Steeljaw Scribe

Come On Over to the Home Field . . .

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Wed, 17 Feb 2010 15:18:00 +0000

We're missing YOU!

http://steeljawscribe.com

June 4th, 1942

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Thu, 04 Jun 2009 10:09:00 +0000

Pause...

Ponder...

Remember...

Honor..

From these honored aviators, Marines and Sailors - those departed and the few left with us, we draw our heritage...our ethos.

May they and their actions this day never be forgotten. And from their stand, may we evermore draw strength.
- SJS

North Korea: Here We Go Again - Part II

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 05:15:00 +0000

As if the 29 April statement from the DPRK Foreign Ministry wasn't provocative enough, comes the latest missive dated 29 May (full statement here):

As long as the UNSC fails to respond to the DPRK's just demand, the DPRK will not recognize any resolution and decision of the UNSC in the future, too.
Third, if the UNSC will make further provocative actions, this will inevitably lead to the DPRK's approach towards adopting stronger self-defensive counter-measures.
The end of the Cold War worldwide works only between big powers, but a Cold War still persists on the Korean Peninsula.
The UNSC-crafted UN Command itself is a signatory to the Korean Armistice Agreement.
Any hostile act by the UNSC immediately means the abrogation of the Armistice Agreement.
The world will soon find out how the army and people of the DPRK will stand up against the high-handed and get-it-alone approach of the UNSC in defending its dignity and sovereignty.
The U.S. is keen on using a catchphrase "Carrot and stick."
It would be better for the "Donkey" of the U.S. Democratic Party to lick the carrot.

Well. What next Alphonse?

Some have said another strong statement from the UNSC would do the trick and if the Russians or Chinese don't join in it won't matter - though in light of the above we are hard-pressed to see how this would work. Others argue that it's time to effect kinetic solutions on the DPRK homeland, to which we respond - 'done a count of tube artillery in the hills outside of Seoul recently?' Clearly those two COAs represent the extremes of the range of operations (assuming 'do nothing' isn't an option). Reflecting some of the rising frustration on this issue, a commenter on another site remarked -"I hear a lot of frustration from pretty much everyone I talk to about this. But what does anyone actually think we should do?" Actually - there is a good bit we can do short of direct, kinetic effects. A couple, for example might be:

1. Step up rigorous enforcement of the Proliferation Security Initiative. Every nK flagged vessel is suspect of carrying materials for their ballistic missile and/or nuke program and hence gets stopped, wherever they are, and searched. Any problems with manifests, logs, etc. and the ship is impounded and the crew interred or sent back to nK, minus the ship.

2. Crack down on the backdoor hard currency exchanges that only serve to keep the leadership elite in power and do nothing to aid the people. We started doing this back in ‘06-07 and it hurt them so much they agreed to come back to the 6-party talks. Do it again and this time keep the pressure up.

And work on regional confidence building measures with our allies in Australia (yes, Australia - look at yesterday's chart and plot out a southerly trajectory to 4,000 nm/7500 km, roughly the same distance to Hawaii and you are in the heart of Australia), South Korea and Japan. Things like strengthening theater and regional defenses to include missile defense, for example.

Because every carrot needs a stick.

DPRK and Long Range Missiles: Here We Go Again

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 05:18:00 +0000

Looks like the missiles of spring are coming back for return engagement this summer:

SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea may this month test a missile designed to fly as far as U.S. territory and may also be gearing up for skirmishes with the South around their disputed sea border, South Korean media reported on Monday.

and

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea has shifted its most advanced long-range missile — capable of reaching Alaska — to a new west coast launch site near the border with China, reports said Monday, in a move that threatens to further escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula.
The regime could fire the long-range missile as early as mid-June — around the time South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and President Barack Obama hold a summit in Washington, the Dong-a Ilbo newspaper in Seoul said, citing unidentified officials in Washington and Seoul.
The missile at the Dongchang-ni launch site on the northwest coast is believed to be a version of the Taepodong-2 rocket that the North fired on April 5 saying it was a satellite launch, the report said. The JoongAng Ilbo newspaper carried a similar report. A new long-range missile launch would mark a significant escalation in tensions already running high after the North's April rocket launch and an underground nuclear test conducted a week ago. The U.N. Security Council has been discussing how to punish Pyongyang for the atomic blast.

Well, say this about nK - they do stick to the script:

"In case the UNSC does not make an immediate apology, such actions will be taken as:
"Firstly, the DPRK will be compelled to take additional self-defensive measures in order to defend its supreme interests.
"The measures will include nuclear tests and test-firings of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
"Secondly, the DPRK will make a decision to build a light water reactor power plant and start the technological development for ensuring self-production of nuclear fuel as its first process without delay."

The new wrinkle in this iteration is the apparent use of a new west coast launch facility - adds al sorts of new factors in indications and warning and defense compared to the facility at T'aepo dong. Also raises questions about nK's turnaround/lessons-learned from the previous launch of a new TD-2 variant in April this year. Starts to possibly speak volumes about the nK's assessing the failure of April's launch and incorporating lessons learned form that event. By comparison is the almost three year period and new airframe from the 2006 TD-2 launch failure to April 2009 launch attempt.

It won't be a boring summer 'round these parts...that's for sure.

Midway Week

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Mon, 01 Jun 2009 12:29:00 +0000

This week is the 69th anniversary of the Battle of Midway. In recognition of that, check with your local VFW/American Legion Post for local observances and try and make it a point to attend. To help, here's a listing of known events from around the country:

2009 BOM ANNIVERSARY AND UNIT REUNION ANNOUNCEMENTS

1. 3 June, Arlington, VA: formal banquet, Army-Navy Country Club

2. 4 June, Washington D.C.: USN commemoration at the Navy Memorial

3. 4 June, Washington DC, BOM symposium (IMMF)

4. 4 June, Houston, TX: BOM commemoration by NOUS

5. 4 June, Boston, MA: BOM commemoration aboard USS Constitution (I'm sure Maggie will be there - right? - SJS)

6. 4-7 June, New Orleans, LA: USS Yorktown (CV-5) reunion

7. 6 June, Chino, CA: Coral Sea & BOM symposium and air show

8. 6 June, San Diego, CA: BOM commemoration aboard USS Midway.

