PRP of Beito

Beito raped and murdered a girl. The trial judge found facts predicate to the exceptional sentenced imposed. Those familiar with Blakely know that the jury is supposed to find facts predicate to an exceptional sentence. Unfortunately, the judge’s hands were tied due to legislation not in line with Blakely. Thus, Beito must be sentenced to the standard range.

The real argument here is whether Beito stipulated to ANY sentence and additional findings. He did stipulate to the facts as pleaded in the information for purposes of sentencing range. However, the judge’s finding that the crimes were closely related to each other isn’t one found in the information.

JJs Jim Johnson and Fairhurst dissented based on the fact that Beito acknowledged that the trial court may impose a greater than standard range. However, this argument seems to go towards emotion rather than the clear mandate of Blakely.

Federal Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State

The legislatures formulas for funding school’s do not violate our State Constitutional mandate in Article IX, s. 2. Section 2 of Article IX states, “[t]he legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.” Uniformity doesn’t mean uniform base salaries for everyone, but rather, “that ‘every child shall have the same advantages and be subject to the same discipline as every other child.’  Sch. Dist. No. 20 v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 502, 99 P. 28 (1909).

Our cases discussing article IX, section 2 make it clear that the provision requires uniformity in the educational program provided, not the minutiae of funding. Such details — unless specifically mandated by the constitution — are the province of the legislative branch. See Const. art. II, § 1 (legislative authority vested in the legislature, subject to powers reserved by the people); Const. art. IX, § 2 (mandating limits on the use of common school fund revenues). Federal Way School District fails to overcome the presumption that the statutory funding formulas are constitutional and fails to prove that the disparities in those formulas have violated article IX, section 2.

Federal Way also made an Article IX s. 1 argument that the State failed to fund all school districts the same. Unfortunately, the clause only requires ample funding, not uniform funding. No case has ever required that ample means uniform formulas for salary.

Finally, and this doesn’t come up often, the court held that the individual parent claims weren’t justiciable. The individual claimants tried to claim they were denied a benefit by the use of a different formula. However, the formula allocates money to the school, not to any individual, thus they had no claim to the moneys. They were unable to show any actual harm, unlike the Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 case, in which the levy program was alleged to have caused sufficient harm. The students, in fact, are above average.

In this tight economy, Career Services Centers at law schools nationwide have been forced to take a more pragmatic approach to finding students jobs

Courtesy of Courtoons.net

What is the point of doing a blog if I can’t take advantage of a little bit of promotion on behalf of social justice. What follows is an email from Peter O’Neil regarding a chance to make a difference in Guatemala.

Sent on behalf of Peter O’Neil.

My daughter, Gemma, has been accepted for a program where she volunteers all year in Seattle and then spends two weeks in Guatemala working with people to build schools, plant coffee, plant trees on reforestation projects and other worthwhile projects. She is trying to raise money for the projects by selling wreaths ($22), garlands (75 feet long — $62) and coffee ($12/12 ozs). The cool thing about the coffee is that the local farmers get one-half of the money which is extremely rare and the profits are then used to do projects. You may choose French Roast, Dark or Espresso (whole bean or ground).

Every person at my office has contributed and purchased at least one of these items. (I am the only person at my office.)

Since I can’t help her in other ways, I am returning to pester you with feelings of guilt and hopefulness. If you would like to order, please contact me at peter@peteroneil.net.

The wreaths and garlands need to be ordered by November 16^th and will be delivered to your office on November 24^th. Gemma can provide pictures of the wreath and garlands if you would like to see them.

If you like the coffee, she can sell it all year long which will continue to help the local farmers.

Thank you.

Peter

(Global Visionaries Project Fund)

As the Dean of the Amateur Law Professor is a Christmas Spirit kinda guy, I will be purchasing the wreath.

