“Battle for Right of Way”

Word that possession of the gap was in doubt hastened Ricketts march. At Haymarket all unnecessary equipment was discarded into large piles. Skirmishers were posted and a rapid march toward the firing was commenced. About one mile from the gap the advancing column ran into Wyndham’s retreating troopers. Having been impressed with the growing numbers of Confederates flowing into the fight Wyndham had opted to preserve his command.  Longstreet now controlled the Gap. It would be up to the advance (Stiles) to seal the exit. It was a tall order for the rookie brigade from Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.  Stiles (commanding for the ill BG George Hartsuff) was unfamiliar with the brigade having come from Zealous Tower’s brigade to assume command and they were marching into an unknown situation. Nevertheless they pushed forward vigorously.

The one positive that Stiles had was the prior knowledge of the Gap held by the 11^th Pennsylvania. COL Richard Coulter’s men had spent the previous spring in occupation duty there and assumed the lead. After a momentary delay to maneuver through some of Wyndham’s obstacles the 11^th and a portion of the 12^th Massachusetts (Co. H) bumped into the 9^th Georgia. The Georgians had not expected further resistance after dispatching the Federal cavalry and were caught somewhat unprepared. After a smattering of musketry COL Benjamin Beck ordered his men to retire, leaving behind eight men taken prisoner. They moved back to Chapman’s Mill where they met Anderson’s advancing supports. As they formed a line at the mill the pause allowed the Federals to deploy the 12^th and 13^th Massachusetts on Coulter’s left and more importantly four guns of Battery F, 1^st Pennsylvania Artillery (CPT Ezra Matthews) and two from Battery C (CPT James Thompson) of the same unit. The Union line advanced on the Confederate position at the mill.

The large stone eminence of Chapman’s Mill was easily the most recognizable man made feature in the gap. The mill, built in 1742 by Jonathan and Nathaniel Chapman, by 1862 stood an imposing seven stories over the little level ground around it. Powered by Broad Run it had long been a prosperous business enterprise but now it served only as cover for Georgians seeking shelter from the Union artillery.  The reorganized Confederates stopped the Federal advance with a volley from the well concealed men of Anderson’s line. As the Confederates maintained their cover behind the mill and its outbuildings it became obvious that any attempt to drive down the center of the gap would be suicidal. Division commander Jones recognized that a different plan had to be made.

Jones called for Colonel Benning and ordered him onto the mountain on the south side of the gap.  Benning sent the 20th Georgia, up the incline as skirmishers, and strengthened them with additional men from the 2^nd Georgia. This key terrain was also recognized by Ricketts who sent skirmishers from the 13^th Massachusetts, on the Union left to secure it as well.  The Twentieth won the race to the top by less than one hundred yards. The Georgians maintained their advantage, by driving the Federal skirmishers away with a “spirited fusillade.” After the 2^nd Georgia arrived the position was solidified.

Realizing that the Federal advantage lie in the power of their artillery (the Confederates had none deployed) to control the Gap, Benning selected somewhere between 50-60 troops with long-range rifles and pushed them forward to an advanced position. They took a Union battery under fire at a range of about 400 yards. As the Confederates peppered the position the Union artillery thought better of their role and moved out of action. The situation at the gap stabilized, but the Confederates were unable to gain a decisive advantage. In the rear Lee (traveling with this portion of his army) and Longstreet consulted about means to shorten the affair to meet their expected link up time with Jackson.

 Passage Gained

With Jackson expecting their arrival Lee and Longstreet searched for means to circumvent the Union defense in the gap. A prolonged struggle would put them behind schedule and endanger Jackson. A flanking effort was determined to be necessary. Cadmus Wilcox was sent north with three brigades to pass through Hopewell Gap and come back down in Ricketts’ rear. Lee realized however that the move, although militarily sound, would take until the next morning to complete. He was unwilling to wait for the completion of the move. Searching for an alternative a local man stepped forward and announced that could guide men over Mother Leathercoat (the northern mountain forming the gap) on a little known trail. The proposal represented a significantly shorter route to Ricketts’ flank and the plan was quickly adopted by Lee and Longstreet.

The steep climb started with Law’s men pulling themselves forward by grasping the foliage in front of them. Unfortunately, the guide may have overstated his knowledge of the supposed trail. Law was unimpressed with the man’s guidance. His suspicion was confirmed when halfway up the mountain the man declared he could lead them no further. Law angrily dismissed him but refused to give up the mission. He set out scouts to search a way over the mountain. Near the crest a small opening in the sheer face was found. One by one the men (about one thousand) hoisted and pulled each other through the passage. When enough men had been gathered on the far side of the obstacle Law formed a skirmish line and started down the reverse slope.

Following the sound of the continuing fight Law’s line emerged on the flank of a Federal battery. Fearing he did not have enough to silence the enemy guns Law waited for the remainder of his brigade. As they assembled he again pushed out skirmishers. The growing force was impossible to hide and Riketts sent the 84^th Pennsylvania to cover his artillery. As Law’s advance clashed with the 84^th the Federal battery loaded up their guns and moved off. Desperately hoping to extend the battle into night Ricketts was doing everything but calling on his reserves to hold back the Confederate tide. Although the 84^th managed to stop Law bad news from his left convinced Ricketts that he had done all he could. The 13^th Massachusetts was being driven down the slope of Pond Mountain (the southern mountain forming the gap) by the 20^th and 2^nd Georgia. Deprived of some of his artillery support and a collapsing left flank Ricketts decided enough was enough. Finding his position “untenable and all efforts to take the pass unavailing” he decided to not commit more troops to a losing battle. He called for a retreat. Using the remaining artillery to cover the withdrawal of his infantry the fight for the gap ended. Ricketts marched his men back through Bristoe, where they buried two of the wounded that did not survive the nighttime trip in the ambulances, and rejoined the III corps on the 29^th. They would play a large role in the coming debacle at Manassas.

Anxiously awaiting the outcome at the gap Longstreet wasted no time when their victory was announced. By morning of the 29^th his men were bivouacked at the eastern exit to the gap. From there they moved on unimpeded to join Jackson.  Forming opposite the Federal left flank where they would again be ignored by Pope. The short fight for the gap resulted in only about 100 casualties; most by the 11^th Pennsylvania (18K and 37 w) the most important result of the battle would not be felt until August 30^th.

Conclusion and Assessment

Some minor criticism has been leveled at the Union commanders for the loss of the gap but for the most part Wyndham and Ricketts can hardly be blamed for the failure to prevent the unification of Lee’s army at Manassas. Theirs was a very credible effort.  They had been told that a two hour delay of Longstreet would ensure the destruction of Jackson’s Corps. They held the exit to the  gap at long odds for more than four hours while Pope frittered away his opportunity with a series of disjointed and fruitless assaults on Jackson’s position. The failure belongs to Pope and McDowell. Pope became so fixated on Jackson that he ignored the tactical necessity of preventing his reinforcement. An early recognition of this fact might have allowed the Federals to seize the western end of the gap in force. Such a deployment would cause Longstreet to seek alternative routes, which could be countered on the shorter inside track, or accept a lengthy battle for the Gap. McDowell, to his credit, realized that such an effort would be of value but dedicated insufficient force to the task. If he had opted to ignore Pope’s order with his entire Corps instead of a single division Longstreet may have been stopped or at least further delayed somewhere near Haymarket. Instead Longstreet moved without further resistance toward Manassas where Pope continued to ignore reports of his presence and was eventually crushed by his attack on the Union left.

The Confederate commanders handled the situation at the Gap in fine style. After initial contact they reinforced in a timely manner, deployed the available troops to the best possible advantage, and maneuvered skillfully. Key amongst the decisions made was the recognition that a few correctly armed men using key terrain could have a large effect on the outcome. They won the race to the heights and dominated the field with a small number of long range weapons. Although faced with a determined effort by a smaller force the gap was won by proper consideration of key terrain and a few appropriate weapons deployed for their best use at the right time. Law’s flanking march also made the enemy realize that their position in the face of an opponent that outnumbered them by a large margin would eventually be rendered untenable. The victorious Confederates moved on to greater glory but it all started at the Gap.

