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Trump’s Liberation Day Tariffs

In a ceremony he anointed as “Liberation Day”, President Donald Trump announced a new tariff regime for exports destined for the United States. A wide array of countries that compete with Pakistan for US imports now face significantly high tariffs as a result, including Vietnam (46%), Cambodia (49%), Bangladesh (37%), Sri Lanka (44%), China (34%), Thailand (36%), and Taiwan (32%). The new tariff regime will impose an average tariff rate of 29% on Pakistani exports to the US.

The Trump administration’s actions are consistent with the president’s campaign promises as he seeks to reshape the US economy—using American strategic, economic and military strength to force the adoption of new trade terms by US trade partners. The inflationary impact of tariffs or other considerations consistent with neoliberal economic theory are of limited consideration for the Trump administration as it seeks specifically to reduce the quantum of US dependence on external supply chains, and reduce the leverage accumulated by countries that enjoy trade surpluses with the American economy (especially China).

This document is restricted to the analysis of the potential economic implications of the new US tariff regime on Pakistan’s economy. It is based on analytics provided by Tabadlab’s proprietary ‘Datacube’ analytics and insights tool.

Snapshot of the US-Pak trade

America’s share of Pakistan’s major imports is very low

Pakistan’s effective tariff rates to the US are lower than overall average. In 2024, Pakistan collected USD 3.9 billion in tariffs on total imports of USD 47 billion—an effective tariff rate of 8%. In contrast, US imports, totaling USD 1.8 billion, generated only USD 85 million in tariffs, indicating a lower rate of 4%.The US claim of a 58% average tariff rate appears inconsistent with these figures, even when accounting for para-tariffs (such as regulatory duties, sales tax, FED, and income tax collected at source), which are not traditional customs duties.

Tariff protection and para-tariffs

Certain sectors benefit from high tariff protection and para-tariffs. For example, vehicles face an effective tariff rate of 76%, one of the highest among import categories. 

Pakistan’s weak tax collection machinery at a domestic level also forces the government to charge value-added tax (18% in general but as high as 25% in some categories like automobile imports) and income tax at source, especially on consumer items. Similarly, the country extensively uses para-tariffs like regulatory duties to manage consumption of luxury items which are not applied to domestic produce. This may represent an area of weakness in negotiations with the US because other countries may not have similar charges applied to imports at the port. Taken cumulatively, for policy makers, this makes the narrative of fair tariffs a more challenging sell.

Pakistan’s Non-Tariff Barriers

Non-tariff barriers might emerge as a potential point of friction in US-Pakistan trade relations. Examples include the use of SROs (Statutory Regulatory Orders) to manage specific import items and restrictions on US digital platforms like X (formerly Twitter). These issues have been noted in the Foreign Trade Barrier report published by the US Trade Representative’s (USTR) office, and referenced by President Trump.

While the USTR report does not accuse Pakistan of targeted barriers against the US, nor of currency manipulation, it signals areas of concern. To mitigate future tensions, Pakistan must proactively engage with US counterparts and manage these perceptions carefully.

Scope for Change in Current and New Sectors

Pakistan already offers American businesses a decent market access in areas such as cotton where there is zero tariff and where the local market offers significant scale such as animal and vegetable fats (USD 3.5 billion in total imports). There is limited scope to offer tariff related benefits in these areas.

The US is not a significant exporter of goods that Pakistan requires on a regular basis and the US government is looking to change this. Whilst difficult to achieve in the immediate term, Pakistan has strategically offered FTAs to countries like China, Turkey and Sri Lanka and this has significantly improved access of goods of these countries to Pakistani consumers. Some significant sectors in which the US currently exports goods but faces significant tariff protection in Pakistan include: Vehicles (76% tariff on USD 1,234 m imports), Furniture (27% tariff on USD 91m imports) Edible fruits and nuts (22% tariff on 122m imports) and Paper (19% tariff on 408m imports). Any change on this front would require Pakistan government to change its sector policy.

In the near term, Pakistan has more flexibility to expand access for US firms in the services sector—particularly in digital payments. With a growing market estimated at USD 35 billion, this space remains largely untapped by US players. Google has recently entered the Pakistan market through the launch of Google Pay in Pakistan, marking a potential shift in the landscape—other similar entries, facilitated by enabling public policy, may be seen favorably by US negotiators.

Favorable Terms of Trade with the US

Pakistan enjoys favorable trade terms with the US, generating nearly USD 400 million per month in current account surplus, alongside an average of USD 300 million a month in remittances. In recent months, Pakistan has exported nearly USD 500 million per month in goods and over USD 250 million in services to the US. Whilst significant for Pakistan, they amount to just 0.16% of the overall annual USD 4 trillion US imports.

What Trump’s Tariffs mean for Pakistan

Lifeline of Pakistani textile exports sector

While tariffs will impact all sectors, textiles account for over half of Pakistan’s exports to the US, making this sector particularly vulnerable. Initial discussions with exporters indicate that the sector’s low profit margins make it difficult to absorb increased costs and US importers are likely to pass these costs onto US consumers. This could lead to a reduction in the volume of textile imports into the US. However, there is no immediate solution to manufacturing these goods domestically in the US. Whether Pakistan will lose or gain market share in the US will largely depend on how the Pakistani government engages with the Trump administration and how other textile-producing countries respond. Rapid and proactive engagement with US authorities, such as what Vietnam’s government is doing, are likely to yield the best results.

Market Share

Although the proposed tariff increases are unlikely to reduce Pakistan’s market share significantly in the short term, the dynamics could shift as other countries renegotiate their trade terms with the US. Competitors such as India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam face similar or higher tariff hikes, potentially keeping Pakistan’s share stable—or even allowing it to grow. Nonetheless, given that these competitors operate with larger trade volumes, their negotiations could have a greater impact on US policymaking and market outcomes.

Reduced Demand for Imports in the US

In the long run, higher tariffs are likely to reduce demand for all imports into the US, including Pakistani goods. Studies indicate that the price elasticity of US imports is around -0.2 to -0.5 up to a year, and -1.67 in the long term. This means that a 10% tariff increase would lead to a 5% reduction in demand by 2026 and 17% in the medium to long run.

This will affect Pakistan’s exports in two key ways.

