The Ambivalent Soapbox

Better The Devil You Know...

noreply@blogger.com (The Ambivalent Soapbox) — Sat, 03 Jan 2009 00:08:00 +0000

The invocative ideas of liberty, equality and freedom disseminated in Europe during the Enlightenment are often credited with the dynamic growth of market capitalism to the full scale industrialisation of production that enabled European states to assert their power. The similar provenance and close historical time frame of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution would suggest that they are connected. It would seem too great a coincidence to say that they were completely unrelated, though certainly there is no simple answer to what their relationship is. This essay focuses on the interaction between ideas, technology, economic growth and social institutions. The similarities between early modern China, Japan and Britain show that the relationship between ideas, social institutions and economic growth is not simply that one leads to the other, they develop concurrently. As an interrelated progress that is in no way inevitable but contingent on many factors. The ideas of the Enlightenment propelled the industrialisation of European economies and their military, enabling their eventual rise to power. However, European colonialism was not guided by the principles and ideas of the Enlightenment. It was the fierce nationalism and desire for power that compelled governments to engage in the violent conflicts and wars of the nineteenth century.

No linear progressions in colonial expansion
The consequences of Enlightenment thought initiated many social and political changes throughout Europe during the eighteenth century. These changes may have lead to the massive industrialisation of European states known as, the Industrial Revolution. The social and political reordering of France after the French Revolution in 1789 is one event that can be taken to discuss the changes that occurred in Europe during this period. Public enthusiasm for change after the Revolution led Napoleon to centralise government administration and codify the nation’s laws. This set in place the legal and administrative framework to enforce the rights of property and contract which allowed business and commerce the ability to securely operate in France. In England, there also existed the ‘political and social conditions [that] enabled merchants and industrialists to mobilize capital for investment…which drove the British economy into continuous and self-sustaining growth’. The crucial question here is whether the ideas that flourished during the Enlightenment instigated the political and social changes that facilitated economic growth, or whether a burgeoning middle class demanded social and political reform. The interaction between ideas, political administration, social institutions and economic growth is one of interdependent progression.

The interaction between economic growth and technological progress is also problematic if conceived as a linear or directional relationship. Although it would be true to acknowledge that technology sometimes leads to economic growth, or that directing resources to scientific research will likely result in some technological discovery. This is only indicative of the relationship between them and not of any linear progression. The invention of cotton spinning machinery is a useful example of this relationship, as its introduction into France did not result in the same economic growth that it did for the British textiles manufacturing industry. At the time both countries had comparable economies but Britain would ‘improve, adapt, and streamline existing techniques already in use, to reduce costs’ and improve the efficiency of technology. It is the innovative ideas that drove the synergy between technology and economic growth.

The economic similarities between pre-industrial Europe and Asia indicate a high degree of endogenous choice rather than inevitability or destiny for world hegemony by the European states. Some of the extensive research conducted by Kenneth Pomeranz considers the economic indicators and natural resources that were required for economic growth in pre-industrial Britain compared with China and Japan during the same period. Pomeranz findings show similar levels of soil depletion as well as supplies of timber, fuel and other essential resources in Britain, as there were in China and Japan. Whilst Britain possessed greater levels of livestock and land transport, China and Japan had developed remarkable water transport capabilities and equally impressive agricultural techniques. The average life expectancy across central Asia was equal to that of any European country. Furthermore, the operation of many commercial enterprises that coordinated the production of goods in China thrived during the late seventeenth and eighteenth century. The merchants of these commercial dynasties conducted credit arrangements, hired managers, operated over large geographical regions and supplied multiple lines of products. Chinese trade had political support and relative economic freedom, although only to the extent that commercial activity achieved social stability. China operated a market economy that was very similar to those in Europe at the time. Both Pomeranz and Wong present similar reasons for the subsequent divergence of Asia and the European states.

