Past presidential elections in Ukraine have been a contest for control of the “swing” region of central Ukraine that Leonid Kuchma and Yushchenko won in 1994 and 2004, respectively. But to win nationwide, a candidate needs either western or eastern Ukraine as well.

Kuchma won by winning the east and the center, Yushchenko the west and the center. The last three elections were won by slim majorities of 52-56 percent.

The upcoming presidential elections will be different, and the first in which western Ukraine will play a strategic role in deciding the winner. Central Ukraine continues to be dominated by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, whereas opposition Party of Regions Chairman Viktor Yanukovych has a dominant position in eastern-southern Ukraine.

The presidential election is set for January 17, 2010; if no candidate wins outright in the first round, a runoff will take place three weeks later.

Presidential Fragmentation

Western Ukraine’s central role in the upcoming elections is the product of five years of infighting and fragmentation of the center-right. The Our Ukraine-People’s Self Defense bloc (NU-NS) that entered parliament in September 2007 included nine parties that had promised to merge into a single pro-Yushchenko party that would support his bid for a second presidential term.

Instead, the nine have grown to 14, with the establishment of two new parties, led by Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko (Self Defense) and former chief of staff Viktor Baloga (United Center), plus three NGOs that are embryo parties led respectively by former Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko (Civic Initiative), former parliament speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk (Front for Change), and Vyacheslav Kyrylenko (For Ukraine!).

Of NU-NS’s 72 parliamentary deputies, approximately 40, a slim majority, support the democratic coalition underpinning the Tymoshenko government (together with the Tymoshenko and Volodymyr Lytvyn blocs).

Of the remaining 32 deputies, 17 belong to the single pro-Yushchenko group, For Ukraine!, while a further 10 belong to United Center.

President Yushchenko’s election campaign is hampered not only by his low popular support, which he routinely dismisses as unimportant, but also his lack of a political machine. Yushchenko is honorary chairman of the People’s Union-Our Ukraine (NS-NU) party, one of the original nine in the NU-NS bloc, and his chief of staff Vera Ulianichenko is its leader. Both the NS-NU and Yushchenko personally can count on only 2-3 percent support.

The NS-NU has been bankrupt since the spring, when Ukrainian businessmen withdrew their funding after it became evident that he was a lame duck president unable to win a second term.

At least five of the figures who played key roles in the Orange Revolution will be competing for the presidency: Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Yatsenyuk, Hrytsenko, and Yuriy Kostenko, leader of the People’s Party, one of the original nine in the NU-NS bloc.

The nationalist-populist leader of the Svoboda Party (formerly called the Social-National Party) Oleh Tyahnybok, who won a majoritarian seat in 2002 and joined the Our Ukraine faction (only to be expelled two years later for anti-Semitic remarks), will also be competing for the western Ukrainian vote.

Not Easy Breaking In

The two leading candidates in western Ukraine are Tymoshenko and Yatsenyuk. Yatsenyuk leads among younger and educated voters in the three Galician oblasts, while Tymoshenko leads in the remaining four oblasts of western Ukraine. Overall, Tymoshenko has a 6-7 percentage-point lead over Yatsenyuk throughout western Ukraine.

Yatsenyuk’s popularity has catapulted him to third place in national opinion polls, but this should not make him overly self-confident, and his ratings have dropped by a third since the summer. Yatsenyuk’s popularity is being squeezed from four directions: Tymoshenko, Ukraine’s best election campaigner and most charismatic politician; incumbent Yushchenko, who has the same voter base as Yatsenyuk; Hrytsenko; and Serhiy Tyhipko.

In addition to Yatsenyuk, Hrytsenko and Tyhipko also figure within the “second tier” of candidates. Tyhipko has roots in the Dnipropetrovsk clan’s Labor Ukraine Party, but is increasingly challenging Yatsenyuk for the position of the “new face in politics” among disillusioned voters.