• Impact on Exports of Goods: Our internal forecast currently suggest a target of USD 42.5 billion for exports for Pakistan including USD 6.3 billion in US exports of goods.  With a 29% increase in tariff for US consumers, we estimate  a loss of approximately USD 564 million in the base case and USD 2,166 million in the, unlikely, worst case where we lose market share and domestic demand in the US is increasingly met by local producers. This will erase the recent gains in exports in all the sectors but will particularly impact the textile sector.
• Impact on Exports of Services: A significant portion of Pakistan’s export growth is in services which have increased from an average of USD 200m in 2023 to USD 250m in 2024 and beyond. This sector will not be affected by tariffs per se but may become an avenue of conversation in negotiations.

What Pakistan needs to do next

Initiate New Trade Negotiations

• Initiate (or accelerate) negotiations for new bilateral trade agreements—not just with the US, but also with economic blocs like the GCC, ASEAN, and RCEP
• Revisit existing trade agreements, especially those with high risk of producing adverse outcomes such as dumping into the Pakistani market

Build Data-Driven Trade Capacity

• Expand and deepen government capacity to collate and analyze key economic data
• Invest in human capital and tools to monitor and respond to shifting trade dynamics globally
• Ensure that decision making for domestic and foreign trade policy is informed by data

Reform the Tariff Regime

• Reassess the basis for the existing Pakistani tariff regime, including the risks of using tariffs as a source of foreign currency denominated revenue
• Eschew the use of para-tariffs, import taxation, and protectionist policies—especially in inefficient sectors
• Deploy tariffs more strategically, in service of national objectives, rather than allowing tariffs to be used in service of narrow interest groups—such as inefficient and low quality domestic vehicle manufacturers

Enhance Economic Diplomacy

• Build a stronger international trade negotiation team with sectoral expertise. Consider the merger of the Commerce and Foreign Service occupational groups of the civil service as a necessary element of developing such expertise  
• Revisit existing silos and dual functions across the federal government, such as the divide between Commerce and Foreign Affairs divisions, or the duality of the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, and Pakistan Software Export Board

Diversify and Upgrade Export Offerings

• Invest in non-substitutable, complex products to gain a competitive edge

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Background

Pakistan is currently pursuing its 24th IMF bailout package to facilitate long-term reforms. The agreement aims to unlock USD 1.1 billion from the IMF’s USD 3 billion standby arrangement from the previous year. Reforms will primarily target fiscal consolidation, energy sector viability, inflation, and private sector-led economic activity. The 65th Tabadlab Policy Roundtable unpacked the implications of this programme for Pakistani citizens.

 

Featured Panelists

Hadia Majid

Hadia Majid is an Associate Professor and Economics Department Chair at LUMS.

Tobias Haque

Tobias Haque is the Lead Country Economist for Pakistan at The World Bank.

Sobia Khurram

Sobia Khurram is a Professor at the Institute of Administrative Sciences at the University of Punjab.

Shahrukh Wani

Shahrukh Wani is an Economist at the International Growth Centre and has experience working in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uganda, and Zambia.

Khurram Husain

Khurram Husain is a Business and Economy Journalist and writes regularly for Dawn.

The post Tabadlab Policy Roundtable 65: Balancing IMF relief with long-term stability appeared first on Tabadlab | Understanding Change.

Detailed in Tabadlab’s seminal analysis, “A Raging Fire,” the gravity of this crisis is laid bare, revealing the depth and breadth of the problem, the quantum of financial resources lacking, and the path forward with or without transformational structural changes.

By dissecting key financial indicators, drawing comparisons with global standards, and showcasing multi-scenario projections “A Raging Fire” serves as a critical blueprint for navigating Pakistan’s debt dilemma.

Providing comprehensive solutions in a dedicated section, the analysis ends with crucial reforms needed to extricate Pakistan from the this perennial financial spiral, and put it on a path to economic recovery, eventually leading to prosperity.

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Pakistan has witnessed a high degree of activity in the EdTech segment, as numerous platforms and services emerge to offer new learning solutions that either add to or complement existing channels. The need for more content and increased accessibility is obvious, given chronic gaps in learning outcomes. A number of technology-centric service providers played a critical role in supporting timely and efficient responses for education continuity as both the Covid-19 pandemic and the devastating superfloods of 2022 disrupted normal education delivery. The most recent macro level effort in Pakistan’s EdTech portfolio was the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training (MoFEPT) TeleSchool Pakistan mobile app.

While leveraging technology to provide learning support for Pakistani students holds immense potential for bridging educational disparities, it is crucial to assess how well such efforts address the specific needs emanating from the country’s fragmented education system and diverse population. For a system that experiences frequent interruptions to the education system—because of climate, public health and political crises – new interventions must introduce innovative approaches that are built upon previous interventions, anchored in evidence and designed to offer continuity and contribute to improved outcomes.

TeleSchool Pakistan App: An Overview

Three years ago, just when education around the world had been disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic and Pakistan was experiencing school closures affecting more than 40 million students[1], the government introduced and piloted a dedicated TV channel with free education content available to a vast majority of Pakistani households. Implemented almost instantaneously, the TeleSchool TV channel was a remarkable demonstration of government capacity and the potential for private sector contributions to complex and sophisticated crisis responses^[2]. The TeleSchool TV channel broadcast teaching and learning content for a number of subjects covering Grades KG to 12 from 8 am to 6 pm daily on the nationwide terrestrial Pakistan Television Network (PTV). With 74% ownership of televisions among households in Pakistan, terrestrial TV was chosen as the primary medium for education delivery response during Covid19 school closures^[3]. Several other public sector programmes were introduced alongside TeleSchool as a response to Covid-19. These include Radio School, TaleemGhar (Punjab) and the e-taleem portal, which utilise various channels, including online websites and radio to deliver learning material to students.

The launch of the TeleSchool app in March 2023 is an important leap for the delivery of learning material and education at large. Given that this app has been introduced just three years after the Teleschool TV channel, it manifests more sophisticated and rigorous thinking in the public sector about how Pakistani education futures. The aim of the TeleSchool app is to “revolutionise formal education in Pakistan using digital technologies” and reflects the government’s efforts to drive “innovation”^[4]. Similar to the TV channel, the TeleSchool Pakistan app is a government led project powered by partnerships with private educational platforms namely Knowledge Platform, Sabaq, Taleemabad, Learning Pitch and Nearpeer[5]. It is notable that the TeleSchool story now encompasses two political regimes, in an ecosystem of intense political polarisation where the previous and current governments are otherwise severely opposed to each other.

