Talking Brains

Motor control for speech versus non-speech vocal tract gestures

2013-05-16T08:08:00.003-07:00

Here is a pretty cool demo from the 1960s showing the dissociability of motor control during speech versus non-speech tongue movements. Check it out! Thanks to Ron Nutsell for pointing this out.

Flying Pigs on National Public Radio: Promoting the wrong theory of language and understanding

2013-05-09T15:04:00.003-07:00

NPR aired an interview recently with Benjamin Bergen, UCSD cognitive scientist, discussing an embodied view of word meaning. The basic idea is nothing new by now: we understand words by "simulating" our physical experiences that have become associated with those words. Here's a quote taken from the NPR transcript of the interview:

If someone read a sentence like, "the shortstop threw the ball to first base," parts of the brain dedicated to vision and movement would light up, Bergen says. "The question was, why?" he says. "They're just listening to language. Why would they be preparing to act? Why would they be thinking that they were seeing something?"

The answer that emerged from this research is that when you encounter words describing a particular action, your brain simulates the experience, Bergen says.

"The way that you understand an action is by recreating in your vision system what it would look like to perceive that event and recreating in your motor system what it would be like to be that shortstop, to have the ball in your hand and release it," Bergen says.

This is standard embodied cognition speak. I haven't read his book, but this view seems to be the central topic of Bergen's monograph, Louder than words: the new science of how the brain makes meaning. I'm sure his book is much more careful and articulated than the interview, but the interview is what more people will hear and so deserves a response, particularly because the interview discussion goes beyond word meanings, claiming to reset our understanding of language itself:

Just a few decades ago, many linguists thought the human brain had evolved special module for language. It seemed plausible that our brains have some unique structure or system. After all, no animal can use language the way people can.

But in the 1990s, scientists began testing the language-module theory using "functional" MRI technology that let them watch the brain respond to words. And what they saw didn't look like a module, says Benjamin Bergen.

They found something totally surprising," Bergen says. "It's not just certain specific little regions in the brain, regions dedicated to language, that were lighting up. It was kind of a whole-brain type of process.

He then goes to explain how we understand language via simulation, as in the baseball example. This generalization to language is troubling, reckless even. There are so many problems with the claim, it's hard to know where to start, but I'll try:

1. A theory of word meaning is not a theory of language, it's a theory of word meaning. Let's translate the argument to the visual domain to reveal how ridiculous this generalization is. "Just a few decades ago, many visual scientists used to think that the human brain has evolved special modules for vision, like systems for wavelength frequency detection, motion detection, and analysis of object form. But in the 1990s MRI technology let them watch the brain respond to visual scenes. And what they saw didn't look like a module, but involved activation all over the brain." Do we conclude that decades of research on vision got it all wrong just because lot's of brain tissues lights up when we look at things? Of course not! Bergen's comment is nothing more than a misguided interpretation of functional MRI and its relation to computational systems in the brain.

2. To push the point, it's not even clear to me that Bergen's theory has anything to do with language. It is a theory of conceptual representation, not a theory of how the brain takes an acoustic signal and extracts and transforms the relevant bits to make contact with that conceptual system. The latter issue is what occupies most linguists' time and theoretical focus. Does Bergen claim that his theory explains cochlear filtering of the acoustic signal. No. Does he claim that his theory explains how that signal is elaborated in the frequency and time domains to yield a spectro-temporal representation of the signal? No. Does he claim that the theory explains how that spectro-temporal signal makes contact with representations of word forms in the listener? No. Does visual simulation of the events described in the sentence explain the word order in the sentence? Or the position and use of words like the and to in that sentence? No, those are the kinds of things that perceptual scientists and linguists worry about: the transformation of the acoustic signal into some format that will allow contact with meaning and Bergen's simulation theory has nothing to say about it, which means that it has nothing to say about the "module for language" that many linguists used to believe in. Moral: don't claim to have solved puzzle A when you are fiddling with the pieces of puzzle B.

3. Simulation theories of conceptual representation don't solve any problems. Let's consider Bergen's theory: we understand the sentence "the shortstop threw the ball to first base" by simulating what it would be like to see the action and by simulating what it would be like to do the action. And, he argues elsewhere, we understand things we have never seen or done by combining or generalizing from things we have seen and done. So "flying pig" is understood by combining the experienced concepts of FLY (as seen with birds) with that of PIG. The result is the visual activation of the image of a pig with wings, which is the neural basis of our understanding. But wait, Bergen said that the way we understand action (flying is an action) is by simulating it in our visual system and by doing it with our motor system. It's not clear how we can simulate FLYING PIG in our motor system, so the motor part must not be critical in this case, which makes us question whether it is critical in the shortstop throwing a ball case. (Good thing we have a reason to question the motor part, because then we have an explanation for why quadraplegic individuals can enjoy baseball as much as the rest of us.) So, we must conclude, simulation of the perceptual bit is where our understanding of "flying pig" comes from. But now I'm confused. How do we know which perceptual experience to simulate? Do I combine my experience with pigs and birds and give the hybrid creature wings? Or do I combine pig with superman and give it a cape (a possibility noted in the interview)? Or maybe I combine pig with my experience flying on 737s and imagine a pig sitting in coach ordering a Diet Coke. Or should I combine pig with my baseball experiences and picture a mini pig being used as a baseball and getting smacked out to center field. Maybe, an embodied theorist might claim, that's the cool part: depending on which experiences I combine, I get a different meaning. Fine, but let's flip it around. How do I know that a pig with wings, a pig in coach, and a ball-shaped pig, one flapping, one sitting and sipping, and one hurtling through space are all examples of flying pigs? What is telling me that each of those simulations are linked? You might say that they are linked due to similarity of experience. By what metric? My perceptual experiences with each of these kinds of FLYING are wildly different. How does the brain know to associate them? Something must be telling the system that those instances are "similar" in the relevant respects. Now we need a theory of that! Here's the point: simulating a specific experience of say FLY can't be enough because it doesn't capture our ability to generalize the meaning to birds, planes, and baseballs. We have to be "simulating" something more abstract such that it captures those generalizations; and if we are "simulating" an abstract something, we might as well call it an abstract representation just like in "classical" theories. Saying that we understand by "simulation" just relabels the problem, it doesn't solve anything.

I'm sure we could go on but I think I'll just conclude instead: Bergen's theory is not about language so whatever claims that are made on that front are just hyperbole. And in the domain that the theory actually applies, it doesn't improve our understanding.

Post Doctoral Position - Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Leipzig (Obleser lab)

2013-05-02T13:31:00.001-07:00

The Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences (MPI CBS) in Leipzig and the Max Planck Research Group “Auditory Cognition” (headed by Jonas Obleser) are now offering a Postdoctoral researcher position, for initially 2 years, preferably starting by October 2013.

Successful candidates will have a PhD in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, or natural sciences. Prior experience with either fMRI or EEG/MEG methods is expected, and an interest in further applying and combining both domains in their research is highly desirable. Candidates with a background and/or interest in advanced fMRI methods are particularly encouraged to apply.

The successful candidate will share our enthusiasm in problems of auditory cognition and auditory neuroscience, and ideally has already demonstrated this by contributing to the field. However, researchers with a background in visual or other neuroscience are also encouraged to apply. He or she should have a solid methods background and strong methods interest, hands-on experience in problems of data and statistical analysis, and the interest to co-supervise the PhD and Master students in the group. The position offered does not include any teaching obligations.