Yatsenyuk’s western Ukrainian voters could also turn away from him over his inconsistency on issues that they consider crucial to Ukraine’s national identity. Although elected to parliament in the NU-NS bloc, Yatsenyuk has de facto ditched key elements in its platform, such as abolishing parliamentary immunity; legal recognition of Ukrainian nationalist partisans who fought against the Nazis and Soviets in the 1940s; NATO membership; and energy independence (Yatsenyuk supports a gas consortium with Russia).

He has also recently become skeptical of EU membership and withdrew his signature from a January 2008 letter to NATO’s Bucharest summit (which he signed together with Tymoshenko and Yushchenko) seeking a Membership Action Plan.

These are all issues on which Yushchenko (and to some degree Tymoshenko) are challenging Yatsenyuk. Ironically, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s bitterly critical August letter to Yushchenko will only have served to improve his ratings in western Ukraine and therefore eaten into Yatsenyuk’s popularity.

Touted last year as representing the younger generation of Ukrainian politicians and therefore by implication as “pro-Western,” Yatsenyuk looked decidedly less so at the September Yalta European Strategy (YES) summit.

YES, an NGO established five years ago by oligarch Viktor Pinchuk, invited Yanukovych, Tymoshenko, and Yatsenyuk to present their platforms to a special “Freedom of Speech” ICTV live program and to European guests (ICTV is one of four television channels owned by Pinchuk). Of the three, Yatsenyuk, according to Ukrainian media reports, was the most disappointing and vacuous.

Tymoshenko Stands Up

Tymoshenko’s campaign team have realized the strategic importance of western Ukraine and reached out to the North American diaspora, which retains its influence over the region. Addressing the annual meeting of the World Congress of Ukrainians in Lviv on August 21-22, on the eve of Ukraine’s Independence Day, Tymoshenko stressed her support for Ukrainian remaining the only state language, an issue of particular concern to western Ukrainians and the Ukrainian diaspora.

On October 13, the Tymoshenko bloc organized a parliamentary hearing on links with the Ukrainian diaspora. Tymoshenko’s reaffirmation of support for the Ukrainian language forced Yanukovych to announce prematurely that, if reelected president, he would elevate Russian to the status of the second state language. This policy, which figured in his 2004 campaign program, will ruin his chances completely in western Ukraine, and to some degree in the central region as well.

The January elections are likely to require a runoff, as in 2004, this time between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych. But unlike five years ago, when Yushchenko ran as the united opposition candidate, this time around the former Orange Revolution parties and leaders are fragmented.

Ukrainian intellectual groups are increasingly calling on the “Orange” camp to unite around Tymoshenko, as they had united around Yushchenko. That lack of “Orange” unity in turn improves Yanukovych’s chances, so it is likely that this time the bitter second round will pit him against Tymoshenko.

Taras Kuzio is a senior fellow of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto, adjunct research professor at the Institute of European and Russian Studies at Carleton University, and editor of the bimonthly “Ukraine Analyst”

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

October 18, 2009

The Rise And Fall (And Rise?) Of Arseniy Yatsenyuk

by Andrew Wilson

The one enduring symbol of Ukraine’s problems since the 2004 Orange Revolution has been the constant, wearisome guerrilla warfare between its main personalities: the predictable triptych of President Viktor Yushchenko, current Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and Yushchenko’s defeated rival in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych.

When the economic crisis hit Ukraine in October-November 2008, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, leader of the newly created Front for Change, initially seemed like a breath of fresh air. His Obama-lite campaign turned the contest for the next president into a three-horse race, with himself in third place as Yushchenko dropped out of contention. By this spring, Yatsenyuk was polling at 12-13 percent, almost catching up with Tymoshenko in second place behind Yanukovych.

But Yatsenyuk’s rise stopped abruptly in May. He had clearly started his campaign too early, and by summer it seemed the bubble had burst. Private polls now put him at 9 percent or less.

Now Yushchenko hopes to climb back from political death and rise above him in the polls. So what went wrong? What explains the rise and fall of Arseniy Yatsenyuk?

Yatsenyuk’s rise has indeed been meteoric. He only reached age 35, the minimum required to stand for the presidency, in May. He served as foreign minister for a few months in 2007 and chairman of parliament in 2007-08, though he has never been in any position for long.

