conduct a joint prosecution may, sometimes, amount to discrete exceptional circumstances. In the instant case, the delay caused by the unavailability of the co‑accused’s counsel amounts to a discrete exceptional circumstance. It should therefore be deducted from the net delay. This brings the total delay to under 18 months, rendering it presumptively reasonable.

Criminal Law: Forfeiture
R. v. Nguyen, 2024 QCCA 674; 2026 SCC 10(41400) Apr. 17, 2026

This matter is remanded to the Court of Québec, which does have jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal forfeiture hearing herein. First, the stay of the trial proceedings is not, for the purposes of the forfeiture matter, tantamount to an acquittal. The stay may be equated to an acquittal for the purposes of the plea of autrefois acquit and the exercise of appeal rights because they engage a person’s risk of criminal liability and liberty interests. But the stay has no decisive effect on the forfeiture proceedings. The matters required to establish that the property is criminally tainted were not decided in the respondents’ favour in a prior criminal proceeding, such that it is open to the Crown to lead evidence on those issues to support its forfeiture application. There is no necessary issue estoppel between matters decided on the stay — whether the delay was unreasonable — and matters at issue in subsequent forfeiture proceedings — whether the property is tainted by crime. The stay does not oust statutory jurisdiction in respect of forfeiture. Second, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court of Québec does not have the power in the instant case to order forfeiture under the principal provisions invoked by the Crown in the Criminal Code and the CDSA, which tie that authority to trial and sentencing proceedings. Jurisdiction to conduct criminal forfeiture proceedings survives under statutory rules that operate independently of trial and sentencing. Parliament has provided for a number of circumstances in which forfeiture can be ordered even where no accused has been tried.

Criminal Law: Hearsay
R. v. Saddleback, 2024 ABCA 352; 2026 SCC 18(41567) Nov. 1, 2024; May 22, 2026

In brief oral reasons, the trial judge convicted the respondent of second degree murder. In support of his conclusion that the two men were left alone at the crime scene shortly before the murder, the trial judge referenced an out-of-court statement made by the deceased during a phone call with a witness. A majority of the Alta. C.A. concluded the trial judge erred in relying on the statement for an impermissible hearsay purpose and, on this basis, quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial. Based on a plain reading of the trial reasons, the trial judge used the out-of-court statement as hearsay, that is, to make proof of the truth of its contents. Even if it were true that the out-of-court statement could have been relied on for a purpose other than establishing the truth of its contents or could have been admissible to prove the truth of its contents under a hearsay exception, the trial judge’s reasons, read in light of the trial record as a whole, are insufficient to allow an appellate court to infer or reconstruct an analysis supporting either basis. It is noted the Crown does not rely on the curative proviso. In the circumstances, a new trial is required.

Criminal Law: Sexual Assault; Alibi
R. v. G.G., 2025 ONCA 574; 2026 SCC 12 (41963) Aug. 1, 2025; Mar. 20, 2026;

The S.C.C. agreed with the Ont. C.A. that herein the time period alleged by the Crown concerned the last sexual encounter between the appellant and the complainant on or about April 7, which they agreed happened on the last night they slept in the marital home together. This period was defined by the language of the charging document, the substance of the complainant’s evidence, the evidence elicited by the Crown, and the Crown’s position at trial, taken together. In these circumstances, the complainant’s estimate of when the sexual assault occurred, elicited by the defence in cross-examination, did not narrow the Crown’s case to that specific period. As a result, the Crown did not shift the alleged time frame or deny the appellant the right to make full answer and defence by maintaining that it was not required to prove that the sexual assault occurred around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. on April 7. Put simply, the Crown never claimed that it did occur at that time. And the Court agreed that substituting a conviction was the appropriate remedy. Under s. 686(4)(b)(ii) an appellate court can set aside an acquittal and enter a conviction where “the trial judge’s findings of fact, viewed in light of the applicable law, supported a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt” (R. v. Katigbak, 2011 SCC 48, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 326, at para. 50). That standard was met in this case.

Criminal Law: Sexual Assault; Conflicting Evidence
R. v. Berg, 2025 SKCA 85; 2026 SCC 21(41980) April 14, 2026; June 5, 2026

A majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan dismissed Mr. Berg’s appeal. There, and herein, Mr. Berg argued that the trial judge made two reversible errors. First, the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony. Second, he failed to assess the complainant’s testimony in light of the totality of the evidence and erroneously used it to reject Mr. Berg’s account. The Sask. C.A. convincingly explained how the trial judge convicted Mr. Berg based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. An outright rejection of an accused’s evidence based on a considered and reasoned acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of conflicting credible evidence is as much an explanation for the rejection of an accused’s evidence as is a rejection based on a problem identified with the way the accused testified or the substance of the accused’s evidence. As a general rule, trial judges should not rely on J.J.R.D. (2006) 218 O.A.C. 37 when structuring their W. (D.) analyses or when providing W. (D.) directions to a jury. J.J.R.D. is a case about appellate review for sufficiency of reasons and it does not purport to set out a formula for performing a W. (D.) analysis. It was intended to apply to appellate review of trial decisions when assessing whether the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient to permit appellate review, not to be applied by trial judges themselves.

Torts: Intimate Partner Violence
Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2023 ONCA 476; 2026 SCC 16 (41061) July 7, 2023; May 15, 2026

On the strength of the facts and Ms. Ahluwalia’s pleadings, the S.C.C. recognized a tort of “intimate partner violence”. To establish liability under this new tort, a plaintiff must prove three elements: first, that the abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath; second, that the defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct; and third, that the conduct, on an objective measure, constitutes coercive control. Proof of these three elements suffices to establish that the plaintiff has suffered a dignitary harm (see generally Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Ari, 2025 BCCA 131, 46 C.C.L.I. (6th) 173, at para. 32). Harm flows from proof of the intentional wrong because coercive control directly interferes with the plaintiff’s legal interests in dignity, autonomy, and equality within an intimate partnership. The extent of that harm may warrant a greater or lesser quantum of damages, depending on the circumstances.

Oral Judgment

Criminal Law: Fresh Evidence
R. v. Maadani, 2025 ONCA 582; 2026 SCC 11 (41972) Judgment rendered April 17, 2026

“The Chief Justice: “A majority of this Court is of the view that Huscroft J.A., writing for the majority of the Court of Appeal, made no reviewable error in dismissing the application for new evidence for lack of cogency. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. Justices Karakatsanis and Côté would have allowed the appeal. They are of the view that, in its cogency analysis, the majority erred in law in making its own determination of the witness’s ultimate credibility. The majority also erred in its analysis of due diligence. Justices Karakatsanis and Côté agree with Copeland J.A. that the fresh evidence was reasonably capable of belief by the triers of fact on key points relating to self-defence and would have admitted the fresh evidence and would have ordered a new trial.”

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Agriculture: Fertilizers
Biogénie Canada Inc. v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2025 FCA 150 (42060) May 28, 2026

Federal regulations re fertilizer composition.

Charter: Language Rights
Forum des maires de la Péninsule acadienne Inc. v. Minister of Justice and Public Safety, 2025 NBCA 99 (42073) May 28, 2026

Language rights re court services.

Class Actions: Road Disturbances
Belmamoun, et al. v. Ville de Brossard, et al., 2025 QCCA 1011 (42047) Apr. 30, 2026

Class action issues re municipal roads.

Corporate Litigation: Derivative Actions
Hougen Co. Ltd. v. Su, et al., 2025 BCCA 164 (41946) May 28, 2026

Issues, including limitations, in derivative action.

Criminal Law: Failure to Blow
R.v. Emereuwa, 2025 SKCA 83 (42075) May 28, 2026

Offence elements of failing to blow.

Criminal Law: Homicide
R. v. Dussault, 2025 QCCA 1433 (42169) May 14, 2026

There is a publication ban in this case, in the context of homicide.

Criminal Law: State Agents
R. v. Pham, 2025 BCCA 324 (42101) May 21, 2026

Courier depot employees as state agents.

Criminal Law: Theft; Sentencing
Wood v. R., 2025 ONCA 746 (42127) Apr. 30, 2026

Sentencing principles for theft offences.

Elections: Returning Officer Appointments
Canada (Attorney General) v. Drover, 2025 ONCA 468 (42005)

Constitutionality of Canada Election Act re returning officer appointments.

Judicial Independence: Special Clerks & Bankruptcy Registrars
Québec (Attorney General) v. Petrishki, et al., 2025 QCCA 893 (42018) Apr. 30, 2026

Constitutionality of judicial independence re special clerks and bankruptcy registrars.

Mining/Aboriginal Law: Duty to Consult
British Columbia (Chief Gold Commissioner) v. Gitxaala Nation, et al., 2025 BCCA 430 (42200) May 21, 2026

Duty to consult; justiciability of U.N. Declaration.

Professions: Pharmacists
Haggaï v. Loiselle, 2025 QCCA 932 (41976) May 7, 2026

There is a publication ban in this case, in the context of alleged professional disciplinary complaints against a pharmacist.

Securities: Constitutionality of Summons
Ontario Securities Commission v. Binance Holdings Limited, 2025 ONCA 751 (42156) May 21, 2026

Constitutionality of Security Commission summons.

Torts: Malicious Prosecution
McCormack v. Evans, et al., 2025 ONCA 767 (42170) May 21, 2026

Wrongful prosecution, negligent investigation, and other civil torts.

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Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : Un examen inégal des témoignages de l’appelant et de la victime d’agression sexuelle allant au-delà de la méthodologie est démontré; l’analyse de la crédibilité de l’appelant a mené à un renversement du fardeau de la preuve, et la Cour d’appel ordonne la tenue d’un nouveau procès.

Intitulé : Savoie c. R., 2026 QCCA 866
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Québec
Décision de : Juges Marie-France Bich, Michel Beaupré et Myriam Lachance
Date : 22 juin 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — infraction — infractions de nature sexuelle — agression sexuelle — femme — absence de consentement — intoxication de la victime — appréciation de la preuve — examen inégal — renversement du fardeau de la preuve — déclaration de culpabilité — appel — norme d’intervention — déférence — erreur de droit — disposition réparatrice n’ayant pas été invoquée par la poursuite — tenue d’un nouveau procès.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — preuve pénale — appréciation de la preuve — témoignage — versions contradictoires — application de R. c. W. (D.) (C.S. Can., 1991-03-28), SOQUIJ AZ-91111043, J.E. 91-603, [1991] 1 R.C.S. 742 — examen inégal — crédibilité des témoins — présomption d’innocence — absence de consentement — intoxication de la victime — contradictions — détail périphérique — omission de tenir compte d’un élément de preuve — renversement du fardeau de la preuve — agression sexuelle — appel — norme d’intervention — déférence — erreur de droit.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — garanties fondamentales du processus pénal — présomption d’innocence — appréciation de la preuve — témoignage — versions contradictoires — application de R. c. W. (D.) (C.S. Can., 1991-03-28), SOQUIJ AZ-91111043, J.E. 91-603, [1991] 1 R.C.S. 742 — examen inégal — crédibilité des témoins — absence de consentement — intoxication de la victime — contradictions — détail périphérique — omission de tenir compte d’un élément de preuve — renversement du fardeau de la preuve — agression sexuelle — appel — norme d’intervention — déférence — erreur de droit — disposition réparatrice n’ayant pas été invoquée par la poursuite — tenue d’un nouveau procès.

DROITS ET LIBERTÉS — droits judiciaires — personne arrêtée ou détenue — présomption d’innocence — appréciation de la preuve — témoignage — versions contradictoires — application de R. c. W. (D.) (C.S. Can., 1991-03-28), SOQUIJ AZ-91111043, J.E. 91-603, [1991] 1 R.C.S. 742 — examen inégal — crédibilité des témoins — absence de consentement — intoxication de la victime — contradictions — détail périphérique — omission de tenir compte d’un élément de preuve — renversement du fardeau de la preuve — agression sexuelle — appel — norme d’intervention — déférence — erreur de droit — disposition réparatrice n’ayant pas été invoquée par la poursuite — tenue d’un nouveau procès.

Appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité. Accueilli; la tenue d’un nouveau procès est ordonnée.

L’appelant a été déclaré coupable d’agression sexuelle par la Cour du Québec. Les gestes reprochés par la victime ont eu lieu la nuit, chez l’appelant, au terme d’une soirée festive.

Décision

M^me la juge Lachance: L’appelant ne démontre pas que le verdict est déraisonnable, mais il relève cependant 2 erreurs de droit déterminantes dans l’analyse du juge de première instance. S’il est vrai que, pour justifier une intervention de la Cour, l’omission reprochée doit concerner un élément de preuve important se rapportant à la question à trancher, certains faits périphériques peuvent aussi contribuer à démontrer l’asymétrie de l’examen des témoignages. C’est le cas en l’espèce. Un examen inégal des témoignages de l’appelant et de la victime allant au-delà de la méthodologie est démontré, ce qui constitue une erreur de droit. Ce constat ressort des 25 pages de transcription du jugement rendu oralement. Parmi celles-ci, 14 pages passent au peigne fin le témoignage de l’appelant, alors que seules 3 pages résument la version de la victime, sans vraiment l’analyser. Évidemment, une démonstration convaincante d’un double standard n’est pas le résultat d’un exercice arithmétique où le nombre de mots utilisés pour commenter le témoignage de l’un est comparé à celui utilisé pour l’autre. Cependant, les motifs du juge sont non équivoques à cet égard.

Au terme de chacune des sections qui passaient en revue tous les angles du témoignage de l’appelant, le juge concluait que toute discordance, même menue et périphérique, donnait prise à un constat de contradiction. Certes, l’évaluation de la preuve par le juge mérite déférence, mais cela devient problématique lorsqu’il ressort de la facture générale du jugement que le juge semble se donner pour mission de décortiquer le témoignage de l’appelant afin d’y déceler toutes les raisons possibles de ne pas le croire et, de surcroît, lorsqu’il omet de faire de même à l’égard des autres témoins et notamment de la victime. Le rôle du juge du procès n’est pas de scruter chaque aspect d’un témoignage afin de trouver la moindre divergence, et ce, dans le but d’écarter celui-ci. Une telle analyse microscopique risque de faire bifurquer l’évaluation de la preuve vers des éléments périphériques à l’essence du litige.

Le danger de l’évaluation inégale des témoignages est donc de porter atteinte à la présomption d’innocence. Ce malheureux exercice se révèle dans le jugement entrepris où, après avoir scruté le témoignage de l’appelant, le juge a limité essentiellement l’évaluation de celui de la victime à 1 énoncé de sa version des faits. Il a qualifié son récit d’honnête et de candide, et a estimé que cette version était «en grande partie compatible avec l’ensemble de la preuve recueillie». Pourtant, le juge n’a pas porté attention à certains témoignages apportant une vision différente de l’état d’intoxication allégué par la victime, ce qui constitue une question pertinente au consentement. Qui plus est, ces témoignages allaient dans le sens de celui de l’appelant, mais le juge a estimé que sa version à ce sujet était évolutive et contredite par la preuve. Cette façon de confronter le témoignage de l’appelant à celui de la victime ressort aussi d’une autre portion du jugement: le problème dans cette analyse concernant le consentement aux activités sexuelles réside dans le fait que «le reste de la preuve» se limite au témoignage de la victime.

L’analyse de la crédibilité de l’appelant a mené à un renversement du fardeau de la preuve qui contrevient à la présomption d’innocence, et cette erreur de droit est présumée lui être préjudiciable. Il revenait dès lors à la poursuite de démontrer l’absence de préjudice afin de pouvoir recourir à la disposition réparatrice, qui n’a pas été invoquée en l’espèce.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

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As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Leave to Appeal Granted

Bankruptcy: Contempt
Lymer v. Jonsson, 2025 ABCA 423 (42227)

Civil contempt issues in bankruptcy.

Civil Litigation: Contempt; Charter s. 11 (c)
Estate of Craig Sutherland, et al. v. Murphy, 2025 ONCA 227 (41818)

Civil contempt issues in injunctions and Anton Piller.

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Through my own journey with chronic pain, I am acutely aware of the impact language can have on your health. More specifically, I recognize the role catastrophizing plays in magnifying pain and that simple word substitutions can facilitate healing. It has also triggered a recognition that the language I use with clients may also negatively contribute to their anxiety.

Catastrophizing involves exaggerating the severity of a situation and jumping to the worst possible conclusion. As noted in the recent Psychology Today article, “Catastrophizing”:

Everyone has negative thoughts. But for many people, negative thinking can spin out of control and be disproportionate to the reality of the situation. A relatively modest error, disappointment, or source of embarrassment (or even the possibility of one) can sometimes become, in one’s mind, a cause for major fear or despair – in short, a catastrophe.[i]

In the context of chronic pain, a sufferer may tell themselves that the pain will never improve, it will only get worse and the pain will result in losing their job and family. The sufferer may use phrases to describe their pain such as ‘sharp knife’, ‘stabbing’, ‘searing’ or in my case ‘being beaten with a bat’. Numerous studies have found that this way of thinking or catastrophizing increases the severity of pain. Substituting these words with more neutral adjectives such as ‘sensation’, ‘tingly’ or ‘pulsing’ has a profoundly positive effect on pain levels.[ii]

In addition to chronic pain, several conditions such as anxiety, depression and fatigue may be also exacerbated and be more prevalent in those who catastrophize. [iii] What does this mean when your bread and butter is based on pessimism and identifying worst-case scenarios as it is in the legal profession?

There are many in the profession who embrace our tendency to catastrophize and see it as indispensable to a successful practice. As noted by one practitioner:

It’s probably why I’m a not-too-bad lawyer. I worry – all the time.

….

Catastrophizing, often seen as pessimism in everyday life, is indispensable in legal practice. It’s a form of strategic foresight that protects clients. Lawyers should lean into this character flaw but also keep it in track – try to stop worrying before going to bed.[iv]

As noted by Richard J. Landau, an experienced lawyer and clinical psychologist specializing in cognitive behavioral therapy:

Attorneys need to accurately predict outcomes and envision worst-case scenarios. Catastrophizing is their stock in trade. In this unforgiving environment, optimism can be a liability.[v]

However, Landau also warns of the danger of this thinking, particularly when it seeps into our personal lives. He offers cognitive behavioral therapy as a means for lawyers to recognize pessimism and catastrophizing as useful tools for their practice but also “a means to an end with limited applicability to healthy functioning in day-to-day life”.

While leaving these analytical tools at the office as Landau suggests is good advice, it only addresses one issue – the health of the lawyer themselves. What about our clients? Is our catastrophic thinking bleeding into our client communications and causing unnecessary harm?

Research conducted in the medical profession found that a physician’s use of language and choice of words can influence how anxious patients are after a consultation.[vi] Like lawyers, doctors often meet their patients/clients at their worst moment and need to deliver difficult news. Researchers have identified ‘never words’ that doctors should avoid to reduce harm to their patients.[vii] These ‘never words’ include:

There’s nothing else we can do.

They will not get any better.

Withdrawing care.

‘Fight’ or ‘battle’.

I don’t know why you waited so long to come in.

Instead, research suggests alternative word choices can decrease patent anxiety. For example:

• ‘They will not get any better’ replaced with ‘I’m worried they won’t get better’. The doctor is replacing a negative prediction with an expression of concern.
• ‘Fight’ and ‘battle’ replaced with “We will face this difficult disease together’. This alternative language focuses on the team supporting the patient rather than implying that the patient can overcome the illness with sheer will and may let loved ones down by not fighting hard enough.