9. 6 June, San Francisco, CA: formal banquet, Marines Memorial Club

10. 6 June, Jacksonville, FL: BOM commemoration & banquet hosted by Navy League

11. 6 June, Monterey, CA: formal “Dining Out” at Naval Postgraduate School

12. 8 June, Chattanooga, TN: BOM event begins “Navy Week.”

I'll be observing here in the heartland since this week I am also TAD for training and so posting will, perforce, be light. There are some posts scheduled for publication here and over at the USNI blog (most there focusing on Midway). Wherever you are on the 4th, take pause and remember those who dared, those who fought heavy odds - those who gave their all; and how much different the course of the war in the Pacific would have been otherwise...

w/r, SJS

Links to More Midway Sites:

The Course to Midway: Turning Point in the Pacific

Naval History & Heritage Command

International Midway Memorial Foundation

Battle of Midway Celebration at Army Navy Country Club

Navy PA Resources Website

BMD From the Sea - It's Not Just for SWO's

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Thu, 28 May 2009 02:11:00 +0000

It is time for Naval Aviation to become more than interested bystanders and step up to the plate for the ballistic missile defense mission. For those who have been otherwise engaged or looking elsewhere, the cover and main article in the May 2009 issue of Proceedings is your wake-up call. Now, besides the ever-present threat posed by cruise missiles, we can add ballistic missiles to the list of concerns. And to the naysayers who point to the Aegis community and say it's their job because they're the archer, I say not so fast, for several reasons. Chief among these is the growing threat itself.

Since the end of the Cold War, ballistic missiles have become a growth industry, especially in the short- and medium-ranged categories (figure out to 1500km). Missiles in these categories don't require the engineering, technology, and support structure of their larger IR/ICBM cousins and as such, lend themselves to a variety of domestic production programs using proliferated knowledge and technology, or, may be purchased wholesale from willing proliferators, such as the DPRK. These missiles lend themselves to mobile launchers which may be deployed far forward, reducing warning and engagement times, and employed in sufficient quantities as to greatly complicate planning and operations in a number of areas and conditions ranging from APOD/SPOD operations to choke point transits. The numbers may be troublesome enough on their own - add in WMD, especially where certain countries that are expanding their ballistic missile capabilities are also engaged in nuclear programs that are unsupervised by international agencies and the problem 3-5 years out grows more complicated. Factor in the addition of sophisticated technology by near-peer nations - MaRV's based on the Pershing II missile with millimeter terminal guidance radar for example, that are deployed in significant numbers on mobile platforms well within denied territory, and planning at all levels - tactical, operational and even strategic grows more difficult as options are taken off the table. Difficult or impossible, that is, absent a robust and credible defense.

CNO has declared BMD to be a core competency for all Navy - not just Aegis BMD. To be successful in that mission area will require efforts and capabilities that cut across communities and the operational and electromagnetic spectrum, much like we have and are doing for cruise missile defense. We must be able to bring to bear the full capabilities of sea-based power, kinetic and non- as all the elements of that sea-based power can provide force multiplier roles from pre-launch to terminal intercept. Naval aviation is a major player in this effort and not just as an attempt to "get a piece of the action."

While it is true that at present, the only active (read: hard kill) defensive capability is via the SM-3 family and SM-2 BlkIV, there are a number of near and longer term instances where naval aviation, and carrier aviation in particular, will play an increasingly important role. Emphasis in the last several years in the development of these missiles and Aegis BMD has focused on the mid-course/exo-atmospheric (SM-3) and terminal/endo-atmospheric (SM-2 BlkIV) intercept of short- and medium range ballistic missiles, along with the long-range search/track contribution of Aegis BMD as part of the BMDS designed to counter intermediate- and intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, with the recent shift in emphasis to the regional/theater fight and a renewed focus on ascent phase intercept (API), maritime forces will come to play a substantially increased role in all three areas of BMD - offensive action, passive and active defenses. How will this be possible? Through a combination of emerging/evolving platforms and capabilities teamed with core competencies already found across several NAVAIR communities. Let's look first at the platforms.

A key requirement and necessary capability for API to be successful is persistent ISR with rapid cueing via fast, redundant network paths to the shooter(s), in this case Aegis BMD-equipped ships. CVW's in the 3-5 year out view will see their capabilities grow in this area following planned upgrades and introduction of new platforms. Close at hand will be the wider deployment of AESA equipped F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and the EA-18G Growler. One potential vulnerability of mobile TBMs is their command and control networks, especially if there is intent to employ them in saturation raids in concert with anti-ship or land-attack cruise missiles. Identification of critical communications nodes and attack via non-kinetic means may result in disruption of attacks or even disablement of the missiles themselves. The capabilities inherent in AESA-equipped aircraft and the electronic attack capabilities in the Growler lend themselves to further investigation in this field. Netted and linked data between these platforms, passed via current E-2C's and fused with other off-board sensors (e.g., Predators, EP-3, and other joint platforms) build a richer picture for the afloat and ashore command elements. At the far end of that 3-5 year period the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye should begin seeing fleet introduction and the addition of its networking capability and revolutionary mechanically- and electronically scanned radar, among many other new or improved capabilities will bring battle management in the missile defense realm to new levels. Tapped into CEC or one of the other links for cueing, an Aegis BMD ship should be able to fire on remote, significantly expanding the battle space for API. Farther out, the addition of BAMS, P-8 and EPX, a possible marinized-Predator/Reaper and UCAV-N grow the range of possibilities for persistent ISR and cued attack, non-kinetic and kinetic. Indeed, even today Predators and their IR tracking have been successfully used in BMD tests. The carrier version of the JSF, the F-35C, will bring additional capabilities to the fight with its integrated sensor/weapons suite. And don't forget - Fire Scout is already out there with potential near shore/over the beach surveillance as well.

