The 3 Back Option Football Spot

Clinic went well. Thanks to all

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Mon, 30 Jan 2012 12:44:00 +0000

The clinic went well in Fairfax Va. I'm only sorry I didn't have more time but for those that were there - thanks for coming. If you have any questions just post them on the message board.

Been busy with new school and moving (Try selling in this market!) so I haven't gotten to write lately. Don't worry, as soon as I get things in order I'll be back with a few articles.

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 22:02:00 +0000

Just was announced! I have taken the head coaching position at Holy Spirit in Absecon, NJ. (Yeah I know - there always seems to be a casino around me!)

I am excited as this is the first time I am not taking over a reclamation project as Holy Spirit has a long and titled football history

ALSO I WILL BE SPEAKING IN LANCASTER PA IN APRIL - MORE DETAILS TO FOLLOW

Finally, I have a couple of schools that I have signed on for consulting appearances already. Since I will be busy with my new position I will only be taking a couple of more. So if you are interested (I received numerous questions about it) get your requests in early.

Guidelines for adding special tags tags

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Fri, 06 Jan 2012 15:49:00 +0000

Anyone who has read this blog, heard me at a clinic, or just knows me, knows that the lifeblood of our offense are tags. Tags are individual calls for specific defenses that allow us to appear very complex and multiple while only having to practice certain schemes against certain defenses and have specific answers that are only practiced for specific problems. Our procedural method of getting in and out of tags allows for a fluidness and ease of execution that espouses confidence throughout the offense dispite the complexity and multidue of the looks.

Thee are three types of tags in our system:

system tags: these are built into our core concepts and are the way we execute the offense. It puts us in the perfect scheme for the concept we are going to run. It allows for "mixed rules" that would not hold up universally but allow the player to attack the right player with confidence due to the quarterback call. They are part of our core packages.
universal tags: these are tags that can be run vs. everything and all things. They allow the quarterback a "safety net" or an "out" if confused. They also allow us to run the lesser part of our offense using schemes that are not universally sound but combine with these - we have an instant "out" if a problem exist. They are taught from the inception of the original concept that needs them. They usually place us back into a core play. For example: if we get walkups we will check certain structurally stressed schemes back into our double options or rocket based on the flank.
Added or Special Tags: These are tags we add to plays to create a special look for an opponent. There are added to the base scheme and, therefore, substituted for a core or system tag vs. a certain look. (and only that look! the advantage of tag with practice time.)

For the sake of this article we will deal only with "added" or "special" tags.

Every offseason coaches get hundreds of ideas in their head. Multiple ways of attacking a defense. we all get the urge to add and add and add. Of all the programs I have consulted with, I would say that the biggest problem I see from these teams is the overuse of tags. They simply have too many and practice ones they are not using for that week. This gets away from the very idea of using tags to reduce your practice time while mutiplying and complicating your offense. REMEMBER: tags are taught by rote vs. one look therefore they can be implemented in a week (as long as there is carryover in techniques and recognition.)

What a tag should accomplish:
In order to add a tag, we feel it must accomplish one of the following:

Take advantage of an extreme defensive structure, designed to stop a particular play or answer you already have. As an example is our tag for a spot pass to the wide receiver on the backside. If a team insist on folding or fast folding there lbers to motion even in a soft three shell we will run the spot pass added to our midline lead play. (We run it off our midline lead because you need to get a hat on the five tech so he doesn't bat it down.) If we come out and see that look the QB will abandon the play (without the others knowing) and pick up the ball and throw it out to our wide receiver. If it's not there we just run the lead play. (we wouldn't even practice it vs. 50 team)
Allow us to run a play to a formation that would not make our base tags sound: We get very multiiple formationally at times. We want the defense to have to be option sound versus a large variety of options and still line up soundly vs. a great deal of formations, yet we want to be consistent with our quarterback recognition and our 3 back concepts taught. Sometimes, tags are necessary to keep all of these parameters sound. Let's look at if we expaned our #2 receiver to a twin set. We can run triple easily vs any 7 man front with no assignment changes. The detached receiver would still block #3. However, if he defense came out reduced we would now be in delemma as our qb would tell the inside receiver to seal backer to safety, something unsound from his alignment. We would simply tag it with a double option specifically set up for a reduced front where we would pitch off the 5 and the detached receiver would now block #2. (we also have a tag where we instruct the detached hb to return to his normal alignment if he is assigned to seal. We are now tagging a "shift.")
Force the defense to align soundly on every receiver even if it is an ineligible receiver. If you run bubble and quick screens vs everything it takes work and time. Time that you don't have when running the triple. For us these only take for when we have 2 on 1 fast break football. Take the above example. If we are playing a reduced front team, we might tag our double options with a bubble tag. If #2 didn't widen we check and hrow a 2 on one bubble. In splitends over we may check it with the quick screen. Many teams ignore #2 because he is ineligible but you still have 2 on 1 with both split ends and a corner. We would add the tag of a quick screen to the widest with #2 blocking the corner. (taught this way these are two easy and simple exlosive plays. We spend no more then 5 min. on all of them.
Change the structure of the defense to place the blockers where we want. This can be as simple as tagging the quarterback and receivers to count a player in the perimeter he may not normally count or telling the perimeter to block the defense in a manor to completely change the structure. In the former, picture a 3 deep 50 defense. The short side is a reduced look that we would normally veer and seal with the hb when running the triple. But if they are rerotating quickly the safety can outnumber you to the boundary. By tagging the play with an ALLEY call the quarterback knows to count the safety and tells the wr and hb to also by calling Alley. This places us back into a 50 loop scheme and accounts for the unwanted stranger (free safety) In the latter, if we want to seal the box with the HB (veer and still block a deep MLB) we might add the tag force blocking from ends over. If the requirements for force blocking exists (#3 softer the 4 yards) the quarterback will call force and treat the defense as a reduced front. (Due to the elimination of #3)
Keep you best athlete in the game: As an example, look at a reduced front and you have a great HB. Well if they force the give over and over again your best player never gets the ball. Sure you could run rocket but that's a whole other play. So we'll add a package to our triples with a double option tag for ony reduced fronts where we pitch off the five. We are not going to let you dictate who carries the ball - we will!
Change the defensive option assignments. We want the defense to think we will pitch (soundly) off anybody. We do not want them playing rote option responsibilities - we want them defending schemes where they are more liable to mental mistakes. Look at the reduced front. We just forced the 5 tech to play both fb and qb with the tackle veering. (we wrap the FB for the inside backer in our double option.) He has to decide who he has after the snap.
Taking away defensive mismatches: Look at the above double option tag. Let's say the defense was giving us the dive - not because of taking away our good HB but because they were flat better then us inside (Iowa did this to Georgia tech a couple of years ago as did LSU - all despite Dwyer the FB being Tech's best player. We'll this tag let us get outside and took away the disadvantage.
Take advantage of defensive repetition in defending the triple: Many times option teams get in trouble when defenses are allowed to get into a rythm against it. ("Dive, QB, Pitch....Dive, QB, Pitch...repeat until done.) This is why we vary formations and scheme so much. Another way we handle this is to use it to our advantage. Lets look at the reduced front that plays dive with the 5, LB scrape and SS on QB, and runs the Free to the pitch every time. (I've seen this from major colleges.) we might add a reduced front tag where we send the HB right to the safety and leverage pitch off the scrape lber knowing the outside lber is taking him. (thus the qb is "blocking" 2 people) Another might be a tag w use to a three tech where we single the three and put the tackle right up to the lber (4-3 and reduced) we could only do that if the defensive 5 tech was taking the fb every time. As soon as the qb saw a different look or maybe an echo stunt he would not check to the tag.

The above are reasons we add "tags" to our already established packages. The examples are not that important in themselves. They just serve as a "view" as to why the method is used. You could substitute any tag that fulfills the need.

Parameters of Tagging:
In order to be successful with tags 11parameters must be filled.

The recognition for the qb must stay as it is for your base offense. Whatever system you use the tags must fit in. This is the most important
Tags must have a specific reason to be run. Not the flavor of the month.
Tags must be able to be taught rote vs. one look PERIOD!
Tags must use already practiced techniques
Tags must not take more then 10-15% of your practice time
Your playcallig system must be condusive to tags as must your cadence
Your personnel must be able to execute the tag. What good is it to check into a double option that keeps your qb in the game if he runs a 5.4 40
nly one tag per problem. If I gave you a test awith 5 questions and then gave you the five answers, how much better would you do if I gave you 6 answers. NONE!
When putting in your tags - make them exciting as if yu have the answers to the test.
Tags should be designed for Big plays - not for 3 or 4 yard gains. Your base offense will take care of that.
Don't ever sacrifice yur base for tags because when your tags fail or they line up in something else - yur base keeps yuo going.

As you begin your offseason - I hope the idea of tags gets you thinking!!!

UPCOMING 2012 Speaking engagement

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Sun, 01 Jan 2012 18:43:00 +0000

UPCOMING CLINIC
"NIKE NO. VA / DC COACH OF THE YEAR CLINIC" @
the
Westfield Marriott Washington Dulles 14750 Conference Center Drive Chantilly, Virginia 20151 USA Phone: 1-703-818-0300 Toll-free: 1-800-635-5666
JAN 27th and 28th

I am speaking on
"Triple option football" on the 27th at 4 PM and will stay around for both days.

NOVA / DC NIKE
http://www.nikecoyfootball.com/dc-north-virginia.aspx

As more clinic appearances come up - I will post them here.

Packaging / reverse checking / and teaching conceptually

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Tue, 13 Dec 2011 13:52:00 +0000

So people who have heard me at clinics, read, my articles, or had me in for a private session understand I'm always talking about packages and concepts rather then plays. I thought I'd get a little into it here as my people have emailed me for a clarification.
(This will be more of an overview as time and space does not allow for detailed information. Hopefully, it will give someone regardless of his or her style of offense an idea or two.)

Teaching Conceptually

I have always believed in teaching conceptually. In giving the team / player an overview of what your trying to accomplish and how you're trying to accomplish it with each play or package. By doing this you expand your capabilities to expand the packages and allow the player / team the ability to work through unique grey areas that appear on the field.

(An example of this is a stack Lber behind the hand of key in the triple. Is he inside or outside? If you teach rote and are a pure recognition team then you have to treat him as one way only. By his alignment or movement that can hurt you. Additionally, if the tackle recognizes him differently then the quarterback is taught by rote there is a scheme problem. However, if you teach conceptually (we are reading one and optioning #2 and the quarterback will distribute the perimeter blockers accordingly, you are right regardless of where the tackle calls him. Plus you can make an easy adjustment by just telling the tackle or the quarterback to treat him as outside or inside, since the quarterback will apply the concept and distribute blockers according to the concept.)

In our triple system we teach a number of triple concepts within our offense. they may look and be taught as the following

42 - 48 read #1 Option #2; veer whenever possible; block all 4i's and become double option ("jersey" call)

41 - 49 read #1 Option #2; loop whenever possible; Never block a 4i (read your way out)

44 - 46 (loaded scheme) read #1 Option Support (#3 in Ace or 50; #2 in reduced) Veer whenever possible. Block a 4i (double option) except a 50

43 - 47 (load Scheme) read #1 / option Support (#3 in Ace or 50; #2 in reduced) Veer whenever possible. Block all 4i's and move option out Read #2 Option #3 (turns into outside veer on the run)

When a quarterback has these tools and he has already learned option theory (taught in the off season) he can easily come up with the right call in the package.

Packaging:

"Packaging" is simply taking these concepts, coming up with the proper scheme and giving them tags. It is the grouping together of similar or dissimilar blocking schemes to make a concept mechanically sound. It gives us a chance to never be in the wrong play and never be outnumbered on the option.
(Nothing ticks me off more then a play called that has no chance or one that relies on pure athletic ability. That, in my mind, is not coaching. It's not giving the players every chance at success.)

In the all our concepts, our quarterback is trained to recognize FLANKS as a 50, ACE (4-3), reduced front, and a six man side. (For option plays we do not recognize complete or internal parts of the fronts. Our line rules will take care of this.) All our checks are based the same perimeter recognition so once it's learned - that's it. No more.

For each of the concepts above, the quarterback will have a "tag" for each flank (6 man side is to check opposite) One might read as follows:

50 RED; ACE WHITE, REDUCED BLUE (all the terms are just made up for this example)

The tag places the team into the proper scheme.

Some people have said that this is difficult to teach. On the contrary. The recognition is universal so once it's taught - it's taught. The tags are rote. The quarterback must learn them as a times table but that's not hard. First a cheerleader could memorize these tags. Secondly, rote has been proven to be effort. If, your quarterback won't give you the effort - he shouldn't be the quarterback in this offense (really - you're going to out the ball in the hands of a player who won't memorize - think about it!)
Thirdly, our tags are grouped by structure (i.e. all fruit might be used vs. reduced fronts, etc.) Fourth, there is redundancy in the tags throughout our system. Also, since he has already been versed in option theories (i.e. numbers / sealing the box, etc.) he can figure out which tag goes with which defense.

External Tags

"External Tags" are tags added to adapt / add to the offense for a particular play. It allows us to expand our offense greatly without overburdening the team with great learning. Their emphasis and the emphasis of practice is and aways will remain on the base part of the offense.

An example of "external tagging" is our double options. Although we run double options to keep the ball in the hands of who we want, we do not overburden the offense with them. A double option we like against a reduced front is our "Vegas" call where we pitch off the 5 tech. It might be the only double we practice that week against a 4-2-5 team. So we'll tag it onto a triple. It might be called as "42 ck Vegas"

Since the quarterback knows that "Vegas" can only be used vs. a reduced front it would take the place of a "Blue" call in the above example of "red, white, and blue." If the defense surprises us, we by calls in the package, revert back to our base - something we have run since day one and have great confidence in.

By doing it this way, we can expand and contract our offense easily to handle potential problems. All "external tags" are taught to the team by rote. This can happen because we only run them vs. one defense.

Reverse Checking

Reverse checking is a method of helping the quarterback out and taking away the redundancy of repeating tags over and over again.

