tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-176476142024-03-08T19:47:55.169-05:00Split CircuitsA blog dedicated to tracking developments concerning splits among the federal circuit courts.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.comBlogger563125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-76513252309137592432013-09-20T09:56:00.002-04:002013-09-20T09:56:57.409-04:00No Longer Posting; Call for CollaboratorMy current responsibilities and projects do not permit me to keep up with circuit splits in support of posting to this blog. So I will no longer be posting for the foreseeable future. However, if there is a law professor or practitioner who has an interest in writing for the blog, just contact me to let me know and we can discuss it.<br />
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Prof. A. Benjamin SpencerA. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-1729331576604434852013-01-10T10:38:00.001-05:002013-01-10T10:39:18.556-05:00SDNY Notes Split Re Conflict between Federal Reserve Act and State Anti-Discrimination Law<br />
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Per <b>Goonan v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York</b>, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2013 WL 69196 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The proper interpretation of the FRA's dismiss at pleasure provision is undeniably a difficult question. Some courts have concluded that there is no conflict between the FRA and state anti-discrimination laws because this provision speaks only to contractual and other common law rights created under state law. See Katsiavelos, 1995 WL 103308, at *2–4; Mueller, 797 F.Supp. at 662–63. Other courts have read the provision as a wide-ranging grant of discretionary authority that shields the Fed from any liability that arises from termination decisions—except as impliedly amended by later-enacted federal anti-discrimination statutes.See, e.g., Fasano, 457 F.3d at 288. These courts, in turn, have split over whether state anti-discrimination laws are preempted in their entirety or only to the extent that they sweep more broadly than their federal counterparts. Compare Arrow, 358 F.3d at 393 (entirely preempted), with Kroske, 432 F.3d at 988–89 (partly preempted), and James II, 471 F.Supp.2d at 236 (same); see also Fasano, 457 F.3d at 288 (reserving judgment on this issue while noting that “[w]e need not take a position on whether state remedies exactly consonant with the ADA and 12 U.S.C. § 1831j would similarly offend ‘the full purposes and objectives of Congress' ”). In a dissenting opinion, three Justices of the California Supreme Court have gone even further than the federal courts by strongly suggesting that later-enacted federal anti-discrimination laws did not impliedly amend the FRA—in which case the Fed would be immune even from ADA liability. See Peatros v. Bank of Am. NT & SA, 22 Cal.4th 147, 185 (2000) (Brown, J., dissenting). In sum, district and appellate courts that have addressed this issue are deeply divided.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Recognizing this split in judicial authority, and considering both the arguments advanced by the parties and the arguments offered by other courts, this Court concludes that the FRA doesnot preempt state and local anti-discrimination laws. In reaching that conclusion, the Court has considered all three forms of preemption: express, field, and conflict. None applies here.</span><br />
A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-68167710707792544752013-01-09T09:23:00.001-05:002013-01-10T10:40:30.907-05:00Third Circuit Declines to Weigh in on Split Re Whether Adjustment under Guideline § 3E1.1(b) Is Mandatory under Certain Circumstances <br />
<span style="background-color: white; text-indent: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Per <b>U.S. v. Castro,</b> --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 69214 (3d Cir. 2013):</span></span><br />
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Castro also contends that his 60–month sentence under Count Nine is procedurally unreasonable because the District Court erred in refusing to reduce his offense level under § 3E1.1(b). In his view, the additional adjustment is mandatory if the government moves for it and the other requirements of the provision are met. Whether that is so is a question we have not addressed but which has divided other circuits. Compare United States v. Williamson, 598 F.3d 227 (5th Cir.2010) (district court has authority to determine whether conditions for one level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 have been satisfied), with United States v. Mount, 675 F.3d 1052, 1055–57 (7th Cir.2012) (application of additional one level decrease in defendant's offense level under § 3E1.1 is mandatory). We decline to address that question, however, because it is precluded by Castro's appellate waiver and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver on this point.<br />
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A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-52911127849886565842013-01-02T12:37:00.002-05:002013-01-02T12:37:41.679-05:00Sixth Circuit on Split Re Need for Automatic Reversal after Deprivation of Counsel at Competency HearingPer <i>U.S. v. Ross,</i> --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 6734087 (C.A.6 2012):<br />
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The issue of a remedy for deprivation of counsel at a competency hearing is a question of first impression in this Circuit. However, “[i]t is settled that a complete absence of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding is a per se Sixth Amendment violation warranting reversal of a conviction, a sentence, or both, as applicable, without analysis for prejudice or harmless error.” Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 311–12 (6th Cir.2007); see also French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir.2003). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit have considered whether a competency hearing is a “critical stage.” “However, every federal court of appeals to take up the question has answered it affirmatively.” Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Being There: Constructive Denial of Counsel at a Competency Hearing as Structural Error Under the Sixth Amendment, 56 S.D. L.REV. 238, 242 & n. 31 (2011) (listing cases from the Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits). We join those circuits in holding that a competency hearing is a critical stage.<br /><br />Other circuits are divided, however, as to whether automatic reversal is required when there has been a deprivation of counsel at a competency hearing. Compare Appel, 250 F.3d at 217–18 (holding retrospective analysis of a defendant's competency is not an appropriate remedy for a deprivation of counsel violation), with Klat, 156 F.3d at 1264 (remanding “for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the competency hearing could have come out differently if [the defendant] had been represented by counsel”), and United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148–49 (10th Cir.2010) (remanding to determine if the trial court could make a retroactive competency determination and, if so, to make such a determination).<br /><br />We see no reason to create an exception to our established rule that complete deprivation of counsel during a critical stage warrants automatic reversal without consideration of prejudice. See Van, 475 F.3d at 311–12. It is unclear on this record whether or not standby counsel satisfied Cronic's requirement that his representation of Ross provided “meaningful adversarial testing” of Ross's competency. Accordingly, we must remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Ross was unconstitutionally deprived of representation.FN2 Satisfaction of this standard requires evidence, at a minimum, that standby counsel (1) conducted an adequate investigation into Ross's competency, including reading and analyzing Dr. Nixon's report, and preparing for the hearing and (2) chose not to contest Ross's competency based on his own strategic decision rather than a belief that he simply had no obligation to do so over Ross's instructions.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-48139669287210154752012-11-27T09:25:00.002-05:002012-11-27T09:25:14.352-05:00First Circuit Weighs In on Circuit Split re Jurisdiction over Defense Base Act ClaimsFrom BNA's <i>U.S. Law Week</i>, 81 U.S.L.W. 739 (Nov. 27, 2012):<br />
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The circuit courts have jurisdiction to take the first crack at judicial review of claims under the Defense Base Act, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held Nov. 20, evenly splitting the eight circuits that have considered the issue (<i>Truczinskas v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs</i>, 1st Cir., No. 11-2503, 11/20/12).<br /><br />
After satisfying itself that it had jurisdiction, the court denied a widow's petition for review relating to the denial of death benefits under the DBA. The court, in an opinion by Michael Boudin, said that the denial of benefits was reasonable, despite the strange and unconfirmed circumstances surrounding the petitioner's husband's death.<br />
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The full article can be read by BNA subscribers <a href="http://news.bna.com.ezproxy.wlu.edu/lwln/LWLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=28686928&vname=lw1notallissues&jd=a0d5j4d8u9&split=0">here</a>.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-55276786672276839222012-09-04T11:33:00.002-04:002012-09-04T11:33:32.652-04:00Fort Lee soldier’s custody case gets SCOTUS hearing<br />