In the beginning, this seemed like an asset. On closer inspection, it seems he has been given a series of leg-ups by his patrons: unlike most politicians in Ukraine, Yatsenyuk has little wealth and few resources of his own.

Supported By Oligarchs

He was plucked from obscurity to become deputy head of the National Bank in 2003 by Serhiy Tyhipko. His main patrons now are two of Ukraine’s biggest oligarchs — Viktor Pinchuk and Dmytro Firtash — along with smaller versions such as Donetsk tycoon Leonid Yurushev.

Pinchuk is an independent force, but has apparently made his peace with Tymoshenko. Firtash was with Yushchenko, then shifted to the Party of Regions, and more recently has been at daggers-drawn with Tymoshenko over the fate of the shadowy gas intermediary company RosUkrEnergo, where he controls the Ukrainian half. Yatsenyuk was therefore pulled in different directions by his different sponsors.

A turning point came in June when the putative coalition between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych fell apart. Yatsenyuk demanded that Firtash switch to backing him full-time, but Firtash stuck by Yanukovych.

Yatsenyuk was suddenly no longer omnipresent on the Inter TV channel then close to Firtash. Pinchuk became the more important sponsor, and replaced Yatsenyuk’s Ukrainian team with Russian-connected “political technologists:” Timofei Sergeitsev, Dmitry Kulikov, and Iskander Valitov.

As well as working for Yanukovych’s controversial campaign in 2004, the new Russian team came from the Duma Expert Council under Konstantin Zatulin. It is headed by Sergei Markov and notorious for its attempts to set up Russia-friendly NGOs and politicians throughout the CIS. If Russia cannot control or confront Ukraine directly, it has an interest in helping to build up a “satellite ideology.”

The new team pushed a version of a Russian “third way” ideology, which stretches from the nationalist right to earlier campaigns for the Union of Rightist Forces and Anatoly Chubais’s infamous “liberal imperialism.” It combines business-friendly policies with attacks on the bankruptcy of the West and Western liberalism, the consequent degradation of structures based on them like the EU, and the rise of an alternative pole centered around Russia in the east.

‘Greater Europe’

Yatsenyuk shifted from his plague-on-both-your-houses rhetoric and so-called “New Ukrainian Pragmatism” to something more like a new Ukrainian isolationism, suddenly repositioning himself as the Sinn Féin (“Ourselves Alone”) candidate and lambasting the EU and everything non-Ukrainian. His campaign slogans – “Productive Village,” “A Battle-Ready Army,” and “New Industrialization” – suddenly sent a different message, one that also sounded more like “feed and support Russia.”

Yatsenyuk has even toyed with the idea of announcing a Ukrainian-led Eastern European Union as a kind of club for all those disappointed with the EU within what he likes to call “Greater Europe” — which would almost inevitably be a Trojan horse for Russia.

The new Russian team also tried to sell Yatsenyuk as Putin-lite, the new tough kid on the block. His campaign color became khaki green. But these messages were too Russian and didn’t sell well in Ukraine.

Most Ukrainians would actually quite like to join the EU. Yatsenyuk’s khaki-colored tough-talk was uncomfortably reminiscent of Michael Dukakis’s ill-fated tank ride in 1988 and never sounded convincing coming out of the mouth of someone whose nickname is “Kinder Surpriz.” Yatsenyuk even staged his own Dukakis moment, careering around on a combine harvester.

Vladimir Putin is popular in Ukraine, and many would vote for a “strong hand” as an alternative to disorder. This sentiment is also exploited by Tymoshenko.

But Ukrainian political culture is different. There is no cult of power, or of the KGB.

So Yatsenyuk has faded in the polls. He has three choices when the actual campaign begins on October 17. He can switch back to Plan A and act as a genuine “third force.” Otherwise, he risks losing this niche to other candidates like Tyhipko or Yatsenyuk’s successor as chairman of parliament, Volodymyr Lytvyn. Or his sponsors can keep him in the field with Plan B — siphoning votes from Yanukovych.