In reverse checking, the play is called in the huddle with the anticipated tag for the predicted defense. In the above example of "Red, White, and Blue," if we were playing a base 4-2-5 team then our huddle call would be "42 Blue" rather then just 42. The quarterback would then only use the other tags if the defense wasn't reduced. Otherwise the quarterback will give a non-sense check (something that doesn't mean anything) to tell the team to stay in the original call.

This method also clears up some grey areas. In the case we started with, if "blue" is called in the huddle, the quarterback knows that we want to consider that stacked linebacker inside unless he is clearly outside.

Practicing Reverse Checking

If you are going to reverse check, then you must make sure that the quarterback knows all the tags (and the team also) So, the first two weeks of practice he will call all the tags at the line of scrimmage. We will simply call 42 in the huddle and he must put us in the right play every time. This will go right through our scrimmages.

We will then start weening the QB off the no help system by every one out of three plays we will help and reverse tag (care must be given to make sure all of the tags are still practiced)

During the year, on Monday and Tuesday, he will call all the tags in our half line. (we cover every flank look in this) On Wednesday and Thursday we reverse tag. Care must be given in your scripts to make sure the quarterback has to check out. If you don't do that. He will get lazy AND the team will get lazy in their listening.

Conclusion:

I hoped this helped you. I really believe any system can use and benefit from checking and using tags regardless of your offensive style. As I stated before, there is no reason for your team to be in a bad play or scheme.

Hope you got something from it.

Rants from an idle coach #3

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Fri, 09 Dec 2011 20:11:00 +0000

Redundancy in play call- the good and the bad

Something to just get you thinking a little! Hopefully it does.
Just reading an article in another site about playcalling and the ability to run the triple time and time again,whereas other plays in the offense do not have that ability. I agree with the post but I think there is more of a reason then just what was written. There are certain plays that can be run time and time again but there one catch which we will get into in this article ans there are plays that cannot be run repetitiously because of certain demands. Which plays fit into what categories? We'll try to give you and easy method for figuring that out and also how each category should fit into the design of your offense regardless of what you run.

First of all, we divide all our plays into "rhythm" plays and "intrusion" plays. The "rhythm" platys are hose we talked about that you can run over and over again, such as the triple option that we talked about above. As a play caller you and your offense can get into a rhythm calling the play over and over again and only disruption or lack of execution stops it. An "intrusion" play is one that is designed to take advantage of a particular reaction or alignment to stop your rhythm plays.

(It is important to note that here we are talking about playing against sound teams that are equal or slightly better then you. For teams that align unsoundly or you have a great talent advantage - any play can become a rhythm play if it exploits those aspects.)

Rhythm plays

There are reasons that these plays are able to be redundant in a playcalling sequence.

They do not depend on defensive alignment. therefore they can be run against any "numbers equal defense"
They have a way in your offense of getting away from numbers disadvantages. For example, in our triple scheme, we will check opposite if the numbers are greater then we can run against. No play can be run if there are extra defenders. Great talent can be run against extra defenders but then it is not the play that was successful, it was the athlete who beat the extra defender by skill alone. (I have never had one of those so they are foreign to me.)
They read the defense at the point of attack, therefore they do not rely on a particular defensive reaction. (As an example I'll use the rocket - it is an "intrusive play because if the 5 tech is wide and runs up the field and out. He will destroy the play as it develops. As oppose to the triple where that becomes a give.)
Rhythm plays must attack across a broad front. That means they must make the defense play either assignment football or be gap sound. (A play that has limited entry points can be greatly outnumbered by defensive reaction after the snap.) This is not to say that you have to attack the whole field on a play but you have to have multiple entry points threatened.

Let's take a look at a "rhythm" play I consider so but many people do not - the traditional power. (trust me from playing defense I've seen it run over and over again.) First, it can be run against any defense. Only numbers will stop you from running it and with a sound system the quarterback can check "opposite" easily. As the play has developed, the running back is able to read the defense. He can hit it in the off-tackle hole, read the wrong arm and bounce it, and, with the way the double teams are run now and the tighter entry point, he can cut it back to the A or B gaps. Based on that it is a rhythm play.

The inside and outside zone and zone read schemes are examples of this also.

"Intrusion" plays

There are reasons these plays cannot be run over and over again. (we call them intrusion plays because they intrude on the defensive flow or alignment.)

Some are designed for an exact defensive alignment and cannot be run vs. everything. (Back when the 46 became big I know teams that had a complete package that was only checked to when the 46 - a unique alignment - appeared.
They are based on a particular defense reaction and counter that. The majority of time these plays are "counters" or "reaction" type plays based off the defensive reaction to the "rhythm" plays. The problem with running these plays on sequential downs is the rhythm of the defensive reaction is broken on the first play. (A good example of that was Georgia Tech vs. Georgia. After running the triple Tech countered with the counter dive and had success. However, they repeated this play a number of times with no luck. The reason - the last reaction of the defense was to the counter - a play that needed the defense to be reacting to the triple away.
They can be outnumbered after the snap without change of defensive alignment. Take the midline tuck play. Defenses have learned to fold players inside to outnumber the play. (Yes you can formation and that is exactly what we do. However, then it becomes formation restrictive.) The same is true of the Quarterback follow play - if you don't believe this just look at the Georgia Tech - Virginia Tech game. Short yardage became an exercise in frustration as numerous follows were outnumbered by a normal 4-3 alignment and a "universal" option stunt. (Of course I have an unfair advantage due to the fact that I'm critiquing after the fact. So any comment here should be no reflection on any playcalling. I'm sure there were reasons for this)
It has limited entry points. Take a look at the zone dive. With the fullback getting the handoff right behind the line of scrimmage - he is limited to a one gap cut. (A-B or even if it's behind the nose - for anybody who's run this knows that with the nose working down the line it is a one gap cut!)

What does this mean in playcalling:

First you must call you intrusive plays with care and in conjunction to the rhythm of the offense. you cannot make intrusive plays the basis of your playcalling. (except of course against a poorly coached unsound team or teams you totally dominate athletically.)
Don't be scared to repeat your "rhythm" plays. Too often we out coach ourselves. Unconfidence shows in thoughts of "I have to counter them here" or "My run pass ratio isn't good." Make the defense stop the base of the offense. If they can't - don't get "fancy play syndrome."
Limit your "intrusion" type plays in your gameplan. You probably won't get to use them. Too often we worry about what we'll get - when in realty we get what we saw on film. (I've been guilty of this.) To quote a famous general "Don't defend ghost!" This worry will only take away from practice time of your rhythm plays and their execution. It will also overload the players with stuff you will never use. If they do come up with a "bastard" or surprise look go back to your base rhythm plays - they should by definition not be defensive restrictive and you've been running it for multiple weeks against a team that has only practiced a junk defense for one week.
Don't be afraid to have a personality in your offense due to your rhythm plays. It may not be popular but the object is to win the game note get votes. I once had a reporter accuse me of being limited offensively because all I knew was one play - the triple. We were 5-0 at the time. Along the same point - it's interesting that in an age of spreads Alabama and LSU are power teams that hang their hats on the power O. I don't think Miles and Saban are interested in being called innovative.

What does this mean in practice organization:

The majority of your practice should be on your rhythm plays. At least 60% of that aspect (run or pass) Maybe more.
The "rhythm part of the offense must be universal and practiced as such. This allows you to run this aspect vs. everything. For example - we have limited the defensive looks to 4 to the tightend and 4 to the non-tightend for the triple. Every week we have a 40 min 1/2 line segment where we practice all 4 of our triples vs. all these looks. Even if we are not facing a 4-3 we will run it. By doing this - we pray that the defense changes for us! Our advantage. I believe that this is why offenses can't get in rhythm anymore. Like people say they've caught up with the power. Yet teams run it. (Ask LSU / Alabama / Stanford) It's the way your practice it. When those teams run it, they don't care what you're in except for numbers. They have practiced and taught it to handle all situations.)
I truly believe that rhythm plays - since that involve reaction to defensive movements must be practiced live at some place in the week.

What does this mean in designing an offense:

The base of your offense should be rhythm plays - 3-5 at most. (for us it's our 4 triple packages) Any more is unpracticable. Any less is limiting your offense greatly.
An offense based on Intrusion or unrelated plays is a smorgasbord and at the mercy of defensive alignment and reaction.
Your rhythm plays must have a system built in to check yourself out of number disadvantages. The only thing that can stop rhythm plays is breakdowns or number disadvantages. (interestingly, one of the best defensive coordinators in the ACC told me in confidence - you don't stop the triple - you slow it down and hope it gets off rhythm or the offense makes a mistake. Many times he said getting off rhythm was a result of the offensive running a complimentary play that was easier to stop!)
"Intrusive" plays must be simple in design and easy to install (see article on Payout vs. cost) In addition they must come off or be answers for your "rhythm" part of your offense.

The key is that "rhythm" plays and repetition is not limited to the triple teams. It's also with spread teams, power teams, zone teams and even passing teams. (I heard BYU under Lavell Edwards say they had 3 "universal passing concepts and they would run those over and over against any defense. And interesting many more gun plays fit the rhythm section due to the depth of the backs.)

I hope this just makes you think a little about your offense this offseason. It's completely theoretical but I think it has it's place in offensive design

Rants from an idle coach #2

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Thu, 17 Nov 2011 16:07:00 +0000

Meaningless end of year breakdowns

Nothing gets me to chuckle more then when a coach rattles off his end of year statistics with no caveats. They take all their games and lump all the stats together. They spout this play averaged this and that play averaged that. They had this % here and that percentage there. We led the league in this and we were last in the league in that. What gets lost in all of it is that it is an average. An accumulation of ALL your games - those against horrible opponents and those against the people you have to beat to win your league and district.

I remember when I first starting coaching listening to Woody Hayes talk about designing an offense. He talked about you start with your schedule and rank all your opponents from one to ten in terms of toughness to beat. Then you base your offense on beating the top 3 or 4 teams. That's it. Once you are done there you just make sure you're sound against everything else.

This logic really makes sense when you analyze it. If you can beat the 3 or 4 best teams on your schedule - you should have enough to beat the rest providing you're sound. (He did say that he also threw in the rivalary game as that usually meant somebody's job.) You shouldn't need any more.

Now let's take that to the statistics we talked about above. They should also be filtered in their use in analysis. Don't include your game with "Sister Mary's School for the Armless and Blind." Filter out your top three or 4 opponents and see what your stats we're against those teams only. If you average 50% conversion rate on 3rd and short for the year but only 20% against top competition - the 50% is a meaningless number and you better come up with some answers.

The same filters can be used in any aspect of football. I was just reading in "War Room" where Bill Bellichek thought that a key component to designing an offense to win the super bowl meant to design it to play in "playoff weather" in the Northeast. To analyze and tweak his system - he needed filter out his stats for games played in what he considered "playoff weather." Only then could he get a true meaning of the success of his offensive design.

So when yuo analyze your offense at the end of the year (or defense for that matter) or are listening to a coach espouse the statistical merits of going to his offense, take out the "give me's." You will get the same results vs. those weak schools regardless of what you run. The key is how you do / did vs. the games you must win.

Hope these rants make you think a little.

Running the rocket with downhill blocks Part III

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Thu, 10 Nov 2011 17:56:00 +0000

(Note: Images can be enlarged by clicking on them)

Okay - so let's take a look at how we blocked the rocket in order to get downhill blocks. In this article we'll talk about the perimeter (WR and HB) In part IV we'll talk about the interior blockers and show it against many of the traditional defenses flexbone teams face. In Part V we'll deal with formational and blocking variations. (I know that this is a little change from my original schedule but when I did part III it was a little longer then expected and I was forced to cut it up.)

Three concepts to understand with our blocking:
Concept #1
We are a man scheme that applies some zone principles on the run. By assigning a man and then applying zone principles (they only have the defender on one side - the outside) we can be more aggressive with and quicker to our blocks. We also don't have to spend a lot of time reading the "daisy chain" to the sideline of the run and reach concept. Additionally, the blocks are made with the shoulders up field allowing us to be more physical.

Concept#2
In a fifty or 4-3 defense (assuming the secondary is balanced) we will have three defenders outside the tackle for our two blockers (HB and wide receiver) so somebody will be unblocked. (see fig.1 and #2) With this in mind, we will allow the non-support player to go free. I know people hate to let people go but in this case there are a number of reasons the play works so well this way:

We are letting the player go who has the deep pass. We will throw the pitch pass on him if he gets nosey.
In many cases these are small corners who don't want to / can't make the tackle. In today's football world many of these are picked for their pass covering ability first.
Unlike when you do this in a traditional toss sweep or option (we do this to crack an alley running safety in the option game but with less success.) the play does not have to get to the edge - it's there now. When you run the option and set the non-support free, the defender has time as the ball comes down the line, it is pitched back and the halfback has to get his shoulders up field. Often the corner will make the tackle within 4-6 yards of the line of scrimmage with, because of pursuit, the back's shoulders not square restricting the cuts the the defender has to honor. The rocket however gets out there immediately and, because of the fact we try to create a pivot point on the defense (see below #4) with a leverage block, the back can turn up and square his shoulders almost immediately making the defender cover a large area and defending a two way go from depth.
We always try to create leverage with some sort of a downblock / crack. (see concept #3) This allows the back to to turn upfield in space (I guess this comes with the wing-t background)

Concept #3
We will always create a pivot point around the defense with a crack or leverage block where available. We do not want to outrun the defense to the side. We are already outside the defense - we want to get upfield and get yards.

Base Recognition:
To a wide receiver flank we must have somebody make a 2 or a 3 call to tell the blockers and the quarterback if we are going to leave somebody free. It also tells the halfback if the crack affects his blocking and alerts the quarterback if he may have to check opposite. We use code words and let the quarterback make the call using his option count system. However, I've seen coaches let their halfbacks make the count call

Base Rule:

Playside Halfback: I block # 2 (option count) Aim 3-4 yards outside and attack. I do not have any hard inside moves. If I get a 2 count call and the wide receiver says he can crack I will exchange assignments

Wide Receiver: I have the support player. If he is not blockable - signal in and block non-support. (Yes that is the corner in 2 deep and he has to read leverage as to who supports but it will happen very quickly.)

