Tea with FT

Again, we would do better with capital requirements for banks based on sustainability of earth and job creation ratings

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Wed, 15 May 2013 12:16:00 +0000

Sir, I often wonder about how strange it is that those who most present themselves as being very concerned with the health of our planet, and should therefore one would presume be the ones most concerned with making sure that scarce financial resources are used as effectively as possible to save the earth, then end up being the most willing to just throw money at the problem.

I say this because Martin Wolf in “Why the world faces climate chaos”, May 15, argues that “If we are to take a prudential view of public finances we should surely take a prudential view [on saving for humanity] the only home it is likely to have”. As I see it those two prudential views go hand in hand, as we do need a prudential view on public finances in order to assure having some resources for all the prevention, adaptation and mitigation which will be required.

Two fundamental problems the world faces everywhere now, is the deteriorating environment of the earth and the lack of jobs for our youth. And in this respect for almost a decade now I have been arguing the following:

If we have capital requirements for banks which clear for the information provided by credit ratings, even though that information has already been cleared for elsewhere, and thereby only produces dangerous distortions, why then do we not have instead capital requirements for banks that are based on sustainability of earth and job creation ratings?

The above would allow banks to play a significant role in solving both problems, without us having to leave the financing of environmental or job creation projects in the hands of government bureaucrats or short terms political interests. Unfortunately there are some who prefers the government to solve it all… seemingly that is on their agenda.

PS. Sir, just to let you know, I am not copying Martin Wolf with this, as he has told me not to send him anything more about these “capital requirements”… he already knows it all, at least so he thinks.

We need to see the hiding-behind-regulatory-risk-weighting index of the banks

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Tue, 14 May 2013 16:08:00 +0000

Sir Patrick Jenkins and Daniel Schäfer at the end of their “Banks in cash calls to meet Basel III” state the caveat with respect of the numbers shown that “Regulators [will] either raise risk-weightings and/or give more emphasis to nominal balance sheets.” Indeed, but it can also be, like the current crisis has clearly evidenced, that the risk-weights could also simply turn out to be very wrong.

And that is why I consider the illustration that shows Basel III core tier one capital ratios of 12 large banks to be quite opaque. As a minimum, next to each Basel III ratio they should have given us each banks capital to nominal balance sheet ratio.

That way, by dividing the first ratio by the second (or the other way round) we can build an index which allows us to identify how each bank hides behind risk-weights, whether these are calculated by themselves or by the regulators.

Was the Basel Committee, and the Financial Stability Board, created in order to bypass democracies?

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Fri, 10 May 2013 17:25:00 +0000

Sir, what would be the possibilities of passing a law, in any European parliament, which would dramatically increase banks expected risk-adjusted returns on equity when lending to a sovereign or triple-A rated borrowers, and thereby stop banks from lending to those perceived as more risky, like small and medium businesses and entrepreneurs, or having these pay higher interest rates to make up for a regulatory competitive disadvantage; and all justified with the argument of making banks safer? None I would say… especially if a parliamentarian reminded law makers of the fact that no bank crisis ever has resulted from excessive lending to those perceived as risky, they have all resulted from excessive lending to what was wrongly perceived as absolutely safe.

But that is exactly what the Basel Committee has achieved by imposing their capital requirements for banks based on perceived risk. And this is why I do not agree much with Philip Stephens’ “Do not blame democracy for the rise of the populists” May 10, since democracies should never have allowed their power to be diffused in such a way. Governments and democracies are now in many ways kept hostages by their own creations... and suffering their own Stockholm-syndrome

Was the Basel Committee and the created on purpose in order to bypass democracies? I have no answer to that question… sometimes shit just happens. But, who have benefitted from it? Not “the risky”, that’s one thing for sure.

Regulators, and FT journalists, suffer from cognitive overload and malfunctioning prefrontal cortex.

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Fri, 10 May 2013 14:46:00 +0000

Sir, Christopher Coker’s “Technology is making humans the weakest link in warfare” May 10 is an extraordinarily enlightening article…among other for understanding why bank regulators are seemingly not able to correct what they should correct.