The European states seized labour and imposed international trade with the use of military force that propelled their own economic growth. Under the mercantilist belief that there was a limited amount of economic growth and resources to trade the European states, especially Britain, sought to exploit and control international trade. The British Empire imported grain and wood from North America, precious metals from Brazil, Peru and Mexico, drained all the resources and labour they could from India and exploited slave labour from Africa. The influx of resources to Britain propelled their economic growth and military power, which they in turn used to enforce further beneficial trade. Pomeranz attributes the British ‘engines of growth’ to a fortuitous geography and slight technological advantage, which then led other European states to follow. Whilst accurate, both Pomeranz and Wong provide an idiographic analysis of the European rise to preeminence that is primarily concerned with describing particular realities, rather than providing explanations for why these realities took place.

Reason triumphs in providing economic growth, but history refuses to end.

The dissemination of knowledge and development of reason to substantiate knowledge transformed European social and political institutions. In his work ‘The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth,’ Joel Mokyr delineates an historical causation for the transformation of European institutions and how these changes initiated economic growth during the Industrial Revolution. In the late seventeenth century, some Scottish universities and several smaller German academic organisations began to focus on the enquiry of ‘reason’, and with the establishment of the British Royal Society in 1662 as a formal club ‘devoted to scientific and technical discourse’ the seeds of reason and scientific discourse had begun. By the eighteenth century, there was a prolific rise in the formation of provincial clubs and organisations, like the Birmingham Lunar Society, as institutions for specialised and professional knowledge. The dissemination and formalisation of ‘reason’ and knowledge continued slowly throughout most of Europe but most significantly within France and Britain. The influence of these ideas and continued collection and dissemination of knowledge advanced agricultural techniques and developed productive economic practices.

In Britain, the initial development of commercial relations and professional technical skills began in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. By 1740, British merchant capitalism managed to institute principles of law and order, enforceable contracts, credit arrangements, productive trade practices and capital investment. Significant improvements were made to agricultural techniques, such as crop rotation and fodder cropping. Institutions with formalised structures that emphasised economic growth and innovative ideas can account for the initial propensity for growth in the British economy. However, it was then essential that production became more innovative and efficient if it was to sustain future growth, or as E. L. Jones famously wrote, ‘economic history may be thought of as a struggle between a propensity for growth and one for rent-seeking’. This initial advantage was in no way certain to become sustained economic growth, and the continued expansion of the British state would have to be based on innovative and increasingly efficient technology.

The social and political institutions in Britain that had enabled their initial growth also facilitated the development of innovation, ideas and technology in the nineteenth century. Machinery such as the iron blast furnace and the steam engine powered British industrialisation and continual technical improvements refined the technology to increase its efficiency. A professional, technical and specialised body of 'useful knowledge' was developed with the meticulous classification, measuring and cataloguing of material properties and facts, that could range from the shortest way to sail across the sea, to the pressure limit of a vessel or the correct fertilizer in a given type of soil. The British textiles manufacturing, mining and metal industries all grew so rapidly in the thirty years from 1850 that by 1881 industry and industry related occupations employed 44 percent of the entire British labour force. Industrialisation was not just building factories it meant 'establishing systems of management and control of skilled labor, sourcing raw materials, and establishing transport and outlets'. Britain achieved sustained economic growth from the technical and innovative ideas that first fostered and then propelled industrialisation.

The Industrialisation and modernisation of social and political institutions continued to spread throughout Europe during the nineteenth century. The impact of Enlightenment thought on institutional reforms moved steadily, and by the 1880s and 1890s, the modernisation of German universities produced a steady flow of science and engineering graduates. With a skilled and educated work force the chemical, electrical, and precision instrument industries in Germany developed quickly, adding to their economic strength. Industrial activity established in areas of France and Italy with textile and metallurgical industries. Whilst it was necessary to disseminate knowledge in order for it to become formally institutionalised, dissemination was not sufficient to ensure that knowledge survived and flourished in every European state. In areas with a poorly educated work force like Russia, despite huge deposits of natural resources and labour, industrialisation progressed very slowly. Although many European states fostered an environment that was conducive to the ideas of the Enlightenment it was never a foregone conclusion that they would survive.