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From the <i>Virginia Law Weekly</i> Blog:</div>
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A soldier from Fort Lee will get a U.S. Supreme Court hearing in his custody dispute with his ex-wife, who moved with their five-year-old daughter to her native Scotland</div>
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In August, the high court <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/court-grants-one-new-case/" style="color: #333333; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">granted a writ</a> and scheduled oral argument for Dec. 5, 2012, in the case of <em style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Chafin v. Chafin,</em> No. 11-1347.</div>
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Sgt. 1st Class Jeff Chafin is appealing an 11th Circuit decision that said under the Hague Convention, an international treaty governing custody disputes, the federal court had no power or jurisdiction to take further action in the custody contest.</div>
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Federal courts of appeals are split on whether the return of a child to the country of “habitual residence” moots an appeal by a parent seeking custody, according to Chafin’s <a href="http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Petition-for-Writ-of-Certiorari-1.pdf" style="color: #333333; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">petition for appeal</a>. The 11th Circuit decision stands in contrast to a 2001 decision by the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, <em style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Fawcett v. McRoberts</em>, that<a href="http://valawyersweekly.com/2003/04/28/domestic-relations-child-custody-international-abduction-hague-convention/" style="color: #333333; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">granted</a> a Scottish mother’s petition for return of her child from the U.S. because the father in that case had wrongfully removed the boy from Scotland under the Hague Convention.<br style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;" />–Deborah Elkins</div>
A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-45756672694690852482012-04-17T09:58:00.000-04:002012-04-17T09:58:00.067-04:00SCOTUS Resolves Split Re Interpretation of IIRIRAHere is the West synopsis of <span class="GroupHeading" id="headerTitleTruncate1" style="font-weight: bold;">Vartelas v. Holder</span> <a class="InformationalSmall" href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?rs=WLW12.04&cite=132+S.Ct.+1479&cnt=DOC&cxt=DC&service=Find&fn=_top&n=1&elmap=Inline&ss=CNT&tnprpdd=None&vr=2.0&tnprpds=TaxNewsFIT&rlt=CLID_FQRLT9533623558174&mt=Westlaw&rlti=1&migkchresultid=1&tf=0&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&scxt=WL&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tc=0&sv=Split" target="_top"><span>132 S.Ct. 1479</span></a> (<span class="InformationalSmall" id="headerTitleTruncate4">March 28, 2012), which resolved a circuit split regarding the interpretation and application of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA):</span><br />
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<strong>Background:</strong> Lawful permanent resident (LPR)
alien, a native and citizen of Greece, petitioned for review of a
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=999&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2027392346&serialnum=2018125685&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=E86D836D&rs=WLW12.04" target="_top">2009 WL 331200,</a> denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=PROFILER-WLD&docname=0251134701&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=h&ordoc=2027392346&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=E86D836D&rs=WLW12.04" target="_top">Kearse</a>, Circuit Judge, <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=506&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2027392346&serialnum=2022963224&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=E86D836D&rs=WLW12.04" target="_top">620 F.3d 108,</a> denied petition. Certiorari was granted.</div>
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<a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/documenttext.aspx?rs=WLW12.04&scxt=WL&rlti=1&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&rlt=CLID_FQRLT9533623558174&service=Find&sv=Split&ss=CNT&cite=132+S.Ct.+1479&n=1&fn=_top&mt=Westlaw&vr=2.0&cnt=DOC&cxt=DC#F32027392346"><strong>Holding:</strong></a> The Supreme Court, Justice <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=PROFILER-WLD&docname=0224420501&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=h&ordoc=2027392346&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=E86D836D&rs=WLW12.04" target="_top">Ginsburg</a>,
held that, assuming that provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) superseded prior case law and
prevented lawful permanent resident alien from departing, even briefly,
from the United States without having to seek admission upon his return,
provision could not be applied retroactively to LPR alien who committed
felony offense years prior to provision's effective date.<span class="InformationalSmall" id="headerTitleTruncate4"> </span></div>
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<br />A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com51tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-38661487210198203112012-03-13T05:18:00.000-04:002012-03-13T05:18:22.888-04:00D. Colo. Notes Split Re Whether FRCP 9(b) Applies to Negligent Misrepresentation Claims<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: inherit;">Per <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: bold;">Denver Health and Hosp. Authority v. Beverage Distributors Co., LLC </span><span style="color: blue;"><a class="InformationalSmall" href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&vr=2.0&rs=dfa1.0&ss=CNT&scxt=WL&tnprpds=TaxNewsFIT&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&cxt=DC&sv=Split&tnprpdd=None&findtype=Y&elmap=Inline&cnt=DOC&serialnum=2027068464&rlti=1&fn=_top&service=Find&rlt=CLID_FQRLT2163850144133&tf=0&n=1&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tc=0&migkchresultid=1" style="color: blue;" target="_top">--- F.Supp.2d ----, 2012 WL 400320</a></span> (D.Colo. Feb. 8, 2012):</span><br />
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Beverage contends that <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR9&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 9(b)</a>, not <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR8&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 8(a)</a>, applies to the negligent misrepresentation claim and that the claim cannot meet <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR9&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 9(b)</a>. <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR8&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 8(a)</a> prescribes the pleading requirements for most claims. It requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”<a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR8&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)</a>. By contrast, <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR9&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 9(b)</a> requires that “a party must state <i>with particularity</i> the circumstances <i>constituting fraud or mistake.</i>” <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR9&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)</a> (emphases added). This standard requires the complaint to “set forth the time, place and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and the consequences thereof.” <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=506&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2027068464&serialnum=1997183588&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&referencepositiontype=S&pbc=DEAF8D23&referenceposition=1252&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top"><i>Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc.,</i> 124 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir.1997)</a>(citation omitted). The rule's purpose is “to afford defendant fair notice of plaintiff's claims and the factual ground upon which [they] are based ...” <i>Id.</i> (quoting <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=350&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2027068464&serialnum=1992041287&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&referencepositiontype=S&pbc=DEAF8D23&referenceposition=987&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top"><i>Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,</i> 956 F.2d 982, 987 (10th Cir.1992)</a>).</div>
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px;"><br /></span><div style="font-family: Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; text-indent: 20px;">