Starting date is flexible. Salary is dependent on experience and based on MPI stipends or equivalent salary according to German Public service regulations.

The research will be conducted at the MPI CBS in Leipzig, Germany, an internationally leading centre for cognitive and imaging neuroscience equipped with a 7.0 T MRI scanner, three 3.0 T MRI scanners, a 306 channels MEG system, a TMS system and several EEG suites. All facilities are supported by experienced IT and physics staff. Our institute (just 190 km, or 70 minutes by train, south of Berlin) offers a very international environment, with English being the language spoken in the laboratory. It offers a friendly and generous environment of researchers with diverse backgrounds and with an excellent infrastructure.

In order to increase the proportion of female staff members, applications from female scientists are particularly encouraged. Preference will be given to disabled persons with the same qualification.

Applications should be kindly sent to personal@cbs.mpg.de using the application code “PD 03/2013” in the subject. Please send your application as a single pdf attachment, with the file name containing your surname. It should enclose a cover letter (max. 2 pages) that also specifies your future research interests; a CV; up to three representative reprints; and contact details of 2 personal references. This call remains open until the position is filled.

For further details please contact Dr Jonas Obleser, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany, obleser@cbs.mpg.de

http://www.cbs.mpg.de

http://www.cbs.mpg.de/groups/misc/mprg-ac

http://obleserlab.com

What is language?

2013-04-16T12:35:00.000-07:00

Daniel Everett recently gave a talk on his language-as-a-cultural-tool idea at our UC Irvine Center for Language Science. (Here's a decent review of his recent book.) It was an entertaining talk but misses the point, in my view, regarding what language really is.

Today I'm reading a very nice review paper by Agnes Roby-Brami and colleagues on the relation between language and praxis (suggested by a sage reviewer of a submitted paper of mine). It's worth a look. Very informative and scholarly, but that's not what I want to talk about here. Instead I want to focus on their definition of language:

Language refers to a system of signs (indices, icons, symbols) used to encode and decode information so that the pairing of a specific sign with an intended meaning is established through social conventions.

This definition is exactly the kind of conception about language that lends itself to Everettesque monologues about language as culture. Yes, yes culture is reflected through language, but it doesn't mean that language IS culture.

But back to signs: how does the notion of language as a system of signs tilt the playing field toward a language as culture viewpoint? It does so by focusing on the arbitrary aspects of language, those aspects that most closely related to "cultural conventions"; things like words.

It's not the signs that define language. To see this, think about Roby-Brami and colleague's definition in visual terms:

Vision refers to a system of objects (forms, movements, and so on) that contain information so that the pairing of a specific object with its associated meaning is established through social conventions.

What?! Vision isn't a social convention, you say. It's a neural system that analyzes visual form, motion, and location to transform physical information into conceptual representations or into motor patterns for interacting with those objects. Vision is NOT in the objects themselves!

Of course you are right. But we can easily think of vision as social if we misconstrue it. Take any number of your modern objects and show them to a member of a hunter-gatherer society. Take your iPhone, you coffee maker, your bicycle, your eyeglasses, your credit card, your zipper, your whatever. They will have no idea what those objects are. These "object-signs" have no meaning to them. We know what they are only because we have learned the object-signs through cultural experience. It's as if we are "speaking" different visual languages! Therefore, we should conclude, vision is a cultural system.

We can see the flaw in *that* argument, of course. What vision takes as input and what previous associates we have with particular objects and their uses doesn't define the perceptual/perceptual-motor system. What defines vision are the computations that are used to extract form, motion, and location and associates these with higher-order conceptual systems, motor systems, and so on.

Why can't we see that the same flaw holds in the language argument? The "word-signs" with their culturally agreed on meanings don't define language. What defines language are the computations that are used to extract sound patterns from acoustic babble, to segment them, to combine them, and ultimately link them to complex conceptual representations or to motor speech gestures.

RTs: One-voxel neuroimaging?

2013-03-22T07:24:00.002-07:00

Yes! says Brad Buchsbaum in an entertaining and thought provoking post on his flowbrain blog. Check out the post here.

Postdoctoral position -- MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UK

2013-03-18T07:33:00.002-07:00

Career Development Fellow (Postdoctoral position)

MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UK

The MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (CBSU) is an internationally renowned research institute with state-of-the-art cognitive neuroscience facilities, including a research dedicated 3T Siemens Trio MRI scanner and 306-channel Elekta Neuromag MEG system.

Applications are invited for a post-doctoral position to work within a research programme led by Dr Matthew Davis investigating neural systems for perceiving, understanding and learning spoken language. The research will use advanced functional imaging methods (fMRI, MEG/EEG) to explore speech processing in healthy, adult participants. Additional opportunities may arise to work with children or adults with language impairment.

You should have, or be in the final stages of obtaining, a PhD in cognitive neuroscience or related field, including experience of one or more neuroimaging methods. A strong computational or statistical background is desirable and experience of speech signal processing or psycholinguistics.

This is a three year training and development postdoctoral position. The starting salary will be in the range of £26,022 - £29,324 per annum, depending upon qualifications and experience. We offer a flexible pay and reward policy, 30 days annual leave entitlement, and an optional MRC final salary Pension Scheme. On site car and bicycle parking is available.

For informal enquiries, contact Matt Davis by email: matt.davis@mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk.

Applications are handled by the RCUK Shared Services Centre; for further information and to apply please visit our job board, by following this link, including the IRC86470 reference. Closing date: 9th April 2013

FIVE POST-BAC RESEARCH POSITIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

2013-03-14T08:56:00.001-07:00

The Dept of Linguistics at the U of Maryland, is looking to fill up to five full-time positions for post-baccalaureate researchers. Starting date for all positions is Summer/Fall 2013. Salary is competitive, with benefits included. The positions would be ideal for individuals with a BA degree who are interested in gaining significant research experience in a very active lab as preparation for a research career. Applicants must be US or Canadian citizens or permanent residents, and should have completed a BA or BS degree by the time of appointment. The ability to interact comfortably with a wide variety of people (and machines) is a distinct advantage. Applicants may request to be considered for all five positions.

The positions are open until filled, but for best consideration, applications should be received by April 5th. Details at http://ling.umd.edu/baggett/jobs/

Positions #1-#2: Baggett Research Fellowships

Baggett Fellowships are full-time positions. Fellows can pursue research in linguistics, cognitive (neuro-)science of language, language acquisition, or computational modeling. 1-2 positions are available for 2013-2014. Positions are for one year and are not renewable. Contact person: Dr Andrea Zukowski (address below). For further details, including the faculty mentor list:

http://www.ling.umd.edu/baggett

Position #3: Research Assistant in Psycholinguistics/Cognitive Neuroscience

This person will be involved in all aspects of studies of language comprehension using behavioral and neuroscientific techniques, including electrophysiological brain recordings (training provided). The person will also contribute to Maryland's IGERT training program in Language Science, (languagescience.umd.edu). Previous experience in (psycho-)linguistics preferred. 1 year initial appointment, possibility of extension. Contact Dr. Colin Phillips (address below). Application requirements same as for Baggett Fellowships.