Burd v. Clarke, Sec. of Wa Dept of Corrections

Burd sought a writ of mandamus to order Clarke to complete his dangerous mentally ill offender assessment.  The trial court denied Burd’s MSJ and granted the Department’s MSJ.  Burd appeals the trial court’s decision arguing that RCW 72.09.370 requires Clarke to finish the assessment and develop a release plan.

The Department argues that this case is moot because they no longer confine Burd (he was transferred to Social and Health Services Special Commitment Center).  The court finds that the department does not have custody of Burd and therefore has no duty to conduct the evaluation.  The court agrees with the department that the case is moot.

Affirmed

State v. Johnson

Johnson was convicted of 2nd degree child molestation.  He appeals the conviction arguing that the court impermissibly allowed opinion testimony from a law witness, ineffective counsel for failing to object to the testimony, the court impermissibly commented on the evidence, and the trial court improperly imposed an exceptional sentence. 

The State introduced testimony that the wife of the accused had a conversation with the victim and that the victim admitted a sexual relationship with the accused and that based on that information the wife tried to commit suicide.  The trial court gave an instruction that stated that the defendant’s story does not need to be corroborated to be convicted. 

Johnson argued that the trial court should not have allowed the testimony of his wife’s conversation with the victim and her alleged suicide attempt after because it was improper opinion testimony to his guilt and introduced only for the reason that his wife believed that he was guilty.  This was not raised at trial and therefore the court looks to determine if a manifest Constitutional error occurred. The court finds three problems with the testimony; first that it did not shed light on the credibility of any witness or evidence, that the evidence is collateral and a witness should not be impeached on a collateral matter, and finally that it was very prejudicial.  The court also finds that this is a Constitutional error because it implicates Johnson’s right to a fair trial and actually affects his right to a fair trial.  The court explicitly holds that the testimony was inadmissible and served no other purpose but to prejudice the jury. 

The court reverses on the above argument but also holds that the instruction given by the trial court was not a erroneous comment on evidence. 

State v. Morales

Due to clerical inadvertence the published opinion was withdrawn.

State v. Williams

Williams was convicted for obstructing an office when he gave false identifying information and made false statements.  Williams appeals his conviction and argues that the RCW dealing with obstruction applies only to obstructive conduct and not speech.  He also argues that his counsel was ineffective for not arguing the same at trial. 

The court analyzed the statute which states that obstruction occurs when one, “willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement office in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties.” The court further defines hinder, delay, and obstruct using Webster’s dictionary.  The court held that, by the plain language and ordinary meaning of the statute, the statute does not treat conduct and speech differently and therefore, affirms Williams’ conviction.

In re Estate of Borghi

A has C, a son from a previous marriage. A buys Blackacre. A married B. A deeds Blackacre jointly to A & B. A dies instestate. Under the rules of separate property, Blackacre is property acquired before marriage and passes by the rules of intestate succession. Under the rule of presumed joint gifting, Blackacre goes to B.

The court simply framed the question as whether the warranty deed to A & B converted the property to community property such that it would pass to B. The rule is that absent sufficient evidence of an intent to convert the nature of the property, it stays what it was on the date of acquisition. “While this could be accomplished through a quit claim deed or other real property transfer, a properly executed community property agreement may also effectuate a transfer of real property.” Thus, simply including the name on the warranty deed, without further evidence of an intent to actually transfer the property to the community, doesn’t suffice. “We have consistently refused to recognize any presumption arising from placing legal title in both spouses’ names and instead adhered to the principle that the name on a deed or title does not determine the separate or community character of the property, or even provide much evidence.”

Always have to look to the true intent of the parties. If the evidence of intent is scant, you will have a hard time overcoming a presumption.

Now, given this was a 4-1-4 opinion, the breakdown of the law will only hold to the extent that it was concurred with:

See above. She adopted the lead opinion reasoning and wrote only to say that there was no other evidence outside the name on the deed, so the court, under our states abstention principles, should not have even looked to the question of what kind of evidence would be sufficient.