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<rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" version="2.0"><channel><description>Here you’ll find weekly summaries of selected cases provided to Slaw by Maritime Law Book’s National Reporter System.</description><title>MLB-Slaw Selected Case Summaries</title><generator>Tumblr (3.0; @slawcases)</generator><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/</link><item><title>R. v. Gagnon (J.G.A.) 2016 CMAC 2</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Armed Forces - Civil Rights - Criminal Law&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	Gagnon and Thibault were charged with sexual assault. Court Martial proceedings ensued. Gagnon was acquitted. In Thibault&amp;rsquo;s case the Court Martial found that it had no jurisdiction over the charge of sexual assault because of a lack of sufficient military nexus. The Minister of Defence appealed the two decisions pursuant to s. 230.1 of the National Defence Act (NDA). Gagnon and Thibault applied to have the Minister&amp;rsquo;s appeals quashed and dismissed, arguing that the right to appeal had to be attributed to an independent prosecutor and that it was contrary to s. 7 of the Charter to confer it on the Minister.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Court Martial Appeal Court allowed the appeals. Section 7 of the Charter protected the constitutional right of an accused to an independent prosecutor. The Minister of Defence could not reasonably be perceived as an independent prosecutor. Section 230.1 of the NDA, which conferred on the Minister the right to appeal, thus did not satisfy the constitutional requirement of prosecutorial independence. It was declared to be of no force and effect to the extent that its holder was not independent. The section could not be saved under s. 1 of the Charter.  The court suspended the declaration of invalidity of s. 230.1 for six months. The court, however, refused to quash the appeals, but rather adjourned the appeals until after the suspension period for the declaration of invalidity of s. 230.1. Presumably, Parliament would by that time have passed the amendments deemed necessary to the NDA, thus granting Gagnon and Thibault the remedy sought (i.e., an independent prosecutor for the conduct of the appeal proceedings).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/gagnon_2016-04-26.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+CMAC+2&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143434279004</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143434279004</guid><pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2016 12:17:16 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Daniels et al. v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) et al. 2016 SCC 12</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Administrative Law - Constitutional Law - Courts - Indians, Inuit and Métis&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	The plaintiffs sought declarations (a) that Métis and Non-status Indians were &amp;ldquo;Indians&amp;rdquo; within the meaning of the expression &amp;ldquo;Indians and lands reserved for Indians&amp;rdquo; in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867; (b) that the Queen (in right of Canada) owed a fiduciary duty to Métis and Non-status Indians; and &amp;copy; that the Métis and Non-status Indian peoples of Canada had the right to be consulted and negotiated with, in good faith, by the federal government on a collective basis through representatives of their choice, respecting all their rights, interests and needs as Aboriginal peoples.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Federal Court, in a decision reported 426 F.T.R. 1, declared that those persons who were Métis and those who were Non-status Indians as set forth in the reasons for judgment of the court, were &amp;ldquo;Indians&amp;rdquo; within the meaning of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The court refused to grant the other declarations sought, although the court opined that the fiduciary relationship existed as a matter of law flowing from the declaration that Métis and Non-status Indians were &amp;ldquo;Indians&amp;rdquo; pursuant to s. 91(24). The Crown appealed and the plaintiffs cross-appealed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/daniels_2016-04-26.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2016+SCC+12&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143434152249</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143434152249</guid><pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2016 12:14:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Carvery v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) et al. 2016 NSCA 21</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Crown - Equity - Statutes&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	 The plaintiff alleged that a probation officer sexually abused him for seven months in 1975. The plaintiff sued the probation officer and his employer, the Province of Nova Scotia, for damages for breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff also alleged that the Province was vicariously liable for breaches of fiduciary duty by its employee. The Province moved for summary judgment to have the claims dismissed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Nova Scotia Supreme Court, in a decision reported (2015), 364 N.S.R.(2d) 63; 1146 A.P.R. 63, dismissed the motion for summary judgment with respect to the direct claim against the Province for breaches of fiduciary duty. That claim could proceed. However, the motion for summary judgment with respect to the claim that the Province was responsible for a breach of fiduciary duty by its employee was granted. The Province appealed and the plaintiff cross-appealed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/carvery_2016-04-26.