<a href="" name="sp_999_4"></a><a href="" name="SDU_4"></a>As the parties note, whether <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR9&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 9(b)</a> applies to negligent misrepresentation claims divides the circuit courts of appeals. <i>Compare, e.g., </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=506&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2027068464&serialnum=2022319382&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&referencepositiontype=S&pbc=DEAF8D23&referenceposition=1028&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top"><i>Trooien v. Mansour,</i> 608 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir .2010)</a> (concluding that <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR9&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 9(b)</a>applies to the claim), <i>and </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=506&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2027068464&serialnum=2006468838&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&referencepositiontype=S&pbc=DEAF8D23&referenceposition=583&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top"><i>Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co.,</i> 404 F.3d 566, 583 (2d Cir.2005)</a> (same);<i>with </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=506&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2027068464&serialnum=2011203666&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&referencepositiontype=S&pbc=DEAF8D23&referenceposition=833&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top"><i>Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP,</i> 475 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir.2007)</a> (holding <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR9&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 9(b)</a> does not apply to claim), <i>and </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=6538&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2027068464&serialnum=2012443133&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&referencepositiontype=S&pbc=DEAF8D23&referenceposition=921&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top"><i>Baltimore Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare,</i> 238 Fed. App'x 914, 921–22 (4th Cir.2007)</a>(same). The issue similarly splits this district court. <i>Compare </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=0000999&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2027068464&serialnum=2017153501&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top"><i>Gunningham v. Std. Fire. Ins. Co.,</i> No. 07–cv–02538–REB–KLM, 2008 WL 4377451, at *2 (D.Colo. Sept.18, 2008)</a> (applying <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR9&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 9(b)</a> to claim), <i>with </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=4637&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2027068464&serialnum=2019636330&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&referencepositiontype=S&pbc=DEAF8D23&referenceposition=1182&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top"><i>Conrad v. Educ. Res. Inst.,</i> 652 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1182–83 (D.Colo.2009)</a> (concluding <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR9&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 9(b)</a> does not apply to claim). The Tenth Circuit has not decided the issue.</div>
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px;"><br /></span><div style="font-family: Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; text-indent: 20px;">
<a href="" name="sp_999_5"></a>I conclude that <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Westlaw&db=1004365&docname=USFRCPR9&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=L&ordoc=2027068464&tc=-1&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Split&tf=-1&pbc=DEAF8D23&rs=WLW12.01" style="color: blue;" target="_top">Rule 9(b)</a> does not apply to the negligent misrepresentation claim before me. The crux of the claim is that Beverage failed to use reasonable care or competence in obtaining and communicating information concerning Hood's eligibility. This rings not of fraud but negligence.</div>A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-91500364920657771292012-01-03T09:59:00.001-05:002012-01-03T10:00:09.071-05:00First Circuit Notes Split Re Excludability of Plea Negotiations Time Period under Speedy Trial ActPer
<span class="GroupHeading" id="headerTitleTruncate1" style="font-weight: bold;">U.S. v. Huete-Sandoval</span>, <a class="InformationalSmall" href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?rs=dfa1.0&ss=CNT&cnt=DOC&sv=Split&cxt=DC&service=Find&fn=_top&n=1&elmap=Inline&tnprpdd=None&vr=2.0&tnprpds=TaxNewsFIT&rlt=CLID_FQRLT436303455831&rlti=1&migkchresultid=1&tf=0&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&scxt=WL&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tc=0&findtype=Y&serialnum=2026773461" target="_top">--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 6823186</a> (1st Cir. <span class="InformationalSmall" id="headerTitleTruncate3"></span><span class="InformationalSmall" id="headerTitleTruncate4">Dec. 29, 2011):</span><br />
<h1 class="ADAHtmlHeading3">
</h1>
[W]e conclude that the sixteen days between July 22 and August 7, 2009,
were not excludable pursuant to the STA and in light of prior circuit
precedent.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=17647614" name="FN8"></a><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/documenttext.aspx?ss=CNT&scxt=WL&serialnum=2026773461&rlti=1&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&rlt=CLID_FQRLT436303455831&service=Find&rs=dfa1.0&sv=Split&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&cnt=DOC&cxt=DC&n=1#B00982026773461"><sup>FN8</sup></a><br />
<br />
<a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/documenttext.aspx?ss=CNT&scxt=WL&serialnum=2026773461&rlti=1&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&rlt=CLID_FQRLT436303455831&service=Find&rs=dfa1.0&sv=Split&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&cnt=DOC&cxt=DC&n=1#F00982026773461">FN8.</a> We note that other circuits are divided as to whether plea negotiations
are automatically excludable from the Speedy Trial Act calculation as
“other proceedings” pursuant to <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=T&docname=18USCAS3161&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&referenceposition=SP%3bb4e500006fdf6&pbc=45183067&ordoc=2026773461" target="_top">18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)</a>.
<i>Compare </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2003575890&referenceposition=344&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=45183067&ordoc=2026773461" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Leftenant,</i> 341 F.3d 338, 344–45 (4th Cir.2003)</a> (holding that plea negotiations trigger automatic exclusion pursuant to <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=T&docname=18USCAS3161&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&referenceposition=SP%3bb4e500006fdf6&pbc=45183067&ordoc=2026773461" target="_top">18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)</a>); <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1997140722&referenceposition=1218&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=45183067&ordoc=2026773461" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Van Someren,</i> 118 F.3d 1214, 1218–19 (8th Cir.1997)</a> (same); <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1987103455&referenceposition=150&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=350&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=45183067&ordoc=2026773461" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Montoya,</i> 827 F.2d 143, 150 (7th Cir.1987)</a> (same); <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1987150441&referenceposition=610&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=350&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=45183067&ordoc=2026773461" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Bowers,</i> 834 F.2d 607, 610 (6th Cir.1987)</a> (same),
<i>with </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2024172229&referenceposition=1058&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=45183067&ordoc=2026773461" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Alvarez–Perez,</i> 629 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir.2010)</a> (holding that plea negotiations do not trigger automatic exclusion pursuant to <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=T&docname=18USCAS3161&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&referenceposition=SP%3bb4e500006fdf6&pbc=45183067&ordoc=2026773461" target="_top">18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)</a>); <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2019163900&referenceposition=107&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=45183067&ordoc=2026773461" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Lucky,</i> 569 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.2009)</a>
(same). We need not and do not reach that issue here. To the extent the
parties entered plea negotiations between July 16 and July 22, the total
number of days excluded would be insufficient to avoid a violation of
the Speedy Trial Act.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-20495548397921512702011-12-14T11:12:00.000-05:002011-12-14T11:12:08.947-05:00Fifth Circuit Notes Split Re Propriety of Internet Restrictions During Probation for Sex Crime ConvictsPer<span class="GroupHeading" id="headerTitleTruncate1" style="font-weight: bold;"> U.S. v. Miller</span>, <a class="InformationalSmall" href="https://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?rs=dfa1.0&ss=CNT&cnt=DOC&sv=Split&cxt=DC&service=Find&fn=_top&n=1&elmap=Inline&tnprpdd=None&vr=2.0&tnprpds=TaxNewsFIT&rlt=CLID_FQRLT47467327101412&rlti=1&migkchresultid=1&tf=0&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&scxt=WL&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tc=0&findtype=Y&serialnum=2026662460" target="_top"><span>--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 6160220</span></a> (5th Cir.
<span class="InformationalSmall" id="headerTitleTruncate4">Dec. 13, 2011):</span><br />
<br />
<h1 class="ADAHtmlHeading3">
</h1>
<br />
[W]e acknowledge that there is some tension among various courts of
appeals' opinions regarding the reasonableness of restrictions on
computer use and Internet access [for sex crime convicts].<sup>FN63</sup><br />
<br />
FN63.
