• Kevin Kallmyer, University of Mary Washington ‘10 — 2010 NDT Semifinalist
• Gabe Murillo, Wayne State University ‘07 — 2006 and 2007 NDT Semifinalist, 2007 NDT Top Speaker
• Greta Stahl, Michigan State University ‘04 — 2004 NDT Champion, 2002 NDT Semifinalist
• Carly Wunderlich, Michigan State University ‘10 — 2010 NDT Champion

Kevin and Carly represented the affirmative and argued that the United States should withdraw its combat forces from Afghanistan in order to maintain hegemony and stabilize both Pakistan and Central Asia. Greta and Gabe countered with several arguments but eventually settled in their final rebuttal on a Midterms disadvantage and takeouts to the affirmative case.

The debate was moderated by Will Repko, the coach of the 2010 National Debate Tournament Champions. Repko has now coached three NDT Champions in the last seven years and is widely regarded as one of the nation’s best debate educators—he uses the demonstration debate to discuss a wide range of strategic and tactical issues with the audience.

The video of the debate is divided into two parts and is available below the fold.

Part One: Intro through 2NC CX

Part Two: 2NC CX through 2AR

You can read it here

1. Judge philosophies are for the most part totally useless. Most of them read exactly the same “i’ll vote for anything if you explain it well etc”. Even the few that break from this mold are usually a series of opinions followed by “however, these are just my defaults, I will ignore them based on arguments in a debate”.

2. There doesn’t seem to be a better way to get the crucial information you need as a debater out of a judges head. Asking questions before the debate usually yields more of the same-  a bland, flavorless mush of information not helpful for you to adapt.

There had to be a better way. So I decided to come up with a hypothetical that would serve as a debate rorschach test. I tried to create a scenario that would be as balanced as possible so that people could then project onto it their views of debate.

Some issues I wanted to address included (among others)

-what constitutes an argument

-what emphasis is placed on evidence quality

-how big a part of the activity is research

-how do judges interpret/reward spin

-many judges tell debaters to call out bad/stupid arguments, will they put their money where their mouth is?

These are issues I think judges often aren’t entirely honest about in their JP’s.

I will use Bill as an example here. I use Bill not because I thought his comments were uniquely interesting, but because due to his writing on here and his comments on the podcasts there is a larger body of his work to draw on.

In his JP Bill says-

I have voted negative when the 2NR has gone for positions that I think are stupid—even once for Heidegger—but this is usually because the affirmative messed something up, not because the negative really “won”. On the other hand, I have often voted affirmative despite believing that the negative debated very well and demonstrated superior technical skills when they have gone for a stupid argument/strategy. If you rely on spin control and technical superiority to overcome the odious quality of your stale and generic 1NC strategies, I am a really bad judge for you.

Yet his posts about the hypothetical indicate he would vote neg and endorse the technical spin in a K debate.

He later writes-

2. I really don’t get the Heidegger argument. At all. You know how some judges are extremely frustrating because they won’t vote on a particular argument or genre of argument and you don’t find that out until after you’ve gone for it and lost? It’s like that, except I’m warning you ahead of time. I’ve actually voted negative once this year when the 2NR went for Heidegger: the 1AR spent about 15 seconds on it (the 1NR had taken it for five minutes) and I still almost voted aff on “calculative thought is inevitable and good beep beep beep”. I used to think the reason I couldn’t wrap my head around the Heidegger argument was because I just hadn’t seen someone competent extend it, but I’m still waiting and I’m not very optimistic. Unless you think you’ll be the first person to successfully convince me that identifying problems and solving them causes extinction (or *gasp* something worse!), you are encouraged to go for another position.

Bill no doubt has read more K literature, and more about Heidegger specifically, then the average high schooler trying to write a 2AC block to it. And yet here he indicates that it is possible he just can’t “wrap his head around it”, but believes a student debating in front of him should understand it.

I was honestly shocked when I read that Bill would vote neg because I think we have been on a few panels where a debate broke down very similar to the hypothetical (though obviously not this extreme) and Bill voted aff and I voted neg.

