A professional legal advocate occupies a unique position, interposed as they are between the justice system on one hand, and their client on the other. Each advocate has a duty of commitment to the client’s cause, and must resolutely pursue the client’s legitimate goals using all legal means. At the same time, the advocate is an officer of the court and must help the legal system accomplish its own objectives. The need to reconcile duties to client with duties to the law comes up frequently in the practice of law, and pervades the study of legal ethics.

The balancing act isn’t just about what the advocate does, and how they do it, it’s also about when advocacy occurs. Sometimes, a court or tribunal will require submissions on a short timeline, perhaps seemingly too quick for the advocate to do a great job for the client. More common, in Canada’s justice system, is the opposite problem – systemic delay means that it takes far longer than it seemingly should to get results for the client. What resources and ideas might help lawyers and paralegals dealing with such time-related challenges?

Dealing with Systemic Delay

Many niches of Canada’s justice system are notoriously slow. The World Justice Project ranks the systems of countries around the world. Canada ranks high overall (13^th out of 143 countries), but our lowest score, out of the 40+ components of the WJP’s index, is for delay in the civil justice system (42 points out of 100). While some of our courts and tribunals deliver timely justice, many do not. At Ontario’s Human Rights Tribunal, for example, out of the 33 decisions-on-the-merits issued in the 2023/2024 year, Tribunal Watch reports that 29 were filed more than 4 years previously. A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer which lasted over 6 years was found by the Supreme Court of Canada to not constitute inordinate delay.

Needless to say, systemic delay complicates the efforts of lawyers to secure timely resolutions for their clients. What can be done?

• Legal Remedies Canadian law offers some legal remedies for parties who have been subject to excessive delay. A person charged with an offence, who benefits from the Charter right to be “tried within a reasonable time,” can bring an application to have the prosecution stayed. A non-criminal prosecution (e.g. for an alleged regulatory or disciplinary infraction) may become subject to dismissal as an abuse of process if the public authority delays too much, although the bar is high. The remedy of mandamus, compelling a tribunal to speed the hearing of a certain matter, is available on judicial review, although this too is rarely granted.
• Settlement is also obviously an option. Reaching an agreement will end the “slow burn” of time and money for all parties involved in a dispute. Timeliness is one of the reasons why settlement (including plea bargains and joint submissions on remedy) is the most common mechanism by which legal advocates produce results for their clients. Sometimes, however, in high-conflict cases advocates will fall into a “tunnel vision” focus on preparing for adjudication, disregarding opportunities to settle on advantageous terms. Even if one explored settlement of a case without success last month, it’s possible that new opportunities have emerged this month.
• Arbitration can be defied as privatized judging. If all parties want a resolution faster than the court or tribunal can provide one arbitration is an option. Under provincial arbitration statutes, parties can generally agree to have arbitrators decide about most legal disputes. An arbitration will typically be available much more quickly than a court date.
• Fees and Financial Arrangements In some cases, the biggest problem with systemic delay is that the client can’t afford to wait for justice. This may happen if the client is depending on a judgment or settlement to provide the money that they need to live on. In such circumstances, having to wait months or years may seem intolerable, creating pressure on the client to accept an unreasonably low settlement offer. A lawyer or paralegal may have some financial power to assuage this problem. If billing of legal fees is deferred until the matter resolves (whether or not the fee itself is contingent on the outcome), the fee will not be a source of additional financial pressure on the client. Going a step further and lending money to the client creates a conflict of interest, but at least one of Canada’s law societies takes the position that this conflict can be managed with the fully informed consent of the client.

Short Timelines

Less commonly, a court or tribunal will require an appearance, or written materials, on an uncomfortably short timeline. “Justice hurried” may be “justice buried”, if the pressure of time leads to substandard advocacy, or makes it impossible for the client and their evidence to be properly heard. For example, British Columbia’s Residential Tenancy Act creates timelines as short as 48 hours for deciding whether to seek internal review of certain administrative decisions. It has been argued that this timeframe undermines access to justice, especially in cases with literacy impediments or key evidence in the hands of a third party. How should advocates deal with such situations?

• Adjournments may be available, if an advocate can’t make a proposed hearing date or deadline. However, Ontario’s Civil Rules Review argues that excessive recourse to adjournments is a major contributor to the system’s overall slowness. Advocates should not resort too quickly to adjournment requests in these situations, especially when the client’s interest is in a speedy resolution.
• Good enough is Good Enough There is such a thing as materials that are “too perfect,” especially when there is time pressure. A factum that has been proof-read by three pairs of eyes, with every word perfectly chosen, is in one sense better than one that just gets the necessary points across. However, the latter may be functionally equivalent and available much more quickly, in which case it is superior in a more important sense. Good adjudicators know they aren’t judging writing competitions for advocates, but rather determining the real world rights of parties, so they are unlikely to rule against your client because of a typo or two.
• Good Enough is More Affordable The “quick and dirty” (albeit complete and accurate) written piece is also cheaper for the client, if you’re billing by the hour. When the client is paying for every minute, their lawyer or paralegal is ethically obliged to make file management decisions driven exclusively by the client’s interest, which includes their financial interest in paying lower fees. In appropriate cases, an advocate might have a duty to consider using AI or other technology in their practice, if it can produce cheaper and quicker results for their clients with no sacrifice of quality.
• Send for the Backups. A senior advocate might see that it’s impossible to meet a short timeline because of other demands on their time. Before requesting an adjournment, the possibility should be considered that someone else could serve the client just as well. This could be a junior in the same firm (whose abilities may be underestimated for lack of opportunities), or a “locum” from outside the firm who is pinch-hitting for a particular appearance. Inability to reconcile the advocate’s personal schedule with the demands of a tribunal process for timeliness could also be a sign that future matters (and perhaps the matter at hand) should be referred out to lawyers or paralegals with more capacity. It is ethically problematic for an advocate to keep an “inventory” of cases that they can work on whenever they like or whenever they get to them, if this means slowing justice for the client and the system.

Timeliness is a challenge not only for the Canadian justice system as a whole, but also for individual advocates who must reconcile the demands of the system with the needs of their clients, not to mention the advocate’s own need for a manageable work schedule. A creative and open-minded attitude helps one identify opportunities to produce timely justice.

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Adapted from a paper presented to the Law Society of Ontario’s Eight Minute Administrative Lawyer, March 6 2006.

The post The Time’s Not Right: Advocacy When a Tribunal Is Delayed or Imposes Short Timelines appeared first on Slaw.

For years I’ve been buying the same turkey bites from the grocery store (Canadian made, of course). They’re a high protein, grab-and-go snack. And, for years, I’ve paid about $7.00 for them. During my last visit to the grocery store, those same turkey bites were a whopping $12.99. Reading the sticker price led to an audible gasp while strangers around me nodded in agreement, because without having to say anything, we were all thinking the exact same thing – yes, an 85% price increase is astronomical, but this is our new reality.[1] Just after my shopping experience, I came across a few articles published about the Grocery Code of Conduct (the “Code”) with headlines framing it as a response to affordability.[2] I read the articles expecting to learn how grocers intended to respond to public concerns about pricing. I was wrong. The Code does not address higher prices and instead it seeks to clarify the roles of sellers and producers. While the Code doesn’t address how grocers will reduce the price of my turkey bites, it does offer a useful illustration of the limits of industry self-regulation.

What is the Grocery Code of Conduct (the “Code”)?

It took roughly 5 years of consultation, meetings and negotiation before the grocery industry published its first voluntary code of conduct signed by major grocers including Loblaws, Metro, Costco Canada, Walmart Canada and Empire Co., along with roughly 150 suppliers.[3] The Code follows the path paved by other, similarly situated countries, like Australia, and it addresses concerns raised by producers, suppliers and farmers about the consistency and predictability of fees paid by these participants to grocers. By introducing the Code, the industry is hoping to level the playing field, create more certainty and allow suppliers to escalate disputes. By clarifying the roles of the grocer and the producer, the benefit to the consumer will be more of a knock-on effect. The thinking is that more fee predictability will lead to lower prices for consumers. However, according to research conducted by CIBC, who surveyed retailers, wholesalers, suppliers, brokers and industry participants, respondents believe that there will be no notable impact from the Code.[4]

Broad (and Meaningless) Language

The Code and the governance structure that supports it is an attempt at industry self-regulation, and industry self-regulation can be tricky. While it is more cost effective for governments and it can succeed, one of the major flaws in this type of approach is that foundational instruments may be diluted to achieve industry support.

A reading of this code of conduct suggests that the industry took the ‘watered-down’ approach to achieve industry sign-on. The Code starts out strong with a statement of principles:

“Contribute to a thriving and competitive grocery industry, delivering the vital goods upon which Canadians in every community depend, recognizing the needs of all stakeholders in the grocery value chain, including the unique realities facing small and medium enterprises, the realities of the Canadian marketplace, and the importance of environmental, social and governance principles.”[5]

However, after this statement of principles, the principled language in the Code dramatically falls off.

The Code does not address how retailers and suppliers will achieve their stated goals or go deep on important definitions, most importantly, it is silent on the meaning of environmental, social and governance principles (“ESG”). The Code avoids defining ESG. Defining ESG may have been challenging, given that its meaning varies widely across companies and industries. While each of the Code’s signatories may have understood ESG differently, to be meaningful, it is important that those principles be explicit. For example, specific issues that could be of interest in the grocery supply chain could be numerous, including labour practices, environmental impact and supply-chain ethics. The potential ethical issues in the global grocery industry supply chain are manifold and complex and while these issues are often addressed through the procurement processes, or through corporate ESG benchmarks, reporting and other internal governance processes, the Code lumps all potential social concerns into an overall “ESG” bucket. A more principled approach would have been to clearly define the most important terminology and identify the red lines.

After its statement of principles, the Code then reiterates concepts that already exist in law. For example, section 1 reiterates the state of law as it currently exists: that parties have the right to contract, negotiate terms of agreements and enter into agreements, that the parties have to act fairly in their dealings, and it reinforces the Competition Bureau’s pre-existing authority. Defining pre-existing law (and common law), the authority of the Competition Bureau, or re-confirming the purpose of existing contracts or agreements (again, likely already defined in the procurement process) adds little substantive value and misses and opportunity for clear guidance.

The above examples illustrate the dilution pitfall in industry self-regulation. To help get industry buy-in, often meaningful principles are weakened so they’re more palatable to more parties, but this weakens the foundation.

Lacking ‘Teeth’

When establishing industry self-regulation another tricky element includes compliance and oversight which can be weakened by inadequate power provided to enforce the Code and voluntary engagement. Effective monitoring and enforcement powers help to provide ‘teeth’ to the foundational document as does mandatory participation.

In an interview with the Financial Post, Gary Sands, Senior VP of the Canadian Federation of Independent Groceries, describes the Code as a set of principles or provisions.[6] For industry self-regulation to succeed, the Code’s signatories should approach it as a set of mandatory ethical requirements to which all participants in the Canadian industry must adhere. Additionally, all members must agree to embed the Code into their organizational governance structures and abide by the consequences if they fail to meet the Code’s principles.

The Code is administered by the “Office of the Grocery Sector Code of Conduct” (“OGSCC”) and the Code’s signatories bear the financial burden of ensuring industry compliance through this newly established governance framework[7] which includes the appointment of an Adjudicator to administer the Code and resolve disputes between members.[8] Signatories must also adhere to the authority granted to the Adjudicator and abide by the Adjudicator’s recommendations, regardless of whether they agree with them. At this stage, it appears that the Adjudicator will only preside over issues involving two signatories to the Code but only once all other complaint resolution mechanisms have been exhausted. The Adjudicator’s decisions are non-legally binding with consequences somewhat limited to public notice of non-compliance and remediation recommendations.[9] Without strong decision-making authority and consequences that include monetary fines or penalties, an Adjudicator’s decision-making authority to enforce the Code are unlikely, on their own, to drive meaningful compliance.

Some players in the Canadian grocery industry are not currently signatories to the Code and that position is understandable. The benefit to being a non-member at this stage since they benefit from being ‘free riders’. They can participate at their discretion and opt in whenever they like. While they do not contribute financially, they receive the benefit from the industry’s initiatives, which includes improved overall reputation and the lack of governmental regulation and oversight. At this early stage, given that inclusion is voluntary, it may be more beneficial for some organizations to sit on the sidelines and wait to see how the process unfolds by observing the Adjudicator and its decision-making from afar.

A Missed Opportunity

Here’s the final pitfall of industry self-regulation that I would like to address here – the missed opportunity to address consumer concerns. At this moment, most people worry about the price of their groceries, they worry about price inflation, consistency in pricing, and some believe that there is no incentive for members of Canada’s food industry to reduce prices because there is little competition in the market.[10] These concerns are hotly debated in parliament, news and through social media outlets impacting industry reputation. While clarity between grocers and suppliers was likely the low-hanging fruit that needed addressing, after prices steadily increased during COVID with stressed supply chains, the grocery industry had a genuine opportunity to add to public dialogue, but they seemed to have missed the opportunity to implement meaningful and impactful consumer policies to address public concerns.

Some Concluding Thoughts

It may be premature to judge the Code and the OGSCC at this early stage of development and, who knows, these initiatives might ultimately lead to reduced prices for consumers. Industry self-regulation has its benefits. It allows the industry self-determination, greater flexibility, and it may be the most cost-effective solution for governments.[11] But, for now, it seems that I may have to find a protein substitute for my turkey-bites.

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[1] Soon after drafting this blog, ‘Operation Epic Fury’ began with significant shipping challenges occurring in the Strait of Hormuz. It is likely that these global events will further exacerbate shipping issues and food costs over the next few months.

[2] One of the articles: The Canadian Press, “Canada’s grocery code of conduct kicks in Jan. 1, with buy-in from 5 major grocers: Code could improve grocer-supplier relations, but not a silver bullet for prices” (CBC: January 1, 2026) (Online: https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canada-grocery-code-of-conduct-jan-1-9.7031468); “Canada Grocery Code of Conduct Provisions” (OGSCC: 2026) (Online: https://canadacode.org/code/code-of-conduct/)

[3] “Canada’s First-Ever Grocery Code of Conduct Comes Into Effect” (FDA: February 2, 2026) (Online: https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Canada%27s%20First-Ever%20Grocery%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20Comes%20Into%20Effect_Montreal_Canada_CA2026-0003.pdf ); “Retail fees in the Canadian food industry: Findings of the Federal-Provincial-Territorial (FPT) Working Group on Retail Fees” (Government of Canada: July 2021) (Online: https://agriculture.canada.ca/en/sector/data-reports/retail-fees-issue-canadian-food-industry).

[4] Denis Paglinawan, “New Grocery Code of Conduct won’t have notable impact, insiders say” (Financial Post, January 28, 2026) (Online: https://financialpost.com/news/retail-marketing/grocery-code-conduct-wont-impact): Quote by Mark Petrie and Chantel Pearce, CIBC analysts.

[5] Emphasis (underlining) added by me.

[6] “Grocery code of conduct could cut food prices,” Interview: Larysa Harapyn and Gary Sands (Financial Post: November 20, 2023) (Online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYEuw-8sYck).

[7] The Code is read together with a Governance Framework, By-laws and Operating Rules that will only apply to those who are registered members.

[8] “OGSCC Finalizes Governance Framework and Launches Formal Recruitment” (OGSCC) (Online: https://canadacode.org/news/ogscc-finalizes-governance-framework-and-launches-formal-recruitment/).

[9] “Dispute Resolution Management Process” (OGSCC: 2026) (Online: https://canadacode.org/code/dispute-resolution/). For the DRMP to apply, it requires that both parties be participating members at the time of the alleged dispute (s. 2.2). The decision of the Adjudicator is non-legally binding (s. 6.3(d)) and consequences of non-compliance with the Code and the Adjudicator’s decision or remediation recommendation includes publishing a Notice of Non-Compliance and report on the OGSCC website (s.6.4).

[10] “Canada Needs More Grocery Competition” (Competition Bureau Report: June 27, 2023).

[11] The federal government has stepped in to offer GST rebates while food affordability continues to be hotly debated. “Carney announced grocery rebate amid growing affordability issues for Canadians,” Press Conference (Global News: January 26, 2026) (Online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9l-6o4Ech50).