For help drafting client communications with less catastrophic language, following the principles of trauma-formed lawyering is a good start. While not specially providing guidance on avoiding catastrophizing, trauma-informed lawyering allows us to be more conscious of the impact of our words on our client’s well-being.

The Guide to Trauma-Formed Legal Writing[viii] developed by the British Columbia Law Institute provides practical guidance on creating legal documents that “are sensitive to the experiences of those affected by trauma.” Best practices for a trauma-informed approach to legal writing include:

• Avoid assumptions, biases, and myths
• Use clear and accessible language
• Be aware of triggers
• Be empathic and respectful
• Offer support and seek feedback

The guide does not provide clear ‘never words’ as outlined above, but the section on avoiding deficit-based language and euphemisms under the heading ‘Be empathic and respectful’ provides some useful word substitutions.[ix]

Overall, there is a balance that needs to be struck between utilizing our catastrophizing skillset and delivering options or possible outcomes to clients in a way that allows them to make informed decisions without causing unnecessary anxiety. We must catastrophize to a point but find a way to minimize unnecessary catastrophic language. This is an area I will continue to explore and aim to provide further guidance in my upcoming posts.

_____________

[i] Lybi Ma, “Catastrophizing” online:<Psychology Today> https://www.psychologytoday.com/ca/basics/catastrophizing.

[ii] Laura Petrini and Lars Arendt-Nielsen, “Understanding Pain Catastrophizing: Putting Pieces Together”, 11 Front. Psychol., 2020 online <frontiers> https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.603420/full.

[iii] Sian Ferguson and Olivia Walters, “Catastrophizing: What You need to Know to Stop Worrying” online <healthline> https://www.healthline.com/health/anxiety/catastrophizing#causes.

[iv] Deanne M. Koll, “Final Thought Catastrophizing” online <Wisconsin Lawyer> <https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=98&Issue=6&ArticleID=31080.

[v] Richard J. Landau, “Does “Thinking Like a Lawyer” Play a Role in the Legal Profession’s Mental Health Crisis?” 40 Michigan Bar Journal (October 2018) online <Michigan Bar Journal> https://www.michbar.org/file/barjournal/article/documents/pdf4article3495.pdf.

[vi] “Physician’s positive language use reduces anxiety among patients with unexplained symptoms” online <Radboud University> https://www.ru.nl/en/research/research-news/physicians-positive-language-use-reduces-anxiety-among-patients-with-unexplained-symptoms.

[vii] Leslie Henton, “Do No Harm: Researchers Help Doctors identify Words They Should Never Say to Patients”, online <Texas A&M Mays Business School> https://news.mays.tamu.edu/news/2024/11/do-no-harm-researchers-help-doctors-identify-words-they-should-never-say-to-patients/.

[viii] British Columbia Law Institute, “Guide to Trauma-Informed Writing” online https://www.bcli.org/wp-content/uploads/TILWG-Final.pdf.

[ix] Ibid at 42.

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Several times each month, we are pleased to republish a recent book review from the Canadian Law Library Review (CLLR). CLLR is the official journal of the Canadian Association of Law Libraries (CALL/ACBD), and its reviews cover both practice-oriented and academic publications related to the law.

Equal and Inalienable Rights: Essays on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Edited by Melanie R. Bueckert & Derek B.M. Ross. Toronto: LexisNexis, 2024. xlii, 458 p. ISBN 9780433533801 (softcover) $145.00.

Reviewed by Emily Da Silva
Head, Research Support (Education, Law, Management, and Social Sciences)
University of Ottawa Library

This collection of essays gathers the contributions of legal scholars who presented papers at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 75 Symposium held at Wycliffe College, University of Toronto, in the fall of 2023. The symposium brought together legal scholars, practitioners, and historians from across Canada and the globe to reflect on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its historical roots, enduring legacy, and contemporary influence on human rights jurisprudence.

The editors, Melanie Bueckert, Legal Research Counsel at the Manitoba Court of Appeal, and Derek B.M. Ross, Executive Director & General Counsel for the Christian Legal Fellowship, have organized the 17 essays into six themes: freedom of religion, individual rights, collective rights, the UDHR’s global impact, judicial reasoning and human rights, and historical and contemporary perspectives. Common themes include the conceptualization of human dignity in human rights law, the tension between individual and collective or social rights, and the relevance of the historical and political context of the UDHR’s drafting to today’s social challenges.

Librarians and information professionals may be particularly interested in UBC law professor Marcus Moore’s “Freedom of Thought and the Information Revolution.” Moore engages with contemporary threats to freedom of thought related to information provision and restriction (think propaganda, indoctrination, and censorship). The right of freedom of thought is often subsumed under related rights, such as freedom of religion and expression. Moore calls for a positive rights approach to give meaningful content to the right of freedom of thought, independent of those other rights. Moore argues that fleshing out the content of freedom of thought can support balancing protections for conflicting individual freedoms, and he points to social and technological contexts in which an information recipient’s freedom of thought is often at odds with an information provider’s freedom of expression.

Those with a historical bent will appreciate the respective contributions of McGill Librarian Emeritus A.J. Hobbins and the Philos Project’s Senior Research Fellow Habib C. Malik. In “The First Draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Hobbins outlines the contributions of Canadian lawyer John Peters Humphrey to the UDHR. In Malik’s “The Human Rights Challenge for Our Times: Charles Malik and the Universal Declaration at 75,” he recounts his father’s critical contributions to the final draft and negotiations leading up to the UN General Assembly vote to approve the declaration in December 1948, most notably the inclusion of “inherent dignity” and “inalienable rights” in the Preamble.

The editors tackle the challenge of synthesizing the diversity of perspectives represented at the symposium admirably by organizing them into cohesive themes, presenting these in a logical sequence, and drawing together the common threads in their introduction. Exploring these thematic connections in even greater depth would help readers identify further linkages between seemingly disparate contributions. Most essays deal primarily with Canadian perspectives and jurisprudence. Reframing a selection of these essays as a more focused analysis of the UDHR’s influence on Canadian constitutional and human rights law could have allowed a deeper exploration of the interconnection between the UDHR and the Canadian legal context.

This volume addresses a variety of themes central to contemporary human rights discourse, makes the case for further analysis in under-theorized areas of human rights scholarship, and raises important questions about the continuing legacy of the UDHR. It will be of interest chiefly to researchers in the areas of human rights law and Canadian constitutional law, as well as courthouse and academic library collections.

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Each month, we tell you which five English-language cases and French-language cases have been the most viewed* on CanLII in the previous month and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about using summaries sourced from the case text, CanLII-published AI-generated summaries of the case, or anonymized excerpts from the case text.

For this past month, the five most-consulted English-language decisions were:

1. Mazaheri v Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONLSTH 112

Summary from case:

MAZAHERI – Costs – Negligent and Irresponsible Use of Artificial Intelligence – The Lawyer brought a motion to cancel or vary the interlocutory suspension of his licence which was dismissed – The Lawyer also brought other motions and during the process it was discovered that his negligent use of artificial intelligence added to the complexity of the matter – The Law Society argued that it should be awarded its full costs while the Lawyer asked for the costs to either be dismissed, lowered or deferred to the panel that hears the merits of the conduct application – The panel found that the Lawyer bear the full costs of his actions and ordered costs of $31,150 to the Law Society.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. R. v. Berg, 2026 SCC 21

Summary from case:

The accused was charged with sexual assault. The main issue before the trial judge was whether the complainant consented to sex with the accused. Both testified at trial. The complainant said she did not consent to the sexual activity; the accused claimed that the entire encounter was consensual. The trial judge rejected the accused’s account and the accused was convicted of sexual assault. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the accused’s arguments that the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony and failed to assess the complainant’s testimony in light of the totality of the evidence and erroneously used it to reject the accused’s account.

Held: The appeal should be dismissed.

On the merits of the two issues raised by the accused, there is substantial agreement with the reasons of the majority of the court below. However, guidance is required on the application of the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision in R. v. J.J.R.D. (2006), 2006 CanLII 40088 (ON CA), 218 O.A.C. 37. Reliance on J.J.R.D. has become commonplace for trial judges faced with situations where neither of two conflicting testimonial accounts contain any frailties standing alone. Trial judges should not rely on J.J.R.D. when structuring their W. (D.) analyses or when providing W. (D.) directions to a jury. J.J.R.D. is a case about appellate review for sufficiency of reasons and it does not set out a formula for performing a W. (D.) analysis. It was intended to apply to appellate review of trial decisions when assessing whether the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient to permit appellate review, not to be applied by trial judges themselves.

A conviction must always rest on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. J.J.R.D. maintains that appellate courts should ensure that trial judges have considered the conflicting evidence — whether it is only the complainant’s testimony or also includes circumstantial evidence — and explained why it meets the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not an invitation for trial judges to enter convictions solely based on a considered and reasoned acceptance of a complainant’s testimony. In this case, the trial judge did not use J.J.R.D. to resolve a credibility contest, and therefore made no legal error.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. R. v. Jacques-Taylor, 2026 SCC 20

Summary from case:

In November 2021, the accused and co-accused were charged with indictable drug- and firearm-related offences following a traffic stop. Both elected to be tried by a provincial court judge and the Crown did not sever the indictment. Under Jordan’s 18-month ceiling, the date at which the delay would become presumptively unreasonable was May 2023. The earliest available trial dates were in August 2023. Counsel for the accused was available in August but counsel for the co-accused was not, and counsel for the accused was unavailable in September 2023. Ultimately, the trial was scheduled for October 2023, placing the trial end date at 22 months and 2 weeks from the date on which charges were laid.

In July 2022, the case management judge directed that any s. 11(b) Charter applications should be filed within 120 days and counsel for the accused indicated that an application would be filed in September 2022; however, the notice of application was filed in January 2023 and the application itself in February 2023. In response to the application, the Crown sought earlier trial dates, but defence counsel were unavailable. The case management judge deducted one month of defence delay for the unavailability of the accused’s counsel in September 2023 and three months for the delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which was a discrete exceptional circumstance, but refused the Crown’s request to attribute to the accused the delay in August 2023 caused by the unavailability of the co-accused’s counsel. He held that the resulting net delay of 18 months and 2 weeks was presumptively unreasonable and the Crown had failed to rebut the presumption, and granted the stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error and affirmed the decision, holding that since the accused and his co-accused had not proceeded as a collective, the delay caused solely by the unavailability of the co-accused’s counsel could not be attributed to the accused.

Held (Karakatsanis, Martin and Moreau JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed, the stay of proceedings set aside and the matter remitted back for trial.

Per Wagner C.J. and Côté, Rowe, Kasirer, Jamal and O’Bonsawin JJ.: All actors in the criminal justice system have a duty to proactively collaborate and joint trials are a powerful tool for ensuring systemic efficiency. The Jordan ceilings beyond which delays are presumptively unreasonable can be rebutted and delay flowing from the Crown’s decision to conduct a joint prosecution may, sometimes, amount to a discrete exceptional circumstance, transforming an otherwise unreasonable delay into a reasonable one. In the instant case, the delay caused by the unavailability of the co-accused’s counsel amounts to a discrete exceptional circumstance that should be deducted from the net delay, bringing the total delay to under 18 months, rendering it presumptively reasonable. In the absence of argument as to why the presumptively reasonable delay would nonetheless be unreasonable, the delay is reasonable and the stay of proceedings must be set aside.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

4. Granderson v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 CanLII 53065

AI-generated summary:

Facts: An applicant files an application for leave and judicial review, initially stating that written reasons are not received. Reasons are later served and filed under a letter dated October 15, 2025. Under rule 10 of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22 (FCCIRPR), the applicant’s record becomes due and is not filed. A Practice Direction and Special Order grants a guaranteed 45-day extension to perfect the application for leave. The applicant still misses the extended deadline. The applicant then brings a motion to extend time to serve and file the applicant’s record.

Legal Issues: Should an extension of time be granted to serve and file the applicant’s record?

Disposition: The applicant’s motion is dismissed.

Reasons: By Associate Judge Trent Horne: An extension of time is discretionary and depends on intention to proceed, merit, prejudice, and a reasonable explanation for delay. The Practice Direction and Special Order does not amend FCCIRPR deadlines and only provides a guaranteed extension without needing consent. A second extension beyond the Special Order is expected to be infrequent and subject to greater scrutiny. No reasonable explanation accounts for the entire delay, including missing the Special Order deadline and delaying the formal motion. Workload and predictable clinic constraints, such as exams and holidays, do not justify delay. Counsel and client are treated as one for extension motions, so client consequences follow counsel’s failures. The applicant shows an intention to proceed by bringing the motion and addressing merit in the materials. The applicant faces prejudice if the motion is dismissed, while the respondent and the Registry face prejudice from the delay. Overall, the factors do not satisfy the test, and interests of justice do not displace the applicant’s burden or established criteria. Immigration proceedings emphasise timely, summary disposition, including under sections 72 and 74 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001 c 27 and rule 21 FCCIRPR. Granting an extension after a long, unsatisfactorily explained delay is inconsistent with those objectives.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

5. Mentzelopoulos v Alberta Health Services, 2026 ABKB 414

AI-generated summary:

Facts: A plaintiff pursues a wrongful dismissal action against Alberta Health Services and Alberta. Since summer 2025, two podcasters repeatedly publish hostile commentary about the plaintiff and her lawsuit. The commentary calls the plaintiff dishonest and criminal and depicts her lawsuit as a “grift” or “shakedown,” without substantiating evidence. The plaintiff gives uncontradicted evidence that the campaign makes her anxious, fearful, and worn down. The plaintiff applies to cite the podcasters in criminal contempt for litigation-participant interference and seeks restraining and take-down relief.

Legal Issues: Is there “reasonable and probable grounds” to cite the podcasters in criminal contempt for litigation-participant interference? Does the Court have inherent jurisdiction to restrain and order the take-down of contemptuous communications pending the contempt determination? Is the plaintiff’s request for restraining and take-down orders moot because the content was removed? Should the plaintiff obtain access to Anton Piller materials obtained on a related witness application, and a disclosure order for the podcasters’ backers?

Disposition: The podcasters are cited in criminal contempt for apparent litigation-participant interference. Restraining and take-down orders are granted pending, at minimum, the contempt hearing and adjudication. Access to Anton Piller materials and any disclosure order are deferred and may be revisited later. The plaintiff receives costs of the application, with quantum to be determined after written costs submissions.

Reasons: By Honourable Justice Michael J. Lema: The evidentiary record supports only one reasonable inference: the campaign deliberately interferes with a litigation participant. The campaign targets the plaintiff because she sues Alberta and Alberta Health Services, aiming to make her abandon the lawsuit. The record supports objectively understood intimidation and the plaintiff’s uncontradicted subjective impact evidence is objectively reasonable. The appropriate standard at the citation stage is “reasonable and probable grounds,” not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard is satisfied on both intention and intimidation, and the podcasters should be cited in criminal contempt. Inherent jurisdiction extends to restraining further interference and directing the take-down of communications constituting interference pending the contempt determination. The record supports irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favours immediate restraint and removal. Mootness is rejected because the podcasters provide no meaningful evidence of removal efforts, and contempt proceedings may proceed even if content was removed. Access to Anton Piller materials is premature because admissibility and scope remain unresolved on the related witness proceeding. A disclosure order for alleged backers lacks supporting authority on this record and may be addressed later depending on access to the Anton Piller evidence.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

***

The five most-consulted French-language decisions were:

1. Pharmaciens (Ordre professionnel des) c. Sanscartier, 2026 QCCDPHA 14

Excerpt from case:

INTRODUCTION

[1] Les 25 et 27 février 2026, le Conseil de discipline (le Conseil) s’est réuni afin de procéder à l’audition de la plainte disciplinaire déposée par le plaignant, [nom supprimé], en sa qualité de syndic adjoint de l’Ordre des pharmaciens du Québec (l’Ordre), contre l’intimée, [nom supprimé].

[2] Le plaignant reproche à l’intimée d’avoir publiquement tenu des propos qui incitent le public à éviter des médicaments génériques produits par un fabricant pharmaceutique spécifique pour des raisons qu’il qualifie de politiques.

[3] La plainte disciplinaire (la plainte) est ainsi libellée :

1. Sur la plateforme TikTok, entre le ou vers le 14 septembre 2024 et le ou vers le 28 février 2025, dans une déclaration publique traitant de l’exercice de la pharmacie, a encouragé pour des raisons politiques au boycott des médicaments du fabricant TEVA, contrevenant ainsi à l’article 18 du Code de déontologie des pharmaciens (RLRQ, c. P-10, r. 7) ainsi qu’à l’article 59.2 du Code des professions (RLRQ, c. C-26).

[Transcription textuelle]

[4] L’intimée enregistre un plaidoyer de non-culpabilité sur chacune des dispositions de rattachement invoquées au soutien de l’unique chef de la plainte.

QUESTION EN LITIGE

[5] Le plaignant s’est-il déchargé du fardeau de preuve concernant les éléments essentiels de l’unique chef de la plainte portée contre l’intimée?

[6] Pour les motifs qui suivent, le Conseil conclut que le plaignant ne s’est pas déchargé de son fardeau de preuve qui lui incombait et acquitte l’intimée d’avoir contrevenu à l’article 18 du Code de déontologie des pharmaciens et à l’article 59.2 du Code des professions.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. Association des ressources intermédiaires d’hébergement du Québec (ARIHQ) c. Santé Québec – Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’Île-de-Montréal, 2026 QCCS 1360

AI-generated summary:

Faits: Une ressource intermédiaire offre des services d’hébergement à un établissement de santé, selon une entente nationale incorporée à des ententes particulières. Une mésentente survient et porte sur une rétribution alléguée impayée pour une période antérieure à l’intégration du premier usager. Un avis de mésentente est transmis près de trois ans après des refus de paiement, puis un avis d’arbitrage suit. L’établissement soulève le dépassement du délai pour produire l’avis de mésentente et demande le rejet préliminaire de l’arbitrage.

Questions de droit: Une erreur alléguée sur l’art. 2884 C.c.Q. rend-elle la sentence « contraire à l’ordre public » au sens de l’art. 646 C.p.c.? L’appui de la sentence sur des références doctrinales et jurisprudentielles inexistantes constitue-t-il un non-respect de la « procédure arbitrale applicable » (art. 646 C.p.c.)?

Dispositif: Sentence arbitrale du 8 août 2025 annulée. Nouveau choix d’un arbitre ordonné dans les 60 jours. Frais de justice accordés.