Coker writes “The digital world we have created may be outpacing our neurons’ processing capabilities [cognitive overload], forcing us to log off emotionally. The neurons associated with empathy, compassion and emotional stability are sited primarily in areas of the prefrontal cortex. In evolutionary terms, this is a recently developed part of the brain that is bypassed when we are stressed or overanxious. Emotions such as empathy and compassion emerge from neural processes that are inherently slow. It takes time to understand the moral dimension of a situation.”

Bank regulators, with the introduction of risk-weighted capital requirements for banks, which much favors access to bank credit for “The Infallible” caused, as collateral damage, that the access to bank credit for “The Risky”, like small and medium businesses and entrepreneurs became, in relative terms, much more expensive and harder to access. In other words the gap when accessing bank credit, between “The Infallible” and “The Risky”, increased dramatically.

And, since “The Risky” includes many or perhaps most of those potentially able to create the next generation of jobs, our young ones are paying dearly the consequences of such odious regulatory discrimination.

Having for years been protesting these regulations, I could never understand why bank regulators (or FT journalists for that matter) did not care one iota about something which in my mind could even be labeled as a crime against humanity. Now, thanks to Coker I have at least a clue; they are suffering a cognitive overload, which is causing their prefrontal cortex to stop functioning.

I sure pray they recover soon… or we will have to wait for those regulatory drone-robots which in terms of Coker could at least console us with “reducing the inhumanity so as to balance the loss of humanity”.

Since when can a mistake in a paper be used as evidence of an opposite conclusion?

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Thu, 09 May 2013 21:37:00 +0000

Sir, Robin Harding reports “Reinhart and Rogoff publish errata to paper on public debt and growth”. May 9. In it Harding writes that the 2010 paper on public debt and growth, by pointing out a significant effect on growth when public debt reached 90 percent of GDP, was widely cited as an argument for fiscal austerity. Since the paper was thought to be correct, I guess that was a quite reasonable thing to do.

What I cannot lay my hands around though is how the existence of a mistake in the paper can suddenly be turned into evidence which supports the opposite conclusion. I say this because I have lately read more opinions advancing that the 90 percent is no limit, than what I ever read about the original paper stating it was.

That said, since all this type of debt-sustainability discussions often sound to me like a torturer debating how much torture his victim can take before fainting… I will, without any religious fervor invested in it, keep on opining that public debt at 90 percent of GDP is high… although that will of course also have to do with who are the holders of that debt, nationals or foreigners, friends or foes.

And also, if the 90 percent to GDP has been reached by incurring in distortions, like requiring banks to have more capital when lending to the citizens than when lending to the government, then my previous “high” becomes a “VERY HIGH”

Higher bank capital ratios without eliminating distortions based on perceived risks, would make banks riskier

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Wed, 08 May 2013 14:39:00 +0000

Sir, John Plender refers both to the draft legislation advanced by US senators David Vitter and Sherrod Brown, and to Anad Admati’s and Martin Hellwig’s “The bankers’ New Clothes”, in order to point out that “Support is growing for higher bank capital ratios”, May 8.

Plender unfortunately entirely misses what is most important. Many have asked for higher capital requirements but, what sets those he references apart from many others is that they also want to do away with the pillar, and the pride and joy of Basel regulations, namely that the capital requirements are to be based on perceived risk.

Let me ask Plender. Today, according to Basel II, a bank can hold some zero risk weighted sovereign assets against zero capital, while giving a loan to a business requires it to hold 8 percent of it in capital. If tomorrow the risk-weights for some sovereign would remain zero, but banks were instead required to hold 30 percent against a loan to a business, would the distortions be smaller or larger?

Without eliminating regulatory distortions, neither austerity nor profligacy can help Europe

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Wed, 08 May 2013 12:59:00 +0000

Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “the hope that [the European countries in crisis] will grow their way out of their difficulties, via eurozone demand and internal balancing, is a fantasy, in the current macroeconomic context”, “The German model is not for export” May 8.

Wolf’s line of argument, again, points to the “austerians”, as he likes to call them, being wrong. I agree with this. But that does not mean that their opposites, let’s call them the “profligates”, would be right either.

Europe, to stand a chance, and the European youth to find the next generation of jobs, needs to get rid of those distortions which direct bank credit, not based on its productivity, but based on perceived risk-avoidance. And before that is done, I would have to be an “austerian”… since wasting away scarce profligacy space on nothing is just plain stupid.

In fact those regulations are more than stupid they might in fact even signify a crime against humanity.