Quarterback: With a 3 count and the wide receiver signaling he can't block the support player - check opposite.

System mechanics

First: Wide Receiver signals if he can block support and quarterback give count

2 count - wide receiver's signal affects halfback and means nothing to the quarterback

3 count - wide receiver signal affects quarterback as far as flank is concerned

Okay, lets take a look at a couple of examples. (Then we'll talk about the halfback's technique)

1. 4-3 level coverage - a 3 count. The HB has number 2 and the wide receiver will block force. We will leave the corner go (fig.3)

2. The same is true vs. a 5-2 with level coverage. Again a 3 count. we will let the corner go. (fig.4)

3. In a 4-4 or reduced front the count is now 2. If the WR can crack #2 the halfback will arc on #3 (Note: This is not a traditional drop step arc but should get up field as fast as possible off the hip of the Wide Receiver as the halfback is turning up also. (Fig.5)

4. The same 4-4 and the WR can't crack the halfback and wide receiver will block their man by rule (fig.6)

5. Let's look at a 5-2 with 3 deep. If the strong safety could be cracked we will let the halfback go (we can also check away from numbers by a tag but we want to control where we run and we like the wide side.) (Fig.7)

6. In the same scenario as 5 but the strong safety is too tight to crack. Now with the 3 count and the "I can't crack" signal the qb knows to check "opposite" (When there is a 3 count you will and you cannot crack you will always have a reduced front backside. With the SS that tight they cannot rotate back out of it in time. (Fig. 8)

(In Part IV I'll also deal with 2 deep)

Halfback's technique on #2.

When are halfback is assigned #2 we do not want him turning his shoulders and going lateral to the line of scrimmage. Instead we borrowed something from my jet sweep days. We tell him to attack a spot 2-3 yards outside #2, keeping his shoulders as square as possible to the line of scrimmage. As the defender moves he keeps on a course for 2 yards outside of #2. By doing this we feel we have three advantages over the lateral run and reach technique. We also tell the halfback that he doesn't have any hard inside move. We let that go as we don't have to block anything C-gap or in. Basically he is beating the defender to a spot.

We can be physical and not get knocked back. Blocking is always easier going north south and with the ability to let the c-gap move go we can be extra aggressive.
We get on the block quicker. With the ball already outside the block you only need to tie up the defender for an instant. Many times the halfback will just get headup on a running defender but with the ball outside already that is enough to give us a great advantage.
By having a man assignment there is a sureness in his execution and by giving him zone concepts of not having the inside move he can work levels and has a better chance of cutting off the alley runners (Linebacker and free safety.) If you break down your film you'll see these usually make the tackle on a stretched out rocket.

(Note: If I was able to cut I'd still do it the same way as you must get your shoulders square when cutting. It's easier and more jolting to cut going forward with your shoulders square. Additionally, as I mentioned above - if you only got the back leg of this technique but got it quick enough and, going upfield, forceful enough - with where the pitch is caught you already have speed in space.)

As added safety catch, anytime the defender is on the line and too far for the halfback to reach - he will make a "HOT" call. This usually happens in a eight man front. The quarterback knows that any hot calls are automatic checks to our midline double lead. (He will first look to check opposite if that's any better.) With #2 on the line and wide there is no way for the defense to outnumber the midline. You have a hat for a hat. (Figure 9) This is a call the halfback can make on any of our plays where he arc's or leverages #2 and the quarterback's checks are consistent.

PART IV will focus on 2 deep (including the inside corners that are commonly displayed nowadays.) and the guard and tackle assignment and techniques.

Rants from an IDLE Coach #1

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Tue, 08 Nov 2011 02:48:00 +0000

With time on my hands from being out of work, it has allowed me a lot of time for thinking, introspection (Both personal and professional), analyzation, and reminiscing. Professionally, you get to really analyze what you do and why you do it. You also get to go back and relate what you do to the lessons you've learned. With that I've decided to add a new feature - "Rants from an idle coach." In it I'll take 1 or 2 points - maybe a lesson I learned a long time ago, an analysis of something I see, or just some thoughts on the profession. For you that are here strictly for the technical aspect - don't worry - these will just be fill ins. (Part III of the rocket article will be coming next.)

Rant #1
A lesson learned:

It's not unsound if you can't exploit it!

How many times do you look at a film or see a defense or even face one that the first thought to come to your mind is "That's not sound!" Maybe it doesn't have gap integrity vs. the run. Maybe it doesn't keep contain vs. dropback. Maybe it just can't line up to certain formations.

But is it unsound or is it just a "tilted" perspective?

Like you I use to complain vehemently. It was common to hear me say "I can't believe they played me like that. It was totally unsound. And they beat me!" In my desire to fit everything neatly into a nice "fundamental" view of football - I just couldn't believe that people could play me in and beat me with these bastardized defenses. It was also a way to justify what I was doing.

What I was really doing by putting the blame on the opposing coaches ineptitude was taking away my ability to see the real problem: my offenses lack of an answer or the ability to get to that answer and I also took away a chance to make our offense better. Basically, I was justifying my own ineptitude.

That all changed with a post game conversation with Tony DeMeo. As we usually did , Tony and myself would have these conversations often after games. One day, the conversation about unsound defenses came up and Tony made the statement "It's not unsound if you can't exploit it." Light bulbs went off. I had it all wrong. What I was pointing as the culprit for failure was not the reason at all. The reason was my offense was incomplete. All the defense was doing was stopping my offense. If I couldn't take the "unsoundness of the defense" and use it to my advantage - it wasn't unsound.

Lets give a couple of examples:

First look at the bastardized pass rush defenses of Rex Ryan. The infamous third down defenses where he puts 7 on one side and 4 on the other creating a supreme overload. Are these defenses gap sound - absolutely not but if NFL teams pass 100% of time on third and long - then they're sound. It's the offense that's unsound for not exploiting this.

If you look at Indianapolis a couple of years ago they ran every time they saw these defenses making them unsound, gashing them, and in essence making them all but disappear.

In a second example, lets take an extreme that would never come up but will illustrate this concept. Let's say the defense puts all 11 players on one side of the formation (again this is unpractical but just used for an example.) but your offense could only run the ball to that side - who's unsound. By structure the defense but not in this scenario. The object of defense is to stop the offense. There are no style points for following a preset pattern and looking sound. In this case the defense stopped what the offense did.

So how do we use this? First of all if you face a defensive structure that you cannot exploit it should send bells and whistles off that you need to tweak your offense. The key here is that you have to be able to get to it when they're in it and not a play late. If they lined up in that extreme defense and the next play you ran a play to exploit it you are basically a play behind. (Think about the 7/4 Rex Ryan defense and the offense decides to run the ball on the next 3rd and long only to find the defense has aligned conventionally.)

So not only do you have to have the plays to attack the weakness (Or as Woody Hayes said "attack across a broad front.") but you have a method of recognition to find the weakness and a packaging / audible system to get you into the right play at the right time.

(To further illustrate this think about the 46 defense in its popularity. It certainly had many flaws but was a bitch against certain things. The teams that had the most success and eventually drove the 46 out as a "Main line" defense were those that ran a small handful of plays against it, recognized it, and checked when it appeared. They made the 46 "unsound."

In the 90's, vs. Florida state UVA did this by checking into speed option on a Thursday night game every time they saw the 46. They scored 2 TDS on long runs vs.the 46 which FSU had crushed people with up to that point. I remember the announcer saying "There something unsound about the way FSU is playing that defense." UVA is what made it unsound.)

Hopefully, this gets you to thinking a little bit about the way you do things.

Next up Part III of the Rocket series

Running The Rocket with "Downhill" Blocks - Part II

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Wed, 02 Nov 2011 16:31:00 +0000

In part I of this series we discussed the parameters we used as our blocking scheme developed for the rocket in relationship to the "traditional" "run and reach" blocking of the rocket sweep. (See figures 1, 2 and 3) Every scheme has flaws - every system has holes. This does not make it bad - on the contrary, Navy and Georgia Tech have thrived in this scheme. But as any good coach should we want to keep evolving and trying to find answers.

When analyzing schemes we always feel it's important to look at a couple of questions

Numbers - will a blocker be left unblocked and who?
Leverage - do we have an advantage to does the defense have a advantage before the start of the play
Personnel - who are we asking to make a block vs. a defender and what is the skill set we asking our player to perform? Does it fit his base job description.
Timing - does the entry point of the back time up with the blocks made so as to maximize the efficiency of the block both in duration (least amount of time held) and in scoop. (Does the block have to be at a specific point or does the back have a chance to "option" run off of him.
How does the scheme enhance our offense in terms of sequentiality (in scheme along with backfield series.), techniques, and overall efficiency? (does the scheme give US the best answer of are we just using it because other people use it as their answer?)
How does the scheme fit in as to where we are in as far as rules (in high school you can't cut, the hashes are different, etc.) practice time, personnel (sometimes a great scheme answer is not an answer for you because of your given personnel (at Langley we did not run the rocket because of the type of halfbacks we had.) and learnability and carryover.

When the base system is run against a reduced front (that is 2 guys outside the tackle - see 4-4 above) the numbers are natural. That simply means that you can get a hat on a hat.(WR on Corner, HB on SS / OLB, Tackle on DE or inside backer) Given the additionally fact that the ball was pitched outside the tackle meant the offensive tackle would only have to slightly tie up a running 5 tackle. If the tackle was able to get around the end and to the inside backer that was a bonus that just enhances the efficiency of the play. The play against the reduced front was basically a "downhill" play with a fairly positive payout.

After years of film analysis of this play, only negatives we felt to the scheme were the flat reach by the halfback and tackle and the fact that there was no other play in our offense where the tackle pulled flat taking away any conflicts from the defense. The reach scheme,essentially, gives the defense time to catch up - stretching the play further to the sideline where the defense may have time to catch up or you may run out of real estate. You are even bringing the C-gap out to the play, a defenderthat by the play's design you didn't have to block in the first place. (A real problem if forced to run the play into the boundary in high school - i.e. free safety over to the field.) Additionally, pulling to the sideline mismatched our halfbacks and tackles vs. physical blockers who kept themselves gap sound and knocked our undermanned players back. (If we could have cut in high school the problem would have been eliminated. Look at Navy and Georgia tech tapes and you see the offensive player barely getting into the legs of these two players but that's enough to get gain leverage to the outside quickly due to the wide pitch.)
The biggest problems from this scheme come against the 50 and the 4-3 look and this is what forced us to diverge from the norm. If you look at figure 2 and 3 above, the first thing you notice is that there are 3 people aligned with defensive leverage on the slot. (the SS / OLB / and Corner with just the slot and wide receiver to block them.) This means that you have 3 defenders equal to or wider then the point (Outside leg of the slot) that the carrier receives the ball. Somebody from the interior has to make these blocks. It certainly does not put the blocker in an advantageous situation especially given the entry levy or the back (He receives the ball a full man outside the tackle already running full speed!) and the aim of the play (to circle the defense.) This is totally different then asking a halfback to tuck inside the kick out of a sweep or to be almost directly behind an arc block with an option to make a two way cut. In this scenario, in order to match numbers, two interior blockers (guard and tackle) will have to block a player with a full man (and sometimes more) head start on him. (see fig 4a and b below) Certainly these blocks are considered uphill but add to the fact that you cannot cut in high school and you are asking you tackle to block a skill player in a race and in space (OLB) the advantage fails clearly to the defense. (Once again, in studying many years of college cutups of this play, you see these players nipping at the heels of the defender just barely bidding time for the halfback to outrun the defense. You also notice that against these defenses there are just as many zero yard plays as there are great gains.) Against the 5-2 the problem is even more pronounced with the tackle trying to catch up to and hook an OLB ON the line of scrimmage.

(I know you can change formations to change numbers but for this section we'll deal strictly with 2 x 2 formations. In section IV we'll deal with formation variations.)

Additionally, if the defense was sound and kept its gap integrity with the OLB in D and DE in C etc. you end up with nobody on the support player. The very player the defense places the responsibility of stopping this play. (Fig 5) Usually a strong safety that is placed in that position to make tackles and support the run in the first places

The play also featured the pulling tackle again, making it readable to defenses.

One additional note that made us evolve away from this scheme was the inability to veer block or place the 5 technique in a bind. (We always felt that this would cause hesitation and either open up the fullback in our triple or shorten the flank on the rocket.) If you veer schemed this vs. a seven man front it was virtually impossible to match numbers since the guard would now have to block the OLB giving him a two man advantage and starting the guard in poor relative position to block in front of the halfback. (fig 6)

Three thing that this play did accomplish were that it 1) slowed down option stunts between #1 and #2, 2) give the offense a way to run away from garbage inside now in an instant, and 3) gets the ball in a good halfback's hands in space when option defenses wouldn't allow that. These positives we wanted to keep. We also didn't want to teach zone blocking which would require more practice time. (If you read my last thread on cost vs. rewards, you would release that any play that involves the reading of defensive reactions requires more practice time.)

In part III we will discuss what scheme we evolved into, how this has helped us, and how it has even simplified the practice and learning of this play.

Running the Rocket with Downhill" blocks. Part I

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Sat, 29 Oct 2011 17:41:00 +0000

Over the last couple of years the "rocket" sweep (or toss play) has gained in huge popularity with both flexbone and wing-t teams. It has given the offense a method to get to the outside quickly with low cost both in practice time and number of defenders needed to be blocker.

Basically, most teams block the rocket as below (fig 1, 2, and 3) with the line and slot basically running and reaching, in essence blocking the 1st thing that shows or crosses their face on their way through the alley.

Recently we have seen more veer blocking with the tackle and the guard now picking up the tackle's assignment as he pulls around (Fig 4 and 5) This was to make the 5 technique close as he would with veer triple and thus creating some "indecision" in the defensive player's assignment. (Dual conflict for all the wing-t people out there.)

