The American College of Forensic Examiners News

4 Types of Terrorists - with Dr. Hamden

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Mon, 31 Mar 2008 16:32:00 +0000

International Psychologist Dr. Raymond Hamden talks about the 4 criminal profiles of terrorists. Dr. Hamden will be presenting "4 Types of Terrorists" at ACFEI's national meeting September 4-6, 2008 in San Diego. Go to acfei.com for more info.

Books by members

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Wed, 26 Mar 2008 19:49:00 +0000

Book Reviews

Choices and Illusions: How Did I Get Where I Am, and How Do I Get Where I Want To Be?

Eldon Taylor, PhD, FAPA

In his best-selling book, Choices and Illusions, Taylor applies the same approach he uses as a deception-discovering criminalist to unravel human behavior. In Choices and Illusions, Taylor reveals the thoughts behind the behavior when people are doing what they want to do and when they are doing what they don’t want to do. But most significantly, he teaches that it is never too late to be happy and successful, regardless of the past.

Countless case studies detail how attitude pervasively affects every aspect of life. Reading this best-selling book will open a new realm of possibilities for readers who translate the message into life action. Taylor exposes false illusions, and replaces them with simple teachings to help each reader reach his or her highest potential. Choices and Illusions tells the story of one man’s journey into the workings of the human mind and raison d’etre [reason for being].

Eldon Taylor has made a lifelong study of the human mind and has earned doctoral degrees in psychology and metaphysics. He is a Fellow with the American Psychotherapy Association and a nondenominational minister. Taylor is both president and director of Progressive Awareness Research, Inc.

Healing Parents: Helping Wounded Children Learn to Trust & Love

Michael Orlans, MA, DAPA, and Terry M. Levy, PhD, DAPA

Learn to change the dynamics in your relationship with your child through developing secure attachments. Healing Parents gives parents and caregivers the information, tools, support, self-awareness, and hope they need to help a child heal emotional wounds and improve behaviorally, socially, and morally. This book is a toolbox filled with practical strategies and research that will help parents and caregivers understand their child, learn to respond in a constructive way, and create a healthy environment.

Michael Orlans, MA, DAPA, DABFE, is a Certified Master Therapist with more than 32 years of clinical experience working with children, adults, and families in public mental health, the criminal justice system, and private practice. A pioneer in the treatment of children, adolescents, and adults with compromised attachment, he is the developer of Corrective Attachment Therapy and innovator of the two-week intensive treatment approach. He is a Diplomate of the American Psychotherapy Association, and a Fellow of the American College of Forensic Examiners.

Terry M. Levy, PhD, DAPA, DABFE, DABPS, has been a psychotherapist, trainer, supervisor, and consultant for over thirty years. Dr. Levy is a Licensed Clinical Psychologist in both Colorado and Florida, and a Diplomate and Master Therapist of the American Psychotherapy Association. Dr. Levy is the editor of Handbook of Attachment Interventions (2000, Elsevier Press).

Forensics News on CNN.com

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 20 Mar 2008 15:15:00 +0000

from: http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/03/20/csi.mansonranch.ap/index.html

FRESNO, California (AP) -- Crime scene investigators may dig for bodies at a remote ranch where Charles Manson and his followers once hid because new evidence suggests victims were buried at the site, authorities said.

Tests at Manson's old hideout indicate at least two sites could be unmarked graves.

1 of 2

more photos »

An ad hoc team of detectives and forensic investigators visited Barker Ranch in the California desert last month to test the soil for evidence of decomposed bodies.

Follow-up laboratory testing revealed that at least two sites could be unmarked graves, and the group is urging local investigators to begin excavating.

Former Inyo County detective John Little said Wednesday he was sent into the desert in 1974 by his former boss to investigate possible human remains buried at Barker Ranch.

"He said I should go up and take a look around the Barker Ranch and try to find four grave sites somewhere around 150 yards from the building," said Little, who set off toward Death Valley first in a pickup, then on horseback. "At that time, there wasn't a lot of really good forensic techniques to find things. Imagine what you could find with the sonar stuff they have now." See photos from the compound »

Even though Manson and many of his followers had been convicted and sent to prison by 1971, Little spent part of the 1970's trying to tie together loose ends from the case. At one point, he came across a cache of canned food the cult members had stockpiled in the Panamint Mountains.

Little doesn't recall what led his boss, then-Inyo County Undersheriff Jack Gardiner, to send him in search of the graves. But Paul Dostie, a police detective from Mammoth Lakes who was on the team that visited the ranch in February, suspects Gardiner was tipped off to their presence by Dianne Lake, a former member of the Manson family.

Don't Miss

Manson ranch searched for bodies

Prosecutors say Lake's parents encouraged her to join Manson and his followers when she was just 14. She lived with them at an old Hollywood movie set north of Los Angeles. It was there that Manson began preaching of an apocalyptic race war he said was predicted in The Beatles' song "Helter Skelter."

Members believed they were a select group that would eventually come to rule the United States if they carried out gruesome killings that Manson ordered. After authorities raided Spahn Ranch, the Manson family set up alternate headquarters in the Panamint Mountains, near Death Valley, at a dilapidated house on Barker Ranch.

The clan was ultimately prosecuted for nine murders that took place in the summer of 1969.

Lake was later arrested in a raid, and Gardiner and his wife took her in to "deprogram" her, said Steve Kay, the former Los Angeles County deputy district attorney who prosecuted Manson.