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2016+NSCA+21&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NSR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143434010154</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143434010154</guid><pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2016 12:10:11 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Commission scolaire de Laval et al. v. Syndicat de l'enseignement de la région de Laval et al. 2016 SCC 8</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Administrative Law - Arbitration - Education - Evidence - Labour Law&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	The Syndicat de l'enseignement de la région de Laval (&amp;ldquo;Union&amp;rdquo;) filed a grievance with respect to the dismissal of a teacher. In the course of the inquiry into the grievance, the Commission scolaire de Laval (&amp;ldquo;Board&amp;rdquo;) objected to the examination of three commissioners who were members of its executive committee, which had decided in camera to dismiss the teacher. In the Board&amp;rsquo;s view, the motives of individual members of a collective body that underlie a decision made by the body by way of a resolution were &amp;ldquo;unknowable&amp;rdquo;, and therefore irrelevant. In addition, the executive committee&amp;rsquo;s members were shielded by deliberative secrecy from being compelled to testify regarding their in camera deliberations. The Fédération autonome de l'enseignement (&amp;ldquo;FAE&amp;rdquo;) intervened in support of the Union&amp;rsquo;s position. The Fédération des commissions scolaires du Québec (&amp;ldquo;FCSQ&amp;rdquo;) also intervened, asking that the summonses to the executive committee members be quashed. The arbitrator dismissed the Board&amp;rsquo;s objections and allowed the examination of the executive committee&amp;rsquo;s members regarding their in camera deliberations and their decision to dismiss the teacher. The Board and the FCSQ brought a motion for judicial review of the arbitrator&amp;rsquo;s interlocutory decision.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/laval_2016-04-26.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2016+SCC+8&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143433887344</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143433887344</guid><pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2016 12:06:46 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Lymer (Bankrupt), Re 2016 ABCA 32</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Practice&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	Lymer, a bankrupt, filed numerous applications and appeals in a bankruptcy matter, including making repeated requests that the Registrar recuse himself or be removed from his role.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Alberta Court of Queen&amp;rsquo;s Bench, on its own motion, in a decision reported 601 A.R. 165, declared Lymer to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to s. 23.1(1) of the Judicature Act. Lymer appealed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the declaration of the court below.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/lymer_2016-04-26.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2016+ABCA+32&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=AR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143433705839</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143433705839</guid><pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2016 12:02:12 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>R. v. McMillan (B.W.) 2016 MBCA 12</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Civil Rights - Criminal Law&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	The accused pleaded guilty to a charge of intentionally discharging a firearm into a place knowing that or being reckless as to whether another person was in that place (Criminal Code, s. 244.2(1)(a)). There was a mandatory minimum sentence of four years for that offence. The issue of sentencing was adjourned to allow the accused to pursue an application challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to s. 12 of the Charter (i.e., the provision respecting cruel and unusual punishment).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Manitoba Court of Queen&amp;rsquo;s Bench allowed the application. The court held that the minimum sentence of four years as required by s. 244.2(1) of the Code violated s. 12 of the Charter in that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The minimum sentence could not be saved by s. 1. Accordingly, the minimum sentence provision of s. 244.2 was declared invalid and of no force and effect. The court, after making allowance for two months spent in pre-trial custody and the 18 months the accused spent on judicial interim release, sentenced the accused to one year of incarceration, plus two years&amp;rsquo; probation. The Crown appealed.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/mcmillan_2016-04-26.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2016+MBCA+12&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=MANR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143433589979</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143433589979</guid><pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2016 11:59:30 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Spence Estate, Re 2016 ONCA 196</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Civil Rights - Family Law - Wills&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	VS asked the court to set aside her father&amp;rsquo;s will. The deceased’s will disinherited her and benefited her sister, DS, and DS&amp;rsquo; two children. VS claimed that the disinheritance was racially motivated; therefore, the will was void for public policy reasons and should be set aside resulting in an intestacy. An intestacy under the Succession Law Reform Act in Ontario would result in the two sisters sharing the estate equally. The BMO Trust Co., in its capacity as Estate Trustee, opposed VS&amp;rsquo;s request for relief.