<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:blogger='http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005" xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417</id><updated>2024-09-04T23:42:44.861+01:00</updated><category term="POSIWID"/><category term="automation"/><category term="Ashby"/><category term="StaffordBeer"/><category term="VSM"/><category term="complexity"/><category term="stakeholder"/><category term="trust"/><title type='text'>System Viability and Corporate Governance</title><subtitle type='html'>A systems engineering view of regulation and compliance, including Sarbanes-Oxley.</subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default?redirect=false'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>23</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>25</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-3935370435841548836</id><published>2007-05-10T12:11:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2007-05-10T12:13:43.843+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="POSIWID"/><title type='text'>New POSIWID Materials</title><summary type="text">POSIWID lens (edited by Richard Veryard)POSIWID wiki (edited by Amicus Rex)</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/3935370435841548836'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/3935370435841548836'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2007/05/new-posiwid-materials.html' title='New POSIWID Materials'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-110052563770273754</id><published>2004-11-15T13:04:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-11-15T13:33:57.703+00:00</updated><title type='text'>Shareholder Democracy</title><summary type="text">According to John Plender, the biggest curiosity of US corporate governance is that shareholders&#39; votes on directors&#39; appointments at annual meetings have no force. Shareholders can &quot;withhold&quot; their votes, but even if more than 50 per cent do so the gesture is purely symbolic and the company can continue on the management&#39;s chosen path. Plender comments: &quot;This shareholder democracy is about as </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/110052563770273754'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/110052563770273754'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/11/shareholder-democracy.html' title='Shareholder Democracy'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-109128529245211559</id><published>2004-07-31T15:47:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2004-07-31T15:48:12.453+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Commitment and Self-Interest</title><summary type="text">Standard investment advice is to diversify. Among other things, this means that it&#39;s not a good idea to hold significant quantities of shares in your own company, since you are doubly exposed if the company fails. (Think Enron.)Meanwhile, it is widely supposed that the company&#39;s interests are served if the directors and employees have an investment stake in the company as well as an employment </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/109128529245211559'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/109128529245211559'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/07/commitment-and-self-interest.html' title='Commitment and Self-Interest'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-109028024744559676</id><published>2004-07-20T00:27:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2004-07-20T00:37:27.446+01:00</updated><title type='text'>AIIM Survey</title><summary type="text">Emperor&#39;s New Clothes AIIM Survey Shows Organizations Face Internal and External Barriers in Adapting to New Compliance Environment  Press Release Report in Business Intelligence Pipeline Download PDF  </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/109028024744559676'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/109028024744559676'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/07/aiim-survey.html' title='AIIM Survey'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-108941327180915193</id><published>2004-07-09T23:46:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2004-07-09T23:55:25.940+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Excuses</title><summary type="text">Once upon a time, the standard excuse for bureaucratic incompetence was the computer. Sorry sir, we’d love to help you but the computer won’t let us, the computer is down, the computer is so scary you wouldn’t want to upset it now would you?This excuse isn’t used so much nowadays. This could mean that computer systems have gotten better, or it could simply mean there are now too many computer </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/108941327180915193'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/108941327180915193'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/07/excuses.html' title='Excuses'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107784522867690193</id><published>2004-02-27T01:22:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-02-27T01:29:59.686+00:00</updated><title type='text'>Compliance Machine</title><summary type="text">Trevor has drawn our attention to the recent move by Barclays Bank, which uses a product called Raft Radar from Raft International.Does Raft Radar count as a compliance machine?  How does the Raft solution compare with Trevor&#39;s?</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107784522867690193'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107784522867690193'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/02/compliance-machine.html' title='Compliance Machine'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107784489281372198</id><published>2004-02-27T01:16:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-05-10T01:33:52.503+01:00</updated><title type='text'>404 is the key</title><summary type="text">SEC Press Release http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-21.htmSome internet sources suggest an alternative explanation for the delay - that there is some confusion about the role of auditors.  Now where have we heard that before?!?</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107784489281372198'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107784489281372198'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/02/404-is-key.html' title='404 is the key'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107628613851419676</id><published>2004-02-09T00:15:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-02-09T00:25:10.436+00:00</updated><title type='text'>Chris Johnson</title><summary type="text">Bill, I assume you&#39;re talking about the Chris Johnson who is head of the Glasgow Accident Analysis Group.There is a lot of impressive-looking Safety Critical material here, but how do you see this could transfer to the Corporate Governance domain? </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107628613851419676'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107628613851419676'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/02/chris-johnson.html' title='Chris Johnson'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107597771892510177</id><published>2004-02-05T10:32:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-02-05T10:44:20.123+00:00</updated><title type='text'>Compliance Machine (Functional Requirements and Quality Constraints)</title><summary type="text">Trevor has usefully stated some of the general quality constraints for the compliance machine.  