The post Why the Grocery Code of Conduct Won’t Lower Prices and What It Shows About Industry Self-Regulation appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Reconciliation Syllabus 2. David Whelan 3. IFLS at Osgoode 4. Excess Copyright 5. Global Workplace Insider

Reconciliation Syllabus
Learning Land and Relationship

For some time, I have been wanting to bring experiential learning related to land to a 3^rd year course I teach in an undergraduate Legal Studies program at Ontario Tech University: LGLS 3310U – Indigenous Peoples, Law and the State in Canada . This is the story of how this happened. Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland discuss “stories as tools for thinking”, for both tellers and listeners, in their work on engagement with Indigenous legal traditions.[1] Although my topic is much smaller, telling this story gives me space to think – about the land, about teaching and relationships, and about myself as a teacher — if you feel you can take it up as a thinking tool, too, please do. …

David Whelan
The Two Speeds of Law Practice Technology

It is funny how you can be aware of something but, until you explain it to someone else, it doesn’t really take form. So far this semester, we have been looking at law practice technology from the perspectives of efficiencies: doing things more quickly and more accurately. Now that we’ve hit some security topics, the focus is on shifting into reverse and slowing down: how do you add friction. When I read about lawyers running into trouble with practice technology, increasingly it seems as though they’ve allowed their focus on efficiency to get out of balance with their need to induce friction. A law practice without friction is on a very slippery slope. …

IFLS at Osgoode
Why the Rule of Law Matters Now More Than Ever

At a time when courts, constitutions, and core democratic values are under increasing pressure, Osgoode Hall Law School convened a public conversation to examine a fundamental question: why the rule of law matters now more than ever. Hosted by Osgoode and York University, the event brought together judges, lawyers, scholars, students, and policy leaders for a focused discussion on law’s power and capacity in this dramatically challenging moment in history. The conversation featured the Honourable Bob Rae, former Premier of Ontario and Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations. Opening the event, Dean Trevor Farrow situated the discussion in a context familiar to many in the room. …

Excess Copyright
Blacklock’s Pyrrhic Victory in the Federal Court of Appeal

I have blogged about Blacklock’s war against fair dealing for over a decade during which it has been protracting its long lasting litany of litigation losses. This began notably with Justice Barnes’ 2016 decision in a case in which he ruled against Blacklock’s and stated that “Although there are certainly some troubling aspects to Blacklock’s business practices it is unnecessary to resolve the Attorney General’s allegation that this litigation constitutes a form of copyright abuse by a copyright troll.” See 1395804 Ontario Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 1255 (CanLII), [2017] 2 FCR 256, <https://canlii.ca/t/gvrbx>. Incidentally, the Government’s lawyer on that case, Alexandre Kaufman, has since been appointed as a judge of the Ontario Superior Court. …

Global Workplace Insider
Mandatory ethnicity and disability pay gap reporting: government response

On 25 March, the government published its response to the consultation on mandatory ethnicity and disability pay gap reporting, confirming its intention to proceed with a new reporting regime for large employers. Reporting will apply to organisations with 250 or more employees, aligning with the existing gender pay gap framework and avoiding additional regulatory burden on smaller employers, who will instead be encouraged to report voluntarily with the support of guidance. …

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*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : Le juge de première instance n’a pas erré en concluant que, même si l’accusé n’avait pas la possession réelle des armes à feu trouvées dans l’appartement de son ex-conjointe, duquel il avait été expulsé, il en avait la possession imputée.

Intitulé : S.G. c. R., 2026 QCCA 351
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Jocelyn F. Rancourt, Genviève Cotnam et Christine Baudouin
Date : 16 mars 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — infraction — infractions relatives aux armes — armes à feu — entreposage négligent d’armes à feu, de munitions et de dispositifs prohibés — entreposage d’armes à feu, de munitions et de dispositifs prohibés en violation des règlements — possession non autorisée d’armes à feu — possession non autorisée de dispositifs prohibés — chargeur à haute capacité — possession d’une arme à feu en sachant que son numéro de série a été modifié, maquillé ou effacé — présomption légale (art. 108 (4) C.Cr.) — violation d’une ordonnance d’interdiction — armes trouvées dans l’appartement de l’ex-conjointe de l’accusé — expulsion — possession imputée (art. 4 (3) a) C.Cr.) — contrôle — connaissance — intention de reprendre possession des biens — appréciation de la preuve — preuve circonstancielle — déclaration de culpabilité — requête en non-lieu — rejet — appel — caractère raisonnable du verdict.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — preuve pénale — appréciation de la preuve — infractions relatives aux armes à feu — armes trouvées dans l’appartement de l’ex-conjointe de l’accusé — expulsion — inférence tirée de la preuve — possession imputée (art. 4 (3) a) C.Cr.) — contrôle — connaissance — intention de reprendre possession des biens — preuve circonstancielle — preuve de l’occupation des lieux — possession des clés par l’accusé — propriété des outils de travail de l’accusé — démarches effectuées par l’accusé pour récupérer ses biens — degré de visibilité de l’arme — seule inférence raisonnable — spéculation — hypothèse d’un tiers ayant laissé les armes à l’insu de l’accusé — témoignage — crédibilité des témoins — lacunes — corroboration — preuve matérielle — modification du numéro de série — présomption légale (art. 108 (4) C.Cr.) — appel.

Appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité. Rejeté.

L’appelant a été déclaré coupable, par la Cour du Québec, sous 6 chefs d’accusation en lien avec la possession interdite et l’entreposage négligent d’armes à feu, de munitions et de dispositifs prohibés. Des armes ont été trouvées dans l’appartement de l’ex-conjointe de l’appelant, alors que ce dernier y a habité pendant près de 6 mois avant d’être expulsé des lieux.

Décision

Le juge de première instance n’a pas erré en concluant que la preuve, évaluée dans son ensemble, permettait d’établir autant la connaissance que le contrôle par l’appelant des biens saisis dans l’appartement. La preuve de l’occupation des lieux, le témoignage de l’ex-conjointe et la possession des clés par l’appelant suffisaient pour rejeter la demande en non-lieu. Par ailleurs, à elle seule, l’expulsion de ce dernier quelques jours avant la saisie ne fait pas échec à la possibilité d’invoquer la possession imputée. La preuve ne permet pas de conclure que, en raison de son expulsion, l’appelant avait perdu tout contrôle sur l’appartement et les biens s’y trouvant; au contraire, il possédait encore les clés permettant d’y accéder et ses biens y étaient entreposés, notamment ses cartes de crédit, ses pièces d’identité, ses vêtements et de nombreux outils d’une certaine valeur. Son intention de reprendre possession de ses biens ressort des démarches répétées qu’il a effectuées à la suite de son expulsion. Son ex-conjointe reconnaît d’ailleurs qu’ils étaient censés s’organiser pour qu’il revienne chercher ses affaires. Le juge pouvait donc inférer de cette preuve circonstancielle que l’appelant conservait un certain contrôle sur les biens saisis et les autres biens lui appartenant dans l’appartement.

Le verdict ne peut être qualifié de déraisonnable. Le juge était pleinement conscient des lacunes du témoignage de l’ex-conjointe, reconnaissant qu’il n’était pas possible de s’y fier en ce qui concerne les circonstances de la découverte des armes, la connaissance par celle-ci de leur présence dans son appartement ou son consentement quant à cette présence. Il a cependant retenu son témoignage relativement à certains éléments plus objectifs soutenus par une preuve extrinsèque. Le juge a conclu que, même si l’appelant n’avait pas la possession réelle des armes, il en avait la possession imputée (art. 4 (3) a) du Code criminel (C.Cr.)). Le verdict se fonde sur: le degré de visibilité de l’arme «militaire», entraînant une inférence de connaissance pour toute personne habitant les lieux ou circulant dans la pièce; le lien entre l’appelant et les autres objets présents dans les pièces où les biens saisis ont été trouvés, particulièrement ses documents officiels; l’occupation importante de ces pièces par l’appelant, permettant une inférence de contrôle; ainsi que le nombre d’armes, leur valeur et leur dangerosité, desquels émerge l’inférence selon laquelle de tels objets ne seraient pas laissés par un tiers sous le contrôle d’une personne qui en ignore la nature et la présence. Au surplus, il était raisonnable de rejeter la suggestion voulant que des tiers aient pu laisser les armes dans l’appartement à l’insu de l’appelant. Cette suggestion, qui est entièrement spéculative, relève d’une hypothèse sans assise. L’unique inférence raisonnable était celle d’une possession par l’appelant des biens saisis.

Quant au chef d’accusation d’avoir eu en sa possession une carabine en sachant que son numéro de série avait été modifié ou effacé, le juge a mentionné que l’on pouvait inférer de la possession de l’arme que l’appelant savait que le numéro de série avait été effacé. Bien qu’il n’ait pas fourni davantage d’explications à ce propos, cette conclusion est conforme à la présomption légale prévue à l’article 108 (4) C.Cr. L’appelant n’a fourni aucune preuve de nature à contrer l’effet de cette présomption.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeals

Insurance: Presumption of Death
Riddle v. ivari, 2026 SCC 9 (40986)

“Return” of a person declared dead, established on a balance of probabilities.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

Most professionals review their financial portfolios regularly. They assess what’s performing, what’s stalled, and what no longer fits the strategy. They make deliberate decisions about where to invest time and capital.

Almost no one applies the same discipline to the most valuable asset in their professional life: their relationships.

The Asset You’re Not Managing

A contact base that isn’t actively maintained doesn’t stay neutral. It erodes.

The client you worked with intensively three years ago and haven’t spoken to since? They’ve moved on. The colleague who moved to an interesting company but slipped off your radar? They needed someone with your expertise last month and called someone else. Not because they don’t respect you. Because you weren’t visible when it mattered.

These relationships rarely end dramatically. They fade.

The result? The contact still exists in your CRM, you might see their LinkedIn posts occasionally, but the connection has gone quiet. Reaching out can feel awkward, like calling someone after years of silence and pretending nothing happened.

Here’s the thing: it’s normal and it happens to everyone. Acceptance is the first step.

Honestly Review Your Contacts

Before you reach out to anyone, spend time understanding what you’re working with. The audit must come first – and it must be honest

Think about your contacts in terms of relationship temperature, not industry or revenue. Who have you spoken to – not emailed, not liked on LinkedIn – in the last twelve months? Who is in a position today that didn’t exist when you last connected? And critically, who should no longer be on this list at all?

That last question matters more than most people expect because it focuses your attention. Most people, when they do this exercise, honestly, discover their active network is significantly smaller than they assumed. That’s not a failure, but it is useful information.

The Intelligence You’re Not Using

Today, you don’t have to guess what’s happening with your network. The information is largely available, it just isn’t being collected and used.

LinkedIn, when used as an observation tool rather than a broadcasting platform, reveals role changes, company news, and professional milestones in real time. Google Alerts costs nothing and takes minutes to set up. Think of it as preparation.

The professionals who reach out at the right moment with a relevant observation aren’t lucky, they are paying attention.

Outreach That Doesn’t Announce Itself

The worst business development communications have one thing in common: they are obviously about the sender. The most effective way to revive a dormant relationship is through outreach that asks for nothing.

This sounds simple, but most professionals struggle with it. We are conditioned to view every interaction through the lens of business development, which makes outreach feel transactional even when we don’t intend it to be.

A true no-ask message might congratulate someone on a recent accomplishment, share an article relevant to their work, or simply note that you were reminded of them. Keep it brief. Three or four sentences at most.

The other type of outreach references something real and it makes a defined ask. Not a vague coffee, but a stated purpose: “I’d like 20 minutes to understand what’s on your plate this year.”

That’s the difference between managing a network and investing in one. Investment requires putting something in first.

The Team You Are Probably Underusing

If your firm has marketing, communications, or business development professionals, you need to leverage their capabilities. These teams have access to tools, data, and perspectives that you don’t have or at least don’t have time for.

Here are a few things they can help with – research a prospect before you reach out, monitor clients for news and trigger events, audit your CRM so it reflects reality rather than history, and help identify which relationships are worth reactivating.

What only you can do: have the relationship, exercise the judgment, make the call.

Spend 30 minutes with your BD team and share your top 20 names. Ask what they know. It will almost always surface information you didn’t have.

A Career-Stage Reality Check

As with everything in this space, your approach should vary depending on where you are in your career.

Early career: Your list is small – that’s fine. The goal is habits, not volume. One substantive outreach per week is a practice. That person you were in school with may be a decision-maker later. Be there when they need you

Mid-career: You have more contacts than time. Prioritization is the skill you need to hone. Identify your top 15-25 contacts with real and genuine potential. Give them real attention. Trying to actively maintain 200 relationships means maintaining none of them well.

Senior level: Relationships built over decades still erode without attention. Bringing in colleagues and broadening points of contact is good practice management and good client service. Don’t underestimate the weight your personal outreach still carries.

What Results Actually Look Like

Let’s be honest about timelines. Not every reconnection will lead to new business. You must be comfortable with that. Some relationships are valuable for referrals, others for knowledge sharing, while others simply for what they add to your professional life.

Real near-term results look like this: a conversation that surfaces a need you didn’t know existed. A referral that traces back to a reconnection made months ago. A CRM that your whole team can actually use. One dormant relationship genuinely reactivated.

Make It A Habit

There is a version of professional life where business development is reactive — something you do when work slows down. Most professionals spend most of their careers there.

There is another version where your contact base is something you understand clearly and draw on strategically. Where your outreach is specific enough that people actually respond. Where the relationships you have built translate into opportunity. Not because you are the best at what you do, but because the right people know it at the right moments.

The difference between those two versions isn’t talent or luck. It is whether you are managing your network or investing in it. Professionals who do this consistently don’t win because they are lucky. They win because they are visible.

The post Stop Managing Your Network. Start Investing in It. appeared first on Slaw.

Several times each month, we are pleased to republish a recent book review from the Canadian Law Library Review (CLLR). CLLR is the official journal of the Canadian Association of Law Libraries (CALL/ACBD), and its reviews cover both practice-oriented and academic publications related to the law.

Legal Knowledge in Organizations: A Source of Strategic and Competitive Advantage. By Robert C. Bird. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2025. xxv, 261 p. Includes bibliographic references and index. ISBN 9781009596671 (hardcover) $143.95; ISBN 9781009596695 (softcover) $47.95; ISBN 9781009596701 (eBook) $41.99.

Reviewed by Gillian Eguaras
Research Librarian
McMillan LLP

Legal Knowledge in Organizations spans 10 comprehensive chapters, each exploring the crucial role of legal knowledge in today’s fast-paced and competitive business landscape. Author Robert C. Bird, a business law professor and Eversource Energy Chair in Business Ethics at the University of Connecticut, addresses the challenges that organizations face to maintain a competitive advantage, highlighting how the protective shield of legal expertise can also drive sustainable business success. Bird offers a clear, practical, and step-by-step methodology that organizations of any size or industry can use to harness the law as a strategic organizational asset. Rather than viewing law merely as a set of compliance obligations or a source of liability, Bird reframes legal knowledge as a dynamic force that promotes organizational growth and innovation.

Central to the book is Bird’s introduction of a five-part framework for applying legal knowledge to business strategy: avoidance, conformance, prevention, value, and transformation. Each stage represents a different way organizations can interact with and leverage legal knowledge, moving from simply steering clear of legal trouble (avoidance) or adhering to the rules (conformance), to actively preventing problems before they arise (prevention), finding creative ways that legal knowledge can add business value (value), and, finally, using legal insights to fundamentally transform business models and markets (transformation). This progression encourages organizations to develop a more sophisticated and integrated approach to legal management, rather than treating legal issues as isolated events.

In each chapter, Bird meticulously details actionable methods for building robust legal expertise within an organization. He does not just speak to legal departments or top executives: his recommendations also empower managers, team leaders, and many other non-legal personnel to develop a deeper understanding of legal issues relevant to their roles. One of Bird’s key points is that legal knowledge does not have to be the exclusive domain of lawyers. When knowledge about contracts, regulations, intellectual property, and risk management is democratized within an organization, it allows for faster, coordinated, and more informed decision-making.