Since I first learned the play in the early 2000's from VMI (The origin of this play and when it started is greatly contested but for the appearance and meaning of this article - who cares!) we have always blocked it a little different. In order to show you how and why we block it this way - we'll take it in parts . First we'll take a look at the thought process behind our scheme (Part I - here), then we'll look at the way the academies are blocking the play and why we didn't think that fit our needs (Part II), next we'll look at our blocking system for the rocket (Part III), and, finally, our formation adjustments (Part IV) Although a little lengthy, I hope it will give you enough insight to help you run the rocket if you haven't before or add to your success if you have or just make you think of why you do what you do.

It should be said here that we are not saying our scheme is better then any others. There is a reason why Georgia Tech and Navy block it as they do and part of that success is due to the ability to cut on the perimeter and the difference in college and high school hashes. The point is just to give you another idea of "how to skin a cat!"

Our Rocket blocking scheme has been based on the following principles:

You did not have to block the C-gap player. If left to his gap assignment he could not make the tackle on the halfback since the toss was to be caught be the playside slot of even wider.
In a traditional 50 or 4-3 look and using our base formations, there was always going to be one player you could not block. (This was important to me when I later studied other teams and schemes running the play. Even with the schemes above, except for poorly played defenses - you come up short by defensive reaction.) Funny thing is an answer to this became the tightend flank not employed by the schools above. (We'll show that one later.)
From the center back (including the fullback) was completely negligible in having a big effect on the play and you could do anything you wanted with them. (we have at times had them block a complimentary play run to their side with no loss t the play.)
The key points for the carrying halfback were that he had to catch the pitch going full speed and be on the outside leg of the playside slot when receiving it. he also had to be running flat and not gaining depth. (These are the points that I think most offenses fail, regardless of their scheme - I've seen nobody blocked and this play gain yards because of the huge space where it is caught vs. lack of defenders - most coaches because of fear of the long pitch either run the motion too slow or catch it too early and allow for interior players to catch up to the play.)
The play is best run when you can set an edge to the defense. That simply means that if you can create a pivot point where the defensive pursuit is separated from the perimeter it creates greater space for a halfback running full speed to operate in and places less defenders in that area: speed in space. A pivot point can be created in three ways - a leverage block, a block that quickly gains leverage with no responsibility of the blocker to movement away from the leverage, or movement of a defender going in the opposite direction of the play (i.e. veer blocking with the play going outside. (This is probably the biggest difference in what we wanted to do vs. the above schemes.) This was called having "downhill" blocks or blocks with an offensive advantage.
Since this was a complimentary play - we wanted the rules to be definitive and have the ability to carry across the use of formations including the use of a tightend. Simply speaking (For those who read my article on cost) we wanted to keep the cost of the play down including it's learning curve.
In keeping with a downhill play - if we had to leave somebody free - that player would be the farthest player from the ball, who had a dual responsibility, if possible a cover guy who had to tackle in space.
Wherever possible, we wanted to tie it in with our veer blocking scheme in hopes of helping our triple out but opening up the fullback some (5 tech hesitates to see play.) and getting a clean release for our tackle (teams widening the 5 tech in order to help on the rocket).
Finally, we felt it had to be a man scheme so it did not talk any additional practice time then team. (Cost vs. use again)

Before we get to our scheme, I think it's important to analyze the run and reach scheme so as to see the difference and how it didn't fit into our needs. This will be coming next week in part II.

Back from the depths - FINALLY

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Fri, 21 Oct 2011 16:10:00 +0000

Well, I 've finally got back to posting. I should be up a little more regularly now. Hopefully the next article will be soon and will be technical in nature.

As most of you know I was fuoughed in a massive teacher layoff in PA. (riffed to some.)
(I succumbed to giving up security to the promise of administrators hunting a coach! Go ahead and say it "So you believed that!!" LOL Funny thing is I blame nobody. I made the decision to go there.)

Anyway, I needed to take some time off to figure out what I was going to do - guess what the answer hasn't changed - COACH FOOTBALL! So if any of you hear of any open head jobs in high school or college assistant jobs please let me know. If right I will move. (Yeah, I know - so you're going to trust administrators AGAIN!" But if we give up trust totally, why be in this profession.)

It is amazing what you think about when unemployed. But a little introspection is good. I hope to write some of those thoughts in future articles.

Enjoy the new article below. I hope to hear from you as you are my connection to my true bliss - coaching football!

Payout vs. cost - is a new concet / pay / answer worth adding

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Fri, 21 Oct 2011 15:59:00 +0000

Many of us have fallen prey to it. Many have given in to it's temptations. There is always that big reward - that payday out there if we just add one more play - one more concept - have one more answer.

Whether it is the flavor of the month learned in the off season, a frantic answer to a struggling offense, or just an urge to keep from the boredom of the regular season drudgery of practice, we've all added that one play, concept, or package that we hope can get us over the hump and make us an elite offense.

Done in the right context there is nothing wrong with it - and that context is the weighing of cost vs. reward. How much is it going to cost in practice time, learning curve, disruption, and addition answers vs. the impact on the offense in terms of usage and results. We are all on limited resources (practice time, number of game run plays, meeting time, learning and retaining ability of of our players, and our knowledge.) Any addition that that further divides these resources takes them away from practice and the execution of the other aspects of our offenses / time / mind. This is the basic law of compensation (with apologies to Emerson) For everything you add - you take something away.

So how then can a coach add and expand his system without a great cost and how can one weigh this cost to balance this out. There are some basic rules to keep in mind:

(Although most of these rules seam common sense, they are often overlooked and many times the addition becomes a substraction.)

Plays that have moving parts have a higher cost therefore must be a bigger part of your offense to install then the actual % of practice time. This means plays with pulling linemen or timing up motion. Because of the timing of these plays (phasing up guards with backs so as to have the entry of he backs time up with the blocks.) and the idiosyncrasies of there techniques (i.e. Teaching a guard to read on the run.) these plays cost more in reps and practice time. They also have a hidden cost in that they take longer to perfect and thus longer before they payout in the offense. Plays of this nature should only be a part of the base offense and not added "on the run" Additionally, their use in sheer volume must quantify their cost.
Plays that use techniques previously taught have a lower cost and vice versa. If one has no trapping plays in his offense but decides to add a trap, the cost escalates because of the time it takes to teach the new individual skill of trapping. The cost is not only the reps of practicing the trap but the time to teach it (usually longer then the time to rep it) and the cost of the learning curve (the play will not look as good early with new techniques and the burden of learning a new technique on the individual will take away from the execution of others and his confidence in that execution.) Conversely, if techniques already taught are used then there is a shorter learning curve and less tax on the player (an example of this would be a zone team that wants to run a new play using the same zone blocking. This has a lesser cost to the offense.)

          Along the same thought, new line techniques are much most costly then new skill techniques.
          A wrong initial step by a back or being a yard off on a pattern, while undesirable, will still           leave the play with a chance of success. while, the same mistake in lineplay will sabotage of
          play because of the immediacy of action. Thus if putting in a play / concept / answer that will
          have minimal payout (use) one should stick to variations in the backfield actions or patterns .
          and keep the line play consistent

3. What is the cost of the play vs. practice execution and organization. This is something

many coaches don't look at but this is big when deciding to add something. Not only do certain

          concepts / plays take away practice time from others but some change the landscape of
          practice. For example,the years we ran trap option and down option, we need a segment for
          just our guards and backs to phase up and allow for the reads of the guards with the backs. Not
          only is there a learning curve for the play and the practice reps taken away from other plays but
          there is a learning curve in how to practice it. There is an early period where the object of these
          segments are to teach the players how to run the drill. Plays and concepts like this should only
          be added if part of the base offense andstarted from day one.

     4. Plays that can be learned rote, run vs. a specific defense only, and packaged with
         established concepts are the easiest to put in in short amount of time. This simply means
         that if you put in an answer for a given week the easiest and simplest way to do it is by rote vs.
         one defense. It's basically: you have him and you have him. However, to do that you must be
         able to package it with your base plays (already perfected - hopefully!!!) so that if your
         opponent tries to change on you, you can get the players into a successful situation.

         An example of this is our double option vs. the 4-4 to get the ball outside. It is our "Vegas" tag.
         It only works vs a reduced front. So rather then putting in a bunch of if's and end's in our rules
         to cover any possible defenses that can seen, we only put it in vs. a 4-4 and tag it (Our actual
         call would 142 check Vegas.) If we saw the 4-4 we would run Vegas. If we saw anything else
         we would revert back. to our base triple which we had practiced vs. everything since day 1.

         In order for one to do this, we must have a check system in place that facilitates this method
         and the techniques used should be already taught. If a new recognition or audible system is
         installed or if the concept is totally foreign to the offense the cost gets higher and can actually
         bankrupt the execution of an offense.

     5, The cost in practice or meeting time should be relative to its use in the offense and / or its
         its production in the offense. This simply means that if you spend 65% of the time practicing triple
         techniques and plays - you better be running the triple close to 65% of the time or better, or in your
         final stats the triple should constitute around 65% of your productivity. When figuring this out it should
         be for over the year and not for any particular game as time left / score / defense faced / and matchups
         all have a bearing on play calling. Additionally, a group of plays with similar use or techniques may be
         grouped to give you a certain %. For example our "axillary plays" constitute 5 -10% of our practice
         time. Therefore, they should as a group add up to 5 - 10% of the total use. (we would not run an end-
         around 10% of the time.)

        How many people actually checked their % of practice time used vs. % of usage in game and / or
        productivity. I have and I will tell you I am always amazed at time I wasted on stuff I never really used.
        (Note: when tallying the time cost of anything other then base offense, techniques that are used for the
        base are not recounted in time used for any other as there is no additional expedenture. (another
        reason to use plays or concepts when adding that have a carryover.) Remember also that you are
        measuring in an either / or scenario. Some plays are used less then their allotted practice time but are
        bigger yields in yards per play. (The reverse mentioned above.) That is also fine as it meets the %

        of productivity if not the % of practice time cost. Remember it's cost vs. reward - not just one or the
        other.

    6. Plays that involves reading are more costly then plays that do not and plays that involve two
        people reading on the same page are the costliest. This is a simple idea to understand. If you are
        adding to your offense during the year, don't make it plays that involve reads. And if it must, keep the
        number of people involved in reading to a minimum. That is why, if we have to come up with an
        answer, we try to do it by adding a non-option play or one that is a simple read that we have already
        practiced and installed. Adding concepts like run and shoot ideas, where both receiver and
        quarterback must be on the same page are extremely costly in that their learning curve is broad and the
        practice time one must use to perfect these ideas will bankrupt any already established offense.
        Additionally, these take time to perfect and thus they aren't going to produce early so their cost vs.
        reward will be greatly reduced by poor early returns.

    7. Plays that get the ball into your best people's hands have a higher production to cost ratio.
        If you must add a play, then give the ball to your best player. It's a easy formula, he will produce
        greater numbers thus boosting the cost to productivity average.

        Here's an example. In my early years, I felt we weren't running enough misdirection to hold the
        backside linebacker on triple. In previous years, we had run the counter Iso to our halfbacks. In
        the middle of the year, we put in counter iso again. This time, though, we put in QB counter Iso
        as he was the best player on the field. I could have put the normal counter Iso in to our halfbacks
        and it probably would have been good for us. (For this example's sake, let's say it would have
        averaged 5 yards per carry.) However, putting it in to the QB gave us a bigger average (almost
        11 yards that year.) thus giving us a greater production vs. cost ratio. (The cost was the same for
        both ways.)

    8. Putting in answers that don't fit your players ability reduce the cost / productivity ratio
        I love the counter option. I think it has a great place in our offense. However, with the triple as our
        main concept, we place our best drive blockers at the guard position's. At Langley, my two guards
        were Andrews Bernard at 6'4" 305 and MikeMilkin at 6'1" 330. Both were as good as drive
        blockers as I've had in my 33 years. However, when on the run or in open space, they didn't work as
        efficiently. I could have ran counter option with some degree of success but by coming up with other
        answers for the questions that that the counter option took care of, and using their drive blocking as the
        focal point we got greater productivity. We would have had a positive cost to productivity / use ratio
        with the counter option, however, we maximized it by going to a different method.

       The key principle here for numbers 7 and 8 are when running a conceptual offense such as
       flexbone, you are married to the concept and not the particular plays. Just because G Tech
      runs the counter trap option doesn't mean you won't be a triple option team if you don't. There
      are more ways to skin a cat. As long as you have the answers for the problems or are adding
      them, it doesn't matter how you do it. Oklahoma for years didn't run the counter trap option.
      Neither did Army. Both were triple option teams that had success. They fit the concepts and their
      answers around their people's talent. (How many times did Oklahoma run loaded option as an
      answer to a hard force rather then check away. When you have Thomas Lott, J.C. Watts and the
      bunch - that was a better answer.)

    9. Big or Key concepts should only be added in the off-season and installed in the preseason.
        Simply stated if you have to add a "big" new concept or a totally new concept, you probably
        didn't do your homework in the off-season. These are too costly and not only will give you a
       poor bang for your buck (due to their early deficit in the learning curve) but putting them in
       during the season will have additional cost on your already established offense in diminished
       practice time, change in practice methods and, probably not thought of enough, the confidence
      of the team. Many times kids will question why we need such a big change and also, the failure
      during the learning curve will deteriorate that which has been previously taught and mastered.
      Napoleon Bonaparte said "Morale is to the physical as 3 is to 1. Keep your players confident but
      not adding major concepts with steep learning curves.

Although these are relatively basic and pretty universal, (Mostly common sense), around this time of year, I get a lot of inquiries about adding plays or what people need to do to attack a certain defense or solve problems they encountered. The problem is really bigger then just tweaking. Many times the problem lies in the work that is done in the off-season. Most problems can be foreseen and the design of most systems, if competent, should have these answers built in. The real cost lies in the fact that many times coaches accept "cookie cutter" predesigned systems only to find they now need additional answers. Other coaches have a collection of plays and not a system which tends to grow every time a new idea is found or situation is encountered. Finally, some take their system as is from year to year, never analyzing it in the off season as to problems they had or personnel they have coming up. They hung their hat on past success only to find the little cracks in the foundation have been spreading.