Position #4: Research Assistant in Psycholinguistics/Cognitive Neuroscience

This person will have the opportunity to be involved in a variety of projects examining language comprehension with behavioral and neurophysiological recording methods including ERP, MEG, and fMRI (training provided). Previous experience in linguistics and/or language processing is preferred; reasonable comfort with basic programming and statistics is a significant plus. 1 year initial appointment with possibility of extension. Contact person: Dr. Ellen Lau (address below). Application requirements same as for Baggett Fellowships.

Position #5: MEG Laboratory Manager

This person will play a leading role in the operation of a magnetoencephalography (MEG) facility that is managed jointly by the Dept. of Linguistics and the Maryland Neuroimaging Center, and serves researchers from many departments, for studies on language, vision, memory, reading, audition, and kinesiology. The person will be trained as an expert user of the facility, will help to guide and train other users, will coordinate and enhance resources for the experimental paradigms in use in the lab, and will manage the smooth daily operation of the lab. The person will also have opportunities to participate in and/or lead research projects, and participate in a range of other intellectual activities in language and cognitive neuroscience. Previous laboratory experience is preferred, and the ability to interact comfortably with a wide variety of people and technologies is strongly preferred. Prior experience with MEG or other electrophysiological techniques is NOT required. The position is for a one year initial appointment, with the possibility of extension beyond that time. For more information contact lab co-directors Dr. Ellen Lau (Linguistics; address below). Application requirements are the same as for the Baggett Fellowships.

Applicants may request to be considered for all five positions, or any subset. Applicants for any of these positions should submit a cover letter outlining relevant background and interests, including potential faculty mentors (multiple mentors are possible), a current CV, and names and contact information for 3 potential referees. Reference letters are not needed as part of the initial application. Applicants should also send a writing sample. All application materials should be submitted electronically to the following recipients:

Positions #1-#2 - Andrea Zukowski (zukowski at umd.edu). Put 'Baggett Fellowship' in the subject line.

Position #3 - Colin Phillips (colin at umd.edu). Put 'Research Assistantship' in the subject line.

Position #4 - Ellen Lau (ellenlau at umd.edu). Put 'Research Assistantship' in the subject line.

Position #5 - Ellen Lau (ellenlau at umd.edu). Put 'MEG Lab Manager' in the subject line.

The Dept of Linguistics has shared facilities for testing of infants, children and adults, 2 eye-tracking labs, an ERP lab and a whole-head MEG facility. The department is part of a vibrant language science community that numbers 200 faculty, researchers, and graduate students across 10 departments, and is affiliated with the Neuroscience and Cognitive Science Program and the new Maryland Neuroimaging Center.

Best Consideration for Applications: 5-Apr-2013

Cognitive Neuroscience Research Assistant / Lab Manager Position -- Moss Rehab,

2013-02-19T11:53:00.001-08:00

The Cognition and Action Lab at Moss Rehabilitation Research Institute (MRRI), a division of the Einstein Healthcare Network, has an opening beginning early summer of 2013 for a BA/BS- or Master’s-level Research Assistant/Lab Manager. The position involves assisting on NIH-funded studies of action and object representations in healthy and stroke populations using behavioral experiments, state-of-the art neuroimaging, and TMS/tDCS. Applicants should have a strong academic background in psychology, cognitive neuroscience, or a related field, coursework in statistics and research methods, excellent organizational and interpersonal skills, and prior human behavioral research experience. Moss Rehabilitation Research Institute is a stimulating academic environment offering many training opportunities, including close collaboration with colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University, and is located near the vibrant city of Philadelphia. We offer competitive compensation, an attractive benefits plan including medical/dental/vision coverage, generous vacation time, and tuition reimbursement. See our laboratory website at http://www.mrri.org/focus-areas/cognition-and-action-laboratory. To apply, please email a cover letter, CV, and the names and email address of 2-3 professional references to Ms. Allison Shapiro (shapiral@einstein.edu), our current Lab Manager, with the header “Research Assistant”. Albert Einstein Healthcare Network is an Equal Opportunity Employer.

Post-Doctoral Position at Georgetown University Medical Center

2013-02-04T04:03:00.000-08:00

The Cognitive Recovery Lab invites applications for a post-doctoral position opening immediately. The lab is directed by Dr. Peter Turkeltaub and operates across Georgetown University Medical Center and MedStar National Rehabilitation Hospital. We aim to improve the lives of people with cognitive and language difficulties by expanding our understanding of (1) how the brain performs language and cognitive functions, (2) how these brain systems change in the face of injury or dysfunction, and (3) how we can improve recovery. To achieve these aims we perform a range of human subjects research from basic cognitive neuroscience through clinical trials. We use a variety of methods, including behavioral studies, lesion studies in people with stroke, multimodal MRI, tDCS, tDCS/fMRI, TMS, and TMS/EEG. The lab is part of the Center for Brain Plasticity and Recovery (Director, Elissa Newport), and is affiliated with the Center for Aphasia Research and Rehabilitation (Director, Rhonda Friedman) and Georgetown’s Interdisciplinary Program in Neuroscience (PhD program).

We welcome applications for a 2-3 year NIH-funded post-doctoral position opening immediately. The post-doc will collect and analyze a multimodal MRI dataset (fMRI, DTI, functional connectivity, VBM, VLSM) for an ongoing clinical trial of tDCS for post-stroke aphasia, and will design additional imaging studies on normal subjects and individuals with aphasia due to stroke or traumatic brain injury. The successful applicant will have a PhD in Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, or related field; experience designing fMRI experiments and conducting advanced MRI analysis; and a track record of research productivity. Preference will be given for individuals with experience conducting MRI research involving people with stroke or brain injury. Please apply to turkeltp@georgetown.edu. Send a cover letter with a statement of interest, CV, and the names and email addresses of three professional references.

NYU/NYU-Abu Dhabi: Research assistant and post-doc positions

2013-02-04T04:00:00.000-08:00

1. Lab Manager/RA:  Full-time Lab Manager position for the Marantz group at the NYU Neurolinguistics Laboratory, with responsibilities extending to the NYU Abu Dhabi Neuroscience of  Language Laboratory. Initial appointment for one year, with possibility of renewal. BA/BS or MA/MS in a cognitive science-related  discipline (psychology, linguistics, etc.) or computer science is required.  The lab manager will be involved in all stages of execution and analysis of  MEG experiments on language processing, with a concentration on auditory word recognition as modulated by the morphological structure of words. Previous experience with psycho- or neurolinguistic experiments is highly preferred. A background  in statistics and some programming ability (especially Matlab) would give an applicant a strong edge.  Preferred start date is July 2013, but this is negotiable. Salary and rank  will be commensurate with experience. Applications will be accepted through February. Review of applicants will begin immediately. To apply, please email CV and names  of references to Paul Del Prato at paul.delprato@nyu.edu.