Another strength is the book’s emphasis on innovative risk management tools. Bird recognizes that the legal landscape is always shifting, with new regulations, court decisions, and business practices emerging regularly. To help organizations not just react but proactively prepare for unforeseen legal threats, Bird outlines practical tools and techniques for anticipating legal risks, identifying emerging issues, and responding with agility; for example, how to apply the prevention legal knowledge strategy in competitive environments. Managers with conformance-oriented mindsets focus on meeting the requirements of a mandate or prohibition without necessarily addressing or considering the underlying reasons the rules exist. A manager applying a legal prevention approach identifies and understands the causes and conditions that may threaten compliance with a legal mandate and can implement measures designed to eliminate or limit those risks before they arise. Bird’s succinct, yet thorough, discussion of the various mindsets is continued throughout the text, with multiple case studies in subsequent chapters.

A crucial thread running through all 10 chapters is the importance of ethical decision-making in the use of legal knowledge. Bird is careful to demonstrate that while legal knowledge can be a source of competitive advantage, it also comes with a responsibility to act ethically and fairly. Using case studies and real-life examples, Bird encourages leaders and legal professionals to develop ethical practices that align business interests with broader societal interests. To Bird, this approach not only protects organizations from legal and reputational harm, but it also creates trust with stakeholders, regulators, and customers, further cementing competitive advantage.

Figures and tables enhance the book’s utility. These elements break down complex legal concepts into digestible parts, so readers can easily apply these ideas within their own businesses. Whether readers are grappling with the basics of legal compliance or exploring how to use legal innovation to gain market leadership, Bird’s frameworks and diagrams clearly illustrate how to turn this knowledge into action.

Importantly, Legal Knowledge in Organizations is designed for academic and corporate law firm libraries. It balances rigorous academic analysis—evidenced by its over 1,200 footnotes, which reference legal commentary and scholarship—against accessible, real-world business insights. The book is equally valuable for students and scholars interested in business law and organizational behaviour, as well as for corporate leaders, managers, and attorneys seeking to improve their firm’s competitive positioning through better legal practices.

Bird’s text offers much more than a theoretical treatise on the importance of law for businesses: it serves as an essential playbook to transform legal knowledge from a peripheral concern into a central pillar of business strategy. By combining thorough research with clear, actionable guidance and a focus on ethical leadership, Legal Knowledge in Organizations can equip organizations to not only survive but also thrive in a constantly evolving marketplace.

The post Book Review: Robert Bird’s Legal Knowledge in Organizations: A Source of Strategic and Competitive Advantage appeared first on Slaw.

Each month, we tell you which three English-language cases and French-language cases have been the most viewed* on CanLII in the previous month and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about.

For this past month, the three most-consulted English-language decisions were:

1. Kapahi Real Estate Inc. v. Elite Real Estate Club of Toronto Inc, 2026 ONSC 1438

* As of February 2025 we measure the number of unique pageviews that a case gets; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.

The post Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII? – March 2026 appeared first on Slaw.

During my Spring Break, I decided to reread some examples of classic literature, including my favorite one of all times, Don Quixote. Since I was a kid, I have always been obsessed with the scene on windmills and the “quixotic” battle that ensues. Don Quixote’s faithful companion, Sancho Panza puts an end to it with his insightful remark: Mire vuestra merced que aquellos que allí se parecen no son gigantes, sino molinos de viento (Look, your grace, that those appearing over there are not giants, but windmills).

[ Photo by Alberto Gasco on Unsplash ]

More recently, we had the removal of an incredibly important free source of information, the CIA World Factbook. I believe it’s fair to say that the Factbook was widely used, not only by Americans, but also by people everywhere interested in reliable and trustworthy facts about countries and territories around the world. Several months ago, the database was unceremoniously removed without any reason or explanation given to anyone. As someone who has done this work for years, this action may be described as a celebration of wilful ignorance in close dialogue with so many other governments in the world which thrive in the blindness of its citizens. In the wise words of Don Quixote, El conocimiento es la mejor herramienta de que puede disponer el hombre (Knowledge is the best tool available to man).

Therefore, please allow me to show you three free sources which are great alternatives to this type of information as well as a research technique which may prove to be of importance. It’s all about resilience, my dear readers.

Our first stop is Our World in Data (OWID), the flagship project of the non-profit organization, Global Change Data Lab based in the UK and operating since 2013. From the homepage, you have three ways of navigating the richness of the information on their site: topics, data and insights. Personally, I prefer to start my research with which board topic I’m interested in and then navigate the data from there. OWID is organized in ten topics: Population and Democratic Change; Health; Energy and Environment; Food and Agriculture; Poverty and Economic Development; Education and Knowledge; Innovation and Technological Change; Living Conditions, Community and Wellbeing; Human Rights and Democracy; and Violence and War. Once you have selected the topic you are interested in, there are numerous sub-topics to choose from and it takes you to an intro page from where you can select data, charts and blog posts. The project is related to the University of Oxford. Therefore, their experts seem to be current and former academics with connections to the academic institution.

A newer free source alternative is OpenFactBook (OFB) which claims to be a “community-maintained successor to the CIA World Factbook”. True to the World Factbook format, OFB allows users to choose from a total of 254 places ranging from fully-independent and internationally recognized countries as well as territories from all over the world. Once you click on your place of interest, you will find data categories which we are all familiar with such as Geography, People & Society, Government, Economy and so on. A major improvement from the CIA Factbook is how OFB allows researchers to compare and rank countries and territories based on the available data for different categories. You can choose to build your comparison yourself from scratch or you can use one of the pre-formatted rankings in topics such as Life Expectancy, Unemployment Rate, Internet Users and others. I hope they are able to maintain and expand in the future.

When searching for primary data or expert analysis on different topics at an international level or for comparison purposes, another important research strategy to keep in mind is finding regional and/or international organizations that work on the area. These organizations do collect vast amounts of data and information including their member states as well as other countries/territories related to whichever topics they are interested in. Finding which international organizations cover completely or partially your topic of interest is not an easy task.The list of intergovernmental organizations maintained by Wikipedia is a great starting point, albeit with its limitations. For a more extensive list, the reputable and well-known Yearbook of International Organizations published by the Union of International Associations has its own free version called, Open Yearbook. Here you can sort by regions or topics and find both non-governmental organizations as well as intergovernmental organizations.

Lastly, I have the utmost confidence in the resilience of our FCIL community of researchers, librarians, professors and students that do this work every day. A few years ago, I began teaching students in my courses about the importance of visualizing themselves as resilient researchers able to face any challenge coming their way. That is how we have always succeeded in the past and this time, it will not be any different.

The post The Quixotic Journey of Country Information and Data appeared first on Slaw.

It has been clear for a long time that self-represented litigants struggle to understand the system they are often thrown into. By contrast, lawyers study for years, and have the benefit of ever-mounting daily experience, topped off with the privilege and deference associated with belonging to the legal profession. It’s no wonder then that SRLs tend to muddle blindly through the system, piecing together whatever information they can find from a host of sources, some more reliable than others. Naturally they make mistakes, and are inefficient, contributing to the existing backlog and straining the legal system. These litigants are very aware of this, and it adds to their stress and embarrassment. It’s not pleasant to feel, based on your own experience and the reactions of others, that you are inadequately navigating an unforgiving system not built for your participation. As a consequence, SRLs often feel lost, isolated, and scared.

The National Self-Represented Litigants Project (NSRLP) has long worked to address SRLs’ challenges, in part by providing practical, plain-language resources to assist litigants to navigate the system more smoothly, when the option to hire legal representation is out of reach. Our library of “primers” has been an important and much-used resource since the early days of the organization (in the past year the primers have been viewed over 3600 times), but we always envisioned a more cohesive educational initiative, something that would give SRLs a big-picture “crash-course” in important elements of the legal system, putting them on firmer footing to understand where they are in the system and how it operates, and equipping them with practical strategies for navigating it.

In 2022 we were able to realize this goal thanks to funding from the federal Department of Justice that allowed us to create a pilot project, the “School for Family Litigants.” The pilot version encompassed two separate runs of a 12-week program, where SRLs from across Canada attended weekly virtual sessions taking them through a syllabus that included the structure and basics of family law, as well as best practices and strategies for navigating the system while self-represented. Each week consisted of a lecture by a legal professional followed by a live question and answer session with the lecturer and 2-3 other experts (our lecturers and panelists were lawyers, judges, academics, law librarians, mediators, paralegals, former SRLs, etc., all of whom generously donated their time to this project). The participants were also encouraged to connect with each other via a private Facebook group, where they could share experiences, questions, tips, and resources with each other. The pilot program was incredibly successful, with both sessions filling up almost immediately, and effusively positive feedback via messages and NSRLP surveys. (To learn more about the pilot program see this previous Slaw column.)

Unfortunately, the pilot iteration of the School was not sustainable or scalable given the limited staff and financial resources of the NSRLP; however the value was undeniable, and we were committed to finding a way to make the program permanent, and expandable. With a small top-up of funding from the DOJ, we re-worked the model into a proposed hybrid version, which would consist of recorded lectures (available thanks to the pilot program), regular (though not weekly) live Q&A sessions, a community forum, and various other collected resources.

We are pleased to say that as of late February, the revamped School for Family Litigants is now operational, and has already attracted over a hundred participants, with more signing up each day. We are in the early, growing stages of this initiative, but we are excited to learn and improve as we go, and hopeful that it will have a positive impact on the ability of Canadian SRLs to navigate the family justice system. We strongly believe in the combination of reliable legal information content that SRLs can access in their own time, with interactive Q&A sessions that allow participants to gained a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the legal information they access.

Another goal with this new iteration is to begin providing jurisdiction-specific content – this need became very obvious the longer the pilot program went on, as participants (from across the country) naturally had questions about the forms and processes in their specific provinces. To that end, NSRLP has been seeking funding in various jurisdictions, with the goal of creating complementary material to supplement the national content. We are very grateful to the Law Foundation of Saskatchewan for being our first provincial funding partner, and we look forward to starting to release Saskatchewan-specific materials in the School very soon. Following after will be both Prince Edward Island and Ontario content, thanks to their respective Law Foundations. The support of family law professionals is essential to this endeavor, as it relies on access to justice-oriented volunteers to help create content and serve on live session panels. We therefore encourage any professionals interested in helping with this project, particularly those in Saskatchewan, PEI, and Ontario, to reach out to us at representingyourself@gmail.com.

We are learning as we go with this initiative, but one demonstrable benefit is its flexibility and adaptability. New content can be added at any time, old content can be removed or adapted, participants can stay as long as they wish or come in and out, and the School is scalable to a very large capacity. We look forward to adding modules not only on jurisdictional content, but on content for special populations, such as those who have experienced family violence. We also see the School as a clearinghouse of other resources – working with provincial partners, we are seeking to share existing resources without duplicating them, while at the same time creating new content where gaps in legal information remain. Furthermore, it helps tackle issues of remote access to justice by virtue of its virtual setting. The School will grow along with our capacity, and discrete injections of funding will add to the long-term practicality and viability of the program.

The School for Family Litigants fills a crucial gap in resources for self-represented litigants; we hope it will become one of NSRLP’s primary initiatives, and we invite participation and collaboration from as many jurisdictions and stakeholders as possible.

The post The New “School for Family Litigants” appeared first on Slaw.

Each Monday we present brief excerpts of recent posts from five of Canada’s award­-winning legal blogs chosen at random* from more than 80 recent Clawbie winners. In this way we hope to promote their work, with their permission, to as wide an audience as possible.

This week the randomly selected blogs are 1. Canadian Appeals Monitor 2.Vincent Gautrais 3. Family Health Law Blog 4. PierreRoy & Associés 5. Le Blogue du CRL

Canadian Appeals Monitor
What does 2026 hold for Canada’s technology sector?

AI, digital infrastructure and tech buildouts continue to dominate not only the tech sector but the economy as a whole. Our Technology Perspectives Outlook examines what impact these have on Canadian businesses at both a macro and an operational level. Drawing on insight from our Technology Group, this year’s Outlook provides a grounded, practical analysis of the trends organizations need to understand as they optimize products, streamline operations, and manage risk in an increasingly complex environment. …

Vincent Gautrais
Qu’en est-il des données de vos comptes fidélité ? Le rappel de la dépersonnalisation des données par le CPVP (décision Loblaw)

Nous avons déjà tous adhéré à un compte fidélité d’un magasin ; ils permettent de gagner des points qui peuvent se traduire par des rabais ou encore des offres commerciales. On finit souvent par en accumuler une grande quantité. Mais avez-vous déjà essayé de supprimer un de ces comptes fidélité ? C’est ce qu’ont tenté de faire les détenteurs d’un compte fidélité (aussi appelé PC Optium) offert par les compagnies Loblaw. Certains se sont heurtés à des difficultés techniques et ont donc contacté le service clientèle du magasin ; mais aucune réponse. Après un certain temps d’attente, des plaintes ont été déposées auprès du Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée (CPVP) afin de signaler un potentiel abus. …

Family Health Law Blog
Ontario Surrogacy in 2026: New Funding & Legal Rights

One of the most significant updates for Ontario families this year involves time away from work. As of early 2026, the Employment Standards Act has been updated with a category called “Placement of a Child Leave.” …

PierreRoy & Associés
Renouvellement hypothécaire en 2026 : comment se préparer au choc des taux

L’année 2026 marque un tournant majeur pour des millions de propriétaires canadiens. Selon les données du marché, environ 60 % des prêts hypothécaires au pays arriveront à échéance cette année. Pour ceux qui ont acheté leur propriété pendant la pandémie, profitant de taux historiquement bas oscillant entre 1,79 % et 2 %, le réveil risque d’être brutal. …

Le Blogue du CRL
Les leçons du rapport TikTok – Partie 2 : La biométrie

Après avoir examiné, dans la première partie, les enjeux liés à l’efficacité des mécanismes de vérification de l’âge et à la validité du consentement, le second volet de notre analyse reprend le Rapport d’enquête sur TikTok Pte. Ltd.[1] (« TikTok »), publié à la fin de 2025 par le Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée du Canada (« CPVP »), la Commission d’accès à l’information du Québec (« CAI »), ainsi que leurs homologues de la Colombie-Britannique et de l’Alberta (collectivement, les « Commissaires »). Dans la continuité des constats formulés précédemment, ce second volet porte sur l’utilisation par TikTok de technologies d’estimation de l’âge fondées sur l’analyse des traits faciaux, ainsi que sur leur qualification juridique en tant que renseignements biométriques. Ce débat met en lumière une tension entre l’innovation technologique et les exigences en matière de protection de la vie privée. A. La position de TikTok…

_________________________

*Randomness here is created by Random.org and its list randomizing function.

The post Monday’s Mix appeared first on Slaw.

Michael Geist had a lawyer on his Law Bytes podcast recently to talk about how AI is radically transforming his practice. For this long-time listener of one of the best law podcasts out there, the episode with New York lawyer Zack Shapiro was among the two or three most interesting and informative episodes I think Geist has ever done.

As someone who follows developments in legal AI closely, I found Shapiro’s insights into how to make the best use of AI outstanding. This is an episode that anyone interested in where law is headed — and concerned with not being left behind — can’t afford to miss.

Shapiro had three core insights to impart that, when combined, give you, in his words, “superpowers of the kind we have not seen in the law yet.” And he paints a vivid picture of how these powers have transformed his practice at a small transactional firm focusing on tech startups and investors. (Shapiro has conveyed some of these ideas in a few essays that have gone viral X.)

I will briefly sketch his insights, which I think are entirely valid and empowering. But my larger aim here is to make the point that, as exciting and inspiring as this glimpse into the AI future may be, it’s a partial vision. It leaves a lot out.

It’s not unlike a news clip of a crowd protesting in front of city hall, which looks large close-up, but, as the camera pans out, is revealed to be not that big.

To be clear, the buzz and excitement here is real. Some superpowers are now attainable. But much of this is localized. It’s clustered in some areas of practice, for some things.

First, the good news.

Shapiro’s three insights

Stop using bespoke legal AI

In the past three months, he says, we’ve reached a tipping point. Off-the-shelf, frontier models like Claude and ChatGPT are so good that it’s time to stop using AI tools tailored for law, such as Protégé, Westlaw, Harvey, and so on.

Shapiro sees these as unnecessary “wrappers” around a language model, with buttons and controls meant to assist you but that only get in the way. Remove all the clutter and learn to work with the best models directly.

Why? Because there’s something you need to be doing — constantly — that Harvey and Westlaw won’t let you do. You want to be using AI to teach you how to use it better, and you want to build a library of background instructions that run with every prompt, so as to make your output ever more responsive and accurate, and to automate more steps in your process.