"How would Gardiner know with such specificity the sites of these graves if it weren't for Dianne Lake telling him?" Dostie said. "It just fits too well."

Gardiner has since died. Little has trouble remembering the exact dates of his visit to the ranch, but is confident in many of the details. A man who answered the phone at a listing for a Dianne Lake in Ojai said his wife was not a former Manson family member.

In the meantime, law enforcement officials are poring over the forensic evidence gathered at the ranch by investigators from Tennessee's Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

Inyo County Undersheriff John Eropkin said a decision on whether to dig is expected next week.

Police in nearby Bishop have also reopened a case believed to be linked to the Manson family.

Fillippo Tennerelli was found dead in a motel room there October 1, 1969. At the time, the death was ruled a suicide, but at the behest of Dostie and a relative of one of Manson's victims, police are now reviewing the case to find out whether he really killed himself.

Debra Tate, whose sister Sharon Tate was killed by Manson's clan, said she was told there was a drug link between Tennerrelli and the Manson family.

"At this point, we're looking at whatever shreds of evidence we can gather," Bishop police Chief Kathleen Sheehan said. "There's no statute of limitations on murder."

The Forensic Examiner - selected articles

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 17:55:00 +0000

What the 10 New Auditing Standards Mean for Forensic Accountants

Posted by admin | Edit Published in THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007

What the 10 New Auditing Standards Mean for Forensic Accountants

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007 www.acfei.com

CE Article: (CERTIFIED FORENSIC ACCOUNTANT, Cr.FA) 1 CE credit for this article

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit:

(ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

(Cr.FA) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Accountants.

Recently, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued 10 new Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). One of the standards addresses audit documentation and another discusses professional requirements. The remaining eight are conceptually related and are known as the Risk Assessment Standards.

Forensic accountants should become familiar with the new standards. While the SASs are issued for external auditors, the requirements in the SASs impact the work of forensic accountants as well. Forensic accountants should understand how the new mandates affect and expand the work performed by the external auditors in the examination of the financial statements. The enhanced work performed by the external audit team may unearth clues that forensic accountants can use in their work.

Overview

The guidance in the standard addressing audit documentation expands and clarifies the items that must be memorialized by the auditor in the workpapers. Also, the time frame related to various documentation requirements is discussed. The verbiage used to indicate mandates versus recommendations is noted in another of the new SASs.

The eight Risk Assessment Standards serve to enhance the assessment of risks that is performed on every audit engagement. A deep understanding of the client as well as the operational environment, including its internal control, is to be obtained. Using the understanding, the external auditor makes a rigorous assessment of the risks of material misstatements in the financial statements.

Once the risks of material misstatements are assessed, the auditor develops a response to the risks. An overall response may be deemed appropriate. Another possibility is that the auditor might elect to adjust the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures that are to be performed in response to the risks. The Risk Assessment Standards call for improved linkages between the assessed risks of material misstatements and the audit procedures planned in response to those risks.

Each of the 10 new SASs is discussed in more detail below. Understanding the requirements in the standards will help forensic accountants comprehend the work performed by the external auditor and enable forensic accountants to more efficiently and effectively plan their own procedures. The titles of each standard, and their corresponding numbers, are shown in Exhibit 1.

SAS 102

SAS 102 is entitled “Defining Professional Requirements in Statements on Auditing Standards.” The standard explains that mandates in some SASs are unconditional, while others are presumed to be required. If the language in the standard reads “must” or “is required,” the auditor is unconditionally required to perform the procedure noted in situations in which it is relevant. When the language used includes the word “should,” the task discussed is a presumptively mandatory requirement. For the latter, the auditor may, in rare situations, depart from the mandate if alternative procedures can supply the needed evidence. Provided this is the case, the justification for the departure from the mandate must be documented.

SAS 103

The standard discusses the contents of the documentation of the engagement. Also, several important dates related to documentation are noted.

Per SAS 103, the auditor’s documentation must include a description of both the work performed and the evidence gathered. Also, the conclusions reached by the auditor should be noted.

The standard discusses three important dates relative to audit documentation. They are the audit report date, the report release date, and the documentation completion date.

The audit report should be dated no earlier than the date that sufficient and appropriate audit evidence has been obtained. At that time (or after), the auditor can release the report to the client. The date of release to the client is significant because the documentation completion date is dependent upon it. Specifically, audit documentation is to be assembled within 60 days of the report release date.

Risk Assessment Standards

SASs 104 through 111 were issued as a suite. They are interrelated and both the forensic accountant and auditor should consider their requirements together.

SAS 104

SAS 104 is the first of the eight Risk Assessment Standards. The concepts of reasonable assurance and evidence are addressed in this statement.

According to the standard, the auditor must obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence in order to support the audit opinion. As the auditor gathers this evidence, audit risk must be restricted to an appropriately low level. The concept of reasonable assurance relates to this low level of audit risk. SAS 104 explains that the level of assurance corresponding to a low level of audit risk is that which is high enough to meet the minimum required for reasonable assurance. The standard explains that “reasonable” implies a high, although not an absolute, level of assurance.

SAS 105

SAS 105 impacts the second standard of fieldwork. Also, the third standard of fieldwork is revised by this statement.

Previously, the second standard of fieldwork required the external auditor to gain an understanding of internal control. The understanding was to be used for the purpose of planning the nature, timing, and extent of evidential matter to gather.