Finally (and a pet peave of mine), if a system is truly a system it will cover all of these problems. Sometimes that answer comes in the form of a systems ability to add or subtract easily to fit its needs and its situations.

Although abstract and a little off the beaten path, I hope these ideas make you think the next time you want to add something regardless of the answers.
(next up - perimeter blocking the "rocket sweep" - a lil different way.

- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad

Location:Yardley, Pa

new email address

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Tue, 02 Aug 2011 17:44:00 +0000

I am currently in the process of switching cable companies. All contacts should be made to Coach_john@msn.com

Please do not send to the verizon account anymore

Thank you

Reprint of quarterback manual available

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Fri, 22 Jul 2011 17:19:00 +0000

I've just sent the quarterback manual out for reprint if anybody is inerested. The flyer is attached link

I know some people contacted me before but I did not have any copies at that time nor did I know if I was going to reprint it. For those people - please resent your request.

QB manual update

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Tue, 05 Jul 2011 16:45:00 +0000

Over the last 3 months I've had a couple of request for the QB manual. Although I am currently sold out, I do expect to have a new batch done very soon. Sorry for the delay.

Also a new article should be up within a week!

Too simple may really be too complex; complex may be actually simpler

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Wed, 01 Jun 2011 14:49:00 +0000

In keeping with the pattern of following a technical article with an abstract, I decided to write about a pet peeve of mine in coaching - the craving toward simplicity. We all hear it in the "coach speak" whether at clinics, listening to tv, or just in conversation with other coaches. Phrases like "it's not rocket science," "our number one goal is to keep it simple," "our goal is to make it easy on the athletes' learning," etc. Then there's the coaching axiom that I've heard more then the coke jingle, "Keep It Simple Stupid," commonly referred to with the anagram K.I.S.S. While I have no problem with these sayings and their meaning in "context." It is the application of these principals that I think many coaches miss. It is the term "simplicity" that gets tangled in the translation.

If simplicity for simplicity sake was the answer, then given that opponents athletes are relative to the level you are on, the pros should be lining up in the power I and running simple, vanilla power off tackle and isolation plays. So with that regard we know that just plain simplicity isn't an answer within itself.

The real question is what is considered simple and what is considered complex. And what makes something simple to learn, yet, broad enough to beat a variety of opponents. We've all been in a lecture where one person ones comes out saying "that made my head hurt" and other, who heard the exact same lecturer says "really, I found him quit easy and understandable." So there seems to be a personal perception involved with the term simplicity. To twist a phrase, simplicity seems to lie in the "eyes of the beholder." Certainly, current education on the topic (familiarity), the way it was presented and by who (source), and the individual learning it (is he a rote, conceptual, etc. learner?) all have a factor. But probably the most important aspect is perception.

We will take a look at all these aspects in regards to teaching football but first why is it important to define this to me:

1. It is our job as coaches to place the players in a situation they have a chance for success. All decisions in life are based on ultimate objectives. If you're #1 objective is to keep it simple then that is what you'll get - simplicity. Winning will become secondary to that. You're goal as a coach should be to give the players a chance to win. That may take outcoaching the opponent. But if you're ultimate objective was to be simple that may no longer be possible. Showing my age, I once heard Woody Hayes say that you build an offense to beat the top three teams on your schedule. He mentioned nothing about simplicity.

2. These terms themselves belittle the coaching profession. When a school hires a calculus teacher - it does not hire him to teach simple math. It hires him to teach the complex and make it seem simple. (we will return to this concept later as therein lies the key to simplicity.) As the football coach, you are the top level of the subject in your school and, like the calculus teacher, you were hired to teach the complex yet make it seem simple. If they just wanted simple they could go to the local little leagues. (no disrespect to little league coaches. Just comparing levels)

3. The simpler the structure, the more emphasis on athletes and the less on coaching. If everybody is as simple as possible then the winning falls with the ability of the athletes and away from coaching. Unfortunately, every game has one team with the better athletes. By this theory, the game has a better chance of being decided prior to the start. (this is also a result of espn) if this theory is working for you now, all the power to you but, remember, there will be a time or game when you has the lesser athletes.

4. The problem with some coaches and the kiss theory is it all goes to justify their lack of ability or effort to establish a concrete system that although complex to the outside is simple to teach and learn. Coach's use these terms as a escape for their own inabilities. (not all -so don't get made - I'll explain later in the article.)

Interesting, when Notre Dame was dominating under Knute Rockne, There was a movement abound to change the rules to abolish all his innovations. Many coaches tried to emulate his offense but said it was too complex to copy. Rather then raise their game, they choose to protest and abolish what they didn't know how to do. (this still happens today with many rules - gauzed under the wrapping of "for safety's sake.") After much barbing, Rockne replied that if he was forced to simplify and run what everybody else ran (as he put it, a neatherthal offense based on simplicity and brute force.) he would leave football and go into a career he could still use his brain. Fortunately, although the "shift" was eliminated, enough of a concession was made that he stayed.

So then all these simplicity axioms are wrong when thousands of coaches have professed to them?

No. The answer is much more complex then that. Taken in the right context these sayings and thoughts are valuable to putting together any offense. It is the definition of simple that poses the problem. To help let's eliminate what simplicity is not:

1. The number of plays you put in.

Although the sheer volume of plays you put into a system affects manageability, it does not affect simplicity. You must have a workable number (concepts) to maintain an organized and meaningful practice, however, one play may be presented in a complex and confusing manor while a multiple offense, that has a systemic approach, may actually be easier to install and learn.

I'll use 2 examples to cover this point:

A. I once went to work for a guy that told me he had 5 plays. That was it. Seems pretty simple. However, none of the 5 plays tied into each other technique wise, vocabulary wise, and concept wise. This caused multiple learning on the part of the players. Additionally, all his plays were blocked by rote recognition. That cause each player to memorize 10 - 12 diagrams (that mean actually nothing to him) and then recognize the defense on the field and apply his techniques that were random due to the recognition system.

B. A very good friend of mine, George Deleone, (I coached for George in the 70's) was giving us a private clinic one day when the install question came up. George said they had a limited # of concepts they would install and then proceeded to tell us that the first day they might be installing outside zone as one of the concepts and would run it 5 or 7 plays the first day. Sounds like somebody would be confused by all those plays on day 1 doesn't it. But when one compares it with the above example you realize that even learning 2 plays with the above method takes more mental learning then George's, where a concept is learned and carried across the board. Additionally, since in the zone case the techniques are carried over with the blocking rules there is an ease of learning that is facilitated.

2. The type of plays you put in does not make an offense simpler?

On the contrary, plays that require decision making after the snap usually cover more scenarios and allow for the use of less auxiliary compliments to be installed. The decision making aspect is a one person learning process that is accomplished through visual repetition and has nothing to do with complexity. It places less learning on the part of the other players since the quarterback's decision making allows for less to be learned by the others.

3. Keeping it limited does not make lesser athletes better.

As a matter of fact it's the opposite. The lesser your athletes the more you need to do to "level the playing field." In the 70's I had the chance to visit the University of Michigan and speak one on one with the legend -Bo. That conversation along with the mentoring by great coaches like DeLeone and my high school coach Tony DeMatteo, had a lasting impression on me. One thing he espoused was that the better the athletes you have the less you do. They will beat people with there athletic ability. The lesser the athletic, the more you do. They are outmatched anyway so give them the only chance to win.

So what is the fine line between complexity and simplicity and how does one make teach a complex system to athletes?

The answer is in perception or the M.I.S.S or "make it seem simple" concept. The overall system must be complex enough to not only handle but conquer and gain an advantage over all situations it may encounter;yet seem simplistic in it's individual learning to the players. (and other coaches as I've found out the hard way.)

Here are some specific points for accomplishing this:

1. Teach concepts rather then totally rote. The beginning of every concept must have a rote basis (I.e. Rules to be memorized, techniques to be associated with the rules but anybody CAN learn those.)However, concepts allow one teaching to cover a multitude of situations and a multitude of usages. (see the zone example above)

Asan example, I can have you memorize the multiplication table or I can teach you the concept of multiplying. In the first scenario you have a vast number of functions to memorize, log jamming the mind and often confusing the participant through its shear volume. In the second I just have to teach you one concept.

Additionally, teaching concepts expand to cover all scenarios. Teaching rote is limited to the scenarios memorized. In the above multiplication situation, the rote student can only answer the limited number of problems he has memorized. The one that learned conceptually can answer any problem including ones he didn't see.

To further illustrate this, look back at the coach mentioned above that had his offense run by a complete recognition, or memorization method. If a defense came up that wasn't memorized the players would be scrambling. Over the last 20 years, have seen just about every "junk" defense imaginable versus the option. Yet, by teaching a conceptual recognition system, our team has been able to handle them.

2. Don't just take - learn. Too many times coaches change what they do to what
they hear at a clinic or what's in vogue. As a result they teach something you barely understand yourself. This causes inconsistencies and lack of answers that future confuse the player. Also, there are specific methods to teaching certain concepts. (I can remember after my week at Michigan that although I really thought I understood the slant angle system, I realized I had no idea how to teach it.)

The same holds true for my private clinics I've given. I don't know how many times I've been asked for "more plays," rather then how to teach the subject.

3. Keep the offense manageable. I know this sounds like I'm being hypocritical but I'm not really. A nuclear scientist deals with very complex matters, yet, he tries to have a manageable workload during the day. The too are totally dissimilar.

4. Don't get hung up in symbols or technical terms. Use terms you are comfortable with, make sense, and have carryover from play to play. Additionally, limit terminology to what you need- no more! As an example, since we are an option team and count - there is no reason that we need to label the outside backer in a 4-4, 4-3, and 50. He is #2 to us regardless. I've seen coaches have kids recognize every position in every defense without need. For us it doesn't matter. He could be the coaches wife. It doesn't matter. For your offense it might. But if the player doesn't need to know if it's a nickel or the starting outside linebacker - don't tell him. You may need to know it for play calling but he might not.

The same is true in how you use your terms. Nothing gets me madder on the field then my coaches showing off their knowledge by calling him Sam or Stud and the player giving him that dear in the head lights look. Again, he's #2, nothing less - nothing more.

Also try and make your terms simpler and more descriptive. Remember the players are empty glasses ready to be filled. If you had no idea of what a fruit was and I said "go get the apple" you would really be scratching your head. However if I said go get the green round shiny round object on the table - you would have a good chance. Technical names are overrated when dealing with novices. (I have even let our players think up some code words when we worked on our audible package. You'd be surprised how good they are with association.)

5. Run packages not plays. Get yourself out of bad plays or plays that need to be accommodated to run against certain looks. This includes what I call "squeeze" plays. These are where you have a play that, although good against certain defenses, has problems fitting into every scenario. So you whittle the end of the square peg to make it fit into a round hole. The more "exceptions" you have to build into the design of the play the harder it becomes to learn. The more confusing it becomes. (think about when somebody gave you directions and then they started adding on exceptions.)

The answer is to have packages. Series of plays called together in order to give the player a "simple" answer as per the defense.

6. Run a system and not plays. A system includes "associated" plays that have a carryover in mechanism of execution, terminology, techniques, concepts, and teaching process. A series of plays present a whole new learning experience whenever one is introduced. A system builds upon one another in knowledge and theory.

7. Teach whole-part-whole. If you can't teach your base system in 5 days (3 in college) then it isn't a teachable system no matter how simple it is. I didn't say execute, I said teach. By teaching everything vs every defense at once you are flooding and overloading the athlete - however the mistakes don't count. Sure you will get more mistakes early but you're not playing anybody the first week. As with any learning curve there will be mistakes and frustration. However, as with any learning curve" these mistakes will lessen through repetition. However, piecemealing your offense up to the first game will get the mistake of the first day through the first game. Additionally, the offense will seem more complex as it never gets completed. There is always new learning, a learning curve, and confusion.

8. Before cutting things out find out where the problem really lies or try to grind through. This is really two considerations. The first one takes away the excuse that it's too complicated to learn and places it back on the players and coaches. Is the reason the player's not getting it because it's too difficult or is he just not motivated? It doesn't take any athletic ability to learn rote. (as a matter of fact, they teach rote in 2nd and third grade. So, an athlete in high school or college can learn his plays.) the problem may lie with the athlete and his real desire (or lack of) to be there. Is it the offense or the way I taught it? Too infrequently do we go back to analyze how we teach. We have computer breakdowns on stats, we study film endlessly in the offseason, but rarely do we look at how we taught something or go to a clinic to learn how to teach it. (with everybody looking for the "magic" play, very rarely is this subject broached in a clinic anymore.)

The second aspect of this is grinding through it. I once was flown in by an excited young coach who wanted to put in the triple. He took copious notes, studied, and planned intensely. About the second week of camp he called me to say, he was going back to his "simpler" offense as this just didn't look good and he was stymied in his first scrimmage.

In the first three weeks of the season everything looks bad. That's why you practice. The more complex the system the worse it looks earlier. However it grows to pass the simpler one on the way.

(to illustrate this let's look at 2 jigsaw puzzles on a table, undone. The first has 30 pieces and the second 500. At a glance the one with only 30 looks neater and more organized even though neither have been done. However over time the one with 500 passes the smaller one in magnitude and beauty. Simpler and less will always look better earlier.)

9. Avoid the temptation of a talent switch or the flavor of the day. Too many times we change our offense for our talent or because we become enamored by what's out there on the clinic circuit. Yes, you have to ADAPT your offense to your talent but not change it radically. Remember, every time you change completely there is a learning curve for you and your coaches in content, the completion of the offense (offensive packages get better when tweaked over time), teaching methods, and practice organization. This adds to player confusion.

Additionally, if you tweak your offense, the techniques, learned material, and method of practice are all carried over by the players, deleting some of the confusion.

10. Your auxiliary must come off your base and be simpler then your base package. Too often coaches put in an "auxiliary" play to either at tact a certain scheme or get the ball to a certain playmaker. While there is nothing wrong with this if kept in the context of the system, it is what whole new concepts and system mechanics must be taught.

I once had a quarterback that although "adequate" I didn't want the defense making him keep the ball every play. So we had a system of tags that we used to get the ball out of his hands. These were also options, that used our system and techniques and were designed against specific looks and packaged to be used only in those scenarios.