Motifs: Par l’honorable Martin F. Sheehan, j.c.s. : La demande en annulation constitue l’unique moyen de se pourvoir contre une sentence arbitrale. Les motifs d’annulation prévus à l’art. 646 C.p.c. sont exhaustifs et ne permettent pas l’examen du fond. La contrariété à l’ordre public vise le résultat de la sentence, non l’exactitude du raisonnement. Une erreur de droit, même relative à une règle d’ordre public comme l’art. 2884 C.c.Q., ne justifie pas l’annulation. Le délai en litige concerne l’obligation d’aviser la mésentente, et sa qualification en déchéance est écartée. La validité d’un préavis contractuel est reconnue en jurisprudence, de sorte que le dispositif n’est pas inconciliable avec l’ordre public. Une violation importante de la procédure arbitrale convenue peut justifier l’annulation si elle affecte l’intégrité du processus. Les parties choisissent l’arbitre et s’attendent à ce que la décision émane de celui-ci, sans délégation du pouvoir décisionnel. Les références doctrinales et jurisprudentielles déterminantes dans la sentence s’avèrent inexistantes, ce qui appuie la conclusion d’une délégation et d’une abdication du rôle décisionnel. Le manquement est important et a probablement eu un impact sur le résultat, justifiant l’annulation.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. Poulin c. Hydro-Québec, 2026 QCCA 758

AI-generated summary:

Faits: Un haut cadre d’une société d’État travaille longtemps au sein de l’organisation et occupe un poste de vice-président. En 2020, une réorganisation entraîne sa mutation à un poste de directeur principal avec des responsabilités jugées moins stratégiques. L’employeur impose la mutation et indique que le refus sera assimilé à une démission. Le cadre refuse la mutation, conteste toute intention de démissionner et l’employeur met fin à son emploi au 31 juillet 2020.

Questions de droit: Le constat de congédiement déguisé repose-t-il sur une erreur révisable en appel? L’obligation de mitigation impose-t-elle d’accepter la mutation à l’origine du congédiement déguisé? En l’espèce, l’employeur a-t-il établi une aggravation du préjudice par manquement à la mitigation?

Dispositif: Appel accueilli. Jugement de première instance infirmé. Condamnation à payer 836 365 $, avec intérêts et indemnité additionnelle, à compter du 31 juillet 2020. Frais de justice accordés en appel et en première instance.

Motifs : Par le juge Sansfaçon, J.C.A. (les juges Healy, J.C.A. et Kalichman, J.C.A., y souscrivant) : Les moyens visant le constat de congédiement déguisé sont rejetés selon la norme applicable. La mutation impose une modification substantielle des fonctions, non autorisée par le contrat. La rétrogradation ressort objectivement de la perte du titre et des responsabilités stratégiques. L’obligation de mitigation de l’art. 1479 C.c.Q. ne force pas l’acceptation d’une mutation imposée comme modification permanente. L’approche inspirée de Evans suppose une offre claire de revenir travailler à titre de délai-congé. L’employeur présente plutôt un ultimatum, assimilant le refus à une démission, sans offrir un préavis en temps. L’absence des « obstacles » de Evans ne dispense pas de l’obligation de donner un délai de congé raisonnable suivant l’art. 2091 C.c.Q. Le fardeau de prouver un manquement à la mitigation et une aggravation du préjudice n’est pas rempli. L’indemnité due n’est pas contestée et correspond à un préavis de 24 mois.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

4. Haroch c. Banque Toronto-Dominion, 2026 QCCA 700

AI-generated summary:

Faits : Une emprunteuse convertit une portion de prêt en hypothèque fermée à taux fixe et reçoit un escompte sur le taux affiché. Elle rembourse avant terme et paie des frais de remboursement anticipé calculés selon le différentiel de taux d’intérêt (DTI). Un emprunteur contracte aussi une hypothèque fermée à taux fixe assortie d’un escompte et d’une formule DTI. Il rembourse avant terme et paie des frais de remboursement anticipé selon la formule DTI. Les emprunteurs contestent l’usage d’un « escompte constant » dans le calcul DTI, qu’ils jugent surindemnisant. Ils cherchent l’autorisation d’exercer une action collective contre plusieurs institutions financières.

Questions de droit : Le syllogisme fondé sur l’usage de l’escompte est-il frappé par la chose jugée au sens de l’art. 2848 C.c.Q.? Le stare decisis rend-il la cause d’action « insoutenable » malgré l’absence de chose jugée? Les faits allégués satisfont-ils au seuil de l’art. 575(2) C.p.c. quant à une cause d’action défendable? Les demandes soulèvent-elles une question commune au sens de l’art. 575(1) C.p.c. malgré des variables individuelles?

Dispositif : Appel accueilli. Jugement de première instance infirmé. Demande modifiée d’autorisation accueillie, sauf quant à la définition du groupe et aux questions et conclusions recherchées. Exercice de l’action collective autorisé, avec représentants désignés et groupe redéfini. Dossier retourné à la juge en chef de la Cour supérieure et autres demandes déférées au juge gestionnaire, avec frais.

Motifs : Par les juges Vauclair, J.C.A., Schrager, J.C.A. et Hamilton, J.C.A. : L’absence d’identité de cause exclut la chose jugée au sens de l’art. 2848 C.c.Q. Le stare decisis ne s’étend qu’à la ratio decidendi, et ni Brunelle ni Haroch 1 ne tranche l’argument précis fondé sur l’escompte. Le rôle à l’autorisation demeure un mécanisme de filtrage, au seuil peu élevé, suivant l’art. 575 C.p.c. Le raisonnement de première instance compare les FRA à la perte brute d’intérêts contractuels, sans intégrer la minimisation du préjudice. Deux visions contradictoires demeurent possibles, dont celle selon laquelle les FRA devraient approximativement refléter la perte économique nette, et une preuve préliminaire soutient une surindemnisation. Le débat exige une instruction au fond plutôt qu’un tranchage à l’étape de l’autorisation. Une question commune utile subsiste, soit la comparaison des formules DTI avec la perte économique nette ou brute du prêteur, car la réponse peut faire avancer le dossier de manière non négligeable. Les variations individuelles relèvent du recouvrement individuel, non de recours individuels distincts, conformément à l’art. 599 C.p.c. La définition du groupe et les questions communes doivent être reformulées pour viser les FRA supérieurs à la perte économique nette.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

5. R. c. Robitaille, 2026 QCCA 785

AI-generated summary:

Faits : Les accusés font face à des accusations de corruption liées aux affaires municipales de la ville de Terrebonne. Un témoin important de la poursuite devient visé par un signalement alléguant d’autres gestes de corruption. Les accusés demandent la communication de toute l’information liée à ce signalement. Le traitement du signalement et la divulgation de la preuve se déroulent lentement et par vagues successives, y compris pendant une requête en abus de procédure.

Questions de droit : La juge de première instance s’ingère-t-elle dans le pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’UPAC en examinant le traitement du signalement? La conduite de l’UPAC et du poursuivant en matière de communication constitue-t-elle un abus de procédure? L’arrêt des procédures est-il une réparation juste et appropriée selon le par. 24(1) de la Charte?

Dispositif : Appel du poursuivant rejeté.

Motifs : Par le juge Cournoyer, J.C.A. (les juges Schrager, J.C.A. et Harvie, J.C.A., y souscrivant) : La déférence s’impose aux constats de crédibilité, sauf erreur manifeste et déterminante. L’appel repose principalement sur une relecture des faits et sur des témoignages policiers rejetés en première instance. Aucune erreur manifeste et déterminante n’est démontrée quant à l’appréciation de la preuve. La discrétion policière ne permet pas d’éluder les obligations constitutionnelles de communication. L’examen du traitement du signalement s’impose pour trancher les obligations corollaires de divulgation et l’allégation d’abus. La pertinence du signalement tient à son contenu relatif à la crédibilité d’un témoin, non à sa validation préalable. Les délais et tergiversations entourant la divulgation, conjugués au manque de transparence, appuient le constat d’abus de procédure. La juge du procès pouvait conclure à une conduite choquante pour l’intégrité du système de justice. Le choix d’une réparation sous le par. 24(1) de la Charte relève d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire et aucune erreur justifiant l’intervention n’apparaît.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

* As of February 2025 we measure the number of unique pageviews that a case gets; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.

The post Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII? – June 2026 appeared first on Slaw.

How many times have you asked someone , “ how are you?”

Similarly, how many times have you been asked the same question?

If we think about this, the question becomes very mundane and actually quite meaningless.

“How are you?” has become a customary greeting, wherein we don’t expect to receive or give a response that is more than “I am okay.

Recently, after being asked by a friend “how are you?” I realized in mid answer, that this person was not even listening to what I was saying.

I am certain that many of you have found yourselves in a similar situation.

As I pondered on this realization and how it made me feel, it became clear to me, that in a world that is lacking authenticity and the ability to be present in the moment, actually listening to the answer, may be a turning point which leads us back to meaningful human interaction.

So let me ask those who are reading this… How are you… truly?

Are you feeling overwhelmed in a world that seems to be running a race without a destination?

Are you lacking real human connection… the kind that feels safe, genuine, and non judgmental?

Are you craving emotional acceptance and being able to share your true feelings without fear of judgment and/or repercussion?

If so, then I want you to know that you are NOT alone.

Most people are not able to either express this or are too afraid to admit it.

So let me invite you to a safe space. Even if it’s just you and your journal for now. Just find those few moments to sit with yourself, or if you are lucky to have that one special friend or family member, and allow yourself to be authentic and free to vent, write, talk and connect with yourself.

It seems that technology with its constant demands of 24/7 availability is taking over the human need to recharge, disconnect and be present.

We were never meant to actually respond to calls and emails at all hours of the day or night. We were meant to work, play, rest, and repeat.

24 hours of every day were meant to consist of 8 hours of rest, 8 hours of work and 8 hours of play.

When you think about this time allocation, you are probably asking yourself, where do I have time to rest or play for 8 hours? How can I find these hours in my day when I am multitasking child or elder care, general family responsibilities, work, volunteer activities and a multiple “to do” list.

That is the dilemma in North American culture, but realistically speaking, people in other parts of the world have mastered this quite well.

In Europe there are three or four hour ‘lunch hours” where people go home and eat with their families, rest and recharge. Weekends are for family and relaxation. Vacation is at least four weeks per year.

In our culture, only some careers allow for such “luxury.” However this is not luxury, it is a necessity. Mental health professionals and advocates have been urging us to do this for years.

We were never meant to adjust to the 24/7 technological world and become human robots. We are meant to harness the technology and other innovation to create a more kinder, calmer and meaningful world.

Using technology to work smarter not harder is the key.

If we allow technology to dictate our evolution as human beings, the “human” part of our existence and interaction will actually one day disappear.

So next time you ask someone “how are you?” I would invite you to ask this only if you are ready to truly listen.

When you put away the phone, shut down the computer and other distractions , you can show others that you are present and willing to bring humanity into the conversation.

Who knows… maybe if all of us start to practice really listening to the answer, we will begin to feel connected to our fellow human beings.

This in turn will lead to feeling safe sharing our own feelings and emotions with those asking us “how are you?”

The next transformation will then lead to people accepting the fact that sharing emotions and feelings is humanity and not weakness, which will finally create a world with more acceptance, love, compassion and permanent eradication of the pandemic of mental health issues.

Wishing you all much success in finding and expressing you true selves.

________________

Disclaimer

The information in this article is not therapy, counseling, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, mental health care/treatment, substance abuse care/ treatment, nor is it medical, psychological, mental health advice or treatment, or any other professional advice.

The information in this article is for information purposes only, and is not to be used as a substitute for therapy, counseling, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, mental health care, medical care, or any other professional advice by legal, medical or other qualified professionals.

The information in this article shall not be recorded, copied or distributed.

If you feel that you may need medical or other professional help, please contact your doctor or call 911 if it is an emergency.

The post The Wellness Lawyer: “How Are You?” appeared first on Slaw.

The troika of artificial intelligence, pricing, and talent transience has been with us for some time now. As a result, traditional pyramid-structured law firms grappling with these bet-the-business juggernauts are at an inflection point. I propose a flatter way forward.

I have been writing and talking about this issue for many years, most recently as part of my ‘The Law Firm’ series: Pyramid Rollover, Private Equity Puzzle, Disappearing Act, Foundational Rebuild, and now this one, Inflection Point.

My argument throughout this series is that traditional law firm pyramid structures will not hold against AI, pricing, and talent transience. Therefore, those who want to fix their firm structure must do so in stages strategic to their client base, not the firm’s internal constituents.

And there’s the rub. This is why we will see more mergers and consolidations because they are “easier” than restructuring with less blood on the floor. In addition, we are likely to see more failures of firms of all sizes in various jurisdictions worldwide.

A Flatter Structure

The traditional law firm pyramid structure is crumbling. It is rotting from the bottom up. New lawyers are asking “what’s in it for me?” and leaving after getting experience. Mid-career lawyers are questioning whether to invest capital into becoming an equity partner with the possibility of no one buying them out in 20 to 30 years. Senior partners are shifting to counsel with many feeling that now is no time to be a senior partner in a law firm.

Against this turbulent backdrop, I propose a flatter law firm structure that reflects how firms can shift from being traditional hives of busy work that can now be done almost to completion by AI, to become environments where true advisory services are founded on four cornerstones: 1. Industry Alignment, 2. Business Experience, 3. Legal Perspective, and 4. Sales Culture. Let me explain.

1. Industry Alignment

Clients don’t care about your business; they care about their business. This translates to “Clients don’t care about your practice; they care about their industry,” which I have been writing and talking about forever. Yet most law firms structure by and lead with practice because it is traditional and puts the focus on themselves. This is backward, shortsighted, and client insensitive. Better to flip the script because even though transitioning to an industry-aligned structure is not for the faint of heart, it meets the market where it is and from a position of strength.

Every law firm regardless of practice – including litigation – can align by industry using NAICS (North American Industry Classification Systems) Codes. NAICS is the gold standard because every business engaged in active commerce must select a code that identifies them by industry. For example, the code for Legal services is 5411 that being parsed further reveals that 54111 is the code for Offices of lawyers, 54112 for Offices of notaries, and 54119 for Other legal services. The same is true for all industry categories.

The best part about identifying clients by their NAICS code is that these codes cannot be argued – an enterprise self-selects the code that best identifies its business. Therefore, NAICS codes ensure exact alignment with recognized and real industries rather than catering to whims of those who insist on aligning fantastical, non-existent industries to their individual practices. For example, there’s no number high enough to tally how many times I have argued that there is no such thing as a technology industry, which is why NAICS doesn’t include it. Industries are verticals. Technology, somewhat like tax or litigation, is horizontal and touches all industry verticals.

Industry alignment presents a firm’s strengths and weaknesses with stark clarity. Other pluses of structuring by industry include but are not limited to market positioning, client attraction, talent and technology considerations, budgeting, and teams.

Market Positioning and Client Attraction

Industry alignment cements your market position. How? Because industry strengths crystalize a firm’s standing in terms of its client base. And when industry strengths are cast against financials, findings are further clarified about which ancillary industries to keep or add to those revealed as core as well as those that can be downplayed or spun off.

An industry-first market position enables a distinctly defined go to market objective with clear strategies to support it as well as no-nonsense tactics that act as bulwarks. It also enables bright-lined brand boundaries that reinforce a revamped or new business.

While market positioning is client-facing, there is no clearer message to both the firm’s internal constituents as well as a firm’s current and prospective clients that industry alignment, experience and know-how are to be found at an industry-first firm. Both talent and clients who recognize this signal are either attracted to it or understand they may be better suited elsewhere.

This is exactly the part most traditionally structured law firms fear most: That a non-aligned client may shift out or a non-aligned lawyer may leave. But this is also the precise turning point that results in the short-term pain/long-term return-on-investment gain of industry-aligned market positioning. This is because those who leave open capacity for a firm to take in more of the exact type of talent it wants along with clients whose work sits squarely in the centre of its industry-based wheelhouse.

Talent, Technology, and Budgeting

Industry alignment identifies where to invest or divest in talent and technology in order to either bulk up or trim down. While it enables smart hiring because it identifies a firm’s strengths, it also sends a signal to those who have expertise outside the firm’s industry distinctions that they may be best to consider other opportunities.

The ugly truth is that job losses due to AI and pricing have and will continue to impact talent at all levels throughout traditionally structured law firms and are part of the transience we’ve seen to date. It’s fair to expect this will not abate and transformation of roles will continue to happen resulting in turnover at all levels in law firms worldwide. While this is an uncomfortable topic, it is very real.

What is also real is that industry alignment enables a firm to become lean and, due to industry strengths, is better able to attract talent with industry depth and savviness who, in turn, attract and retain industry-relevant clients.

The same can be said for new, current or dated technology that can be added, kept, tailored or turfed depending on industry relevance.

Lastly, budgeting becomes sharply defined with decisions around expenditures being black or white – money either supports a key industry target, or it doesn’t. Budgeting debates become moot, and business moves ahead with less friction and better speed.

Industry Teams

The smartest law firms ensure that within multidisciplinary industry teams, there are individuals with proven, hands-on experience working within that team’s specific industry. Simply being interested won’t cut it with hardcore industry professionals who eat pretenders for lunch. This why the person with direct, hands-on industry experience – and not the most senior lawyer – is the best choice as that industry team’s leader.

For example, a firm I worked with in 2006 was identified by NAICS client codes as having distinctive automotive industry strengths. So, when I created an automotive team to service those clients, its leader was an associate-level lawyer and mechanical engineer with hardcore automotive expertise. Team members had proven experience working on automotive shop floors, testing facilities, and with parts manufacturers. True industry experts, they spoke the language of “automotive” that enabled the team to be founded on zero fantasy and no BS. Furthermore, because of their industry qualifications, that automotive team remains strong and vibrant to this day.

2. Business Experience

While it may not be taught in law schools, it’s still amazing how many lawyers range from ill-informed to clueless about business fundamentals. For example, while walking down the hall of a national firm many years ago, I overheard a 30-year-out senior business lawyer ask what “variance” meant. His question stopped me in my tracks. How could someone who advises businesses not know that term or what it means? (Variance is the difference between actual and budgeted income and expenditure.) It’s basic business. And “speaking to the variance” monthly helps those who control the purse strings understand when and how budgeted funds are currently being or will soon be spent.

Understanding how business works is a critical piece of the puzzle. If business fundamentals are not taught in law school, get educated by another means fast.

This harkens back to my argument that clients don’t care about your practice; they care about their business and while their legal needs are only one supportive facet of their business, speaking the languages of both their industry and commerce makes all the difference in the world.

3. Legal Perspective

Providing a legal perspective is the smallest piece of a flattened structure, but it is where legal knowledge enables judgement on a client’s problematic issues as well as their business planning. This is a piece AI isn’t capable of – yet. It is where our humanity and abilities to sympathize and emphasize, listen and watch, and question and gauge for nuance still eclipse machines.

As an illustration, one of the most successful managing partners with whom I’ve worked over the years also handled trademarks for one of Canada’s most iconic companies. In addition, he acted as a business planning sounding board by attending the company’s management meetings gratis for many years and, as a result, knew the business inside out and backward. While he wasn’t qualified to answer questions to all issues that had a legal component, the company entrusted him to find the very right person from the very right firm – that often wasn’t his own – to provide a response and solutions. In doing so, he was indispensable to the company’s leaders and general counsel who told me during a feedback session that they would never make a move without him.

4. Sales Culture

The combination of AI and pricing is leading smart law firms toward the development of a sales culture. You can call sales “business development” if you prefer, but the type of business development I am proposing is very different from the type of business development that currently predominates in the conventional law firm realm.

This is a sales culture as it was in the Big Four in the mid-1990s and law firms – even though they’re late into the starting gate – are well-advised to catch up.

A Sales Culture supports the three cornerstones of Industry Alignment, Business Expertise, and Legal Perspective as well as being a cornerstone unto itself.

Success with a sales culture starts by hiring business development people who have proven experience and deep knowledge of the industries with which the firm has notable strengths and aligns. These people are worth their weight in gold because they know their industry’s needs and wants as well as its players and politics and, best of all, they speak that industry’s language fluently.