Easy installation and configuration, low/remote management, non-intrusive, and so on.What we now need is a clear summary of what the machine will actually do.  Trevor proposes to build one and show us.  In the meantime, perhaps the rest of us can discuss what we are hoping that Trevor will be able to</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107597771892510177'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107597771892510177'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/02/compliance-machine-functional_05.html' title='Compliance Machine (Functional Requirements and Quality Constraints)'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107576983950641519</id><published>2004-02-03T00:50:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-02-03T00:59:37.840+00:00</updated><title type='text'>Compliance Machine</title><summary type="text">I like Trevor&#39;s concept of a compliance machine. This could presumably be deployed in a range of management contexts, including second-party audit (monitoring your trading partners) and third-party (new style independent audit).What are the general requirements for such a compliance machine?  Can we articulate a small list of high-level design principles?</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107576983950641519'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107576983950641519'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/02/compliance-machine_03.html' title='Compliance Machine'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107576858473077955</id><published>2004-02-03T00:34:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2011-10-20T22:02:23.077+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="automation"/><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="stakeholder"/><title type='text'>Rebalancing Power Proximity and Interest</title><summary type="text">Agency theory says that the agent (e.g, the management) has many opportunities to behave in ways that are against the interests of the principal (e.g the shareholder).  This can be explained by an uneven distribution of power (the agent has too much) and proximity (the principal has too little). Technology potentially provides greater proximity for those with a legitimate interest.  It brings </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107576858473077955'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107576858473077955'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/02/rebalancing-power-proximity-and.html' title='Rebalancing Power Proximity and Interest'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107572218497908951</id><published>2004-02-02T11:39:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2008-11-22T12:08:19.807+00:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="automation"/><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="POSIWID"/><title type='text'>Collaboration</title><summary type="text">Prompted by Bill&#39;s message, I had a quick read of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Draft Revised Text, Jan 2004.“Shareholders … should be allowed to consult with each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights … subject to some possible exceptions regarding inappropriate collusion.”In other words, collaboration is allowed for some purposes and not for others.  In </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107572218497908951'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107572218497908951'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/02/collaboration.html' title='Collaboration'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107559330495665149</id><published>2004-01-31T23:34:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2011-04-16T22:35:38.168+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Ashby"/><title type='text'>What is Intelligence Amplification?</title><summary type="text">Principia Cybernetica definitionTribute to W Ross Ashby by George J. KlirTribute to W Ross Ashby by Roger Conant</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107559330495665149'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107559330495665149'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/what-is-intelligence-amplification.html' title='What is Intelligence Amplification?'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107541942606647176</id><published>2004-01-29T23:36:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-01-29T23:41:00.530+00:00</updated><title type='text'>BBC and Hutton</title><summary type="text">Sequence of events.  Secret meeting between an unidentified government scientist and a BBC journalist.  Inaccurate reporting by the journalist, apparently quoting the scientist as impugning the integrity and honesty of Government and one named adviser.  Major row between Government and BBC.  Government scientist identified, publically interrogated, committed suicide.Independent investigation </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107541942606647176'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107541942606647176'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/bbc-and-hutton.html' title='BBC and Hutton'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107537267613090132</id><published>2004-01-29T10:09:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-01-29T10:41:10.670+00:00</updated><title type='text'>Competition and Peer Pressure</title><summary type="text">Why do people not strive for excellence?  There are sometimes social pressures involved.  