With the issuance of SAS 105, the external auditor is broadening the understanding obtained. Under the new mandates, the entity and its environment, including its internal control, must be understood. The auditor then uses the understanding for two purposes. First, the auditor employs the expanded understanding to assess the risks of material misstatement. Further, the understanding is used to design audit procedures that address the risks of material misstatement.

Under the previous third standard of fieldwork, the auditor was required to gather sufficient, competent evidential matter to support the opinion. That mandate is now amended by SAS 105. With the issuance of the new standard, the auditor is to gather sufficient appropriate audit evidence. The results of procedures used in obtaining such evidence form a reasonable basis for the audit opinion.

SAS 106

The standard supersedes an earlier SAS, number 31, “Evidential Matter.”

SAS 106 reiterates the concept of sufficient appropriate evidence introduced in other Risk Assessment SASs. Also, audit evidence is defined in the statement. Further, the topic of relevant assertions is discussed, as are the use of relevant assertions in the process of assessing risks and designing audit procedures. The SAS goes on to address the qualitative aspects of audit evidence. The two characteristics that make up the qualitative nature of audit evidence are sufficiency and appropriateness. Finally, descriptions of various audit procedures are provided and the purposes of performing each are discussed.

Audit Evidence. All of the information used by the external auditor to arrive at the conclusions that support the opinion on the financial statements is audit evidence. Data underlying the financial statements are also part of audit evidence.

Besides the evidence obtained during the current engagement, audit evidence may be obtained in several other ways. Work that had been performed on previous audits, as well as procedures completed during the acceptance or continuance decision process, are part of audit evidence. Finally, other sources may yield audit evidence.

Assertions. As previous standards did, SAS 106 emphasizes the significance of gathering audit evidence to support management’s assertions regarding the financial statements. In the newer standard, the five management assertions presented in prior statements are expanded. Also, the enhanced assertions are organized into three groups: assertions applicable to the income statement, those related to the balance sheet, and those addressing presentation and disclosure issues.

Management makes five assertions related to the income statement and four assertions each relating to the balance sheet and to presentation and disclosure. The management assertions in each of the three categories are displayed in Exhibit 2.

Sufficiency and Appropriateness of Evidence. As discussed, the external auditor is required to gather sufficient and appropriate audit evidence. Sufficiency measures the quantity of audit evidence, while appropriateness relates to the quality of the evidence.

Two characteristics impact the appropriateness, or quality, of evidence. The first is relevance. To be considered appropriate, audit evidence must relate to management’s assertions. For example, the confirmation of a client’s accounts receivable balance relates well to both the existence and valuation assertions; it does not provide relevant evidence regarding completeness.

The second aspect of appropriateness is reliability. This attribute is impacted by the source of the evidence. Also, the nature of the evidence has an effect on reliability.

Audit Procedures. As noted, the external auditor performs audit procedures in order to reach conclusions on which to base the audit opinion. The procedures performed may be divided into three categories: risk assessment procedures, tests of controls, and substantive procedures.

In the first category, risk assessment procedures, the external auditor obtains an understanding of the entity and its environment, including its internal control. The understanding is then used to assess the risks of material misstatements. Such risks occur at two levels, the financial statement level and the relevant assertion level.

Test of controls is the second category of audit procedures. Such tests are performed at the relevant assertion level. There are two conditions under which testing of internal control occurs. First, if the external auditor expects internal controls to be effective and plans to place reliance on them, control tests must be performed. Further, in those circumstances in which substantive procedures alone do not provide sufficient appropriate audit evidence, testing the effectiveness of controls is necessary.

The final category of audit procedures is substantive procedures. Like tests of controls, such tests are performed at the relevant assertion level.

The focus of substantive procedures is the detection of material misstatements. Substantive analytical procedures are one of the two types of substantive procedures. The other involves tests of details. Classes of transactions, account balances, or disclosures might all be examined by using tests of details.

SAS 106 presents eight specific procedures that the auditor might use. The external auditor may employ these procedures as risk assessment procedures, tests of controls, or substantive procedures. The eight audit procedures are displayed in Exhibit 3.

SAS 107

SAS 107, “Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit,” supersedes SAS 47, which bore the same title. The new statement groups misstatements into two types. Also, the audit risk model of SAS 47 is updated.

Misstatements. Per SAS 107, misstatements are classified as either known misstatements or likely misstatements. The first category encompasses those misstatements arising from the incorrect selection of accounting principles. Further, misapplication of accounting principles may yield known misstatements. Also, misstatements of facts, including misstatements from mistakes in gathering or processing data, as well as those which occur as a result of overlooking or misinterpreting facts, may give rise to known misstatements.

There are two sources of likely misstatements. First, management’s estimate of a financial statement element may fall outside of the range the external auditor considers reasonable. The difference between management’s estimate and the nearest endpoint of the range developed by the external auditor is considered a likely misstatement. Extrapolation may also lead to a likely misstatement. For example, when sampling, the auditor projects the known misstatement to the population. The extrapolated amount, less the known misstatements, is the second type of misstatement classified as likely.

Audit Risk Model. SAS 107 describes audit risk as a function of two other risks. These include the risk that the financial statements are materially misstated and the risk that the auditor will not detect the misstatements. The first is known as the risk of material misstatements (RMM), while the second is termed detection risk (DR).

When performing an engagement, the external auditor considers audit risk at two levels. To aid in evaluating audit risk, risk assessment procedures should be performed at both the overall financial statement and the relevant assertion levels. The results of the risk assessment procedures are used by the external auditor as the RMM is assessed.