Bibliography

Books

• The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the union and Confederate Armies; Vol. 12
• The History of the First New Jersey Cavalry, Henry R Pyne, 1871
• The story of the regiment (11^th Pennsylvania Infantry);Locke, William Henry
• Three years in the army: The story of the Thirteenth Massachusetts Volunteers from July 16, 1861, to August 1, 1864; Davis, Charles
• History of the Twelfth Massachusetts Volunteers (Webster regiment) – Cook, Benjamin F.
• History of Duryée’s brigade, during the campaign in Virginia under Gen. Pope, and in Maryland under Gen. McClellan, in the summer and autumn of 1862; Hough, Franklin Benjamin,
• The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide, John Salmon
• Return to Bull Run – The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas; John J. Hennessy
• From Manassas to Appomattox; James Longstreet

Internet Resources

• http://americancivilwar.com/authors/Joseph_Ryan/Articles/Second-Manassas/Relative-Command-Decisions-During-Second-Manassas-Campaign.html
• http://chapmansmill.org/history
• http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va025.htm

• The Fight at Chapman’s Mill Part 1
• The Fight at Chapman’s Mill Part 2

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

The Fight at Chapman’s Mill Part 2

We have a tendency to view history as if through a rear view mirror, looking back along the path taken and framing what happened by how it turned out.  Since we know that in May and June of 1862 General Thomas Stonewall Jackson led a famous campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, the events leading up to that campaign tend to be told with Jackson as the focus. But for a brief time General Robert E. Lee, directing operations in Virginia that spring, considered other plans including what I refer to as the ‘Ewell Option’.¹

When General Joe Johnston moved the bulk of his army to Yorktown in April 1862, he left three subordinate commands in an arc across northern Virginia: General Charles Field near Fredericksburg, General Richard Ewell at the rail crossing of the Rappahannock River, and Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. Johnston’s final instructions had been defensive in nature but Ewell was restless for action. On April 16 he proposed an offensive north up the rail line. Johnston was supportive though cautious; Lee was more enthusiastic and wrote to Field, asking him to communicate with Ewell about a combined movement.  This was the seed of the ‘Ewell option’ but events to the west would keep it from sprouting.

On April 17 General Banks began driving Jackson up the Shenandoah Valley.  In accordance with his instructions from Johnston, Jackson headed for Swift Run Gap and wrote to Ewell for support.  Over the next several days Jackson retreated up the Valley to Harrisonburg then turned east out of the Shenandoah Valley to take shelter in the Blue Ridge.  Ewell started receiving messages from Jackson on the 18th asking Ewell to come to his aid. As a result, Ewell set aside any idea of attacking northward and instead moved south to be closer to Jackson.  On the 20th Ewell wrote to army headquarters that responding to Jackson’s requests had prevented him from making any offensive move of his own.

With Jackson falling back, Lee was ready to give up on the Valley — he wrote to Generals Ed Johnson and Harry Heth, who had small commands in the mountains to the west, that they may need to fall back to the line of the Blue Ridge —  but he was not ready to give up on action in northern Virginia.  On the 21st he wrote to Jackson telling him that if he was going to use Ewell to attack Banks that would be fine, but if Banks was too strong to be attacked at this time he wanted Ewell to move east to work with Field and attack the enemy near Fredericksburg.  He did not want Ewell to be passively held in place.  After a few days passed, Lee wrote again this time to both Jackson and Ewell to emphasize that he wanted Ewell used aggressively, either with Jackson or with Field. Days went by with no action as Jackson rebuilt his command and kept Ewell nearby for support. Jackson asked for more troops in order to take the offensive; but Lee was redirecting men to Field instead.  In Lee’s view, if Jackson couldn’t accomplish anything with what he had, Ewell should go to Fredericksburg.

After a visit from General Ed Johnson, Jackson decided to unite with Johnson in order to attack Fremont’s forces in the mountains to the west.  He wanted Ewell to take his place in Swift Run Gap in order to watch Banks and the Valley. Bad roads delayed Jackson and by May 5th he had only made it as far as Staunton. Lee accepted Jackson’s new plan but he was frustrated at the delays and the imposed inactivity for Ewell.  Two weeks had gone by since Lee wrote that he wanted action against US forces, but so far precious little had been done. When Lee learned that Banks had withdrawn down the Valley, he wrote to Ewell that “I see no necessity for your division at Swift Run Gap”. Lee also redirected the brigades of Generals Branch and Mahone to reinforce Ewell in order to built a larger force for action east of the Blue Ridge — he gave specific instructions that they were not to be taken to the Valley but instead used for attacking north.  Lee was not giving up on the ‘Ewell option’.

A few days later, on May 8th, Lee wrote again to Ewell that he didn’t need to stay in Swift Run Gap but should move east.  But Jackson had been writing Ewell asking him not to leave and Ewell wrote to Lee that Jackson needed him. Lee relented, acknowledging to Ewell that he should stay if it was necessary for Jackson. Frustrated, Lee mentioned in a message to Gen Joseph Anderson, now in command of the Confederate forces near Fredericksburg, that his hope for a coordinated offensive in northern Virginia was delayed by Jackson’s side trip into the mountains. At this point General Joseph Johnston, nominally still in command of Ewell and Jackson, stepped in and directed Jackson to return and unite with Ewell in order to implement what Lee had directed three weeks ago — either attack Banks or move east to Fredericksburg. Lee likewise wrote Jackson to return to Ewell.  Unable to accomplish anything further in the mountains, Jackson began his return journey.

A few more days went by until on May 17th commanders to the east were growing anxious as the US pressure on Richmond increased.  Anderson wrote Ewell asking him to come help him and Johnston wrote Ewell telling him to either do something productive or move east.  Meanwhile, the reinforcements sent to Ewell were stripped away — there were pressing needs which couldn’t justify idleness.  Branch was sent to Hanover Courthouse and Mahone was redirected to Drewry Bluff. But Jackson told Ewell not to follow what Lee, Johnston, or Anderson were asking. For the final time Jackson kept Ewell from partaking in operations east of the Blue Ridge, demanding that Ewell unite with him in the Valley as the only way they could strike an effective blow against Banks. Ewell chose to stick with Jackson.

What I have called the ‘Ewell Option’ was an idea, advocated for about a month, that Ewell should strike north in conjunction with the forces near Fredericksburg in order to disrupt US arrangements in northern Virginia. It never came  to be, but in the end Ewell’s partnership with Jackson would deliver what Lee was looking for. While there was anxiety at how long it took to get an effective offensive going, Ewell’s decision to stand by Jackson made a critical difference in how the 1862 campaign played out.

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

The Ewell Option

Introduction

The early summer of 1862 saw the fate of Federal forces in the east taking a serious turn for the worse. McClellan’s greatly anticipated Peninsular Campaign had ground to a halt under the weight of Seven Day’s Battle losses and the commander’s timid approach. The result of four months of campaigning left the Army of the Potomac against the James River and completely out of position to defend Washington. Fearing the Confederate forces, now completely freed from the threat of McClellan’s offensive, would move on Washington before McClellan could return the Union officials in Washington threw together a new army to defend the capital. General Order No. 103 issued on 26 June 1862 combined forces from the Department of the Shenandoah (Banks), Department of the Rappahannock (McDowell), and the Mountain Department (Sigel) and a small cavalry brigade under BG George Bayard  to form the Army of Virginia. The new army established a line of defensive along the Rappahannock River. The whole was placed under the command of the bombastic MG John Pope. The command make-up of this army did not portend great success.  Indeed, their existence would be a short one.