While the platforms are coming on-line, what is more important is recognition within the various NAVAIR communities, especially VAW, VAQ and VQ of these inherent BMD capabilities, that BMD is a core mission across the Navy and that their particular communities have a natural affinity for BMD. Particular skill sets are required in the areas of C4I, Battle Management, ISR, net-centric operations and data fusion, all of which are an inherent part of those communities and representative of a natural and evolving growth. Joint and combined operational experience would certainly underscore these skill sets.

Thirty years ago the VAW community, was geared to the long-range AEW/AAW fight and gave little thought to the overland ABCCC mission, for example. Yet by the time of operations in the Gulf and over former Yugoslavia it was increasingly engaged and tasked so. Those skill sets evolved from the battle management skills developed over a half-century of AEW and refined in the digital age with the introduction of the E-2C/F-14 teamed with Aegis with the assistance of organizations like the Carrier AEW Weapons School and Naval Strike Warfare Center. Today it should be no less so and with organizations like the Navy Air and Missile Defense and Naval Strike and Air Warfare Commands serving as the laboratory cum schoolhouse for such evolutionary expansion, the time to start is now.

Because the threat certainly isn't marking time...

North Korea's Nuclear Test

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Mon, 25 May 2009 13:57:00 +0000

It appears that second-time around worked for the North Koreans:

SEOUL (AFP) — North Korea carried out a second and more powerful nuclear test, defying international pressure to rein in its atomic programmes after years of six-nation disarmament talks. The hardline communist state, which stunned the world by testing an atomic bomb for the first time in October 2006, had threatened another test after the UN Security Council censured it for a long-range rocket launch in April. The North "successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test on May 25 as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defence in every way," the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said. "The current nuclear test was safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology," it said. The force of the blast was between 10 and 20 kilotons, according to Russia's defence ministry quoted by news agencies, vastly more than the estimated one kiloton blast three years ago.

While the Russians have historically over-estimated yields in their previous assessments, it is probably safe to say that the yield will fall around 10kt, more than surpassing 2006's fizzle @ 1/2 kt. Better refinement should come with independent verification by US and other international sources in the coming days.

And now all the chips are on the table. China has been vocal about not desiring to see North Korea armed with nukes and it has been the principle intermediary at the Six Party talks on behalf of the North Koreans. By far, it is the major supplier of energy resources to the North, keeping them from literally going dark. What will China do besides verbally condemn? Support full sanctions against the DPRK or block such a move? What about the Russians? Push-back expected on any measures beyond strong verbal condemnation in the Security Council? To be sure, expect one or both to forward the argument that harsher penalties will be "unproductive" and lead to greater instability in the region (read: China is afraid of provoking collapse of the DPRK government and subsequent rush of refugees across its borders into China). What of South Korea and Japan? The DPRK's on-gong missile tests, which have continued in the face of similar vocal condemnation and in spite of international agreements like the Missile Technology Control Regime or the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, have energized Japan's missile defense efforts - will a successful DPRK nuclear test now result in a Japan that feels it must either develop its own nuclear weapons as a counter? Undertake a more offensively oriented military? How assured can/should the Japanese be about any U.S. guarantees via extension of its nuclear umbrella?

Unstated in the initial uproar is this little gem -- with a demonstrated proclivity towards proliferation whoring, particularly with Iran, what does this say about the future of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation? Were the parallel tests of an alleged new SRBM today demonstration of a nuclear capable missile? How close to a weaponized form was today's test? What are the implications for increased instability in other regions that are faced with their own issues of nuclear proliferation (viz. Israel-Iran)?

It's 0300 and somewhere there's a phone ringing...

This Date in Naval History: Battle of the Coral Sea - 7 & 8 May

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Thu, 07 May 2009 02:37:00 +0000

Sixty-seven years ago...

Day 1 - "Scratch One Flattop!":

The first day of the carrier battle of Coral Sea, 7 May 1942, saw the Americans searching for carriers they knew were present and the Japanese looking for ones they feared might be in the area. (more at NHHC)

Day 2: We lose USS Lexington:

. . . Japanese struck the American carriers shortly after Eleven, and, in a fast and violent action, scored with torpedoes on Lexington and with bombs on both carriers... rest of the story here and here

Midway awaits...

Saturday at the Movies: 33 Minutes

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Sat, 02 May 2009 02:45:00 +0000

Continuing the missile defense theme from the stand-up of the NAMDC, offered here is a new trailer for the Heritage Foundation film on the need for missile defense:

Stand-up of the Navy Air and Missile Defense Center (NAMDC)

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Fri, 01 May 2009 02:00:00 +0000

On Thursday, 30 April 2009, the Navy's newest Center of Excellence (COE), the Navy Air and Missile Defense Center, was opened for business onboard the Naval Weapons Development Center, Dahlgren Virginia. RADM Brad Hicks, who is also the Aegis BMD program director, will serve as the Center's first commander until a permanent flag is assigned later this year. The ceremony's keynote speaker, ADM Robert "Rat" Willard, Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet spared no words in underscoring the importance of this particular COE in the context of recent events to include the recent North Korean launch.

The challenge ahead of the center will be the role it plays in Navy's quest to equally field a national missile defense to shield the homeland, a regional defense for friends and allies and theater systems for protection of forward deployed forces while still accounting for the multi-mission nature of platforms like the Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers currently deployed. And the center's efforts won't end there, for the threat includes ever-increasingly proliferated cruise missiles and a host of other airborne threats. In that context the NAMDC will serve to integrate technical capabilities, warfighter concepts and C3 solutions to cover the entire kill chain, from the "high-end" of afloat BMD to the wave-tops.

The Center's focus also won't be Aegis- or even Navy-only, though that will constitute a good portion of its effort. As one of six envisioned Warfare Centers of Excellence that also include the Naval Strike Air Warfare Center in Fallon, Nev., and the Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command in San Diego, Calif, NAMDC as the lead organization for Navy and Joint AMD will also partner and work closely with organizations like Joint Force Command's Joint Warfighting Center down the road in Suffolk, VA. I should also note that with close proximity to Pax River and Norfolk/Oceana, the center should also have ready access to work with the VAW and VFA communities, especially important when one looks at the capabilities currently available (e.g. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), and the AESA in the newer Super Hornets) and planned (e.g., E-2D Advanced Hawkeye) for those communities.