2. RA:  Two full-time NYU Abu Dhabi Research Institute-funded research assistants for Cognitive Neuroscience of  Language projects at the Neuroscience of Language Laboratory in Abu Dhabi, assisting PIs Alec Marantz, Liina Pylkkänen, and David Poeppel. Initial appointment for one year, with possibility of renewal. BA/BS in cognitive  science-related discipline (psychology, linguistics, etc.) or computer  science. Programming and/or statistics experience a plus. The RAs will be involved in all stages of planning, execution and analysis of MEG/EEG experiments on language processing. Participant recruitment as well as lab maintenance would be among RA duties. Preferred start date is June-July 2013, but this is negotiable. Salary and rank  will be commensurate with experience; benefits, including travel and lodging in Abu Dhabi, are quite generous. Applications will be accepted through February. Review of applicants will begin immediately. To apply, please email CV and names  of references to Paul Del Prato at paul.delprato@nyu.edu.

3. Postdoctoral Position: Cognitive Neuroscientist  2-year, potentially renewable post-doctoral position in the cognitive  neuroscience of language for the NYU Abu Dhabi Neuroscience of Language  Laboratory. The researcher will have had experience with evoked response  experiments using either MEG or EEG. The main  responsibility of the researcher will be to design and complete MEG experiments with participant populations of varied linguistic and educational  backgrounds to address questions related to the research projects of the PIs of the Laboratory, Alec Marantz, Liina Pylkkänen, and David Poeppel. Working with Arabic and East Asian speakers  requires nuanced understanding of the linguistic situation on the ground as  well as a search for necessary corpus resources and area experts on the  languages and language-particular psycholinguistics. A researcher with  cross-linguistic experimental experience would be ideal for the job.   Salary and rank  will be commensurate with experience; benefits, including travel and lodging in Abu Dhabi, are quite generous. Applications will be accepted through February. Review of applicants will begin immediately. To apply, please email CV and names  of references to Paul Del Prato at paul.delprato@nyu.edu.

Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship in Cognitive Developmental Neuroscience at Georgetown University

2013-01-07T09:32:00.002-08:00

The Center for Brain Plasticity and Recovery and the laboratory of Professor Elissa Newport, director, are seeking a postdoctoral fellow capable of taking a leadership role in a new line of research focused on language, cognitive, and motor development after perinatal stroke, as compared with recovery of the same functions in adults after stroke to similar cortical areas. The research involves longitudinal research, observing and testing infants and young children who have suffered a perinatal stroke to the left or right hemisphere; and cross-sectional research, observing and testing older children and young adults who have grown up after the same type of stroke, or adults who have experienced a comparable stroke during adulthood. Our aim is understand how reorganization of cortical functions occurs after stroke early versus late in life. The research will involve both behavioral and fMRI tasks, with a particular focus on fMRI and DTI analyses in both children and adults. Our research team includes developmental cognitive scientists and cognitive neuroscientists, adult and pediatric stroke neurologists, and experts in fMRI with children and adults. Candidates with experience in both language/cognitive development and fMRI research are preferred. The research will take place at Georgetown University Medical Center, Children’s National Medical Center, and the National Rehabilitation Hospital, all in Washington DC and all affiliated within the Center for Brain Plasticity and Recovery. Start date is anytime from January through July 2013, whenever a top candidate is identified.

Interested applicants should submit a CV and statement of research interests and background, and request 3 letters of recommendation, sent to Professor Elissa L. Newport, Center for Brain Plasticity and Recovery, Georgetown University, at eln10@georgetown.edu.

Post Doctoral and RA positions, Moss Rehabilitation Research Institute

2013-01-07T09:05:00.002-08:00

The Language and Aphasia Lab of MRRI (www.mrri.org) invites applications for expected openings at the postdoctoral and RA levels, starting Summer/Fall 2013. Under the direction of Dr. Myrna Schwartz, our lab conducts NIH-funded research on language processing in typical speakers and individuals with aphasia. We seek to advance understanding of how words are learned and retrieved in speech, how these processes are affected by stroke, and how word production deficits can be ameliorated by treatment. MRRI and MossRehab, part of the Einstein Healthcare Network, are located in Philadelphia and Elkins Park, PA. We offer our employees unparalleled career opportunities including competitive compensation, attractive benefits plan including medical/dental/vision coverage, generous vacation time, and tuition reimbursement. EOE

Postdoctoral Position

Announcing a 2-year post-doctoral position on Dr. Schwartz’s long-running RO1 on aphasia, which supports multi-site collaborations with computational psycholinguist, Gary S. Dell, and behavioral neurologist, H. Branch Coslett. In the current grant cycle, we are exploring how normal and aphasic word production is influenced by cognitive learning, with the aim of enhancing neural plasticity and treatment outcomes. The postdoctoral fellow will be expected to contribute to ongoing projects and develop new lines of research related to this general theme. Applicants should have a Ph.D. in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, or speech and hearing sciences; a track record in research; and one or more first-authored, peer-reviewed publications. Preference will be given to candidates with expertise in combining behavioral and EEG/ERP approaches. Please apply by email to mschwart@einstein.edu; include a cover letter, CV, and the names and email addresses of 3 individuals who can be contacted for letters of recommendation.

Research Assistant Position

The Language and Aphasia Lab of MRRI is also accepting applications from individuals with BA or BS degrees for a full-time research assistant position. Our RAs gain valuable experience with language-impaired patients. They are trained to administer clinical measures of aphasia and to design, run, and analyze experiments with patients as participants. Learning opportunities also include state-of-the art lesion analysis and applications of computational modeling. Applicants should have strong academic backgrounds in psychology, neuroscience or linguistics, with coursework in statistics and research methods. Preference will be given to applicants with prior research experience, particularly in cognitive psychology, speech and hearing sciences, or linguistics. Email cover letter, C.V. (which includes a list of relevant coursework) and contact information for three references to Dr. Erica Middleton: middleer@einstein.edu.

PhD scholarships and post-doctoral positions for 2013

2012-12-19T22:11:00.000-08:00

The Centre of Research Excellence in Child Language (CRE-CL) at the Murdoch Childrens Research Institute invites applications for PhD scholarships and post-doctoral positions across a range of cutting edge program areas. This CRE-CL links a number of longitudinal Australian and international studies with the aim of advancing the science of how language develops, what goes wrong and when and how to intervene. It is also unique in its parallel cohorts of children with normal hearing and hearing impairment. It brings together some of the best research, and leading researchers in the world incorporating the following organisations - MCRI, Deakin University and the Parenting Research Centre (all Melbourne based) - and international collaborators at the University of Newcastle (UK), and University of Iowa (USA).

The CRE-CL provides an internationally-unprecedented capacity for language research - in both hearing and deaf children - combining the latest theoretical and measurement approaches in molecular genetics, neuro-imaging, epidemiology, biostatistics and health economics.

Potential research areas include:

Clinical research

Public health research

Molecular genetics

Epidemiology

Neuro-imaging

Health economics

For more project details visit here

Please send completed applications to debra.page@mcri.edu.au.

All applications to include

Details of two academic references

Cover letter detailing which project you are interested in and why, and long term research goals

Academic transcripts

For post-doc applications please also address the selection criteria in the position description.

Closing date - 11th January 2013

Interviews - late January/ early February

Action Based Language - More on Glenberg and Gallese

2012-11-28T13:36:00.000-08:00

The core of Glenberg and Gallese's proposal is that language is grounded in a hierarchical state feedback control model, made possible, of course, by mirror neurons. I actually think they are correct to look at feedback control models as playing a role in language, given that I've previously proposed the same thing (Hickok, 2012) along with Guenther, Houde and others, albeit for speech production only, not for "grounding" anything. Glenberg and Gallese believe, on the hand, that the feedback control model is the basis for understanding language.