General Lee, sensing weakness, embarked on a bold plan to dismember the new army and possibly push the Federals to the peace table with a move into Maryland. Splitting his force, he sent “Stonewall” Jackson on a circuitous march around the Union defenses. His route would take him across the upper Rappahannock into the valley to strike the Union supply center at Manassas Junction.  Using the Bull Run Mountains for cover he successfully completed an uncontested march through Thoroughfare Gap, united with Stuart’s cavalry, and appeared before a startled and apparently mystified Pope. The Federal reaction was slow and complicated by Pope’s indecision and lack of tactical acumen. Eventually he managed to place two of his three corps (I and II) in position to challenge Jackson.  The final corps (III) under McDowell brought up the rear.

As McDowell moved his men toward unification with Pope another serious issue came to his attention. Where was Longstreet’s corps? The location and intent of the missing Confederate corps needed to be determined. It soon became evident that Longstreet would also pass into the valley but Pope could not manage to put his concentration on Jackson aside long enough to order the gaps sealed by a strong force of infantry. Instead, to cover the passages through the mountains BG Bayard’s cavalry was rushed to the west. By Thursday August 27^th a thin line of cavalry outposts was established to cover Thoroughfare Gap and some other smaller passages through the mountains.  McDowell, at Gainesville, continued to fear for the safety of the Federal left and understood that knowing where Longstreet would emerge had great value. He also realized delaying Longstreet was important and disregarded an order from Pope to move with his “entire force” to Manassas. He detached troops to assist the cavalry troopers at the Gap. Like everything else about this Federal campaign it would be mismanaged. Complying with Pope’s order with the rest of his corps he detailed only a single division (Ricketts) to confront one half of the Army of Northern Virginia.  Thus began the string of events that would lead to the Battle of Chapman’s Mill.

1st New Jersey Cavalry prepares to meet the enemy
On Wednesday, 27 August, BG Bayard’s cavalry was ordered toward the Gap to search for the missing Confederate column. By Thursday the 1^st New Jersey Cavalry, commanded by English adventurer Col Percy Wyndham, entered the narrow pass of Thoroughfare Gap and started their search. Jackson’s rapid move through the area had littered the roadway with stragglers, who were gathered up by the dozens. From these men it was learned that Longstreet with the remainder of the Army of Northern Virginia would be closing on the Gap very soon. They immediately began the process of preparing a defense. Wyndham had only 200 or so troopers on hand to pose as an obstacle to Longstreet’s passage and knew a force multiplier was necessary if they were to be even marginally successful. Every available axe was commandeered and put to use as his men sought to obstruct the road through the narrow passage. Additionally, small scouting teams were sent out to the western end of the Gap to search for the expected column. These parties were gradually thinned as more and more prisoners had to be escorted to the rear. Eventually, one such team was reduced to just two men, SGM Craig and Corporal Patterson (Co. L). It was not long before the two men saw the tell tale sign of Longstreet’s approach. Huge dust clouds rising over the hills indicated the approach of the enemy column. Undeterred the two men rode forward until they found themselves within ear shot of the Confederate advance guard. An unsuspecting trio from the enemy force moved away from their resting comrades to hurry on alone. As soon as they were out of sight Craig and Patterson pounced on them. Taken prisoner were an officer and two enlisted men who were whisked away by the intrepid pair. With them went the last Federal presence on the western side of the Gap.

On the trip back to friendly lines with their prizes they found the eastern end of the gap well obstructed;

“Trees had been felled all along from one height to the other and immense rocks rolled down the hillsides among them. Earth was cast lightly upon the branches and ravines converted into traps for the unwary; until no horse could expect to pass with life…”

Wyndham deployed some of his carbine equipped troopers dismounted to take advantage of the available cover. The remainder of the 1^st New Jersey and the 1^st Pennsylvania along with portions of other units arriving to reinforce his effort stood mounted ready to attack any breakthrough. He also sent a courier to Ricketts informing him of the arrival of Longstreet’s column. While his soldiers peered west Wyndham must have been looking over his shoulder to the east searching for the promised infantry support.

The Fight Opens

The Federal troopers did not have long to wait before the appearance of the enemy at the western end of the gap. Longstreet sent an order to MG D. R. Jones to explore the gap. Jones transferred the order downward to the lead brigade commander, COL G. T. Anderson. From his brigade of Georgians Anderson ordered two companies of the 9^th Georgia forward as skirmishers. The advance was followed “at proper distance” by the remainder of the brigade (1^st GA Regulars, 7^th, 8^th and the rest of the 9^th GA). The rest of the division followed.

About half a mile from the main body they halted and the skirmishers from the 9^th Georgia proceeded into the Gap charged with performing a reconnaissance. Moving slowly into the gap the Georgians ran into the Federal cavalry patrols about 0915. Anderson reported that these vedettes were quickly driven through the gap with his skirmishers claiming 3 of the Union troopers killed. No mention was made of the three men taken by Craig and Patterson. They continued unimpeded through the remainder of the gap until they reached the obstacles at the eastern end. Here the well placed and well protected dismounted troopers made effective use of their carbines. The advance of the enemy skirmishers was halted at the abatis.

The unequal firefight demanded the reinforcement of the Confederate effort. Word was sent back for the support to move up. The 20^th and 2^nd Georgia were called upon to lead the way. The rest of Anderson’s Brigade and COL Henry Benning’s (substituting for the arrested BG Robert Toombs) would follow. It was clear to Wyndham that his troopers would eventually be swamped by growing Confederate strength. He looked again for his support.

As the Confederates were moving Wyndham’s courier reached the infantry column on the Warrenton Pike near Gainesville. McDowell immediately issued an order for BG James Ricketts division to move to “assist Colonel Wyndham, who at 10:15 a. m. reported the enemy passing through Thoroughfare Gap.”

The race for the Gap was on. Ricketts understood the urgency of the matter and turned his division off the crowded road. The cross country march west proved more arduous than time saving. The lead brigade (COL John Stiles with the 11^th PA, 83^rd NY, and 12^th and 13^th MA) did not reach Haymarket, three miles short of the gap, until after 1400. Meanwhile Wyndham’s men maintained their blocking action preventing the deployment of a Confederate battery by sweeping the only available position with their rapid fire weapons. Despite their heroic efforts they needed help badly. It was still about two miles away.

• The Fight at Chapman’s Mill Part 1
• The Fight at Chapman’s Mill Part 2

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

The Fight at Chapman’s Mill Part 1

SIMPLY MURDER: The Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862 (Emerging Civil War)
by Chris Mackowski and Kristopher White

Product Details

• Paperback: 168 pages
• Publisher: Savas Beatie (April 2013)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1611211468
• ISBN-13: 978-1611211467

Raising the bar

Sometimes breaking the mold fails.  However, breaking the mold can yield a spectacular success producing something that works on multiple levels.  This book is a combination of guidebook and history that works both as a guidebook and as a history.

As a battlefield guide, the book takes the reader on a tour of the battlefield, visiting all the important places.  The organization of the tour is logical; the directions are clear and contain parking and safety instructions that are helpful.

As a battle history, the book follows the action in clear concise sentences.  The authors explain the options available and the logic behind the decisions.  They present Burnside in a fair, balanced and intelligent way.  The explanation of what went wrong, using the newest discoveries, is clear and fair.  They are careful in how they say some things that contradict popular history.  The history portion of this book is worth the purchase price without the guidebook.

It is the combination of the two that set this book apart from its peers.  The presentation of an intelligent readable original account at each location is wonderful.  Time after time, I wished this book was with me during my visit to the battlefield.  Having this book, would both guide me to all the important places and tell me why this place is important while explaining its’ influence on the battle.

The authors display an in-depth knowledge of the battle.  Additionally, they worked with experts to test their conclusions and expand their knowledge.  While this is a short book, it has a large amount of information and value.