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Ontario Superior Court (applications judge), in a decision with neutral citation 2015 ONSC 615, set aside the will on public policy grounds. BMO appealed. At issue was whether it was open to the courts to scrutinize an unambiguous and unequivocal residual bequest in a will, with no discriminatory conditions or stipulations, if a disappointed beneficiary or other third party claimed that the bequest offended public policy. Further at issue was whether third-party extrinsic evidence of the testator&amp;rsquo;s alleged discriminatory motive for making the bequest was admissible on an application to set aside the will on public policy grounds.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/spence_2016-04-26.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2016+ONCA+196&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=OAC&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143433467989</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/143433467989</guid><pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2016 11:56:17 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Police Complaint Commissioner (B.C.) v. Abbotsford Police Department et al. 2015 BCCA 523</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Courts - Criminal Law - Evidence - Police&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	The Police Complaint Commissioner of British Columbia (PCC) appealed from a decision of Cullen, A.C.J., reported at [2015] B.C.T.C. Uned. 978. The appeal raised two primary issues. The first was one of appellate jurisdiction. It required the court to characterize the nature of the order from which the appeal was taken as either criminal or civil. If it was the former, the appeal had to be quashed as no statutory authority existed for the Court of Appeal to determine the appeal. The second issue was one of substantive law, being whether the PCC in his supervisory role over the conduct of municipal police under the Police Act, and investigators carrying out duties under that Act, could be given access to information, sealed in a packet in a criminal proceeding, that could reveal the identity of confidential police informants. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that an application to obtain access to a packet that had been sealed in a criminal proceeding had to be treated as criminal in nature. It followed that the order made by Cullen, A.C.J., was also criminal and that no appeal to the Court of Appeal was available. On that basis, the court quashed the appeal. Even if the appeal had been properly brought, the court would have dismissed it. The court held that aside from the &amp;ldquo;innocence at stake&amp;rdquo; exception (which was not engaged here), the police informant privilege, or &amp;ldquo;secrecy rule,&amp;rdquo; was not to be &amp;ldquo;balanced&amp;rdquo; or weighed against other interests or objectives, however worthy. It was a &amp;ldquo;legal rule of public order by which the judge is bound&amp;rdquo; and in that sense was &amp;ldquo;absolute&amp;rdquo;. For the same reason, the &amp;ldquo;circle of privilege&amp;rdquo; could not be expanded to include investigators under the Police Act, the PCC himself or others carrying out &amp;ldquo;disciplinary&amp;rdquo; or &amp;ldquo;administrative&amp;rdquo; duties and not involved directly in criminal law enforcement.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/police_2016-01-26.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+BCCA+523&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=BCAC&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/138162164624</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/138162164624</guid><pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2016 13:25:16 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>Warman et al. v. Law Society of Alberta 2015 ABCA 368</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Administrative Law - Practice&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	The Conduct Committee of the Law Society of Alberta discontinued discipline proceedings against a lawyer without notice to the two people who had filed the complaint in the first place (i.e., the complainants). The complainants applied for judicial review of the discontinuance. The Law Society subsequently applied for summary judgment to dismiss the judicial review application. The Law Society argued that the complainants were not parties to the Law Society&amp;rsquo;s discipline process and had no standing to apply for judicial review, and that judicial review was not available to scrutinize the Conduct Committee&amp;rsquo;s exercise of discretion about whether to discontinue the complaint against a member.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Alberta Court of Queen&amp;rsquo;s Bench, in a decision reported [2015] A.R. TBEd. AP.052, dismissed the Law Society&amp;rsquo;s application for summary judgment. The Law Society appealed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Alberta Court of Appeal, Wakeling, J.A., dissenting, dismissed the appeal. The application for judicial review in its entirety should proceed to a full trial.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/warman_2016-01-26.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+ABCA+368&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=AR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/138162033549</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/138162033549</guid><pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2016 13:22:28 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>Enmax Energy Corp. v. TransAlta Generation Partnership 2015 ABCA 383</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Arbitration - Estoppel&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	The appellant appealed a chambers judge&amp;rsquo;s decision where he held that the parties to an arbitration were not bound by a prior arbitration award involving the same parties, that a party (in this case, the respondent) was not estopped from taking certain positions in the current arbitration as a result of the prior arbitration decision, and that the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel did not apply to arbitration awards.