As a result, they are best positioned to research and select high potential clients – both current and prospective – who have work that sits squarely in the centre of a firm’s industry purview. As for clients, having someone from their industry working within a firm helps cement both trust and loyalty.

Industry-based sales talent is also well-positioned to use relationship mapping to find opportunities for the firm to provide cross-servicing opportunities that lawyers often miss because they are focused solely on the work they are doing for a client and how they are being compensated for it. This is when industry-aligned sales talent that sees the big picture of how well a client is or isn’t being served can determine if said client is even a good match for what the firm offers.

This identification is vitally important. Not every dollar is a good dollar and carrying an unsuitable client is costly. This is when a strong sales culture bolstered by industry-experienced sales talent can cull burdensome clients to open capacity for clients with work that sits dead centre of the flatter structured law firm’s industry-based wheelhouse.

Account-Based Growth

In this model, sales acts as a client-work instigator as well as a bridge to the very right lawyer and/or industry team that has the know-how to apply business smarts and legal perspective. Brought it at the midway point or later in the process, the lawyer or industry team close the sale, do the legal work, and both they and the relationship sales talent retain ties to the client to aid in the development of that client’s business, which is at the heart of – guess what? – business development.

This revenue-generating model takes the heat off lawyers who – at least to me over the last almost-30 years – have complained that they didn’t go to law school to sell legal services.

In a nutshell, what I have described is an account-based growth strategy.

Over the years, I have revamped legal services teams to embrace account-based growth. Some firms have taken to it better than others. Those best suited tend to be peopled by lawyers who understand – and are often relieved – that they don’t have to be leaders of a pack. In a flatter structure, lawyers are equal members of a team.

Firms that struggle tend to be peopled by lawyers who cannot stand even the thought of not leading the charge to acquire a new client often with bull-in-a-china-shop tactics, such as a senior lawyer who, in front of me, failed to introduce himself to a decision-maker from a major bank who he had never met and whose work every firm wanted. Instead, he sprang in front of this individual and asked a direct but confrontational question: “How do we get your work?” It was hardly a surprise that the bank’s decision-maker decided that neither this partner nor his firm would be successful.

Fix the Firm

Lawyers are not unique in wanting control over their livelihoods. We all desire control in one way or another. However, controlling the juggernaut effects of AI, pricing, and talent transience is like trying to push a pill up a hill with your nose: It’s a lot of work that takes too long and the return on investment is nil. The real question is how to wrangle this three-headed hydra effectively.

I often talk about this problem as “fixing the plane while flying it,” a phrase that seems to capture imaginations because it’s visual. The problem is not who on the plane is doing the fixing; instead, it’s the plane itself. “The plane, she is broken,” said an Alitalia representative when I checked in at Italy’s Pisa airport years ago and learned a flight was cancelled.

Like that plane in Pisa, the traditionally structured law firm, she is broken. Short of ordering a new type of aircraft – or in this case, a new type of law firm, which private equity is already doing in a big way worldwide right now – a flattened industry-aligned structure that positions clients squarely in the centre of its account-based growth strategy might be one of the most effective models now and in years to come.

The post The Law Firm Inflection Point appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. BC Estate Litigation Blog 2. Administrative Law Matters 3. Equilawbrium 4. Civil Resolution Tribunal blog 5. Labour Pains

BC Estate Litigation Blog
What I’m Reading: Interesting Estate Articles for May 2026

The following is a round-up of noteworthy articles published this month on estate litigation issues: Eric Hendry, tax lawyer at Gowling LLP – Ontario, writes about how estate planners can navigate tax dual-residency and the applicability of ‘tie breaker’ treaties for the All About Estates law blog …

Administrative Law Matters
New Paper: An Institutional Approach to Judicial Independence and Accountability

I am looking forward very much to a trip to South Africa next week for the Public Law Conference this year on the theme of Public Law and the Future of Constitutional Democracy. My paper is on “An Institutional Approach to Judicial Independence and Accountability”: …

Equilawbrium
SPECIAL EDITION: Fireside Chat with Claudio Klaus

Civil Resolution Tribunal blog
CRT Key Statistics – June 2026

Do you like data? We do! Here’s our monthly report of key statistics. If there’s information you would like to see added to our monthly reports, please contact us. We will consider including it. “Open” includes disputes in screening, negotiation and facilitation, on hold, decision preparation, and adjudication. “Closed” includes withdrawn claims, disputes resolved by agreement, the CRT refused to issue a Dispute Notice, disputes resolved by default or final decision, and other reasons for closure. …

Labour Pains
Application Best Serves Proportionality, Efficiency, and Justice in Wrongful Dismissal Case: ONSC

Applications remain an appropriate vehicle, if not the preferred approach, for the resolution of wrongful dismissal cases. In an endorsement released May 12, 2026, the Honourable Justice Marc Garson of the ONSC refused a request to convert a wrongful dismissal application into an action.In providing reasons for decision, Justice Garson observed, “Proceeding by application best reflects the principle of proportionality in light of the issues raised. It is also the most efficient, cost-effective and timely means of achieving a just result.” Adding, “While many wrongful dismissal claims involving employment contracts proceed by way of an action, there is no requirement that this case do so.” …

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*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Earlier this year, a motion at the Ontario Superior Court paused while everyone in the room went looking for a quotation. The factum on one side quoted a decision of the Court of Appeal, and opposing counsel could not find the quoted words anywhere in that decision. He suspected the factum had been drafted with AI. The judge called a short recess, so the party who filed it could go and find the passage.[1]

The citation was correct, and anyone who looked it up would have found exactly the case named. In this instance, AI produced a fake quotation from a real case. A legal database would have cleared the citation without trouble, because the citation was never the problem.

For two years now, the story of generative AI in Canadian courts has been a story about fake cases. We have catalogued the problem in more than 166 published decisions. However, behind them sits a second body of AI misuse that the defences built for fake cases do not reach. We have now found 28 Canadian decisions in which a court or tribunal flagged AI misuse that was something other than a fictitious citation.[2] In general, they come in three kinds.

Propositions with no source

The first kind is a hallucinated proposition of law. The tool states a legal rule with confidence, and either gives no citation at all or points to a real provision that says nothing of the kind. In one strata dispute before British Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal, a self-represented litigant built his argument on six sections of the Strata Property Act. While the sections are real, none of them said what the party claimed they said, and the tribunal treated the submissions as likely AI hallucinations.[3] A near-identical thing happened in another strata matter weeks earlier.[4]

Fake quotes from real cases

The second kind is the one that stopped the motion described above. The case is real and correctly cited, but the words attributed to it are invented. In one Ontario proceeding, a party’s reply factum quoted a passage it ascribed to Justice Rothstein, writing for the Supreme Court of Canada in Sattva. The court found that nothing resembling the quotation appears anywhere in the decision.[5] In a tribunal matter, a party quoted a block of text from paragraph 150 of a decision that only has 124 paragraphs.[6]

The new frontier: evidence

The third kind is the newest, and it is the reason this is worth writing about now. Litigants have begun using these tools not to find the law, but to create evidence.

For example, a party in BC supported his case with material generated by ChatGPT and Claude, which the tribunal disregarded.[7] In another, an applicant asked a chatbot to describe the signs of a horse that needs dental work, then asked it to review a clinic’s records and summarize the veterinarian’s findings, and submitted the output as proof.[8] Before Quebec’s labour tribunal, a worker put forward a large body of AI-generated research to establish that his shoulder injury had been caused by his job, and the tribunal dismissed the material in its entirety.[9]

And notice where these cases are landing. Of the 28 decisions, 25 involved self-represented litigants, and 20 came from tribunals rather than courts. Almost none drew a consequence heavier than a warning, with the highest costs award in the set being $910.[10] Tribunals are the busiest and least formal corners of the system, where the rules of evidence are relaxed by design, and where an adjudicator working through a long list of cases will sometimes decide on the arguments that hold and set the rest aside. It is the softest target in the system, and it is where the harder problem is arriving first.

Where the rules stop

None of this is what the current rules were built for. Most practice directions issued so far speak to the same hazard, that AI invents fictitious citations, and tell parties to verify their case law against a trusted database like CanLII.[11] The whole apparatus appears to stop at the citation, which is exactly where the new frontier begins. There is no CanLII for facts, and almost nothing in the rulebooks points at them yet.

So, the response must move onto the evidence layer. Right now, when a tribunal confronts AI-generated evidence, it improvises. It reaches for a thin line of earlier decisions that declined to rely on such material because of its inherent unreliability, and it decides the question case by case.[12] That instinct is sound, but it should not have to be rebuilt every time. British Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal has shown what the alternative looks like. As of February 1, 2026, its rules forbid participants from submitting fabricated evidence, including evidence created or altered by an AI tool.[13] A rule like that is the first half of the answer. The second half is a default the practice directions could adopt tomorrow: AI-generated material offered as evidence carries no weight until the party putting it forward can show where it came from and why it can be trusted.

This will not catch everything, and we have to be honest about that. A standard like this works on the litigant who discloses, or whose opponent objects. It does nothing about the determined party who launders an AI-generated document into their record and says nothing. But it is a starting point to address this new frontier.

________

Tom Macintosh Zheng is a Toronto-based former commercial litigator and the co-founder of Courtready.ca. Courtready builds practical tools for Canadians who litigate and conducts original research on access to justice issues. He maintains a live database of Canadian decisions flagging AI-fabricated case law and other AI misuse, updated daily, at courtready.ca/fictitious-citations-in-canadian-courts. He is the 2026 recipient of the Ontario Bar Association Foundation Award.

________

[1]RSR Road Surface Recycling v Bonnechere Excavating et al., 2026 ONSC 698 at paras 34, 39.

[2]Figures in this article are drawn from the author’s database of Canadian decisions flagging AI misuse, current to June 2026 and updated daily: courtready.ca/fictitious-citations-in-canadian-courts.

[3]Wyszynski v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS1721, 2026 BCCRT 851 at para 10.

[4]Chen v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS3094, 2026 BCCRT 823 at para 11.

[5]Kapahi Real Estate Inc. v. Elite Real Estate Club of Toronto Inc., 2026 ONSC 1438 at paras 24–25.

[6]Re X Corp., 2025 BCCRT 1228 at para 45.

[7]Lee v. AutoCanada MR Motors GP Inc., 2026 BCCRT 854 at para 8.

[8]Iida v. Meadow Lane Equine Clinic Ltd, 2026 BCCRT 626 at paras 25–26.

[9]Côté et Placements JF Desgagné inc., 2026 QCTAT 1311 at paras 21–23.

[10]Ren v. Area 09, 2025 BCPAAB 20253891, at para 33.

[11]See, e.g., Tribunals Ontario, Practice Direction on the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Tribunal Proceedings.

[12]See, e.g., Bahia v. ICBC, 2025 BCCRT 453 at para 14.

[13]Civil Resolution Tribunal, Standard Rules, r 8.3(9) (effective February 1, 2026).

The post Beyond Fake Cases: The Other Ways AI Is Going Wrong in Canadian Courts appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : Serge Audette est reconnu coupable de l’homicide involontaire d’une jeune femme qui a disparu 30 ans plus tôt et dont le corps n’a jamais été trouvé.

Intitulé : R. c. Audette, 2026 QCCQ 2478 *
Juridiction : Cour du Québec, Chambre criminelle et pénale (C.Q.), Montréal
Décision de : Juge Dennis Galiatsatos
Date : 25 mai 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — infraction — infractions contre la personne — homicide involontaire coupable — femme — victime âgée de 22 ans — disparition de la victime — faits survenus il y a 30 ans — actus reus — acte illégal — mens rea — appréciation de la preuve — preuve d’identification — preuve circonstancielle — preuve de faits similaires — preuve de conduite indigne antérieure — agression sexuelle commise par l’accusé à l’égard d’une autre victime — moyen de défense — dénégation générale — aveu — témoin douteux — informateur de prison — mise en garde de type Vetrovec — déclaration de culpabilité.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — preuve pénale — appréciation de la preuve — preuve d’identification — preuve circonstancielle — témoignage — versions contradictoires — crédibilité des témoins — fiabilité — absence de contamination — documentaire réalisé au sujet de cette affaire — accusé n’ayant pas témoigné — déclaration extrajudiciaire — déclaration disculpatoire — contradictions — déclaration mensongère — comportement postérieur à l’infraction — intention coupable — moyen de défense — dénégation générale — disparition de la victime — corps de la victime n’ayant jamais été trouvé — mémoire — passage du temps — faits survenus il y a 30 ans — preuve de faits similaires — preuve de conduite indigne antérieure — agression sexuelle commise par l’accusé à l’égard d’une autre victime — absence de coïncidence — aveu — témoin douteux — informateur de prison — mise en garde de type Vetrovec — absence d’intérêt à mentir — preuve d’absence de mobile à mentir — homicide involontaire coupable.

Accusation d’homicide involontaire coupable. Déclaration de culpabilité.

Il est reproché à l’accusé d’avoir causé la mort d’une jeune femme, Ferguson, en juin 1996, commettant ainsi un homicide involontaire coupable. Le corps de la victime n’a jamais été trouvé. La disparition est demeurée non résolue pendant plus de 2 décennies. Le lendemain de la disparition de la jeune femme, un témoin a trouvé une note laissée sur sa porte dans laquelle Ferguson l’avisait prétendument qu’elle allait déjeuner avec sa soeur au restaurant, ce qui pouvait expliquer son absence. Or, la preuve laisse entendre qu’une telle rencontre n’a jamais été planifiée et n’a jamais eu lieu. La poursuite allègue que l’accusé est la dernière personne qui a vu Ferguson vivante. Ceux-ci auraient consommé de la cocaïne ensemble peu après la dernière fois où la victime aurait été aperçue. À la suite de la découverte de nouveaux faits, en 2022, l’accusé est devenu suspect aux yeux de la police. Il a fait certaines déclarations auprès des policiers, d’une journaliste et d’autres personnes de son entourage, niant toute implication dans la disparition. Le témoignage de T., un codétenu et ami de l’accusé ainsi que témoin collaborateur, revêt une grande importance, car l’aveu qu’il a rapporté — soit que, à l’automne 2022, alors que les 2 hommes étaient détenus au pénitencier, l’accusé lui aurait fait certains aveux en insinuant qu’il avait tué la victime — est la seule preuve directe reliant l’accusé à l’infraction. Il s’agit d’un témoin douteux, et son témoignage nécessite un examen très rigoureux; notamment, le témoin a un lourd casier judiciaire comprenant des crimes de malhonnêteté, il est un consommateur de cocaïne de longue date et un informateur de prison (bien qu’il ne cadre pas dans le modèle typique de cette catégorie). Par ailleurs, le tribunal a déclaré recevable une preuve de conduite antérieure indigne. En 1984, l’accusé avait séquestré X, la conjointe de son ami. Pendant 1 journée entière, il l’avait agressée sexuellement tout en consommant de la cocaïne. Après plusieurs heures, il avait forcé X à rédiger une note mensongère dans le but d’expliquer son absence. Au procès dans la présente affaire, l’accusé a choisi de ne pas témoigner.

Décision

Même sans considérer les aveux faits à T., et malgré l’absence du corps, le tribunal conclut hors de tout doute raisonnable à la lumière de la preuve que Ferguson est bel et bien décédée au début de juin 1996. Il ne croit pas l’accusé et n’accorde aucun crédit à ses déclarations disculpatoires. Quant aux témoignages de Jodoin et de Beaulieu, les personnes ayant eu les dernières interactions avec la victime, ils sont loin d’être parfaits. Bien que le tribunal ne croie pas certaines portions de leurs témoignages, quant au fond de leurs versions, Jodoin et Beaulieu n’avaient aucune raison d’impliquer faussement l’accusé 26 ans après les faits. De plus, ces 2 témoignages se corroborent au sujet de l’apparence de la note laissée sur la porte de l’appartement de Jodoin. Cette question est également corroborée par la preuve de faits similaires. Au-delà de la note, les versions de Jodoin et de Beaulieu voulant que Ferguson soit allée chez l’accusé pour passer la soirée et consommer de la cocaïne sont corroborées par l’aveu de l’accusé fait à la journaliste et par la version de T. Contrairement au témoignage de Beaulieu — laquelle a bel et bien été influencée par ce qu’elle a vu dans une série télévisuelle concernant cette affaire —, il n’y a aucune preuve que Jodoin a été contaminée par le contenu de la série.

T. a témoigné avec spontanéité et ouverture, reconnaissant ses nombreux défauts et son lourd casier judiciaire; par ailleurs, il demeure que ses nombreuses condamnations antérieures en matière de malhonnêteté ont un effet certain sur sa crédibilité. On ne voit pas l’intérêt qu’aurait T. à incriminer faussement l’accusé. Au contraire, la preuve démontre que sa longue collaboration avec les policiers allait foncièrement contre ses propres intérêts et ses valeurs et qu’elle lui avait causé une panoplie de problèmes. Il y a donc une preuve affirmative écartant le mobile de mentir. Il est vrai que, parfois, T. s’est contredit par rapport à sa déclaration aux policiers, mais ces contradictions s’expliquent. Plusieurs éléments de la preuve, examinés dans leur ensemble, renforcent considérablement la confiance du tribunal envers le témoignage de T. Enfin, l’absence d’aveux explicites captés lors de l’écoute électronique ne compromet pas sa crédibilité.

Le tribunal retient le témoignage de T. comme un récit fidèle des déclarations faites par l’accusé dans la cellule. T. concède que celui-ci n’a jamais dit: «Oui, je l’ai tuée.» Cependant, le contexte des propos, l’échange entre les hommes, leurs réactions respectives et le ton de l’accusé sont tous des éléments qui éclairent l’interprétation des déclarations. Considérés dans leur ensemble, les éléments suivants constituent une admission de l’accusé voulant qu’il ait commis un crime de violence sexuelle à l’égard de Ferguson: la référence à son propre historique de violence sexuelle envers les femmes en état d’intoxication; le lien qu’il y a lui-même fait avec l’incident de 1996, ajoutant «bien, c’est ça»; son intoxication à la cocaïne au moment de cet incident; le fait que l’entente prévoyait un échange de sexe en contrepartie des stupéfiants; la somme importante que l’accusé avait déboursée pour les stupéfiants; et, enfin, le fait que les choses ne se sont pas déroulées comme il était prévu et que la soirée «a plutôt mal fini». Ensuite, l’accusé n’a pas répondu «non» à la question de savoir s’il avait tué Ferguson, ce qui aurait indubitablement été la réponse naturelle à laquelle on se serait raisonnablement attendu dans un contexte semblable. Après avoir été alerté de la possibilité d’une preuve d’ADN, l’accusé a plutôt affirmé que les policiers «ne la retrouver[aient] jamais». Dans le contexte de l’échange, l’accusé faisait manifestement allusion à un cadavre. La seule interprétation logique de cet échange est que l’accusé a reconnu avoir tué la victime et caché son corps. Le tribunal conclut aussi que l’accusé était impliqué dans la rédaction de la note. À la lumière de la preuve de faits similaires, il est irréaliste que la note soit le fait d’un auteur distinct. Les similarités entre les 2 notes analysées sont tellement pointues qu’il est extrêmement improbable qu’une simple coïncidence les explique. Par ailleurs, la note manuscrite mensongère avait pour but d’éloigner les soupçons, de détourner l’attention des enquêteurs, de les tromper ou d’envoyer les autorités sur une mauvaise piste; elle constitue une preuve importante postdélictuelle. Associée à la note physique, la déclaration faite par l’accusé à Jodoin selon laquelle Ferguson était partie déjeuner au restaurant constitue également une preuve de conscience coupable.