<i>See </i><a href="https://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2009439226&referenceposition=895&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=1CAE6B67&ordoc=2026662460" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Sullivan,</i> 451 F.3d 884, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006)</a>
(observing “[t]his circuit has yet to decide whether individuals
convicted of sex crimes may have their Internet usage conditioned on
Probation Office approval, and our sister circuits are divided on the
issue.”) (comparing <a href="https://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2003753925&referenceposition=621&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=1CAE6B67&ordoc=2026662460" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Rearden,</i> 349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir.2003)</a>,
<i> and </i><a href="https://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2003161265&referenceposition=1093&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=1CAE6B67&ordoc=2026662460" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Zinn,</i> 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir.2003)</a>,
<i>with </i><a href="https://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2007239694&referenceposition=733&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=1CAE6B67&ordoc=2026662460" target="_top">
<i>Crume,</i> 422 F.3d at 733,</a>
<i>and </i><a href="https://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2002218767&referenceposition=126&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=1CAE6B67&ordoc=2026662460" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Sofsky,</i> 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.2002)</a>).<sup> </sup>A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-76829411348348261602011-11-27T10:28:00.001-05:002011-11-27T10:32:13.403-05:00Judge Moore (Fed. Cir.) Notes Need to Clarify Claim Construction PrinciplesCheck out this dissent from a denial of a petition for rehearing en banc in<span class="GroupHeading" id="headerTitleTruncate1" style="font-weight: bold;"> Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co. </span><a class="InformationalSmall" href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?ss=CNT&db=ALLFEDS&tf=0&rs=dfa1.0&scxt=WL&tnprpds=TaxNewsFIT&rlti=1&cxt=DC&sv=Split&tnprpdd=None&findtype=Y&elmap=Inline&cnt=DOC&serialnum=2026448620&vr=2.0&fn=_top&service=Find&rlt=CLID_FQRLT12420452992711&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&n=1&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tc=0&migkchresultid=1" target="_top"><span>659 F.3d 1369</span></a>
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 31, 2011), in which Judge Moore stresses the need for more clarity in the claim construction area:<br />
<br />
Claim construction is the single most important event in the course of a
patent litigation. It defines the scope of the property right being
enforced, and is often the difference between infringement and
non-infringement, or validity and invalidity. Despite the crucial role
that claim construction plays in patent litigation, our rules are still
ill-defined and inconsistently applied, even by us. Commentators have
observed that claim construction appeals are “panel dependent” which
leads to frustrating and unpredictable results for both the litigants
and the trial court.
<i>See, e.g., Fed. Cir. Split for 2nd Time In 2011 On Use of Patent Specification In Claim Construction,</i>
BNA Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (noting the
“disagreement within the Federal Circuit on the extent to which judges
may look to the patent specification to interpret claims continues”);
<i>Court Continues to Struggle with Claim Construction,</i> Patently–O
(2011), http:// www. patentlyo. com/ patent/ 2011/ 07/ court-
continues- to- struggle- with- claim- construction. html (noting the
“panel dependence” in claim construction);
<i>see also </i>Wegner, H.C.,
<i> Arlington Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings: The 20 Year Claim Construction Debate,</i>
IP Frontline, http:// www. ipfrontline. com/ depts/ printable template.
aspx? id= 24829 (“Until there is a final resolution of this debate
there will never be clarity in claim construction at the Federal
Circuit.”). Nowhere is the conflict more apparent then in our
jurisprudence on the use of the specification in the interpretation of
claim language. The familiar mantra is “there is a fine line between
construing the claims in light of the specification and improperly
importing a limitation from the specification into the claims.” <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2025630012&referenceposition=1305&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=8515828B&ordoc=2026448620" target="_top">
<i>Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,</i> 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed.Cir.2011)</a>.
This case is a good vehicle to address two important claim
construction principles: the role of the specification in construing
the claims and whether deference should be given to the district court
in the claim construction process. Accordingly, I dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-63232304993666428082011-11-03T10:33:00.000-04:002011-11-03T10:33:24.748-04:00Fith Circuit Weighs in on Split Re Stay Pending Arbitrability AppealPer
<span class="GroupHeading" id="headerTitleTruncate1" style="font-weight: bold;">Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller</span>, <a class="InformationalSmall" href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?ss=CNT&db=ALLFEDS&tf=0&rs=dfa1.0&scxt=WL&tnprpds=TaxNewsFIT&rlti=1&cxt=DC&sv=Split&tnprpdd=None&findtype=Y&elmap=Inline&cnt=DOC&serialnum=2026427621&vr=2.0&fn=_top&service=Find&rlt=CLID_FQRLT5632057279311&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&n=1&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tc=0&migkchresultid=1" target="_top"><span>--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 5142183</span></a>
<span class="InformationalSmall" id="headerTitleTruncate3">(5th Cir. </span><span class="InformationalSmall" id="headerTitleTruncate4">Nov. 1, 2011):</span><br />
<br />
<h1 class="ADAHtmlHeading3">
</h1>
<br />
Whether an appeal from a denial of a
motion to compel arbitration divests the district court of jurisdiction
to proceed to the merits is the subject of a circuit split. The Second
and Ninth Circuits have held that a stay is not automatic.<a href="" name="FN1"></a> In
<i>Britton,</i> the court pointed out that normally, appellate review of
a collateral order does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction
to proceed to the merits. The court cited the determination in <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?serialnum=1983109286&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=708&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=46A573C7&ordoc=2026427621" target="_top">
<i>Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,</i> 460 U.S. 1, 21, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)</a>,
that because arbitrability is an issue easily separable from the merits
of the underlying dispute, the district court could address the merits
while the appellate court reviewed arbitrability. Additionally, the
<i>Britton</i> court noted that an automatic stay would allow litigants
to delay resolution of the matter by filing frivolous appeals. In the
absence of an automatic stay, the district court nonetheless retains the
power to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether proceedings should
be stayed until the appeal regarding arbitrability has been resolved.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-indent: 20px;">
<a href="" name="sp_999_1"></a><a href="" name="SDU_1"></a>The Seventh Circuit, later joined by the Third, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh, <a href="" name="FN2"></a> has held that a notice of appeal automatically stays proceedings in the district court. The Seventh Circuit reasoned in <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?serialnum=1997207813&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=46A573C7&ordoc=2026427621" target="_top">
<i>Bradford–Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network,</i> 128 F.3d 504 (7th Cir.1997)</a>,
that the underlying claims before the district court are not collateral
to the issue presented by an appeal, because the appeal is to determine
whether the matter should be litigated in the district court at all.
The court was worried about inconsistent handling of the case by the two
courts and was concerned that allowing simultaneous proceedings would
defeat the speed and cost benefits parties seek from arbitration. <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?serialnum=1997207813&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=46A573C7&ordoc=2026427621" target="_top">
<i>Id.</i> at 505.</a> These courts analogize arbitrability appeals to appeals regarding double jeopardy, sovereign immunity, and qualified immunity,
<i>see </i> <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?serialnum=1997207813&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=46A573C7&ordoc=2026427621" target="_top">
<i>id.</i> at 506,</a> reasoning that because a district court cannot
proceed past these issues when there are interlocutory appeals, it
similarly cannot proceed when arbitrability is appealed.</div>
<br /><div style="text-indent: 20px;">
<a href="" name="sp_999_2"></a><a href="" name="SDU_2"></a><span class="StarPage" name="StarPage" title="StarPage"></span><a href="" name="citeas((Cite as: 2011 WL 5142183, *2 (C.A.5 (Tex.)))"></a>The legal debate turns on <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?serialnum=1982151208&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=708&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=46A573C7&ordoc=2026427621" target="_top">
<i>Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,</i> 459 U.S. 56, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982)</a>.