This was a much needed step in beginning to restore balance to a force that has , frankly, become very power projection-centric. Along with other warfare areas, such as blue-water ASW, it seemed in the post-Cold War environment that integrated air and missile defense was increasingly pushed to the back even while threats like those posed by new generations of low-observable, fast cruise missiles were widely proliferated. However, the emerging area denial capabilities of countries like China and Iran, not to mention the requirements levied by the Maritime Strategy (and, one presumes, the NOC when it ever is released) clearly demand the establishment of an organization to oversee the disparate parts of the air defense picture. I would go further to say that it is one which should have taken place a couple of decades ago, around the time of the introduction of Aegis to the fleet with all the attendant integration, coordination and synchronization issues that presented with other ship- and airborne platforms, sensors and networks.

The NAMDC will have an initial staff of approximately 25 personnel, and grow over the next three years to a fully operational staff of about 75 members, equally divided between military personnel, government civilian employees and supporting contractors. Considering the magnitude of the challenge ahead, I'd say they will all be fully engaged, especially if what ADM Willard said, that the Center is "the most important thing to the future of this capability in the Navy" comes to pass.

Красная звезда среда - Red Star Wednesday

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Wed, 29 Apr 2009 01:19:00 +0000

Several items on the docket today:

If at first you don't succeed...

From Ria Novosti comes word the much troubled Bulava SLBM will be tested five times in the coming year:

Despite five failures in 10 trials, Russia's Defense Ministry is planning to complete a series of Bulava tests and put the ICBM into service by the end of 2009.
"Considering that we must ensure reliable performance characteristics of the [Bulava] missile, we have decided to raise the number of additional test launches to five, if everything goes well," Vladimir Popovkin said.
Popovkin, who is visiting the Russian exposition at the IDEF-2009 arms show in Turkey, said that a faulty detail caused a test launch failure in December last year, and that the on-board systems would undergo additional ground testing in June-July prior to the next test launch.

At the same interview, it was revealed that sea trials of the Yury Dolgoruky, Russia's first Borey class strategic nuclear submarine, are due to start in the summer, and two other Borey class nuclear submarines - the Alexander Nevsky and the Vladimir Monomakh - are currently under construction at the Sevmash shipyard. They are expected to be completed in 2009 and 2011 respectively. Russia is planning to build a total of eight submarines of this class by 2015.

Some days you're the bug - others the windscreen

One of Russia's prototype Su-35's (SU-35BM) was destroyed earlier this week during testing. According to a plant spokesman, the prototype caught fire during take-off, but the pilot safely ejected:

"The accident occurred at 09.55 Moscow time [05.55 GMT] on Sunday at the Dzemgi airfield during the Su-35 prototype's take-off," Vitaly Tyulkin said, adding that the pilot ejected safely. "We will announce the details of the accident later in the day," he said.

According to the news report in Ria Novosti, speculation is centering on a faulty fuel pump. The aircraft was one of three Su-35 prototypes that incorporate improved engines and avionics (including the new Irbis-E AESA radar allowing automatic detection and tracking of up to 30 targets and engaging up to 8 of those) with the proven SU-27 airframe to create what is billed as a "4++ gen fighter with 5th generation features." The third prototype had been recently added to the program in hopes of speeding up test and development flights to 160 or so a month and stay ontrack for deliveries to the Russian air force, Malaysia and Algeria among others.

Aircraft carriers - everyone wants them it seems; India, China and now Russia talks about new plans:

A deputy minister for defense procurements, Vladimir Popovkin was quoted on a recent trip abroad as saying that final plans for the next generation of new Russian aircraft carrier will be finalized sometime in the 2011-2012 timeframe. Nuclear-powered and with an expected displacement of close to 60K metric tons (for comparison, the Kuznetsov is about 55K metric tons), the new carrier is expected to host new fixed- and rotary wing aircraft (ed. think a hummerinski will be amongst them this time? - SJS) to include a fifth generation fighter to replace the SU-33/MiG-29K currently employed. In one interesting note that hints at the possible configuration, Vice Adm. Anatoly Shlemov, the head of defense contracts at the United Shipbuilding Corporation noted that unlike past carriers, the new one would not be armed with cruise missiles as "that's not part of it's job description..." Cost is estimated at $4 billion.

While the next item may seem surprising, when one considers Turkey already deploys Russian-made anti-tank and has cooperated with the Chinese on SRBMs, it seems less so:

According to Ria Novosti, Turkey has approached Russia regarding purchase of the S-400:

"Turkey has expressed a strong interest in buying S-400 air defense systems from Russia," said Anatoly Aksenov, a high-level adviser to the head of Russian arms export firm Rosoboronexport. "We have explained to Turkish officials that S-400 is not just a simple air defense system but an element of strategic missile defenses, which can be placed in one country but protect the airspace over a number of neighboring countries," said a source who accompanied Aksenov as part of the Russian delegation to this year's International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul

The prospect of this sale raises questions on any one of a number of fronts. As Aksenov points out, the range of the S-400 is enough to provide defense to more than just the deploying nation. Given that there is no love lost between the Turks and Greeks, especially where Cyprus is involved, there may be something there (i.e., protection of Turk interests on Cyprus and in the Aegean). The same with Syria - no love lost there either. A more likely answer may lay to the east and southeast - towards one country (Israel) which has demonstrated an ability for long-range airstrikes that may have violated Turk airspace as well as an unacknowledged regional nuclear strike capability with its Jericho II MRBMs. Further to the east is another country that appears bent on acquiring nuclear weapons and certainly is working hard to develop and deploy a long-range missile system to deliver the weapons when able. The recent successful Safir SLV launch certainly imputes a nascent IRBM capability to Iran. Given the S-400's alternate role as part of a strategic (i.e., regional) missile defense system, Turkey may well be seeking an indigenous capability that will not rely on the US (which has been very busy in cooperative efforts with Israel to develop and build a multi-tiered BMD system for the protection of Israel) and provide protection from Israeli OR Iranian attack. To be sure, if Turkey goes through with the purchase, it would make it difficult to integrate with one of the US regional systems coming online - THAAD or land-based SM-3, for example.