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/enmax_2016-01-26.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+ABCA+383&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=AR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/138161894889</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/138161894889</guid><pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2016 13:19:38 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>Manager of Child, Youth and Family Services, Zone E (Nfld. and Lab.) v. J.T. et al. 2015 NLCA 55</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Civil Rights - Family Law - Guardian and Ward - Practice&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	The Manager of Child, Youth and Family Services (Nfld. and Lab.) applied for an order of continuous custody respecting three children, aged six, four and three.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court, Trial Division (Family), in a decision reported 341 Nfld. &amp;amp; P.E.I.R. 47; 1061 A.P.R. 47, granted the order. The children&amp;rsquo;s mother (J.T. or appellant) appealed. At issue on appeal was: (1) whether the trial judge made errors in principle or made palpable and overriding errors of fact in exercising her discretion not to make a further temporary custody order in respect of all or some of the children, instead of making a continuous custody order; (2) whether the appellant should be allowed to raise a Charter issue on appeal even though she did not make the argument at trial; and (3) if the answer to issue (2) was in the affirmative, whether the legislative restriction in s. 32(6)(a) of the Children and Youth Care Protection Act prohibiting attaching conditions, in particular access conditions, to a continuous custody order was in violation of s. 7 of the Charter and if so, whether the provision was nevertheless saved by section 1.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/jt_2016-01-19.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+NLCA+55&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NFLD&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/137689511514</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/137689511514</guid><pubDate>Wed, 20 Jan 2016 10:56:19 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>Michela et al. v. St. Thomas of Villanova Catholic School 2015 ONCA 801</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Damages - Master and Servant&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	The plaintiff school teachers brought a wrongful dismissal action against the defendant private school. On a motion for summary judgment, the motion judge found that the teachers were wrongfully dismissed and awarded pay in lieu of the six months&amp;rsquo; notice that he found they should have received (2015 ONSC 15). The motion judge reduced the 12-month notice period proposed by the teachers to six months after taking into account the employer&amp;rsquo;s financial position and the availability of alternative teaching positions. The motions judge awarded the teachers $42,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis (2015 ONSC 1145). The teachers appealed, seeking to vary the damage award by substituting a 12-month notice period. The employer sought leave to cross-appeal the motion judge&amp;rsquo;s costs award on the basis that the teachers failed to accept a settlement offer greater than the damages they were awarded on summary judgment.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and denied leave to cross-appeal the costs award. The parties requested that the court deal with the costs on the motion rather than remit the matter to the motion judge. The motion judge had awarded the teachers $42,000 in costs on the basis that they were not entirely successful. That was a reduction of the partial indemnity costs sought of $68,573.42. Given the teachers&amp;rsquo; success on the appeal, the court saw no reason to discount the teachers&amp;rsquo; costs on the motion. Accordingly, the court awarded costs of the motion to the teachers in the amount of $68,573.42, inclusive of taxes and disbursements. By agreement of the parties, costs for the appeal were set at $10,000, inclusive.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/michela_2016-01-19.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+ONCA+801&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=OAC&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/137689330804</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/137689330804</guid><pubDate>Wed, 20 Jan 2016 10:52:19 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>Tenny v. Ontario 2015 ONCA 841</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Conflict of Laws - Statutes - Trials&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	At issue on this appeal was whether s. 26(3) of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P-33, authorized service of a summons by registered mail on an individual who resided in the United States of America.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 26(3) clearly and unambiguously authorized service of a summons on an individual outside Ontario, and outside Canada.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/tenny_2016-01-19.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+ONCA+841&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=OAC&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/137635311974</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/137635311974</guid><pubDate>Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:34:31 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>Mwanri v. Mwanri 2015 ONCA 843</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Courts - Family Law&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	On a variation application in a family law matter, a motions judge varied custody and spousal support, including awarding the wife a lump sum equivalent to an unpaid equalization payment. The husband/father appealed, raising a number of issues.