Although appeals transfer jurisdiction from the district court to the
appellate court concerning “those aspects of the case involved in the
appeal,” <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?serialnum=1982151208&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=46A573C7&ordoc=2026427621" target="_top">
<i>id.</i> at 58,</a> the district court is nonetheless free to adjudicate matters that are not involved in that appeal,
<i>see </i>
<i>Alice L. v. Dusek,</i> 492 F.3d 562 (5th Cir.2007). At issue here is
whether the merits of an arbitration claim are an aspect of a denial of
an order to compel arbitration.</div>
<br /><div style="text-indent: 20px;">
<a href="" name="sp_999_2"></a><a href="" name="SDU_2"></a>The Ninth Circuit interpreted
<i>Griggs</i> narrowly, holding that because answering the question of
arbitrability does not determine the merits of the case, the merits are
not an aspect of the case that is involved in the appeal on
arbitrability. To the contrary, the Seventh Circuit interpreted
<i>Griggs</i> broadly, holding that because an appeal on arbitrability
concerns whether the case will be heard in the district court at all,
the merits in district court are an aspect of the case that is involved
in the appeal.</div>
<br /><div style="text-indent: 20px;">
<a href="" name="sp_999_2"></a><a href="" name="SDU_2"></a>The
narrower interpretation better comports with our precedents and the
nature of arbitration. “How broadly a court defines the aspects of the
case on appeal depends on the nature of the appeal.” <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2012692919&referenceposition=565&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.10&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=46A573C7&ordoc=2026427621" target="_top">
<i>Alice L. v. Dusek,</i> 492 F.3d 563, 565 (5th Cir.2007)</a> (per curiam). The facts of
<i>Griggs </i>suggest a narrow interpretation is normally appropriate.</div>A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-5614677345538002972011-10-19T09:55:00.000-04:002011-10-19T09:55:03.283-04:00Third Circuit Joins Majority on Time for RemovalFrom BNA's <i>U.S. Law Week</i>, Oct. 17, 20100:<br />
<br />
The 30-day period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) for filing of the notice of removal of a civil action begins to run separately for each defendant after service upon them of the initial pleading setting forth the claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held Oct. 12. The court, which had not previously addressed the issue in a precedential opinion, noted that Section 1446(b) specifies that the notice be filed “within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting for the claim for relief[.]” Although the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have adopted variations of the” first-served” defendant rule, under which removal by any defendant must occur within 30 days of service on the first-served defendant, the court aligned itself with the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits, which follow the “later-served” rule under which “each defendant individually has thirty days to file a notice of removal beginning when the particular defendant is served.” Quoting Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952,(79 U.S.L.W. 1965 (9th Cir. 2011) the court favored the “later-served” rule “for reasons grounded in statutory construction, equity and common sense.” Delalla v. Hanover Insurance, 3d Cir., No. 10-3933, 10/12/11.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-85885371987581264932011-09-30T11:06:00.001-04:002011-09-30T11:06:35.117-04:00First Circuit Weighs in on Split Re Meaning of "Warrant" in 18 U.S.C. sections 3606 & 3583(i)Per
<span class="GroupHeading" id="headerTitleTruncate1" style="font-weight: bold;">U.S. v. Collazo-Castro</span>, <a class="InformationalSmall" href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?ss=CNT&db=ALLFEDS&tf=0&rs=dfa1.0&scxt=WL&tnprpds=TaxNewsFIT&rlti=1&cxt=DC&sv=Split&tnprpdd=None&findtype=Y&elmap=Inline&cnt=DOC&serialnum=2026249062&vr=2.0&fn=_top&service=Find&rlt=CLID_FQRLT5337838210309&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&n=1&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tc=0&migkchresultid=1" target="_top"><span>--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 4495851</span></a> (<span class="InformationalSmall" id="headerTitleTruncate3">1st Cir. </span><span class="DocumentSectionTitle" id="headerTitleTruncate4">Sept. 29, 2011):</span><br />
<br />
<h1 class="ADAHtmlHeading3">
</h1>
The central dispute is whether the
district court had relation-back jurisdiction under the Delayed
Revocation Statute, which provides:<br />
<br />
<div style="margin-left: 12px;">
<a href="" name="sp_999_3"></a><a href="" name="SDU_3"></a><span class="StarPage" name="StarPage" title="StarPage"></span><a href="" name="citeas((Cite as: 2011 WL 4495851, *3 (C.A.1 (Puerto Rico)))"></a> </div>
<div style="margin-left: 12px;">
The
power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation
of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to
serve a term of imprisonment and, subject to the limitations in
subsection (h), a further term of supervised release, extends beyond the
expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably
necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration
<i>if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued</i> on the basis of an allegation of such a violation.<br />
</div>
<br /><a href="" name="sp_999_3"></a><a href="" name="SDU_3"></a><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=T&docname=18USCAS3583&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&referenceposition=SP%3b17a3000024864&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">18 U.S.C. § 3583(i)</a> (emphasis added). “While <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=18USCAS3583&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">section 3583</a> extends the jurisdiction of a court to hold revocation hearings after the term of supervised release has expired, [<a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=18USCAS3606&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">18 U.S.C. § 3606</a>] actually governs the issuance of warrants for the arrest of probationers or supervised releasees.” <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2008783276&referenceposition=446&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">
<i>Garcia–Avalino,</i> 444 F.3d at 446 n. 3;</a>
<i>see also </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2005559226&referenceposition=906&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">
<i>Vargas–Amaya,</i> 389 F.3d at 906</a> (same). <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=18USCAS3606&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">Section 3606</a> provides:<br /><br />
<div style="margin-left: 12px;">
<a href="" name="sp_999_3"></a><a href="" name="SDU_3"></a>If
there is probable cause to believe that a probationer or a person on
supervised release has violated a condition of his probation or release,
he may be arrested, and, upon arrest, shall be taken without
unnecessary delay before the court having jurisdiction over him. A
probation officer may make such an arrest wherever the probationer or
releasee is found, and may make the arrest without a warrant. The court
having supervision of the probationer or releasee, or, if there is no
such court, the court last having supervision of the probationer or
releasee, may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer or
releasee for violation of a condition of release, and a probation
officer or United States marshal may execute the warrant in the district
in which the warrant was issued or in any district in which the
probationer or releasee is found.<br />
</div>
<br /><a href="" name="sp_999_3"></a><a href="" name="SDU_3"></a><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=18USCAS3606&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">18 U.S.C. § 3606</a>. <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=18USCAS3606&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">Sections 3606</a> and <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=18USCAS3583&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">3583</a>
were enacted in 1984 as part of the Sentencing Reform Act package that
transformed the federal parole system into a supervised release system.
“Under the Sentencing Reform Act's provisions for supervised release,
the sentencing court, rather than the Parole Commission, would oversee
the defendant's postconfinement monitoring.” <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1991039855&referenceposition=400&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=780&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">
<i>Gozlon–Peretz v. United States,</i> 498 U.S. 395, 400–01 (1991)</a>.<br /><br /><div style="text-indent: 20px;">
<a href="" name="sp_999_3"></a><a href="" name="SDU_3"></a>Appellant
argues that in the absence of a statutory definition of “warrant,” this
Court should apply the word's ordinary meaning, which, in her view, is
the definition in the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=USCOAMENDIV&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">U.S. Const. amend. IV</a>. If the term “warrant” in <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=18USCAS3606&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">sections 3606</a> and <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=T&docname=18USCAS3583&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&referenceposition=SP%3b17a3000024864&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">3583(i)</a> is defined to require sworn facts, the district court did not have jurisdiction to revoke appellant's supervision.</div>
<br /><div style="text-indent: 20px;">
<a href="" name="sp_999_3"></a><a href="" name="SDU_3"></a>Two
circuit courts have split on this precise issue. The Ninth Circuit held
that the term “warrant” requires an oath or affirmation both as a
matter of statutory interpretation and to avoid an interpretation
inconsistent with the Constitution.
<i>See </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2005559226&referenceposition=904&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">
<i>Vargas–Amaya,</i> 389 F.3d at 904, 906</a>. The Fifth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion.