То все для теперь - см. вас следующая неделя!

Bye, Bye Bandit...

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Mon, 27 Apr 2009 23:35:00 +0000

...and GTO.

GM puts a bullet in Pontiac, Saturn, Saab and Hummer.

And, of course, a greater share by the feds of the General...

The Ridiculous Not Restricted to DC

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Mon, 27 Apr 2009 23:33:00 +0000

Meantime, the denizens of NYC were, not surprisingly, alarmed at the sight of a large airliner being intercepted and escorted by a fighter near the site of the World Trade Center:

Yep, you're not seeing things - it's the 747 that serves as Air Force One on a photo op over downtown NYC...

But hey, it's ok - the director of the White House Military Office apologized...

Springtime in DC

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Mon, 27 Apr 2009 21:50:00 +0000

Ahhhh, just soak it in -- warm days, Dogwood blooming, pollen a dustin' and all around the city, the sap is rising:

Alas, for the poor dears - not as many this year as in years past because, you know, it's *expensive* coming to DC and what with the economy and all, mom and dad just couldn't spring for a spring break trip to DC this year...

More Hawkeye Pics

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Mon, 27 Apr 2009 01:09:00 +0000

Via Pinch, comes a bevy of new E-2D shots from NAVAIR:

Delta1 And 2 Presentation

View more presentations from Steeljaw Scribe.

Rememberig Columbine - 10 Years Later

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Mon, 20 Apr 2009 07:45:00 +0000

It began as an ordinary, early spring day - teachers going about their business of teaching students; students doing what normal high school students are wont to do. At 1140, itdramatically, tragically changed with 12 students and a teacher dead and 23 others physically wounded - many more emotionally scarred.

Two years, four months and 22 days later, another "ordinary" day would close with thousands dead and many more physically and emotionally scarred. At the Pentagon, among the hundreds and thousands of cards and remembrance banners received, there was one that is still etched in my memory, for I saw it on my way into the building each and every day the following weeks and months. It was a profoundly simple banner from the students, faculty and parents of Columbine HS that stated their support, love and remembrance.

Today, I return my own as we remember the events of that day ten years ago and the innocence lost. God bless you all. - SJS

This Date in Naval Aviation History: 15 Apr 1969 - Deep Sea 129

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Wed, 15 Apr 2009 02:10:00 +0000

The weak can be rash. The powerful must be restrained.- Secretary of State William Rogers, April 1969