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

Civil War Book Review: SIMPLY MURDER: The Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862

THE BATTLES THAT MADE ABRAHAM LINCOLN: How Lincoln Mastered his Enemies to Win the Civil War, Free the Slaves, and Preserve the Union
by Larry Tagg

Product Details

• Paperback: 576 pages
• Publisher: Savas Beatie (November 2012)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1611211263
• ISBN-13: 978-1611211269

A wonderful and unique look at Lincoln’s presidency.

Our Abraham Lincoln is the Great Emancipator, the sure hand that guides America through the Civil War, struck down as we entered the promised land of peace.  A wise and wonderful man of courage and strength, an eloquent voice that defines our better nature, a guide, a comfort in a time of crises or need.  Our Abraham Lincoln “is a marble man, a mythic icon enshrined in a magnificent twenty-foot tall statue that looks down on visitors from beneath the dome of his Memorial, a Greek temple modeled after the Temple of Zeus.”

The book’s Abraham Lincoln is about seven feet tall, by today’s height standards, topped with a shock of unruly black hair, clad in an ill-fitting suit, unattractive if not ugly, speaking in a high voice with a distant western twang.  He is not socially adept, prone to bluntness and seems not to consider the feelings of his peers.  The man in the middle, he is trying to hold things together while being attacked for going fast/slow in the right/wrong direction from all sides at the same time.

That both portraits are Abraham Lincoln and that the author reconciles the different ideas shows what a well-written book this is.  This was a slow and often difficult read for me.  Because the reader has to reconcile our Lincoln with the actual man and the times, this can be difficult read.  This is the story of the political and personal attacks on Lincoln.   An excellent epilogue covers how the years after his death were kinder to him and built our Lincoln.  This book reconciles our understanding of how different things were and how the image of Lincoln changed.

The book opens with a short introduction covering Lincoln’s nomination and election.  This combines with a look at American life and politics in the years leading up to the election of 1860.  The book concludes with the construction the Lincoln of legend. Many factions found building the legend useful.  In between is a very solid political history of Lincoln’s administration.

Lincoln’s election is not the result of personal popularity; he receives fewer votes than loser in past elections did.  The collapse of the national political parties keeps Lincoln off Southern ballots.  He is unpopular in the Democratic strongholds of major Northern cites and with the Radical Republicans.  Negative reactions and comments start right after the election and never stop.  The Baltimore Plot is just the first incident that provides the press with material.  The war almost silences the Democrat papers with a combination of patriotic mobs and government action.  The author handles this story in a nonjudgmental tone avoiding any fiery rhetoric on this highly charged subject.  This is one of the strongest points in the book, as the story has many sensitive subjects.  Another well-written comprehensive section is the election of 1864; Lincoln’s nomination, Chase and the role of the Radicals make an exciting mix.  The author traces each of these in both the press and historically giving the reader a ringside seat on the double-dealings, back stabbings and ultimately Lincoln victory.  This is well written, informative and enjoyable reading.

An excellent section is the fight over slavery and emancipation within the Republican Party and Lincoln’s Administration.  The very strong writing could upset many people.  Lincoln is the man in the middle, working to keep a coalition of War Democrats, Border States, Republicans and Abolitionists focused of preserving the Union.  The Radical Republicans and Abolitionists launch some of the harshest and most persistent attacks on him.  This is an excellent history of not only the fight for emancipation but the start of Reconstruction politics too.

Another well-done area is the fight between an activist President and a Congress in the process of losing control to him.  It is easy for us to miss how much power Lincoln took from Congress and how bitterly they resented this.  That they were the same political party rarely occurred to many congressmen.

In 2009, this book was published as “The Unpopular Mr. Lincoln”.

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

Civil War Book Review: THE BATTLES THAT MADE ABRAHAM LINCOLN

Combined Failure

No further major operations were undertaken by Burnside as his expedition became inexorably linked to the success of the Peninsula Campaign. As early as April 2 the two campaigns became associated when McClellan wrote to Burnside;

“…if I succeed in driving the enemy out of Richmond I will at once throw a strong force on Raleigh and open communications with you via Goldsborough.”

This, of course, assumed a move by Burnside in that direction. McClellan seemed to be authorizing such a move when he continued;

“It appears probable that a movement in the direction of Goldsborough would be the best thing for you to undertake.”

He did however instruct Burnside to use “great caution” because “we cannot afford any reverse at present.” Burnside felt he lacked the necessary strength to accomplish a move on Goldsborough and exercised the caution suggested by his commander by remaining stagnant. This inactivity was seemingly approved of by McClellan who wrote on April 20;

“Make no offensive move beyond New Berne until you have secured Fort Macon.”

The next opportunity for major action arose after the fall of Norfolk. Burnside received a dispatch from Secretary of War Stanton on 11 May. In the message Stanton revealed a chance for coordinated action with MG Wool’s forces at Norfolk.

“Wool proposes a move without delay on Suffolk and would be glad to cooperate with you by your advancing to Weldon and seizing the railroad there.”

Again Burnside declined the offer of action stating that his command was stretched too thin by his garrison responsibilities and protection of the rail line. He also cited a lack of horses and wagons for supply operations to support such a movement. The situation remained unchanged as Burnside awaited instructions from McClellan “before attempting another move.” Accordingly his operations in North Carolina after Fort Macon was taken devolved into a series of patrols and skirmishes of no great military importance. On May 21st he received an optimistic private note from McClellan that stated “if I thrash these rascals we will soon be in direct communication with you.” In official correspondence he encouraged Burnside to adjust his garrisons to allow 12,500 men to conduct “a cautious yet bold advance on Goldsborough.” McClellan obviously saw this as a means to “neutralize” the enemy in front of him by drawing forces away. Burnside disregarded the suggestion yet again. There is no correspondence giving his reason for not attempting the move but on 28 May he wrote to Stanton that he was still awaiting the results of McClellan’s push on Richmond and indicated that his request for horses and locomotives had not been fulfilled. Apparently he continued to be concerned about his ability to logistically support that kind of move. As McClellan’s campaign began to sour the request for a move by Burnside took a different twist. On June 28 he received a message from President Lincoln that stated;

“I think you had better go with any re-enforcements you can spare to General McClellan.”

On 3 July he embarked 7000 infantry for the trip to Fort Monroe leaving BG Foster in command of 6100 troops to secure the gains made. The Burnside Expedition was over. No effort was made against Goldsborough until December.
Conclusion and Assessment
The Burnside Expedition is another example of McClellan’s ability to conceptualize strategic initiatives and his inability to successfully execute them. There is much to suggest that a fully supported and properly configured force could have accomplished all that was expected and more against the available enemy defense. The reasons they did not are twofold.

1. Insufficient strength of the deployed forces.
Not enough consideration was given to the necessity of securing any gains made deep in enemy territory. The early successes (Roanoke, New Berne, and Fort Macon) drained away significant combat power as troops were required to garrison these locations and secure communications. A much larger force was needed if there was to be adequate troops available to act as maneuver force after these requirements were met. There was also inadequate cavalry to conduct the reconnaissance necessary for this type of action.

2. Logistical Instability.
The area of operations was incapable and unwilling to supply any assistance in supporting the occupying force. Everything from rations to water had to be brought in and distributed. Supporting a force in enemy territory, especially one attempting distant offensive operations, under such conditions required a much greater ability to conduct sustainment operations than Burnside had on hand. His repeated requests for assistance in this area went unanswered.

Burnside correctly understood these limitations and declined to put his overextended and under resourced men at risk. Had he left what he felt necessary to secure his rear then he would have advanced with only 6200 troops. This would certainly be a very risky endeavor. Had he beefed up his maneuver force by stripping away these garrisons, as McClellan suggested, he would have been taking the risk of becoming isolated inland if the weakened areas in his rear fell. He elected neither option. When McClellan was replaced and the emphasis on operations turned to more direct confrontation with enemy forces the coastal footholds were quickly relegated to distant sideshows. The “internal blockade” concept failed. Interestingly, the Weldon Railroad would eventually become an important target for major Union operations but not until the siege of Petersburg two years later.