Their theoretical trick is to link up action control circuits for object-oriented actions and action control circuits for articulating words related to those actions. Motor programs for drinking are linked to motor programs for saying "drink". Then when you hear the word "drink" you activate the motor program for saying the word and this in turn activates the motor programs for actual drinking and this allows you to understand the word.

The overlap ... between the speech articulation and action control is meant to imply that the act of articulation primes the associated motor actions and that performing the actions primes the articulation. That is, we tend to do what we say, and we tend to say (or at least covertly verbalize) what we do. Furthermore, when listening to speech, bottom-up processing activates the speech controller (Fadiga et al., 2002; Galantucci et al., 2006; Guenther et al., 2006), which in turn activates the action controller, thereby grounding the meaning of the speech signal in action.

So as I reach for and drink from my coffee cup, what words will I covertly verbalize? Drink, consume, enjoy, hydrate, caffeinate? Fixate, look at, gaze towards, reach, extend, open, close, grasp, grab, envelope, grip, hold, lift, elevate, bring-towards, draw-near, transport, purse (the lips), tip, tilt, turn, rotate, supinate, sip, slurp, sniff, taste, swallow, draw-away, place, put, set, release, let go? No wonder I can't chat with someone while drinking coffee. My motor speech system is REALLY busy!

By the way, what might the action controller for the action drink code? It can't be a specific movement because it has to generalize across drinking from mugs, wine glasses, lidded cups, espresso cups, straws, water bottles with and without sport lids, drinking by leaning down to the container or by lifting it up, drinking from a sink faucet, drinking from a water fountain, drinking morning dew adhering to leaves, drinking rain by opening your mouth to the sky, drinking by asking someone else to pour water into your mouth. And if you walked outside right now, opened your mouth to a cloudless sky and then swallowed, would you being drinking? Why not? If the meaning of drink is grounded in actions, why should it matter whether it is raining or not?

Because it's not the movements themselves that define the meaning.

But the motor system can generate predictions about the consequences of an action and that is where the meaning comes from, you might argue, as do Glenberg and Gallese:

part of the knowledge of what “drink” means consists of expected consequences of drinking

And what are those consequences? Glenberg and Gallese get it (mostly) right:

...predictions are driven by activity in the motor system (cf. Fiebach and Schubotz, 2006), however, the predictions themselves reside in activity across the brain. For example, predictions of how the body will change on the basis of action result from activity in somatosensory cortices, predictions of changes in spatial layout result from activity in visual and parietal cortices, and predictions of what will be heard result from activity in temporal areas.

So where do we stand? Meanings are dependent on consequences and consequences "reside in activity across the brain" (i.e., sensory areas). Therefore, the meanings of actions are not coded in the motor system. All the motor system does according to Glenberg and Gallese (if you read between the lines) is generate predictions. In other words, the motor system is nothing more than a way of accessing the meanings (stored elsewhere) via associations.

So just to spell it out for the readers at home. Here is their model of language comprehension:

hear a word --> activate motor program for saying word --> activate motor program for actions related to word --> generate predicted consequences of the action in sensory systems --> understanding.

Why not just go from the word to the sensory system directly? Is the brain not capable of forming such associations? In other words, if all the motor system is doing is providing an associative link, why can't you get there via non-motor associative links.

More to the point: if the *particular* actions don't matter, as even the mirror neuron crowd now acknowledges, and if what matters is the higher level goals or consequences, and if these goals or consequences are coded in sensory systems (which they are), then there is little role for the motor system in conceptual knowledge of actions.

Glenberg and Gallese correctly point out a strong empirical prediction of their model:

The ABL theory makes a novel and strong prediction: adapting an action controller will produce an effect on language comprehension

They cite Bak's work on ALS and some use-induced plasticity effects. Again, let me suggest, quite unscientifically, that Stephen Hawking would have a hard time functioning if he didn't understand verbs. Further, use-induced plasticity is known to modulate response bias -- a likely source of these effects. In short, the evidence for the strong prediction is weak at best.

But rather than adapting an action controller, let's remove it as a means to test their prediction head on. Given their model in which perceived words activate motor programs for articulating those words, which activate motor programs for generating actions, which generate predictions etc., if you don't have the motor programs for articulating words you shouldn't be able to comprehend speech, or at least show some impairment. Yet there is an abundance of evidence that language comprehension is not dependent on the motor system. I reviewed much of it in my "Mirror Neuron Forum" contribution that Glenberg edited and Gallese contributed to. NONE OF THIS WORK IS EVEN MENTIONED in Glenberg and Gallese's piece. This is rather unscholarly in my opinion.

Toward the end of the paper they include a section on non-motor processes. In it they write,

We have focused on motor processes for two related reasons. First, we believe that the basic function of cognition is control of action. From an evolutionary perspective, it is hard to imagine any other story. That is, systems evolve because they contribute to the ability to survive and reproduce, and those activities demand action. As Rudolfo Llinas puts it, “The nervous system is only necessary for multicellular creatures-that can orchestrate and express active movement” Thus, although brains have impressive capacities for perception, emotion, and more, those capacities are in the service of action

I agree. But action for action sake is useless. The reason WHY brains have impressive capacities for perception, emotion, and more is to give action purpose, meaning. Without these non-motor systems, the action system is literally and figuratively blind and therefore completely useless.

Why the unhealthy obsession with the motor system and complete disregard for the mountain of evidence against their ideas. Because the starting point for all the theoretical fumbling is a single assumption that has gained the status of an axiom in the minds of researchers like Glenberg and Gallese: that cognition revolves around embodiment with mirror neurons/the motor system at the core. (Glenberg's lab name even assumes his hypothesis, "Laboratory for Embodied Cognition"). Once you commit to an idea you have no choice to build a convoluted story to uphold your assumption and ignore contradictory evidence.

I don't think there is a ghost of a chance that Glenberg and Gallese will ever change their views in light of empirical fact. Skinner, for example, was a diehard defender of behaviorism long after people like Chomsky, Miller, Broadbent and others clearly demonstrated that the approach was theoretically bankrupt. Today the cognitive approach to explaining behavior dominates both psychology and neuroscience, including embodied approaches like Glenberg and Gallese's. My hope is that by pointing out the inadequacies of proposals like these, the next generation of scientists, who aren't saddled with tired assumptions, will ultimately move the field forward and consider the function of mirror neurons and the motor system in a more balanced light.

Hickok, G. (2012). Computational neuroanatomy of speech production. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 13, 135-145.

Orthogonal acoustic dimensions define auditory field maps in human cortex

2012-11-27T15:23:00.001-08:00

Wow, this is the most blogging I've done in months. This one is way off the topic of embodied cognition and mirror neurons (some of you will be relieved to hear) and in my view more important. An interdisciplinary group of us here at UC Irvine have successfully mapped two orthogonal dimensions in human auditory cortex, tonotopy (which we knew about) and periodotopy (which most suspected but hadn't measured convincingly or showed its orthogonal relation to tonotopy in humans). What's cool about this is it allows us to clearly define boundaries between auditory fields just like is commonly done in vision. There are 11 field maps in the human auditory core and belt region.