For most of these past several weeks, international attention has been focused on the activities taking place near a peninsula on the north-east coast of Korea. There, despite protests and warnings from around the world, the North Koreans attempted to duplicate the success of another pariah state, Iran, and place a satellite in orbit atop a missile that also had ICBM capability. That effort failed in its stated intent, with the payload finding a watery grave in the broad ocean area of the Pacific, but the fact that the North Koreans defiantly carried out their intent should not have come as a surprise to international community. Indeed, roughly 100 nm east-north-east of the launch site is the site, unmarked, of another North Korean action undertaken in contravention of international norms. That spot is the terminus of Deep Sea 129’s final flight, now forty years ago this April 15th (Korea time, April 14th US).
Deep Sea 129 was a Navy EC-121 Warning Star operated by VQ-1. With a crew of 31 (8 officers and 23 enlisted), the flight launched from NAS Atsugi, Japan on what was known as a BEGGAR SHADOW mission to collect ELINT information off the Soviet port of Vladivostok. The big four-engined aircraft was originally designed and built as a land-based AEW follow-on to Project CADILLAC II’s PB-1W’s with a capability to haul a significantly larger and more powerful radar aloft, remain onstation much longer and carry a larger crew to support the expanded mission and endurance. All of those characteristics made it an ideal platform to modified for the PARPRO mission. PARPRO, the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance PROgram, covered the variety of airborne missions flown by US Army, Navy and Air Force crews near what was termed “denied territory” which constituted hostile nations such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea among others. These missions gathered information on radar and other electronic equipment (signals intelligence or SIGINT), communications such as those found at regional or sector air defense centers (communications intelligence or COMINT), photography of critical facilities or geographic features (PHOTOINT which later became imagery intelligence or IMINT) or a combination of COMINT and SIGNINT – ELINT. The program began shortly after WWII when it became apparent the Soviet Union had designs on expanding its reach in to western Europe, the Mediterranean and Far East. As an Iron Curtain was reigned down on the Soviet perimeter, the need for intelligence collection grew on the capabilities of Soviet forces. With the acquisition of the atomic bomb by the Soviets in 1949, the urgency of that requirement grew. Surprises, like the appearance of the MiG-15 jet fighter and China’s ground incursion during the Korean War underscored the importance of intelligence collection and the need for expanded coverage from the air and sea.
Most of the PARPRO missions were flown in international airspace – electronic signals don’t obey national borders, but some were flown immediately adjacent to and at times, across those same borders. Sometimes, the effort was safely completed, all too frequently it wasn’t. And sometimes, despite the fact the aircraft, or ships (viz. USS Liberty) were operating in international airspace or waters and clearly marked with US colors, they were still attacked. Some survived and were rescued or captured and disappeared into the Gulag – many never came back. That was Deep Sea 129’s lot.
There were no indications of possible hostile intent on the North Korean’s part when the WV-2 launched on the morning of the 15th, despite the capture of the USS Pueblo a bit over a year ago. Setting course for the operating area, a point off Musu Point where it would set up 120nm orbits focused on Vladivostok. Besides the Navy airmen onboard, there were 9 Naval Security Group cryptologists and Russian and Korean linguists onboard, including a Marine. The mission was under strict orders not to approach the Korean coast any closer than 50 nm and the two hundred-some odd flights in the past three months by USN and USAF aircraft on the BEGGAR SHADOW track had given no foreshadowing of possible action by the Koreans – but then, neither had there been for the Pueblo.
PARPRO missions, since the Gary Powers shootdown over Russia required monitoring and tracking by ground-based sites to serve as both a means of flight following and to provide warning if danger approached. That day, radar sites in Japan and Korea monitored Deep Sea 129’s mission, and the USAF 6918th Security Squadron at Hakata Air Station, Japan, and Detachment 1, 6922nd Security Wing at Osan Air Base monitored the North Korean reaction by intercepting its air defense search radar transmissions. Additionally, the Army Security Agency communications interception station at Osan listened to North Korean air defense radio traffic, and the Naval Security Group at Kamiseya, which provided the seven of the nine CTs aboard Deep Sea 129, also intercepted Soviet Air Force search radars. Still, there was no airborne escort and it would take several minutes, long agonizing minutes, for interceptors to be airborne and reach the Warning Star’s OPAREA should it come under attack. But with nothing showing on the boards that would lead commanders to think otherwise, no alerts were moved up or placed airborne.
It is an axiom of aviation that a problem in the developing stages tends to be slow and stealthy, but in the final stage it reaches completion in a rush. Thus an incipient icing condition builds slowly, steadily stealing lift until an aviator finds himself in an impossible coffin corner of airspeed, maneuverability and altitude with fatal results. So too did the final hour of Deep Sea 129’s mission progress.
At 1234 local, radar and listening posts reported the launch of suspected Mi-21’s in North Korea. Alerted, the larger monitoring network pricked it’s electronic ears and eyes to attempt and see and hear more. Deep Sea 129 completing a 1300L “ops normal” report to parent squadron VQ-1 and twenty-two minutes later the MiG’s were lost, not being re-acquired until 1337L. Alerted, VQ-1 passed a “Condition 3” report to the Warning Star indicating a possible intercept might be in progress. LCDR Overstreet, plane an mission commander for the flight, acknowledged the report and instituted abort procedures to terminate the mission. At 1337L the radar tracks of the MiG’s and Deep Sea 129 merged with radar and radio contact with the EC-121 and its crew lost two minutes later.
No CAP was launched and while a rescue effort was launched later that day, and eventually expanded to include over 20 aircraft, no debris was sighted until the following morning – which just happened to have been recovered by two Soviet destroyers in the area. When US ships arrived on the scene that evening, the USS Henry W. Tucker (DD 875) recovered a piece of the aircraft, riddled with shrapnel. The bodies of LTJG Joseph R. Ribar and AT1 Richard E. Sweeney were also recovered, the only ones thus so. The Soviet ships turned over what wreckage they had recovered to the US ships who then returned to Japan.
North Korea not only acknowledged the shoot down, they loudly and boastfully celebrated their action. President Nixon suspended PARPRO flights in the Sea of Japan for three days and then allowed them to resume, only with escorts. No reparations were ever paid to the US or the families of the lost airmen.
And Kim Il-Sung celebrated another birthday (April 15th).
The crew of Deep Sea 129:
LCDR James H. Overstreet,
LT John N. Dzema,
LT Dennis B. Gleason,
LT Peter P. Perrottey,
LT John H. Singer,
LT Robert F. Taylor,
LTJG Joseph R. Ribar,
LTJG Robert J. Sykora,
LTJG Norman E. Wilkerson,
ADRC Marshall H. McNamara,
CTC Frederick A. Randall,
CTC Richard E. Smith,
AT1 Richard E. Sweeney,
AT1 James Leroy Roach,
CT1 John H. Potts,
ADR1 Ballard F. Conners,
AT1 Stephen C. Chartier,
AT1 Bernie J. Colgin,
ADR2 Louis F. Balderman,
ATR2 Dennis J. Horrigan,
ATN2 Richard H. Kincaid,
ATR2 Timothy H. McNeil,
CT2 Stephen J. Tesmer,
ATN3 David M. Willis,
CT3 Philip D. Sundby,
AMS3 Richard T. Prindle,
CT3 John A. Miller,
AEC LaVerne A. Greiner,
ATN3 Gene K. Graham,
CT3 Gary R. DuCharme,
SSGT Hugh M. Lynch,(US Marine Corps).

Underway ... Again

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Tue, 14 Apr 2009 23:17:00 +0000

Well, pulling the old blog out of mothballs and getting underway again. Seems certain organizations just can't get their blocking software to work uniformly across the net. Of course, for those of us who have experienced first hand those same organization's abilities at more mundane matters, like, oh, maybe migrating user's domains, we aren't very surprised...

So here's the gameplan. Check the mothership first, if no joy, pogo this.
Steeljaw sends...

Come on Over...

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Mon, 02 Feb 2009 23:21:00 +0000

...the water's great!

If by chance you have landed here from another site or print article, the location of the current/active site is http://steeljawscribe.com See you over there!
- SJS

Changes, changes, changes...

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Sun, 30 Dec 2007 23:42:00 +0000

First - not to worry - we've just re-directed you to the old site whilst doing some work on the current site. Because, you see despite the best efforts of the distaff side yesterday with an unplanned site mod to the den (which we wrapped up in the wee-hours of the night with the last a/v cable re-zip-tied in place, btw) - plan on seeing some major changes around here with the New Year. Fear not - the favorites will remain and it won't be going off on a wild-@$$ tangent, just some changes. And afterall, change is good...n'est ce pas ? See you in the New Year...back over at http://steeljawscribe.com

Well - shoot...

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Mon, 12 Nov 2007 14:02:00 +0000

Hi all -

If you're reading this post it's *probably* because you've been redirected from the primary site, http://steeljawscribe.com

This is because:

Your humble, all thumbs scribe has managed to hose up the upgrade/maintenance work (a phrase from an ancient and salty Maintenance Master Chief comes to mind re. aircrew and toolboxes, but this is a family blog...) or
The host is having database or other "issues"

So...check the link above - if it looks like the problem is going to be prolonged we'll post here until it is resolved.
- SJS

New Site

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Fri, 08 Jun 2007 08:17:00 +0000

I have shifted my pennant to a new site:

http://steeljawscribe.com

Looking forward to seeing you over there!
- SJS

Midway 65 Years Later - Lessons Learned

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Thu, 07 Jun 2007 11:41:00 +0000

"I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success." - Fleet Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto

In racing there is a saying - 'luck is where preparation meets opportunity' Perhaps there is no truer an example than the Battle of Midway. Popular literature seems to emphasize the American forces stumbling into a heaven-sent scenario of laden carrier decks and little to no opposition to the dive bombers, while giving short shrift to the preparation that enabled them to make use of that opportunity. How so?