PS. Sir, just to let you know, I am not copying Martin Wolf with this, since he has asked me not to send him anything more about the implications of these “capital requirements for banks based on perceived risk”… he already knows it all… at least so he thinks.

It was bank regulators who suffered the mother of all intellectual failures

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Wed, 08 May 2013 12:33:00 +0000

Sir, John Kay writes that the left, were so horrified that a collapse of capitalism from its own global contradictions, might occur under their watch, that their only thought was to avert it by shoveling public money at the capitalists, “Sinister or silly, protest politicians are united in grievance” May 8. And Kay refers to that as an “intellectual failure”.

That is indeed true, but, as intellectual failures come, much worse was the one which preceded it, namely the regulatory theory that banks would be better off diverting their credits from what though perhaps productive was perceived as risky, and concentrate on earning high returns on their equity by giving credit to what was perceived as “absolutely safe”.

Capitalism might have contradictions but, allowing banks to leverage their equity 62.5 to 1 when lending for instance to Greece, but only 12.5 to 1 when lending for instance to a German medium sized business, has of course nothing to do with that.

In fact those regulations are more than stupid, they might in fact even signify a crime against humanity.

I did not take Simon Kuper for a baby-boomer.

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Sat, 04 May 2013 19:34:00 +0000

Sir, I have admired many of Simon Kuper articles, and there is no doubt he is a rising star that could help to rejuvenate your paper. That said his “Smile if you live in Europe” May 4, left me a bit surprised, as I did not take him for a baby-boomer content with being able to obtain a certainly splendid caffé macchiato at a very good price.

I say that because when you are young, more than where you find yourself, is where you are heading that matters… and Europe, for the time being at least, is heading down, down, down.

And as I have explained to you Sir some couple of hundred times, that is much a result of silly bank regulations which allow banks to obtain a much larger expected returns on their equity when lending to The Infallible than when lending to The Risky.

And as you must certainly be aware of, the value of any portfolio which does not include a hefty dose of risk-taking, is destined to wither away, and therefore, although quite appropriate for oldies with few years left of living according to actuarial tables, is something highly inappropriate for the young.

In fact had a certified financial advisor proposed a portfolio to a young person with the ingredients regulators establish for their banks, he would have his certification immediately removed. So no, if in Europe, and if young, don´t smile but kick out the current batch of bank regulators… as fast as you can.

The best way to compete with tax havens and fiscal paradises abroad is to create tax heavens and paradises at home.

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Sat, 04 May 2013 18:51:00 +0000

Sir, Vanessa Houlder writes that with respect to tax avoidance “Governments are complicit in the problems they are condemning. It is their tax systems that has created incentives for businesses to behave that way”, “Talk is cheap in the clampdown on tax avoidance” May 4. And she is more correct than what she probably knows. I have always held that the best way to compete with tax havens and fiscal paradises abroad is to create tax heavens and paradises at home.

Also considering the enormous growth in fiscal income and the relative poor delivery of services, like the costs of any government financed infrastructure going to the roof, we might be reaching the point in which governments become too-big-to-govern, and in which case some escape valves could prove to be blessings in disguise. For instance, once the air cleans in Greece, private Greek capital safeguarded abroad might prove indispensable for the survival of Greece.

FT, how can you learn if you do not want to listen?

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Sat, 04 May 2013 13:37:00 +0000

Sir, in your editorial “US spring fails to spread to Europe” May 4, if it could really be called a “spring”, you write “fixing the banks to help the recovery is the lesson Britain and the eurozone must learn from the US.”

The real difference between the US banks and your banks is that the former never fully implemented Basel II and are therefore much less exposed to the distortions the capital requirements for banks based on perceived risks already cleared for elsewhere cause.

But since that is precisely what I have written you more than a thousand lettersabout, but that you have preferred to ignore, I must then ask… how are you suppose to learn if you are not even willing to listen?

Frankly... who has such silencing powers in the Financial Times?

Bank regulators make the prospects of the living-hand-to-mouth especially bleak

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Sat, 04 May 2013 12:31:00 +0000

Sir, Gillian Tett’s “The cost of living hand-to-mouth” May 5, is splendidly scary, especially when contrasted with all the how the US is doing great hoopla on FT's first page… especially since there is nothing in the “for our business it has become critical to understand the cycle – when pay [and benefit] cheques are arriving” that will increase the relative number of citizens who can afford a planning scenario that goes further than next pay cheque.