The ideas of the Enlightenment, in particular the primacy of ‘reason’, were contingent on many social, political and ideological conditions to culminate and allow them to formalise. There are many examples throughout history of societies with great knowledge or economic growth that did not result in sustained growth, this was the case for the classical antiquity in China, the great discoveries of Renaissance Europe and the prosperity of the Dutch in the seventeenth century. However, during the eighteenth century in early modern Europe there was a growing proclivity to question tradition and in order ‘to understand the origins of the triumphs of Enlightenment thought, we must understand the victory of scepticism and rebellion against authority in the centuries of early modern Europe’ and the political fragmentation that allowed rebellious agitators to avoid persecution. In Europe during the eighteenth century there existed a milieu of interdependent societal factors that fostered the Enlightenment. Each of which were dependent on the environment they created as a whole to arise, and were each necessary to establish the social and political institutions that sustained them.

An irony of the Enlightenment thought was that the intellectual and economic competition it enabled also provided the industrial capabilities to fuel nationalist competition between nation states. European colonial expansion and the intensity of competing nationalisms in the period after 1870, was of a different magnitude to that of the mid nineteenth century. The progressive wings of the Enlightenment were constantly struggling with the instincts of economic rivalry and political hostility. However, the competitive rivalries and potent nationalism of the European powers proved to be more decisive. The European governments had new medicines, communication technology and weaponry to supply their armies and were in a much stronger position to assert their colonial and national interests. The British, the Dutch and the French all pursued their own commercial interests by conquering and colonising other parts of the world. Most of sub-Saharan Africa was seized by the European powers, beginning in about 1878 when the French strengthened their hold on West Africa. Then in 1882, the British occupied Egypt and by 1898 had conquered the upper Nile region as well. The strident nationalism of the European powers continued to evolve as they conquered more territories often as simply a preemptive exercise on the chance they would provide a strategic advantage in the future. The British Indian empire reinforced its influence throughout the Middle East; the Dutch asserted their control of the Indonesian archipelago and German colonies formed in West Africa and New Guinea. The thoughts and ideas of the Enlightenment that modernised Europe and developed their industrial and military strength did not guide their political endeavour to expand, or curb their nationalism. Finally, the desire for hegemony would ignite the fierce competition for domination and result in the First World War.

The social institutions that established ‘reason’ and logical scientific thought in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries facilitated the thoughts and ideas of the Enlightenment. The principles of equality, liberty and fraternity inspired further enthusiasm for reform that resulted in the French Revolution. Any comparative analysis of European society with other societies to isolate particularities of European culture does not identify an exact cause of these events. Many similar practices, resources and living standards existed in China and Japan during the same period. The environment that existed in Europe was an interaction of the many societal conditions discussed, each of which was fostered, contingent and furthered by each of the other conditions.

The primacy of ‘reason’ and freedom entrenched in the British institutions encouraged productivity, ingenuity and economic growth. Knowledge became the basis for creating more knowledge through the socialisation of a common belief in ‘reason’. This established institutions that supported intellectual competition and scientific pursuit. The individual and economic freedom institutionalised in France and Britain created a commercial competition that propelled the industrialisation of Europe. Despite claims made that the British were civilising nations or that Napoleon was liberating the people, the thoughts and ideas of the Enlightenment did not guide European governments to colonial expansion. The conflict and wars of the nineteenth century were fought for resources, nationalist fervour and the desire for hegemony.

There were always many forces confronting the ideals of the Enlightenment and such ideals alone do not create better living conditions, improve the quality and longevity of human life, or sustain economic growth. However, social and political institutions that constitute a belief in the primacy of ‘reason’ work to prevent the inequality, corruption and violent conflicts which destroy the many efforts to create a better future.

Is the Hokey Pokey REALLY what it's all about?

noreply@blogger.com (The Ambivalent Soapbox) — Fri, 10 Oct 2008 06:20:00 +0000

The unfortunate reality of frequent injustice and widespread inequality present in the world today, gives good reason for one to ask the question 'why?' and moreover, what are the alternatives to the dominant systems of market capitalism and liberal democracies that have allowed these inequalities to continue. A brief reading of Fukuyama's 'End of History' may lead you to believe that there are currently no alternatives, or at least, no viable alternatives to capitalist liberal democracies. Whether you understand Fukuyama's thesis as the grand triumph of 'western' social, political and economic systems, or as a disheartening realisation that there are limits to the extent of selfless human nature, either way it certainly encourages me to seek out a more encompassing and thorough understanding of the alternatives.