COMINT: Communications Intelligence - the US code breakers labored mightily to figure out what the IJN was up to. Were it not for their efforts prior to Midway, and some particularly inspired thinking and risk taking, the US may well have fallen for the feint up to Alaska and end up caught in the trap laid by Yamamoto.

Damage Control: Had the crew of the Yorktown not been so proficient in DC, particularly something as seemingly mundane as draining the avgas lines and filling them with inert gas prior to the battle of Coral Sea, the Yorktown may very well have been lost, leaving CINCPAC with only two carriers facing four, forcing a different battle plan. Conversely, the almost lackadaisical approach the Japanese took in repairing Shokaku's damage or replinishing Zuikaku's air wing and repairing her light damage from Coral Sea's action ensured their nonavailability for Midway, keeping the balance of forces on a razor's edge.

Training: The contrast between USN and USMC effectiveness in employing dive bombers at Midway was signatory. Using the same platform (SBD-3's) USN pilots scored major hits while minimizing losses to AAA and fighters, whereas the Marines suffered significant losses for little, if any gain. The difference? Tactics, training and procedures or TTP (yes, we know -ugh, one of those modern terms...) - the Navy employed steep, usually 70-degree, dives on the target whereas the Marines used much shallower, gliding approaches. The former minimizes your exposure time and profile to AAA and fighters while increasing the likelihood of a hit. However, it requires considerable practice at obtaining the proper dive angle, avoiding target fixation and knowing how/when to pullout of the dive and avoid over-stressing the airframe. Lots of practice, underscoring the maxim about training like you are going to fight...

Employment of forces: The Japanese were the first to employ massed striking power using carriers and the strike at Pearl (and subsequent actions through SE Asia and the IO) validated the philosophy. The problem was the Japanese failed to comprehend the inherent flexibility of carrier-based air and thus eschewed opportunities to utilize it in other scenarios, such as scouting, which in turn, led to less than robust search plans and reliance on out-dated search aircraft and methodologies. Curiously, the Japanese broke this rule in planning the Aleutian invasion, diverting forces on a mission of questionable value and success for territory that would prove to be exceptionally harsh on man and machine while yielding little, if any strategic value outside of propaganda for an overly wrought plan of entrapment. This leads to questions of planning...

Planning/Command: In studied contrast to the run-up at Pearl, Japanese planning for Midway was poorly thought out, egregiously evaluated and gamed and haphazardly executed (cf: the entire submarine picket plan). Indeed, it was put together and executed in such a toxic atmosphere of arrogance and bluster that even when one of the final wargame sessions showed American forces gaining an upper-hand because of gaps in the air search pattern, referees for the wargame manipulated the environment and other factors to bring about a successful conclusion for Kido Butai. As for dealing with changing factors at sea, commanders were loath to step outside the boundaries of the plan and demonstrate initiative. In studied contrast were the actions of the Americans from Nimitz's orders based on calculated risk to Dick Best's last minute change in targets.

Luck indeed smiled on the Americans that day, but she did not grab them by the hand (or scruff of the neck) and tell them what must be done in PowerPoint bulletized format. She merely opened the door, a crack, and offered a fleeting moment to change the course of the battle...the Americans grasped it and changed the direction of the war.

Review the list above - these are timeless lessons learned, every bit as applicable today as they were 65 year ago. My observations lead me to believe we are ignoring them at our future peril.

(ed. This is the last in the Midway series, one that YHS has thoroughly enjoyed working on and fielding your comments. There are some other items of note in work - such as a Flightdeck Friday on the USS Macon with some interesting original source material passed my way and, hopefully soon, breaking out my pennant on a new site. More to follow. - SJS)

65th Anniversary of the Battle of Midway: 4/5 June - Forces Engaged

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Mon, 04 Jun 2007 14:19:00 +0000

In carrying out the task assigned … you will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of our forces without good prospect on inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage on the enemy. (Extract from CINCPAC Operational Order to TF 17 Commander)

In every battle there is a moment when the combatants, and the world, seem to catch their breath. It is a fleeting moment, lost in the blink of an eye. But in that same blink, everything changes. Such moments are borne of desperation, of courage, of plain dumb luck. But they are pivotal - for what was before is forever changed afterwards.

Until 1019 on the morning of 4/5 June 1942, things had gone badly for the US and its allies. With few exceptions, the Allies were fighting a losing battle in the Pacific. Indeed, as events unfolded that morning, it appeared as of the rout was on. The attacks by land-based air forces from Midway had utterly failed culminating in the loss of many aircraft. The strikes by the torpedo aircraft were decimated - an entire squadron of TBDs shot down with only a sole survivor to claim witness. An entire airgroup missed the Japanese carriers and the battle altogether and of the remaining forces, they were scattered and disorganized. The future was looking grim.

At 1019, Hiryu's senior lookout shouted he had spotted dive bombers attacking Kaga from overhead. Despite being thrown into a hard turn, Kaga was struck by a 500 lb bomb and then successive strikes utterly crushed her...

At 1024 Soryu was struck a mighty series of blows...

At 1026, LT Dick Best led a flight of two other SBDs away from Kaga in an attack on Akagi. Attacking in a "V" formation from a right-hand turn, history held its breath as the first bomb missed and the third narrowly missed the carrier. But the second bomb, a 1,000 pounder from LT Best's aircraft bore through the aft edge of the elevator and exploded in the upper reaches of the Akagi's hangar bay, in the midst of the refueled/rearming aircraft parked there. In the blink of an eye, fate turned and three carriers lay burning.