Of course, as Ms Tett has preferred to ignore it, even if she writes for the Financial Times, I must remind her again of the fact that if any of these “living hand to mouth” were to have access to bank credit, then the dollars, or pounds, or euros they would pay in interests, would be worth much less to a banker than those dollars, or pounds or euros paid by anyone dressed up as safe. And that is simply so because the regulators allow the banks to leverage much more a “safe” dollar, pound or euro, than a “risky” one.

Of course, as Ms Tett has preferred to ignore it, even if she is an anthropologist, I must remind her that one big reason many have possibilities of planning for a longer horizon, is that so many before them took many risks, assisted by the banks. And therefore, as a result of banks daring taking risks having been ordered out of fashion by too concerned and too dumb regulators, the future of the current living-hand-to-mouth looks especially bleak.

No nation and no economy has become great by playing it safe!!! God make us daring!!!

Distortion is not free, current low public interest rates are an illusion and could be the highest real rates ever

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Thu, 02 May 2013 12:16:00 +0000

Sir, during the two years I had the fortune to have a voice as an Executive Director at the World Bank, 2002-2004, there were a lot of discussions on the issue of debt sustainability for poor developing countries. I hated those. They always sounded like a torturer calculating how much he could go on before his victim fainted. No doubt much of the ongoing, and I would have to say much less civilized debate between the austerians and the profligarians, reminds me of that.

And I also remember when some years ago some environmental austerians fouled up some research, which was immediately interpreted as a great go ahead by the environmental profligarians.

I do pity Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart, for probably having been too interpreted by vested interests, hand having to end up in the eye of the current storm on debt. They do a good job of fixing their positions in “Austerity is not the only answer to a debt problem” May 2. Of course it is not a question of either or… and it is not even necessary for them to call on Keynes to testify in their defense.

That said, what they entirely miss, probably because it has never been an area of research or concern to them, is how current bank regulations, which so immensely favor sovereign borrowings, leads to the illusion of low rates.

Just one example: Banks in Europe lending to Germany do not need to hold any capital, something which implies an authorized infinite leverage of their equity. But, if they lend to a German small or medium business or entrepreneur, then they need to hold 8 percent in capital and can only leverage the risk-adjusted returns of that loan on their equity 12.5 times to 1.

Anyone who does not understand that translates into a direct subsidy of Germany´s borrowing rate, paid by taxing the more “risky” and the real economy losing out of opportunities, has little idea about how banking and capitalism work.

If some real game changing opportunities are thereby lost by Germany, it could in fact currently, and quiet unwittingly, be paying they highest interest rates ever on their public borrowings.

On the Battle between “Austerians” and “Profligarians”

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Wed, 01 May 2013 12:38:00 +0000

Sir, Martin Wolf refers sort of contemptuously to “austerians”, to whom he holds “a financial crisis is a mark of moral turpitude, to be redeemed only by suffering. “Why the Baltic states are no model” May 1.

But Wolf himself could also with moral turpitude equally be accused of being a “profligarian” in holding that a financial crisis should only be redeemed by just letting the party go on… in the best style of an Après moi, le déluge baby-boomer’s perspective.

Before the worst type of austerity is eliminated, namely that which hinders banks to take the real risks the real economy demands, I find myself definitely to be an “austerian”, because otherwise fiscal and monetary profligacy would just be a waste of fiscal and monetary space.

Now, once the regulatory establishment has come to its senses, God willing, and eliminated the current capital requirements for banks based on risk-weighting for perceived risks which have already been weighted, by means interest rates, amounts of exposure and other terms, then I will gladly think of joining the camp of the profligarians. I said “think” because I would need to be sure regulators really understood how dumb they had been, so as to never again repeat similar nonsense.

PS. Sir, just to let you know, I am not copying Martin Wolf with this, since he has told me not to send him anything more about the implications of these “capital requirements for banks based on perceived risk”… he already knows it all... at least so he thinks.

Risk-weighting for risks already weighted for, well that is regulatory zealotry you can write home about

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Wed, 01 May 2013 11:49:00 +0000

Sir, you write that “the Fed’s monetary policy [is] much more efficient than in those economies where the transmission of central bank money-printing to real economy remains broken” “If th e Fed ain’t broke, don’t fix it” May 1.