One such alternative has been presented in some of Chomsky's earlier work on anarchism and I was hopeful that it would contain a few refreshing ideas. It seems that in many ways anarchism applies a similar understanding of society as socialism or communism, however different in their conception of authority. Anarchism has the same reliance on participation being freely undertaken by the individual. I do not wish to retract my earlier sentiment and favour for selfless human nature but I do not intend to have blind faith in humanity either. It is the reliance on work as being freely undertaken that I question. That everyone will participate in the community and become involved because of an inner impulse to this 'highest want in life' is highly questionable. Clearly, Chomsky does not envisage himself as part of a socialist, communist or anarchist state in the waste management or service industry. Anarchism does not provide an answer to how is it that the debilitating, menial and dangerous jobs will just be 'freely undertaken' by the individual, perhaps society should engage in some form of individual subsistence farming so that these jobs do not exist?? And for this we must somehow deny our tendency to value items that we have a particular affinity for.

By placing a value on products we are simply formalising the preference for one item over another. This is all that capitalism is; nothing more, nothing less, and personally I do value things differently. The enjoyment I get from reading a book is far greater than the convenience of having an object to stop a door from closing, and so I place a higher value on a book than I do on a doorstop. A system that is able to assign value to products in this way will be successful because it reflects natural human behaviour. Assigning different values to products is market capitalism. Which is all good and well but when the free market enables such a gross inequality in the distribution of wealth there should be some measures taken, as there must be some way, to achieve a more balanced distribution of wealth.

I think in many ways it does come back to the individual, theirs choices and involvement with collective action. Most of us are capable of volunteering our time, if not money, to local charity organisations or community groups. Alternatively, the many overseas or internationally focused organisations and NGOs that deal with humanitarian aid, famine relief, microloans, global justice and human rights, not only depend on their volunteers and charitable donations but also benefit from any increased awareness and public support for their cause. Furthermore, we should support the politicians that take up these issues. Though admittedly, the individual can be somewhat removed from the political process and when politicians lie, cheat, deceive, drink like sailors on leave, get blowjobs in the Whitehouse, take paper bag bribes and then attack the poor wait staff of a restaurant, it is hard not to think of politics as some tawdry wheel o' fortune game show.

Unfortunately, the consequence is that more and more people have become disillusioned and feel alienated from the political process but the responsibility does not lie solely with the political elite. If you won't take action yourself, there's no point expecting your representative to do so. Especially given the fact that governments are increasingly beholden to the transnational corporate hegemons which operate virtually unrestricted by national borders in a global marketplace that has no moral or ethical basis for the distribution of wealth. TNCs financially support the political parties that allow them to freely operate and also provide often desperately needed capital for the national economy, but in doing so TNCs cede power from government bodies and diminish state sovereignty. This is discussed at length in some of Saskia Sassen's work that is well worth taking the time to read.

The distribution of goods and services in a capitalist market economy does not require a completely unregulated and unfettered 'free market' for it to operate. The overwhelming consensus in favour of economic liberalisation and deregulation is a relatively recent change in economic policy. Baffled by the combination of stagnant economic growth and continued inflation (stagflation) in the 1970s President Nixon followed by Reagan in the United States and later Thatcher in England opted to pursue the liberal economic theory of Friedrich Hayek. Unsure as to why the policies of controlled economic management were not sufficiently guiding the economy to provide steady growth, the once popular Keynesian economic modeling was all but abandoned. By lowering tariffs, offshoring manufacturing, floating the national currency and the privatisation of the public sector, governments integrated into a world economy. Often implemented as a 'shock therapy' solution to stimulate growth or stem hyperinflation. Trade liberalisation is a means of destructive creation, whereby the initial effect is that prices would rise and growth would slow, but further on economies are then able to achieve sustained growth. As Paul Keating declared to Australia it was 'the recession we had to have'. There is an excellent three part series called 'Commanding Heights' produced by PBS that covers the history of dominant economic theories in the 20th Century and if you have read this far, it is probably of some interest to you.