The opposite of this would be a option friend of mine who put in a whole "I" package for the same reasons. Used different techniques and different teaching and practice methods. Do you think this added to the learning curve?

Conclusion:

As you can tell by the length of this article, I think this is a pretty weighty subject. By going around in circles we've discovered that the old axioms regarding simplicity are really correct except they've been taken out of context because of that one word "simple." Maybe what the should have said was "keep it manageable stupid" or "have a learnable system stupid." Either way, the important aspect is to have a system that is complex enough to level the playing field, seem to be of such magnitude that is gives opponents' coordinators fits, adapts to every scenario that may arise, yet, is teachable, manageable in game plan and practice and, most importantly, SEEMS simple to the players. The last part is the hardest but something the coach controls in his design of the system, its mechanics, and practice methodology.

I hope you Enjoyed it. The next article will return to the technical and, I promise, be much shorter.

mechanics

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Part II using "force blocking to solve problems

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Tue, 10 May 2011 13:50:00 +0000

In our first post on"force" blocking, we saw how adding a simple tag that placed the responsible of blocking #3 (fig. 1) could answer some simple problems with the triple. In this article we are going to look at taking that same tag and answering some other problems in the run game. In order to do this we must first remember that "force" blocking allows us to treat the seven man front (50 or 4-3) as an reduced front.

(if you want to catch up because you missed part I or just want to refresh the process a link is available on the side bar.)

1. Force blocking allows for the midline triple to be run vs. a 4-3 without an "exotic" scheme or tag.

I, personally, love the midline triple (fig 2) due the the fact that you don't have to block any playside linemen and in the places I've been at that is a big advantage. (this comes in handy on any level. If you don't believe me then look at Georgia Tech vs. Iowa 2 years ago. The dominance of the 3/2 techs shut down Tech's run game.) It also allows you get the ball out of the quarterbacks hands. Finally it takes advantage of a #2 player who was peeking his nose into the midline tuck play when motion goes away.

However, vs a 4-3 there is a numbers problem. There are just two many men outside the pitch key. (fig 3) yes, there are exotic schemes including looping the tackle, veering to the 1 tech, arcing the tackle, etc. and at times, we've used them all, but just to run the base triple scheme, there is a problem.

An answer to this is to use the midline triple with fox blocking. Because the front is now considered reduced, numbers can be matched. (fig.4) Also a nosey outside linebacker on the tuck or aligned in a stack is an easy arc for the halfback.

(One coaching point is the play side tackle. When he veers we teach a "stack" release. That means he is responsible for any exchange between the olber and the defensive end before going to the mike. This always for consistent option reading and less teaching on the arc technique.)

2. force blocking allows for you to get the ball out of the quarterback's hands quickly using the double options.

Whether we are purist or not, we've all had quarterback's who, although adequate, are less then idea in the offense. We've also had times where we would like to get the ball in a real good halfback's hands but the rocket has been shut down. This is easy vs. an eight man front where the 5 technique will always squeeze enough to pitch off of and you can match numbers on the the perimeter with the halfback arcing. However, vs a seven man front the defense can string this along because of the leverage they have with the 5 technique and force the quarterback to tuck up.

By using "force" blocking and making the flank now reduced, the offense can again gain leverage and pitch off the 5 technique. (fig. 5)

(some people will ask why this is different then the rocket? Two reasons: first the front is constricting and secondly the tempo is totally different as the defense has to honor another option aspect. Plus the extra long motion is not a tip)

Additional benefits of this are that we force the defense to play multiple option responsibilities, tempo the free safety in the alley with multiple options, and we dictate who carries the ball - not the defense.

(Again, the tackle will stack release when veering, allowing for the exchange to be handled without the halfback working on it. The tackle may bump the 3 vs. Certain teams and athletes to secure the edge.)

3. It gives us a legitimate way to block a seven man front with the rocket.

If you've run the rocket for years as I have, you realize that you will be a man short against a good seven man front team. If you stretch it as the academies do and people keep their gap integrity you will come up a man short. If you man the perimeter and veer / loop it as I learned years ago from VMI you end up leaving the non- support player free. You can draw it up theoretically and say you can stretch somebody to the perimeter but the game is played on paper and you should design your scheme to beat your best teams, not teams that allow you to reach past team. (you'll beat those no matter what you run!)

By using force blocking and the inside receiver assigned #3, we change the halfback's rule to #2 to the free safety. The nice thing with this is the speed of the play doesn't require the receiver to hold his block long. (fig. 6)

I hope these helped in using the "force" concept. Whenever we install a tag we do it as a "universal" concept. One that is consistent in both recognition and execution and can be used in multiple packages and scenarios. This allows what is a small simple package to seem as a multitude of schemes. Once the concept is learned the uses don't end with the limited info presented here. We have used it with many other concepts and expanded the actual "force" blocking into exchanges (cracks) and double exchanges. It has allowed us to use a flexed wide receiver as an interior blocker and load blocker, both with leverage. The possibilities are limitless and all require very little teaching if you start with a solid system.

I hope this helped.

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Interesting new way to clinic

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Mon, 09 May 2011 13:41:00 +0000

About two weeks ago I was asked to do an on air clinic for Compusport Radio. (a Blogcast) At first I was a little skeptical as I questioned having a clinic without visual aids. After talking to the host John Anderson, I relunctently agreed. I have to say I was pleasantly surprised and I think it will be a plus for all option coaches. It won't be on for a couple of months as he backlogs the show but until then listen to the other clinics he has posted on his site. (including option guru - Larry Bekish) I was really surprised at the quality of the speakers and the content. I hope you enjoy

link to Compusport Radio

http://www.compusportsradio.com/

Indecision - the greatest detriment to a quarterback's play. Are you teaching it?

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Tue, 26 Apr 2011 15:35:00 +0000

Over 22 years of researching, teaching, organizing, and practicing the flexbone, I have come to realize that more failure comes from quarterback indecision then anything else. This is true of any quarterback decision heavy offense whether it be the spread, a pro style attack, the split back veer, or the wishbone. When the quarterback makes decisions that control the success of the entire offense, any hesitation, lack confidence, or lack of focus will cause severe consequences.

The problem is that most coaches, including myself over the years, teach these recipes for disaster without even realizing it. They handcuff their quarterback without even knowing they are the culprit. In reality, their efforts to refine the offense, give help, and correct only make the matter worse. How do they do this? Let's look at some of the mistakes I have made and learned to correct over the years!

1. Verbiage, verbiage, verbiage! Most coaches I've talked to don't realize the value of CONSISTENCY in verbiage throughout their staff. If I teach the quarterback "give unless the handoff key makes a direct path in front of the fullback." and you say to him "give the ball unless the handoff key tackles the fullback." you have in essence given too very different messages to the quarterback. He now has two very succinct, different pictures in his head. So as he goes through his reads, imagine the indecision in the thought process, "well, um, he made a path in front of the fullback but is he going to tackle the fullback?" or "he looks like he's made a path to arm tackle the fullback but, um, wait.....that path doesn't bring him in front of the fullback." You can see his dilemma with just this simple example. Now imagine him with a more overt difference or many coaches on your staff saying the same thing in a different way.

If you study cognitive theory at all, you realize that the mind records everything as photographs. Every time he hears a different phrasing, he gets a different picture to interpret it. The difference is like trying to find the right piece to a jigsaw puzzle with only one piece (the right one) on the table and trying to find that same piece when there are many to look at on the pile. (and remember, every one of these phrases are subject to his interpretation.) The phrase "perception is reality" holds true here. So he has a better chance of getting it right if everybody is onboard with the same phrasing.

2. Verbiage, verbiage, verbiage! No, we're not being redundant here. In this part we're going to talk about too much and too technical of talk. Coaches love to show how much they know. They like to dazzle in their use of terms. The key though is for the quarterback to understand it and be able to process it in a split second. The mind has been proven to not be able to multitask. Instead, it jumps back and forth rapidly from one task to another. It does this so rapidly that it gives the appearance of multitasking but gives neither thought process enough time to amply finish the task.

To explain this in simpler terms, I am going to use an example of an interview I had for a college offensive coordinator job. We were discussing how they taught the "all curl route." First, he said the quarterback must preread the coverage to get an idea as to which way he MIGHT be throwing. (now you must understand that their presnap recognition system for the passing game was totally different then for the run!) Then as he dropped back his first thought was the hot read. If the hot read wasn't there then he would focus on the safeties to make sure that he was going to the right side (oh, so the presnap read was an educated guess!) Once he set and finally decided where he was going to he read mike because it seemed that mike could rechange the direction he was going. Once that was understood (if it ever was because I was lost now!) he focused on a flat defender read and threw opposite him. (I love that expression, "throw opposite." What happens when he sits half way? More indecision for the quarterback! We'll deal with that problem later in the article.) Finally, if he had not thrown an interception yet or gotten sacked or panicked and ran out of the pocket, he would now have the option of coming back to the middle hook if the inside linebacker ran under the curl. But wait we're not done yet! If the safety robbed the curl that brought him to a whole other read! And to think the quarterback had to execute proper footwork and throwing mechanics while simultaneously he was feeling the rush and keeping the play alive. It was no wonder that the coach told me my most pressing issue, if I came, was to cut down on interceptions and improve the quarterback mechanics. DUH!!!

Instructions to the quarterback so be as simple as possible, as short as possible, as solid as possible (very little ifs and buts), and in as much of "normal" language as possible. They don't need to know titles and complex designs; they need to execute complex designs through a simple pattern.

When I was asked how I would teach the same read, my reply was that with a limited quarterback I would first not hot read it (take some of the pressure off him and put in on others) then I would decide which side I would throw to presnap and stay with it (maybe not the best play but it was still a sound play). After executing my footwork I would tell him to "throw the curl unless the flat coverage went there." (we've taken away the indecision of the halfway player on defense.) if as he hitched up to the curl he didn't like it, he could come back down to the middle hook(put the responsibility on the receiver to get open.)

The funny thing was that after all that he said "that's exactly what I said!" this further proves my theory that sometimes we forget we are in "coach speak" and they're not!

3. Give the player a one way decision! This is easy to explain. The human mind does not work like a computer. We've already decided that when we talked about multitasking. That becomes even more in play when dealing with a muscle memory movement tied into the thought process.

Let's use a baseball batter as the quintessential example. When one is up at the plate, he does not say I'm going to hit it if it's a strike and take if it's a ball. If he did that he would never have enough time to trigger his swing once the ball is pitched. Rather he approaches the at bat with the thought that "I'm going to swing unless the ball is outside the strike zone." These two statements may sound the same but they're not. In the second he has started his mechanics as the pitcher is delivering. He only has to adjust (stop his mechanics) if the pitch is not a strike. In the first he has to make two decisions and reactions. If it's a strike start his swing and if it's a ball don't swing.

Now imagine the hitter going to the plate with the thought process "I will swing if it's a strike. I will take if it's a ball. However, if it's a low and inside fastball or a curve on the outer half I will take." You wouldn't handcuff one of your batters that way but you do when you teach the read. Many coaches teach each individual read independently, filling the quarterback's mind with multiple pictures causing indecision. These are the ones you heard that say "if he sits give, if he crashes the mesh then pull, if he squeezes flat pul, if he does an up move give, if he steps square and pushes the tackle give, etc. etc."

I've always believe in a one way decision that covers all situations but leaves an easy thought process. Ours is "give the ball unless the handoff key makes a direct path in front of the fullback." That's it! Nothing else! It doesn't matter how you word it as long as it is a way way decision that covers all situations. The example above ends up coming out the same but the thought process and initiating the mechanics are greatly hampered. It's like having the quarterback use speed dial versus having him check through the rolodex.

4. Let the quarterback know you have his back. There are just times the quarterback is going to struggle with a certain read or combination of reads. If you've coached this offense long enough you know what I'm talking about. It's a muscle memory skill just like shooting a basketball and even Michael Jordan had an "off" day. (well - off to him) If he thinks he will have to pound his head on the wall over and over again, possibly causing his team to lose then he'll get more and more indecisive. However, if he knows you have a way to get him out of the bad read, he will be honest on his ability and he'll continue to try and conquer the problem, knowing his teams outcome doesn't solely rest on it.

An example of this would be the 1 - 2 exchange commonly known as the stack read. We always try to read our way out but there have been times either due to athletes on the other team or whatever (we must remember we are dealing with humans here - not robots!) our quarterback just plain "kicks the pooch" on it. He know though we always have our loaded tag to go to. (one that takes away the stack read from him but keeps our triple alive.)

5. All quarterbacks are not the same. The beauty of our system, the triple option in general, and any complete system is the ability to keep within the structure / philosophy of the design, yet, adapt it to the strength and weaknesses of the individuals in the system. Many coaches ignore this aspect. We do it through our check system and / or the "packaging" of plays. Some coaches expect all quarterbacks to execute the offense equally; regardless of the personal on defense or their individual abilities. If two, totally unequal quarterbacks are forced to deal with a problem with the same answers they will have unequal results and come away with a very different attitude to the same situations.

To illustrate this let's take a commander in war. He's in his foxhole when he says to his troops "okay when I count 5 with jump over the edge and attack!" Now if his troops are massive, elite special forces with overwhelming firepower and, most importantly have had continued success in this maneuver they will probably follow their commander with unending loyalty and energy.

Now, picture the troops in the foxhole who are outmanned, outgunned, and outnumbered. (and they know this) More importantly, every time they followed this command previously, the results were disastrous. I can guarantee you there will be some trepidation and indecision about putting that first leg over the front of that foxhole.

The same is true with athletes. It's even more extreme because they know their ability (firepower) The more they are asked to do something they can't, the more trepidation and indecision.

The answer is to individualize the offense or packages for each quarterback's skills. This can be yearly for what you have as a group or individually within a year as per the individual quarterbacks. (we did this at William Paterson, where we had 2 quarterbacks of very different abilities. Although they ran the the same offense, not causing any additional teaching time, their answers / checks were totally different to fit their abilities. In this way, they both approached the line of scrimmage with confidence they could execute the calls in the situations they were put in. Confidence allows a player to play faster and without indecision.)