Indeed but the reason of that is that the US never adopted as fully as Europe did those Basel dictated capital requirements based on perceived risk, that so completely have clogged up the channels whereby bank lending can flow to the real economy.

And when you refer to that US Senators Sherrod Brown and David Vitter want banks to hold more capital you are ignoring that their bill contains the much more important provision of limiting [and hopefully making away altogether] with the obnoxiously dumb risk-weighting, something that is not explicitly mentioned in the Dodd-Frank law.

Sir, you mention the dangers of “zealotry”. Let me inform you that the worst example of regulatory zealotry is precisely the setting of capital requirements based on perceived risks that have already been cleared for.

Sir, as I wrote in a letter published today by the Washington Post, “Europe would also do better with a Brown-Vitter proposal”

The only acceptable antidote against tax-havens should be tax-heavens

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Tue, 30 Apr 2013 15:27:00 +0000

Sir, Jeffrey Sachs’ unrestrained attack on tax-havens, shows there are many ways of exploiting tax havens. “Austerity exposes the global threat from tax havens” April 30.

As a citizen, I have for a long time held that the best enemy of tax havens is the existence of tax heavens, by which I mean countries in which a government respectfully earns its fiscal revenues by delivering good government.

I come from a country, Venezuela, which in the 80s I saw rescued after its governments, after being excessively financed by foreign banks, had submerged into a total crisis, precisely because its citizens had saved abroad, and were able to return resources to their nation when they felt conditions so merited, instead of allowing these resources also to get wasted.

And I sure pray that for instance in Greece’s case, there is also a lot of Greek private capital in safe havens, ready to return to their country. And so, in this respect Sachs should start by making sure we have good and worthy politicians, before closing the escape doors on desperate citizens, which can otherwise most probably lead to having even worse politicians.

Also, over and over again in these debates about tax-havens we read about immense amounts tucked away, implying that if only governments could lay their hand on it, the world would be saved. In this case “Recent estimates by the Tax Justice Network suggest that deposits are in the range of $21tn.” Deposits… what deposits? All that money is placed somewhere and so if it was recovered by governments in its entirety it might very well just mean that $21tn was taken out of private management, like the stock markets, and handed over to perhaps inept and corrupt governments. Would that save the world? Forget it.

Finally, I would wish to remind Professor Sachs that public greed can easily be even much more destabilizing than private greed.

Bank rules already hinder inclusion and widen the gap

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 13:38:00 +0000

Sir, Alfred Hannig in his letter “Rules shouldn’t hinder inclusion” writes about the importance of finding a balance in financial regulations between the need of protecting the banks from systemic risks and the need for the inclusion of those currently without access to the financial system. And he is of course right when holding that “infection in the financial system will not come from financial inclusion” just the same way that a financial crisis will never result from excessive exposures to “The Risky”, these will always come from excessive exposures to what has erroneously been considered a member of The Infallible”.

That said Mr. Hannig should take notice that current bank regulations, with their capital requirement based on “perceived risks” already cleared for by means of interest rates (risk premiums) amounts of exposure and other terms, already attempt against the inclusion of many; and only helps to further widen the gap between the haves, the old, history, the developed, “The Infallible” and the have-nots, the young, the future, the developing, “The Risky”.

More than the public borrowing rate trapped at zero, it is the banks that are trapped into public lending

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Sun, 28 Apr 2013 13:58:00 +0000

Sir, I refer to the “Austerity is hurting. But is it working?” debate, April 27.

The Yes camp, represented by Chris Giles advances by far the strongest argument by just stating the fact that with respect to “finances to fight crises or wars. Advanced economies had leeway in 2008; they do not now”.

The No camp, represented by Robin Harding, echoing Martin Wolf, refers again to the boost that fiscal policy could give the economy “when interest rates are trapped at zero”. Again no consideration is given to the fact that the infallible sovereign rate is “trapped” at zero in much by capital requirements for banks that are extremely biased in favor of public borrowings. And again no consideration is given to the fact that the “risky”, like the small and medium businesses and entrepreneurs, therefore need to pay banks exaggerated risk premiums in order to provide the banks with the same return on their equity; that is if they even can get the banks to take notice of them.