Think of stroppy gangs of schoolchildren, and the social pressures that sometimes militate against excellence in many schools. Parents fight to get their children into &quot;hothouse&quot; schools, where pupils compete for academic excellence - although the psychological pressures in these schools can also be damaging</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107537267613090132'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107537267613090132'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/competition-and-peer-pressure.html' title='Competition and Peer Pressure'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107532573082650442</id><published>2004-01-28T21:34:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-01-29T21:01:07.653+00:00</updated><title type='text'>Blog Structure (Strawman)</title><summary type="text">Comments anyone?blogstructure.ppt</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107532573082650442'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107532573082650442'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/blog-structure-strawman.html' title='Blog Structure (Strawman)'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107516847149245616</id><published>2004-01-27T01:40:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2011-04-16T22:32:12.657+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="StaffordBeer"/><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="VSM"/><title type='text'>Alerts, Alarms and Algedonic Signals</title><summary type="text">Trevor writesThe SEC, FSA or whoever can receive automatic alerts if anything odd is going on ...Some houses have burglar alarms, linked to the local police station.  Many people have car alarms loud enough to wake the street.  Smart burglars may simply go around creating events to trigger the alarms, thus generating enough apparently false positives to subvert the social system on which the</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107516847149245616'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107516847149245616'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/alerts-alarms-and-algedonic-signals.html' title='Alerts, Alarms and Algedonic Signals'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107512734326130471</id><published>2004-01-26T14:18:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2007-05-07T02:52:05.661+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="POSIWID"/><title type='text'>The Old Guard</title><summary type="text">Aidan talks about the possible perversion of the system by &quot;old purposes&quot;.One converse of POSIWID - when you find a purpose surviving, look for the system whose purpose it is.  Existing power bases will obviously look for ways of preserving power.  The Old Guard.So there may be two or more different systems in play, each attempting to exploit Trevor&#39;s mechanisms to different ends.  The </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107512734326130471'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107512734326130471'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/old-guard.html' title='The Old Guard'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107507606207430302</id><published>2004-01-25T23:57:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-01-26T00:16:29.153+00:00</updated><title type='text'>New Reporting Models for Business</title><summary type="text">Bill&#39;s latest message talks about the Baldrige award.  This US-based award is approximately equivalent to the European Quality Award, administered by the EFQM.The Institute of Chartered Accountants (England &amp; Wales) has produced a discussion document on various alternative reporting models.  It can be downloaded from the following URL (pdf format).  http://www.icaew.co.uk/viewer/index.cfm?AUB</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107507606207430302'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107507606207430302'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/new-reporting-models-for-business.html' title='New Reporting Models for Business'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107490250037899846</id><published>2004-01-23T23:50:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-01-24T14:12:59.140+00:00</updated><title type='text'>Global accounting problems</title><summary type="text">Excellent article by John Plender in the Financial Times Thursday 22nd Januaryhttp://search.ft.com/search/article.html?id=040122000023</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107490250037899846'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107490250037899846'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/global-accounting-problems.html' title='Global accounting problems'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107463602210932541</id><published>2004-01-20T21:59:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2007-05-10T10:36:32.967+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="complexity"/><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="POSIWID"/><title type='text'>Complexity: Devious Management and Investment Risk</title><summary type="text">A common feature of much recent malfeasance is the construction of highly complex corporate structures, apparently beyond the legitimate demands of Requisite Variety.Complexity – whether requisite or otherwise – adds to investment risk.  Dodgy management practices may cause a continuous erosion of corporate value, or they may trigger a sudden collapse of value (Enron, Parmalat).  Some companies </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107463602210932541'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107463602210932541'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/complexity-devious-management-and.html' title='Complexity: Devious Management and Investment Risk'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107452164832373263</id><published>2004-01-19T14:07:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2011-04-16T22:36:32.660+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="trust"/><title type='text'>Independent Vision</title><summary type="text">Bill writesWhen you tire of this looping exercise of the intellect in foresight v hindsight, you must select one operating platform or the other. Go for &quot;judgment&quot; or go for &quot;evidence.&quot; A combination is forbidden, don&#39;t bother.I disagree with this Either/Or.  What&#39;s wrong with Both/And.  One of the most important lessons in systems thinking I got from reading Bateson was the necessity of </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107452164832373263'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107452164832373263'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/independent-vision.html' title='Independent Vision'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6323417.post-107451704192596791</id><published>2004-01-19T12:56:00.000+00:00</published><updated>2004-01-19T12:59:19.543+00:00</updated><title type='text'>SEC 404</title><summary type="text">Would someone kindly provide a summary of Section 404.  Is there a convenient URL for the whole thing?</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107451704192596791'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6323417/posts/default/107451704192596791'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://systemviabilityandcorporategovernance.blogspot.com/2004/01/sec-404.html' title='SEC 404'/><author><name>Richard Veryard</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='32' src='//blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ-ct1uAH0nWo_0j30dxF5V4ntq0GLrf8nE52s7GRu0XK6-FUVW3q4rnctNTEZytpyFAxiuRCuhmldp5OVT7hcr4w7RI-EdDeFCC_VYK445cazJmEZiaJAewFA8CoXj0E/s220/RV20161118a.jpg'/></author></entry></feed>