While both variants i.e., TeleSchool TV channel and TeleSchool Pakistan app, offer free of cost learning resources for Grades KG to12, the app offers an enhanced feature set and more structured content in an attempt to expand the scope of opportunities to support education outside schools. The table below provides an overview of the two TeleSchool variants:

We now cover the two key features of the TeleSchool App – live channels (broadcast through the mobile app), and on-demand grade and subject-wise content:

Live Channels

The TeleSchool Pakistan app consists of six Live Channels that broadcast content continuously. These channels are currently only available on the app and follow a weekly broadcast schedule.

Four of the six educational channels are dedicated to school-going children covering specific grades while two channels cater to out-of-school children.

On-Demand/Stored Content

One of the major upgrades that the app offers, as opposed to the TV channel, is on-demand content availability. The TV channel was, by virtue of being broadcast only, limited to users viewing content as per the channel’s schedule. Amidst long electricity blackouts and power failures, and any number of other possible disruptions to user access to broadcast content, the app provides on-demand content for Grades KG to 12 in the form of videos—accessible as per user availability and preference. Another major upgrade is the improved content library that covers more subjects/topics and grades, organised by curricular learning outcomes. The content library in the TeleSchool Pakistan app already boasts 2,236 video packages across all grades and subjects – curated specifically for this app[6].

In the short time since its launch, the TeleSchool Pakistan app garnered impressive engagement—surpassing 30,000 downloads, 43,000 registered users and accumulating over 50,000 video views[7]. This highlights its potential as a valuable tool for supporting students who fall into two categories: a) those attending school but in need of additional assistance to improve learning processes and outcomes, and b) those who are no longer a part of the formal education system and can benefit from learning opportunities. However, it is imperative that we go beyond these initial markers of success and delve deeper into evaluating interventions with a focus on the app’s potential contribution to scaled adoption and demonstrable improvement in learning outcomes.

TeleSchool App: A rapid review

The TeleSchool Pakistan app characterises key elements and features that are central to educational apps. These include:

Easy to install and sign-up

Available for Android and Apple users through their respective app stores, TeleSchool Pakistan is easy to install and requires one-time registration to start using the app. Once registered and an account has been created, there are no further onboarding processes, and content can be accessed right away.

The app offers users the ability to create multiple accounts with a unique mobile number, catering to multi-children households whereby different profiles can be created by entering details of all children that can use the app. This allows families to access relevant content streams conveniently on a shared phone. In addition to students, the app also allows teachers to sign up, with similar registration steps with the only difference of linking registration to the Computerised National Identity Card Number (CNIC).

While the app requires parental consent through a checkbox, it does not offer any additional robust means of verification/validation of the parental consent.

User-Friendly Interface

The landing interface of the application offers a creative and user-friendly design and navigation. Every section and tab has a clutter-free and attractive design, featuring clear labels that make it engaging for users, particularly children, to explore.

Expanded coverage and content library 

The TeleSchool channel initially encompassed six subjects: Math, English, Urdu, Science, Biology, and Physics. The app, however, offers additional subjects including Chemistry, General Knowledge, and Pakistan Studies. This expansion of the subject list showcases MoFEPT’s commitment to ensuring that learners spread across all levels have access to a wider spectrum of content to support their educational experiences.

Content Enrichment

To enhance the learning experience, the app leverages external resources such as TED Talks and YouTube channels to augment in-app content for each grade and subject covered in alignment with the national curriculum. These linkages to external resources provide an expanded set of aids to facilitate lessons undertaken through the app. Moreover, the videos cover a range of topics covering life skills and general knowledge, which can be invaluable in developing key behavioral competencies like problem solving, critical thinking and collaboration among children.

Feedback Response Mechanism

The app introduces a critical feature of soliciting user feedback and complaints. This sets it apart from traditional mediums like television, where individuals are required to make phone calls and manually report inconveniences, as a low-probability channel of engagement. Having an in-built feedback mechanism allows the process to become simplified and streamlined, encouraging users to express their thoughts more easily and frequently. On the other hand, by effectively utilising information and insights through feedback, MoFEPT can benefit immensely through clearly identified areas for improvement in design and content. These feedback loops can lead to upgrades that can ultimately enhance the overall user experience.

Inclusive approach catering to out-of-school children

In addition to covering content for all grade levels, the app through its newest addition of a Live Channel also caters to out-of-school children.  This content primarily is designed to be an accelerated learning program for children who may have dropped out or have never attended school. Given Pakistan’s out-of-school-children crisis, this is an area of high importance and can enable pathways for improved engagement and learning for these excluded groups.

But is this enough? Limitations and Shortcomings

While the TeleSchool Pakistan app is a notable addition to the bouquet of digital learning platforms, it also drives attention to the critical aspect of effectiveness; how can such interventions improve learning outcomes at scale? We now highlight some fundamental challenges and limitations of the TeleSchool Pakistan app.

Universal Access  

While the TeleSchool Pakistan app is an innovation in the public sector context, its efficacy as a national solution is hindered by Pakistan’s digital readiness. Smartphone ownership in Pakistan stands at around 40%, and the state of internet connectivity is far from satisfactory^[8]. Despite 2.3x growth in total broadband subscribers since 2016, less than half of the total population can avail broadband internet with sub-par quality and experience.^[9]

This raises concerns about the target audience for such interventions. According to the latest Human Capital Review by The World Bank, the most vulnerable children in the education system are girls, children residing in rural areas, predominantly from Sindh and Balochistan and children who may never be able to afford schooling due to their socio-economic circumstances^[10]. In all of the above-mentioned scenarios, these children face significant barriers in accessing smartphones and stable internet connections required to yield benefits from such an app.

Affordability

While the app is free to install and use, there is a cost associated with data usage to access content through the mobile app. Even for families who may own a smartphone, the increasing cost of fixed and mobile broadband due to high taxation coupled with other inflationary pressures that reduce the income available for connectivity requirements. Based on our usage of the app, approximately 40 minutes and 3 videos results in 500MB (0.5GB) of data usage. Projecting modest use of the app for 30-40 minutes a day over 10 days a month would require 5GB of internet usage. Given Pakistan is a mobile-first internet market with limited fixed broadband coverage, such internet usage for the app can cost households an additional PKR 400 to 800 per month[1]. This can act as a major barrier for households in the lower income quintiles which are subject to highest inflationary and other cost pressures.