Finalement, à la lumière de l’ensemble de la preuve, le tribunal tient compte de l’effet cumulatif des éléments suivants: la déclaration faite en prison par l’accusé à T., en 2000, selon laquelle il avait déjà commis d’autres crimes de violence sexuelle pour lesquels il n’avait jamais été arrêté; l’occasion de commettre l’infraction (l’accusé est la dernière personne qui a été vue en présence de Ferguson, alors qu’elle était vivante, et il a reconnu ce fait; cela constitue un élément de preuve circonstancielle parmi d’autres tendant à établir l’identité du tueur); la consommation de cocaïne avec la victime le soir en question; l’aveu fait à T. en 2022 selon lequel il avait été violent avec Ferguson parce que l’échange de sexe pour les stupéfiants ne s’était pas concrétisé comme il était prévu (à cela s’ajoute le fait que l’accusé a implicitement admis avoir tué la victime et que les policiers ne trouveraient jamais le corps); la note mensongère collée à la porte de Jodoin; la déclaration mensongère faite par l’accusé à Jodoin le matin de la disparition, soit que Ferguson était partie déjeuner au restaurant; l’ordre qu’a donné l’accusé à Jodoin et à Beaulieu de taire son nom si elles contactaient la police; et l’implication inexacte et mensongère de son ami pour donner crédit à son histoire concernant des hommes noirs qui seraient venus à sa porte à la recherche d’une dénommée Patricia. Cette preuve, considérée dans son ensemble, établit amplement la culpabilité hors de tout doute raisonnable. Qui plus est, les inférences deviennent d’autant plus accablantes lorsqu’on considère cette preuve à la lumière de la preuve des faits similaires. Il y a des similitudes frappantes entre l’agression sexuelle de 1984 et la disparition de Ferguson, en 1996. Bien que la victime de 1984 n’ait pas été tuée, elle a été conduite dans une zone isolée près d’un bois dans le nord de l’île de Montréal, et ce, en pleine nuit, où l’accusé, armé d’un couteau, lui a ordonné de sortir du véhicule sur le bord de la chaussée. X craignait qu’il ne la tue et qu’il ne l’abandonne à cet endroit. La constellation de ces similitudes est si distinctive qu’elle démontre un modus operandi frappant et unique, de sorte qu’elle défie toute suggestion de coïncidence. La preuve de conduite indigne associée aux événements de 1984 est pertinente en ce qui concerne la preuve de l’actus reus et de la mens rea. À la lumière de toutes les circonstances, cette preuve bonifie les conclusions du tribunal voulant que l’accusé ait violemment agressé sexuellement Ferguson et causé sa mort.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeal

Criminal Law: Police Misconduct Disclosure
Edmonton (Police Service) v. McKee, 2026 SCC 24 (41110)

Multiple disclosure issues re prior police misconduct.

Leave to Appeal Granted

Torts: Future Care Needs; Deductibility of Provincial Payments
H.D v. British Columbia (Ministry of Children and Family Development), 2025 BCCA 457 (42219)

Future care needs; provincial payments deductibility.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

In a previous article, I wrote about the benefits of simulations in jump-starting learning. In this article, I want to focus on one specific aspect of simulation: the use of simulated clients.

Medicine has long used simulated patients to help students develop practical skills and bedside manner. The use of simulated clients to support law student learning is a more recent development. Through the pioneering work of Paul Maharg and others, simulated clients have become an important educational tool in legal education in Canada and around the world.

Rather than discussing the history of simulated clients or the training they receive, I want to focus on the value they bring to student learning.

Learning with Classmates

Over the years, I have had the opportunity to work with articling students developing interviewing skills both with and without simulated clients. Working with another student can be beneficial, particularly in the early stages of learning, but pairing two law students together has its limitations.

The most obvious limitation is that they are both law students. They want each other to succeed and, often without realizing it, can “feed” information to their partner. Students acting as clients may ask questions that steer the interview in a particular direction or volunteer information that makes it easier for the student acting as the lawyer to ask the “right” questions or provide the “right” advice.

Their shared focus on legal analysis also removes them from experiencing the interaction from the client’s perspective. As a result, they are less able to assess something equally important: how it feels to be the client.

This is not to say that working with classmates has no value. Practising with someone who is also developing the same skills can create a sense of trust and psychological safety that allows learning to take place. It is also a relatively inexpensive way to provide students with opportunities to practise interviewing skills.

The Value of Simulated Clients

When properly trained, simulated clients can provide an incredibly meaningful learning experience.

Like first-time clients, they are unknown to the student. This uncertainty allows students to experience many of the same nerves and emotions they will encounter in practice. Simulated clients have no stake in the outcome. Their role is to portray the client authentically, and their training helps prevent them from unintentionally “feeding” students information.

In most cases, simulated clients are not lawyers. They do not evaluate the interview through a legal lens or focus on a particular technique. Instead, they occupy a unique position from which they can assess something that lawyers sometimes overlook—the client experience.

Did they feel heard? Did they understand what the student lawyer was telling them? Did they feel respected? Did they have confidence in the student’s ability to help them?

These are questions that go to the heart of client-centred practice.

Another benefit is that the experience remains low stakes. No real client is harmed if the student misses an issue, asks incomplete questions, or provides incorrect advice. At the same time, students receive something that most real clients are unlikely to provide, meaningful feedback on the interaction itself.

Hearing the Client’s Voice

Perhaps the greatest benefit of simulated clients is one that lawyers rarely experience in practice: hearing the client’s perspective.

In practice, clients seldom tell us whether they felt heard, whether our explanations made sense, or whether they left the meeting feeling reassured or overwhelmed. Unless something goes seriously wrong, lawyers often receive little feedback about the experience from the person sitting across the table.

Students face a similar challenge. Most feedback comes from instructors, assessors, or peers. While valuable, that feedback is inevitably filtered through a legal lens. It focuses on whether the right questions were asked, whether issues were identified, and whether the law was accurately explained.

Simulated clients offer something different. They provide feedback from the perspective that matters most, the client’s. They can tell students whether they felt listened to, whether they understood what was being explained, and whether they had confidence in the student lawyer’s ability to help them.

Those observations provide students with insights that are difficult to obtain elsewhere. They help students appreciate that effective lawyering is not simply about identifying legal issues and providing accurate advice. It is also about building trust, communicating clearly, and ensuring clients feel heard and understood.

Perhaps that is the greatest value of simulated clients. They remind students that legal practice is not just about solving legal problems. It is about serving people.

More Than Assessment: Reflection and Growth

Simulated clients provide students with valuable feedback on both technique and what medicine would refer to as bedside manner. They replicate many of the emotions and uncertainties that accompany real client interviews while avoiding many of the limitations associated with practising exclusively with classmates.

They are also valuable assessment tools. Simulated clients can provide insights into communication skills, professionalism, empathy, and a student’s ability to build trust, competencies that are difficult to assess through written assignments or traditional examinations.

More importantly, simulated clients provide students with an opportunity for structured reflection. Feedback from the client perspective often reveals gaps between what students intended to communicate and what the client actually experienced. Those moments can be powerful catalysts for learning.

Students move beyond simply asking, “Did I get the law right?” to considering broader questions: “Did I make my client feel heard? Did they understand what I was trying to explain? Did they leave the interview confident in my ability to help?”

These are not merely questions of technique. They are questions about the client experience and the relationship that lawyers build with those they serve. Reflection on those questions helps students develop the self-awareness and communication skills that are essential to becoming practice-ready lawyers.

Investing in Practice-Ready Lawyers

Programs that are serious about preparing practice-ready lawyers should consider incorporating simulated clients into their curriculum. Training and employing simulated clients require both time and resources, but the investment is well worth it.

Students gain more than an opportunity to practise interviewing techniques. They gain experience interacting with clients, develop confidence in their communication skills, and receive feedback that helps them understand not only what they did, but how they made another person feel.

Ultimately, law is a profession built on relationships. Simulated clients help students develop the skills needed to build those relationships before the stakes become real.

The post Beyond Role Playing: How Simulated Clients Enhance Learning appeared first on Slaw.

Research libraries are integral to scholarship, scientific discovery and economic innovation. A foundational element of this support is providing access to extensive collections of scholarly content — peer-reviewed journals and monographs, databases, archives and primary source materials — that enable current research methodologies. Of increasing concern is how libraries can fulfill these obligations when access to much of the essential research corpus is through digital access and governed by contracts that often explicitly or implicitly prohibit certain uses, including AI-driven research methodologies.

AI, cloud computing and increased processing power have accelerated the growth of computational research methodologies and scholars from diverse academic disciplines are increasingly turning to advanced forms of analysis such as text and data mining (TDM). This automated process uses AI, machine learning and natural language processing to extract structured information from vast amounts of unstructured text or numerical data. It enables researchers to analyze massive datasets and identify patterns, correlations and insights without human interaction or hours of analysis. Scholars at post-secondary institutions typically want to apply TDM to find, read and analyze information in academic journals and other content in their research library’s collection. However, library licenses frequently do not permit these activities.

Contractual override refers to situations where the terms of a contract take precedence over, or limit, rights provided by law, a longstanding concern for libraries. Licensing agreements for digital content often restrict uses that would otherwise be legally permitted under Canadian copyright law, including user rights and exceptions such as fair dealing. The challenges are well documented and discussed. In Canada, the Canadian Association of Research Libraries (CARL) and the Canadian Federation of Research Libraries (CFLA) have spoken out about these concerns. The International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA) issued a statement on the impact of contract override, and the Association of Research Libraries (ARL) in the United States published a guidebook for libraries on how to understand and address licensing constraints. ARL, a member of the Library Copyright Alliance, sponsored a public symposium on “Protecting Copyright User Rights from Contractual Override” at American University’s Washington College of Law in May 2023 that brought together intellectual property scholars from around the world, including Canada.

While it has been argued that contracts may not override legal exceptions, the lack of jurisprudence and clarity in Canadian copyright legislation, combined with inferred or explicit risks of license contravention, can have real implications. As summarized by UC Berkeley, non-compliance with restrictive licensing terms for text and data mining may have repercussions for the institution, including loss of access to scholarly content as well as penalties for the researcher. In one particularly concerning case, an article was retracted because researchers conducted TDM in violation of the vendor agreement. This puts libraries in the difficult position of having to negotiate for robust research rights, while also keeping researchers and vendors informed about what is at stake when those negotiations are less than successful.

While contract override may be an overarching issue, it is only one element of a problematic licensing environment. AI-assisted research highlights various related licensing and technical restrictions experienced by libraries and their researchers. Vendors can exert control and impede access and use through restrictive contract and licensing terms and the implementation of technological protection measures (TPM) or digital locks. The impact of TPMs is significant, and the option to purchase an add-on application for TDM, generally at substantial additional cost, is not an equitable solution for libraries. This means that a provision in Canadian copyright law that contracts cannot override exceptions and limitations already codified in the legislation would only be a partial solution. In addition to a contract override provision, legislation would need to explicitly permit computational research methodologies, such as text and data mining, and permit the circumvention of technical protection measures for non-infringing purposes.

As demonstrated in other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom (UK), which has exceptions permitting TDM for non-commercial purposes and prohibiting contract override in their copyright legislation, technological protection measures still pose significant challenges. Similarly, Singapore has statutes that authorize commercial and non-commercial TDM and limit contractual override, but anti-circumvention rules allow technological restrictions on computational research. Notably, a 2018 report commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI-Committee) acknowledged that protections against both contractual and technological override should be extended to TDM. However, the EU Copyright Directive (Directive 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market) only includes provisions enabling TDM for scientific research and prevents any contractual provisions that attempt to override the exception from being enforceable. It does not limit the impact of TPMs. Canada and others can learn from international copyright precedents set by the UK, Singapore, Japan, France and Germany for both contract override and text and data mining and recommendations from associated organizations.

Libraries and library consortia who manage licenses are working to negotiate reasonable AI-related terms. This process is often challenging due to the lack of consistency in terminology and clauses from vendors, non-disclosure agreement requirements and an imbalance of power between libraries and vendors. However, successful negotiations have occurred, particularly in U.S. research libraries; for example, Colorado State recently renegotiated a prominent agreement to ensure licensed content can be used with any LLM tool.

When research libraries are unable to meet the needs of their community due to restrictive vendor agreements, it provides an opportunity to raise awareness of how complicated the licensing environment is. TDM and related methods are essential for researchers, yet differing legal exceptions mean that colleagues in other countries may use the same content without limitation, making cross-border collaboration difficult. Researchers need to understand why these differences exist across jurisdictions. Equally important is an awareness of the broader issues and understanding the potential publication risks.

While research libraries contend with negotiating reasonable terms for AI-related research methodologies and national library associations advocate for legislative provisions that may smooth the way, researcher backing is valuable. For example, the University of California Academic Council issued a statement supporting UC Libraries’ negotiating position with respect to licenses. Such collective, public support may not always be feasible, but individual researchers can also signal their solidarity with libraries by keeping these licensing optics in mind while pursuing publication and dissemination.

It is clear that computational research methodologies are here to stay and libraries and vendors are having to reconceptualize their collections and services in response. In a recent interview with Library Journal, Xuemao Wang, Dean of Libraries at Northwestern University summarized the new reality well, “AI is changing expectations. Our collections are no longer just materials to read; they are becoming data to compute, analyze, model, and interact with conversationally.” Research libraries and their representative organizations are still contending with the ramifications of this profound change and vendor agreements are just one facet of this much broader recalibration towards collections as data. While libraries are committed to supporting research endeavours at their institutions and are working to improve restrictive and prohibitive licenses both from a legislative and contractual negotiation perspective, a future-proof research sector depends on all stakeholders understanding the current issues and engaging in solutions.

The post Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Research Libraries, AI Research and Contract Override appeared first on Slaw.

I watch a lot of hockey – but mostly on television. This year I attended a playoff game of the PWHL’s Ottawa Charge at the Canadian Tire Centre in Ottawa. It was an exciting game, but for me there was one concerning moment, when I heard thousands of people chanting, “Refs, you suck!”, after a call on the ice against the home team. As a hockey fan, I too did not like some of their calls, or non-calls, but there is a critical difference between attacking a decision and attacking the person who made the decision.

Before the game started, there was a public service announcement video of many of the players saying that harassment and abusive behaviour against fans, officials or players would not be tolerated. The fan code of conduct that appears on all PWHL team websites is a bit more generic:

The PWHL is committed to creating a safe and enjoyable environment for all fans. Please refrain from disruptive behavior, including foul or abusive language, or obscene gestures. Do not engage in fighting or the throwing of objects. Please report any violations of these rules to the nearest usher, security or guest services staff member….

Harassment of officials in all sports is a big issue at the community and minor league levels. There have been many reported incidents of parents harassing officials in games that their kids are playing. It has become so prevalent, that in hockey games, officials under the age of 16 wear green armbands so parents know not to harass them. Imagine a society where you are protected from general harassment only up until the age of 16.

Canadian hockey at the community level now has fewer officials than it did before the pandemic. The reasons for this decline are multifaceted, but a major factor is the abuse directed at officials. These community level officials are the feeder pool for higher levels and leagues. Ironically, fans who abuse officials because they are unhappy with officiating may be contributing to a shortage that could reduce the overall quality of officiating.

As a decision-maker, I have always had a lot of respect for referees who make decisions in the moment based solely on their own observations. For the bigger decisions, they may have some assistance from watching a replay but must still decide quickly, with thousands of people looking over their shoulders.

Tribunal members and judges rarely experience abuse in the hearing room. When it does happen, those hurling abuse are quickly removed from the room. Personal attacks against decision-makers, when they come, do so after a decision is released to the public.

At his annual press conference in June, Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Richard Wagner commended judges who have spoken out against attacks on the judiciary. He said, “We have seen judges and courts sometimes portrayed as partisan actors or described as obstacles to the will of the people.” Although he did say that his remarks were not confined to Canada, he did note “strong statements” by the chief justices in several provinces following political attacks on the judiciary. He stated that it was the responsibility of chief justices to speak out about any attacks on judicial independence or the rule of law.

One of those attacks was from the Premier of Ontario, Doug Ford, in a rant about bail reform last year. Ford said, “These judges that are bleeding hearts, I can’t wait until they retire. Matter of fact, I’ll pay them to retire earlier. I’ll pay you out, for two, three, four years. Just get out of the system”. In a joint statement, the chief justices of the Ontario Court of Appeal, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, and the Ontario Court of Justice, said:

The principle of judicial independence is generally recognized as having two dimensions. The first applies to individual judicial officials and embodies the fundamental principle that a judicial official must be, and must be seen to be, free to decide each case on its own merits, without interference or influence of any kind from any source, including politicians. The second applies to the Court as an institution. It requires the Court, as a whole to be, and appear to be independent of the legislative and executive branches of government. Together, both dimensions safeguard the judicial decision-making process and, in turn, the public that the Court serves.

Every Canadian has the constitutional right to have their legal issues decided by fair and impartial judiciary. Our justice system is founded on public confidence that decisions, whether popular or not, are fully heard and fairly made. It is crucial that judiciary are both actually independent and appear to be independent so the public can be confident that judicial decisions are made without bias.

The other attack that Chief Justice Wagner was likely referring to happened earlier this year. The premier of Alberta, Danielle Smith, responded to a question from a caller about a bail decision on her weekly radio show: “I wish I could direct the judges, honestly. The judges get very, very prickly when you criticize them, but boy, the example you just raised, they deserve the criticism.” The chief justices in Alberta released a passionate statement about their role, emphasizing that Alberta’s judges are Albertans “like the people we serve.” They also stated:

Independence of the judicial branch protects the public. It ensures judges can make decisions based solely on the law and evidence presented. It frees judges from pressure or influence from external sources including the governments that appoint us.

I suspect that neither premier is chastened at all. In fact, Premier Ford was recently back at personal attacks on judges after a decision from the Superior Court of Justice on the right of the Region of Waterloo to dismantle a homeless encampment.

Ford said of the judge:

I wish I could get that guy’s address. I’ll send 15 encampments in his backyard and see how he likes it. [It’s] the craziest decision I’ve ever heard, but there are a lot of crazy decision coming from our courts lately.

Professor Martha Jackman of the University of Ottawa wrote a letter to the Ontario Attorney General on behalf of herself and other lawyers critical of Ford’s statement, calling it a “serious attack on the constitutional principle of judicial independence”. The letter stated that “judges must be free to decide cases without fear of intimidation, retaliation, or personal targeting by members of the executive branch”. The letter asked the Attorney General to:

• Publicly reaffirm the constitutional principle of judicial independence and the obligation of all members of the executive branch to refrain from conduct that may reasonably be perceived as threatening or intimidating judges.
• Publicly repudiate any suggestion that judges should be subjected to personal targeting or exposure of private residential information because of decisions they render.
• Confirm that appropriate steps are being taken to ensure the safety and security of the judge concerned and of members of the judiciary generally.
• Advise whether any additional protocols, guidance, or measures will be adopted to prevent conduct that may undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

Ford’s office issued a prepared statement that missed the point completely. It said that the premier had “immense respect” for judges and their independence “but their decisions are not immune from scrutiny or from the impacts they have on people and communities across the province”. Ford’s comments went beyond criticizing the decision, to a vague threat of retaliation against the decision-maker.