Previous studies of auditory field maps disagreed about whether A1 lined up along Heschl's gyrus or is perpendicular to it. The disagreements stemmed from the lack of an orthogonal dimension to define boundaries. We show that A1 lines up along Heschl's gyrus, as the textbook model holds, and show how contradictory maps can be inferred if you don't have the periodotopic data.

What can we do with this? We can map auditory fields in relation to speech activations. We can measure magnification factors. We can measure the distribution of ~receptive field preferences for different frequencies or periodicities between auditory fields and between hemispheres (can you say, definitive test of the AST hypothesis?). We can determine which fields are affected by motor to sensory feedback, cross sensory integration, attention, and so on. We use them as seeds for DTI studies or functional connectivity studies. The floodgates are open.

The report was published online today in PNAS. You can check it out here:

http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/11/27/1213381109

Barton, Venezia, Saberi, Hickok, and Brewer. Orthogonal acoustic dimensions define auditory field maps in human cortex. PNAS, November 27, 2012, doi:10.1073/pnas.1213381109

COMMENTS WELCOME!

Action-Based Language: A theory of language acquisition, comprehension, and production

2012-11-27T14:33:00.000-08:00

This is the paper by Glenberg and Gallese. How could not skip ahead to this one?! I mean, the title does seem to imply that it will provide the answer to how language works! So let's dig in.

Here's a quote:

our understanding of linguistic expressions is not solely an epistemic attitude; it is ﬁrst and foremost a pragmatic attitude directed toward action.

So all of language reduces fundamentally to the action system?

One caveat is important. Whereas we focus on the relation between language and action, we do not claim that all language phenomena can be accommodated by action systems. Even within an embodied approach to language, there is strong evidence for contributions to language comprehension by perceptual systems

Whew! I was going to have to quote Pillsbury again:

A reader of some of the texts lately published would be inclined to believe that there was nothing in consciousness but movement, and that the presence of sense organs, or of sensory and associatory tracts in the cortex was at the least a mistake on the part of the Creator” (Pillsbury, 1911) (p. 83)

On page 906 we get to learn about the Action-Sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE), Glenberg's baby. This is where a sentence that implies motion in one direction (He pushed the box away) facilitates responses (button presses) that are directed away from the subject and interferes with responses that are toward the subject.

The ACE is a favorite of the embodied camp. They want to argue that this means that the meaning of say push is grounded in actual pushing movements that must be reactivated to accomplish understanding. The ACE is interesting but not surprising nor conclusive. Just because two things are correlated (the meaning of the word push and the motor program for pushing) doesn't mean one is dependent on the other; one could exist without the other. Again, think "fly", "slither", "coil", etc. etc. Or think of it this way. If I blew a puff of air in your eye every time I said the phrase "there is not a giraffe standing next to me", before long I could elicit an eye blink simply by uttering the phrase. Furthermore, I could probably measure a There-Is-Not-A-Giraffe-Standing-Next-To-Me-Eyeblink Compatibility Effect (the TINAGSNTMECE) by asking subjects to respond either by opening their eyes wider or by closing them to indicate their decision. This does not mean that the eye blink embodies the meaning of the phrase. It just means that there is an association between the phrase and the action. Glenberg's ACE simply highjacks an existing association that happens to involve action-word pairs that have not only a "pragmatic" association but also an "epistemic" relation, to use their terminology, and calls them one and the same.

Another study that GandG highlight as further evidence for an ACE-like effect makes my point. Here is the relevant paragraph:

Zwaan and Taylor (2006) obtained similar results using a radically different ACE-type of procedure. Participants in their experiments turned a dial clockwise or counterclockwise to advance through a text. If the meaning of a phrase (e.g., “he turned the volume down”) conﬂicted with the required hand movement, reading of that phrase was slowed.

Unlike in Glenberg's ACE procedure, Zwaan and Taylor showed that arbitrary pairings between phrases and actions show the same effect (more like the eyeblink example). Yes, some volume controls involve knob rotation, but others involve pressing a button, increasing/decreasing air pressure passing through the larynx, covering or cupping your ears, or placing your hand over your friend's mouth. When you read the phrase, "he turned the volume down" did you simultaneously simulate counterclockwise rotation, button pressing, relaxation of your diaphram, covering your ears, and covering your friend's mouth in order to understand the meaning of the phrase?

GandG also selectively site data in support of their claims while obscuring important details:

Bak and Hodges (2003) discuss how degeneration of the motor system associated with motor neuron disorder (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis -- ALS) affects comprehension of action verbs more than nouns.

This is true statement. What is lacking, however, is the fact that Bak and Hodges studied a particular subtype of ALS, that subtype with a dementia component. In fact, high-level cognitive and/or psychiatric deficits appear first in this subtype with motor neuron symptoms appearing only later. I'll let Glenberg and Gallese tell Stephen Hawking that he doesn't understand verbs anymore.

So much for the first two sections.

Language and the Motor System - Editorial

2012-11-27T09:19:00.004-08:00

And another quote from the editorial:

phonological features of speech sounds are reﬂected in motor cortex activation so that the action system likely plays a double role, both in programming articulations and in contributing to the analysis of speech sounds (Pulvermuller et al., 2006)

which explains why prelingual infants, individuals with massive strokes affecting the motor speech system, individuals undergoing Wada procedures with acute and complete deactivation of the motor speech system, individuals with cerebral palsy who never acquired the ability to control their motor speech system, and chinchilla and quail can all perceive speech quite impressively.

One of the most frequently cited brain models of language indeed still sees a role of the motor system limited to articulation, thus paralleling indeed the position held by classical aphasiologists, such as Wernicke, Lichtheim and especially Paul Marie (Poeppel and Hickok, 2004). Recently, a contribution to speech comprehension and understanding is acknowledged insofar as inferior frontal cortex may act as a phonological short-term memory resource (Rogalsky and Hickok, 2011). These traditional positions are also discussed in the present volume, along with modern action-perception models.

Good hear we will get the "traditional" perspective. David, did you ever think WE would be called "traditional"? Nice to see that our previously radical views are now the standard theory.

Let's try turning the tables:

One of the most frequently cited brain models of speech perception indeed still sees the motor system as playing a critical role, thus paralleling indeed the position held by classical speech scientists of the 1950s such as Liberman and even the early 20th century behaviorists such as Watson (Pulvermuller et al. 2006).

Moreover, one of the most frequently cited brain models of conceptual representation indeed still sees sensory and motor systems as being the primary substrate thus paralleling indeed the position held by classical aphasiologists, such as Wernicke and Lichtheim (Pulvermuller et al. 2006).

Cortex special issue: Language and the motor system

2012-11-26T23:22:00.002-08:00

Observation #1. In the editorial Cappa and Pulvermuller write,

Whereas the dominant view in classical aphasiology had been that superior temporal cortex (“Wernicke’s area”) provides the unique engine for speech perception and comprehension (Benson, 1979), investigations with functional neuroimaging in normal subjects have shown that even during the most automatic speech perception processes inferior fronto-central areas are being sparked (Zatorre et al., 1992)

I take it that they are referring to Zatorre's task in which subjects are listening to pairs of CVC syllables, some of which are words, some of which are not, and alternating a button press between two keys. Contrasted with noise, activation foci were reported for automatic-speech-perception-of-random-CVC-syllables-while-alternating-button-pressing in the superior temporal gyrus bilaterally, the left middle temporal gyrus, and the left IFG. Clearly the stronger activations in the temporal lobe (nearly double the z-scores) are doing little in the way of speech perception and it's the IFG activation that refutes the classical view.