Similarly, if I was asked to wager how Herndon would vote based on judging with him and this from his JP:

I ultimately think that I am a pretty fair judge that falls somewhere in the middle in terms of K debates. I’d probably PREFER a politics throw down. However, I enjoy a discussion of postcolonialism and ontology as much as the next person. I think you should read whatever you want. Being good on an argument I dislike is better than being bad on an argument I like. Both sides should focus on the role of the ballot, how the impacts interact with one another, and why the world of the alt/aff is better in comparison. I will vote for the K and do so regularly – although i will often make jokes about being openly hostile towards it. If you give me a piece of Zizek or Baudrillard evidence you can expect me to scoff at it as I read it. If you aren’t explaining the K I will vote against you if it makes no sense. I think the neg has to work very hard for me to completely ignore the advantages to the aff. I default to comparing the philosophical and political implications to the aff.

I would have bet on him going neg. This is not to insult/denigrate the judging skills of either Herndon or Batterman. I will save the insults/denigration for Roy.

Roy starts out

As I’ve gotten older (maybe grumpier too) more things seem to frustrate me with the debates I judge. I’m not sure if some of the debating has transitioned (note that means become worse) or I’ve become a pickier critic. I feel like this may become more of a blog post then judge philosophy but I promise it’s a good read one way or another.

Roy, your promise was broken.

He later says:

2.) Key argument emphasis- The other speeches seldom slow down and emphasize key arguments, most of it is a random array of blitzing through arguments. I can count the number of times my kids and others have walked out of rooms saying we just got screwed XYZ judge just didn’t understand our argument. Are you really naïve / cocky / dumb enough to think that they didn’t get it? If you win the debate I promise I’ll vote for you, but if you don’t do the work to win the debate I won’t gift it to you.

3.) Even if statements. While you obviously always think your opponents arguments suck, I don’t necessarily always agree. Why don’t you tell me about how even if they win xyz crappy argument that you should still win because of ABC? This is why coaches want their kids to judge debates more. The perspective you gain from the back of the room helps you know how to sell your argument. Your goal is not just to be right, but to easily convince me of it. Decisions take much longer because this is missing from so many debates

…

5.) Evidence comparison anyone? It seems like since 2002 anything with a tag, cite, url and some text is considered evidence. Notice how “quals” is missing from that. Aside from the fact that evidence is usually so bad, its qualifications are often worse. Teams do not invest sufficient time into beating up people’s evidence. Where is it from? Who wrote it? Is that person qualified? When is it from? Does it have a warrant? Does It even say what its tagged? I am convinced a 2ar could beat up most politics disads by just indicting the evidence, mocking it for quality, and extending the aff. I will not do the work here for you. I will not read another team’s evidence and say because it was bad I won’t vote on it unless YOU TELL ME TO DO THIS. Maybe judges are to blame for accepting too much, but the relative non interventionist in me finds it reasonable that teams should have to point out their evidence is bad. While this might encourage people to cut bad “cards”, they will get their act together when they lose on bad evidence.

Obvi he votes neg…

I will stop for a moment here to discuss how I would vote. From 2001 until probably 2007 I would of voted neg without even thinking about it. 2007- now probably voted neg after some thought, perhaps a great deal of it. Now I am less sure.

You can obviously debate how well I constructed a hypothetical that is actually balanced, but I think if you read back through the comments knowing what I was trying to accomplish you can quickly see that everyone who comments (including me in my devils advocate posts) is injecting a LOT into the debate, and especially after their views are challenged they double down on their initial impressions and cast them as absolutes.

This is particularly evident in the “toulmin model” posts that just keep repeating the aff has not made “an argument”. This seems clearly false. They may not have “made an argument” about the substance of the K (though that is also debatable), they have clearly made an argument about how the judge should resolve competing claims when 1 is “spin” and 1 is “evidence”.

In this particular instance, one thing I tell kids all the time and that I have heard several of the posters in the thread tell students is that it is bad to just repeat your arguments and not clash with what the other team is saying. That is what the neg is doing here, repeating their ABC in each speech. The aff has already made their response to ABC, and read a piece of evidence on it. The aff then moved on to arguing about why you should prefer that piece of evidence over analytics from a debater. At the end of many debates judges are left to decide for themselves whether or not to prefer a piece of evidence or an argument from a debater. Several people I talked too about this all responded “yes” that it would be better for the neg to re-read or paraphrase parts of the evidence then it would be to give this 1AR. That seems totally insane, and to me is what is wrong with many debates. Teams who don’t understand their arguments “fake it” and then win, never being forced to actually go back and learn what they are talking about.