Take the curl / flat example given before. We've had some rocket armed quarterbacks we've taught "throw the curl unless." and we've had some noodle armed ones that we taught "throw the flat unless." sometimes there we're one of each of these in the same year.

6. Don't let the situation surprise the quarterback. This is one of the biggest I've seen over the years. A team runs an offense as "plays" and not a system, syncing their whole practice into one look they expect from them opponent. Then, even when playing a team you are much better then, a "surprise defense of the week" pops up and chaos breaks out. Not only is the line confused but you now ask the quarterback to execute something that he probably hasn't practiced in many weeks.

By having a compact system and a systematic way of practicing, you should be able to handle any situation that occurs. In ours, we practice every look that he may see. (yes, even the strangest looks can be categorized in some fashion. Also our rules allow for confidence in execution.)

This methodology is harder at the beginning and during the week as more is thrown at the quarterback. However, once the game begins, the fun starts.

(I have found that most "flexbone" systems have this method built in, from the early Ballard's to the latter day Georgia Tech's)

7. You can't coach a decision maker the way you coach a player whose position is built by rote. This was perhaps the hardest thing I had to learn when I switched over to the option from the wing-t. In my previous coaching, everything was nice, tight, and rote. There was a double team here and you hug the double as you made your 90 degree cut, etc. Mostly you were coaching execution of a motor pattern. If a player didn't get it right, he usually heard my wrath.

With a triple option quarterback it's totally different. You are now asking him to make decisions and decisions are made by what he sees, not what you told him. Simply stated the quarterback has to go by what he sees in a split second, not what you see when the film room 2 days later. Correction is necessary but it's different. Your
wrath won't get you anywhere. As a matter of fact, I'd be glad to wager anybody that a "baggering" "what are you doing? Don't you know that was a give." will only get you a predetermined give on the next play - regardless of the reaction. Do it enough and you'll have so much indecision by a quarterback who doesn't trust his eyes, you better start checking the prices of moving companies.

Instead, you must coach through HIS eyes and mind. Questions like "what did you see?" or "what was your thought process?" are essential. Reiteration of proper thought processes and walk through visualizations and reps are the only way to correct the mistakes and build confidence.

As a final note on this, remember from above, all quarterbacks are not born the same. Although, through reps, any quarterback can read at a certain degree of efficiency; some will never get to an elite level. For those you must be ready to rely on your non-option plays. Additionally, as mentioned before, reading is like hitting a baseball and like the hitter who has trouble with the curve, certain quarterbacks have trouble with certain reads. (I.E. Cross charge, back to back, etc.) To build confidence you must reps this "sticking point" at a rate of 2 to 1 and have an answer built into the system so as to have your quarterback's back.

There are many mistakes we've all in coaching the quarterbacks. These are a few that I had to correct over the years to be successful. I am sure there are many others that could be added. Regardless of the system you run, if decision making is part of it then indecision is a major problem.

I hope this helps.

- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad

USING “FORCE” BLOCKING TO HELP SEAL THE BOX Part I

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Tue, 05 Apr 2011 14:43:00 +0000

There are many times when running the triple we wished we had an extra blocker to help us inside the "box" in a seven man front. Needing the Halfback to arc on #3 places a strain on the interior blockers to handle the middle man in any defense. (Middle linebacker or Nose guard in fig. 1 and fig. 2.) Both defenses have a simple method of getting the 6^th man to the side of the triple. Sure there are answers with other schemes or other plays but to run the triple places the blockers on those two people in an uphill situation.

(I realize you can go to a loop schemes vs. the even or tackle's over vs. the odd but, for this article's sake, we're talking about keeping the triple to a non-tightend as a base play. I also realize the Georgia tech faithful will talk about cutting back behind the nose but, again, for this conversation we'll keep it as a total mismatch that makes that seem impossible.)

When I first started running this offense about 17 years ago, I asked many people the same questions. Besides using a tightend or tackle over to add an extra interior blocker or allowing us to veer a 50 the answer was always another play or scheme or checking it to the opposite side in the case of the 4-3. That was except for Tony DeMeo and the Army staff. Both of them also found an answer by using their "Ends over" formation in a unique way.

Rather than use the extra receiver in the traditional way and our base rule (fig. 3) in order to handle the free safety in the alley, they used the receiver as a perimeter blocker on the force player by call. (Fig. 4 and fig.5) By eliminating a defender from the perimeter without using the core structure of your offensive scheme you have, in essence, made the rest of the defense a reduced front. (the "pseudo" #3 (free safety) is inside the tackle.) So what does that give you? It allows you to use the halfback as an interior blocker.

Let's take a look at the problems again that we mentioned previously and the affect this scheme has on them.

First, vs. the 50, now that the halfback is no longer needed on the perimeter to arc on #3, (fig. 4) we can now veer block allowing the guard to double / combo off the nose to the backside linebacker. We still get 2 blockers working on the inside linebacker – one inside and one outside the handoff key. Problem solved. (fig. 4)

Vs. the 4-3, the schemes allows us to keep the middle in the box by sealing him with the Halfback and keeping the double / combo on the three technique. (fig. 5 above)

I know some people, even at the college level, don't like to stalk a rolled up run support players and over the years certain alignments have given us problems. However as we evolved we found this problems opened up a wealth of gains by incorporating a simple check system. We also found out that what you put into it – you get back. Fundamentals practiced over and over again as well as never putting the middle receiver in an advantageous position have made this a great addition.

In checking the "force" blocking the quarterback will keep the middle receiver away from blocking an extreme disadvantage – rolled up closer than 6 yards. Simply stated for the quarterback if #3 is closer then 6 yards from the line of scrimmage go the other way. Normal 6 man side checks apply.

There are three situations that highlight this point.

The free safety over (outside the tackle) that allows the force player to be so hard or align so radically he is a problem to block. If the force player does this without the free safety over there is nobody to take the inside receiver vertically on play action pass. (We can make the inside receiver eligible by stepping him off and one of the halfbacks on depending on motion.)

Answer: the free safety over makes this a six man side by rule and we will go opposite. By going opposite now you are running to a nub flank that hits much quicker. The #3 defender (deep halfback) is in a bind and cannot play the arc and the deep pass as he has no help from the free who has remove himself by alignment.

When the inside receiver is ineligible the support player moves so far inside he is hard for the inside receiver to block.

Answer: Make the inside receiver eligible by stepping him off and stepping one of the halfbacks on the line or pick the ball up and throw a one-step quick screen to the wide receiver with the inside receiver blocking. This has been huge in that circumstance. (Fig. 6) If we are keeping the inside receiver ineligible we will usually tag the play with this possible check.

Answer: go the other way which has become reduced and allows us the same seal / veer scheme. You can't have 7 people one way and not be reduced backside.

This article doesn't afford the time and space to delve deeply into the middle receiver's technique but there are a couple of coaching points that should be pointed out:

Always break down halfway from the defender. If he's at 6 you go to 3. This allows us to react to the angle of support and be more physical when the defender approaches

Vs the inside defender, step lateral and stay square rather then turning to block like a crack. This allows the blocker to react to the defenders movement either up (crack) or over the top (stalk)

Do not position. Get body on body to be physical.

This is a physical stalk. Once you make contact – latch on and run defender. Do not sit and recoil.

There are certainly many sound ways to overcome the stated problems. Over the years, we have found "force blocking to be a valuable addition to our system.

In part II we will delve into other advantages of force blocking that allow us to use plays we would normally rule out vs. certain defenses and therefore reduces the number of actual plays we have.

An Analysis of two different mesh techniques

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Fri, 04 Mar 2011 15:42:00 +0000

After running the triple for seventeen years now, I am amazed how many different ways there area to teach it, package it, and systemize it. The philosophies behind all these methods vary greatly but they all have one thing in common – they stick to basic three back triple option theory. The same is true with how people teach the quarterback mechanism. I have seen an investigated many different methods over the years, some legit and some – well let's just say out there. The four that I hear most mentioned now are (in no order of preference) 1) the glide ride, 2) the hop step or flat footed read, 3) the quick read, and 4) the "point" method. When deciding what method is better for you there are a number of factors to study. So let's take a look at the two most popular method – the glide and the flat footed mesh. They certainly have their plusses and minuses.

The Glide Ride

The oldest method going and the original wishbone technique the glide ride has been around for decades. It is the one I prefer (probably because of comfortability and ease in teaching from experience.)

Method: The quarterback will push off his backside foot getting and much depth as possible and pointing his toe to the sideline. (for the people using a clock we want to get to 5 o'clock with the step.) As he steps, he simultaneously, pushes with his backside hand to extend the ball over the backside foot and tucks his chin snapping his eyes to the read key. (The eyes should go to the read key a fraction before the snap – in essence cheating the snap.) The key here is the backside arm doesn't bend. It is like a board and pushes the ball back. As the fullback catches up to the quarterback, the ride starts and the second step is taken parallel to the line of scrimmage. In essence the ball travels with the fullback and the step is taken as the ride occurs.

Coaching Points: The first step is a push with the weight presnap on the backside foot. If the quarterback steps rather than pushes, he will end up a backward lean, his backside foot facing into the l.o.s. and rising up on the step. The ball must be pushed back simultaneously with the foot. We tell the quarterback that there is a string connected from the back to the playside foot. The fullback must be around 4 1/3 yards. The Georgia tech type system with the fullback at 5 yards leaves the quarterback sitting on his front foot too long.

Pros: The biggest pro is the glide ride. It combines the best of all worlds since the front foot is a duration step. The depth of it controls how long you are in the mesh. Vs. a person that crashes the mesh the quarterback can take a shorter second step and get the ball out before being tied up in the mesh. Vs a reader, the quarterback can step longer into the line and make the read commit. This leads to very good ball protection.

Because of the duration step it is easier to read the up move because you have time. (up moves is where handoff key starts to close and then comes off to the quarterback.

Because of the duration step, an experienced quarterback can handle the back to back (dive – qb read now stunt) pretty well. Although it is not the easiest for doing that.

With everything moving throughout the mesh, the quarterback doesn't have to start up again from a dead standstill. This always a lesser athlete to seem quicker because he is already moving. It also alleviates the triple getting chased down from behind as often since you are running away from it.

If you are an old fashion, fullback frontside triple (cut the nose in a fifty – loop scheme) this meshes up the best with a shorter distanced fullback.

Cons: Because everything is moving throughout the mesh, it is harder to teach. Moving parts are always harder to teach.

I have found this harder to teach to a real tall quarterback. They tend to get too much lean over their first step.

Inexperienced quarterbacks tend to push through the mesh and tie themselves up or, worst let, run into back to back stunts.

Because the hand moves with the feet, a quarterback must have quick hands in order to execute the fake

If you run a triple with a deeper fullback allowing a cutback this does not help you. The quarterback is too long in his first step and the glide step can take away the cutback.

If the second foot doesn't get to the fullback's path through the mesh, the fullback will actually be running away from the pendulum of the arm ride causing a possible fumble on a five situation.

The flat footed or hop method.

This is the method that is very popular today with the Georgia Tech, Navy style attacks. I have used this in certain situations (see below) but am not the biggest fan of it.

Method: As the quarterback steps with depth on his first step, he quickly (simultaneously) steps with his backside foot. This creates almost a hopping motion to get the feet parallel with the fullback's path. As with the glide ride the quarterback will push the ball back with his off arm (like a board – no bend) and tuck his chin on his frontside shoulder focusing on the read key. He will then ride from a flatfooted stance.

Coaching points: The quarterback must get both feet into the ground as fast as possible. The ball must be pushed back as the quarterback hops as deep as possible with the front arm as stiff as a board. As he hops the eyes must immediately go to the handoff key. Once the second step is down the feet must be parallel to the fullback's path. Although both feet seem to be in the air, care must be given to have knee bend throughout the mesh.

Pros: Since once the hop is taken the moving parts are limited and the foot movement is consistent regardless of the defensive reaction, it is a very easy mess to teach.

Because the read is done flat footed it is much easier to read stunts (echo – qb and handoff key exchange, back to back, etc.) as well as any read where the speed of the read affects the outcome. (i.e. a wide 5 or 7 coming at the mesh – will he get there.) It you don't believe this – stand on a train station and judge the speed of the trains as they pass. Now, get on a moving train and try to gauge the speed of a train passing by in the opposite direction. It is much easier to judge from the stationary position on the platform.

Because the quarterback is stationary it is much easier for him to execute the technique of stepping backwards vs. the crash back to back reads.

Since the ride is a consistent distance the quarterback and fullback get a good feel for the disconnect or giving "timing." When it is no longer going to be changed

Since the footwork is basically set, all of the quarterback's thought process can focus on the read and the mechanics of the give or pull.

Because of the consistency of the footwork it facilitates the fullback cutback.

Cons: Because both feet are actually moving simultaneously there is a tendency to not get the foot or the ball as deep. There really is no push mechanism (off other foot) so the ride is usually shorter.

The quarterback must restart from a stationary position. This takes a better (faster) athlete. He has more of a tendency to get caught from behind. (It's why Georgia Tech, etc. tuck their quarterback up so quick)

Because the duration of the ride is set, it is not as good vs. the up move (see above) and can get stuck in the mesh vs. the mesh crash

With both feet off the ground simultaneously, there tend to be some inconsistencies. They include 1. not getting the send foot up to the fullback's path causing the fullback to run away from the pendulum of the arm action of the quarterback; 2. When one hops he tends to rise up or sit on the back foot; and 3) when you hop it is harder to immediately focus on the read area. (This is only a millisecond but it happens. Your whole body is moving so your eyes and head are changing levels. If you don't believe this step at a wall turn your head and read a word. Hop around and do the same thing. It is slower because of the change in head level.)

With your Fullback at 4 1/3 it is very harder to get both feet in the ground and catch up arm wise to the fullback.

Additional methods:

Although I have not used the other two methods (point and quick read) I have researched them in order if they were for me. Here are the reasons I eliminated them.