Use AI to create a virtuous cycle of greater efficiency

Shapiro singles out a key feature of Claude that I don’t believe any other AI provider has a true equivalent of yet. For a while, all the big platforms (ChatGPT, Gemini, etc) have allowed you to upload sources to the model and to create ‘projects’ that can have specific instructions for all chats within it.

Claude has something unique called ‘skills,’ which are files you can create that contain plain-language instructions for how you would like certain things to be done or things Claude should keep in mind with every prompt (your style, voice, formatting preferences, etc). They can also contain code for complex operations, like opening a Word file, making requested changes, and creating a new file.

How does this help?

You can get Claude itself to make skills for you, critique the ones you’ve made, amend them, troubleshoot them, and so forth. You can also use them for more technical things, like moving files in a directory, comparing documents, etc. It’s not clear that other models can do this yet.

Shapiro describes a process in recent months of working with Claude to build and refine an elaborate set of skills that have automated stages in the creation, review, and revision of complex contracts using a host of special instructions and technical shortcuts. What used to take him four or five hours to generate a draft of a contract now takes minutes.

The quality of the output has only been improving, he says, as he harnesses Claude to make and revise skills, based on what has worked well and what hasn’t.

Your prompts need to be longer, much longer

The point is often made that the quality of output with AI depends on the length and specificity of your prompt. Shapiro is emphatic on this point. He says that the average length of his prompts is 2,000 words. In a Word doc, that’s roughly 8 pages double-spaced.

You need to load your prompts with detail. Everything should be in there: your client’s multifarious concerns, what the other side is likely to accept or not accept and other sticking points, prevailing law, key terms you think should be included, and so on.

Shapiro makes the general point that if you take the time to craft prompts that are extensive and nuanced enough, the quality of the output can and often will be comparable to what a mid-level or senior associate would produce. And once you begin working with a sufficiently large library of skills — or other background instructions — you’ll be producing at a pace never before possible, with no discernible loss in the quality of your work.

What this picture leaves out

I’m all over Claude and building a library of skills to generate a recursive cycle of greater efficiency.

But outside of a practice focused mainly on writing contracts and a few other areas, even the most bullish embrace of AI will result in productivity gains that are far less dramatic.

The fact is that for many other forms of practice — for lawyers who do research-heavy work, who spend most of their time negotiating, or who litigate in certain areas — AI will play a more limited, often peripheral role.

It was telling, I thought, that Shapiro gave only two concrete examples of how he uses AI in his practice: to generate contracts and to write opinion letters. (Near the end of the episode, he also described how he uses AI to help draft social media posts.)

I’m in touch with a litigation lawyer in BC who is experiencing something similar to Shapiro’s miraculous epiphany. He reports saving countless hours in recent months using AI to review documents in his employment practice, to generate demand and opinion letters, and to draft settlements. He also notes that his prompts tend to be extensive, in many cases well over a thousand words — and that he often gets AI to help him formulate better prompts.

So there is certainly an argument to be made that Shapiro’s insights apply to litigation and can lead to a significant boost in productivity.

But not in every kind of litigation, and not in every kind of law.

Over here in criminal law land, its use has been far more limited. We get tons of disclosure from the Crown, lengthy documents, often terabytes of data on whole hard drives. We grapple with whether we can upload these documents to any language model hosted in the cloud, bespoke or otherwise, given the uncertainty around privacy. And no one is sure whether sensitive client information is safe with AI.

The larger narrative in litigation is that lawyers relying on AI to draft court submissions has been a disaster. I don’t think it’s well suited to writing submissions — or opinion letters for that matter — even if a lawyer confirms that law is summarized accurately. These are things, I’ve argued, that lawyers need to do on their own, to ensure they’re done competently.

And although I’m seeing progress in using AI to assist with legal research — including the possibility of using Claude to look things up for you on CanLII — the efficiency gains there are significant, but not as striking as in Shapiro’s case.

And of course, for lawyers who spend a good portion of their time dealing with clients and negotiating with opposing counsel or appearing in court, AI will not bring about a radical transformation of their practice.

The AI revolution is coming, but it will be jagged and uneven. Some parts of the future will look distinctly like the past.

The post The AI Future of Law Is Already Here — It’s Just Not Evenly Distributed appeared first on Slaw.

The post Summaries Sunday: Supreme One-Liners appeared first on Slaw.

Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) Dans une affaire de voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles commises lors d’une bagarre à la sortie d’un bar, l’erreur de la juge de première instance est d’avoir refusé de considérer tout fait qui n’avait pas été exposé lors du plaidoyer de culpabilité et d’avoir refusé à l’accusé la possibilité de présenter la preuve tendant à expliquer qu’il n’avait pas agressé la victime sans motif.

Intitulé : Ferjuste c. R., 2026 QCCA 334
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Martin Vauclair, Geneviève Cotnam et Myriam Lachance
Date : 13 mars 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — infractions contre la personne — voies de fait — voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles — agression armée — homme — coup à la tête avec une bouteille de bière — recevabilité de la preuve — observations des parties — faits pertinents — juge ayant refusé de considérer tout fait non exposé lors du plaidoyer de culpabilité — preuve additionnelle — pertinence — circonstances de l’infraction — motivation du geste — absence d’agression gratuite — entente entre les parties — exposé des faits — proportionnalité de la peine — culpabilité morale — rapport présentenciel positif — faible risque de récidive — remords — condamnation avec sursis — appel — erreur — absolution inconditionnelle — intérêt véritable de l’accusé — intérêt public — accusé ayant déjà purgé sa peine — ordonnance de prélèvement de substances corporelles à des fins d’analyse génétique.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — principes généraux — rôle et pouvoirs des cours — recevabilité de la preuve — observations des parties — faits pertinents — application des articles 723 et 726 C.Cr. — juge ayant refusé de considérer tout fait non exposé lors du plaidoyer de culpabilité — preuve additionnelle — pertinence — circonstances de l’infraction — voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles — agression armée — motivation du geste — absence d’agression gratuite — faits admis — entente entre les parties — exposé des faits — éléments essentiels de l’infraction (art. 606 (1.1) b) (i) C.Cr.) — proportionnalité de la peine — culpabilité morale — condamnation avec sursis — ordonnance de purger sa peine dans la collectivité — appel — erreur — substitution de la peine — absolution inconditionnelle — intérêt véritable de l’accusé — intérêt public.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — détermination de la peine — principes généraux — facteurs à prendre en considération — observations des parties — faits pertinents — recevabilité de la preuve — application des articles 723 et 726 C.Cr. — juge ayant refusé de considérer tout fait non exposé lors du plaidoyer de culpabilité — preuve additionnelle — pertinence — circonstances de l’infraction — voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles — agression armée — motivation du geste — absence d’agression gratuite — faits admis — entente entre les parties — exposé des faits — éléments essentiels de l’infraction (art. 606 (1.1) b) (i) C.Cr.) — proportionnalité de la peine — culpabilité morale — pertinence — condamnation avec sursis — ordonnance de purger sa peine dans la collectivité — appel — erreur — substitution de la peine — absolution inconditionnelle — intérêt véritable de l’accusé — intérêt public.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — preuve pénale — recevabilité de la preuve — observations des parties — faits pertinents — application des articles 723 et 726 C.Cr. — juge ayant refusé de considérer tout fait non exposé lors du plaidoyer de culpabilité — preuve additionnelle — pertinence — circonstances de l’infraction — voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles — agression armée — motivation du geste — absence d’agression gratuite — faits admis — entente entre les parties — exposé des faits — éléments essentiels de l’infraction (art. 606 (1.1) b) (i) C.Cr.) — proportionnalité de la peine — culpabilité morale — pertinence — condamnation avec sursis — ordonnance de purger sa peine dans la collectivité — appel — erreur — substitution de la peine — absolution inconditionnelle — intérêt véritable de l’accusé — intérêt public.

Requête en autorisation d’appel et appel de la peine. Accueillis.

À la sortie d’un bar, une bagarre est survenue entre la victime et un ami du requérant. Souhaitant aider son ami alors qu’il se faisait poursuivre par la victime, le requérant a frappé 6 fois celle-ci derrière la tête à l’aide d’une bouteille de bière, qui ne s’est pas cassée. La victime a été coupée à la tête. Le requérant s’est ultérieurement livré à la police. Il a plaidé coupable à 2 infractions, l’une de voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles et l’autre de voies de fait armées. Le requérant suggérait une absolution inconditionnelle. La juge de première instance, qui a refusé de prendre en compte la preuve que voulait présenter le requérant à propos des circonstances de l’infraction, lui a plutôt infligé une peine de 12 mois d’emprisonnement avec sursis. Elle a expliqué que l’unique raison de refuser l’absolution tenait au caractère «gratuit» et «sans motif» de l’attaque du requérant à l’endroit de la victime.

Décision

M. le juge Vauclair: La juge a refusé au requérant la possibilité de faire la preuve «d’autres faits» que ceux «admis» lors du plaidoyer. Or, la preuve et les observations qu’un accusé peut présenter à l’audience sur la peine ne sont pas limitées aux faits justifiant l’accusation qui ont été exposés lors du plaidoyer de culpabilité. Bien entendu, cette preuve n’est pas l’occasion de remettre en cause la culpabilité ou les admissions consenties. Cependant, en principe, les faits exposés lors du plaidoyer sont ceux qui sont nécessaires pour justifier l’accusation, rien de plus (art. 606 (1.1) b) (i) du Code criminel (C.Cr.)); c’est précisément le rôle des exposés des faits qui sont livrés de façon routinière aux juges d’instance par les avocats. Il est vrai qu’une entente peut prévoir le dépôt d’un exposé complet des faits relatifs à une accusation; ainsi, au-delà des faits justifiant l’accusation, l’exposé peut comprendre, par exemple, l’admission de facteurs aggravants ou atténuants ou encore en exclure d’autres. Sans entente complète et précise, une preuve additionnelle pertinente est toujours possible. Un exposé des faits qui se veut exhaustif doit être explicite et précis à cet égard.

La nécessité d’une preuve complète découle du principe fondamental de la proportionnalité, lequel commande que le juge soupèse toutes les circonstances pertinentes liées à l’infraction ou à l’accusé. À l’évidence, des informations destinées à éclairer le juge sur la motivation du geste criminel sont pertinentes et peuvent être utiles, ne serait-ce que pour tempérer la responsabilité morale de l’accusé; cela ne remet aucunement en cause l’admission de culpabilité.

En l’espèce, l’erreur de la juge est d’avoir refusé de considérer tout fait qui n’avait pas été exposé lors du plaidoyer de culpabilité et d’avoir refusé au requérant la possibilité d’en faire la preuve. Cette erreur a eu une incidence sur la détermination de la peine. Par conséquent, il appartient à la Cour de refaire l’exercice.

La juge aurait sérieusement considéré la possibilité d’accorder l’absolution demandée si elle n’avait pas commis cette erreur. Celle-ci l’a empêchée de recevoir la preuve tendant à expliquer que le requérant n’avait pas agressé la victime sans motif. Vu le profil très favorable du requérant et son intérêt véritable à l’absolution, qui est admis, il s’agit d’un cas où l’absolution peut être envisagée. La Cour n’est pas convaincue que l’absolution inconditionnelle demandée par le requérant aurait été la peine la plus appropriée, compte tenu du crime et des circonstances. L’absolution conditionnelle aurait mieux servi les objectifs de la peine, notamment celui d’assurer la quiétude de la victime pendant un certain temps. Or, cet objectif est rempli selon la poursuite. Au surplus, le requérant a déjà purgé la totalité de sa peine, laquelle était assortie de conditions beaucoup plus restrictives de liberté que celles qui auraient été imposées dans le cadre d’une probation.

Ainsi, il y a lieu d’absoudre inconditionnellement le requérant.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

The post Summaries Sunday: SOQUIJ appeared first on Slaw.

Artificial intelligence is quickly becoming part of everyday professional practice in dispute resolution. As its use expands across the legal profession, questions are beginning to arise about how these tools should be used by mediators and arbitrators.

Until recently, the issue has received little attention within the ADR community itself.

At present, most mediation and arbitration codes of conduct say little or nothing about artificial intelligence.

While much of the discussion about AI in law focuses on lawyers using these tools, far less attention has been paid to their use by mediators and arbitrators. Yet as AI becomes more common in legal practice, questions about its use by dispute resolution professionals are likely to arise.

This raises an important question: should mediators and arbitrators disclose when they use AI tools in a case?

The answer may shape emerging expectations about transparency in dispute resolution practice.

For ADR practitioners, the question is not whether these tools will be used, but how they can be used while preserving the principles that make dispute resolution processes credible: fairness, transparency, and trust in the neutral.

When AI Use May Arise in Practice

In Canada, where mediation and arbitration are widely used across commercial, employment, construction, and condominium disputes, these questions are becoming increasingly relevant.

Mediators and arbitrators may encounter AI-generated chronologies, summaries, or draft submissions before they ever decide to use these tools themselves.

In mediation practice this can arise in simple ways—for example, when a party submits a chronology or summary prepared with AI assistance.

As these tools become more widely used in legal practice, their presence in dispute resolution processes will become increasingly difficult to ignore.

Three Emerging Approaches

Discussion in mediation, arbitration, and legal ethics circles is beginning to coalesce around three broad approaches to disclosure.

Each reflects a different view of how technology should fit within the professional responsibilities of mediators and arbitrators. Despite these differences, they share a common concern: how to integrate new technology without undermining fairness, confidentiality, or trust in dispute resolution processes.

AI as a Professional Tool

One view emerging among practitioners—and currently the most common—is that disclosure is unnecessary when AI is used purely as a professional support tool rather than as a decision-making mechanism.

Under this approach, AI is treated much like other technologies professionals routinely use. Lawyers rely on research databases, document management systems, and proofreading software without disclosing their use to clients or opposing counsel. AI tools, in this view, represent another form of professional assistance.

Applied to ADR practice, mediators and arbitrators might use AI systems for tasks such as organizing issues, summarizing submissions, improving written communications, drafting procedural correspondence, or refining written materials.

So long as the neutral remains responsible for all analysis and decisions, the use of AI in these ways is comparable to other productivity tools. On that basis, disclosure may not be required.

Transparency and Party Confidence

A second perspective holds that some level of disclosure is good practice, even if not strictly required.

ADR processes depend heavily on party confidence in the neutrality of the mediator or arbitrator. Because AI remains a relatively new technology, clarity about its use may strengthen confidence in the process.

Under this approach, disclosure would not need to be extensive or technical. A neutral might simply acknowledge that secure technological tools—including AI systems—may be used for administrative or drafting assistance while retaining full responsibility for all professional judgments.

Such disclosure could appear in a mediation agreement, procedural order, or general statement of practice. The objective would not be to regulate AI use, but to avoid misunderstanding about the role technology plays in the neutral’s work.

When AI Influences Decision-Making

A third perspective supports disclosure when AI tools play a more substantive role in analysis or decision support.

Examples might include situations where AI systems are used to analyze large volumes of documents, identify evidentiary patterns, generate predictive assessments of case outcomes, or assist in drafting arbitral awards.

In these circumstances, the concern is not simply transparency but process fairness.

This issue is particularly significant in arbitration. Arbitrators issue binding decisions and are expected to exercise independent judgment. Several arbitration institutions have emphasized that while AI may assist with research or editing, the arbitrator must remain solely responsible for the reasoning and decision.

Where technology materially influences analysis or recommendations, parties may reasonably expect to be informed.

Emerging Guidance on AI in ADR

Outside the ADR field, courts and legal regulators in Canada have also begun addressing the use of artificial intelligence in legal practice. Several courts have issued guidance reminding counsel of their obligation to verify authorities and submissions prepared with the assistance of AI tools. Law societies have likewise emphasized duties of competence, supervision, and protection of confidential information when using AI in legal work.

Although discussion about AI in dispute resolution is expanding rapidly, formal guidance remains limited.

Several ADR organizations have begun addressing the issue, particularly in the context of arbitration. Guidance and discussion materials have been published by organizations such as the ADR Institute of Canada, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association /ICDR, the Silicon Valley Arbitration & Mediation Center, and the International Bar Association, which has issued Guidelines on the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence in Mediation. In Canada, professional discussion about the appropriate use of AI in ADR practice is continuing as institutions and practitioners consider how guidance may evolve.