I wonder why no mention was made of a rather nifty study published around the same time by Mazoyer et al. in which a larger sample of subjects listened to sentences of various sorts and which did not result in consistent activation in the IFG. This is a finding that has persisted into more recent research: listening to normal sentences does not result in robust IFG activation. Sometimes you see it, sometimes you don't (see Rogalsky & Hickok for a review). Superior temporal cortex, that area that people were writing about on their IBM selectrics (Google it, youngster) is not so fickle. Present speech and it lights up like a sparkler on Independence Day.

Hopes of a balanced (and therefore useful) volume already sinking. And I haven't even made it past the first paragraph of the editorial.

Mazoyer, B. M., Tzourio, N., Frak, V., Syrota, A., Murayama, N., Levrier, O., Salamon, G., Dehaene, S., Cohen, L., & Mehler, J. (1993). The cortical representation of speech. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 5, 467-479.

Rogalsky, C., & Hickok, G. (2011). The role of Broca's area in sentence comprehension. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 1664-1680.

Language and the Motor System

2012-11-26T22:48:00.002-08:00

This is the topic of a special issue of Cortex edited by Stefano Cappa and Friedemann Pulvermuller published just this year (Cortex, Vol. 48, Issue 7). Let's work our way through what appears to be a highly balanced selection of papers by... oh wait, it seems to be mostly authors sympathetic to the idea that the motor system is the center of the linguistic universe. But I haven't even looked at the papers yet, so let's not pre-judge. (Oops, I guess I already did.) Kidding aside, I'm hopeful, actually, that the discussion won't be as one-sided as it has been for the last 10 years.

My plan is to read through the papers, one by one, and post my thoughts. Please read along and feel free to post your own in the commentary section, or you can email me and I'll post your own guest entry. As always, input from the authors is welcome.

Now turn to page 785 for the editorial by Cappa and Pulvermuller...

What does "cognitive" mean to you?

2012-11-09T21:53:00.000-08:00

Just curious... what counts as "cognitive" to you? I've been reading a bit of the embodied cognition literature and I find statements like this rather odd: "the traditional conceptualization of cognition as a stage in the perception–cognition–action pipeline." Is cognition just high-level stuff? I don't see it that way. Perception is cognition. Action is cognition. Language is cognition. Categorization, memory, attention, are all cognition. Is this "cognitive sandwich" notion just a straw man given modern conceptualization of cognition?

Second International Conference on Cognitive Hearing Science for Communication, June 16-19, 2013 - Linköping, Sweden

2012-11-09T08:29:00.001-08:00

The first conference in 2011 was a real hit and has boosted research in the field.
We believe that this second conference will be just as successful. Some of the
themes addressed at the first conference have been retained, some will be
explored further, and others are quite new. This reflects the development of
the field. Conference speakers represent the international cutting edge of
Cognitive Hearing Science.

We look forward to welcoming you to an exciting new conference and to
Linköping University, the home of Cognitive Hearing Science. Many prominent
researchers have already accepted to give a talk.

Further information can be obtained from: www.chscom2013.se

Research Assistant/Lab Manager position - Language Behavior and Brain Imaging Lab, Rutgers University

2012-10-26T15:13:00.001-07:00

A research assistant/lab manager position is available in the newly formed Language Behavior and Brain Imaging Lab at Rutgers University in Newark, New Jersey. Much of the research in the lab is devoted to the cognitive neuroscience of reading, with potential application to reading disorders. Other aspects of brain and language studied in the lab include concept formation and speech production. Research is performed using a variety of techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), behavioral responses, gene-brain correlations, and magnetoencephalography (MEG).

Responsibilities will include data collection from human research participants in both a purely behavioral and functional brain imaging setting, contacting and scheduling research participants, managing institutional review board (IRB) protocols, and data analysis.

Requirements for a successful applicant include spoken and written proficiency in English, a minimum of a bachelor-level degree (e.g., BA or BS), preferably in psychology, neuroscience, computer science, engineering, biology, or a related field, and willingness to make a 2-year commitment. Preference will be given to applicants who have experience in cognitive neuroscience research with human participants, are proficient with the linux computing environment, have used experiment delivery and data acquisition software such as E-prime, and can program in a scripting language such as Matlab or python.

Rutgers is the state university of New Jersey, and its Newark campus is in the state’s largest city. Newark is undergoing a renaissance of its own and is only minutes from Manhattan by train. Applications will be reviewed as they are received, with a deadline of December 15th. Please email a resume or CV and contact information for 3 references to william.graves@rutgers.edu.

Two Open-Rank Tenure Track Jobs - Northeastern University

2012-10-25T08:14:00.001-07:00

Two Open-Rank Tenure Track Openings in the Department of Speech-Language Pathology & Audiology

The Department of Speech-Language Pathology and Audiology at Northeastern University announces two tenure-track open rank faculty positions. Areas of specialization are open. Particularly desirable areas include, but not limited to, speech and language development, speech and language neuroscience, disorders of articulation/phonology/language, adult neurogenics, speech science, auditory neuroscience, hearing impairment in children, aging, communication technologies, and neuroimaging. Applicants from all subfields of Speech-Language Pathology and Audiology are strongly encouraged to apply. Responsibilities include the ability to develop and maintain a program of independent and collaborative scholarly research and teaching, as well as college and university service.

A doctorate degree in Speech Language Pathology, Audiology, or a related discipline relevant to human communication and its disorders and a record of publications in scholarly journals appropriate to the field of research and desired appointment level are required. Junior candidates will demonstrate promise for building an externally-funded research program and teaching background. Candidates at the Full and Associate Professor level will have national and internationally recognized scholarship programs, a demonstrated track record of external funding, and a history of exceptional teaching and service.

The Department of Speech-Language Pathology and Audiology, within the Bouvé College of Health Sciences, offers degrees at the undergraduate and graduate levels, in addition to an interdisciplinary certificate in Early Intervention, and houses the on-campus, state-of-the art Speech-Language and Hearing Center. Our programs are described in greater detail at http://www.slpa.neu.edu. The Department has a 50-year history of externally funded research through the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the US Department of Education. Northeastern University provides the opportunity for collaborative academic, clinical, and research program development through established links to other units within the University (e.g., Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, and Psychology), as well as with other universities (e.g., Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Boston University), hospitals (e.g., Children’s Hospital), and schools (e.g., Boston Public Schools) in the Boston metropolitan area.

Bouvé College of Health Sciences has a faculty of 189, with approximately 2,100 undergraduate and 1,500 graduate students. It is the leading national model for education and research in the health, psychosocial and biomedical sciences and supports the University's mission of educating students for a life of fulfillment and accomplishment and creating and translating knowledge to meet global and societal needs.