Language

Although the app offers content in both English and Urdu, there is a prevalent language barrier, particularly in terms of interface elements. From the sign-up process to the labels in the main interface and video content, the interface of the app uses English. This can lead to alienation of children who may not have sufficient proficiency in reading and understanding English. Even parents, who are required to provide consent and active support to their children in using this app, may continue to face difficulty in navigating the app due to the language barrier. The absence of content adaptations that translate the primary content in commonly spoken regional languages including Punjabi, Pashto, Saraiki, Sindhi, Brahvi etc. certainly limits the adoption and use of the app as a universal platform for all Pakistani children.

Information and awareness

Other than the launch-hype around the app, there is no broadcast schedule available in the app or publicly for the live educational channels for users to know about the content coverage and modality. This lack of access to simple yet critical information leads to issues that inhibit an elaborate utilisation of the digital content available through the app.

Content accuracy and visual presentation

We found notable issues based on a very narrow-scope review of selected videos on the app. There are occasional interruptions and slight lags in the audio-visual sync where some sections lack the accompanying voiceover that provides an explanation of the content displayed on the screen or the sequence of content skips abruptly to a new section. These disruptions hinder the seamless viewing experience of the audience and makes it difficult for them to follow the instructional sequence. Furthermore, there are instances of spelling and conceptual errors that pose a risk of conveying inaccurate knowledge to students. For instance, a Math video for Grade 3, the word “nonagon” is spelled correctly in the question, but it is incorrectly spelled as “nanogram” in the subsequent answer visual. The shape marked as ‘pentagon’ is actually a hexagon. Content curation and quality assurance is a resource-intensive yet critical layer of launching such platforms. The MoFEPT must institute quality assurance layers and processes including proactive user feedback for identification and rectification of such errors before making them public and ensure that the videos are free from any lags and disruptions.

Assessments & measuring results  

Any educational intervention must be designed to effectively measure results and evaluate impact on learning outcomes. Despite this fundamental principle, assessments remain a persistently neglected area in the design of learning interventions especially in various forms of urgent responses. While the app provides a large pool of learning content and in-video question and answer sections, the absence of a robust assessment mechanism in the form of formative and/or summative instruments that can generate data for MoFEPT is a significant drawback. Without the ability to assess student progress and learning, the true impact of the app remains uncertain and collection of critical insights, that can enable action-oriented decision making for a range of priorities including teacher training and remedial measures, is missed out.

Recommendations

Impactful learning interventions are carefully planned, well-designed and equipped with relevant content and features that cater to the needs of an education system at large. In our case, the education system is plagued with chronic issues of poor access and quality. This requires effort, coordination and collaboration by multiple stakeholders including relevant government agencies, education service providers, teachers and parents/communities. We outline areas that can be enhanced to improve the uptake and adoption of the TeleSchool Pakistan app and increase its effectiveness to contribute to improved outcomes.

Accessibility and Affordability

Improve connectivity infrastructure to enhance internet services: With the internet penetration rate of 36%[11] and internet access gender gap of 67%[12], Pakistan’s core connectivity, fixed and cellular, remains a challenge especially in rural and remote areas. It is, therefore, essential to increase investments in connectivity infrastructure for expansion of the fiber optic network, improved coverage and quality of service across Pakistan. In addition to this, telecom providers must be facilitated in their efforts to strengthen mobile data networks to enable rich use-cases like consumption of education content. Cross-sectoral national priorities like the right to education as guaranteed by Article 25-A of the Constitution should be driving digital expansion for Pakistanis.

Increase smartphone penetration/ownership: Since mobile apps can only function on smartphones, it is crucial to increase smartphone penetration and ownership across the population. This requires making smartphones more affordable which can be achieved through increased local manufacturing of handsets and a reduced taxation on mobile devices, automatically bringing down the cost. Additional measures could include providing tailored subsidies/social transfers, installment plans and/or low-cost devices for households of varying socioeconomic backgrounds with clear metrics for education participation.

Support right to education through the TeleSchool Pakistan app:  Regular usage of the in-app content will shift data consumption patterns and create affordability issues for lower income segments. Several measures can be taken to reduce the burden of cost on users. TeleSchool app can be made free for end-users through strategic collaboration with mobile network operators. This will entail agreements to pay for data usage and consumption of the TeleSchool app (at an aggregated level) directly to mobile operators. Enabled through bespoke arrangements for enterprise services, the requirement for users to pay for and/or consume data on TeleSchool app from their mobile plans can be eliminated and these interventions can contribute to fulfilling Pakistanis’ right to education and the concomitant responsibilities of the state.

Engagement and Communication

Secure institutional support from schools to create awareness: In addition to digital advertising, and promotion around launch bursts, schools in the public, private and non-profit segments can play an active role in raising awareness among students and parents about the TeleSchool app and its benefits in complementing their learning from school and improving academic performance.

Improve literacy (overall and digital): Due to low digital literacy and lack of trust in online platforms, community-focused trainings through vast school networks and education frontline staff can be helpful in educating parents and children on the benefits and usage of apps while also equipping people with the digital skills needed to navigate it effortlessly. This would help create familiarity with the opportunity set offered by online learning solutions in addition to the TeleSchool app and enable people to initiate personal digital transformation journeys.

Functionality

Offer offline content: As long as access to the internet is subject to shutdowns, cost escalations and low quality, it is crucial for any new digital education initiative to address the challenges faced by those with limited connectivity. Therefore, it is important that mechanisms to ensure offline access are introduced to support learning journeys. This feature will not only enable students and teachers to access the content readily and repeatedly on their phones but also limit the dependency on unreliable and/or expensive connectivity.

Create inclusive instructional elements: Given Pakistan’s low literacy levels, and even lower proficiency in English, having enabling interfaces that use local language and/or audio-visual prompts to support text-based navigation, can improve adoption across population segments. A language selection feature should be available up top to give users the freedom to choose their language of instruction. In the long term, the MoFEPT in collaboration with provincial education departments should also introduce content library adaptations in local languages to effectively serve Pakistan’s multilingual student population.

Broadcast Live Channels on television: Currently, live channels are only exclusively available on the app. This restricts access for households that do not have smartphones and/or internet connectivity. To address this issue, it is recommended to make the Live Channels available on television and web as well. While the current content is being broadcast on TeleSchool TV channel, new avenues to access content on flexible schedules on cable and other broadcast media especially for out-of-school children can create supplementary opportunities. Detailed market and segmentation analyses can inform the best scaling options to deliver high value for money.