Decision-makers are not immune from accountability for their decisions – either through judicial review or public comment about either the outcome or the reasoning process. The bright line that should not be crossed is attacking or threatening the decision-maker personally. Admittedly, the chant “Refs, your interpretation of the rule against goalie interference sucks!” doesn’t exactly roll off the tongue.

The post “Refs, You Suck!”: Personal Attacks on Decision Makers appeared first on Slaw.

Not all mystery cases are caused by a mistyped citation or AI hallucination. Sometimes people remember only the vague details of a case (“it was an employment case involving someone who insisted on dressing up as a clown at work”) but not the names of the parties. While they may have a vague idea of when it happened, people tend to remember events as being more recent than they actually were.

If you’re missing crucial information about a case and can’t seem to track it down with the information that you have been given, it can be helpful to check news archives. Assuming the case was interesting enough to be reported in the news, finding a news article will allow you to establish the date of the case and the names of the parties for a more targeted search in the case law. Furthermore, given that older cases are more likely to be unreported, this may end up being the only information available on the case.

— Susannah Tredwell

The post Tips Tuesday: Use Newspaper Archives to Find Cases appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Sport Law Blog 2. Slaw 3. Lash Condo Law 4. Vincent Gautrais 5. SOQUIJ | Le Blogue

Sport Law Blog
Beyond Cultural Intelligence: Why Highly Relational Teams Will Help Sport Thrive

I’ve been writing about better ways of leading, coaching, and competing for over three decades. And yet, I find myself returning to the same essential question — the one that I believe sits at the very heart of what ails our sport system: what are we actually building when we build a team? I used to think this was a question with a simple answer. Experience — and the courageous voices of over a thousand individuals who came forward to the Future of Sport in Canada Commission — has taught me that it is anything but. …

Slaw
Forum Shopping Could Fix the Delay Problem

Forum shopping, that taboo practice in which a litigant chooses the most favourable jurisdiction to try a case, is generally looked down upon. Indeed, courts frown upon the practice even if the sole reason is to stem delay; that is, that a case can be tried faster in one jurisdiction than another. From a system-wide lens, this challenges common-sense. We need only look in the medical field, where patients can shop for medical services like MRIs, specialists, family physicians, anywhere they like. Yet the courts prefer to treat themselves as islands. …

Lash Condo Law
Occupancy Restrictions in Condos: Rules, By‑laws, and Common Pitfalls

Occupancy issues are coming up more often in condominiums. Boards are dealing with concerns around overcrowding, short‑term rentals, rooming‑house style arrangements, and the resulting impact on noise, security, garbage, and general wear and tear on the building. One issue we are seeing with increasing frequency is condominium corporations trying to limit the number of occupants through rules, rather than passing an occupancy standards by‑law. While the intention is often understandable, this approach can create serious enforceability issues if the wrong governance mechanism is used. …

Vincent Gautrais
Preuve + CCQ + Numérique

l est rare que je le fasse, en préparant mes notes pour la conférence qui aura lieu cet après-midi à la Faculté de droit sur CCQ + Numérique: Livre 7 – De la preuve, je me suis dit qu’il serait sans doute pertinent de rendre publiques quelques notes relativement à cette activité. Un propos qui forcément devra s’insérer dans ceux de mes brillants collègues qui m’ont fait le plaisir de m’accompagner dans cette tâche de mieux percevoir ces dispositions modifiées il y a longtemps, 2001, par la fameuse Loi concernant le cadre juridique des technologies de l’information (ci-après LCCJTI), un texte abscon, certes, à la facture pour le moins dérangeante pour le commun des juristes, mais qui n’est pas sans attraits. …

SOQUIJ | Le Blogue
La diffamation ne prend pas de vacances

L’été dernier, j’ai rédigé un billet intitulé «Jurisprudence récente en matière de diffamation». Près de 1 an plus tard, je constate que la diffamation n’a pas pris de vacances. Voici les jugements récents en la matière qui ont retenu mon attention. …

_________________________

*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : La juge de première instance n’a pas erré en concluant que l’Unité permanente anticorruption et le poursuivant avaient transgressé de manière délibérée des principes jurisprudentiels connus en matière de communication de la preuve ni en ordonnant l’arrêt des procédures contre les intimés, lesquels faisaient l’objet de sérieuses accusations de corruption dans les affaires de la Ville de Terrebonne.

Intitulé : R. c. Robitaille, 2026 QCCA 785
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Mark Schrager, Guy Cournoyer et Judith Harvie
Date : 9 juin 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — procédure pénale — procédure fédérale — arrêt des procédures — corruption dans les affaires municipales — obligation de la poursuite — divulgation de la preuve — communication de la preuve — manque de transparence et de candeur — communication de renseignements en la possession d’un tiers — Unité permanente anticorruption — signalement — enquête policière — fruits de l’enquête — pouvoir discrétionnaire — crédibilité d’un témoin — pertinence — divulgation tardive — fausse déclaration — inconduite policière — intégrité du système judiciaire — abus de procédure — catégorie résiduelle — droit à une défense pleine et entière — gravité de la conduite attentatoire de l’État — injustice — réparation du préjudice — appel — norme d’intervention — question de fait — article 676 (1) c) C.Cr. — déférence — absence d’erreur manifeste et déterminante.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — garanties fondamentales du processus pénal — droit à une défense pleine et entière — arrêt des procédures — corruption dans les affaires municipales — obligation de la poursuite — divulgation de la preuve — communication de la preuve — manque de transparence et de candeur — communication de renseignements en la possession d’un tiers — Unité permanente anticorruption — signalement — enquête policière — fruits de l’enquête — pouvoir discrétionnaire — crédibilité d’un témoin — pertinence — divulgation tardive — fausse déclaration — inconduite policière — intégrité du système judiciaire — abus de procédure — catégorie résiduelle — gravité de la conduite attentatoire de l’État — injustice — réparation du préjudice — appel — norme d’intervention — question de fait — article 676 (1) c) C.Cr. — déférence — absence d’erreur manifeste et déterminante.

DROITS ET LIBERTÉS — droits judiciaires — vie, sûreté, intégrité et liberté — droit à une défense pleine et entière — arrêt des procédures — corruption dans les affaires municipales — obligation de la poursuite — divulgation de la preuve — communication de la preuve — manque de transparence et de candeur — communication de renseignements en la possession d’un tiers — Unité permanente anticorruption — signalement — enquête policière — fruits de l’enquête — pouvoir discrétionnaire — crédibilité d’un témoin — pertinence — divulgation tardive — fausse déclaration — inconduite policière — intégrité du système judiciaire — abus de procédure — catégorie résiduelle — gravité de la conduite attentatoire de l’État — injustice — réparation du préjudice — appel — norme d’intervention — question de fait — article 676 (1) c) C.Cr. — déférence — absence d’erreur manifeste et déterminante.

DROITS ET LIBERTÉS — réparation du préjudice — arrêt des procédures — droit à une défense pleine et entière — corruption dans les affaires municipales — obligation de la poursuite — divulgation de la preuve — communication de la preuve — manque de transparence et de candeur — communication de renseignements en la possession d’un tiers — Unité permanente anticorruption — signalement — enquête policière — fruits de l’enquête — pouvoir discrétionnaire — crédibilité d’un témoin — pertinence — divulgation tardive — fausse déclaration — inconduite policière — intégrité du système judiciaire — abus de procédure — catégorie résiduelle — gravité de la conduite attentatoire de l’État — injustice — intérêt de la société à ce que l’affaire soit jugée au fond — appel — norme d’intervention — question de fait — article 676 (1) c) C.Cr. — déférence — absence d’erreur manifeste et déterminante.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — preuve pénale — divulgation de la preuve — communication de la preuve — arrêt des procédures — corruption dans les affaires municipales — obligation de la poursuite — manque de transparence et de candeur — communication de renseignements en la possession d’un tiers — Unité permanente anticorruption — signalement — enquête policière — fruits de l’enquête — pouvoir discrétionnaire — crédibilité d’un témoin — pertinence — divulgation tardive — fausse déclaration — inconduite policière — intégrité du système judiciaire — abus de procédure — catégorie résiduelle — droit à une défense pleine et entière — gravité de la conduite attentatoire de l’État — injustice — réparation du préjudice — appréciation de la preuve — crédibilité des témoins — fiabilité — appel — norme d’intervention — question de fait — article 676 (1) c) C.Cr. — déférence — absence d’erreur manifeste et déterminante.

Appel d’un jugement de la Cour du Québec ayant accueilli une requête en arrêt des procédures. Rejeté.

Les intimés faisaient l’objet de sérieuses accusations de corruption dans les affaires de la Ville de Terrebonne; pendant 12 ans, ils auraient accordé des contrats publics à des entrepreneurs en contrepartie de pots-de-vin. Dans le cadre du procès, la poursuite entendait faire témoigner Tessier, un entrepreneur qui avait admis avoir participé à ce système. Or, durant le procès, les intimés ont appris que ce dernier était visé par un signalement auprès de l’Unité permanente anticorruption (UPAC). Selon ce qui est allégué par 2 personnes, Tessier aurait lui-même été impliqué dans d’autres cas de corruption touchant d’autres villes. Les intimés ont alors demandé que toute l’information ayant trait à ce signalement leur soit divulguée. Selon eux, il y a eu une série d’efforts dilatoires de la part de l’UPAC et de la poursuite visant à empêcher la divulgation de l’information demandée. La juge de première instance a conclu que l’UPAC et la poursuite avaient transgressé délibérément des principes jurisprudentiels connus en matière de communication de la preuve au point de constituer un abus de procédure. Elle a estimé qu’un arrêt des procédures constituait la seule réparation possible, compte tenu de la gravité de l’inconduite.

Décision

M. le juge Cournoyer: En l’espèce, l’exercice que propose la poursuite est fondamentalement incompatible avec le rôle d’une cour d’appel, qui ne doit pas décortiquer le dossier d’appel à la recherche d’une erreur. La poursuite met essentiellement de l’avant une interprétation différente des faits et d’autres conclusions qu’aurait pu tirer la juge. Cette interprétation s’appuie principalement sur les témoignages de policiers qui n’ont pas été crus par cette dernière. Or, l’appréciation de la crédibilité et de la fiabilité des témoins relève des juges d’instance. La poursuite invite la Cour à réévaluer l’ensemble du dossier, alors qu’elle ne parvient pas à établir 1 seule erreur manifeste et déterminante dans l’analyse de la preuve.

En ce qui concerne le premier moyen d’appel de la poursuite, il est mal fondé, car la présente affaire ne soulève pas la question de l’empiétement de la juge dans l’exercice des prérogatives d’un corps policier, mais plutôt celle de l’omission de ce corps policier de mettre en oeuvre son obligation corrélative en matière de communication de la preuve. D’autre part, la juge pouvait conclure que la conduite de l’État constituait un abus de procédure. Non seulement le délai de traitement du signalement reçu par l’UPAC est inexplicable, mais la pertinence de l’information à l’égard de la crédibilité du témoin ne pouvait faire l’objet d’un doute et, compte tenu des délais écoulés, il était urgent de la communiquer. L’UPAC ne pouvait tenir pendant des mois la poursuite dans l’ignorance complète de la réception d’une information concernant la crédibilité d’un témoin important qui devait être entendu au procès. Par ailleurs, si la poursuite estimait qu’elle devait retarder la communication de cette information afin d’éviter de compromettre la nature et l’étendue d’une enquête en cours ou de protéger la confidentialité de l’identité du dénonciateur, elle devait en informer les intimés.

En outre, les procureurs de la poursuite n’ont pas fait preuve de candeur et de transparence. L’indulgence que réclame la poursuite en faveur des observations de ses procureurs ne justifie pas les propos trompeurs qui relèvent de la dissimulation. La complexification à outrance par l’UPAC et la poursuite concernant la communication d’une information, somme toute simple et visiblement pertinente, soutient le constat de la juge selon lequel il y avait une volonté arrêtée d’accroître les obstacles avant d’être forcées à procéder à une telle communication, dont on craignait qu’elle n’entache la crédibilité d’un témoin important. De plus, le manque de transparence s’est poursuivi tout au long des procédures, le tout conjugué à un alourdissement inutile du débat.

Enfin, l’arrêt des procédures était une réparation juste et appropriée. À cet égard, la poursuite ne parvient pas à démontrer que l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la juge était erroné au point de créer une injustice. Celle-ci a prononcé un arrêt des procédures afin d’empêcher qu’une injustice envers les intimés ne soit perpétuée et de protéger l’intégrité du système judiciaire. C’est la conduite de l’État qui était injuste, et non la décision qui l’a constatée.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

AI issues started to creep into the conference in 2023. A friend and colleague, Will Tao, did excellent work at that time reporting on the use of Chinook at IRCC and he published the article, AI statecraft heating-up: the automation of governance through Canada’s Chinook case study.  Back in 2023, I think it is fair to say that most immigration lawyers were against the use of AI tools (whether Chinook is/was an AI tool is, by itself, a subject of debate) and the conference was a chance for lawyers to question the government’s use of such tools.

From my perspective, the CBA National Immigration conferences in 2024 & 2025 continued to focus on the potential negative side of AI. I published my thoughts on the AI Tools from 2025 here. In addition, each year, it seems, more and more of the sessions either focused on AI or it became part of the presentation indirectly.

[By the way, just for the record, I did not use AI to generate or edit this post. It has been drafted by a carbon-based life form, with all its flaws.]

The recent 2026 conference seemed to mark a shift. The sessions and topics seemed to focus less on how AI may violate principles of procedural fairness and how to prepare applications to actually get a human decision-maker to, instead, the sessions focused more on what AI tools to incorporate within our practice. Quite the shift.

It’s funny how these technologies slowly bleed into normalcy. It’s like a slow burn. At first, we’re cautious about how the benefits of the old system may be eroded by the new. Then, as the new becomes the new normal, we tend to just forget about how we used to do things and, instead, focus on being the most efficient with the new tools. And that basically sums up the 2026 conference.

The Horse Has Left The Barn

During Mario’s speech on this topic, he noted that the proverbial AI horse has left the barn. That is to say, the issues which were raised in 2024 and 2025 seem to be out of date and there is no going back to the old system. To be honest, I’m not sure if we are at that point yet, but we are certainly close.

Jordan Furlong gave an excellent keynote. One of his key points is that, apparently, immigration lawyers may be difficult to be replaced by AI. IP lawyers, not so much. There was audible relief from the audience at that statement.

I can understand my colleagues’ enthusiasm for streamlining their workflow by implementing these shiny tools. Work smarter, not harder is a sound approach to most situations. Increasing efficiency sounds very nice. My concerns, which have not changed since 2023, is we still need to think about what we may sacrifice when we embrace these tools.

Who Sacrifices From Adopting These Tools?

To an extent, the immigration bar is a bit different from other areas of practice as many of us run a small business. At my firm, for example, I have a team of 9 staff, including 2 lawyers, 2 immigration consultants and 5 support staff. At the conference, one of the key “selling points” to adopting these AI tools is that these firms may need less support staff – or possibly no support staff at all!

It goes without saying that small business owners loathe HR issues. Sure. Who wants to deal with training new staff or supervising their time? Or juggling files when a worker takes a vacation? The firms that fully embrace AI tools envision a world free of HR issues. Sure, who doesn’t want that?

I spoke with a lawyer in the GTA who is fully on board. She has an AI agent book her meetings, fill out forms, organize her time and draft replies to clients. She recently laid off 3 support staff and she couldn’t be happier. Her clients are mostly corporate executives and HR Managers who have a high level of tech skills. So for her business, I can see how these tools make sense.

Who is Your Client?

I remember during my time at Queen’s Law, our professors would hammer the point that we need to constantly think about the best interests of our clients. Absolutely. In my practice, the vast majority of our clients are individuals and most have limited computer skills. I love working with international students, families trying to be reunited, workers who want to use their skills, and refugee claimants who are trying to build a safe home. We deal with messy situations and litigate, when necessary. These are my clients. I love meeting face to face. Clients bring their kids and their pets to the office. We hand out Canadian flag pins and sweets. That’s our vibe.

Our firm has glass walls, a fully stocked kitchen, a conference room which is almost always booked and we have most of our conversations face to face. We even have extra laptops for clients to use because many of our clients don’t have their own computers. Our firm could be the set of a legal sitcom from the 90s and it suits us just fine. For our firm and for our clients, the AI tools don’t make sense. But

The Next Sacrifice?

I can see how the world is moving towards these new systems. I can understand my colleagues’ enthusiasm for streamlining their workflow by implementing these shiny tools. I can certainly understand the appeal of not having to deal with HR issues.

But what is the next sacrifice? If lawyers can easily replace support staff with AI agents to streamline their systems, maybe the next step is to just cut the lawyers from the system altogether. Jordan seems to think that the business of immigration law may last longer than other areas of law; however, it seems to be just a matter of time until we are all replaced. I may start to take classes in plumbing, just in case…

The post AI Tools in an Immigration Practice appeared first on Slaw.

Forum shopping, that taboo practice in which a litigant chooses the most favourable jurisdiction to try a case, is generally looked down upon. Indeed, courts frown upon the practice even if the sole reason is to stem delay; that is, that a case can be tried faster in one jurisdiction than another. From a system-wide lens, this challenges common-sense. We need only look in the medical field, where patients can shop for medical services like MRIs, specialists, family physicians, anywhere they like. Yet the courts prefer to treat themselves as islands.

What do we look for in a justice system? One oft-repeated feature is consistency. Consistency in verdicts yield predictability and confidence in the justice system. It goes without saying that a case tried in Goderich should yield the same result in Ottawa*. Consistency in the time it takes to complete a case should be just as important. You would think this would be trite, as illustrated in the old adage “justice delayed is justice denied”. But the courts seem to say differently: that we should accept that a case in Thunder Bay can go to trial in two years, and that a case in Brampton can go to trial in four years, and forum shopping should not be used to make the two times closer.

The benefit of a free market is its ability to fill in gaps. When uber took over the taxi-market, it became markedly easier to hail a ride in every city. Gas prices move up and down according to machinations of supply and demand, both present and future. Imagine then how delay would be flattened across free-market courts: the time it takes to hear a motion in London would be the same as in Toronto would be the same as in Belleville would be the same as…

This paradise would come at a cost. Faster jurisdictions would lament further delay. Costs could increase lawyers travel (but then again, virtual courts still dominate the scene). Certain forums may be so local as to not admit a different jurisdiction (neighbours fighting over a fence line; or a local councillor stepping in doo-doo); but then again, maybe such cases are best dealt with elsewhere, for the reason of unimpeachable impartiality.

Intra-provincial forum shopping would help equalize delay times. The law of the forum would be the same; for example, there would be no difference in the law applied, and the expertise of the judge, in the same case whether it be in Welland or Perth. The difference in costs would be mitigated by virtual courts. The lawyers – decreasing in rural areas in a bit of a crisis – could come from anywhere in the province, thus increasing access to justice. With distances decreasing thanks to virtual technology, the old arguments against forum-shopping are weakened.