In countries with weak political and financial institutions, or without the legal and regulatory bodies to implement the process of integration with the world economy, economic liberalisation was disastrous. The most notable example is the Asian economic crisis of the 1990s, but also in Latin America with the collapse of the Mexican and Bolivian economies. Of course, this did not stop the developed countries and the IMF from providing (and I use the word 'providing' very loosely) their cure-all economic liberalisation pill, for whom they were ultimately the beneficiaries. Hayek's liberal economic theory saw market economies as more akin to a force of nature that will, and should be allowed to, dictate its own direction, rather than an intricate machine that could be controlled by governments. The United States for most of the 20th Century pursued a relatively liberal economic policy, with the exception of agricultural tariffs. However, the United States has on several occasions facilitated incredible debt relief, notably in Mexico, that seems to be quite contradictory in terms of their history and conviction that capital markets pursue a natural path, guided as they are by what Adam Smith described as the invisible hand of supply and demand. The United States latest attempt to circumvent the natural corrections of a free market is in relation to their recent financial crisis. Where the artificially inflated real estate market was propped up by the rampant and largely unregulated home loans and credit sector. Now that the 700 billion dollar economic relief package has finally passed through the US Senate, perhaps we are once again leaning towards the controlled economies put forth by John Maynard Keynes.

Over the past thirty years the economic divide has continued to grow. The United Nations Development Report (2004) showed that the world's richest third of countries increased their per capita income on average by 1.9% every year between 1970 and 1995, whilst the middle third increased by an average only 0.7% and the world's poorest countries showed no increase whatsoever over the quarter century. One figure provided by the UN Development Report (1995-2005) that is often used as a measure of poverty is the number of people living on less than US$1 a day, and indeed between 1995 and 2005 this figure dropped significantly. However, the number of people that live on less than US$2 a day, a staggering 2.8 billion people, more than accounts for the drop in US$1 a day figures. This does not mean that more people are now twice as wealthy, US$2 buys about the same amount of poverty as one dollar used to.

Thankfully, many developed countries, the IMF, the World Bank and international institutions, such as the UN and ASEAN, have realised the devastating effects these policies had. Now abandoning the false assumptions of a 'win-win' situation that was predicted by many economists and disseminated by a flurry of 'free traders' in the late 20th Century. No doubt, in part assisted by the anti-globalisation, G8 and G20 summit protests that have run furiously around the world. Personally, I don't agree with their exact opinions or the sentiment that drove so many people to speak out against globalisation and international cooperation. Nevertheless, I applaud any effort to question and challenge the dominant theories and policies that guide our world system. It is now a matter of voting not only with your ballot paper, but your voice, your feet and your consumer dollar as well.

In allowing myself a modest glimpse of optimism, I will believe that through the international cooperative efforts of ASEAN, the G8 and G20 summits and the UN, combined with the new direction of the less politically encumbered IMF and World Bank the influence of TNCs to direct policy will be increasingly quelled and sovereignty will become the coordination of mutually beneficial joint efforts between states, a kind of shared sovereignty. This may seem like the wide-eyed aspirations of an idealist that has been somewhat tempered by a dose of cynicism. Held together in a protracted, prolonged and lingering diatribe that ends with the overly optimistic hopes and dreams of an oxymoronic notion of 'shared sovereignty' as the future of international relations. And on all counts you'd be exactly right, but you chose to read The Ambivalent Soapbox and you can't very well unread it.