At the level of the individual account balance, class of transactions, or disclosures, audit risk is composed of RMM and DR. In turn, each of these has two components.

RMM is made up of inherent risk (IR) and control risk (CR). The entity owns these risks; the external auditor assesses them but cannot control them.

Detection risk is comprised of substantive analytical procedures risk (AP) and tests of details risk (TD). The external auditor adjusts the nature, timing, and extent of analytical procedures and tests of details in response to the RMM. Exhibit 4 shows the audit risk model as presented in SAS 107.

SAS 108

The standard supersedes the section in SAS 1 addressing the appointment of the auditor. Also, the newer statement supersedes standard SAS 22, which bore the same title as 108.

Per SAS 108, the auditor is to develop an overall audit strategy when planning the engagement. Such a strategy is necessary to effectively organize, staff, and conduct the audit. The statement explains that a strategy is different than an audit plan. That is, a strategy is at a higher, more conceptual level than a plan; a plan is more detailed.

The standard goes on to reiterate that the auditor is to obtain an understanding of the entity and its environment, including its internal control, during the planning stage. This requirement expands the previous mandate of the second standard of fieldwork, which had focused exclusively on internal control.

SAS 108 reaffirms the requirement from previous standards that the auditor obtain an understanding with the client of the nature of the engagement. While formerly the understanding could be either in writing or made orally, this new standard states that a written understanding is mandated.

While planning the engagement, the auditor may consider whether professionals possessing specialized skills will be needed. Such individuals may include those with information technology (IT) expertise. If such help is needed, the auditor should begin making arrangements and scheduling their work.

SAS 109

SAS 55, “Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit,” is superseded by this standard together with SAS 110.

The guidance regarding understanding the entity and its environment, including its internal control, is expanded upon in SAS 109. The standard explains that one objective of obtaining the understanding is to identify and assess the risk of material misstatement. A second objective is to use the understanding in designing and performing additional audit procedures that are responsive to the assessed risk.

Audit procedures for obtaining the understanding are noted in SAS 109. The procedures to be used include inquiries and observation. Also, inspection and analytical procedures might be employed.

This standard also explains that the auditor is to assess the risk of material misstatements at two levels, the financial statement level and the level of the relevant assertions. The assertions relate to classes of transactions, account balances, and disclosures.

SAS 110

As noted, SAS 110, together with SAS 109, supersede SAS 55, which addressed internal control. Further, the section of SAS 45 entitled “Substantive Tests Prior to the Balance-Sheet Date” is superseded by 110.

Per the new standard, responses to the assessed risk of material misstatement are made at two levels. The auditor may choose to respond at the overall level. Also, responses may be made at the level of the assertion.

When responding at the overall level, the auditor may elect to assign more experienced staff or individuals with specialized skills. Also, plans may be made to perform tests that are less predictable, the timing of the tests may be adjusted, or professional skepticism may be increased. Further, a decision on a substantive approach or a combined approach will be made.

At the assertion level, the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures can be adjusted in response to the risk of material misstatement. SAS 110 notes that inquiries and observation are audit procedures, as are confirmations and inspection of tangible assets. Also, recalculation, reperformance, analytical procedures, and inspection of records or documents are procedures the auditor might use to respond to the risk of material misstatement at the assertion level.

SAS 110 emphasizes the importance of documentation, noting that the overall response as well as the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures must be memorialized. Also, the linkage between the risk of material misstatements and the planned procedures should be recorded. Finally, both the results of the procedures and the conclusions reached are to be included in the audit documentation.

SAS 111

SAS 111, updates the guidance regarding both statistical and nonstatistical sampling previously found in SAS 39, entitled “Audit Sampling.” The standard addresses tolerable misstatement, which is used in sampling models as well as components of the audit risk equation.

Tolerable misstatement should be established at a level that is below materiality for the financial statements. By following this guidance, the auditor is allowing for the aggregation of the tolerable misstatements from the various accounts.

Like other standards in the Risk Assessment group, SAS 111 discusses the risk of material misstatement (RMM). The statement reiterates that RMM is composed of inherent risk (IR) and control risk (CR). To facilitate the application of sampling models, the risks in the audit risk equation should be quantified. The auditor makes such quantifications subjectively.

For Forensic Accountants

When performing their own procedures, forensic accountants must comprehend the work that has been performed by the independent auditor. One of the 10 new external auditing standards explains the documentation requirements to which auditors must adhere. Forensic accountants may well be privy to the auditor’s workpapers; thus, an understanding of the mandates for memorializing the engagement is essential to their work. Another SAS discusses terminology related to professional requirements—comprehending whether a certain procedure is unconditionally required of the auditor, is presumed mandatory, or is simply discussed in the statement as critical for the forensic accountant.

The remaining standards, those known as the Risk Assessment Standards, are conceptually related. The audit work resulting from the requirements of these eight SASs should be particularly useful to forensic accountants as they consider areas that are especially prone to misstatements and the results of the procedures already performed by the external audit team. An understanding of the procedures completed aids the forensic accountant both in interpreting the auditor’s findings, and in planning forensic work that delves deeper into the financial aspects of the entity. n

By Jan Colbert, PhD, CPA, DABFA, DABFE, Cr.FA

Abstract

The American Institute of CPAs issued 10 new standards for external auditors. The standards address both documentation requirements for the audit and terminology used in professional mandates. Eight of the standards are collectively known as the Risk Assessment Standards; they focus on assessing the various risks in the audit engagement and on the procedures used by the auditor to address those risks.