Perhaps, if delay was not an increasingly troubling problem – in Ontario, one requiring a complete overhaul of the civil rules, a significant funding shift from civil to criminal litigation to attempt to clear backlogs, a digitization of the courts prioritizing criminal law (and correspondingly de-prioritizing other practice areas) – then forum-shopping would be a smaller issue. And indeed for many past years forum-shopping was not-oft done, not oft-litigated, and if litigated, quickly resolved. But the phenomenon has increased precisely to mitigate against the devil of delay, not the evils of vexatious litigants. Perhaps it is time for forum-shopping to be re-visited as another tool to stem delay and build consistency across the justice system.

_______

*My apologies to those outside of Ontario; this writer’s experience is limited, and I would urge you to opine in the comments.

The post Forum Shopping Could Fix the Delay Problem appeared first on Slaw.

Several times each month, we are pleased to republish a recent book review from the Canadian Law Library Review (CLLR). CLLR is the official journal of the Canadian Association of Law Libraries (CALL/ACBD), and its reviews cover both practice-oriented and academic publications related to the law.

Beach Politics: Social, Racial, and Environmental Injustice on the Shoreline. Edited by Setha Low. New York: NYU Press, 2025. 336 p. Includes bibliographic references and index. ISBN 9781479821952 (softcover) US$35.00; ISBN 9781479821945 (hardcover) US$99.00; ISBN 9781479821969 (eBook) US$25.00.

Reviewed by Emma Cornelius
Reference Librarian
Lawson Lundell LLP

Beach Politics answers two core questions: Why is the public losing access to the beach worldwide, and what are the effects of this loss, particularly on marginalized peoples? I was eager to read this collection of essays and learn more about the mechanics of beach access and restriction. In Lima, Peru, where I spent a good part of my upbringing, there is a stark contrast between the crowded, lively public beaches south of the city and the quiet, spacious beaches of wealthier gated communities in the area. I have close family ties in Far North Queensland, Australia, where environmental preservation of the reef is always a matter of concern. Public access to the beach for recreation and sightseeing sits in tension with protection of the precious ecosystems there.

Editor Setha Low brings together a wealth of expertise and lived experience in this collection. The outcome is a well-rounded book that will give readers a nuanced understanding of beaches as political spaces. The beach becomes not just a place to visit, enjoy, manage, or protect, but a space where the surrounding communities’ varied concerns, attitudes, and identities converge with global economic and social trends. This makes the beach worthy of study as a political space where social and climate justice, colonialism and racism, and power and resistance meet.

The book has fifteen chapters, split into four parts. These four parts mirror the broad strategies employed to restrict public access to the beach: governance, shoring up the coastline, racialization of the beach, and development. The boundaries between each part are somewhat blurred, however, as the four themes overlap and recur throughout the book.

Part I sets up the theoretical framework of beaches as political spaces. With a focus on Connecticut’s beaches, Andrew W. Kahrl’s introductory essay tracks the trajectory toward privatization of U.S. beaches throughout the 20th century. We learn that the value of beach real estate increased massively in the 20th century, resulting in a landgrab of beach land in favour of private ownership, real estate development, and governance over access to the beach. Kahrl reasons that these tactics were aimed at keeping Black people out of coastal communities and maintaining the “character” of white neighbourhoods. Part I also explores the tensions seen in protests against beach governance, and how protest groups with differing aims and perspectives often leverage similar narratives and language.

Part II reveals the tension between the protection of private property and the protection of the beach as an ecosystem and public space. Private property interests are often, it turns out, at odds with what is best for the beach. Common beachside features used to protect coastal communities— including boardwalks, seawalls, and retainers—often privilege private landowners over long-term environmental and public interests. A highlight is Benjamin Heim Shepard’s insightful chapter on the grassroots community protest over New York’s East River Park. Protestors mobilized when the city rejected a community consensus plan to keep trees and public land in favour of a developer-friendly plan to instate a seawall and build up the shoreline with concrete and synthetic turf.

In Part III, authors explore how restricting public access to the beach is often tied to protecting whiteness by excluding or removing BIPOC people from the beach. These aims are usually hidden under layers of narratives designed to create plausible deniability. Here, the essays take us from Queens, New York, to Albuquerque, New Mexico, and then to South Africa and Brazil. We see how whiteness and the right to leisure and vacation become interlaced, and how white entitlement shows up across these diverse cultural contexts.

Part IV introduces the beach as central to economic activity and to keeping up with demands for development and tourism. In the final chapter, Quentin Stevens discusses the value of artificial beaches in urban spaces. Stevens observes how their development could increase gentrification, further alienating and harming local communities and marginalized people.

One worry I had when beginning this book was the potential for it to remain U.S.-centric. While some of the essays focus on local American politics and history, the collection has a global lens, making it relevant to a wider audience. Highlights for me included Nadine Khayat and Clare Rishbeth’s chapter examining three seafronts in Beirut, Katherine T. McCaffrey’s essay on protests over development in Puerto Rico, and Paul Rouse’s examinations of Dollymount Strand and Bull Island in Dublin.

This book shines with essays highlighting ingroup and outgroup tensions and conflicts, as well as its analysis of contradictory narratives surrounding the beach. Use of theoretical language and academic concepts make some parts of this book difficult to parse. I would be interested to see how these stories and ideas could be shared in a more accessible way.

This collection of essays highlights the strong feelings and attachments that beachside communities form. These feelings reveal contrasting concerns and priorities between communities, whether distinguished by class, race, or other identities. On a personal level, this book has given me context on the local beach politics in Latin America and Australia, as well as new language to engage with these topics.

Beach Politics is well-suited to an academic library, as it provides an excellent introduction to the issue of beach access with global case studies for learners and researchers. I recommend this book to anyone interested in exploring how law and governance, protest and community organizing, development and gentrification, and climate change intersect at the ocean’s front.

The post Book Review: Beach Politics: Social, Racial, and Environmental Injustice on the Shoreline appeared first on Slaw.

Artificial intelligence is making its way into courtrooms around the world, and not always for the better. Judges have been caught embedding AI-generated fictitious case references in judicial decisions, in Canada and internationally; and there are no doubt other, more subtle, machine delusions slipping into case law undetected. Judicial misuse of AI tools has profound consequences for the administration of justice and for public confidence in the courts. But a less obvious threat also deserves our attention: a growing body of research indicates that large language models (LLMs) have a homogenizing effect on writing and analysis, meaning that judges’ increasing reliance on AI may stifle the common law’s development.

Judges in Canada are prohibited from delegating their decision-making authority to AI tools. Short of that, some judges are using AI tools to assist with judgment writing. This could involve, for example, asking a tool to generate text summarizing the facts of a case or synthesizing the relevant law. Some or all of this text may then make its way into a judgment. This marks an important shift: the judge moves, by degrees, from author of a judgment to editor of machine-generated text. The concern is that if judges increasingly start from machine-generated text, the arguments, ideas, and language of their decisions may start to become overly influenced by AI and converge on certain tendencies found in these tools. And with such convergence, the future horizons of the common law, as a whole, may start to narrow as well.

A growing body of research suggests this risk is real. A recent study comparing human-written essays and AI-generated essays found that “essays generated by different LLMs…converge to a smaller set of main arguments, sub-arguments, and paragraph-level structures.” In other words, the study found a “tendency of different LLMs, built by different frontier industry labs, to return to the same small set of plausible arguments rather than span the broader range of arguments humans make.” The researchers coined the term “argument collapse” to describe this effect.

Another recent set of studies, again looking at AI-generated essays in comparison to human-written essays, found that “despite their potential to enhance individual creativity, the widespread use of LLMs could diminish the collective diversity of creative ideas.” Over three studies, human-written essays were found to have, collectively, two to eight times more creative content than the AI-generated ones. The researchers noted that “this homogenizing effect persisted even after a range of enhancements to the diversity of the GPT-4 writings, including prompt and parameter modifications”, leading them to conclude that “even as AI tools continue to improve and produce ever better and more creative output, they may still contribute to an overall homogenization of ideas.”

Relying on AI tools not only risks narrowing the arguments and ideas that users engage with, it can also have a homogenizing effect on the language used to describe these arguments and ideas. The opening paragraph of a recent New York Times article paints a vivid picture:

In the quiet hum of our digital era, a new literary voice is sounding. You can find this signature style everywhere — from the pages of best-selling novels to the columns of local newspapers, and even the copy on takeout menus. And yet the author is not a human being, but a ghost — a whisper woven from the algorithm, a construct of code. A.I.-generated writing, once the distant echo of science-fiction daydreams, is now all around us — neatly packaged, fleetingly appreciated and endlessly recycled. It’s not just a flood — it’s a groundswell. Yet there’s something unsettling about this voice. Every sentence sings, yes, but honestly? It sings a little flat. It doesn’t open up the tapestry of human experience — it reads like it was written by a shut-in with Wi-Fi and a thesaurus. Not sensory, not real, just … there.

As the article summarizes “[o]nce, there were many writers, and many different styles. Now, increasingly, one uncredited author [AI] turns out essentially everything.”

Inspired by these research studies and observations, my suggestion here is that judicial use of AI tools for judgment writing risks narrowing and flattening how the common law is described and developed, and that this is a risk we should strive to avoid.

Moves to a more singular, algorithmically driven judicial voice run contrary to the very nature of our common law system and our commitments to a diverse, independent judiciary. It is widely acknowledged and accepted that judges bring their own “conceptions, opinions [and] sensibilities” to their work and that this is a strength of our justice system. Multiple and diverse perspectives facilitate the fullest development of the common law. The common law grows precisely because different judges reason by different routes and in different terms, and the law is richer for having different paths through complex legal problems.

To be sure, judicial decisions are not a place where we want unbridled creativity, as we might in the realms of fiction or poetry or art. Some conformity in judgment writing is a good thing. Judges are, of course, necessarily constrained by precedent as well as formal and informal norms about legal reasoning and judicial writing. Judicial writing has been criticized when it veers outside of perceived conventions, for example, by inserting pop culture references or literary flourishes in legal decisions. In his recently published PhD dissertation, Canadian lawyer Jon Khan makes a compelling case that Canadian common law could benefit from even more standardization in written judicial reasons.

Even so, where judges converge on shared analytical and linguistic practices, there are good reasons to want those alignments to be products of human judgment exercised by thoughtful judges, not a byproduct of machine defaults. The priorities embedded in LLMs are not chosen with justice system values or the public interest in mind. The argument structures and turns of phrase these tools favour are artifacts of training data and developer choices, not a considered view about how a judicial decision should be built to serve the parties, the profession, and the public it speaks to. In other words, to the extent that approaches to judicial decision-writing converge, they should converge around the values and priorities of the legal community, not around the preferences an AI model happens to favour.

The tendencies of AI tools may not only differ from the priorities of the legal community; they can sometimes be actively harmful. Take, for example, a study published earlier this year wherein ChatGPT was used to generate over 140,000 legal memos and the model was found to exhibit “a prosecutorial default bias…systematically recommend[ing] prosecution–even when prompted from a defense perspective, confronted with minimal evidence, or presented with clear constitutional violations.” AI technologies, like all technologies, are not neutral.

No doubt, the severity of the risks raised here scales with the depth of reliance. The risk of undue homogenization is far greater for the judge who lets an AI tool draft a decision, or significant parts of one, and then simply edits the result than for the judge who turns to AI only to check grammar or work through a stubborn sentence. The risks also depend on which tool is used. Some tools are now being built specifically for judges, designed—at least in principle—to better reflect the demands of judicial work. Whether they deliver on that promise remains to be seen.

The ultimate plea of this column echoes one I’ve made before: judges must be careful about using AI in the judgment-writing process, even when they are using it in ways that might be thought of as merely “assistive” and therefore low-risk. The subtlety of the risks raised in this column, as compared to those arising from fake cases, requires, in my view, a heightened vigilance. The types of changes described will not necessarily be immediately obvious and will not happen overnight. As a senior English judge recently observed: “[t]he danger is not a dramatic coup by machine. It is of a gradual drift: standardised prompts, standardised summaries, standardised risk scores and eventually standardised dispositions. A court system may appear formally independent while its informational architecture has been captured by technology we cannot inspect, challenge or control.”

It is easy to be seduced by the ease with which generative AI tools produce seemingly high-quality text; but in the judgment-writing context, there’s a lot at stake when writing is outsourced to machines. A body of common law written by judges who all lean on the same handful of models is a common law that stops sounding, and reasoning, like many minds and starts sounding like one. And that one voice is not oriented toward the values of our justice system. Worse, it gravitates toward a synthetic, flattened and sometimes biased default. This is a future we can, and should, resist.

The post Resisting the Echo Chamber: AI-Assisted Judgment Writing and the Risk of Homogenization appeared first on Slaw.

Artificial intelligence has become, in one way or another, a part of many dispute resolution practices. Counsel use AI to prepare mediation briefs, assess litigation risk, test settlement ranges, or draft suggested terms. Parties use it to understand the process or evaluate options. Some mediators may use it to organize information, draft correspondence, test language, or reflect on process choices.

The discussion about AI in mediation has also become more urgent and comprehensive. Much of it properly focuses on confidentiality, neutrality, party autonomy, disclosure, competence, and human judgment. For working mediators, however, the next step is practical: distinguishing between lower-risk and higher-risk uses of AI and deciding what safeguards are needed in ordinary mediation practice.

My view is that whether mediators are “for” or “against” AI is not a useful question. It is whether a particular use of AI is consistent with the process we have been asked to conduct.

In some parts of a mediator’s work, AI is potentially quite useful. It can summarize long documents, compare position statements, organize chronologies, identify apparent points of agreement and disagreement, suggest agenda structures, generate possible questions, and help reframe inflammatory language. It can also assist with generic role-plays, training simulations, plain-language explanations, and first drafts of routine communications. For busy mediators, this is not insignificant. Preparation is often the invisible work of mediation, and, in complex disputes, the volume of material can be substantial. Anyone who mediates regularly knows that preparation is not just reading the brief. It is trying to understand the best approach to mediation for each particular dispute.

But we must remember that mediation is not simply information processing. Mediators know that some of the most important information in the room is not in the documents. It is in tone, timing, hesitation, anger, fatigue, mistrust, and the particular way a party says, “That is not what happened.” It is in what counsel does not say. It is in the gap between a stated position and an underlying concern. It is in the practical, emotional, relational, and reputational dimensions of conflict.

One of the most important question facing mediators is whether AI can be used without weakening the qualities that make mediation valuable to disputants: confidentiality, neutrality, party self-determination, balanced participation, trust, and judgment.

Start with the IBA Guidelines

The International Bar Association Mediation Committee has issued Guidelines on the use of generative artificial intelligence in mediation. They are helpful because they do see AI in binary terms as either prohibited or harmless. They recognize the potential benefits of AI while grounding its use in mediation values.

The Guidelines are broad. They contemplate AI use by mediators, parties, representatives, and institutions, from administrative support and document synthesis to risk analysis, settlement drafting, mediator selection, and institutional administration.

In many ways the most important contribution of the guidelines to the AI debate is the development of a safeguard framework. The IBA focuses on party autonomy, privacy and confidentiality, neutrality, impartiality, independence, and balanced process. It also includes a sample AI usage statement that may be adapted where disclosure of AI use is required or helpful. In other words, the Guidelines do not ask only, “What can AI do?” They ask, “What does AI use to do to the process?” and this is the question mediators should also be asking.

At the time of writing, I am not aware of any Canadian ADR organization having issued mediation-specific guidelines on the use of generative AI. Existing Canadian materials appear to consist mainly of general professional standards, online mediation guidance, arbitration-focused commentary, educational programming, and broader AI resource lists. That makes the IBA Guidelines a useful reference point, while still requiring Canadian mediators to apply them through Canadian privacy law, mediation agreements, institutional rules, professional standards, and the circumstances of the particular case.

A Practical Risk Matrix

A useful way to start is by separating the proposed uses of AI in mediation. The risk changes depending on whether the tool is being used for generic learning, administrative drafting, confidential document review, live-session transcription, risk modelling, option generation, or settlement drafting. A mediator does not need the same safeguards for every use but does need a well thought out and organized way to decide which safeguards are appropriate. Using a generic role-play in training is one thing. Uploading the parties’ actual mediation briefs is another.

Obviously, not all AI use carries the same risk. The risk depends on the tool, the information entered, the purpose of the use, the level of review, the sophistication of the participants, and whether the use affects the mediation process itself. A simple risk matrix may help mediators think about the issue more clearly. The point is not to create a fixed taxonomy, but to encourage mediators to identify the specific use before deciding on the safeguard.

This is not a set of definitive rules. It is a way of slowing down and that is one of the most important safeguards available to mediators: pause before using the AI tool, identify the risk, and decide what protection is needed. It also helps avoid the common mistake of discussing AI as though all uses are equally risky or equally benign. They are not.

Party Autonomy and Risk Analysis

Mediation is a consensual process. The parties make the decisions. Used carefully, AI can support that decision-making through helping parties and counsel organize information, consider options, and test risk. Used carelessly without thought, it may create the appearance of authority without the substance of judgment.

This warning is particularly important when AI is used for litigation risk analysis, BATNA or WATNA assessment, settlement modelling, concession analysis, or the generation of possible resolution options. A litigation risk analysis generated by AI may look objective. A settlement range may appear data driven. A proposed compromise may seem neutral because it was produced by a machine rather than by a person. A number can change the conversation, even when the number is only as good as the assumptions behind it.

Settlement decisions are rarely based only on legal merits or expected value. They may involve cost, delay, uncertainty, business needs, family dynamics, reputation, enforcement risk, emotional exhaustion, and the desire to move on. In a commercial case, for example, a range generated from legal costs, probability of success, and possible damages may still miss the reason the file is difficult: an ongoing business relationship, reputational concerns, or a party’s need for an acknowledgement that has no obvious monetary value. These factors do not always fit neatly into a model. That does not make modelling a waste of time, but it does mean that mediators should be careful about how AI-generated analysis is used and described.

It should be treated as a prompt for discussion, not as an answer. Some common questions questions are often:

• What assumptions are built into this analysis?
• What facts are uncertain?
• What risks are missing?
• What non-monetary interests are not captured?
• How would the other side see this?
• What would change the assessment?

Mediators must be particularly cautious about presenting AI-generated analysis as though it represents a fair, correct, or objective outcome. AI may help structure a conversation, but it must not decide the destination.

Confidentiality & Privacy Come First

For mediators, confidentiality is central to the service we provide. The convenience of AI creates a real temptation. It is easy to paste a mediation brief, chronology, expert report, email conversation, or draft settlement document into a generative AI tool and ask for a summary. The easier that becomes, the more disciplined mediators must be.

Before using AI with matter-specific information, mediators should ask practical questions:

• Is the information confidential?
• Does it identify the parties directly or indirectly?
• Has it been properly anonymized?
• Could the parties still be identified from the factual context?
• What are the tool’s terms of use?
• Is the information retained or used for training?
• Where is the data stored?
• Is the tool public, proprietary, open-source, or enterprise-grade?
• Do the parties or counsel need to know or consent?

Anonymization is important, but it is not always enough. In a specialized industry, a small community, a unique dispute, or a matter involving public events, parties may be identifiable even after names are removed. Confidentiality analysis, therefore, has to include contextual identifiability, not just whether obvious names and addresses have been deleted.

The safest starting point is conservative: do not place identifiable confidential mediation information into a general-purpose AI tool unless there is a clear, informed, and defensible basis for doing so. That basis may include secure terms of use, appropriate privacy protections, informed consent where required, and a careful judgment that the proposed use is actually necessary.