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part. The court varied the motions judge&amp;rsquo;s order by requiring the mother to pay child support, by deleting the requirement that the husband pay a lump sum and setting aside a charging order.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/mwanri_2016-01-19.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+ONCA+843&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=OAC&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/137635149139</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/137635149139</guid><pubDate>Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:31:19 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>M.M. v. Canada (Minister of Justice) 2015 SCC 62</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Extradition&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	 M.M. brought her children to Canada from the State of Georgia, U.S.A., in violation of a custody order, allegedly for their safety. The State of Georgia sought her extradition to face  prosecution for interstate interference with custody. The Minister of Justice (Can.) issued an Authority to Proceed (ATP) with extradition, listing the corresponding Canadian offences of abduction in contravention of a custody order (Criminal Code, s. 282(1)) and abduction of a person under sixteen (s. 280(1)).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Quebec Superior Court, in a decision with neutral citation 2011 QCCS 4800, dismissed the application for committal for extradition and ordered her immediate discharge. The U.S.A. appealed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Quebec Court of Appeal, in a decision with neutral citation 2012 QCCA 1142, set aside the Superior Court&amp;rsquo;s order of discharge and ordered M.M.&amp;rsquo;s committal for extradition. Thereafter, the Minister of Justice (Can.) ordered that M.M. be surrendered for extradition. M.M. applied for judicial review of the surrender order.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/mm_2016-01-19.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+SCC+62&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/137635013689</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/137635013689</guid><pubDate>Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:28:47 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>B010 v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2015 SCC 58</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Aliens - International Law - Statutes&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	Section 37(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act rendered a permanent resident or a foreign national inadmissible to Canada on grounds of organized criminality, for engaging, in the context of transnational crime, in activities such as people smuggling. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Board found each of the appellants inadmissible, on the basis that s. 37(1)(b) did not require a profit motive. Each applied for judicial review.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Federal Court rejected appellant B010&amp;rsquo;s application (see 412 F.T.R. 23), while the applications of appellants J.P. and G.J., B306 and Hernandez were allowed (423 F.T.R. 144; 421 F.T.R. 52; and 422 F.T.R. 159, respectively). The cases were appealed. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/B010_2015-12-16.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+SCC+58&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/135328369124</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/135328369124</guid><pubDate>Wed, 16 Dec 2015 13:17:23 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>R. v. Appulonappa (F.A.) et al. 2015 SCC 59</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Aliens - Civil Rights - Constitutional Law - Statutes&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	On October 17, 2009, the vessel Ocean Lady was apprehended off the west coast of Vancouver Island in British Columbia. Seventy-six people were aboard. All were Tamil asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka. None had the required legal documentation. The Crown claimed that the four appellants (the captain and chief crew of the vessel) were the organizers of the venture. The Crown alleged that the majority of passengers each paid, or promised to pay, $30,000 to $40,000 for the voyage. The appellants were charged under s. 117 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which made it an offence to &amp;ldquo;organize, induce, aid or abet&amp;rdquo; the coming into Canada of people in contravention of the IRPA. Consequences of conviction could include lengthy imprisonment and disqualification from consideration as a refugee. Before their trial, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of s. 117 of the IRPA on the ground that it was overbroad and infringed the right to liberty enshrined in s. 7 of the Charter. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/appulonappa_2015-12-16.