If the No camp would try to figure out what would happen if for instance bank were required to hold 8 percent on all assets, including sovereigns, then perhaps they would understand that more than the public interest rate trapped at zero, it is the banks that are trapped into public lending.

And if you do not think there is something wrong with that, you've got to be communists.

Regulators, you can even let Libor be the result of a raffle, but please stop distorting and subsidizing the risk-free rate

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 19:07:00 +0000

Sir, I refer to Tom Braithwaite’s and Brooke Masters’ “Regulators urge speed in replacing the Libor rate” April 26.

By allowing banks to hold much less capital when lending to the “infallible” sovereigns than when lending to “risky” citizens, regulators have completely distorted what is probably the most important reference rate, the borrowing rates of the most solid sovereigns, one of these usually the proxy for the risk-free rate.

And that is why I am amazed about how much attention regulators give to the Libor rate, a rate that really, for its small relative importance, could just as well be the result of a raffle among some quotes, after eliminating some outliers. One day, the winning Libor could be somewhat higher than its true rate, and on that day, Libor based borrowers would pay somewhat more, and investors earn somewhat more; other days the picked Libor could be somewhat lower than its true value and the opposite would hold. But, in the long run, no one is really much harmed.

Could it be that regulators are ashamed of what they have done and are using the Libor incident as a distraction?

Europe what you really need is much less risk-taking austerity

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 12:46:00 +0000

Sir, Philip Stephens refers to the “high public debt suffocates growth” vs. “it is low growth that drives up debt” controversy. It all sounds so Lilliput vs. Blefuscu to me, “The New Deal for Europe: more reform, less austerity” April 26.

What currently suffocates the growth of the real economy are those crazy capital requirements for banks that create enormous incentives for banks to shun all what is officially perceived as “risky” like small and medium businesses and entrepreneurs, and to earn all their return on equity by lending to what is perceived as “absolutely infallible”. And, since in Europe the banks have normally been more in charge of financing the risky than those in the US, where more alternative sources of funds exists, Europe suffers the most.

Stephen refers to the existence of “ossified labour markets that lock out young people and discourage investments and innovations”, and he is right of course, but, when compared to bank regulations which lock out the “risky”-risk-takers in the real economy, their effects are sort of minor.

When banks have effectively been castrated, and are singing in falsetto, even low public debt does not help growth and, since currently the lowest capital requirements for the banks apply when these lend to the public sector, higher public debt level will result. It suffices to read Martin Wolf’s almost monothematic preaching for the public sector to take advantage of low interest rates, so as to borrow and take on large infrastructure projects, without understanding that those low rates are just a mirage, caused by regulatory subsidies paid for by the many extremely onerous missed opportunities in the real economy.

Europe, please inform your overly timid and dumb bank regulators that no major bank crisis ever has resulted from excessive bank exposure to the “risky”, they have all resulted from major exposures to what was dangerously perceived as “absolutely safe”.

But also beware of the much greater risk derived from excessive lack of testosterone and dopamine

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Thu, 25 Apr 2013 14:20:00 +0000

Sir, the fundamental problem with good articles like Sarah Gordon´s “Call in the nerds – finance is no place for extroverts”, April 25, is that they tend to analyze risks from the perspective of when risk-taking goes bad, without caring much for when risk-taking goes right.

The problem we are facing now is that bank regulators, with too little testosterone, and too little dopamine, and too little understanding of what they were doing, gave the banks extraordinary incentives to lend and invest in what was perceived as “safe” and to stay away from what was perceived as “risky”… and so the banks did… and loaded up on AAA rated securities, Greece, Spanish real estate and others safes.

Indeed if regulators had incorporated more behavioral analysis then they would not have based the capital requirements for the banks based on perceived risk, like that in credit ratings, but based to how bankers react to perceived risk. And then, instead of more-risk-more-capital less-risk-less capital, they might have applied a somewhat inverse capital requirements, since bank crisis have never ever resulted from excessive bank exposures to something perceived ex ante as “risky.

PS. As gold is mentioned, just as a curiosity let me remind you that in the Report on Global Financial Stability 2012, of April last year, the IMF listed 77.4 trillion dollars in safe assets and therein gold represented 11 percent.