Your Neutrality Is Not Necessarily Prompt Neutrality

Mediators occupy a different role from advocates. Counsel may use AI to test arguments, strengthen submissions, prepare clients, or draft persuasive language. That is advocacy. Mediators must be more careful. Our credibility depends on the parties’ confidence that we are not adopting one side’s framing as our own.

This creates a risk when AI is used to summarize materials or generate possible options—inputs shape outputs. If one party’s brief is more detailed, more polished, or more forcefully written, the resulting summary may give that party’s version disproportionate weight. If the prompt is framed in a way that assumes one side’s narrative, the output may appear neutral while embedding that assumption.

Prompting in neutral terms helps. So does varying prompts and comparing outputs. But the deeper point is that neutrality cannot be delegated to a tool. A mediator should not ask AI to decide who is right, determine the fairest result, or generate the best settlement. Better uses include asking it to identify issues, summarize competing positions, list areas of agreement and disagreement, suggest questions, or generate a range of possible options for further discussion.

The mediator’s experience and judgment must remain essential. AI may help test whether language sounds neutral, but the mediator must decide whether it is neutral in context. That context includes the history of the dispute, the relationships in the room, the information asymmetry between the parties, and the possible impact of the mediator’s words.

A Balanced Process

To be fair, mediation requires a balanced process. Each party must be given an opportunity to fully participate, express their views, understand the process, and make informed choices. AI can support that goal. It can help with language translation, plain-language summaries, information organization, accessibility, and preparation. It may help a mediator identify unresolved issues or participation barriers.

The same tools may also create an imbalance. One party may have access to sophisticated AI tools and technical support while the other does not. One party may use AI during the mediation without the other party understanding how it is being used. A represented party may rely on AI-assisted analysis in a way that pressures an unrepresented party. A mediator may unknowingly rely on outputs that reflect cultural, linguistic, or social assumptions.

The process question is therefore important: are the participants comfortable with the use of AI, do they understand what it is being used for, and can they raise concerns? In some cases, AI use may need to be disclosed. In others, disclosure may not be legally required but may still be good process.

The IBA’s sample AI usage statement helps us because it encourages users to identify the tools they are using, refer to their terms and conditions, acknowledge their data protection responsibilities, protect confidentiality, and confirm that AI outputs will not be treated as final authority. That should be kept in mind at all times because the issue is not the technology’s novelty. The issue is whether participants can still have confidence in the process.

Developing Your Policy

Mediators do not need a complex AI policy for every file. A practical protocol should begin by identifying the proposed use of AI and deciding whether confidential or identifying information is involved. If it is, the mediator should consider whether the use is necessary, whether the information can be limited or anonymized, what the tool’s privacy terms and data use policies provide, and whether disclosure or consent is required or appropriate.

The protocol should, at a minimum, address the mediation values engaged by the proposed use of AI:

• Does the use preserve neutrality?
• Does it support or undermine party autonomy?
• Could it affect balanced participation?
• Are the outputs being treated as prompts for professional judgment, or as conclusions?
• Is any factual or legal content being independently verified?

These are not simply technical details. They go to the integrity of the mediation process.

A simple clause for a mediation agreement might begin along these lines:

The mediator may use generative artificial intelligence tools for limited administrative, organizational, drafting, or professional support purposes in connection with the mediation. The mediator will take reasonable steps to protect confidentiality, including limiting and anonymizing information entered into such tools where appropriate. The mediator will not rely on AI-produced content as a final authority and will independently review any AI-assisted output before using it in the mediation process. Participants may raise any concerns about the use of AI tools in the mediation.

Please note that this is only a starting point and there are more comprehensive examples available online. Whatever precedent that is used must be adapted to the mediator’s practice, the dispute, applicable law, institutional rules, and the expectations of the parties. It may also be too narrow for some cases and unnecessary for others. Its value is not that it solves every issue. Its value lies in requiring the mediator and participants to think about AI use before a problem arises.

Be Mindful

The risk is not that AI will replace mediators. The more immediate risk is casual use. These tools may help us prepare, draft, train, and organize complex information. In some settings, they may reduce costs and improve access to dispute resolution.

But mediation is not valuable simply because it is efficient. It is valuable because it creates a structured process for difficult conversations, informed decision-making, and negotiated resolution. The process depends on trust, confidentiality, neutrality, timing, judgment, empathy, and the parties’ confidence that they remain responsible for their own decisions.

The practical task is to stop asking whether AI in mediation is good or bad in the abstract. Much more useful questions are:

• What is the proposed use?
• What is the risk?
• What safeguards are needed before the tool becomes part of the process?

That requires more than a general comfort or competence with technology. It requires attention to the specific file, the specific parties, and the specific use being proposed. The tool is not the process. The mediator’s judgment and the parties’ informed choices and consent must remain central.

The post AI in Mediation. the Tool Is Not the Process: Using the IBA Guidelines to Evaluate Risk in Mediation Practice appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. ReconciliAction YEG 2. Robeside Assistance 3. Canadian Privacy Law Blog 4. Barry Sookman 5. Double Aspect

ReconciliAction YEG
Alberta Justice Finds that Alberta Independence Would Contravene Treaties with First Nations (Chief Electoral Officer of Alberta v Sylvestre, 2025 ABKB 712)

On December 5, 2025, Justice Feasby of the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta, issued his decision in Chief Electoral Officer of Alberta v Sylvestre, 2025 ABKB 712 regarding whether a referendum on Alberta Independence proposed under the Citizen Initiative Act, SA 2021, c C-13.2 would contravene the Constitution Act, 1982 . Justice Feasby found that Charter rights would no longer be guaranteed, and thus Alberta independence would contravene the Constitution. Justice Feasby also found that Alberta independence would contravene Treaties 6, 7, and 8, which combined cover virtually all of Alberta. …

Robeside Assistance
Recently Published Ottawa Decisions

Family Matters: Saucier v. Lafrance-Dion (2026 ONSC 3370) In a custody dispute, the Court granted the mother sole decision-making authority and primary residence of the child, with supervised parenting time for the father, transitioning to unsupervised visits upon completion of anger management. Child support was recalculated based on the father’s updated income.
Justice R. Maranger …

Canadian Privacy Law Blog
PIPEDA Replacement Tabled in House of Commons

The proposed new privacy law includes order-making powers, penalties but completely sidelines the existing Privacy Commissioner: On June 15, 2026, the Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation Even Solomon tabled in the House of Commons Bill C-36, called “An Act to enact the Protecting Privacy and Consumer Data Act, to amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and to make amendments to other Acts”. This is the long-awaited privacy bill that is slated to replace the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), which has regulated the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in the course of commercial activity in Canada since 2001. …

Barry Sookman
Artificial Intelligence, Access to Justice, and the Future of Law

For more than half a century, access to justice has been one of the most persistent challenges facing legal systems in Canada. Governments have funded legal aid. Courts have simplified procedures. Law societies have promoted pro bono services. Legal clinics have expanded their reach. Yet despite these efforts, legal services remain unaffordable for many people and legal processes remain inaccessible to many Canadians. In Hryniak v. Mauldin,[1] Karakatsanis J. writing for the Supreme Court of Canada stated …

Double Aspect
You Can’t Have a Pony

This is, I hope, the lost post in the sort-of-series occasioned by the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent unprincipled and inconsistent decisions on constitutional interpretation. In my comment on Alford v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 SCC 14, I wrote that, despite my harsh criticism of the Supreme Court’s majority, “I have no time for the populist clowns demanding that Supreme Court judges be removed from office in case they dare make decisions that the clowns dislike”. …

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*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

In previous articles, I introduced the RECLAIM model as a cultural operating system for law firms and explored the first four elements: Respect, Equity, Clarity, and Learning. This month, I turn to A: Autonomy.

Let me introduce you to Priya.

Priya is a fifth-year associate with a busy corporate practice at a mid-sized firm. She is capable, hardworking, and well-liked by clients. She has recently found her work coming from one partner, and the working relationship follows a pattern. He hands her a file and tells her it is hers to run. Then he rewrites her drafts, not for substance, but for style. He asks to be copied on every client email. When opposing counsel sends over a question, he often answers it before she has seen it.

Priya has noticed a change in her own work lately. She no longer asks herself what the best approach to a problem is. She asks what the partner would want.

She has stopped doing her best thinking. She is guessing at his. She is also feeling increasingly demotivated to the point that she has started talking to a recruiter about options.

Autonomy.

Why Autonomy Is Not Optional

A quick reminder about how this fits into our human operating system. Neuroscientists describe the brain as a prediction machine. At every moment it is forecasting what will happen next and checking those forecasts against what arrives from the environment, the body, and the social world. The more accurate the predictions, the more efficiently the brain manages its energy budget and the safer we feel. Security enhances cognitive capacity. That is the deep logic our brains operate from.

Autonomy is a social input our brain is alert to. It is one of the five social domains in David Rock’s SCARF model. When we have meaningful control over our work, our choices, and our environment, we can predict more of what happens to us, and the brain reads that control as reward. When control is stripped away, the brain registers threat. Attention narrows. Stress rises. The quality of thinking, which is the product law firms actually sell, degrades.

This is why micromanagement is so reliably corrosive, and why the cost runs in both directions. The associate (or staff member) disengages, and the supervising lawyer stays trapped in work the firm hired other people to do. Nobody reclaims their time by doing everyone’s thinking for them.

More Than “Stop Micromanaging”

The usual prescription for autonomy is simple: stop micromanaging. The advice is correct. It is also incomplete.

Telling a supervising lawyer to let go of a file is like telling a conscientious driver to take their hands off the wheel. A lawyer who hands a matter to a third-year with “it’s all yours” and disappears has granted abandonment not autonomy.

Autonomy is not the absence of structure. It works because of structure.

Build the Sandbox

The sandbox metaphor usually gets used in business as a play area: a consequence-free corner where people can experiment. I want to use it differently.

Think about why a sandbox works. The walls. The walls hold the sand in. They mark the edge between where the child decides and where the parent does. And they are precisely what allows the parent to sit on the bench instead of hovering, because everything inside the walls is safe.

The walls do not constrain the play. The walls are what make unsupervised play possible.

That is what autonomy needs in a law firm. The walls are the defined edges of a piece of work: what done looks like, when it is due, when you will talk about progress and answer questions. Inside the walls, the how belongs to the person doing the work. Build the sandbox well and three things happen at once: autonomous action becomes safe, errors surface while they are still small, and files become opportunities for learning.

Three walls matter most.

First: A delegation process that sets everyone up for success

Delegation is where autonomy is granted or withheld, and most firms leave it to individual habit. A sound process is not complicated: clear instructions about the outcome and its context, a timeline, genuine availability for questions, and check-in points agreed at the moment of handoff.

That last element is crucial. A check-in agreed in advance is structure. Structure provides a sense of security. A check-in imposed midstream can come across as surveillance. “Is it done yet?” “Have you started?” These questions signal distrust and aren’t simply annoying. They are motivation killers.

Second: Ownership of the how

Once the metaphorical sandbox walls are set, team members decide how they tackle their work and are held accountable for the quality of the product and timely delivery. Define outcomes, not methods, unless necessary. If a precedent is to be followed or a firm convention applies, say so at the handoff; that is a wall, and walls are fair. What is not fair is leaving the method open and then rewriting the work to match an unstated personal preference.

The same principle applies to change. When firms roll out new technology or workflows, leaders rightly decide the destination, but the people who live inside those systems every day need to have genuine input and real choices about how to get there. Autonomy during change is the difference between a team that adopts and a team that complies and grumbles.

Third: A shared discipline of feedback

Autonomous work is best supported by a feedback system that flows smoothly in both directions. The associate running a file, or staff member taking on a task, needs to know how the work is landing. The supervising lawyer who has stepped back needs confidence that problems will be surfaced fast. Both depend on feedback, and at many firms feedback is left to individual personality: some partners give it well, some give it harshly, and others barely give it at all.

The fix is to train every lawyer in one consistent approach to giving and receiving feedback. On the giving side: specific, behavioural, tied to the work, and oriented to progress, catching what is working as well as what needs to change. On the receiving side, the half that is almost always skipped: how to ask for feedback, how to listen without mounting a defence, and how to turn a vague “this needs work” into something usable.

When everyone at the firm gives and receives feedback along the same lines, feedback stops being an event and becomes a regular part of the work. Course corrections feel routine rather than personal. Errors get surfaced while they are easily remedied. The sandbox stays safe, and the learning never stops.

Operationalizing Autonomy

Here are three actions a supervising lawyer can put in motion this quarter:

1. Adopt a delegation protocol. Put it in writing and follow it. When assigning work, provide background information, the outcome and why it matters, the deadline, and check-in points. Provide feedback on the work product. Use this protocol for every significant delegation for ninety days to firmly establish the walls of your sandbox.
2. Make effective delegation and feedback and essential part of your firm’s operations. Train the whole firm in one consistent. Not just partners. Lawyers and staff, giving and receiving. Develop a simple model, run a working session, and practice with real examples.
3. Audit your own redlines. For two weeks, choose some opportunities to review your edits. Notice, what were the substantive edits, and what was a stylistic preference. Send the substance back with your reasons. Let the preference go, or name it once as a convention you like followed. Then watch what happens to the next round of drafts.

Watch out for these Autonomy undermining moves

• Rewriting a draft for personal style rather than substance, without explaining the difference
• Taking back a task at the first wobble instead of coaching through it
• Requiring a cc on every email after handing over a client relationship
• “It’s faster if I just do it myself”
• Announcing changes to systems and processes with no input from the people who use them daily

Each of these examples is small. Each one teaches the same lesson: this is not really yours. People who learn that lesson stop bringing judgment to work and start bringing compliance. Compliance does not develop nor produce the thinking clients pay for.

Returning to Priya

Nothing Priya’s supervising lawyer does is malicious. He is careful, his standards are high, and every override feels to him like quality control. But each one lands in Priya’s brain the same way: as a threat to her control over her own work. And the work product he gets back is shrinking to fit the space he leaves for it.

Now picture the same partner and the same files with a sandbox in place. A clear handoff. Check-ins agreed in advance. Feedback flowing both ways in a shared language. The how belongs to Priya. Errors surface at the check-in, while they are small and fixable. Priya is learning at full speed, and the partner is sitting on the bench, free to do the work only he can do.

One parting thought: While AI will throw a spanner into how we develop lawyers in the future, the need for autonomy and the feedback that supports learning and growth will remain a dependable constant. Start honing your leadership approach now.

The post RECLAIM: A Is for Autonomy appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : La peine de 21 mois d’emprisonnement avec sursis infligée à un jeune homme de 23 ans n’est pas manifestement non indiquée; celui-ci, par le biais d’un média social et d’une fausse identité, a eu une liaison avec une adolescente de 15 ans, laquelle a comporté plusieurs relations sexuelles.

Intitulé : R. c. Bourque, 2026 QCCA 723
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Québec
Décision de : Juges Marie-France Bich, Jocelyn F. Rancourt et Myriam Lachance
Date : 29 mai 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions de nature sexuelle — infractions sexuelles contre des enfants — leurre — média social — fausse identité — contacts sexuels — victime âgée de 15 ans — accusé âgé de 23 ans — facteurs atténuants — jeune âge de l’accusé — absence d’antécédents judiciaires — plaidoyer de culpabilité — thérapie — soutien familial — facteurs aggravants — mauvais traitement à l’égard d’une personne âgée de moins de 18 ans — abus de confiance — manipulation — lien étroit entre le risque de récidive de l’accusé et son isolement social — nombre de contacts sexuels — faits contestés — absence de preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable (art. 724 (3) e) C.Cr.) — dénonciation — dissuasion — réhabilitation — condamnation avec sursis — ordonnance de purger sa peine dans la collectivité — probation — appel — absence d’erreur de principe ou de peine manifestement non indiquée.

Appel de la peine. Rejeté.

L’intimé (23 ans) est entré en contact avec la victime (15 ans) par l’intermédiaire d’un média social. Il a utilisé un faux nom, mais a révélé son âge véritable. Ces derniers se sont rencontrés et ont eu des relations sexuelles. L’intimé a plaidé coupable à des infractions de leurre et de contacts sexuels. Une peine de 21 mois d’emprisonnement avec sursis, assortie de 2 ans de probation, lui a été infligée.

Décision

La juge de première instance n’a pas erré en retenant 4 événements de contacts sexuels, alors qu’il y en aurait eu 7 selon la poursuite. Les avocats ne pouvaient modifier les faits qui ont servi d’assise à la reconnaissance de culpabilité, sans approbation de l’intimé à cet effet. Or, personne ne s’est enquis de son opinion. Si la poursuite souhaitait introduire en preuve un tel élément aggravant, elle devait en faire la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable (art. 724 (3) e) du Code criminel). Ensuite, s’il est vrai que la différence d’âge importante ainsi que la très grande vulnérabilité de la victime sont des facteurs aggravants, il serait erroné d’évaluer la notion d’«écart d’âge» de façon purement quantitative sans tenir compte de la dimension contextuelle de l’affaire. Soulignons aussi que la poursuite n’a jamais proposé à la juge de retenir la différence d’âge à titre de facteur aggravant; elle lui a plutôt suggéré de considérer le jeune âge de la victime et l’abus de confiance, ce qui a été fait.

L’appelant ne convainc pas non plus la Cour que la peine est manifestement non indiquée. La gravité de l’infraction est certes un facteur pertinent quant à l’analyse, mais elle ne doit pas supplanter la culpabilité morale de l’accusée. Dans une décision soignée, la juge a estimé dans un premier temps que les circonstances de l’affaire ne justifiaient pas une peine de pénitencier. Le juge possède la latitude suffisante pour infliger une peine adaptée aux circonstances de l’infraction ainsi qu’à la situation de l’accusé, et la présence de circonstances aggravantes, même si elle augmente l’importance de la dénonciation et de la dissuasion, ne permet pas d’écarter d’emblée la possibilité de l’attribution du sursis à l’emprisonnement pour cette seule raison.

Dans un deuxième temps, la juge n’a pas erré en concluant à l’existence d’un lien étroit entre le risque de récidive de l’intimé et son isolement social, compte tenu de la restriction totale d’utilisation d’Internet imposée à celui-ci pendant plus de 2 ans et du contenu des rapports; elle a évalué qu’il était moins risqué pour la société que l’intimé poursuive son chemin déjà bien entamé sur la voie de la réhabilitation plutôt que de l’incarcérer pendant 21 mois (ou encore de lui imposer la peine de 4 ans de pénitencier que propose la poursuite). La peine comportait en outre de nombreuses conditions, en plus d’une période de probation de 2 ans. L’intimé sera ainsi sous la surveillance et le contrôle de l’État pendant 45 mois et l’a déjà été pendant plus de 2 ans avant l’infliction de sa peine. On ne saurait donc dire qu’il s’agit d’une peine indûment clémente.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeal

Civil Litigation/Elections: Collateral Attack; Abuse of Process; Parliamentary Privilege; Immunity
Resler v. Anglin, 2024 ABCA 113, 2026 SCC 23 (41298)

Election claim not barred by collateral attack, abuse of process, privilege, immunity.

Leave to Appeal Granted

Elections: Returning Officer Appointments
Canada (Attorney General) v. Drover, 2025 ONCA 468 (42005)

Constitutionality of Canada Election Act re returning officer appointments.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.