• Burnside Expedition Part 1
• Burnside Expedition Part 2
• Burnside Expedition Part 3
• Burnside Expedition Part 4
• Burnside Expedition Part 5
• Burnside Expedition Part 6
• Burnside Expedition Part 7
• Burnside Expedition Conclusion

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

Burnside Expedition Conclusion

Those that can’t write, Review!

May 2013

James W. Durney

***********************************************************

In the stores

When this is being written, I am reading Scott L. Mingus Sr.’s Confederate General: Gov. William “Extra Billy” Smith: From Virginia’s Statehouse to Gettysburg Scapegoat.  Extra Billy is quite a character.  He was a businessman, politician and the oldest Confederate generals at Gettysburg.  His actions late on the first day at Gettysburg constitute one of the “if only” stories for that battle.

The second new Scott L. Mingus Sr. book on the shelves this month is Echoing Still: More Civil War Voices from York County, Pa.  This one is co-written with James McClure, with the editor of the York Daily Record.  The book includes excerpts from dozens of newly discovered letters and diaries of York County residents. While the focal point is the 1863 Gettysburg Campaign, the book starts in the slave era and runs through the GAR meetings of the late 1800s.

Last Battle of Winchester by Scott Patchan is a book that is worth reading.

Sitting on top of my “to read” pile is Kennesaw Mountain: Sherman, Johnston, and the Atlanta Campaign by Earl J. Hess from The University of North Carolina Press.  UNC always does a good job with Civil war books and this is no exception.  An excellent author, 21 maps, 25 illustrations and a full set of notes, appendices, bibliography and index makes for an excellent history.

Chancellorsville’s Forgotten Front by Chris Mackowski and Kristopher D. White is going to be a real step forward in this battle’s history.  Chancellorsville is much more than Jackson’s attack and wounding.  John Sedgwick’s Sixth Corps fought two battles in and near Fredericksburg.

CALAMITY AT CHANCELLORSVILLE: The Wounding and Death of Confederate General Stonewall Jackson by Mathew Lively is a detailed look at the truth and the myths surrounding this event.

THE LAST DAYS OF STONEWALL JACKSON: The Mortal Wounding of the Confederacy’s Greatest Icon by Chris Mackowski and Kristopher White is another look at this event.

James S. Humphreys’ Edifice of Freedom: The Civil War Amendments in Historical Perspective looks at the historical context in which each amendment came to fruition and then traces the evolution of the amendments and their impact over time in American life.

Steven J. Ramold looks at the wide array of factors preventing the Union Army and the civilians on whose behalf they were fighting from being a united front during the Civil War.  Across the Divide: Union Soldiers View the Northern Home Front  illustrates how the divided spheres of Civil War experience created social and political conflict far removed from the better-known battlefields of the war.

Captives in Blue: The Civil War Prisons of the Confederacy completes Roger Pickenpaugh’s earlier groundbreaking book Captives in Gray: The Civil War Prisons of the Union, rounding out his examination of Civil War prisoner of war facilities.  They missed the February publication date.

The Lincoln Assassination: Where Are They Now? – A Guide to the Burial Places of Individuals Connected to the Lincoln Assassination in Washington, DC by Jim Garrett and Richard Smyth.

The audio book edition of The Queen of Washington, narrated by Judith Cullen is available. This is not an abridged edition and runs about ten hours.

GENERAL GORDON GRANGER: The Savior of Chickamauga and the Man Behind “Juneteenth” by Robert Conner looks at the general who acting as a gunner at Chattanooga incurred Grant’s displeasure.  There is a lot more to Granger than that one incident and this book tells us about it.

May 2013

Barksdale’s Charge: The True High Tide of the Confederacy at Gettysburg, July 2, 1863 by Phillip Thomas Tucker is a history of Barksdale Mississippi Brigade on the afternoon of July 2, 1863.  Their charge late in the day was “the grandest charge I ever saw” according to many witnesses.  Barksdale’s Charge almost pushed the Army of the Potomac off Cemetery Ridge.  While Pickett’s Charge receives history’s attention this could be the closest Lee came to breaking Meade’s line at Gettysburg.

A SEASON OF SLAUGHTER: The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, May 8-21, 1864 by Chris Mackowski & Kristopher D. White turn their considerable talents from Fredericksburg to Spotsylvania.

Atlanta, Cradle of the New South Race and Remembering in the Civil War’s Aftermath by William A. Link argues that the city defined the broader meaning of the Civil War in the modern South is due on the sixth.

Lee’s Army During the Overland Campaign: A Numerical Study by Alfred C. Young III provides accurate information regarding the Confederate side throughout the conflict. The book shows Lee’s army was larger and suffered higher casualties than popular history says.

The Gettysburg Campaign in Numbers and Losses: Synopses, Orders of Battle, Strengths, Casualties, and Maps, June 9 – July 14, 1863 by J. David Petruzzi and Steven Stanley looks at more than three dozen engagements both large and small waged during the five weeks of the Gettysburg Campaign. A synopsis of each engagement, over three dozen, includes photos of the commanders, an original full page map of the fighting, an order of battle with numbers and losses (including killed, wounded, captured, and missing), charts and graphs of relative strengths and losses, a conclusion of how the fighting affected each side and the course of the campaign.

Joshua L. Chamberlain: The Life in Letters of a Great Leader of the American Civil War by Thomas Desjardin, uses 300 never-before-seen letters from sent by or to Chamberlain from his college years in 1852 to his death in 1914.

ROBERT E. LEE IN WAR AND PEACE: Photographs of a Confederate and American Icon by Don Hopkins is a detailed look at Lee through photographs taken of him.  This is both a look at Lee’s life and a look at the early art of photography.

June 2013

The Battle Hymn of the Republic: A Biography of the Song That Marches On by John Stauffer and Benjamin Soskis look at one of America’s most enduring songs.

GENERAL GRANT AND THE REWRITING OF HISTORY: How a Great General (and Others) Helped Destroy General William S. Rosecrans and Influence our Understanding of the Civil War by Frank Varney.  The book argues that Grant was a poor judge of character as demonstrated during his presidency and as a businessman.  This lack of judgment did not develop after the war but was a lifelong character trait.  Looking over an “Advanced Reading Copy” shows a thorough review of the Grant/Rosecrans relationship.  If the book will change anyone’s mind is an open question.  In either case, this looks like an interesting read that deserves your consideration.

Stephen M. Hood, a collateral descendent of General John Bell Hood, is the author of John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General. The author presents the idea that Hood is not the “lost his mind at Franklin” general of popular history.  Looking through an “Advanced Reading Copy” shows the author supports his premise with logic and facts.  If the book can or cannot change your mind is an open question.  In either case, this well-written book deserves your consideration.

Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation by Caroline E. Janney looks at the people who live during the war and how they felt about things after it.

The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the Union Army by Lorien Foote looks at the clash when educated, refined, and wealthy officers (“gentlemen”) found themselves commanding a hard-drinking group of fighters (“roughs”).

July 2013

Do not dismiss this as “another Gettysburg guide book” A Field Guide to Gettysburg Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People by Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler.  The authors have excellent credentials.  Carol Reardon is the author of several unique books, while Tom Vossler is an excellent guide.  This is a 460+ page guide with 47 maps, 75 color and 59 black & white illustrations is nicely priced at $22.

The Battle of Big Bethel: Crucial Clash in Early Civil War Virginia by J. Michael Cobb, Ed Hicks, and Wythe Holt id the first full-length treatment of this small but consequential June 1861 battle.

Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who Pioneered Battlefield Care by Scott McGaugh looks at this important person in battlefield medicine.

The Civil War, State by State by Chester G. Hearn looks at the war from the perspective of the states and territories covering both military and political considerations.

August 2013

The Petersburg Campaign: The Western Front Battles, September 1864 – April 1865, Volume 2 by Edwin Bearss and Bryce Suderow is a “must have” book. This is 504 pages with original maps by Civil War cartographer Steven Stanley.

Lincoln’s Citadel: The Civil War in Washington, DC by Kenneth J. Winkle looks at the city undergoing the stress of war.

Black Slaves, Indian Masters: Slavery, Emancipation, and Citizenship in the Native American South by Barbara Krauthamer is going to surprise a number of people.  This is a book that I am looking forward to reading.

The Long Shadow of the Civil War: Southern Dissent and Its Legacies by Victoria Bynum shows that the CSA was not a unified political nation.  This book looks at North Carolina, Mississippi and Texas to show how many internal problems existed in the CSA.

THE CIVIL WAR LOVER’S GUIDE TO NEW YORK CITY by Bill Morgan tours Civil War New York, places, buildings and monuments that grace the city.  This looks to be great fun for everyone and a new Civil War tour.

American Civil War Guerrillas: Changing the Rules of Warfare (Reflections on the Civil War Era) by Daniel E. Sutherland looks at how this type of fighting influenced the armies and the war.

Earl J. Hess’ 3-volume study of field fortifications late in the war is being released as paperback books.

September 2013

The Northern Home Front during the Civil War (Reflections on the Civil War Era) by Paul A. Cimbala and Randall M. Miller covers the geographic breadth of the diverse northern home fronts during the Civil War.

The Green and the Gray: The Irish in the Confederate States of America by David T. Gleeson looks at the Irish in who supported the CSA, their reasons and the affect the war had on them.

October 2013

Shiloh: Confederate High Tide in the Heartland (Battles and Leaders of the American Civil War) by Steven E. Woodworth

and

Vicksburg, 1863: The Deepest Wound (Battles and Leaders of the American Civil War) by Steven N. Dossman look at these two important events.

Smithsonian Civil War: Inside the National Collection is a coffee table book released for the 150th that looks at some of the items in their collection.

Last of the Blue and Gray: Old Men, Stolen Glory, and the Mystery That Outlived the Civil War by Richard A. Serrano looks at the last two Civil War veterans and the questions that outlived them.

Unavailable Dates

SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG, THE: The Attack and Defense of the Union Center on Cemetery Ridge, July 2, 1863 by David Shultz and David Wieck expands on the critically acclaimed The Battle Between the Farm Lanes. The book is a completely revised and expanded study, with new photographs, original maps, and a self-guided tour of the fighting.

History Press expects to publish Robert Redd’s St. Augustine: America’s Oldest City in the Civil War in the spring of 2014.

Yankee Dutchmen under Fire by Joseph Reinhart is due this fall.

Ethan Rafuse and Charles R. Bowery Jr. are working on a War College guide for Richmond-Petersburg expected in 2014.

Steve Stanley and J. David Petruzzi are hard at work on The Complete Antietam Campaign Guide.  Antietam Chief Historian Ted Alexander is penning the Forward.  This is a full color book styled on The Complete Gettysburg Guide. The book will feature Harpers Ferry, South Mountain, Antietam, and Shepherdstown plus many points in between.  This will be part of a trilogy for Maryland Campaign – a Guide, a Handbook, and a Numbers and Losses volume.  The format is “just like” the Gettysburg series.

Buckeyes Forward: Ohio Troops in the 1862 Maryland Campaign is Eric Wittenberg’s current project.  The book covers the Ohio units at South Mountain, Harpers Ferry, and Antietam.  A second major section covers the actions of two future presidents of the United States, Hayes and McKinley.  Followed by a series of profiles for other prominent Ohio officers including George Crook, Hugh Ewing. Rufus Dawes, Ohio-born Confederate brigade commander Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley and the Ohio regimental commanders.  Last is a look at the three Ohio soldiers who won the Medal of Honor valor during the 1862 Maryland Campaign.  The book will have a large number of photos and maps.  Savas Beatie is the expected publisher.

Another project Eric Wittenberg is working on The Battle of Yellow Tavern: Jeb Stuart’s Last Battle. This will be a study of Phil Sheridan’s May 1864 raid on Richmond, with particular focus on the May 11, 1864 Battle of Yellow Tavern, where Jeb Stuart is mortally wounded.  The History Press is the expected publisher.

Upcoming Events

James M. McPherson will be at the New York Public Library Mid-Manhattan Library on May first at 6:30 PM.  On June 25^th, at 6:00 PM, he is at the Filson Historical Society, Louisville, KY.

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

May 2013 Civil War Book Notes

DIVIDED LOYALTIES: Kentucky’s Struggle for Armed Neutrality in the Civil War
by James Finck

Product Details

• Hardcover: 216 pages
• Publisher: Savas Beatie (July 2012)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1611211026
• ISBN-13: 978-1611211023

In 1861, states faced the difficult choice of remaining in the United States of America or leaving.  The majority of states chose to leave or remain on their own.  A few were prevented from making a choice by force of arms.

Only one state chose to not make a choice.  Kentucky chose to be neutral.  Only in a time when “Sovereign State” is accepted could this happen.  Kentucky effectively chose secession from both sides.

The overall story of Kentucky neutrality is known to all that read Civil War history.  The state was critical to both sides.  In Northern hands, it is a platform for invading Tennessee.

In Southern hands, it controls one bank of the Ohio River while exposing the Midwest to invasion.  Kentuckians possessed strong ties, both commercial and personal, with both sides.

These ties and fear of being a battleground is the “standard story” behind neutrality.

James W. Finck’s long look at neutrality shows us how little the “standard story” covers.  Kentucky was a cross section of the United States.

The state is a mix of North and South in attitudes, personality and commercial interest.  Slavery is an integral part of the social and commercial life.  Kentucky has fewer slaves but is a major exporter of slaves.

Most Whites see slavery as necessary to control Negros.  As strong as the state’s Southern ties are, its’ Northern ties are equally strong.  Many Kentuckians’ want to avoid war just as all do not want their state turned into a battleground.

The book opens with a political, social and commercial history from 1840 to 1860.  This background is the foundation of a chapter on the election of 1860 and the impact of secession on the state.

Kentucky took the lead in trying to work out a comprise acceptable to both sides.  War ended any hope of comprise even as the infighting over pick a side took over.

The book has an excellent explanation of the factions involved and how they would combine and split apart.  Both sides cannot secure victory making neutrality a chance to gain strength.

Politics dominates the early chapters but neutrality is the main subject of the book.  About half the book is devoted to Kentucky, the USA and CSA working with and around neutrality.

The final chapter covers September to December 1861,when Kentucky is no longer neutral.

This is a well-written book with arguments logically presented.  While some of the material can be dry, the author never allows the book to become boring.

This is not “lite” reading but it will expand your understanding of the political and practical considerations Kentucky faced in 1861.

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

Civil War Book Review: DIVIDED LOYALTIES: Kentucky’s Struggle for Armed Neutrality in the Civil War

150 Years Ago

May 1863

The quick bloodless war that men afraid they would miss is entering its’ third summer.  Both sides are showing signs of strain.  Black wreaths hang on many doors and the streets are full of maimed men.  Some historians think the dead were deliberately undercounted.  Both sides sent badly wounded and very sick men home to “recover”.  These men were “discharged” and not counted as dead.  This idea is based on comparisons of the 1860 and 1870 census.  A historical note, the government did not count a man “killed” working on Hover Damn unless he died at the site.