The forensic accountant should gain a thorough understanding of the requirements of these new external audit standards. The work completed by the external auditor will be substantially enhanced under these mandates and thus, will yield more information useful to forensic accountants.

Key Words: risk assessment standards, audit evidence, sufficient appropriate evidence

(800) 423-9737 Winter 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

Published by Dr. O’Block

no comment

Mar

Books by ACFEI Members

Posted by admin | Edit Published in THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007

(800) 423-9737 Winter 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

Books by ACFEI Members

Physical Abusers and Sexual Offenders

By Scott Allen Johnson, MA, LP

The fields of sexual violence and domestic abuse have long been considered by professionals to be both separate and distinct. However, recent studies have indicated that these two fields are not as divided as previously thought. In his book Physical Abusers and Sexual Offenders, Scott Allen Johnson discusses the similarities between the two fields. Using the cognitive-behavioral approach, he presents issues important to mental health, as well as to investigative and forensic professionals when they assess, investigate, and treat abusers and sexual offenders. He discusses the psychological, emotional, physical, and sexual facets of the abuse cycle from name-calling to complete psychological deconstruction, rape, and homicide.

In his book, Johnson also offers extensive advice on the differing interview methods relative to interrogation or treatment. Additional subjects include the profile of the offender and different types of offenders, the influence of drugs and alcohol, pornography, and genuine mental incapacity. Highly detailed in subject matter, Physical Abusers and Sexual Offenders is the most comprehensive and exhaustive work on the subject to date.

Scott Allen Johnson, MA, LP, is a counseling and forensic psychologist, with extensive experience working with abusers, sexual offenders, and victims of violence. He is a Diplomate of the American Board of Psychological Specialties in Forensic Psychology and an Academy Certified Diplomate of the American Academy of Certified Consultants and Experts. He has been a member of ACFEI since 1998.

Offender Profiling

By George B. Palermo, MD, and Richard N. Kocsis, PhD

The controversial topic of criminal profiling brings to mind mixed reactions, as the field seems to lack a working model on which profiling decisions are based. In their book, Offender Profiling, George B. Palermo and Richard N. Kocsis explore a holistic approach to profiling as they delve into historical, social, and psychological factors.

The book is comprised of three parts. The first part discusses the psychosocial substrate of criminal profiling and includes historical views on the topic. The second part addresses the crime scene and the crime investigator. This section also includes a special chapter on staged crime scenes written by former FBI agents Robert R. Hazelwood and Michael R. Napier. The third part discusses the main approaches to profiling and includes criticisms of the major theoretical research on profiling.

Offender Profiling is easy to read, and the depth of knowledge the authors present is enlightening and of use to any professional involved in criminal work.

George B. Palermo, MD, is a clinical professor of psychiatry and neurology at the Medical College of Wisconsin and an adjunct professor of criminology and law studies at Marquette University. He is the director of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry and Risk Assessment in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Dr. Palermo is a Fellow of the American College of Forensic Examiners and has been a member since 1994.

Richard N. Kocsis, PhD, is a forensic psychologist in Sydney, Australia where he is active in clinical and research work.

Handwriting & Drawings of Death Row Prisoners

By Kimon Iannetta, DABFE, FACFEI

Careful evaluation of the handwriting of serial killers and other violent offenders can lead to a better understanding of the criminal mind. Kimon Iannetta reviews this theory and explains it in further detail in her book, Handwriting & Drawings of Death Row Prisoners. Iannetta’s premise is that no one is born bad or evil. The author’s research would indicate that violent criminals may have a combination of causes for their behavior, including genetic makeup and emotional trauma. By studying the handwriting of these criminals, the minute details can reveal much about the inner-workings of their brains. Analysis can shed light on the self-image and motivation of offenders. Iannetta even asserts that handwriting can give clues as to what type of murderer the person is. She provides handwriting samples and case studies of criminals throughout her book.

The book includes analyses of various criminals’ handwriting along with what kinds of answers each sample can provide. Criminals include serial killer Christine Falling and Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. Additional sections include a project study and a review of literature on psychopathology in handwriting by three major authorities. The intriguing subject matter Iannetta takes on makes this book an interesting read for a variety of audiences.

Kimon Iannetta, DABFE, FACFEI, has been a member of ACFEI since 1996.

no comment

Mar

Investor Turned Murderer: The Story of Albert Walker

Posted by admin | Edit Published in THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007

Investor Turned Murderer: The Story of Albert Walker

By Kristin Crowe, Associate Editor

This is a story of deception, denial, false identity, and murder—the stuff novels are made of. In fact, a book, movie, and play have all been created from this story. However, this trail of deception is more than a “good” story. It is the real account of a Canadian man whose tale is finally coming to a close after 17 years.