Northeastern University is on an exciting trajectory of growth and innovation. The University is a leader in inter-disciplinary research, urban engagement, experiential learning, and the integration of classroom learning with real-world experience. It is home to 20,000 students and to the nation's premier cooperative education program. The past decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in Northeastern's international reputation for research and innovative educational programs. A heightened focus on interdisciplinary research and scholarship is driving a faculty hiring initiative at Northeastern, advancing its position amongst the nation's top research universities.

Salary and rank will be commensurate with education, training, and experience and includes an outstanding benefits package. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vita, research statement, and list of three references. Applicants should apply through the NEU online employment application system http://neu.peopleadmin.com/postings/21982. Recommendations letters should also be submitted through the application system. Position inquiries should be sent via email to Dr. Rupal Patel, Search Committee Chair at r.patel@neu.edu. Applicant review will begin December 1,2012, and proceed until exceptional candidates are selected.

Northeastern University Equal Employment Opportunity Policy: Northeastern University is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action, Title IX, and an ADVANCE institution. Minorities, women, and persons with disabilities are strongly encouraged to apply. Northeastern University embraces the wealth of diversity represented in our community and seeks to enhance it at all levels. Northeastern University is an E-Verify employer.

Three (count 'em) 3 tenure-track faculty positions -- Arizona State Univ., Dept of Speech & Hearing Sciences

2012-09-13T11:16:00.000-07:00

The Department of Speech and Hearing Science at Arizona State University (SHS) announces openings for 3 tenure-track faculty positions at Full (Department Chair), Associate, and Assistant Professor rank. ASU is a Research I University with outstanding research facilities and infrastructure support and is located within the vibrant metropolitan Phoenix area with 3.5 million people. As The New American University (New American University Reader), ASU has been widely lauded for innovation, and its culture of transformation and excellence thrives in the Department of Speech and Hearing Science.

Successful candidates will be expected to develop and/or maintain internationally recognized, externally-funded research programs, teach in the undergraduate and graduate curricula, and participate in service activities in the Departmental, College and University.

A PhD in any discipline relevant to human communication and its disorders and a record of publications in scholarly journals appropriate to the desired appointment level is required. Applicants for an Assistant Professor position must show exceptional promise in research and teaching, whereas applicants for the Associate and Full Professor ranks must have demonstrated excellence in research and teaching appropriate to the rank. Candidates whose research specialization would build on the core strengths of the department will be considered with preference (SHS Labs ). Potential for successful interaction with ASU’s existing centers of research excellence is also desirable. Candidates for Department Chair will have demonstrated leadership abilities, and success in translating ideas and vision into practice.

ASU is an affirmative action/equal employment opportunity employer and is dedicated to recruiting a diverse faculty community. Women and minorities are encouraged to apply. ASU Affirmative Action

Background check is required for employment.

Applications will be submitted electronically with all files in .pdf format to shsjobs@asu.edu. Interested candidates must submit a cover letter indicating desired rank along with a description of research and expertise. Candidates applying for the Assistant Professor rank should also include a 5-year research plan. All candidates must also submit the following for consideration: i) current curriculum vitae; ii) names of 3 references, including address, phone and email contact information, iii) and attachments of 3 representative publications. Applications will be reviewed beginning November 30th, 2012; and every Friday thereafter until the searches are closed. Please visit SHS JOBS for more information on the department and the advertised positions.

Job Number: Professor/Chair (10163); Associate Professor (10164); Assistant Professor (10165

Liberman and the Perception of the Speech Code

2012-08-27T11:25:00.000-07:00

Alvin Liberman is at the center of a scientific divide. On the one hand, his work on the motor theory of speech perception has been elevated virtually to the status of gospel among those researchers who promote the role of the motor system in perception. On the other hand are a new generation of speech scientists who believe that speech perception is the purview of the auditory system. For these researchers Liberman has a near villainous status, or at least represents the personification of a roadblock to progress in speech research. Full disclosure: I lean towards the latter.

So I decided to go back and read some of Liberman's original work. I highly recommend reading the older literature in your research area -- there's a lot of useful information! -- and it is particularly important whenever decades-old results or theories are gratuitously cited in modern work. You'll often be surprised and almost always you will learn something important. With respect to Liberman et al.'s work, I have to admit, it is fairly impressive. Along with a group at MIT that included Ken Stevens, Liberman and colleagues virtually defined the field of speech perception with their pioneering work. It was technically sophisticated, theoretically rich, and generated a massive amount of data that defined the problems we are still struggling with today.

On interesting tidbit of information was Liberman's idea that the somatosensory information was what ultimately drove the perception of phonemes; the motor system was used simply as a means to access this information. Here a quote:

...the articulatory movements and their sensory effects mediate between the acoustic stimulus and the event we call perception. In its extreme and old-fashioned form, this view says that we overtly mimic the incoming speech sounds and then respond to the proprioceptive and tactile stimuli that are produced by our own articulatory movements. For a variety of reasons such an extreme position is wholly untenable, … we must assume that the process is somehow short-circuited – that is, that the reference to the articulatory movements and their sensory consequences must somehow occur in the brain without getting out into the periphery.” (Liberman, 1957) p. 122

In reference to probably the most important of Liberman's early papers, The Perception of the Speech Code, I noticed an interesting juxtaposition. One is the starting assumption that their analysis should be restricted to the level of the phoneme. The article starts,

Our aim is to identify some of the conditions that underlie the perception of speech. We will not consider the whole process, but only the part that lies between the caustic stream and a level of perception corresponding roughly to the phoneme. (p. 431)

The other is the observation that the group is famous for, the parallel transmission of information about phonemes in a syllable, noted here in the context of a discussion of perceptual experiments involving synthesized versions of the phoneme /d/ in the context of a following vowel:

If we cut progressively into the syllable from the right-hand end, we hear /d/ plus a vowel, or a nonspeech sound; at no point will we hear only /d/. This is so because the formant transition is, at every instant, providing information about two phonemes, the consonant and the vowel – that is, the phonemes are being transmitted in parallel. (p. 436)

And a few pages further on, they conclude:

This parallel delivery of information produces at the acoustic level the merging of influences we have already referred to and yields irreducible acoustic segments of approximately syllabic dimensions. (p. 441).

And one more towards the end of the paper:

To find acoustic segments that are in any reasonably simple sense invariant with linguistic (and perceptual) segments ... one must go to the syllable level or higher. (p. 451)

This strikes me as the one point where Liberman's work went awry. By committing theoretically to the notion that individual segments must be extracted and represented in the speech perception process, they were in no position to recognized what their data were clearly telling them: that the acoustic signal is reflecting larger chunks of information -- that is, something closer to the syllable. This observation is nothing new, of course. Others have pointed out the problems with the phoneme as the unit of analysis. But it is interesting to reconsider the data in their own light, rather than in the shadow of the phoneme-as-a-perceptual-unit dogma. It was a perfectly reasonable assumption, that phonemes should be relevant not only for phonological theory (i.e., production) but also for perception. Unfortunately it unnecessarily complicated the perceptual picture. I wonder how Liberman's work might have progressed if he had made different theoretical assumptions. Maybe we'd understand how speech is perceived by now.

Liberman, A. M. (1957). Some results of research on speech perception. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 29, 117-123.

Liberman, A. M., Cooper, F. S., Shankweiler, D. P., & Studdert-Kennedy, M. (1967). Perception of the speech code. Psychol Rev, 74, 431-461.