To be sure the battle was not over and a dreadful price remained to be extracted from the American carriers. Likewise, Kido Butai had not seen the last of the Americans either and would pay the final price later in that day.

Across a seaborne canvass that stretched over 176,000 sq nm, larger than the country of Sweden (as Parshall & Tully observe) the battle see-sawed back and forth. No other naval engagment has seen such breath-taking distances involved and few, short of a Trafalgar, have seen such a decisive turn of events. We honor today those who fought and gave their all in this signatory battle.

- SJS

_____

Notes:

1) Previous postings this series:

2) To appreciate the sweep of events and the timescale involved, the reader is recommended to view the history of the battle as laid out over at Historyanimated, located here for the Battle of Midway.

Countdown to Midway: 3 June – First Contact

noreply@blogger.com (Steeljaw Scribe) — Sun, 03 Jun 2007 17:36:00 +0000

WEDNESDAY, 3 JUNE 1942

ALASKA: In an attempt to divert forces from the Midway area, a Japanese carrier-based bombers and fighters bomb and strafe Ft Mears and Dutch Harbor in several waves inflicting little damage but killing 52 US personnel. P-40s from Cold Bay trying to intercept them arrive 10 minutes after the last attack wave departs. Other P-40s at Umnak are notified too late due to communication failure. 9 P-40s and 6 B-26s fly a patrol but cannot find the fleet-l80 miles (288 km) S of Dutch Harbor- but 2 of the P-40s engage 4 carrier-based aircraft, shoot down one and damage another. An A6M2 Zero fighter crashes in the Aleutian Islands and is discovered intact five weeks later. It is shipped to the United States for testing and evaluation. (ed. – this is the Zero that the urban legend about the design of the F6F sprang from; in fact, the F6F will fly for the first time in a little over 3 weeks from today’s date)

Alaska - Japanese occupy Kiska and Attu in the Aleutians.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (CBI) THEATER OF OPERATIONS: A flight of 6 B-25s of the 11th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 7th Bombardment Group (Heavy), earmarked for China, take off from Dinjan, India for China. They bomb Lashio, Burma en route to Kunming, but afterward 9 crashed into an overcast-hidden mountain at 10,000 feet (3,048 m) and another is abandoned when it runs out of fuel near Chan-i, China. The remaining 2 B-25's reach Kunming, China, 1 with its radio operator killed by a fighter.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA, 7th Air Force):

Preliminary action begins in the Battle of Midway …

On the morning of 3 June 1942 (4 Jun as the calendar was observed by the ships of Kido Butai), elements of Tanaka’s invasion force were discovered by PBYs flying out of Midway. Fist detection of the supporting minesweepers came @ 0830L and followed by another sighting by a different PBY forty-five minutes later (the infamous “Main Body” report). This was a good 700 nm from Midway and after Midway’s air commander satisfied himself it wasn’t the carriers, a long range strike by the Midway-based B-17’s was launched. Indicative of the distances the coming battle would be fought, the first attack force reached Tanaka’s ships around four hours later. Setting up for their runs from 8 to 12 thousand feet above the force, Tanaka’s ships did not react until the bombs were starting to explode around them. Maneuvering to avoid hits, all the ships escaped being hit, despite claims by the returning bombers of having hit and damaged or sunk five large ships.

As alluded to above, the distances in this theater of battle were huge – how each side developed and implemented their search surveillance plan would be critical. At this stage of the war, radar was not available for use in search aircraft with large, ungainly sets and antennas being the province of ships. Even then, the limitations of the radar horizon (straight-line distance to the Earths horizon. Below which surface and low flying targets could not be seen) which was approximately 30 -40 miles, severely constrained the employment of radar for now. Instead, scouting was to be carried out by land- and ship-based aircraft (ship-based only for Japan), one of the original missions envisioned for aircraft in their early naval days. Additionally, picket lines of submarines would be used to form a warning barrier that would be tripped by passage of the other side’s carriers.

The scouting aircraft used by the Japanese were either the Type 95 float plane (a range-limited bi-plane) or the fewer in number Aichi E31A Jake Type 0 float plane. Commonly found on heavy cruisers and battle ships, the former was found in far greater numbers the morning of 3 June. As such, because of the range demands, the limited numbers of Jakes were pressed into service. With a crew of three (pilot, bombardier and gunner) the Jake had a combat/search radius of about 600-650 nm. The search plan for Kido Butai had Jakes launching from Akagi, Kaga, Tone (2) and Chikuma (2). Flying out on assigned radials originating from Kido Butai’s center, each plane would fan out to 300 nm, turn left for 60 nm and then fly back to the origin point (see illustration below). At the patrol altitude of 1200-2000 ft, an optical search swath of about 25 nm, centered on the plane’s ground track could be maintained. Absent any other factors or tipper information, it was a chancy plan at best. Tipper information would come from tripwire notification passed by the submarine pickets as they picked up the carriers leaving Oahu. Except that by the time the subs arrived, the carriers had already left.

Contrast that search plan with the American plan – with 127 search aircraft (primarily PBYs backed up by thirty plus Marine SBDs as well as the B-17’s) on Midway, the Americans already had a more robust search capability. The PBY’s range was double that of the Japanese scouts and with a crew of 9, able to cover a search area. The American subs were also on station as well. But perhaps the most important distinction was the difference in employment of carrier air for scouting/search. Unlike the US, which had scouting squadrons assigned to the CVs (usually with SBDs assigned), the IJN did not employ carrier air. The primary reason goes back to operational philosophy and employment. The IJN was the first to use massed carriers to effectively employ carrier-based air. As such, they did not believe in dissipating any CV-based assets via scouting missions, preferring instead to reserve the force for massed attacks on the target(s) once located. The implications of this differing philosophy would be seen in the following day’s battle.

Later that evening, PBYs carrying jury-rigged torpedoes conduct a night attack on the supporting forces. One torpedo finds a target, impacting and detonating on the bow of a fleet oiler. Though slowed by the damage, it manages to rejoin the supporting fleet. Ironically, this would be the only successful airborne torpedo attack of the coming battle...