As experience with these tools grows, ADR practitioners will inevitably shape the norms that govern their responsible use.

Most of this guidance focuses on arbitration rather than mediation, reflecting the different roles neutrals play in those processes.

Although emerging guidance addresses responsible use more often than disclosure specifically, it consistently emphasizes transparency and professional accountability. Both the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and the American Arbitration Association stress that arbitrators must remain fully responsible for their analysis and decisions even when technology assists with research, drafting, or document management.

Ethical Considerations

Although ADR-specific rules on AI remain limited, broader legal ethics guidance is beginning to converge around several common principles.

Professionals who use AI tools are expected to understand the capabilities and limitations of the technology, supervise its use appropriately, verify outputs for accuracy, protect confidential information, and maintain independent professional judgment.

AI systems can also produce inaccurate or “hallucinated” information, reinforcing the need for neutrals and counsel to verify outputs carefully before relying on them.

These obligations apply whether or not AI use is disclosed.

A Practical Way Forward

In practice, the distinction for most mediators and arbitrators may be relatively straightforward.

Using AI tools to edit writing, organize issues, or assist with administrative drafting is unlikely to affect the neutrality or integrity of the process. In such circumstances, disclosure may not be necessary.

More caution—and greater transparency—may be appropriate whenever technology begins to influence substantive analysis, recommendations, or decisions.

For mediators and arbitrators, the practical question may simply be this:

Would the parties expect you to disclose that these tools were used?

The use of artificial intelligence in dispute resolution practice is still in its early stages. As experience with these tools grows, mediators, arbitrators, and ADR institutions will play an important role in shaping the professional norms that guide their responsible use.

Technology will evolve quickly.

The principles that sustain trust in dispute resolution should not.

The post AI and ADR Neutrals: When Should Its Use Be Disclosed? Three Emerging Approaches to Transparency in Mediation and Arbitration Practice appeared first on Slaw.

A few recent data points about AI and the law, along with one bracing conclusion.

1. At the end of February, American lawyer Zack Shapiro published an article on Linked titled “The Claude-Native Law Firm.” It described how his two-person firm is powered by customized “skills” that capture and encode his legal frameworks and judgment into Anthropic’s Claude AI, enabling Claude to deliver legal outputs rapidly and transferably across the firm. This interview with LawDroid’s Tom Martin relates what Shapiro is doing and why it’s potentially momentous: It suggests that properly and thoroughly instructed general-purpose Gen AI might prove as effective for legal work as more expensive legal-specific Generative AI (e.g., CoCounsel , Protégé, Harvey, vLex).
2. In early March, Canadian lawyer Robert Diab published an article in the CBA National describing how he compared Claude Cowork’s legal research ability with that of the far more expensive LexisNexis Protégé. He assigned a series of advanced legal research question to both programs, setting Cowork loose on the CanLII database and asking Protégé to examine its own data. Protégé’s performance was spotty, missing some cases and misinterpreting others; Cowork was nearly flawless. “Using an agentic tool like [Cowork] with CanLII strikes me as the most accessible and powerful way to do legal research using AI,” Diab wrote. “Given the cost, it is a tool well worth using.”
3. In mid-March, American corporate counsel Laura Jeffords Greenberg published an article on LinkedIn detailing her own comparison between Claude Cowork and Thomson Reuters’s CoCounsel on an employment law question. CoCounsel provided a summary and walkthrough with little elaboration, whereas “Claude told me the current rule, what’s changed in the last 14 months, what to watch for when drafting, and why it matters. It did the interpretive work. … In-house counsel asking a legal question needs a practical answer with citations for verification; not a summary of everything that’s ever been true.”

Now, we always need to be careful when assessing claims like this. Three data points is a microscopic sample size from which to draw conclusions about wider trends across the legal sector. Feel free to discount these claims to the extent your own skepticism warrants.

But there’s a difference between skepticism and outright denial. At the very least, these examples suggest we could be underestimating just how powerful a legal tool general-purpose AI can become when it’s been deeply customized, carefully instructed, and connected to authoritative public legal sources.

That possibility is reinforced by recent gains in the advancement of Generative AI itself. Gen AI analyst Ethan Mollick reported in March that “AI systems are increasingly being used to build better AI systems, creating a feedback loop… If you make models that are good at coding and good at AI research, you can use them to build the next generation of models, speeding up the loop.”

It might turn out that general-purpose Gen AIs like Claude Cowork really can, with enough focused preparation and effort, match or even outperform far more expensive legal-specific Gen AIs in at least some settings. I’m not saying that for certain. Dramatic claims demand dramatic evidence, and three data points that crossed my desktop hardly prove that Cowork can beat Protégé or CoCounsel across the board.

But we need to pay close attention when credible users report that general-purpose models are outperforming expensive legal-specific tools on practical legal tasks. Because if that proves to be the case more broadly, the implications would be enormous. Legal data would still matter to any AI system hoping to compete in the legal market; but the absence of that data might no longer be disqualifying. And that alone is something few of us would have believed when GPT-4 arrived just three years ago.

The post What if Legal AI Doesn’t Need Legal Data? appeared first on Slaw.

A few years ago, I was asked to review a law firm’s student recruitment program. The firm had a respected brand, an engaged student committee, and a long history of bringing in summer and articling students.

The assignment seemed straightforward: review the process and suggest ways to strengthen the program.

So, I began by following the time.

There were student committee meetings. Planning sessions with marketing and talent professionals. Law school outreach events and receptions. Resume reviews. Interview preparation. Full days of interviews involving partners, associates, and administrators. Post-interview debriefs. Offer discussions. Candidate follow ups.

By the time the exercise was complete, we had mapped hundreds of hours of lawyer time.

Then I translated those hours into billable value and added the related hard costs.

The number surprised everyone.

For a firm of moderate size, the annual cost of running the recruitment process alone exceeded $500,000.

And that number did not include the investment in the students themselves. Salaries. Training. Orientation. Mentorship. Administrative support. The many hours lawyers spend teaching, reviewing, explaining, and guiding.

None of this is criticism. Student programs are one of the most important investments a firm can make. They shape the future partnership pipeline, reinforce culture, and allow firms to develop lawyers from the earliest stage of their careers.

It is also worth acknowledging something most firms already understand: students are not expected to be profit centres. Their value lies in the long view. The goal is to develop capable lawyers who will, in time, become productive and profitable contributors to the firm.

But when you step back and look at the numbers, the scale of the investment is striking.

Which raises a reasonable question.

Are firms getting the return they expect?

How often are most students hired back? How much student time ends up written off? How quickly do students begin contributing real value to the firm?

The quiet economics of student recruitment

Student recruitment is both structured and competitive. Committees devote significant time to identifying the right candidates. Lawyers attend receptions, interview days, and campus events. Firms compete with one another for highly sought-after students.

In jurisdictions such as Ontario and British Columbia, the timing and structure of hiring are coordinated through recruitment processes administered by the Law Society of Ontario and the Law Society of British Columbia.

The front end of the pipeline therefore receives enormous attention.

Yet once students arrive, firms often rely on a familiar formula for helping them succeed. Orientation. A principal. Informal mentorship. Exposure to work.

And then the expectation that they will gradually learn how the environment works.

What firms say they struggle with

Recently I asked twenty law firms a simple question.

What are your biggest challenges when it comes to student success?

Four themes surfaced:

• 54 percent said providing adequate legal training and mentorship
• 46 percent cited business development training and support
• 46 percent pointed to challenges building productive relationships with lawyers and staff
• 46 percent said they struggled to derive real value from student work

What is interesting about those answers is that none of them relate to recruitment.

They relate to assimilation.

The professional context students rarely see

Law schools prepare students well for legal reasoning. But the professional operating system of a law firm remains largely invisible to them.

Most students arrive with little understanding of:

• how work actually flows through a firm
• how to initiate finding work
• how internal relationships shape opportunities
• the economics of a law firm
• why mentorship in practice may look different from what they expected
• how lawyers originate work
• how to manage competing demands from multiple lawyers

Students often tell me they spend their first months trying to decode the environment. They are trying to understand expectations, when to take initiative, how to ask for work, and how not to overstep or jeopardize getting hired back.

Many students are left to figure this out themselves.

Yet these dynamics often determine how quickly a student becomes productive, trusted, and integrated into the firm.

What if students arrived better prepared?

When I asked the same group of firms a follow-up question, the responses were revealing.

If students arrived with stronger understanding of law firm dynamics and expectations, what difference would that make?

• 69 percent said students would be more confident and engaged
• 69 percent said they would be more proactive and productive
• 54 percent expected stronger relationships with lawyers and staff
• 54 percent predicted higher student satisfaction and stronger word-of-mouth reputation

That last point deserves attention.

Law firms tend to think of recruitment as a marketing exercise directed outward toward law schools. But there is also a powerful student economy operating quietly alongside it.

Students talk to each other constantly. They compare experiences. They share impressions of culture, mentorship, and opportunity. Reputation among students travels quickly and informally.

Every firm participating in the student market is already part of that economy, whether it realizes it or not.

The overlooked opportunity

The striking thing about student programs is how much effort goes into attracting students and how little time is devoted to helping them understand the environment they are entering.

Orientation programs understandably focus on important operational matters such as IT systems, policies, and administrative procedures.

But the unwritten rules of professional life inside a firm often receive far less attention.

How work is found.
How internal reputation develops.
How relationships are built.
How lawyers begin building practices.

Students typically learn these lessons slowly, through observation and trial and error. Some students are fortunate and their firms have talent professionals committed to some of this training.

A different lens on student programs

The firm I mentioned earlier made a small but meaningful shift after seeing the $500,000 calculation.

They stopped thinking about their student program primarily as a recruitment exercise.

Instead, they began thinking about it as a return on investment question.

How do we maximize the success rate of the students we bring in?
How do we shorten the learning curve for law students?
How do we ensure more students succeed, return, and build careers inside the firm?
How do we strengthen student satisfaction and the reputation that follows?

Student programs have always been about the future of the profession.

But when viewed through the lens of investment, they also represent one of the largest and least examined commitments most firms make to talent development.

Which suggests a useful reframing.

If firms are already investing so much to bring students through their doors, the real opportunity may lie in helping them succeed faster once they arrive.

The post The Hidden Economics of Law Firm Student Recruitment appeared first on Slaw.

What should, and must, a lawyer do when their client persistently breaches court orders, either deliberately or recklessly, despite the firm advice of the lawyer that such breaches must cease?

While I am not qualified to comment on the US context, where such breaches by the federal government are allegedly occurring repeatedly and on a very large scale,[1] I would like to take this opportunity to reflect on what a lawyer in a Canadian jurisdiction should and must do in a parallel situation.

First, why does this lawyer have a problem, and what is that problem? A lawyer cannot “assist or permit” or “assist or encourage” the client to breach court orders. The Model Code of Professional Conduct of the Federation of Law Societies of Canada provides that “[w]hen acting as an advocate, a lawyer must not:… knowingly assist or permit a client to do anything that the lawyer considers to be dishonest or dishonourable.”[2] Likewise, it provides more generally that

“A lawyer must never:

a) knowingly assist in or encourage any dishonesty, fraud, crime, or illegal conduct.
b) do or omit to do anything that the lawyer ought to know assists in or encourages any dishonesty, fraud, crime, or illegal conduct by a client or others, or
c) instruct a client or others on how to violate the law and avoid punishment.”[3]

I assume that the lawyer is actively counselling against such breaches, and so they are not assisting or permitting or encouraging the client to breach court orders. (If the lawyer is permitting or assisting, the situation becomes straightforward professional misconduct.[4]) If the client is breaching such orders despite the firm and honest insistence of the lawyer that such breaches stop, then what?

At first glance, the lawyer could certainly withdraw from the matter under the rule on discretionary withdrawal. That rule provides that “[i]f there has been a serious loss of confidence between the lawyer and the client, the lawyer may withdraw.”[5] The commentary to the rule provides some examples of such a loss of confidence, including “if a lawyer is deceived by his client, the client refuses to accept and act upon the lawyer’s advice on a significant point, a client is persistently unreasonable or uncooperative in a material respect”.[6] A client who persistently breaches court orders, whether unintentionally or recklessly, despite the lawyer firmly warning them not to do so, would certainly appear to create a serious loss of confidence between the lawyer and the client. This loss of confidence would be even more severe if the client is deceiving the lawyer about whether such breaches are indeed occurring. I say persistently because a first breach may be inadvertent or it may occur because the client does not appreciate the seriousness of such a breach. In either situation, the lawyer would inform the client of their responsibilities to the court and insist the breach not be repeated.

However, if the client is an organization, a lawyer who simply withdrew in that situation would actually have breached their professional obligations. Where the client is an organization, the rule on reporting up within the organizational client then applies. [7] The lawyer “knows that the organization has acted, is acting or intends to act dishonestly, fraudulently, criminally, or illegally”, because breaching court orders is illegal if not dishonest, and so the lawyer must progressively report up to dissuade the client from breaching court orders.[8] If the client is not dissuaded, the lawyer must withdraw.[9] If the lawyer withdraws before reporting up, that lawyer is depriving the organizational client of the opportunity to make an informed decision.

This mandatory withdrawal – after unsuccessfully reporting up in the organizational client – is not explicitly mentioned in the rule on mandatory withdrawal. That rule provides that

“A lawyer must withdraw if:

a) discharged by a client;
b) a client persists in instructing the lawyer to act contrary to professional ethics; or
c) the lawyer is not competent to continue to handle a matter.”[10]

Here the client is not instructing the lawyer to act contrary to professional ethics. Instead, they are merely ignoring their lawyer’s firm advice to cease the breaches. Of course, if the client persists in instructing the lawyer to conceal the breaches from the court, thus breaching their duty of candour to the court,[11] this rule would clearly apply. Otherwise, however, this rule is not engaged.

As Alice Woolley and Amy Salyzyn explain, these three scenarios in the rule on mandatory withdrawal are not exhaustive of the situations in which withdrawal is mandatory.[12] In addition to the situations covered by the rule on reporting up within the organizational client, withdrawal may be necessary where a conflict of interest arises.[13]

Moreover, I have argued elsewhere, building on Woolley’s work,[14] that there will be a point where a client’s course of action is so repugnant to the individual lawyer that they must withdraw – whether this is because they cannot provide competent service or they are in a conflict of interest.[15] I would hope that persistent breaches of court orders, whether deliberate or reckless, would constitute repugnance for at least some lawyers. Indeed, such breaches are all the more serious and all the more repugnant where the client is the government.

Given the seriousness of a client persistently breaching court orders, and the importance of signalling clearly to the profession and the public that lawyers cannot continue to act in that situation, it is worthwhile to consider adding a client’s persistent breach of court orders to the rule on mandatory withdrawal. (If such a change has previously been considered, which is quite possible, then it is worth reconsidering.) While this addition would not change lawyers’ obligations in such a situation, it would make those obligations crystal clear. In particular, it would make explicit that withdrawal is mandatory, not merely discretionary.

Nonetheless, despite the client’s instructions and actions, the other rules on withdrawal still apply. These rules provide that “[a] lawyer must not withdraw from representation of a client except for good cause and on reasonable notice to the client” and that a withdrawing lawyer “must try to minimize expense and avoid prejudice to the client and must do all that can reasonably be done to facilitate the orderly transfer of the matter to the successor lawyer.”[16]

More specifically, these rules also require the withdrawing lawyer to “co-operate with the successor lawyer in the transfer of the file so as to minimize expense and avoid prejudice to the client”.[17]

With great respect, the conglomeration of all these rules does not allow the lawyer to inform the court that the breaches have occurred despite their admonishments. The lawyer owes the court candour as to the fact that the breaches have occurred.[18] The admonishments about the breaches, however necessary, are subject to confidentiality and privilege that would displace the duty of candour to the court. If asked, the lawyer would be wise to simply respond by informing the court that they are withdrawing for “ethical reasons”.[19] To do otherwise may be understandable but is not permissible.

_________________

[1] See e.g. Brandi Buchman, “DOJ Lawyer Who Melted Down In Court Offered Terrifying Peek Into ‘Broken System’” Huffington Post (5 February 2026), online: <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/doj-lawyer-who-melted-down-in-court-gave-a-terrifying-peek-into-the-system_n_6984ec70e4b04d5037ef4e99>.