<i>See </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2008783276&referenceposition=447&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">
<i>Garcia–Avalino,</i> 444 F.3d at 447</a>. We agree with the Fifth Circuit.<a href="" name="FN3"></a><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/documenttext.aspx?ss=CNT&n=1&cnt=DOC&rlt=CLID_FQRLT5337838210309&scxt=WL&service=Find&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&vr=2.0&findtype=Y&cxt=DC&db=ALLFEDS&rlti=1&sv=Split&fn=_top&serialnum=2026249062&rs=dfa1.0#B00432026249062"><sup>FN3</sup></a><a href="" name="F00432026249062"></a></div>
<br /><a href="" name="B00432026249062"></a><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/documenttext.aspx?ss=CNT&n=1&cnt=DOC&rlt=CLID_FQRLT5337838210309&scxt=WL&service=Find&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&vr=2.0&findtype=Y&cxt=DC&db=ALLFEDS&rlti=1&sv=Split&fn=_top&serialnum=2026249062&rs=dfa1.0#F00432026249062">FN3.</a> Two other courts of appeal have alluded to the split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, but neither took a position.
<i>See </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2016580879&referenceposition=56&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=6538&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Brennan,</i> 285 F. App'x 51, 56 (4th Cir.2008)</a>; <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2012373513&referenceposition=1348&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=36EA38B6&ordoc=2026249062" target="_top">
<i>United States v. Presley,</i> 487 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir.2007)</a>.<br /><br />A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-47551777116662440222011-08-10T09:08:00.002-04:002011-08-10T09:11:13.786-04:00Ninth Circuit Notes Intracircuit Split Re Compatability of Rule 23 Class Actions and Collective Actions under FLSAPer<span id="headerTitleTruncate1" class="GroupHeading" style="font-weight: bold"> Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc. </span><a class="InformationalSmall" href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?ss=CNT&db=ALLFEDS&tf=0&rs=dfa1.0&scxt=WL&tnprpds=TaxNewsFIT&rlti=1&cxt=DC&sv=Split&tnprpdd=None&findtype=Y&elmap=Inline&cnt=DOC&serialnum=2025835525&vr=2.0&fn=_top&service=Find&rlt=CLID_FQRLT89280498108&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&n=1&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tc=0&migkchresultid=1" target="_top"><span>--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 3449473</span></a> (<span id="headerTitleTruncate3" class="InformationalSmall">9th Cir.</span><span id="headerTitleTruncate4" class="DocumentSectionTitle"> Aug. 9, 2011):
<br />
<br /></span>Aside from dismissing Pitts's entire action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court alternatively dismissed Count 2 of the complaint because, in its view, a <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=USFRCPR23&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1004365&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=E52D92DF&ordoc=2025835525" target="_top">Rule 23</a> class action could not co-exist with a related collective action under the FLSA. Although the question has divided district courts in our circuit, <i>compare </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2020660522&referenceposition=994&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=4637&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=E52D92DF&ordoc=2025835525" target="_top"> <i>Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., LLC,</i> 673 F.Supp.2d 987, 994 (C.D.Cal.2008)</a> (holding that “an opt-out class under <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=USFRCPR23&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1004365&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=E52D92DF&ordoc=2025835525" target="_top">Rule 23</a> is not inherently incompatible with an FLSA opt-in class”), <i>with </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?serialnum=2013074020&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=0000999&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=E52D92DF&ordoc=2025835525" target="_top"> <i>Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.,</i> 2007 WL 2429149, at *4 (D.Nev. Aug. 20, 2007)</a> (holding that “the class action mechanisms of the FLSA and <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=USFRCPR23&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1004365&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=E52D92DF&ordoc=2025835525" target="_top">Rule 23</a> are incompatible”), we need not address this issue because Pitts has told us—as he told the district court—that he will not pursue his FLSA claims.<a name="FN6"></a><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/documenttext.aspx?ss=CNT&n=1&cnt=DOC&rlt=CLID_FQRLT89280498108&scxt=WL&service=Find&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&vr=2.0&findtype=Y&cxt=DC&db=ALLFEDS&rlti=1&sv=Split&fn=_top&serialnum=2025835525&rs=dfa1.0#B00762025835525"><sup>FN6</sup></a><a name="F00762025835525"></a> Because Pitts has abandoned these claims, any alleged incompatibility between a <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=USFRCPR23&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1004365&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=E52D92DF&ordoc=2025835525" target="_top">Rule 23</a> class action and an FLSA collective action is not present in this case.
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<br /><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/documenttext.aspx?ss=CNT&n=1&cnt=DOC&rlt=CLID_FQRLT89280498108&scxt=WL&service=Find&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&vr=2.0&findtype=Y&cxt=DC&db=ALLFEDS&rlti=1&sv=Split&fn=_top&serialnum=2025835525&rs=dfa1.0#F00762025835525">FN6.</a> The only circuit that has addressed this issue has held that <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=USFRCPR23&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=1004365&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=E52D92DF&ordoc=2025835525" target="_top">Rule 23</a> class actions and FLSA collective actions may peacefully co-exist. <i>See </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2024393001&referenceposition=976&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=E52D92DF&ordoc=2025835525" target="_top"> <i>Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs.,</i> 632 F.3d 971, 976–79 (7th Cir.2011)</a>.
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<br />A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-91138388805137365152011-07-25T14:13:00.003-04:002011-07-25T14:18:03.558-04:00Fifth Circuit Declines to Weigh in on Split Re Authority to Issue Injunction Pending ArbitrationPer <span id="headerTitleTruncate1" class="GroupHeading" style="font-weight: bold">Janvey v. Alguire</span> <a class="InformationalSmall" href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?ss=CNT&db=ALLFEDS&tf=0&rs=dfa1.0&scxt=WL&tnprpds=TaxNewsFIT&rlti=1&cxt=DC&sv=Split&tnprpdd=None&findtype=Y&elmap=Inline&cnt=DOC&serialnum=2025759264&vr=2.0&fn=_top&service=Find&rlt=CLID_FQRLT99535251413257&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&n=1&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tc=0&migkchresultid=1" target="_top"><span>--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2937949</span></a> (<span id="headerTitleTruncate3" class="InformationalSmall">5th Cir. </span><span id="headerTitleTruncate4" class="DocumentSectionTitle">July 22, 2011):<br /><br /></span> The circuit split concerns the power of a district court to issue an injunction while arbitration is pending. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the circuit split in <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1988128107&referenceposition=229&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=350&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=8105599B&ordoc=2025759264" target="_top"> <i>RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Associates, Inc.,</i> 858 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir.1988)</a>, but did not enter the fray.<a name="FN6"></a><sup>FN6</sup> The Employee Defendants contend that once again we may avoid the fray and still decide the issue in their favor because both the Eighth Circuit, on one side of the split, and the Seventh Circuit, on the other side of the split, would not permit an injunction here. The Eighth Circuit held that “where the [Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) ] is applicable to the dispute between the parties and no qualifying language has been alleged, the district court errs in granting injunctive relief” because the judicial inquiry required to determine “the propriety of injunctive relief necessarily would inject the court into the merits of issues more appropriately left to the arbitrator.” <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1984105035&referenceposition=1292&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=350&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=8105599B&ordoc=2025759264" target="_top"> <i>Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey,</i> 726 F.2d 1286, 1292 (8th Cir.1984)</a>. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court may only issue injunctive relief that is effective only until the arbitration panel is able to address whether the equitable relief should remain in effect. <i>See </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1993140964&referenceposition=215&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=350&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=8105599B&ordoc=2025759264" target="_top"> <i>Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Salvano,</i> 999 F.2d 211, 215–16 (7th Cir.1993)</a>.