Martin Wolf, monetary profligacy should not be an article of faith either

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Wed, 24 Apr 2013 12:08:00 +0000

Sir, Martin Wolf, insists in that because those “for room for maneuver, such as the US and even the UK” because they did not create stimulate enough the economy the “recovery has been even weaker and so the long run cost of the recession far greater than was necessary”, “Austerity loses an article of faith” April 24.

And to back up his arguments Wolf uses foremost the fact that UK, after reaching a net public debt of 240 per cent of gross domestic debt level, something that most probably most public sector lenders were blissfully unaware of, managed to work down the debt load, thanks to the industrial revolution.

Mr. Martin Wolf, let me just ask you the following four questions:

Where is today’s industrial revolution?

Do you really think that back then the UK had regulators who gave banks extraordinary incentives to avoid taking risks? No matter what Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff hold, in this sense, this time is indeed different.

What soaring private and public debt which led to the crisis was not the direct result of minuscule capital requirements for the banks required for the “absolutely safe”?

Finally what are we supposed to recover to, to the skewed economy we had before? Just so that house prices go up and banks earn 30 percent on their equity?

In October 2009, Martin Wolf kindly published in his Economist Forum my “Free us from imprudent risk-aversion” and I still hold, more than ever that it contains the explanation for what brought us the current crisis and what stops us from getting out of it.

Before we correct the incredibly dumb regulatory bias against risk-taking, any stimulus will just eat up any scarce stimulus space we have, for absolutely no good reason at all.

Would the US not still be treading water had their QE’s been twice as large?

Again, and as I read Mr. Wolf’s arguments, to me, day by day he is becoming, more and more, a worthy representative of those baby-boomers with an “après mois le deluge” philosophy. As a grandfather, I should try to stop him.

With respect to increased capital requirements for banks, what matters most for growth and stability is how it is required.

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 18:11:00 +0000

Sir, I refer to Alex Barker´s and Tom Braithwaite´s “EU and Fed clash over US bank move” April 23. In all the hullaballoo what seems to be ignored, perhaps more by EU than by the Fed, is that with respect to increased capital requirements for banks, what matters the most is how it is required.

If bank regulators require banks to hold more capital, but keep the current risk-weighting system, that just means that The Infallible will be even more favored than The Risky, and since that would only increase the regulatory distortions… the result could only be increased instability.

But, if regulators instead require banks to hold more capital by eliminating the ridicule low risk-weights assigned to The Infallible, then The Risky agents of the real economy, like small and medium businesses and entrepreneurs, will be less discriminated, and therefore the real economy would stand a better chance of recovering… resulting in greater stability.

Capital requirements for banks based on perceived risks… talk about faith in a flimsy theory

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Mon, 22 Apr 2013 21:42:00 +0000

Sir, Wolfgang Münchau writes about “The perils of putting one´s faith in a flimsy theory” in order to decry the not really proven possibility that as has been put forward by some, that 90 percent of public debt to gross domestic product would signify a threshold where more debt begins rapidly to negatively affect economic growth, April 22.

But if we are to talk about flimsy theories, and in which a lot of more faith has been invested, I would hold that the pillar of current bank regulations, namely that capital requirements which are much higher for what is perceived as “risky” than for what is perceived as “absolutely safe” could lead to increased financial stability, that one clearly takes the prize.

Again for the fifth consecutive year I questioned these distorting and odiously discriminating capital requirements during the IMF and World Bank meetings in Washington. Again, as always, I got no answer… for the regulators this is a sacrosanct principle that no one should dare to question... and actually they get upset if you do. Me a heretic!

FT, you urgently need to unclog your own thinking process.

noreply@blogger.com (Per Kurowski) — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 13:38:00 +0000

Sir you write “Fixing the banks needs prudential plumbing, not bluntly closing the monetary taps”, “Better plumbing, not closed taps” April 19. And that evidences to me you, as so many experts, are as far away from understanding what is happening as one can be.

The problem is that the whole plumbing of the financial system has been clogged up by capital requirements for banks which favor “The Infallible” and discriminate against “The Risky” and so money is not flowing where it should... but only dangerously overpopulating what are perceived as safe havens and which is where all big bank crises occur. Therefore what we need is less stupidly prudential plumbing before opening the monetary taps.

Perhaps reading a set of questions which I am circulating during the World Bank and IMF’s Spring Meetings in Washington, April 19-20, could help to unclog your own thinking process.