[2] Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: FLSC, 2009, last amended April 2024) [FLSC Mode Code], r 5.1-2(b) [FLSC Model Code], online: <https://flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/2024-Model-Code-of-Professional-Conduct.pdf>.

[3] FLSC Model Code, supra note 2, r 3.2-7.

[4] See e.g. Sussman, Re, 1995 CanLII 537 (ON LST); Macgregor (Re), 2018 LSBC 39; Merchant v Law Society of Saskatchewan, 2014 SKCA 56.

[5] FLSC Model Code, supra note 2, r 3.7-2.

[6] FLSC Model Code, supra note 2, r 3.7-2, commentary 1.

[7] FLSC Model Code, supra note 2, r 3.2-8.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] FLSC Model Code, supra note 2, r 3.7-7.

[11] FLSC Model Code, supra note 2, r 5.1-1: “When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must represent the client resolutely and honourably within the limits of the law, while treating the tribunal with candour, fairness, courtesy and respect.”

[12] Alice Woolley & Amy Salyzyn, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics in Canada, 3d ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2023), § 3.08 at 143-144. (Now Justice Woolley of the Court of Appeal for Alberta.)

[13] Ibid; FLSC Model Code, supra note 2, r 3.2-1 [emphasis added]: “A lawyer must not act or continue to act for a client where there is a conflict of interest, except as permitted under this Code.”

[14] I say Woolley here because, at that time, Amy Salyzyn had not yet joined Understanding Legal Ethics in Canada as a co-author.

[15] Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Loyalty, Conscience, and Withdrawal: Are Government Lawyers Different?” (2023) 46:3 Manitoba LJ 1 at 7-8.

[16] FLSC Model Code, supra note 2, rr 3.7-1, 3.7-8.

[17] FLSC Model Code, supra note 2, r 3.7-9(f).

[18] FLSC Model Code, supra note 2, r 5.1-1: “When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must represent the client resolutely and honourably within the limits of the law, while treating the tribunal with candour, fairness, courtesy and respect.”

[19] R v Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10 at para 48.

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Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : Au stade d’une requête en rejet sommaire, le critère applicable est celui de la frivolité manifeste; en l’espèce, bien que la juge de première instance n’ait pas mentionné le critère approprié, elle a eu raison de conclure que l’appelant avait présenté sa requête en arrêt des procédures tardivement et en l’absence de circonstances exceptionnelles qui auraient pu justifier ce retard.

Intitulé : Spreutels Béland c. R., 2026 QCCA 316
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Québec
Décision de : Juges Julie Dutil, Simon Ruel et Stephen W. Hamilton
Date : 10 mars 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — procédure pénale — procédure fédérale — rejet sommaire — arrêt des procédures — droit d’être jugé dans un délai raisonnable — application du cadre d’analyse de R. c. Jordan (C.S. Can., 2016-07-08), 2016 CSC 27, SOQUIJ AZ-51302609, 2016EXP-2173, J.E. 2016-1212, [2016] 1 R.C.S. 631 — tardiveté — absence de proactivité — conduite de la défense — tactique dilatoire — obligation d’agir en temps utile — absence de circonstances exceptionnelles — application du cadre d’analyse de R. c. Haevischer (C.S. Can., 2023-04-28), 2023 CSC 11, SOQUIJ AZ-51932923, 2023EXP-1077, [2023] 1 R.C.S. 416 — requête manifestement frivole — application du mauvais critère — application de l’article 104 du Règlement de la Cour du Québec — trafic de cocaïne — complot — appel.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — garanties fondamentales du processus pénal — droit d’être jugé dans un délai raisonnable — rejet sommaire — arrêt des procédures — application du cadre d’analyse de R. c. Jordan (C.S. Can., 2016-07-08), 2016 CSC 27, SOQUIJ AZ-51302609, 2016EXP-2173, J.E. 2016-1212, [2016] 1 R.C.S. 631 — tardiveté — absence de proactivité — conduite de la défense — tactique dilatoire — obligation d’agir en temps utile — absence de circonstances exceptionnelles — application du cadre d’analyse de R. c. Haevischer (C.S. Can., 2023-04-28), 2023 CSC 11, SOQUIJ AZ-51932923, 2023EXP-1077, [2023] 1 R.C.S. 416 — requête manifestement frivole — application du mauvais critère — application de l’article 104 du Règlement de la Cour du Québec — trafic de cocaïne — complot — appel.

DROITS ET LIBERTÉS — droits judiciaires — personne arrêtée ou détenue — droit d’être jugé dans un délai raisonnable — rejet sommaire — arrêt des procédures — application du cadre d’analyse de R. c. Jordan (C.S. Can., 2016-07-08), 2016 CSC 27, SOQUIJ AZ-51302609, 2016EXP-2173, J.E. 2016-1212, [2016] 1 R.C.S. 631 — tardiveté — absence de proactivité — conduite de la défense — tactique dilatoire — obligation d’agir en temps utile — absence de circonstances exceptionnelles — application du cadre d’analyse de R. c. Haevischer (C.S. Can., 2023-04-28), 2023 CSC 11, SOQUIJ AZ-51932923, 2023EXP-1077, [2023] 1 R.C.S. 416 — requête manifestement frivole — application du mauvais critère — application de l’article 104 du Règlement de la Cour du Québec — trafic de cocaïne — complot — appel.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — infraction — infractions en matière de drogues et autres substances — substances — trafic — cocaïne — complot — rejet sommaire — arrêt des procédures — droit d’être jugé dans un délai raisonnable — application du cadre d’analyse de R. c. Jordan (C.S. Can., 2016-07-08), 2016 CSC 27, SOQUIJ AZ-51302609, 2016EXP-2173, J.E. 2016-1212, [2016] 1 R.C.S. 631 — tardiveté — déclaration de culpabilité — appel.

Appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité. Rejeté.

L’appelant, qui a été déclaré coupable de trafic de cocaïne et de complot en vue de commettre cette infraction, conteste la décision rendue par la juge de première instance de rejeter sommairement sa requête en arrêt des procédures pour cause de délais déraisonnables. Il soutient que la juge a erré en rejetant sa requête en raison de sa présentation tardive — soit lors du procès, après que l’intimé eut déclaré sa preuve close — sans en analyser le bien-fondé.

Décision

En 2023, soit après le prononcé du jugement sur la requête en rejet, la Cour suprême du Canada, dans l’arrêt R. c. Haevischer (C.S. Can., 2023-04-28), 2023 CSC 11, SOQUIJ AZ-51932923, 2023EXP-1077, [2023] 1 R.C.S. 416, a clarifié le droit à l’égard du critère applicable en matière de rejet sommaire: le critère est celui de la frivolité manifeste, et non celui des chances raisonnables de succès. En l’espèce, la juge n’a donc pas mentionné le critère approprié à utiliser au stade d’une requête en rejet sommaire, soit celui de la frivolité manifeste. Toutefois, il y a tout de même lieu de rejeter l’appel.

Aux termes de l’article 104 du Règlement de la Cour du Québec, les demandes en vertu de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés doivent être annoncées au plus tard au moment où le procès est fixé. Un manquement d’ordre procédural n’est pas fatal. L’appelant devait tout de même présenter sa requête en temps utile, et ce, afin de respecter son obligation de faire preuve de proactivité. En l’espèce, la juge a déterminé qu’il s’agissait d’une tactique dilatoire, compte tenu du moment de la présentation de la requête, alors que le procès était presque terminé. Elle a estimé que la requête visait à retarder l’instance et témoignait d’une indifférence marquée à l’égard des délais. Alors qu’il avait eu l’occasion de faire valoir son droit, l’appelant n’a donné aucune justification pour expliquer le retard à présenter sa requête, prétendant qu’il pouvait le faire quand il le voulait. Or, cet argument n’est pas fondé en droit; toutes les personnes associées au système de justice doivent adopter une approche proactive en ce qui concerne les délais.

La requête était tardive puisqu’elle a été présentée après que l’intimé eut déclaré sa preuve close. La juge, qui avait une connaissance directe de l’évolution procédurale de ce dossier depuis plusieurs mois, a souligné que, dès la conférence de gestion du 28 juin 2021, le délai de 18 mois était atteint; entre ce moment et la date de présentation de la requête, le 10 mai 2022, l’appelant aurait amplement eu l’occasion de faire valoir ses droits à un procès dans un délai raisonnable. Son avocat a plutôt annoncé, lors des séances de gestion de 2021, qu’il ne présenterait pas de requête préliminaire. En outre, il a demandé le rejet sommaire de la requête de l’intimé, lequel souhaitait procéder par le dépôt de déclarations sous serment dans le but de réduire la durée de sa preuve et d’accélérer les procédures.

Aucune circonstance exceptionnelle ne permettait à l’appelant d’attendre la fin de la présentation de la preuve de l’intimé, après 10 jours de procès, pour présenter sa requête. Il aurait pu faire valoir ses arguments au sujet des délais depuis des mois, mais il ne l’a pas fait. La juge a eu raison de rejeter la requête en arrêt des procédures.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

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As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Bankruptcy & Insolvency: Preferences
American Pacific Corporation v. RPG Receivables Purchase Group Inc., 2025 ONCA 371 (41937)

Issues re preferential pre-bankruptcy transactions.

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Some legal marketers become indispensable strategic advisors. Others stay stuck in the ‘can you make this brochure’ zone. The difference isn’t talent, experience, or even luck. It’s curiosity.

After 20 years in this field, I can tell you: curiosity is a choice and it’s within your control. The marketers who ask better questions, who dig deeper, who challenge assumptions are the ones who earn a seat at the table. They move from taking orders to shaping strategy. The difference? They choose to be curious.

Where curiosity matters most

To succeed in legal marketing, you need four core competencies: relationship building, legal service delivery knowledge, competitive intelligence, and professional excellence. But competence alone isn’t enough. What separates good from great is the level of curiosity you bring to each of these areas.

Relationship building: Show up prepared

When meeting a lawyer for the first time, do your homework. Review their bio, narrow in on their client experience, and dig deep into their LinkedIn. What is their practice breakdown? Where do they spend their non-billable time? What do they engage with online? All firms have ready access to mountains of information. Figure out how to use it effectively. When I was first starting out, I would always ask a lawyer to give me a two-minute summary of their practice. But I never walked in cold. I listened and then I asked targeted questions about their client base, delivery style, ideal client, and challenges. I always asked for their honest opinion, even if I didn’t like the answer. When you get them talking, they open up. When you’ve done your research and ask smart questions, they get hooked. Surface-level conversation leads to a surface-level relationship. Curiosity is what moves you from intake to advisor.

Legal service delivery: Understand the work

You can’t market what you don’t understand. At a litigation boutique, I wanted to learn everything I could about advocacy. I was lucky to work on complicated pitches and learn about litigation strategy from dozens of partners. But to truly understand what happened when cases went to court, I had to see it for myself. So, I asked to join a virtual hearing. I watched a witness get cross-examined. I saw the judge react in real time. I listened to the behind-the-scenes discussion between counsel after court. It changed how I thought about their work and how I did my own. Had I not asked, I wouldn’t have been there. Had I not been curious, I would have stayed on the surface. The lawyers respected the ask and were proud to bring me in. That’s the difference between marketing from a distance and marketing with real understanding.

Competitive intelligence: Know what others don’t

If you don’t know what your competitors are doing, you’re already behind. Do your research. What’s their strategy? Their structure? What can you learn about their market presence? Monitor LinkedIn. Know their C-suite and how they show up. Understand their client base. But don’t stop there. When you see something that challenges your thinking, discuss it with your colleagues. Ask your lawyers how they perceive that firm delivering value. I spend at least an hour every day scrolling, double-clicking, and learning. I see campaigns and try to dissect what’s coming next. I set up alerts, so news finds me fast. This isn’t busywork. This is strategic intelligence that gives you an edge when it matters most.

Professional excellence: Push for more

Curiosity fuels success. The more you know, the better you work. We live in an AI world and preparation has never been easier. But preparation alone isn’t enough. Show up with an engaged, curious mind, and you’ll get more attention. And in legal marketing, how you show up matters.

Here’s the thing: lawyers have a role to play too. A lawyer once asked why we would bother doing a “win review” with a client who already accepted our proposal. My immediate thought? This person isn’t curious about the full picture. Win aside, to compete in the future, we need to know why we won, what we did better, and where we could improve. Not guesswork. We need to hear it directly from the client. Even when lawyers aren’t asking the questions, marketers can. Challenge them and push for the insight. That’s how you stay ahead.

Your move

Curiosity isn’t just about being naturally inquisitive. It’s about making a conscious choice to ask the next question, dig deeper, and challenge your assumptions. To legal marketers: stop waiting for instructions and start asking better questions. To lawyers: if you want your marketing team to move from execution to strategy, create the conditions for curiosity. Invite questions, reward depth over speed (please!), and recognize that the marketer who challenges your assumptions isn’t overstepping – they’re doing exactly what you need them to do.

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2026 is already shaping up to be another big year for the Canadian Open Access Legal Citation Guide – Guide canadien de la référence juridique en accès libre. Read on for recent milestones, new instruction materials, requests for feedback, and ways to get involved.

RJAL Launches

RJAL, the French version of COAL, was released in February 2026! It is now possible to use COAL-RJAL to cite legal materials when writing in both English and French, an important step in serving the legal community in both official languages. Read more on CanLII and Slaw.

Celebrating Our Early Adopters

We’ve been hearing from people across the country about how they are using COAL-RJAL already. We want to take this opportunity to celebrate COAL-RJAL’s early adopters, which include:

• Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan
• Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan
• Provincial Court of Saskatchewan
• Thompson Rivers University Law Journal
• Dalhousie Law Journal (accepts submissions using COAL)
• Classes at Queen’s University Law School, Thompson Rivers University Law School, Toronto Metropolitan University Law School, Université du Québec à Montréal, University of British Columbia Law School, University of Ottawa School of Information Studies, and the University of Windsor Law School.

Congratulations to these trailblazing courts, editorial boards, and professors for moving to a regularly updated legal citation guide that is responsive and available to all, with no financial barriers. Let us know if your class, journal, court, or organization is using or considering using COAL-RJAL! Email us at coal.rjal@ubc.ca.

New Interactive Tutorial to Learn and Practise COAL Citation Style

You asked for it, we made it: learn and practise COAL citation style with the brand new interactive tutorial, Practice Legal Citation with the Coal Guide. Like COAL-RJAL itself, it’s of course free and open to all.

Looking for Support in Adopting and Using COAL-RJAL?

You can find the new interactive tutorial, along with videos, PowerPoint slides, and other instructional materials that are, as always, free to use, at http://coal-rjal.ca/. If your organization is using or considering adopting COAL-RJAL and you would like us to give a presentation on the guide or answer any questions, we are happy to help!

Your Feedback Matters!

Your feedback continues to guide COAL-RJAL. Thank you. Please keep sending your feedback and suggestions.

Want to Get Involved?

If you would be interested in helping to add COAL-RJAL citation styles to Zotero and Jurism, we would love to hear from you.

All inquiries, feedback, and volunteer expressions of interest may be sent to coal.rjal@ubc.ca.

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Several times each month, we are pleased to republish a recent book review from the Canadian Law Library Review (CLLR). CLLR is the official journal of the Canadian Association of Law Libraries (CALL/ACBD), and its reviews cover both practice-oriented and academic publications related to the law.

The Legal Brain: A Lawyer’s Guide to Well-Being and Better Job Performance. By Debra S. Austin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. x, 257 p. Includes bibliographic references and index. ISBN 9781009484602 (hardcover) $102.95; ISBN 9781009484565 (softcover) $33.95; ISBN 9781009484558 (eBook) US$29.99.

Reviewed by Leslie Taylor
Research and Instruction Librarian
Lederman Law Library
Queen’s University

It is no secret that lawyers and law students suffer from chronic stress and high rates of depression and substance abuse. Law societies and bar associations in the United States, Canada, and internationally have published high- profile reports documenting the well-being crisis in the legal profession. But what can lawyers and legal organizations do to address the problem?

The Legal Brain: A Lawyer’s Guide to Well-Being and Better Job Performance by Debra S. Austin provides an approach to supporting and enhancing lawyer well-being that is focused on brain health. Austin, a law professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law and a nationally recognized expert in lawyer well-being, is well qualified to offer such guidance. While there has been a proliferation of self-help books written on the topic of lawyers’ mental health and well-being in recent years, what makes Austin’s book stand out is the way in which she grounds her approach in concrete neuroscience research, offering evidence-based strategies that appeal to lawyers’ analytical nature.