<br /><br />. . .<br /><br /> The <i>RGI </i>Court found that “[t]he crux of the problem [in the circuit split] is whether the commands of the [FAA] require that a federal court immediately divest itself of any power to act to maintain the status quo <i>once it decides that the case before it is arbitrable.</i>” <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1988128107&referenceposition=228&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.07&db=350&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=8105599B&ordoc=2025759264" target="_top"> <i>RGI,</i> 858 F.2d at 228–29</a> (emphasis added). Here, however, the district court has not yet decided whether the case is arbitrable and thus the circuit-split cases are not applicable. <br />. . .<br /><br />FN7. Given that the facts at issue here do not require us to enter the circuit split, we reserve for another day the issues of whether a district court divests itself of the discretion to maintain the status quo once it decides the case before it is arbitrable and, if not, what the limits of that discretion may be.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-8936835404048135822011-07-12T11:05:00.003-04:002011-07-12T11:09:01.957-04:00U.S. Law Week Reports Circuit SplitsHere are the circuit splits reported recently in BNA's <span style="font-style: italic;">U.S. Law Week</span>, 80 U.S.L.W. 22<br />(June 2011):<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Bankruptcy—Farm Debtors</span>: <span style="font-style: italic;">United States v. Dawes</span> (In re Dawes) (79 U.S.L.W. 2786)<br /><br />Are income taxes flowing from the sale of a farm asset during Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceedings taxes “incurred by the estate”under Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, and are they therefore subject to downgrade and discharge? The Tenth Circuit joins the Ninth Circuit in saying “no.” It explains that “post-petition income taxes incurred during Chapter 12 proceedings are liabilities of the individual debtor and not the bankruptcy estate,”and are therefore not subject to discharge. The Eighth Circuit has held that such taxes are subject to discharge.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Schools—Disciplinary Action</span>: <span style="font-style: italic;">Layshock v. Hermitage School District J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District </span> (79 U.S.L.W. 2739)<br /><br />Are schools allowed to punish vulgar student speech on the internet? Based on the facts before it in two separate, but similar, cases, the Third Circuit says derogatory profiles about their principals posted on MySpace by two students were protected by the First Amendment. The Second Circuit, faced with different facts, however, has allowed a school to punish vulgar internet speech by a student.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">United States—False Claims</span>: <span style="font-style: italic;">United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical Inc. </span> (79 U.S.L.W. 2646)<br /><br />Under the False Claims Act, may a claim made to the government be false or fraudulent for failure to meet an implied legal condition of payment that is found in a source other than a statute or regulation? The Second and Ninth circuits have held that the legal condition must appear in a statute or regulation, while the First Circuit sides with the Tenth Circuit in holding that such conditions can be spelled out in other places, such as the underlying contract.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Taxation—Limitations</span>: <span style="font-style: italic;">Salman Ranch Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue </span> (79 U.S.L.W. 2692)<br /><br />May the Internal Revenue Service extend the limitations period for issuing a final partnership administrative adjustment from three to six years where an understatement of gross income results from an overstatement of basis? The Tenth Circuit joins the Seventh and Federal Circuits in holding that Section 6501 of the tax code is ambiguous, opening the door for IRS regulation. The Fourth and Fifth circuits have held that the statute is not ambiguous, blocking agency regulation on the subject.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-60569327717886624822011-07-05T19:35:00.000-04:002011-07-05T19:36:09.825-04:00Fourth Circuit (splitting with other circuits) finds problem with appeal wavier demand for extra acceptance reductionFrom the Sentencing Law & Policy Blog:<div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 16px; "><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 16px; ">Hard-core sentencing fans (and perhaps only hard-core sentencing fans) should find very interesting and perhaps somewhat surprising a ruling today from the Fourth Circuit in <em>US v. Divens</em>, No. 09-4967 (4th Cir. July 5, 2011) (<a href="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/094967.P.pdf" style="text-decoration: underline; color: rgb(51, 102, 153); ">available here</a>). Here is the start of the opinion along with an excerpt from part of the opinion spotlighting why the Fourth Circuit is splitting from its sisters on this issue:</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 16px; "><blockquote style="line-height: 16px; "><p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal; text-align: left; margin-bottom: 10px; ">Lashawn Dwayne Divens pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Divens signed an acceptance of responsibility statement but declined to sign a plea agreement waiving certain rights to appellate review and collateral attack. Solely because Divens would not waive these rights, the Government refused to move for an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). Divens appeals, challenging the district court’s failure to compel the Government to move for the § 3E1.1(b) reduction. For the reasons that follow, we vacate Divens’s sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.....</p><p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal; text-align: left; margin-bottom: 10px; ">Section 3E1.1(a) of the Guidelines provides for a two-level decrease in a defendant’s offense level if he "clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense."... The district court awarded Divens the two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a), but because the Government refused to file a motion under § 3E1.1(b), the court did not award Divens the additional one-level reduction provided by that subsection. The Government makes no claim that Divens does not qualify for a decrease.... [;] the Government’s sole contention is that Divens’s failure to sign the appellate waiver justifies the Government’s refusal to move for the additional one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b)....</p><p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal; text-align: left; margin-bottom: 10px; ">[In our view], under § 3E1.1(b) the Government retains discretion to refuse to move for an additional one-level reduction, but only on the basis of an interest recognized by the guideline itself — not, as with § 5K1.1, on the basis of any conceivable legitimate interest.</p><p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal; text-align: left; margin-bottom: 10px; ">We recognize that this holding does not accord with that of other circuits. <em>See United States v. Deberry</em>, 576 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2009); <em>United States v. Johnson</em>, 581 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2009); <em>United States v. Beatty</em>, 538 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2008); <em>United States v. Newson</em>, 515 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2008). Those courts have concluded that the Government may withhold a § 3E1.1(b) motion based on any rational interest. This conclusion relies heavily on cases interpreting § 5K1.1.</p><p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal; text-align: left; margin-bottom: 10px; ">In our view, for the reasons explained above, the commentary to § 3E1.1(b) forecloses courts from relying on § 5k1.1 cases in interpreting § 3E1.1(b). This commentary, however, has received little attention from our sister circuits. Instead, those courts focus almost exclusively on the fact that Congress in 2003 amended § 3E1.1(b) to insert the governmental motion requirement. <em>See</em> PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(g). According to those courts, the mere fact of this 2003 amendment somehow demonstrates that Congress intended that the Government possess the wide discretion under § 3E1.1(b) that it enjoys under § 5K1.1. But nothing in the 2003 reforms evinces such an intent. After all, Congress could have amended the § 3E1.1(b) commentary so that it conformed to the commentary surrounding § 5K1.1. Congress declined to do so; it instead left unchanged § 3E1.1(b)’s mandatory commentary and inserted language suggesting that the Government’s newfound discretion applies only to the question of "whether the defendant has assisted authorities in a manner that avoids preparing for trial." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 6.