In 1990, Albert Walker left Paris, Ontario, with his daughter and flew to Britain after embezzling between $2.5 and $3.2 million from his investment clients, many of whom were friends and fellow church members. After fleeing to Britain, he was charged in Canada with 18 counts of fraud, theft, and money laundering in 1993. However, in 1992 he had taken the identity of Ronald Platt, an Englishman who wanted to go back to Canada, where he had spent his youth. Walker paid for Platt’s move to Canada in exchange for Platt’s birth certificate and driving license. It seemed for a while that Walker had disappeared with the money and would get away with his fraudulent activity. However, Walker had not counted on Platt coming back to England. Dissatisfied with the Canadian economy, Platt returned to Britain in 1995, presenting Walker with a dilemma: now, there were two Ronald Platts in Britain. Further, the real Platt had decided to live near where Walker was living with his daughter, who was posing as his wife. In an effort to escape detection, police allege that Walker took Platt sailing, knocked him unconscious, and threw his body overboard after weighting it with an anchor, effectively murdering Platt to cover his fraudulent activity. Platt’s body was discovered when caught in some fishing nets, and police were able to identify the body through a serial number on the Rolex watch Platt was wearing.

In the month between the time that Platt’s body was identified and Walker was found, Walker had bought over 67,000 pounds in gold bullion and seemed to be preparing to run again. British police interrupted his plans, however. He was sentenced to life in prison by a British court in 1998 for the murder of Ronald Platt, although he maintained his innocence of the murder throughout the trial. That same year the Canadian court charged Walker with 37 counts of fraud, which was to replace the 18 counts he had been charged with in 1993. After his conviction of murder, he was sent to a British facility in 1999. He requested transfer to a Canadian prison in 2005 to finish the remainder of his life sentence (without parole for at least 15 years), which was granted. Now 61 years old, he appeared in court again in April of 2007, pleading guilty to 20 theft and fraud-related charges. In July of 2007, Justice Rommel Masse sentenced Walker to 4 years for 19 fraud-related crimes and an additional year for violating the Bankruptcy Act.

Fear of being caught in his fraud led Walker to flee to Britain, and fear of his fraud being uncovered led him to murder Platt. Fraudulent-investor-turned-murderer, Walker’s misdeeds were discovered, and $1 million of the at least $2.5 million has been recovered. It has, however, taken 17 years and almost half a million dollars to do so.

References

Babbage, M. (2007). Convicted killer Albert Walker pleads guilty to 20 theft, fraud-related charges. thespec.com. Retrieved October 3, 2007, from http://www.thespec.com/article/188093

Babbage, M. (2007). Former fugitive Albert Walker expected in Ontario court on fraud, theft charges. thespec.com. Retrieved October 3, 2007, from http://www.thespec.com/article/187485

Biography Channel, The. (n.d.). Biography: Albert Walker. Retrieved October 3, 2007, from http://www.thebiographychannel.co.uk/biogphy_story/978:1144/1/Albert_Walker.htm

Canadian Press, The. (2007, July 24). Albert Walker gets four more years. thespec.com. Retrieved October 3, 2007, from http://www.thespec.com/article/223211

CBC News. (2007, April 26). ‘Fugitive financier’ turned killer pleads guilty to fraud, theft. CBC. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/ottawa/story/2007/04/26/walker-fraud.html n

no comment

Mar

The Sub-Classifications of Criminal Enterprise Homicide

Posted by admin | Edit Published in THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007

The Sub-Classifications of Criminal Enterprise Homicide

Contract killing: A contract killer is one who kills by secret assault or surprise for profit. There is usually an absence of relationship between the killer and victim.

Gang-motivated: A gang is an organization, association, or group that has as one of its primary activities the commission of antisocial behavior and criminal acts, including homicide. Homicides are associated with territorial struggles.

Criminal competition: Death in this type of homicide is a result of organized crime over control of territory.

Kidnap murder: Kidnap murder designates persons taken against their will and for a variety of motives, such as a demand for ransom.

Product tampering: Death results from contact with a commercial product that has been sabotaged by the offender whose motive is financial gain.

Drug murder: Defined as the murder of an individual deemed an obstruction in order to facilitate the proliferation of an illegal drug business.

Insurance/Inheritance: The victim is murdered for insurance and/or inheritance purposes.

Commercial profit: Murder to gain control of a business or to profit from the business.

Felony-murder: Property crime (robbery, burglary) is the primary motivation, where during the commission of a violent crime, a homicide occurs.

(800) 423-9737 Winter 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

White-collar criminals are not people who are threatening the lives of others. They are not violent people.”

Inaccurate statement of a Federal District Court Judge commenting on white-collar criminals (Wheeler, Mann & Sarat, 1988).

There were several email correspondences between Porco and his parents that exemplified the tension between the parties when the parents confronted him about his fraudulent behavior and threatened to go to the authorities to take action against him. In one email, his father wrote: “Did you forge my signature as a co-signer? What the hell are you doing? You should have called me to discuss it … I’m calling Citibank this morning to find out what you have done and am going to tell them I’m not to be on it as co-signer” (Lyons, 2005).

The next day, Citibank informed an amazed Peter Porco that his son had also obtained a line of credit to purchase his new Jeep Wrangler. Again, Christopher had used his father’s name as co-signatory to secure the auto loan. The parents tried to contact Christopher via the phone, but Christopher would not talk to them. In another email, the father wrote, “I want you to know that if you abuse my credit again, I will be forced to file forgery affidavits in order to disclaim liability and that applies to the Citibank college loan if you attempt to reactivate it or use my credit to obtain any other loan” (Lyons, 2005).

Table 1: Perri’s Red-Collar Matrix

Pattern

Characteristics

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007 www.acfei.com

Underlying

White-collar Crime

Idolatry

Mental Disorder

Weapon Used

Source of Violence

Place of Murder

Fraud Detection by Victim/3rd Party?