Introduce gamification: Incorporating gamification elements, such as points, rewards, collaboration and healthy competition based on usage and progression in the app can enhance the user experience to reward positive behaviours. Moreover, it can offer an interactive mechanism for personalised learning and growth which is often missing in classroom settings. With information through usage statistics, gamification has the potential to boost app usage and adoption thereby driving user engagement.

Integrate assessments: Introducing assessments in the app is a critical feature that can generate insightful data streams for MoFEPT, Pakistan Institute of Education (PIE), partners and schools. Embedded assessments linked to each lesson/content item/concept/SLO can generate rich insights that can help drive service delivery and governance decisions with overlays from anonymised user data. In addition to planning decisions, such data points can also support increased parental engagement with learning processes, school administration and teachers. The assessment loops can also help improve the TeleSchool app, content and experience through adaptive learning pathways and refining pedagogical approaches reflected in the content pool.

Insights

Enhance parental engagement through app-usage insights: Although the app currently offers a history of watched videos, it would greatly benefit from providing a detailed analysis of the content consumed. This analysis could use profile information of grades and benchmarks including information such as the extent of content covered, subjects the child focuses on the most, completion rates, frequency of video views etc. By offering this level of detail, parents and children can assess their progression, coverage of content and focus areas to ensure they can leverage the app’s potential to the fullest.

Leverage data mining to improve education delivery: Information from app usage across student and teacher profiles, with due privacy protocols and anonymisation, can offer rich insights for education decision-makers. This can then lead to improve adoption through targeted information and communication campaigns, devising of plans to focus on deficiencies and gaps as reflected through the app, and the identification of opportunities to integrate learning from the analytics feed generated through the platform. A crossflow of data, information and insights from schools (public and private) and the TeleSchool Pakistan app can create an important stream of knowledge within the education ecosystem—one that currently relies on assumptions and strongly held convictions largely based on dated, weak or negligible data.

Conclusion

Any intervention by the public sector that originates from the TeleSchool initiative reflects the growing state awareness and capacity. However, the missed opportunity and national cost of poor learning outcomes, exacerbated by Covid-19 and the 2022 superfloods merits a much more elaborate, detailed and aggressive positioning for ecosystem-wide transformation. This is even more imperative given the deep-rooted economic and political crises that currently grip the country. More than three years after the Covid-19 early response, the TeleSchool app is a welcome addition to the landscape of public sector efforts to address Pakistan’s learning crisis. But the scope of possibilities and potential offered by technology is much wider than what this first generation TeleSchool app offers. This important initiative must now be followed up with a dramatically improved second iteration on a fast track – one that has federal and provincial buy-in, and whole of education sector value-addition built in.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Tabadlab (Private) Limited.

End Notes

[1] Rough estimate based on variance in mobile data plans subject to volume and validity parameters across operators.

[1] ASER (2021). Measuring the impact of Covid 19 on education in Pakistan. UNICEf, ITA. https://aserpakistan.org/document/aser/2021/ASER_2021_Measuring_the_Impact_of_COVID_19_on_Education_in_Pakistan_FINAL_REPORT.pdf

[2]Tabadlab | Understanding Change. (2020). Pakistan Tackling Covid-19 in Education. https://www.tabadlab.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Tabadlab-Covid-19-Response-Briefing-01-Education-April-17-2020.pdf

[3]Zubairi. A et al. (2021). Pakistan country-level research review. Edtech Hub. https://docs.edtechhub.org/lib/NZUHTJBG/download/RZFG5HD7/Zubairi%20et%20al_2021_Country-Level%20Research%20Review.pdf

[4]Government launches Teleschool app to provide online education. (2023). The Nation. https://www.nation.com.pk/21-Mar-2023/govt-launches-teleschool-app-to-provide-online-education

[5] Consultations with the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training (MoFEPT)

[6] Consultations with the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training (MoFEPT)

[7] Consultations with the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training (MoFEPT)

[8] Tabadlab’s calculations based on data provided by PTA and PBS

[9] Tabadlab’s calculations based on data provided by PTA and PBS

[10] Ersado, L et al (2023). Pakistan – Human Capital Review: Building Capabilities Throughout Life. The World Bank. Retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/8748b7a7-7345-4298-9631-3f5f146c7007

[11] Digital 2022: Pakistan — DataReportal – Global Digital Insights, Digital, Digital 2022 (DATAREPORTAL), accessed September 1, 2022, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2022-pakistan

[12] Economist Impact: The Inclusive Internet Index, Supported by Meta,

https://impact.economist.com/projects/inclusive-internet-index/2022/country/Pakistan.

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Context

On November 28, 2022, the Foreign Office of Pakistan announced that Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar would visit Kabul. Her delegation included Special Representative of Pakistan to Afghanistan, Ambassador Muhammad Sadiq and officials from the ministries of commerce and finance.^[1] The purpose of the visit was to improve bilateral relations, and especially trade – given Pakistan’s stated priority to alleviate the severe economic pressure faced by the people of Afghanistan.^[2]

Almost simultaneous to the announcement of the Khar visit to Kabul came the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) statement that it was ending the so-called indefinite ceasefire it had claimed to agree to in June 2022.^[3] With the formal announcement of what was, in effect, a scaling up of its terrorist activity in Pakistan, the TTP said, “As military operations are ongoing against mujahideen in different areas, … so it is imperative for you to carry out attacks wherever you can in the entire country.”

Four days after the announcement ending the ceasefire, terrorists attacked the Pakistan embassy in Kabul[4] targeting the Pakistani head of mission, Ubaid-ur-Rehman Nizamani. Mr. Nizamani survived the attack, having taken charge of the Pakistan embassy in Kabul only four weeks prior.[5] In addition to strongly condemning the attack, Pakistan’s Foreign Office announced that the Government of Pakistan and the interim Afghan authorities were working closely to determine the veracity of the Islamic State in the Khorasan Province’s (ISKP) claiming of the attack.[6] ISKP has deep linkages with the TTP,[7] predominantly through their co-location in Afghanistan.