Quick Read: Popularized by Tony DeMeo it is a great way in college because the quarterback makes his mind up on the first step (he may look like the glide ride above or may not even connect with the fullback in some reads.) It in essence, allows you to add the fullback as a blocker after his option is eliminated and greatly cuts down on fumbles. The problem comes in that Tony expects the fullback to cut the read if he squeezes and then comes off when he sees the fullback doesn't have the ball. In college the cut makes up for the loss of leverage by the fullback. Without being able to cut in high school this is an uphill block for the fullback. As always Tony has a great innovation but the differences in high school and college keep it from being universally accepted.

Point Method: This is where the quarterback points the ball at the fullback but does not put it in unless it is a give read. Originally, a split back veer technique it was very successful in that scheme because of the quarterback working on the line of scrimmage and the nearness of the read to the mesh. (right in front of him.) With the fullback behind the quarterback the mesh is far enough away from the read that he can read the mesh for give or keep. (just reads if he puts it in or not.) The football historians will remember that the distance of the mesh and OLB's reading it forced the demise of the outside veer out of the I formation.

Summary

Which method is better? That's up to you. A lot depends of your total scheme, depth of fullback, how you handle the crease (cutback or not), your experience, and how comfortable you are teaching. They both have their plusses and minuses. Perhaps it's a combination of the too. As a example, we have always taught the glide ride but with a one-year senior at quarterback, an inexperienced young kid, or a very tall quarterback I have taught the hop. There is no rule that you can't teach 2 different quarterbacks different methods. I've seen many option teams teach one way of pitching but if a quarterback comes in pitching comfortably and successfully a different way they won't change it. We have even gone as far as packaging plays differently for two different quarterbacks with different abilities.

coming soon

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Sat, 26 Feb 2011 15:25:00 +0000

I have had a request to publish video with many of these articles. I hope to have that up and running soon. Many of the mechanisms with blogging are new to me. However, I will soon get them down.

I also have to upload much of my video collection from DVD to my hard drive, cut it, and format it. Bear with me and we'll get it done.

A couple of unique ways to handle the free in the eight man front

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 16:21:00 +0000

As we continue with the series on handling the eight man front, a couple of ideas we "toyed" with from time to time came to mind.

There are really only 5 concepts to handle the safety and still run the triple and basically everything we've written so far (or will write as we finish up this article) will fit into one of these modes:

Use a blocker to block the free and leave a different person unaccounted for (already discussed)
Add a blocker by formation to account for the numbers (future blog)
Tempo the free safety so as to make him account for everything (already discussed)
Block one of the option responsibilities while leaving two defenders free to play one of the others (already discussed and future blog)
Use one offensive player to become two options allowing for an extra blocker to be added to the perimeter in order to match numbers. (today's blog)

Remember, we are talking about finding our answers within the triple for this concept. Yes, there are other plays and answers that match this defense. However, those are best left for another discussion as the vastness of possibilities would exceed our grasp.

Allowing one offensive player to be two options and then adding a player to the perimeter

When we discuss this we must remember we are talking about a set way to play the triple – a repetitious pattern.

The following two calls have been in our playbook for years. They have been used sporadically with good if not great success. Where they originated I really have forgotten over time. However, the guard pull scheme has been utilized by Air Force against Utah, TCU, and others this past year. (At least I'm assuming it was this scheme. Although the scheme may look the same assignment wise, you really can't tell the quarterback thought process or what "concept" was initiated by a film.)

Using the quarterback as the first two options.

By using the quarterback as the first two options you have freed the fullback to be an added blocker to the scheme.

The guard pull scheme: (see fig.1)

This is the main scheme that I saw Air Force employ this year (to my surprise) It must be run to the three technique.

Assignments:

Playside tackle: Gap, read, down (Use good down block technique on the tackle)

Playside guard: pull around handoff key (#1) for the backer. (See previous article on the fifty for technique) key is to be aware of the tight scrape.

Center back: reach

Playside halfback: easiest release to the free safety (you are blocking for the quarterback and pitch only. See safe call for technique.)

Fullback: triple path, fake. (full-ride) if you don't get tackled block linebacker in hole to levels. (Be physical. You may take linebacker where he goes)

Quarterback: ride hip of fullback. (Do not put ball fully in the stomach) read handoff key. On give key tuck off inside hip of fullback, get north and south, make single gap cut off the fullback.

In essence the quarterback becomes the fullback vs. a give read. Another way to look at is that you have combined the quarterback tuck with the triple and get the best of both worlds. Remember**** you are doing this because you are getting / expecting a heavy dose of squeeze and scrape. This is an answer and not a staple of an offense.

If we get a give read it would look like the following: (fig 2)
A key coaching point is the quarterback must duck off the inside hip of the fullback. This does two things: a) it pulls the quarterback further away from the handoff key; not allowing him to fall back inside, and b) since you are expecting "squeeze and scrape" the cut off the linebacker would normally be through his inside shoulder.

As a variation of this we will add "special" blocking. "special" is a tag that can be used whenever #3 is the free safety and the halfback is assigned to him. (see fig.3) The halfback and wide-receiver will exchange assignments with the halfback arcing the widest corner. The wide=receiver will cut his split 3 yards and push (up to 5 yards) crack the free safety's upfield shoulder.
This is a great way to set up the wheel vs. an eight-man front because the halfback crossing #2's face is now the norm and places him in a bind. (see fig.4)

SUMMARY:

Again, this is an answer for a problem – not a catch all. It is a way to take a known defensive reaction and use it to your advantage. It also shows that if you take any of the five concepts above and work backwards you can come up with your own ways to defeat the free-safety in the alley. This is the problem solving approach I have used to any situation: List the problem (i.e. outnumbering us with the free), reverse the problem into offensive concepts (i.e. outnumber the defense again) then come up with concrete, rote answers. Of course answers on paper don't always translate into answers on the field due to time, distance, and speed factors.

We have also run a loop version of this (the second play using this concept.) to an A-gap player using the tackle as the wrap around blocker. (fig 5) However, that was earlier in my career when the 5-techniques were played much tighter. The rise of the rocket has widened these defensive players and this scheme became a version of the "quarterback follow." However, at times if used properly this can be a great companion to the rocket as the 5 technique becomes in a bind with the wide movement of the tackle. If he peeks inside the rocket is there. If he runs outside for the rocket, there is a huge tuck hole for the quarterback.

COACH'S NOTE:

I feel I would be remiss if I didn't answer why this must be run to the 3-technique. (Air ran it to an A-gap lineman and I believe it cost them the Utah game in a crucial situation.)

If you run it to an A-gap linemen and still tight reach the center (Not including a 2i), the defensive tackle will "backdoor" the down-block due to the distance and make the play on the QB from behind (what happened to Air Force vs. Utah) (fig 6)
If you have the center wide reach and get at least his near shoulder on the 2i, essentially posting him for the down-block, then you can't block the backside linebacker and he becomes the player that outnumbers you. (fig 7)
These are not your normal answers to handling the safety but they could be very big if used correctly to match defensive numbers

Hope this helps

Feel free to post on the message board. Let's get the community up and running.

Is your quarterback an extension of your offense or is your offense an extension of your quarterback?

noreply@blogger.com (The Triple Option Spot) — Tue, 15 Feb 2011 16:03:00 +0000

I recently was watching the NFL channel recap of the super bowl game when I heard a discussion from Brian Billick and Jim Mora jr. concerning the success of Aaron Rodgers. In the course of the conversation they based their opinion that the Packers would have continued success because Aaron Rodgers like Tom Brady and Peyton Manning executed the offense as it was drawn. They, like Rodgers, fit the skill set defined for the execution of the offense and stayed within the structure of the philosophy set forth by the coaching staff. In Rodgers case, the skill set was a quick release with a strong and accurate enough arm to throw the vertical seams, an intelligence to execute hot reads, and the ability to make rhythmic drills down the rhythm. Tom Brady's arm is not as strong, yet in the New England offense his skill set fits the need. Peyton Manning brings a whole different set of requirements in executing the audible rich Indianapolis offense. The final word was that these quarterbacks were basically an extension of the coach and the playbook. They were essentially, "redrawing the play from the playbook to the field."

This conversation struck a chord because a number of years ago I heard Bill Walsh describing the same "fit" when finding a quarterback for his offense. It was his basis for drafting Joe Montana when many people passed. Put Montana in a vertical stretch offense and you probably don't have a hall-of-famer. His arm simply was not strong enough. He went a little further to explain that one of Montana's strong suits was that he thoroughly understood what they (the 49ers) were trying to accomplish and was able (and happy to) function within the parameters set forth by the system.

On the other hand, we've all seen the other side of this. We've all been brainwashed by raw athletic ability and over the last quarter center we've all been "espnized" with highlight reel quarterback. The ad-libber! The guy who makes plays outside the offense. The reversed field scramble followed by the 60 yard heave for the miracle touchdown that is forever imprinted in our minds. And at some time in our career we've all gotten caught up in a great athlete who just "makes plays." And therein lies the problem! An opinion biased on a small portfolio of work. Yet, that work is spectacular enough to sway our opinion.

(In another Fox show the announcers were talking about the same thing when they said that Brady and Manning rarely ended up on the highlight reel except to show their high completion percentages within the structure of the offense. In fact their highlights individual are basically a boring procession of normal plays executed over and over again.)

So I started looking back at the quarterback's I had and the success tied into each of them. The three of the five greatest athletes I ever coached were at the quarterback position including one at the college level. Their highlight film of individual plays would make your jaw drop. Many of their greatest plays were outside the system. Yet, despite all this ability to make plays, I had the worst years of my coaching career. With these "circus," "freak" type plays in our minds we forget the attempted plays outside the system that put us in the hole or, worse yet, came at such an inopportune time they cost a big turn in the game's outcome. We let the great play cloud our overall judgment. Like a high-tech car chase in a bad movie that leaves the crowd buzzing and telling friends to go despite the overall lackluster performance.

(I'll use the quarterback from Georgia Tech as a prime example of what I'm talking about. In a televised game a couple of years ago, on an early drive he started with triple to the right then reverse 180 degrees and ran to the left 60 yards leading to a touchdown. He also pulled the ball down very early (THE RUSH WAS NOWHERE NEAR HIM!) and outran the defenders for a crucial first down that kept a scoring drive alive. Sounds great doesn't it. However, in the 4^th quarter, now trailing, he made the same 180 degree cut on 3^rd and 2 and lost 4 yards. Then in the two minute offense he pulled the ball down early again scrambled and lost 18, effectively ending any chance of success. When I talked to my option friends they were enamored by the plays he made and chalked off the others as trying to make a play. They were in essence "espnized" by the human highlight reel.)

These out of the system plays don't have to just involve the feet. They can be the QB that holds the ball extra long to make a 30yard fade completion a pass that travels 60 yards in the air. Or a quarterback who ignores the reads of the system and forces a pass into coverage. Or a timing route that is held extra long so as to have to force a ball into a now constricted window. You see it all the time. The throw makes espn and people rave at the strength of the quarterback's arm and his courage to throw it into such a small window.

The fact that we had little success with these great athletes lead me to continue my investigation. Was it me? My coaching style? Why were we lacking success with such great athletes? We had great success with lesser athletes! Why then? Certainly a search into this topic would help my overall coaching success.
The answer it turned out was simple. It's what Billick and Mora talked about. The others were an extension of myself and my play calling. Don't get me wrong, the others were good athletes who "made plays." However, they made them within the structure of the offense. This may be a great cut off a scraping linebacker. Or outrunning the safety in the alley. Or making a perfect over the shoulder throw, right on rhythm, on the wheel. (Staying with Rodgers, he certainly made his share of plays in the super bowl. Whether it be the vertical he threw on the last drive or the post he hit splitting three defenders, he made great plays. He did them tough within the structure of the offense.) How many of us remember marveling at Thomas Lott or JC Watts dazzling us once in the option alley.

It's a simple formula. If you have a sound complete system, one that holds up to everything and contains a logistical methodology of getting into and out of the right plays, then the execution is the essential element. (Which I believe we do) If you believe that coaching up your system gives the players the best chance of success, then a "system" quarterback is what you are looking for. You don't need the plays, both good and bad, outside the system to be successful. In fact the more the quarterback gets away from the system the less chance you have to win. If the quarterback understands what you wants and plays within this system then you always have a chance. You have narrowed the game down to two aspects: coaching and execution. The first is 100% on you and the latter is a reflection of your teaching and preparation. So in essence, you've put the game on your shoulders as a coach.
On the other side of the spectrum, I don't know how many times in the course of the technical aspects of the game and in clinics I've heard coaches say "well the player has to make plays too." Think about that answer. First of all, you've eliminated yourself from the formula for success. It's now him adlibbing. It has become his play. Secondly, you've coped out. What most coaches need to say is "I can't figure out an answer so I'm hoping he does!" It's the football equivalent of a bailout of a bankrupt coach. It's your job as a coach to give him the answers. And, if you don't know find out. If you're one of these coaches then you better have a "magician" to create an offense where it isn't there by design.
In the end, these kind of "outside the box" players will lose more games for you and get you fired quicker than you can say "wow!" to his last great move. If you don't believe that, do some research on Jeff George, who many say had one of the greatest physical skill sets to enter the NFL. His arm strength, release, and athletic ability caused coach after coach to risk their careers on him. Many lost that risk. Over and over again, as he traveled from team to team, you read "he just doesn't play within the system. The fans love the individual plays but they'll quickly blame you when the adlib goes astray. They'll blame it on the lack of structure or bad play-calling. It can't be the quarterback, he just went 60 all on his own.
So now, when defining our offense, we include as the first "skill sets" for a quarterback three aspects that have nothing to do with physical or mental capacity:

Understands what we are trying to accomplish schematically with the offense

Is able to manage and execute within the limits of the offense (this may include other physical skills listed later on.)

Has a burning desire to run the offense as described (this is important because we've all heard the phrase "I just want to make plays."

If you find somebody with some athletic ability that can adhere to this and you have a complete sound system then you have it all. If you don't have that great athlete or if you have to settle for a little less ability, by sticking to these principles you still have a chance the offense will do as it was designed to do and score through execution and coaching.