Victim participate in WCC?

Victim (Gender)

Victim (Age)

Victim Injury

Victim (Race/Ethnicity)

Victim’s Body Found?

Victim’s Occupation

Victim Occupational Status

Victims Related to Each Other?

Victim Related to Defendant?

Victim Debt Problems

Victim have a Prior Criminal Record?

Defendant (Gender)

Defendant (Age)

Defendant (Race/Ethnicity)

Defendant’s Occupation

Defendant’s Occupational Status

Defs. Related to Each other?

Defendant Debt Problems?

Defendant Prior Criminal Record?

Defendant Relationship to Victim

Found Guilty by Jury?

Offense (Murder)

Defendant Admit to Murder?

Overkill?

Incriminating Statements?

Concealment of Evidence?

Blood Splatter Evidence?

Computer Evidence?

DNA Evidence?

Murder Plan?

Shoe Print Evidence?

Case 1

Hansen

Embezzlement

Fraud

Mafia

Hammer

Defendant

Victim Office

Victim

Female

Head

White

Yes

Bookkeeper

White-collar

Unknown

Male

White

Salesperson

White-collar

Yes

Coworker

Yes

1st Degree

Yes

Case 2

Dyleski

Credit Card

Fraud

Jack the Ripper

Unknown

Blunt/knife

Defendant

Victim Home

3rd party

Female

Head

White

Yes

Executive

White-collar

Unknown

Male

White

Student

Unknown

None

Yes

1st Degree

Yes

Case 3

Fawaz

Mortgage

Fraud

Unknown

Blunt object

Defendant

Victim Office

3rd party

Unknown

Male

Head

Arabic

Student

White-collar

Unknown

Male

Arabic

Loan Proc.

White-collar

Unknown

Coworker

Yes

2nd Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 4

Farraj

Mortgage

Fraud

Unknown

Blunt object

Defendant

Victim Office

3rd party

Unknown

Male

Head

Arabic

Student

White-collar

Unknown

Male

Arabic

Loan Officer

White-collar

Unknown

Coworker

Yes

2nd Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 5

Porco

Loan

Fraud

Unknown

Defendant

Victim Home

Victim

Male

Head/body

White

Yes

Executive

White-collar

Yes

Male

White

Student

Yes

Son

Yes

2nd Degree

Yes

Unknown

Case 6

Bernal

Mortgage

Fraud

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Victim/3rd

Female

Head

White

Yes

Bus. owner

White-collar

Yes

Unknown

Female

Hispanic

Real Estate

White-collar

Yes/Cousin

Unknown

Bus. Assoc.

1st Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 7

Bernal

Mortgage

Fraud

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Victim/3rd

Male

Head

White

Yes

Bus. owner

White-collar

Yes

Unknown

Male

Hispanic

Real Estate

White-collar

Yes/Cousin

Unknown

Bus. Assoc.

1st Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 8

Barajas

Mortgage

Fraud

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Victim/3rd

Female

Head

White

Yes

Bus. owner

White-collar

Yes

Unknown

Male

Hispanic

Handyman

Blue-collar

Yes/Cousin

Yes

Unknown

None

Yes

1st Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 9

Barajas

Mortgage

Fraud

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Victim/3rd

Male

Head

White

Yes

Bus. owner

White-collar

Yes

Unknown

Male

Hispanic

Handyman

Blue-collar

Yes/Cousin

Yes

Unknown

None

Yes

1st Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 10

Johnson

Insurance

Fraud

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Victim/3rd

Yes

Male

Unknown

Head

White

Yes

Editor

White-collar

Unknown

Male

White

Lawyer

White-collar

Unknown

Yes

Co-conspir.