Although the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) have condemned the attack, and ISKP has claimed responsibility for it, a terrorist attack on the lead Pakistani diplomat in Afghanistan so soon after the end of the TTP’s so called ceasefire raises serious questions in Islamabad. International outcry and condemnation of the attack has been largely muted, especially given the high rank of the Pakistani diplomat in question and the wider implications of a terrorist attack of this nature. Though not overtly related to these events, the new Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Asim Munir, issued a statement declaring the military’s willingness to reengage in kinetic operations to protect civilians from the threat of terrorism.[8]

Negotiations and Ceasefires

For all intents and purposes, the ceasefire was null and void for months, and the announcement on the 28^th of November simply formalised that – but the escalation in violence makes it apparent that the formal end to the ceasefire has enabled TTP to declare open season across the country.

The history of Pakistan’s negotiations with the TTP, ceasefire agreements, and other political concessions is quite clear. The end of the latest so-called ceasefire^[9] represents the latest in a long series of attempts^[10] by Pakistan to find alternatives^[11] to military action against the TTP – efforts that are fifteen years old, tracking all the way back to 2007. Negotiations have nearly always failed, despite the Pakistani state offering a range of concessions, including involving tribal leaders in the conversation, releasing TTP prisoners, and repatriating terrorists’ families. The TTP has consistently used negotiations to normalise anti-state discourse – demanding measures that effectively equate to the dismantling of the Pakistani republic.

Traditionally, ceasefires have been leveraged not as tools of violence-mitigation, but to buy time. For the TTP, it allowed for regrouping, stocktaking, and strengthening. For the Government of Pakistan, ceasefires have been seen as a way to generate respite for frontline forces, and allow for strategy assessment, and redeployments, as well as the application of political pressure. For fifteen years – efforts to negotiate politically with a violent extremist group that employs terrorism as its primary instrument of politics – has only resulted in the weakening of the Pakistani position, and an eventual return to violence. The latest ceasefire episode has been no different.

Past Efforts: Containment and Management

At a cursory glance, one could make the argument that trying to negotiate with a banned, violent, anti-state group indicates that the Pakistani state has not been able to implement its writ upon its sovereign territory. However, the circumstances of this set of negotiations and the short-lived ceasefire are more complicated than that.

First, the TTP and its leadership is no longer in Pakistan. The estimated 5,000 or so fighters of the TTP reside primarily in the bordering provinces of neighbouring Afghanistan.

Second, while Pakistan has the air capability to target TTP hideouts in Afghanistan, it does not have the foot intelligence to mitigate civilian casualties, and any cross-border air strikes would result in further alienating an increasingly distanced Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA).

Third, a ceasefire is also a mechanism to provide temporary relief – both to the active troops on the ground, and the civilian populations that have suffered nearly two decades of violence – particularly in the NMDs and wider Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

How has the TTP survived?

The obvious question is: why, after the concerted and highly successful Zarb e Azb military campaign of 2014, was the TTP allowed to survive and eventually coalesce in 2019 to form the group as it stands today?

First, under tremendous pressure from the concerted kinetic military and intelligence operations, the group splintered into multiple factions and scattered across various geographics, on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This made it very difficult to target and eliminate its members, track down its leadership, and shut down its operations entirely.

Second, the Doha pact^[12] signed on February 29, 2020, between the Trump administration and the Afghan Taliban (notably without any representation of the Ghani regime) created legitimacy for the Afghan Taliban. This had significant knock-on effects on the Afghan Taliban morale (in terms of their recruitment, and consolidation of assets and power), and emboldened affiliated groups, as well as the TTP. Combined with the drawdown announcement in April 2021,^[13] and a reiteration of this promise in July 2021,^[14] this further accelerated the Afghan Taliban’s campaign, which was already sweeping across the country and eventually resulted in the takeover of Kabul on August 15, 2021.^[15] By extension, the recently re-coalesced TTP^[16] also felt empowered, considering its allegiance to the Afghan Taliban.

Third, shortly after the takeover of Kabul, the IEA also released hundreds of TTP fighters^[17] from various prisons, including founding deputy emir Maulvi Faqir Muhammad. The TTP was also given complete freedom of movement and operations, and its emir Noor Wali Mehsud renewed its pledge of allegiance^[18] to the Afghan Taliban. The TTP had a significant base in Afghanistan that was only bolstered and further legitimised by the prisoner release. While the two have coexisted physically, and operationally intertwined against international forced, the Afghan Taliban have never actively encouraged attacks inside Pakistan.

Fourth, the release of prisoners is a negotiation tactic between the Government of Pakistan and the TTP. In November of last year, the TTP demanded the release of its fighters^[19] as a pre-condition for talks. This demand was met by Pakistani authorities, and up to 100 TTP prisoners were released^[20] in early December 2021, and again^[21] in May 2022. While this is a diminishing resource, given that an emboldened TTP had carried out attacks killing hundreds in Pakistan since August 2021, allowing known enemies of the state to escape the rule of law, is of questionable utility.^[22] A related question here is why captured members were not tried, prosecuted, and sentenced at the scale needed to establish the writ of the state, despite a carte blanche being given to the military courts under the NAP.^[23]

Fifth, the Pakistani state’s historic insistence on viewing certain groups, especially the Afghan Taliban, as a strategic compulsion, complicates its ability to rationally negotiate with a group allied to them but opposed to the Pakistani people and Pakistani state. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan went so far as to say that the only solution to the TTP problem was a political settlement.^[24] Adding to the confusion was the claim by President Arif Alvi and the former PM that an amnesty was on offer if the group laid down its arms. A military spokesperson also confirmed^[25] that the recent (now failed) talks and ceasefire was requested by the IEA, emphasising Pakistan’s blind spot when it comes to the Afghan Taliban leadership.

Who will be the likely targets?

While the end of the ceasefire has been declared as a consolidated effort against the state of Pakistan, in practical terms, this means an increase in attacks and violence in the NMDs, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (particularly Swat, Upper Dir, and Lower Dir), and the Quetta Block (comprising of districts Quetta, Pishin, Killa Abdullah).

Given historical precedents and the souring of public opinion against the TTP, particularly after the APS attack, it is unlikely that they will purposely target civilian populations and installations. The bulk of the terror attacks will likely be conducted against security forces in the border and adjoining areas, particularly less-defended security check posts, border outposts, and patrolling convoys. It also follows that a greater volume of attacks will result in an escalation in counter-terrorism operations as well.

What are some factors influencing the situation?