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+SCC+59&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/135328154864</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/135328154864</guid><pubDate>Wed, 16 Dec 2015 13:13:00 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Society for Reproduction Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers in Canada (SODRAC) Inc. et al. 2015 SCC 57</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Administrative Law - Copyright - Statutes&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	In 2012, the Copyright Board, in setting the terms of a licence between Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (&amp;ldquo;CBC&amp;rdquo;) and SODRAC 2003 Inc. and the Society for Reproduction Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers in Canada (SODRAC) Inc. (collectively, &amp;ldquo;SODRAC&amp;rdquo;) for the 2008-2012 period, held that CBC&amp;rsquo;s broadcast-incidental copying activity engaged the reproduction right established by s. 3(1)(d) of the Copyright Act, that a licence for such copies could not be implied from synchronization licences covering the production process, and that CBC required a separate reproduction licence to legitimize its broadcast-incidental copying. The Board found that the appropriate valuation for this licence was more than nominal, and issued a licence authorizing CBC to reproduce works in the SODRAC repertoire in conjunction with a list of activities, including the production of CBC&amp;rsquo;s in-house programs and the broadcasting of programs on CBC&amp;rsquo;s television services and on the Internet (the 2008-2012 Statutory Licence). It later issued an interim licence to take effect after the expiry of the 2008-2012 licence that extended the terms of that licence on an interim basis, subject to minor modifications. CBC applied for judicial review.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Federal Court of Appeal, in a decision reported at (2014), 457 N.R. 156, upheld both the 2008-2012 licence and the interim licence that followed, subject to minor amendments. The CBC appealed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/cbc_2015-12-16.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+SCC+57&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/135327994244</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/135327994244</guid><pubDate>Wed, 16 Dec 2015 13:09:52 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>Tran v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2015 FCA 237</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Aliens - Criminal Law - Statutes&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	Tran, a citizen of Vietnam, was a permanent resident in Canada. In 2012, he was convicted of producing marijuana, and received a 12-month conditional sentence of imprisonment. A delegate of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, under s. 44(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), referred Tran to a hearing before the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Board, to determine whether he should be found inadmissible on account of serious criminality (s. 36(1)(a)). Tran applied for judicial review.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Federal Court, in a decision reported at [2014] F.T.R. TBEd. NO.005, allowed the application, and certified the following questions: &amp;ldquo;1. Is a conditional sentence of imprisonment imposed pursuant to the regime set out in ss. 742 to 742.7 of the Criminal Code &amp;lsquo;a term of imprisonment&amp;rsquo; under s. 36(1)(a) of the IRPA? 2. Does the phrase 'punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years&amp;rsquo; in s. 36(1)(a) of the IRPA refer to the maximum term of imprisonment available at the time the person was sentenced or to the maximum term of imprisonment under the law in force at the time admissibility is determined?&amp;rdquo; The Minister appealed.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/tran_2015-12-01.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+FCA+237&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/134343294289</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/134343294289</guid><pubDate>Tue, 01 Dec 2015 13:28:57 -0500</pubDate></item><item><title>Moore (Bankrupt), Re 2015 SCC 52</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Bankruptcy - Constitutional Law - Highways - Motor Vehicles&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;br/&gt;	Highway 407 in Ontario was an open-access private toll highway operated by 407 ETR Concession Co. Ltd. (&amp;ldquo;ETR&amp;rdquo;). Under s. 22(4) of the Highway 407 Act (&amp;ldquo;407 Act&amp;rdquo;), upon receipt of a notice of a person&amp;rsquo;s failure to pay a toll debt, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles had to (&amp;ldquo;shall&amp;rdquo;) refuse to issue or renew the debtor&amp;rsquo;s vehicle permit. Moore accumulated a toll debt of $34,977.06. ETR notified the Registrar of Moore&amp;rsquo;s failure to pay the toll debt. The Registrar refused to renew Moore&amp;rsquo;s licence plates for his vehicle. Moore made an assignment in bankruptcy. His Statement of Affairs listed ETR as an unsecured creditor. Moore obtained an absolute discharge from bankruptcy. He sought an order that his toll debt had been released by his discharge and an order compelling the Ministry of Transportation to issue his vehicle permits. Moore contended that ETR could not use s. 22(4) of the 407 Act to collect and enforce the toll debt because it had been discharged pursuant to s. 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (&amp;ldquo;BIA&amp;rdquo;). He claimed that s. 22(4) conflicted with s. 178 and offended the doctrine of federal paramountcy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;	The Ontario Superior Court of Justice, in a decision with citation 2011 ONSC 6310, concluded that s. 22(4) was not in conflict with the BIA, since it did not affect the equitable distribution of a bankrupt&amp;rsquo;s property. The judge found that he had no jurisdiction, absent a conflict, to order the reinstatement of Moore&amp;rsquo;s vehicle permits. The Superintendent of Bankruptcy appealed. He argued that s. 22(4) of the 407 Act conflicted with the operation of s. 178(2) of the BIA and that it frustrated the purposes of bankruptcy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://files.slaw.ca/cases/moore_2015-12-01.pdf"&gt;Link to PDF of complete summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://search.mlb.nb.ca/?IW_FIELD_TEXT=2015+SCC+52&amp;amp;IW_DATABASE=NR&amp;amp;IW_BATCHSIZE=20&amp;amp;IW_SORT=-11"&gt;Link to full judgment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/134342619679</link><guid>https://cases.slaw.ca/post/134342619679</guid><pubDate>Tue, 01 Dec 2015 13:15:29 -0500</pubDate></item></channel></rss>