Much of the press judges the war on the Richmond/Washington front.  Robert E. Lee is controlling the war, beating McClellan, Pope and Burnside.  While Antietam is a “loss”, it has not dulled his luster on either side.  Lee is in a perilous position.  The supply satiation forced him to disperse the army.  Longstreet is at Suffolk, Stuart is well behind the lines and the horses are weak from lack of proper forge.

“Fighting Joe” Hooker is confident his plan is going well.  Army moral is improving under his capable administration.  Food is much better, pay is almost regular and the Corps Badges are popular.  With the two-year men leaving the army’s veteran population has taken a serious hit.  Many regiments are “green” or have had little experience.  The newer units have only seen action at Fredericksburg.  The XI Corps is trying to adjust to O. O. Howard as their new commander.  The beer drinking Germans and the dour temperance religious Howard is an awkward match.

In Tennessee Rosecrans is resupplying south of Nashville.  Victory at Stones River improved moral and the men are looking forward to this campaign season.

Bragg’s army is fraught with problems.  Most items are in short supply or unavailable.  The men are discouraged but grimly determined to hold on.  The officers are joining the pro or anti Bragg factions that are compromising its’ ability to function.  After Perryville and Stones River respect and affection for Bragg is almost nonexistent.  The men tell stories of Bragg ordering men shot for trivial offenses.  The officers are starting to ignore his orders without worrying about repercussions.

In Mississippi Pemberton is lost.  He thinks Vicksburg is more important than anything else and must be defended to the bitter end.  Johnston is unable or unwilling to make saving the army a priority.  Grant is between them and stronger than either of them.  In addition, they are reacting to Grant’s moves putting him firmly in control.  Davis is worried and hounding both generals for action.

Banks is closing on Port Hudson.  Grant has beaten him politically by remaining an independent command and not having to reinforce him.

Overall, the North should be optimistic.  They are winning on the Mississippi, in Tennessee, around New Orleans and along the Carolinas coastline.  The blockade is no longer a “paper blockade”.  Europe is not considering mediation.  England is still building ships for the Confederacy and France is still buying bonds.  However, the English government is starting to take a real look at what Laird is doing and listening to Adams.  The French are getting bogged down in Mexico and starting to worry about investing in the CSA’s bonds.

The South has Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.

On the First, Grant wins the Battle of Port Gibson, securing his position on the east bank of the Mississippi.  This is a hard fought battle for both sides.  While the South is outnumbered almost three to one, the terrain favors them.

Stonewall Jackson finds Hooker near Chancellorsville and aggressively challenges his pickets.  Hooker pulls back into the Wilderness giving Lee the initiative.  Bing in the Wilderness negates Hooker’s advantages in artillery and men.

Stuart tells Lee that Hooker can be flanked.

Lee detaches Jackson with the bulk of his command to march around Hooker and flank him.  The Army of Northern Virginia is split in three pieces.  One is at Fredericksburg facing Sedgwick VI Corps, Lee and 20,000 face Hooker’s 75,000 men while Jackson with 30,000 men will make a 14-mile march to reach Hooker’s flank.

On the second, Jackson makes a disciplined 14 mile march.  Sickles sends men out trying to find him.  Headquarters ignores Sickles messages refusing to support him which leads to a recall of his men.  Howard detects Jackson but takes no action.  Jackson builds up two-mile long line and attacks about 6PM.  Despite orders to entrench, Howard is unprepared with his men in the open.  The XI Corps is flanked, unable to make a stand they break and flee over two-miles.  Jackson advances until darkness and the Federal’s center starts to hold.  An unnerved Hooker orders the army to consolidate its’ position by contracting the line and anchors the flanks on the Rappannock.  The field’s best artillery position, Hazel Grove, is abandoned as part of this consolidation.

Stonewall Jackson, always aggressive, rides outside his lines looking for a way to continue fighting.  The 18^th North Carolina fires on him in the darkness.  Jackson is badly wounded.  A.P. Hill assumes command until he is wounded.  J.E.B. Stuart commands the II Corps for the rest of the battle.

Longstreet withdraws from Suffolk to rejoin the Army of Northern Virginia.

Grant crosses Bayou Pierre, the last major obstacle between the river and the Mississippi countryside.

Colonel Grierson’s raiders reach Baton Rouge.  His raid, essential to Grant crossing the Mississippi River, has killed, wounded or captured about 600 Confederates, destroyed 50 miles of railroad and telegraph line and taken 3,00 weapons.

May 2, 1863 is one of the busiest days of the war; the third is not a quiet day either.

Stuart with 50 cannon atop Hazel Grove reopens the Battle of Chancellorsville.  Hooker even with an almost two to one advantage continues his defensive stance.  The second growth forest causes a confusing fight that slowly pushes Hooker’s flanks backward.  Hooker orders a general retreat toward the Rappahannock River signaling defeat.

Sedgwick’s VI Corps pushes Early off Marye’s Heights forcing him back onto Lee at Chancellorsville.  Lee responds by sending Anderson’s division to reinforce Early, leaving only 20,000 to face Hooker and the majority of the Army of the Potomac.  At Salem Church, Early with McLaws help and darkness stop the fighting.  On the fourth, Anderson’s division joins Early and McLaws.  Together, they almost surround Sedgwick and force him back to the Rappahannock.  On the fifth, Hooker orders all units back across the Rappahannock River.

The Chancellorsville Campaign is over ending in a crushing defeat for the North.  Northern losses exceed 22,000.

It is not the causalities; important as they are that is the real problem.

Hooker outnumbered Lee almost two to one and he had promised much.  Northerners with high expectations made an emotional investment in him accepting his promise of victory.  Such a total defeat crushed their hopes and damaged their will to continue.  Lincoln is distraught with worry about how the nation will respond.  There are many reasons for defeat at Chancellorsville.  The best one may be Hooker’s “I lost confidence in Joe Hooker.”

We must mention one of Forrest’s greatest victories of the war.  On the third, with one battery and 600 men he forces Colonel Abel D. Streight to surrender his brigade of 1,500 men at Cedar Bluff, Alabama.

On the sixth, A.P. Hill assumes command of the II Corps.

Stoneman crosses Raccoon Ford, on the seventh, ending his raid into Virginia.

The same day, Sherman starts marching toward Grant and the Army of the Tennessee marches toward Jackson.

Earl Van Dorn is murdered by the husband of a lady he is paying a lot of attention to.  The husband flees to safety behind Federal lines.

Davis orders Joseph E. Johnston to assume command of Confederate forces in Mississippi on the ninth.  Two days before, Davis wrote Pemberton asking for “information on your active operations” and pledging his support.

Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson dies of pneumonia brought on by his wounds at Chancellorsville.  His death creates one of the most active “What If”s of the American Civil War.  Jackson becomes the standard by which Ewell and Hill are judged.  His performance during the Seven Days and at Franklin is forgotten.  In a “What If” he is always the Jackson of the Valley, Second Manassas or Chancellorsville.

On the 11^th, Secretary Chase, upset over patronage, angrily offers his resignation, which Lincoln refuses to accept.

In Mississippi, Pemberton discovers Grant is going to sever the Vicksburg Jackson Railroad at Edwards Station.  General John Gregg’s 4,000 man brigade is ordered contest this at Raymond.  Gregg’s men assume defensive positions blocking the major roads.  The next day, Logan’s Division runs into Gregg’s roadblocks.  The densely forested terrain hampers both sides.  The trees hold the dust and smoke along the battle lines making command and control difficult if not impossible.  McPherson is forced to the XVIII Corps to dislodge Gregg.  While each side loses about 500 men, this convinces Grant that he cannot ignore the Confederates at Jackson.  Grant sends Sherman’s XV Corps and McPherson’s XVIII Corps toward Jackson on the Mississippi Springs Road while McClernand’s XVII Corps marches toward Clinton.  Joe Johnston finds about 6,000 men in Jackson.  Faced with two corps, he orders evacuation of the city.  Additionally, Johnston orders Pemberton to march east with 22,000 men trying to catch Grant between them.  Johnston predicts “I am to late!”