</p><div><br /></div></blockquote><a id="more" style="text-decoration: underline; "></a></span></div>A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-67576758956468029432011-06-29T09:38:00.001-04:002011-06-29T09:40:49.263-04:00Seventh Circuit Notes Split Re Whether Attempted Bank Robbery Is A Specific Intent CrimePer <span id="headerTitleTruncate1" class="GroupHeading" style="font-weight: bold">U.S. v. Durham</span> <a class="InformationalSmall" href="http://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?rs=dfa1.0&ss=CNT&cnt=DOC&rlti=1&sv=Split&cxt=DC&service=Find&n=1&findtype=Y&vr=2.0&rlt=CLID_FQRLT182050388296&fn=_top&migkchresultid=1&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&db=ALLFEDS&scxt=WL&elmap=Inline&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tf=0&tc=0&serialnum=2025560625" target="_top"><span>--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2535801</span></a> (<span id="headerTitleTruncate3" class="InformationalSmall">7th Cir. </span><span id="headerTitleTruncate4" class="DocumentSectionTitle">June 28, 2011):<br /><br /></span>Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has decided whether specific intent is an essential element of attempted bank robbery in violation of <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=T&docname=18USCAS2113&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&referenceposition=SP%3b8b3b0000958a4&pbc=CCDCADB8&ordoc=2025560625" target="_top">§ 2113(a)</a>; our sister circuits are split on the issue. <i>Compare </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1988116593&referenceposition=626&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=350&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=CCDCADB8&ordoc=2025560625" target="_top"> <i>United States v. Darby,</i> 857 F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir.1988)</a> (attempted bank robbery under <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=T&docname=18USCAS2113&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&referenceposition=SP%3b8b3b0000958a4&pbc=CCDCADB8&ordoc=2025560625" target="_top">§ 2113(a)</a> requires the specific intent to take the property by force, violence or intimidation), <i>with </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1976125043&referenceposition=57&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=350&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=CCDCADB8&ordoc=2025560625" target="_top"> <i>United States v. Johnston,</i> 543 F.2d 55, 57–58 (5th Cir.1976)</a> (attempted bank robbery under <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=T&docname=18USCAS2113&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&referenceposition=SP%3b8b3b0000958a4&pbc=CCDCADB8&ordoc=2025560625" target="_top">§ 2113(a)</a> is not specific intent crime) and <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?serialnum=1997131412&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=CCDCADB8&ordoc=2025560625" target="_top"> <i>United States v. Armstrong,</i> 116 F.3d 489 (10th Cir.1997)</a> (unpublished) (same). We need not decide the issue to address defendants' argument here.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-46462407803767485832011-06-14T08:02:00.002-04:002011-06-14T08:05:59.256-04:00First Circuit Notes Split Re Copyright Act Requires Written Agreement Before Creation of the WorkPer <span style="font-weight: bold;">TMTV</span><span id="headerTitleTruncate1" class="GroupHeading" style="font-weight: bold"> v. MASS PRODUCTIONS, INC.; EMMANUEL </span><a class="InformationalSmall" href="https://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?rs=dfa1.0&ss=CNT&cnt=DOC&rlti=1&sv=Split&cxt=DC&service=Find&n=1&findtype=Y&vr=2.0&rlt=CLID_FQRLT202195647146&fn=_top&migkchresultid=1&rp=%2fFind%2fdefault.wl&db=ALLFEDS&scxt=WL&elmap=Inline&pbc=BC6E23F9&uw=0&tf=0&tc=0&serialnum=2025477927" target="_top"><span><span style="font-weight: bold;"></span>--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2306514</span></a> (<span id="headerTitleTruncate3" class="InformationalSmall">1st Cir. June 13, 2011):<br /><br /></span>Jiménez and Morales confirmed in depositions that this was their own oral understanding with the production company; but the statute [Copyright Act] requires express agreement in a signed written instrument, <i>see</i> <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tc=-1&docname=17USCAS101&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=1000546&tf=-1&findtype=L&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=B012A6A6&ordoc=2025477927" target="_top">17 U.S.C. § 101</a> (definition); and the circuits are divided as to whether the language and policy require the writing before the creation or at least the completion of the work.<a name="FN3"></a><sup>FN3</sup><br /><br />FN3. <i>Compare </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1992131931&referenceposition=413&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=350&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=B012A6A6&ordoc=2025477927" target="_top"> <i>Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp.,</i> 969 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir.1992)</a> (written work-for-hire agreement must precede creation of work), <i>and </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=2014988203&referenceposition=626&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=6538&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=B012A6A6&ordoc=2025477927" target="_top"> <i>Gladwell Gov't Servs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Marin,</i> 265 F. App'x 624, 626 (9th Cir.2007)</a> (same), <i>with </i><a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?referencepositiontype=S&serialnum=1995107920&referenceposition=559&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=506&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&tc=-1&vr=2.0&pbc=B012A6A6&ordoc=2025477927" target="_top"> <i>Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas,</i> 53 F.3d 549, 559 (2d Cir.)</a> (written agreement might postdate creation if “memorializing” earlier oral agreement), <i>cert. denied,</i> <a href="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?serialnum=1995200792&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.04&db=780&tf=-1&findtype=Y&fn=_top&vr=2.0&pbc=B012A6A6&ordoc=2025477927" target="_top">516 U.S. 1010 (1995)</a>. <i>See also</i> 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, <i>supra,</i> § 5.03[B][2][b], at 5–56.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-84761736290626059782011-06-13T11:05:00.001-04:002011-06-13T11:20:04.676-04:00Ninth Circuit Creates Split Re Waiver of Sovereign Immunity under Public Vessels ActUnited States—Sovereign Immunity<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Tobar v. United States </span> (79 U.S.L.W. 2449) (May 2011)<br /><br />Does the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity in the Public Vessels Act for “damages caused by a public vessel”apply when a crew from a public vessel boards a private vessel? The Ninth Circuit says that it does, but the Eleventh Circuit has held that it does not.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-55573292581933480632011-06-13T11:04:00.001-04:002011-06-13T11:05:25.354-04:00Sixth Circuit Weighs in on Split Re Ability of Agency to Exempt Itself from Privacy Act's Civil Remedies ProvisionFreedom of Information—Privacy Act<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Shearson v. Department of Homeland Security </span> (79 U.S.L.W. 2441) (May 2011)<br /><br />May an agency exempt itself from the Privacy Act's civil remedies provision, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), by properly issuing rules to exempt a records system? The Sixth Circuit joins the D.C. Circuit in holding that a record system may be excluded only when Section 552a(j) permits the information to be exempted. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits, however, allow an agency to exempt material if the records system was exempted by properly issued rules.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-35684600678122870402011-06-13T11:00:00.002-04:002011-06-13T11:02:24.291-04:00Ninth Circuit Creates Split Re Proper Test for Government Waiver of Confidentiality under FOIAFreedom of Information—Exemptions<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection </span> (79 U.S.L.W. 2520) (May 2011)<br /><br />What is the proper test for determining whether the government has waived confidentiality under the Freedom of Information Act? The Ninth Circuit says that when the government freely discloses to a third party confidential information without limiting the third-party's ability to disseminate it, the government waives the ability to claim an exemption to a FOIA request for the disclosed information. The D.C. Circuit, however, previously adopted the public domain test, which asks whether the information was preserved in a public record.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-39572494605988213382011-06-13T10:57:00.001-04:002011-06-13T10:58:16.419-04:00Fourth Circuit Creates Split Re Removability of Parens Patriae Action by State AGCivil Procedure—Removal<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharmacy Inc. </span>(79 U.S.L.W. 2592) (May 2011)<br /><br />Is a parens patriae action brought by a state attorney general removable to federal court under the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act? The Fourth Circuit rules that it is not. The Fifth Circuit has held that such a suit is removable.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17647614.post-68893924866818907462011-06-13T10:56:00.001-04:002011-06-13T10:57:26.465-04:00Second Circuit Weighs in on Split Re Meaning of "Otherwise Defend" in FRCP 55(a)Civil Procedure—Default Judgment<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop LLC </span> (79 U.S.L.W. 2511) (May 2011)<br /><br />Does a defendant's withdrawal from a suit after initially defending on personal jurisdiction constitute a failure to “otherwise defend” the suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)? The Second Circuit holds that it does, agreeing with the First, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth circuits' broad reading of Rule 55;the Fifth and Eleventh circuits have read the rule more narrowly.A. Benjamin Spencerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10871139625622975565noreply@blogger.com0