Yatsenyuk’s chances of winning a powerful post like prime minister after the election depend on either a strong performance or the eventual winner owing him a favor. Or Yatsenyuk can play a long game and aim to be a player in the next parliamentary elections — possibly even holding the key “golden share” between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. In that case, we may not have seen the last of him or his supporters.

Andrew Wilson is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and a coeditor of the new volume “What Does Russia Think?” The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

Oxford Analytica, 19 October 2009
UKRAINE: Pluralistic media will ensure lively campaign

EVENT: The campaign for the January 17 presidential election officially
begins today.

SIGNIFICANCE: The emergence of genuinely pluralistic, largely
professional media means that presidential candidates will not encounter
deep-seated pro-regime media bias along the lines of what the ‘Orange
Revolution’ protagonists faced in 2004. A dynamic and pluralistic media
environment is also likely to serve as an important check against
possible electoral fraud.

ANALYSIS: Media pluralism is one crucial legacy of the 2004 ‘Orange
Revolution’ and the election of then-opposition candidate Viktor
Yushchenko as president. The variety of political viewpoints offered in
the broadcast media has even attracted Russian television hosts who can
no longer lead open political discussions at home. Indeed, the level of
pluralism in Ukraine is unique among the non-Baltic former Soviet
states, where most media outlets — especially television outlets — are
controlled by the authorities and heavily censored.

Language and nationality. Although media regulation is light by regional
standards, there are laws in place requiring broadcasters to provide an
equal balance of Russian- and Ukrainian-language content. State-owned
print media remain in Ukrainian, whereas newer, privately owned print
media are increasingly in Russian (the two largest newspapers by
circulation are the Russian-language Segodnya and Fakty i Kommentarii).

Media from Russia — both print media and cable television channels –
also remain influential. The Ukrainian versions of the Komsomolskaya
Pravda, Izvestiya and Argumenty i Fakty newspapers are especially
popular; all three cover developments in both Ukraine and Russia.

Internet media. Most Ukrainians receive their news from television, but
internet use is rapidly growing. The Orange Revolution was sometimes
described as the ‘world’s first internet revolution’ due to widespread
online engagement by young opposition activists. Dozens of frequently
updated websites provide diverse political views and coverage. Of these
outlets, the pro-reform Zerkalo Tyzhnia stands out as one of the most
highly regarded online journals in the former Soviet space; such others
as Ukrayinska Pravda and Korrespondent also offer high-quality political
and investigative reporting.

Diverse television coverage. Nonetheless, television is still by far the
most popular outlet for news reporting. Channels are controlled by the
state or big business, but still offer access to a variety of political
viewpoints and — in some cases — sophisticated and critical analysis.
Inter, Ukraine’s most popular and most controversial channel, had a
heavy bias against Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko since her government
entered office in December 2007. However, a recent change of ownership
at Inter has led to somewhat more balanced (if more anodyne) reporting
focused on Tymoshenko and opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych, the two
leading presidential candidates.

Television coverage sometimes appears to be influenced by channels’
ownership and political allegiances:

Channel 1. This state channel is the only one directly controlled by the
presidency. Yushchenko promised in 2004 to transform the outlet into a
public television channel modelled on the BBC, but this was never
implemented. Channel 1 has few viewers and is seen as dreary in
comparison to private channels because of its focus on government
activities and educational programmes.

ICTV, STB, New Channel and M1 Music Channel. These four channels are
owned by oligarch Viktor Pinchuk, and are generally considered
politically objective. Pinchuk left politics in 2006 after deciding to
concentrate on business and philanthropic affairs. During Leonid
Kuchma’s presidency, Pinchuk was a leading member of the Dnipropetrovsk
clan, represented politically by the Labour Party. Pinchuk is Kuchma’s
son-in-law, and his earlier acquisitions of businesses and television
channels were almost certainly facilitated by this relationship. ICTV
airs a popular political talk show hosted by one of Russia’s most famous
anchors, former NTV host Yevgeniy Kiselev, whose broadcasts in Russia
have been restricted to the radio.