Capitalism: save your guilt for church.

noreply@blogger.com (The Ambivalent Soapbox) — Mon, 01 Sep 2008 09:51:00 +0000

Naomi Klein’s ‘No Logo’ gives a chilling account of the reality for factory workers in Cavite. Klein portrays the atrocities of what is in effect slave labour as the product of transnational corporations (TNCs) outsourcing production. TNCs can only lower their production costs with the assistance of national governments that eschew regulatory protections seeking the capital to sustain local growth. However, the motivation for governments to waive regulations that protect workers’ rights is not readily apparent. As noted by Klein wages within the export processing zones (EPZs) are barley enough to cover workers’ food, accommodation and transport, it could hardly sustain real growth. Although highlighting this anomaly Klein neglects to provide any substantive reason for the provision of EPZs by the governments of developing countries. Presumably these governments derive profits from some of the many subcontractors that manage the TNCs production and manufacturing.

I realise there are some concerns regarding the dominant position of TNCs, especially in terms of them ceding power from the nation state. Surely an argument in favour of greater power or even sovereignty for the UN or at least support for the WTO and World Bank to affect policy and positive change as they move away from the false assumptions of the ‘Washington Consensus’. But to suggest that a corporation cannot dictate their business endeavours is ridiculous. The same way a newspaper does not produce the paper they print on because they are in the business of selling ideas. It is their choice to do so. These ‘super brands’ should also be free to choose brand management over manufacturing.

In many ways capitalism upholds and embodies many of the fundamental principles of a liberal society. The freedom to acquire property, ownership of that property and the ability to choose the terms of trade for that property, reflect the principles of individual liberty and freedom of choice (see Nozick's work for a proper discussion). However, without state protections this freedom can lead to terrible abuse. Here’s a clip of Noam Chomsky talking about globalisation. One of the issues of globalisation Chomsky highlights is the spread of free trade, neoclassical liberal economic policy and the ‘Washington Consensus’, all of which are more or less the same theory.

What Chomsky says is that free trade has been improperly applied, that it is not free enough. High tariffs on agricultural imports to developed countries restrict the growth of an export industry that developing countries rely upon. Furthermore, and citing the work of Adam Smith, Chomsky points to the restrictions on the movement of people. Ever increasing immigration controls stymie the ability of people to seek the higher wages in developed countries. So that capital flows into developed countries without any equalisation from the movement of people. I think these issues need to be addressed specifically and not just with broad recriminations and repudiation of the capitalist economic system. “Viva la Reforma!” (not revolucion.)

One Size Fits All

noreply@blogger.com (The Ambivalent Soapbox) — Sat, 30 Aug 2008 07:27:00 +0000

In the spirit of living up to the claim of ambivalence, here’s a little rejoinder to “C’mon baby, do the glocamotion”. I was reading a blog by Dave Webb that covered his thoughts and changing perspective on multiculturalism as opposed to assimilation. Having been presented with various views through university, I’ve also come to change my position on multiculturalism. One piece of information which sticks in my mind is the lauded assimilation policy of France and seemingly repudiated multicultural policy of England. These articles seem to miss an element of valuing cultural heritage by focusing on the standard of living, health and education of (in this case Islamic) migrants and neglecting to consider culture. If assimilation leads to the loss of culture, where are these stats recorded? Does cultural heritage have to become cultural economy to justify its worth, its very existence.

In the past I always considered multiculturalism to have an inherently positive effect on society, and to a great extent still do. However, I now think there are some limits. Patrick Parkinson separates multiculturalism into five stages; toleration, non-discrimination, legal accessibility, (affirmative) multiculturalism and pluralism. The first three stages are less active and more or less adhere to conceptions of negative liberty (see Isaiah Berlin’s seminal work). The final two stages require far more public and administrative support and aspire to establish liberty in a positive sense. I now consider pluralism to perhaps be unattainable and probably undesirable. Pluralism as a multicultural concept is primarily concerned with autonomy. Separate communities with different legal and socio-political organisations that live harmoniously alongside one another within the boundaries of a single nation state. To my mind, this goes against the nature of multicultural policies that seek to bring cultures closer together. I understand there will be some tensions. It was pointed out to me that I probably don’t notice these tensions as much because I don’t look for them. I am still very much in favour of achieving a multicultural policy (and practice!) that lies somewhere between affirmative multiculturalism and complete pluralism.