I think the obvious part that throws people off here is the aff admission that they don’t know what is going on/understand the arguments in the round. If that part of the 1AR had been removed, and the aff had just said “the block spin is garbage, prefer our card, it answers all their warrants” and then paraphrased parts of the card, I think many more people would have voted aff. And IMO that demonstrates how silly their “tolmin model” point is, it can be manipulated to feign understanding so easily that it serves no purpose.

The neg here has given “claim, warrant, evidence”, but based on all the cards in the debate (which is their evidence) and the aff’s card, it is wrong. They have misinterpreted their evidence. The aff is pointing this out, but can’t really explain why. How often does this happen in debates about the economy, climate science, or international relations theory? Based on the responses in this thread one would guess never. Based on my experience, quite frequently.

The last thing I will comment on for now is the people who have told me something like “if we just look at cards, why not just mail them in and skip the speaking”. This seems facially ridiculous. The aff has not said ‘evidence should always trump talking’. They have made a specific argument about the content of this debate, the team they are debating, and this particular argument. The neg FAILED to talk their way out of it- they didn’t respond to it in any way. If you really read this hypothetical and the conclusion you came to was voting aff means the death of speaking and the rise of the cult of evidence I am a little amazed. This, to me, seems like the weakest challenge of them all- if we place so much emphasis on speech should the neg not be required to SAY that the aff’s argument is ridiculous as you think it to be? Apparently not.

The reduction of the hypothetical to “spin vs evidence” is fatally flawed- both sides are using spin and evidence, just in different places.

-top level nonsense like value to life/ontology etc
-security
-IR Fem
-china threat
-zizek
-schmitt

Aff K Final- Wave 2

Big thanks to all those who emailed in cards/files/cites

Thanks,

The Management

Resolved: the United States Federal Government should substantially increase the number of and/or substantially expand beneficiary eligibility for its visas for one or more of the following: employment-based immigrant visas, nonimmigrant temporary worker visas, family-based visas, human trafficking-based visas.

The resolution was selected from a list of five topics. Seventy schools submitted a vote.

Nuclear terrorism is an existential threat—it escalates to nuclear war with Russia and China.

Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves.

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem.

It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well.

Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41

Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo?

In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?

Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability?

If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation.

If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure?

If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

In response to this card the neg says a lot of spin that sounds very good about why this piece of evidence is wrong and doesn’t understand what their K is about.

The 1AR goes only to this piece of evidence and says the following:
“Look, we have no idea what the neg is saying. However, we have a card that is soo good it will make you crap your pants. Not only is it directly responding to what they are saying, it specifically indicts their author and goes through point by point every argument in the 2NC overview and refutes it. I would explain the warrants, but quite frankly, I don’t get it. However, we debated this K at the last tournament and didn’t understand it then either. We spent a whole month researching answers and after reading 20+ books on the subject we found this amazing card. The neg may sound good, but ultimately every argument in the 2NC in response to this card is unevidenced, made up on the spot drivel from a high school student- it may sound good, but there is no real substance behind it. The purpose of the judge is to decide what arguments were the best- we have by far read the best arguments, in order to vote negative you have to decide that we should lose even though we made the best argument, simply because we didn’t understand it. This defeats the whole purpose of a research based activity and punishes us for spending time reading about the topic instead of about obscure philosophy”.

The 2NR Says (amongst other things) the following:

“Their evidence misses the boat- our K makes three key arguments, which are A, B, and C. This indict doesn’t respond to thee arguments because of …..” And then gives a long winded explanation.

Is this debate winnable for the aff at this point in your mind?

Assume the 2AR says more of the same the 1AR said.

You call for the neg cards and the 1 aff card. Upon reading the neg cards, you find that they do clearly make arguments A, B, and C and explain them well, just like the negative said.

Now you look at the aff card. You actually crap your pants. Never before in your life have you seen an on point response that is this good. The card clearly identifies A, B, and C as arguments made by the neg author, and then deconstructs them in such a devastating way that you would bet your life that they are not only false, but that the opposite is true. Assume the neg cards nor the aff card speaks to the “spin” placed on the evidence by the negative.

How do you vote and why?