According to Austin, a “neuro-intelligent lawyer” is one who understands their “predominant lawyering asset—the brain—and how healthy habits can empower it” (p. 237). Austin argues that lawyers need to cultivate neuro-intelligence to understand why lawyering culture can cause harm and how to effectively counter it. Within law school, she points to the intense competition, zero-sum grading curve, and class ranking systems as the crucible in which the deterioration of well-being begins. Next, she looks at law firm culture, which often commodifies intensive legal practice, privileges profits above everything else, and enforces strict social hierarchies. The chronic stress present in both environments compromises lawyers’ cognitive abilities, undermining the very tool—the brain—that lawyers need to be successful in their work.

To equip lawyers with the neuro-intelligence needed to thrive in these environments, Austin provides an overview of how memory, learning, motivation, and habit-building work. Next, she discusses how stress, substance abuse, and other forms of self-medication damage the brain’s functioning. Finally, she describes activities that can heal impaired brains and improve brain health, including exercise, sleep, and respite. In the chapter “Enhancing Mental Strength,” Austin covers research-based practices that lawyers can use to improve their relationship to stress, self-regulation, and self-improvement. She also provides a useful template for lawyers to make a personal well-being action plan focused on the areas that they may need to work on the most: stress management, self-medication, nutrition, brain health, and mental health.

However, Austin does not place the responsibility solely on individual lawyers to deal with their own suffering and stress. She also rightly places the responsibility on legal organizations to better support lawyer well-being. Legal leaders who wish to transform their organizational culture can help this process by using the checklist of questions found in the chapter for legal organizations. Austin concludes the book with a tantalizing vision of leaders who pursue cultural change, not only in their own organizations, but who lead a transformation toward a greater well-being throughout all of society.

Overall, Austin’s focus on neuroscience makes a compelling argument for why the current culture of lawyering and law schools is unsustainable. Not only does it make people feel bad, but this culture also damages their cognitive abilities and affects job performance. Austin’s provision of concrete, science-based strategies for countering the effects of this culture are more helpful than most typical self-help guides on managing stress. While her explanations may be somewhat technical at times, readers can skim these sections and still grasp why they are important. Whether reading the entire book or just selections, an interested lawyer can learn something new and fascinating about their brain health and well-being. The text includes comprehensive footnotes, a detailed index, and practical templates that make it a valuable reference tool for both individual lawyers and legal organizations.

The Legal Brain would make an excellent addition to any law library collection. I would also recommend it for the personal collections of lawyers looking to better understand the connection between their brain health, job performance, and personal well-being. Additionally, leaders who wish to improve the health and well-being of the lawyers in their organizations will find practical guidance for implementing meaningful cultural change.

The post Book Review: Debra Austin’s the Legal Brain: A Lawyer’s Guide to Well-Being and Better Job Performance appeared first on Slaw.

This submission is part of a column swap with the American Association of Law Libraries (AALL) bimonthly member magazine, AALL Spectrum. Published six times a year, AALL Spectrum is designed to further professional development and education within the legal information industry. Slaw and the AALL Spectrum board have agreed to hand-select several columns each year as part of this exchange. 

The Rule of Law is a system of laws, institutions, norms, and commitments that further four key principles: accountability, just law, open government, and accessible and impartial justice. Rule of Law initiatives have been promoted by the American Bar Association throughout the world, and Rule of Law goals are included in the application process for countries seeking to join the European Union. Both authors of this article—Judge Betim Jahja of the North Macedonia Court of Appeals and Karen Westwood, director of the Hennepin County Law Library—are particularly interested in the open government principle of the Rule of Law as a means of increasing trust in the judicial system.

Judicial Context in North Macedonia

In North Macedonia, there is a pervasive public distrust in the judiciary, with a common perception that judges are overly political, make decisions based on ethnic and political favoritism, and are susceptible to bribery. Adding to this distrust is public pressure—particularly in high profile cases—to secure swift convictions. North Macedonia follows a civil law system, and while selected cases are published on the court’s website, search functionality is limited and cases are anonymized prior to publication, adding another step to the publication process. In a system with constrained technology and funding, there is limited appetite for significant investment in court technology to address these challenges.

As a result, the courts face difficult decisions about how to make judicial processes more open and understandable without overhauling existing systems or making major technological investments—in short, how to achieve greater transparency while making efficient use of limited resources. To that end, the judiciary has embarked on two initiatives to make meaningful progress.

A National Strategy for Judicial Communication

On June 10, 2024, North Macedonia’s Judicial Council adopted a five-year Communication Strategy for the Judicial Council and the courts (2024–2028), with the goal of establishing a single, consistent communication policy across the entire judiciary. The Strategy frames transparency as more than the publication of well-reasoned decisions; it calls for systematic, proactive, two-way communication that provides timely and understandable information about how judicial decisions are made. Its broader objective is to rebuild public trust and reinforce the rule of law. The Strategy aligns with national reform policies— including the justice sector development strategy and the “open government/open judiciary” agenda—and incorporates European guidance, including standards from the Council of Europe and the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice.

Based on a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) assessment that highlights critically low trust, resource constraints, and uneven communication capacity—especially the limited number of trained spokespersons—the Strategy prioritizes professionalization through clearer roles for court presidents and spokespersons, improved media protocols (including for high-profile cases), stronger internal communication, expanded digital outreach (including upgrades to the unified court portal), and continuous communication training. Implementation is supported by an Action Plan with measures, deadlines, and indicators, as well as the creation of an implementation commission and a network of court spokespersons to coordinate and monitor progress.

The Judicial–Media Council: Institutionalizing Dialogue

Perhaps the most innovative development in recent years is the establishment of the Judicial–Media Council, formally launched on September 21, 2018 in Skopje as a distinct body within the Association of Judges of the Republic of North Macedonia. The Council brings together judges and journalists in a permanent advisory forum designed to institutionalize dialogue between the judiciary and the media. Its mission is to strengthen judicial transparency, reduce the risk of misinterpretation of judicial proceedings, and promote responsible and accurate reporting on court activities.

The Council draws direct inspiration from the Massachusetts Judiciary–Media Committee model in the United States, adapting this practical American approach to the domestic context and to European principles of judicial openness and transparency, as reflected in the opinions of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE). Operating as a voluntary, nongovernmental platform within the Association of Judges, the Judicial–Media Council includes representatives from the courts, media associations, and civil society. It serves four primary purposes: (1) facilitating cooperation between judges and journalists through regular meetings and workshops; (2) drafting ethical guidelines for media coverage of judicial processes; (3) providing legal and communication training to enhance mutual understanding between the two professions; and (4) publishing educational materials and handbooks to promote transparency and public access to judicial information.
________________________________________

NORTH MACEDONIA IN CONTEXT

The Republic of North Macedonia is a landlocked country of the south-central Balkans, bordered by Kosovo, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania. It declared independence from the former Yugoslavia on December 8, 1991, and gained membership in NATO in 2020. The country received a large number of Albanians displaced from Kosovo during the Kosovo War of 1998–1999, and in 2001 a series of military clashes between ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian majority erupted. The Ohrid Framework Agreement put an official end to the armed conflict later in 2001 and included key points around nondiscrimination, equitable representation, education, and use of languages.

North Macedonia has been a candidate for European Union (EU) membership since 2005 and is committed to judicial reform, intelligence and security services reform, public administration reform, and democratic principles more broadly as pathways toward membership. Tensions between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians persist, and continue to influence public perceptions of government, elections, and the judiciary. The country’s progress has also been affected by increased refugee traffic beginning in 2015, as migrants moved from Greece through North Macedonia toward the EU borders with Hungary and Croatia, as well as by the significant impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. North Macedonia has a rich and storied history in the Balkans and is known for its natural beauty, fine food and wines, and legendary hospitality.

________________________________________

Guidance on Transparency in Practice

One of the Council’s most significant outputs is the Guidebook on Judicial Transparency for Judges and Journalists (2020), produced with the support of the European Union and USAID. The Guidebook offers practical recommendations on balancing freedom of expression with judicial confidentiality, draws on case law from the European Court of Human Rights, and clarifies how judges may communicate with the public without compromising impartiality or the presumption of innocence.

Importantly, the Guidebook emphasizes that transparency does not end with the publication of judicial decisions. Rather, it requires the continuous explanation of judicial actions in clear and accessible language, enabling the public to understand not only judicial outcomes but also the reasoning and values underlying judicial decision-making. This approach reflects the emergence of a new communication culture within the judiciary—one that promotes openness and public engagement while safeguarding judicial independence, dignity, and procedural fairness.

Expanding Public Access to Judicial Decisions

Additionally, in December 2022, the Supreme Court of the Republic of North Macedonia, sitting in General Session, adopted a Principled Legal Opinion requiring courts to publish non-final judicial decisions (judgments and rulings) in cases of public interest on their official websites. While existing legislation already obliges courts to publish final decisions within prescribed deadlines, the Supreme Court clarified that, in light of constitutional guarantees of publicity and freedom of information, as well as the lex specialis nature of the Criminal Procedure Code, transparency requires broader publication.

The Court grounded its position in constitutional principles of public hearings and public information, domestic procedural laws, and the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Articles 6 and 10. Relying on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court emphasized that public access to court decisions enhances the visibility of justice and that withholding information of high public interest may constitute a violation of freedom of expression. Accordingly, the Court concluded that publishing non-final decisions in matters of public interest is necessary to ensure transparency, accountability, and informed public debate about the functioning of the judiciary.

Implications for Law Librarians and Legal Information Professionals

An American legal information professional looking at these projects and this Principled Legal Opinion would immediately begin to see ways that law librarians could assist the courts in these projects, help members of the public access the information generated by the projects, and support citizens in locating underlying information directly from the courts. However, it appears that there is no formal law library profession in the country, and that academic and public libraries do not receive the level of funding or training available in the United States (for instance, there is no graduate information sciences degree available in the country). Nonetheless, examining these North Macedonian initiatives serves as a helpful reminder to U.S. legal information professionals of the importance of promoting attorney, media, and public access to court information, and of persisting in efforts to demand full and transparent access to the workings of the court.

Important Takeaways

• Courts and law librarians share a common commitment to transparency.
• Law librarians should approach courts directly to learn more about existing transparency
• Courts should enlist law librarians, when possible, to assist in promoting court information and transparency.
• Law librarians should participate with courts in shaping data practices, including rules governing public and private data, to promote judicial transparency while protecting privacy.
• Both generators of information (the courts) and users of information (law librarians and other stakeholders) can advance shared goals related to transparency.

This article serves as a reminder of the importance of communicating with justice partners and of taking a fresh look at existing relationships to create new opportunities for collaboration.

______

KAREN WESTWOOD
DIRECTOR
Hennepin County Law Library
Minneapolis, Minnesota

BETIM JAHJA
JUDGE
Appellate Court Skopje
Republic of North Macedonia

The post Improving Trust Through Judicial Transparency : Building Public Confidence Through Open Government Initiatives appeared first on Slaw.

Individuals who disclose wrongdoing are sometimes subjected to negative perceptions, but nothing is more counterproductive to societal progress than such stigma. Reporting unethical or illegal conduct is both appropriate and necessary and those who demonstrate the courage to come forward should be recognized as heroes—not disparaged. Whistlblowers play a critical role in promoting positive change.

The Origins of Whistleblower Protection: Marven and Shaw’s Landmark Stand

In 1777, U.S. naval officers, Richard Marven and Samuel Shaw, made a bold and dangerous decision to expose the misconduct of their commander-in-chief, Commodore Esek Hopkins[1]. At the time, the stakes were extraordinarily high. They were challenging a powerful and well-connected figure from a prominent family, in an era when whistleblower protections did not exist. Despite the risks, Marven and Shaw’s courageous actions laid the foundation for the world’s first whistleblower protection law, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1778.

What Happened?

Commodore Hopkins, the head of the Continental Navy, had engaged in serious misconduct. He was accused of looting British naval and merchant vessels and diverting the proceeds for personal gain, leaving sailors unpaid. More disturbingly, he violated Congressional directives by torturing British prisoners of war, despite clear instructions that prisoners of war were to be treated humanely. Marven and Shaw, along with eight other colleagues, reported these abuses to Congress. Their disclosures led to Hopkins being relieved of his command and dishonorably discharged.

However, the story didn’t end there. Following his dismissal, Hopkins retaliated by having Marven and Shaw arrested on charges of libel. In response, the two officers petitioned Congress for protection. Recognizing the importance of safeguarding individuals who report wrongdoing, Congress passed a whistleblower protection law on July 30, 1778. This landmark legislation not only supported Marven and Shaw but also authorized the payment of their legal expenses from public funds, signaling a commitment to protecting future whistleblowers.

Why Whistleblowers Matter

This historical account underscores the vital role whistleblowers play in promoting accountability and integrity. Their actions can lead to significant reforms and prevent further harm. As Bruce Dorris, J.D., CFE, CPA, and President and CEO of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), notes, “Research by the ACFE indicates that whistleblower tips are by far the most common way that fraud schemes are detected.” Organizations that prioritize ethical conduct and compliance recognize the value whistleblowers bring and often establish internal reporting mechanisms to encourage the safe disclosure of misconduct.

In parallel, government agencies and securities regulators across Canada and other parts of the world have developed external whistleblower programs to ensure that wrongdoing is identified and addressed early, especially when internal systems fail or when the misconduct falls outside the scope of corporate oversight.

The Alberta Securities Commission’s Whistleblower Program

In Alberta, the Alberta Securities Commission (ASC) serves as the regulatory body responsible for enforcing the province’s securities laws. In 2018, the ASC established its whistleblower program to provide a safe and confidential avenue for employees to report securities-related misconduct involving publicly traded companies, registered firms or companies (or persons) illegally engaged in regulated activity. The program is designed to protect whistleblowers from retaliation and to ensure their identities remain confidential. By submitting tips, whistleblowers help the ASC detect and investigate breaches of securities law, ultimately supporting its mandate to foster a fair and efficient capital market and protect investors.

Whistleblowing Is a Protected Activity

Unlike the uncertain legal landscape of 1777, whistleblowing is now a protected activity in many jurisdictions and sectors across the world, including in Alberta’s capital market. Individuals who report wrongdoing can do so with confidence, knowing that their identities will be kept confidential and that they are protected from retaliation, provided they qualify as whistleblowers as defined by the Securities Act (Alberta). If reprisals do occur, whistleblowers have legal recourse through the ASC’s enforcement framework or the Alberta courts.

Though Alberta courts have not yet tested the anti-reprisal protections in the Securities Act, an Ontario Superior Court ruling[2] in September 2025 interpreting similar protections, found that it was unlawful to fire a CEO for raising concerns about potential violations under the Ontario Securities Act. The court adopted a “mixed motive” standard, holding that employer reprisals are illegal if protected activity was even part of the reason for adverse action taken against an employee. Similar judicial reasoning may apply in Alberta.

Aside confidentiality and anti-reprisal, the Securities Act offers other legal protections including limited immunity and bans on employment contracts that restrict reporting. These additional protections act as a safeguard against retaliatory litigation. In addition, employment contracts that purport to prohibit whistleblowing are unenforceable against a whistleblower. While whistleblowing can be difficult, Alberta’s securities laws offer significant support and rigorous protection for those who choose to come forward.

Preserving Integrity and Reputation

Beyond contributing to market integrity, whistleblowers may also protect their own professional reputations by exposing fraud or unethical behavior. Reporting misconduct can be a form of self-preservation, especially when one’s career or credibility is at risk. While some may feel conflicted about being motivated by self-interest, it’s important to recognize that protecting oneself and serving the public interest are not mutually exclusive. In fact, whistleblowing often reflects a commitment to personal ethics and professional standards, whether the disclosure is made internally through a workplace hotline or externally via a regulatory program like the ASC’s.

Doing It Right: Ethical and Strategic Whistleblowing

As with any serious action, there is a right and wrong way to blow the whistle. The first consideration is ethical: the information being reported must be truthful and not misleading. At the time of disclosure, the whistleblower must reasonably and honestly believe the facts to be accurate. Submitting false or misleading information can result in the forfeiture of whistleblower protections and may lead to regulatory or criminal consequences under the Securities Act or the Criminal Code of Canada.