"C'mon baby, do the glocamotion"

noreply@blogger.com (The Ambivalent Soapbox) — Sat, 30 Aug 2008 07:24:00 +0000

Reading Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s article 'World Heritage and Cultural Economics' and made me think about consumerism and commercialisation and how almost everything has a dollar value put on it nowadays. An issue raised in “The Corporation” a film by Mark Achbar, Joel Bakan and Jennifer Abbott based on the book 'The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power' by Joel Bakan. When economic feasibility is necessary for sustaining cultural heritage, I can’t help but feel that this somehow marginalises it. That culture should be sacrosanct. But is it?

Cultures change over time and as they develop a new expression the result, to my mind, can be an exciting fusion of influences. Local fusions of music, food, design and art that are then experienced worldwide. In Australia we can enjoy music from “Bonde do Roll” a local Brazillian Baille Funk band probably best known for “Marina Gasolina” which was briefly a Bonds underwear ad before they realised what the translation was.

Admittedly there is some turbulence - problems such as cultural dispositions towards individual as opposed to group rights (see Will Kymlicka’s work for an excellent discussion of these tensions). It is ignorance that breeds these tensions. We have more in common than is sometimes recognised. By producing culture that connects people we improve the understanding we have of each other. I'd like to see more cultural fusion put into motion. It displays the inherent beauty of culture, perhaps transformed, possibly for sale, and why not mutually, even universally, appreciated.

Consuming the other, it's a guilt free pleasure.

noreply@blogger.com (The Ambivalent Soapbox) — Sat, 30 Aug 2008 07:19:00 +0000

There's nothing I hate more than a chai swilling hippy trying to touch their inner Hindu while their trust fund matures faster than they do. Don't get me wrong I love Kashmiri tea, but face it - when you travel, you are a tourist. There is certainly a difference in the experience you get from a tour group or on a beach holiday, and the one you have by just winging it. I'm just not sure that a sacred life-changing journey is possible. Daniel Boorstin seems to be onto something in his book 'The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America' when he says that in today's world the authentic tourist experience is just not possible. Most people go to places they've read about in the guidebook and then take similar photos to those in the guidebook. For sure this synthetic version of travel is best avoided.

In India my girlfriend and I were even lucky enough to be taken in by a local family. Found lost and stranded at the mercy of the Indian rail system we were rescued and housed us for two weeks. This was as authentic an experience as you may be fortunate enough to receive. There's a Pulp song 'common people' that goes on about how everyone hates a tourist, but there's no escaping that it's not your reality, it's not your life. So take a photo. Eat something crazy. Hell - do some soul searching but don't be fooled into thinking you're going to find yourself in the backstreets of Burma and still catch the budget flight home on Monday.

We are one, we are many, but where am I?

noreply@blogger.com (The Ambivalent Soapbox) — Mon, 25 Aug 2008 00:27:00 +0000

I love this idea of 'national identity'. An inspirational and aspirational communal identity. An idea as juicy as a hamburger that inspires zealous affirmation and passionate fervour. An idea worth dying for? My Australian Nationality, is it what defines me? Such a popular concept, surely it must make up some part of my identity. It is something I have thought about over the past few years, especially since the term 'Un-Australian' is invoked so often by the media and Australian politicians. Is it "a fair go" or sport or can Australian be consumed as a yeast extract. It seems to me anyway, to be an elusive or somewhat arbitrary ideal. An imaginary concept for an imagined community. Perhaps Un-Australian is easier to define, apparently it can be anything you don't particularly like. I don't particularly like the term Un-Australian, I'm not sure I even write it correctly. In 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy' Arjun Appadurai talks about the turbulence of multiculturalism and to a point I understand what he is talking about. We all heard about the Cronulla violence and know that many other Australians are simply racist, you need only to look at the fleeting popularity of the One Nation party to realise that. But I must admit I don't feel the turbulence in my own life, it just doesn't seem to be there. Is Melbourne a cultural diaspora so rich with cultural diversity that we are somehow insulated against this turbulence, or am I just missing something...