On the 14^th, McPherson and Sherman enter Jackson even as Gregg conducts a skillful rear guard action that saves the supply train.  Nathan Banks with 30,000 men advances on Port Hudson.

While the West is falling apart, Robert E. Lee is pushing for an invasion of Pennsylvania at a strategy conference in Richmond.  This high-level conference is trying to decide how to save Vicksburg and take advantage of the victory at Chancellorsville.  Lee’s idea is to win a major battle on Northern soil to discredit the Republicans, help the Copperheads and possibly get Europe intervention moving again.

On the 15^th, Pemberton disobeys Johnston’s orders and marches south trying to cut Grant’s supply line.  However, Grant has no supply line, something Pemberton never considered.  Enraged over a newspaper’s anti-Union statements, Federal troops sack the office of the Jefferson in Richmond, Indiana.

Pemberton deploys on Champion’s Hill.  His 3-mile long defensive line is in well chosen terrain.  On the 16^th, about 10:00 AM, McPherson Corps hits the Left of Pemberton’s line.  Over the next seven hours a bitter seesaw fight sees Champion Hill change hands 3 times.  Pemberton orders Loring to shift men to the Left and when Loring refuses is left no choice but retreat.  Pemberton loses 27 cannon and Loring’s division retreats away from the bulk of his army.  A combination of Johnston and Pemberton is no longer possible.  A combination of Grant’s strategy, Pemberton’s actions and disobedience has set the direction of the campaign.

On the 17^th, Pemberton suffers a serious defeat at the Big Black River.  Deploying on the East Bank, in hopes of reestablishing contact with Loring’s division, his position is crushed with causalities of 1,751 men and another 18 cannon.  Over the last two days, May 16 and 17, Pemberton’s army has lost about 5,600 men and 45 cannons.  Pemberton is forced into Vicksburg’s defenses.

On the 18^th, during a speech in the House of Lords, British Foreign Secretary Lord Russell declares Her Majesty’s Government has no intention to intervene in the American Civil War.  Grant’s army is investing Vicksburg even as Johnston warns against being trapped in the city.

Secretary Stanton orders Clement L. Vallandigham released from jail and deported to the CSA.

Grant attacks on Vicksburg’s defenses are defeated.  The city is subjected to a continuous bombardment from both gunboats and land based artillery.

On the 21^st, General Franklin Gardner disobeys Johnston’s orders to march north to Vicksburg, abandoning Port Hudson.  With Pemberton trapped in Vicksburg and Gardner staying at Port Hudson, Johnston lacks the resources to rescue Vicksburg.

On the 22^nd, the War Department establishes the Bureau of Colored Troops charged with coordinating requirement across the nation.

The same day, Jefferson Davis asks Bragg to aid Vicksburg in every way “possible”.  Bragg will not find any “possible” way to do so.

George Stoneman becomes a causality of the Chancellorsville Campaign losing command of the AoP’s Calvary to Alfred Pleasonton.

Attacking Vicksburg’s defensive line produces only heavy causalities; Grant stops the attacks and settles in for a siege.

On the 26^th, Banks, with his army and the Navy in place, determines to attack Port Hudson.  Hard fighting occurs the next day with heavy causalities the main result, this battle in notable for being the first major use of colored soldiers.  The First and Third Louisiana Native Guards establish that black men can perform in battle.

On the 28^th, the 54^th Massachusetts parades in Boston on its way to South Carolina.  Massachusetts presents the War Department with the first Black regiment raised in the North as part of the state’s quota.  The majority of the volunteers are from northern free black families making the 54^th represent all the northern states.

During the last week in May, Clement L. Vallandigham is released from jail and banished to the CSA at Murfreesboro.  Burnside protests this action, he ordered the arrest, and Lincoln refuses to accept his resignation.

On the 30^th, the Army of Northern Virginia is reorganized into 3 infantry corps and a cavalry corps.

May is an active month for promotions:

• Winfield Scott Hancock assumes command of the II Corps, USA.
• George L. Hartsuff assumes command of the XXIII Corps, USA.
• Richard S. Ewell is promoted to lieutenant general and assumes command of the II Corps, AoNV.
• Ambrose P. Hill is promoted to lieutenant general and assumes command of the III Corps, AoNV.
• Henry Heth is promoted to major general.
• General John A. Schofield replaces Samuel R. Curtis as commander Department of the Missouri.

The naval war is easy to overlook.  The blockade fleet is keeping busy chasing blockade-runners, capturing several.

The US Navy captures or destroys a number of CSA ships at sea.  Gunboats are escorting ships on the Mississippi River to discourage guerrillas.  The CSS Florida and CSS Alabama are active.

Naval operations during the month are:

• Attack batteries at Hayne’s Bluff, Yazoo City and Warrenton Mississippi
• Aid Grant during the crossing of the Mississippi and bombard Vicksburg
• Supports Banks at Port Hudson
• Attack Fort De Russy on the Red River
• Accepts the surrender of Alexander, Louisiana
• Raids Edisto, SC and burns cotton
• Destroys a battery on Island No. 82
• Burn stocks of grain along the Sunflower River
• Support an army operation against Wilkinson’s Point, NC
• Cover embarkation of troops on James Island, SC
• Provides guns and crews to strengthen the siege line at Vicksburg
• The USS Shepherd Knapp is scuttled after hitting a reef off Haiti
• The USS Amanda is wrecked off the Florida coast during a storm
• The USS Cincinnati is sunk by cannon fire near Vicksburg with 25 killed and 16 missing
• The USS Chattahoochee is sunk when a boiler explodes killing 18 men

Reading the War

Steven W. Sears Chancellorsville is the best book I have read about the battle of Chancellorsville.

Blue & Gray covers Chancellorsville with the expected excellent job.

Due in May is CHANCELLORSVILLE’S FORGOTTEN FRONT: The Battles of Second Fredericksburg and Salem Church, May 3, 1863.

Vicksburg has almost as many books as Gettysburg.

Vicksburg Is the Key: The Struggle for the Mississippi River by William L. Shea and Terrence J. Winschel both are excellent historians and writers.

The Campaign for Vicksburg: I Vicksburg Is the Key, II Grant Strikes a Fatal Blow, III Unvexed to the Sea (3 volume set) by Edwin C. Bearss, mine is signed.

The Beleaguered City: The Vicksburg Campaign, December 1862-July 1863 by Shelby Foote many say Foote is not a historian but he is a great storyteller.

While many consider Groom’s histories to be less than valid, I have enjoyed reading him since Better Times Than These.  Vicksburg, 1863 is his entry into this market.

If you want to fight these campaigns on your PC, HPS line of John Tiller’s Civil War campaign games include Campaign Chancellorsville and Campaign Vicksburg.  The F8 key activates “fast A/I” to speed up the computer’s play.

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

150 Years Ago, May 1863

Or is this just another loony theory?

Two astronomers from Texas State University think that the angle of the moon had a lot to do with Stonewall’s fatal wounding at Chancellorsville.

If Jackson’s reconnaissance party was riding in bright moonlight, then his own men should have recognized them as they returned from the Union’s side, but Olson and Jasinski say they did not — for good reason.

“The 18th North Carolina was looking to the southeast, directly toward the rising moon,” they said. It stood at “25 degrees above the horizon” at the time, just at the wrong angle.

“The bright moon would’ve silhouetted Jackson and his officers, completely obscuring their identities.”

The Confederate infantrymen likely thought their own men returning were Union cavalrymen on the approach.

“Our astronomical analysis partially absolves the 18th North Carolina from blame for the wounding of Jackson,” Olson says.

Their article appears in this month’s Sky & Telescope magazine (subscription required).

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

Did the Moon Do In Stonewall Jackson?