The second consideration involves strategic precautions to maintain confidentiality and minimize the risk of retaliation. While internal policies and regulatory programs offer safeguards, whistleblowers must also take personal steps to protect themselves. This includes keeping the fact of their disclosure private. Sharing that one has reported misconduct—especially with third parties (except legal counsel)—can compromise confidentiality and increase the risk of exposure during an investigation.

Conclusion

Whistleblowing can benefit everyone: investors, corporations, regulators, and the whistleblowers themselves. It promotes transparency, accountability, and ethical conduct. Understanding the legal framework and protections available is essential for anyone considering reporting misconduct. By acting ethically and strategically, whistleblowers can make a meaningful impact while safeguarding their own interests. The legacy of Marven and Shaw reminds us that speaking up, even in the face of adversity, can lead to lasting change.

 —

Disclaimer:

Any views or opinions expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of his employer or colleagues.

__________________

[1] Stephen M. Kohn, The New Whistleblower’s Handbook: A Step-by-Step Guide to Doing What’s Right and Protecting Yourself, 2nd ed (Essex, CT: Lyons Press, 2017)

[2] McPherson v. Global Growth Assets Inc., 2025 ONSC 5226

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Sole practitioners in Ontario are required by the Law Society to maintain a contingency plan for their practice in case they unexpectedly become unable to practice law or meet their professional obligations.

Although this has been the case since January 1, 2025, the first time we need to confirm with the LSO that we have such a plan in place is on our Annual Reports that are due on March 31, 2026. Naturally, this month I have received numerous inquiries from clients and colleagues about these contingency plans.

As By-Law 7.1 is not always easy reading, I thought a column providing some thoughts and guidance on contingency plans could be helpful to some.  

Who needs a contingency plan?

The LSO’s contingency plan requirement applies only to lawyers and paralegals in sole practice or who otherwise run their own firm.[1]

Contingency planning is nevertheless advisable for every lawyer. Even if unlikely, unexpected things happen and one never knows when they may suddenly become unavailable. Clients count on their lawyers to protect their legal rights and interests, and the responsible thing to do is to ensure they are not left high and dry if for whatever reason their lawyer cannot continue to assist.

For lawyers in firms, contingency planning can be relatively a simple matter of ensuring that the partners can—and are well-positioned to—step in to handle client matters and property (including trust funds) if necessary.[2]

How do I get started preparing a contingency plan?

The LSO has provided some helpful resources so sole practitioners do not need start from scratch:

• Checklist: Guidelines for appointing an Administrator and developing a client contingency plan
• Client contingency plan template

I chose to adapt the LSO template when preparing my own contingency plan, and have shared it with some colleagues who have struggled to get started.

Although I appreciate that the LSO prepares thorough guidance on what is expected of licensees, I often find (and hear from clients) that their resources can be a bit overwhelming. A four-page long checklist with compound items can be more daunting than helpful.

I was thus pleased to see that the LSO also prepared this one-pager: 6 Steps to developing a client contingency plan. If you haven’t started yet, I recommend starting there.

What should I include in my contingency plan?

For sole practitioners both inside and outside Ontario, here is my practical summary:[3]

1. Identify another licensee you trust to handle your practice affairs if you cannot (the “Administrator”).

• • This is a bit of a burden, so consider pairing up with another sole practitioner, or imposing on a good friend.
  • There are only a few things that must be done by another licensee to wind up your practice (e.g. disbursements from your trust account).
  • You can also appoint a “non-licensee steward” to take care of most of the heavy lifting (e.g. contacting clients, arranging for the transfer of files) for which another licensee is not required. This person could be your office manager or assistant, or a spouse or family member who might otherwise be arranging your personal affairs if you became incapacitated.

2. Identify crucial details about your practice in one place, including

• • Location and how to access your office and computer
  • Contact information for key personnel: staff, bookkeeper/accountant, landlord, etc.
  • Location of client files and financial records
  • Where to find a master file list (the LSO provides this template; I personally maintain the details identified therein in Clio and Outlook, and noted how to find them in my plan)
  • Bank account numbers, passwords, PINs^[4]
  • CRA tax number (and account login details) and, if incorporated, business number
  • Password manager details, if any (note: if you have 2-factor authentication set up on any accounts, be sure you also include details for the phone that will receive confirmation texts or your authenticator app)

3. Set out some basic “how tos”

• • How to access your client files and financial records (not just where are they saved, but also what passwords one needs to get to there)
  • How to disburse funds from trust (including how to access/prepare trust cheques, if applicable)
  • How to transfer active files to other lawyers (including the names and contact details of a few lawyers you would trust to carry on your matters in your absence)

4. Make a list of what needs to be done if you disappear, which includes

• • Notify the LSO
  • Notify LawPRO (or other professional liability insurer)
  • Notify clients and seek instructions to transfer or return files
  • Access and return (or transfer) trust funds
  • Notify contractors/suppliers
  • Set an out-of-office voicemail and email auto-reply

Conclusion

Some new regulatory requirements invite debate about whether they are truly necessary or valuable—but this is not one of them.

Requiring sole practitioners to have a contingency plan falls squarely within the Law Society’s fundamental purpose to regulate the legal profession in a manner that protects the public.

It guards against the distinct possibility that clients will be left hanging—or without access to their funds in trust—if their lawyer unexpectedly becomes unavailable. Unfortunately, this happens far more often than any of us would like to believe.

So I recommend setting aside a couple hours to get organized and prepare your plan. Once it’s done, you only need to review it once a year to make sure its details are up to date.

Happy planning!

___________________

[1] Although section 19.2(2) of By-Law 7.1 refers broadly to “A licensee who practises law or provides legal services…”, s. 19.2(1) expressly excludes licensees practising law in government; at a Legal Aid clinic; in an in-house legal department; or through a firm that is a sole proprietorship not owned by the licensee or a partnership. I assume the omission of lawyers practising through professional corporations is inadvertent and PCs are to be grouped in with sole proprietorships (i.e. if you practise through a PC that is owned by another licensee, you are similarly permitted to rely on that licensee to have a contingency plan in place). To my mind it would have been much clearer to specify which licensees actually need to prepare a contingency plan rather than all the licensees who do not, which is what I have done in the text above. As always, my thoughts in this column should not be taken as legal advice and I trust readers will not rely on them as such.

[2] Indeed, even though the new(ish) requirement in By-Law 7.1 applies to sole practitioners only, the LSO’s Annual Report specifically asks licensees in firms whether their firm has “planned for the continuity of client matters and protection of their property in the event of a contingency that fundamentally affects your firm operations”.

[3] The LSO provides the full details of what is required in s. 19.1(3) and (4) of By-Law 7.1.

[4] I am personally disinclined to including passwords and PINs in any electronic document for security reasons, and instead chose to provide (a) the info for my password manager, which has one master password; (b) where the master password is written down; and (c) a written description of my PIN that I know my Administrator and Non-Licensee Steward can discern.

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Every week we present the summary of a decision handed down by a Québec court provided to us by SOQUIJ and considered to be of interest to our readers throughout Canada. SOQUIJ is attached to the Québec Department of Justice and collects, analyzes, enriches, and disseminates legal information in Québec.

PÉNAL (DROIT) : Le juge de la Cour supérieure a erré dans son interprétation des directives du Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales (DPCP); si l’on applique correctement la portée du rôle de la poursuite lors d’une préenquête, on ne peut justifier la conclusion du juge selon laquelle la décision du DPCP d’arrêter les procédures dans des poursuites privées constituait un abus de procédure.

Intitulé : Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales c. Gauvin, 2026 QCCA 260
Juridiction : Cour d’appel (C.A.), Montréal
Décision de : Juges Guy Gagnon, Peter Kalichman et Myriam Lachance
Date : 25 février 2026

Résumé

PÉNAL (DROIT) — procédure pénale — procédure fédérale — recours extraordinaire — certiorari (art. 774 C.Cr.) — contrôle judiciaire — arrêt des procédures — nolle prosequi — pouvoir discrétionnaire — plainte privée — préenquête — rôle de la poursuite — intérêt public — directive du Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales — directive administrative — fardeau de la preuve — suffisance de la preuve — opportunité d’intenter des poursuites criminelles — perspective raisonnable de condamnation — intérêt de la justice — article 507.1 C.Cr. — comportement de la poursuite — contre-interrogatoire — crédibilité des témoins — opinion juridique — absence d’inconduite de la poursuite — intégrité du système de justice — absence de partialité — absence d’abus de procédure — recevabilité de la preuve — témoignages — protection contre l’auto-incrimination — appel — erreur de droit.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — juridiction pénale — Cour d’appel — compétence — absence de droit d’appel — appel incident — avocat du Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales — absence de droit d’appel indépendant — tiers — inapplicabilité de l’article 359 C.P.C. — procédure en matière criminelle — compétence exclusive du parlement fédéral — inapplicabilité des règles gouvernant l’intervention de tiers — certiorari — contrôle judiciaire — arrêt des procédures — nolle prosequi — plainte privée — abus de procédure.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — preuve pénale — recevabilité de la preuve — nouvelle preuve — présence de l’avocat de la poursuite à un endroit plutôt qu’à un autre — absence de partialité de l’avocat — critères établis dans Palmer c. R. (C.S. Can., 1979-12-21), SOQUIJ AZ-80113054, [1980] 1 R.C.S. 759 — absence de diligence raisonnable — pertinence — allégation d’abus de procédure — critère de la plausibilité — influence sur la décision à rendre — crédibilité d’un témoin — avocat du Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales — décision stratégique — preuve disponible en première instance — protection contre l’auto-incrimination — certiorari — préenquête — contrôle judiciaire — arrêt des procédures — nolle prosequi — plainte privée — abus de procédure — appel — déférence.

PÉNAL (DROIT) — garanties fondamentales du processus pénal — protection contre l’auto-incrimination — recevabilité de la preuve — témoignage — certiorari — préenquête — contrôle judiciaire — arrêt des procédures — nolle prosequi — plainte privée — absence d’abus de procédure — appel — erreur de droit.

DROITS ET LIBERTÉS — droits judiciaires — vie, sûreté, intégrité et liberté — protection contre l’auto-incrimination — recevabilité de la preuve — témoignage — certiorari — préenquête — contrôle judiciaire — arrêt des procédures — nolle prosequi — plainte privée — absence d’abus de procédure — appel — erreur de droit.

PROCÉDURE CIVILE — appel — Cour d’appel — compétence — absence de droit d’appel — appel incident — avocat du Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales — absence de droit d’appel indépendant — tiers — inapplicabilité de l’article 359 C.P.C. — procédure en matière criminelle — compétence exclusive du parlement fédéral — inapplicabilité des règles gouvernant l’intervention de tiers — certiorari — contrôle judiciaire — arrêt des procédures — nolle prosequi — plainte privée — abus de procédure.

Appel d’un jugement de la Cour supérieure ayant accueilli une requête en certiorari. Accueilli. Requête en autorisation de présenter une nouvelle preuve et appel incident. Rejetés.

Le juge de la Cour supérieure a annulé les ordonnances d’arrêt des procédures déposées par le Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales (DPCP) à l’égard d’accusations criminelles découlant de dénonciations privées, lesquelles avaient été présentées par l’intimé à la suite d’un accident de la route impliquant sa fille.

Décision

L’appel incident de l’avocat du DPCP mis en cause ayant déposé les ordonnances d’arrêt des procédures, par lequel il demande de casser les conclusions portant sur sa crédibilité, n’a plus lieu de se poursuivre, le pourvoi constituant en l’espèce une procédure criminelle qui ne le vise pas. Le recours en certiorari, en tant qu’instance parallèle au procès criminel, est de même nature et, comme l’appel en matière criminelle ne prévoit aucun droit d’appel pour les tiers, il ne peut en être autrement pour le présent certiorari. Il n’est par ailleurs pas question pour un tiers à l’instance de puiser dans le droit civil, notamment à l’article 359 du Code de procédure civile, l’existence d’un droit afin de se pourvoir, de façon incidente, dans une affaire criminelle. De plus, l’avocat d’une partie en première instance n’est pas une partie à l’appel. Les règles gouvernant l’intervention de tiers ne sont pas non plus applicables. Même dans le cadre d’un certiorari, un procureur aux poursuites criminelles et pénales n’est pas une partie distincte du DPCP puisqu’il en est le représentant. Il n’a donc pas un droit d’appel indépendant des parties.

Quant à la demande du mis en cause pour obtenir la permission de déposer en appel une nouvelle preuve, elle ne peut réussir, et ce, même si cette preuve démontre que l’atteinte à la crédibilité du mis en cause s’avère infondée. Le mis en cause était un témoin du DPCP devant la Cour supérieure et il n’a pas été cru. L’appel n’est pas un outil par lequel une preuve complémentaire qui existait et était connue — par le DPCP dans le présent cas — peut maintenant être produite afin de demander à la Cour de réévaluer la perception qu’a eue le juge à l’égard d’un témoignage. La déférence s’impose relativement aux décisions tactiques des parties, aussi malheureux que ces choix puissent paraître aujourd’hui pour la réputation du mis en cause.

Quant à l’analyse de l’abus de procédure, la conduite du mis en cause correspondait au cadre d’analyse prévu dans les lignes directrices du DPCP et à l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la poursuite. Le juge pouvait être en désaccord avec la façon dont le mis en cause avait mené ses contre-interrogatoires et présenté sa preuve, mais, pour intervenir relativement à la décision du DPCP d’arrêter les procédures, il devait conclure que le comportement du mis en cause constituait l’un de ces rares cas de conduite inacceptable et compromettant sérieusement l’intégrité du système de justice. Or, en appliquant correctement la portée du rôle de la poursuite lors d’une préenquête, et sans l’erreur de droit commise par le juge dans son interprétation des directives du DPCP qui n’ont pas force de loi, une telle conclusion ne pouvait se justifier.

Le rôle de la poursuite dans une préenquête ne se limite pas à fournir une assistance au juge de paix. Le rôle du dénonciateur d’une plainte privée est parallèle à celui de la poursuite, mais il ne le remplace pas; lorsque ces 2 rôles entrent en conflit, celui de la poursuite l’emporte. Il revient toujours à la poursuite d’évaluer la suffisance de la preuve et l’opportunité d’intenter des poursuites criminelles; pour cela, elle doit être convaincue qu’il existe une perspective raisonnable de condamnation et qu’il est dans l’intérêt de la justice de poursuivre. En l’espèce, c’est après avoir étudié attentivement le dossier — qui soulevait des difficultés majeures quant à certaines preuves, notamment au regard de la protection contre l’auto-incrimination et des procédures criminelles souhaitées, lesquelles ne seraient pas dans l’intérêt public — que le mis en cause a sollicité l’autorisation d’arrêter les procédures.

Le texte intégral de la décision est disponible ici

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As a supplement to our Sunday Summary each month, Supreme Advocacy LLP in Ottawa presents Supreme One-Liners, a super-short descriptive guide to the most recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers its more comprehensive weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, summarizing all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted.

Appeals

Charter: Discrimination Based on Sex; Subsidized Childcare
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kanyinda, 2024 QCCA 144, 2026 SCC 7 (41210)

Excluding refugee claimants from subsidized childcare contra s.15; not saved by s.1

Criminal Law: Implied Licence Doctrine
R. v. Singer, 2023 SKCA 123, 2026 SCC 8 (41090)

Clarifies when police can enter private property and open a vehicle.

Oral Judgments

Criminal Law: Sexual Assault
R. v. Case, 2026 SCC 6 (41610)

Court of Appeal (2:1) sexual assault convictions upheld.

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Torts: Sexual Abuse; Vicarious Liability
H.N. v. Board of Education of School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria), et al., 2025 BCCA 144 (41910)

Vicarious liability in sexual abuse context.

Generoux, et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 82 (41858)
Reviewing subordinate legislation and subdelegated Cabinet authority.

Canadian Coalition for Firearm Rights, et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 82 (41859)
Reviewing subordinate legislation and subdelegated Cabinet authority.

Doherty, et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 82 (41860)
Reviewing subordinate legislation and subdelegated Cabinet authority.

Eichenberg, et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 82 (41861)
Reviewing subordinate legislation and subdelegated Cabinet authority.

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