Ukrayina, NTN (formerly TB Tabachuk). These two channels are owned by
Donetsk oligarch Rinat Akhmetov and Party of Regions (referred to as
‘Regions’) businessman Eduard Prutnik. Akhmetov first entered parliament
in 2006 as a member of Regions, of which he is a major financier. Before
the onset of the crisis, he was the wealthiest person in Europe and the
CIS, with estimated holdings worth 31 billion dollars (see UKRAINE:
Tycoon may yet become political leader – October 30, 2006). Despite
Akhmetov’s allegiance to Regions, Tymoshenko has regularly appeared on
the Ukrayina channel’s popular Shuster-Live programme, reflecting the
degree to which media pluralism exists in practice. The programme is
hosted by Savik Shuster, another ‘refugee’ from Russian television. He
had hosted a talk show on NTV until 2004, but was removed following
criticism from then-President Vladimir Putin.

Inter. Inter is primarily watched in Russian-speaking regions of
Ukraine. The channel was owned by Ihor Pluzhnikov, an ally of the
now-marginal Social Democratic Party-United (SDPUo), until his
mysterious death in 2005. The SDPUo was led by Viktor Medvedchuk, who
also headed Kuchma’s presidential administration; this gave the
authorities great influence over Inter. After Pluzhnikov’s death, the
channel passed into the ownership of industrialist Valeriy
Khoroshkovskiy (who controls a 61% stake) and RosUkrEnergo (RUE)
co-owner Dmytro Firtash. As the SDPUo became marginalised, Inter became
a mouthpiece for Regions and began heavily slanting its news coverage
against Tymoshenko. It is likely that Firtash directly influenced the
channel’s coverage; he had close ties to a group of Regions deputies who
opposed Tymoshenko’s attempts to remove RUE from the Russian-Ukrainian
gas relationship (see UKRAINE: Opposition party is split ahead of key
vote – March 31, 2009). However, Firtash was recently ousted as
part-owner, and Inter is starting to tone down its anti-Tymoshenko bias.

1+1. Pro-Yushchenko oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky purchased 49% of 1+1 in
July from Central European Media Enterprises, the channel’s owners since
2005. The channel has high ratings in Ukrainian-speaking western and
central regions, and has the second-highest number of viewers after
Inter. Kolomoisky provided financing for Yushchenko’s 2004 candidacy and
the Orange Revolution, as well as Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc in the
2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections. He has been hostile to both
Tymoshenko and the business rival Donetsk clan. Like Inter, 1+1 includes
a popular mix of politics as well as local and foreign-dubbed
entertainment programmes. Kolomoisky’s purchase of a major stake is
unlikely to change its balanced coverage, given his history of
non-interference in other Ukrainian media outlets that he partly owns.

Channel 5. Channel 5 is owned by Foreign Minister and former National
Bank Chairman Petro Poroshenko. Channel 5 (together with Era) was one of
only two television stations available to the opposition in the 2004
elections. Poroshenko has been a close ally of Yushchenko since 2001,
when they established Our Ukraine; in 2004, Poroshenko helped finance
Yushchenko’s campaign.

Ukraine’s industrialists often have clear links to particular political
parties (see UKRAINE: ‘Orange’ allies fight over economic policy – May
20, 2008). However, such oligarchs tend to diversify their support
across the political spectrum as a means of maintaining good relations
with whoever might prevail in a genuinely competitive presidential
election. This helps account for the diversity of programming and for
the larger channels’ provision of balanced coverage amid a highly
politically charged environment.

CONCLUSION: A variety of media outlets will provide extensive coverage
of the presidential election campaign, permitting lively debate and free
access to different viewpoints. Such Kuchma-era censorship as secret
instructions sent from the presidential administration to television
channels no longer exists. Although broadcast media ownership is
concentrated in the hands of a small number of leading industrialists,
the diversity of their political interests — and a desire to hedge
their bets ahead of a hard-fought electoral contest — will ensure that
Ukraine’s media environment remains the most dynamic and pluralistic in
the CIS.