Patronage from the Afghan Taliban: Members of the TTP – estimated to be around 5,000 within Afghanistan, with patronage, support, and freedom of movement for their members – reside in provinces bordering Pakistan, particularly Kunar, Khost, and Paktika. They are well-organised, equipped, trained, and mobile. This patronage from the Afghan Taliban regime, in direct violation of the Doha agreement, will likely continue. Having deep roots in Al Qaeda and connections with the Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (ISKP), the IEA would be keen to keep the significant TTP presence appeased and in check, rather than having them turn on them, or worse, join the ideologically opposed ISKP. While negotiations between Pakistan and the TTP occurred at the facilitation and behest of the IEA, with no resolution and the lifting of the ceasefire, the IEA is now in a very precarious and unenviable position.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship: Another factor is the ability for Pakistan to leverage its relationship with the IEA, and the impact that may have on the internal dynamics of Afghanistan. A day prior to the announcement of the end of the ceasefire, the Pakistan Foreign Office announced that Minister for State Hina Rabbani Khar would be visiting Kabul.^[26] This inevitably also changed the ensuing dialogue to be more security-focused, with emphasis placed on curbing cross-border attacks on Pakistani security forces, as well as mitigating the movement of armed fighters across the fenced position. Following the attack on Pakistan’s head of mission in Kabul, the Foreign Office issued a statement demanding that “the interim government of Afghanistan must immediately hold thorough investigations in this attack”[27] and hold culprits to account. In response, the IEA has also issued a statement condemning the attack and assuring a “serious investigation,”[28] but the tangible consequences remain to be seen. Over time, Pakistan’s relationship with the Islamic Emirate, both in terms of its perceived leverage over the group, and the Emirate’s willingness to accommodate Pakistani demands, has been increasingly grounded against its own internal risk matrix.

Border dispute: The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan continues to be a thorny issue and has been politicised to suggest that Pakhtuns on both sides believe it to be a barrier to their long-standing ties and mobility. This may be true for the Afghan side, but it is not necessarily the case on the Pakistani side. It is also a contentious issue for the Afghan authorities, given the several^[29] border^[30] skirmishes^[31] that have broken out^[32] along^[33] the fenced position, often resulting in closing of border crossings.^[34]

TTP’s operational capacity: Assessing the access and capability of the TTP – both the released fighters within Pakistan, and the bulk of its operational forces in Afghanistan – is a key consideration. Pakistan’s security apparatus needs to do better in terms of building local trust and buy-in, as well as establishing stronger foot intelligence to aid in early warning and prevention.

Pakistan’s economic and political crisis: Pakistan is also facing a range of internal political and economic crises. The country is going into an election season with political rivalries and acrimony at an all-time high, thereby affecting political priorities and focus. In addition, after six years, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) was appointed^[35] a few days prior to the annulment of the ceasefire. This has implications both in the context of the prioritisation of national security in the face of the TTP threat, and how the military establishment works with the civilian government to tackle the long-standing TTP puzzle.

Centre-province divergences: The federal-provincial divide in Pakistan has historically resulted in political point scoring and blame gaming, instead of broad collaboration to tackle the many challenges, particular in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the tribal regions. Over the course of time, PTI’s strong popularity in the region and the party’s alienation from the military after the change in government in Pakistan in April 2022 has resulted in significant challenges for the alignment between the security sector and the wider public and political discourse.

Seasonal capability: One factor that limits the TTP’s ability to strike targets is the onset of the winter season. There is sufficient historical evidence to suggest that the ferocity and frequency of attacks lessens in the winters. However, given that the end of the ceasefire was announced at the end of November, the TTP has also conducted attacks to establish legitimacy, tactical prowess, and strike capability.

What does Pakistan need to do?

The TTP in December 2022 represents an urgent national security challenge for Pakistan. Small groups or “tashkeels” have been infiltrating through Dir for years. This time, ostensibly buoyed by the Pakistan-TTP talks, these armed members have stayed – leading to local populations pushing back through several protests in the region.^[36] Any TTP terrorists on Pakistani soil pose a clear and present danger to society, the state and the security sector in the region. In the absence of effective elimination, apprehension, or movement restriction, these terrorist “fighters” (more than one hundred of whom were recently released^[37]) are an immediate problem. The fighters residing in Afghanistan constitute the next priority or group of concern.

Pakistan’s TTP problem has been decades in the making, and has now lasted for fifteen years. It is clear, both through historical precedent and the obduracy of the TTP, that a political settlement or permanent ceasefire are not an option. Given the violent attacks over the last fifteen months, despite the so-called ceasefire, the group has signalled its intent to inflict damage and continue to undermine to undermine the Pakistani republic, particularly in the newly merged tribal districts regions bordering Afghanistan.

Containment, management, and the eventual cycle of negotiations and ceasefires needs to be catalogued as ineffective and shelved as a serious option for Pakistan. The country has suffered tremendously at the hands of terrorist groups in the last two decades, and all prior attempts at reconciliation, political settlement, or ceasefire have failed, save the temporary reduction in hostilities that these agreements offer.

A major shift in thinking is overdue, one that is mandated by both the 25th Constitutional Amendment and the very pronounced public outcry against the TTP resurgence over the last three years. Pakistan’s political and security sector need to better respond to the needs and demands of right-based movements like the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement, and forge better political buy-in from local communities that are most deeply affected by the TTP’s violence. Policies, postures and politics that causes the alienation and disenfranchisement at the grassroots is a formula for an ever growing TTP footprint and expanding distance between Islamabad and the people. The strong public sentiment against the group needs to be channelled and responded to by the state, rather than undermined or propagated against.

What Pakistan must do internally:

1. Identify, stop, and prosecute terrorists by mandating and empowering civilian law enforcement, administration, judicial bodies. This needs to be the de facto state policy with two caveats:
   1. First, any prisoners of this conflict must be treated following the stipulations of the Geneva Convention[38]
   2. Second, effects on the local population must be accounted for, and efforts made to shield them from displacement or disruption in livelihoods
   3. Third, there is no tactical reason for not offering amnesty to terrorists that lay down their arms, but it must be accompanied with the application of the rule of law to said individuals. This can be an easy step toward splintering group cohesion and obtaining updated intelligence from surrendering terrorists.
2. Vigilantly monitor, patrol, and control the now-fenced border, with clear rules of engagement established with border control authorities and governments on both sides. Border posts are likely to remain easy and primary targets for inflicting damage, and non-crossing sections for attempting infiltration. Pakistan has been fencing the border for nearly six years, with 94% of the work complete by January 2022,^[39] and has maintained for a long time that the border is a settled issue.^[40] However fencing must be 100% complete for this to be an effective tool.
3. Heighten security in sensitive installations across the country, but particularly in the newly merged districts and other adjoining areas
4. Enhance, develop and renew foot intelligence or human intelligence networks, building confidence with the local This is necessary both to thwart the potential recruitment of marginalised communities (particularly youth) by the TTP, and to provide actionable information and intelligence to pre-empt potential terrorist planning and attacks.
5. Cross-border military operations, such as the airstrikes conducted earlier this year are the least desirable option. The previous airstrikes, which reportedly killed at least 47 civilians in Afghanistan April 2022,^[41] had limited tactical applicability and negligible strategic value. If anything, it weakened Pakistan’s position in the negotiations with the TTP facilitated by the Afghan Taliban government. Airstrikes also draw the ire of the Afghan Taliban and the international community, particularly since the April strikes came under severe criticism by both the UN and the public in Afghanistan.^[42]
6. The release of TTP prisoners as a tool for negotiation and a confidence building measure is a diminishing resource with limited efficacy. Pakistan needs to properly prosecute TTP prisoners and use the resulting justice as a deterrent and a signal of the state’s strong intent and will to pursue and punish terrorists.

What Pakistan must do regionally:

Diplomatic

1. Apply pressure on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IAE) to keep the TTP in check and restrict its movement across the border. This is problematic because a) the TTP has sworn allegiance to the Afghan Taliban, and b) their raison d’etre is to conduct terror operations against the Pakistani state and security forces, supporting the IEA, and the eventual imposition of their version of Shariah law in Pakistan.
2. Think beyond the carrot and stick approach of pushing for the repatriation of Afghan refugees, tightening of the visa regime, and border closures as effective policy instruments to coerce the IEA. These interventions only result in further alienation and resentment of ordinary Afghans.
3. Continue to build regional consensus and pressure, particularly from Afghanistan’s neighbours and the GCC to ensure that the IEA does not support, patronise, or shelter violent groups that are a direct threat to countries like Pakistan, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. In this context, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are of particular significance, as the IEA survival is increasingly tied to the Afghan Taliban’s legitimacy.

Military 

1. Consider engaging with international partners (including both bilateral and multilateral partners) to explore deeper joint intelligence work, as well as options for joint over-the-horizon kinetic operations and strikes that target key terrorist leaders and networks – instead of relying on unilateral operations. Bilateral partners may include the United States, whilst multilateral partners may include a range of potential regional frameworks, including the SCO, GCC and others.
2. Forge better intelligence gathering and sharing with key partners, including Afghanistan’s neighbours and the US to better facilitate tracking, targeting, and elimination of key terror figures.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Tabadlab Private Limited.

Endnotes

[1]https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1014556-hina-rabbani-to-visit-afghanistan-on-29th

[2]https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2021/03/24/pakistan-loses-spot-as-top-trade-partner-of-afghanistan/

[3]https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/3/pakistan-taliban-says-ceasefire-with-govt-in-islamabad-extended

[4] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/2/assassination-attempt-on-pakistan-envoy-in-afghan-capital

[5] https://www.pakembassykabul.org/en/information/ambassador/

[6] https://mofa.gov.pk/press-release-546/

[7] https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/21/evolution-and-future-of-tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-pub-86051

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-new-army-chief-says-will-defend-motherland-during-visit-disputed-2022-12-03/

[9]https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/11/taliban-ends-ceasefire-with-pakistani-government-vows-revenge-attacks-across-the-country.php

[10] https://www.dawn.com/news/1660188

[11] https://www.dawn.com/news/1660188

[12] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf

[13]https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2573268/biden-announces-full-us-troop-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-by-sept-11/

[14]https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forces-in-afghanistan/

[15] https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan

[16] https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan

[17]https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/21/evolution-and-future-of-tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-pub-86051

[18] https://twitter.com/IftikharFirdous/status/1427543775178600477?s=20

[19]https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-taliban-demand-prisoner-release-condition-talks-sources-2021-11-06/

[20] https://tribune.com.pk/story/2333199/dozens-of-ttp-members-freed-as-truce-holds

[21] https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/pakistans-peace-gamble-with-the-tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan/

[22] https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/01/after-talibans-takeover-pakistans-ttp-problem

[23] It is worth mentioning here that under the NAP-mandated military courts, 345 people were sentenced to death, and of the 8,000 or so prisoners on death row, another 56 were hanged. The latter also required the reversal of a moratorium that has been in effect since 2008, and is back in effect now, at least in spirit, if not in letter. The last sentencing was in 2019, and the last hanging was in Dec 2019.

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/02/world/asia/pakistan-taliban-talks.html

[25]https://www.newsweekpakistan.com/military-ops-against-ttp-to-continue-till-menace-wiped-out-dg-ispr/

[26] https://dailytimes.com.pk/1033490/hina-rabbani-khar-in-afghanistan-on-day-long-visit/

[27] https://www.dawn.com/news/1724302

[28] https://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/677949-Afghan-govt-condemns-attack-on-Pakistan-envoy;-assures-/’serious-investig

[29] https://arynews.tv/pakistan-army-soldier-martyred-cross-border-attack-ispr/

[30]https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/pakistani-soldiers-killed-in-cross-border-fire-from-afghanistan

[31] https://www.dawn.com/news/1665630/border-spat-with-taliban-resolved-official

[32]https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/five-pakistan-soldiers-killed-attack-afghanistan-military-says-2022-02-06/

[33]https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-pakistani-forces-clash-along-border-casualties-reported-2022-09-14/

[34] https://tribune.com.pk/story/2386288/chaman-border-closed-for-indefinite-period-following-clashes

[35] https://tribune.com.pk/story/2388664/new-coas-gen-asim-takes-reins

[36]https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/11/thousands-protest-rising-violence-in-pakistans-swat-valley

[37] https://tribune.com.pk/story/2330584/govt-releases-over-100-ttp-prisoners-as-goodwill-gesture

[38] The status of the enemy, under international law, is quite complicated. In one instance, this is non-international armed conflict; on the other TTP’s majority in Afghanistan implies it is international armed conflict.

[39] https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-176201

[40] https://www.dawn.com/news/759523/durand-line-a-settled-issue-says-pakistan

[41]https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220417-afghanistan-death-toll-in-pakistan-strikes-rises-to-at-least-47-officials

[42]https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-condemn-pakistan-for-alleged-cross-border-attacks-in-afghanistan/6532351.html

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