Yes

1st Degree

Unknown

Off-Book

Fraud

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Victim

Male

Head

White

Yes

Music Tracker

Unknown

Male

White

Record Promoter

White-collar

Unknown

Coworker

Yes

1st Degree

Unknown

Case 11

D’Antonio

Case 12

Petrick

Check/Credit

Card Fraud

Unknown

Tape/Chains

Defendant

Unknown

Victim

Female

Asphyxiated

White

Yes

Musician

White-collar

Yes

Unknown

Male

White

Consultant

White-collar

Yes

Husband

Yes

1st Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Land

Fraud

Unknown

Bomb

Defendant

Public

Victim

Male

Body

White

Yes

Reporter

White-collar

Unknown

Male

Unknown

White

Business Owner

White-collar

Unknown

None

Yes

2nd Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 13

Adamson

(800) 423-9737 Winter 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

Case 14

Dunlap

Land

Fraud

Unknown

Bomb

Defendant

Public

Victim

Male

Body

White

Yes

Reporter

White-collar

Unknown

Male

White

Land Developer

White-collar

Unknown

None

Yes

1st Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 15

Gaede

ID Fraud

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Defs. Home

3rd Party

Male

Unknown

Body

White

Yes

Painter

Blue-collar

Unknown

Male

White

Manager

White-collar

Unknown

Friend

Yes

1st Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 16

Basile

Insurance Fraud

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Victim

Female

Body

White

Yes

Unknown

Male

Unknown

White

Unknown

Yes

None

Yes

1st Degree

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 17

S. Kimes

Mortgage Fraud

Unknown

Yes

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Victim

Yes

Male

Head

White

Yes

Businessman

White-collar

Unknown

Female

White

None

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Friend

Yes

1st Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 18

K. Kimes

Mortgage Fraud

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Victim

Yes

Male

Head

White

Yes

Businessman

White-collar

Unknown

Male

White

None

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Friend

Yes

1st Degree

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 19

Hanson

ID Fraud/

Forgery

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Male

Head

White

Yes

Bus. Owner

White-collar

Yes

Unknown

Male

White

None

Unknown

Father

Pending

1st Degree

Unknown

Case 20

Hanson

ID Fraud/

Forgery

Unknown

Gun

Defendant

Victim Home

Female

Head

White

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Male

White

None

Unknown

Mother

Pending

1st Degree

Unknown

Case 21

Hanson

ID Fraud/

Forgery

Unknown

Blunt Force

Defendant

Victim Home

Male

Body

White

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Male

White

None

Unknown

Brother-in-Law

Pending

1st Degree

Unknown

Case 22

Hanson

ID Fraud/

Forgery

Unknown

Blunt Force

Defendant

Victim Home

Female

Body

White

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Male

White

None

Unknown

Sister

Pending

1st Degree

Unknown

Case 23

Gamov

Money Laundering

Unknown

Arson

Unknown

Victim Home

Victim

Male

Unknown

Body

White

Yes

Gov. Employee

White Collar

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 24

Kholodov

Off-Book

Fraud

Unknown

Bomb

Unknown

Victim Office

Victim

Male

Unknown

Body

White

Yes

Reporter

White-collar

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 25

Klebnikov

Money

Laundering

Unknown

Gun

Unknown

Public

Victim

Male

Head

White

Yes

Reporter

White-collar

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 26

Hovasapian

Tax

Fraud

Unknown

Bomb

Unknown

Victim Home

Victim

Male

Unknown

Body

White

Yes

Gov. Employee

White-collar

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Case 27

Kozlov

Tax

Fraud

Unknown

Gun

Unknown

Public

Victim

Male

Head

White

Yes

Gov. Employee

White-collar

Unknown

Male

Unknown

Banker

White-collar

Unknown

None

Unknown

Pending

Yes

Unknown

Yes

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007 www.acfei.com

Exhibit 1: The Personality and Behavioral Traits Identified by Hare (1991).

Psychopathy Personality Traits & Behavioral Characteristics

Glibness/superficial charm
Grandiose senses of self-worth
Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom
Pathological lying
Conning & manipulative
Lack of remorse or guilt
Shallow affect
Callous & lack of empathy
Parasitic lifestyle
Poor behavioral controls
Promiscuous behavior
Early behavioral problems
Lack of realistic short-term
goals
Impulsive
Irresponsible
Fails to take responsibility for
one’s actions
Many short-term marital/inter-
personal relationships
Juvenile delinquency
Revocation of conditional
release
Criminal versatility

To view additional articles offering CE credits, visit http://www.acfei.com/onlinece.php?section=Articles

(800) 423-9737 Winter 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

There are, perhaps, those who are simply born with psychopathic traits and who conceal them until the proper factors converge and reveal those traits.”

Exhibit 2: Fraud-Detection Homicide Investigation Profile

I. Employment of victim

II. Business owner or employee

III. Victim occupational status:
blue-collar or white-collar

IV. Criminal history of victim

A. White-collar crimes

B. Violent crimes

V. Victim’s source of income (tax
returns, bank statements, etc.)

VI. Fraud detection by victim

A. Was the victim in a

position to detect fraud?

B. Notice to defendant of
the detection by victim

C. Did the victim cooperate
and/or give notice to a third
party concerning defendant’s

fraud?

VII. Third party detection of the
defendant’s fraudulent behavior
without victim’s assistance

VIII. Fraudulent behavior of the victim

A. Would the victim have had
a reason to commit fraud?

1. Support lifestyle

2. Debt problems

3. Addiction issues

B. How would the victim
commit the fraud?

IX. Type of fraud involved

X. Potential fraud co-conspirators
(examine computer evidence
such as email)

XI. Did the victim have reason
to fear retaliation by the

defendant for fraud detection
or disclosures to witnesses?

XII. History of business conflicts
between victim, customers,
or business associates

XIII. Third party business records
indicating fraudulent behavior
(fraudulent loan applications, etc.)

This article published by Dr. Robert O’Block

no comment

Mar

Faud Detection Homicide

Posted by admin | Edit Published in THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007

Abstract

Behavioral data were located from 27 homicide cases in which fraud, a white-collar crime, occurred either prior to or contemporaneously with each homicide. The homicide cases in this study were classified as fraud-detection homicides because either white-collar criminals themselves, or assassins they hired, killed the individuals suspected of detecting their fraud. The white-collar criminals who committed murder were sub-classified as red-collar criminals.

Both the descriptive homicide data and the literature review lend support to three overriding impressions: red-collar criminals harbor the requisite mens rea, or state of mind, to physically harm someone that may have detected, or is on the verge of detecting, their fraudulent behavior; the victim of a red-collar crime does not have to be someone who profiteered, aided, or abetted in the fraud; and red-collar criminals have a history of antisocial and psychopathic tendencies. Given these conclusions, advocacy for consideration of forensic accountants and fraud examiners as members of homicide investigation teams to assist in the development of a motive to support the prosecution of red-collar criminals is in order.

Data gathered in the course of this study indicate the presence of a sub-classification of white-collar criminals who are violent and the need for a new homicide classification to be referred to as fraud-detection homicide for inclusion in the FBI’s Crime Classification Manual (Douglas, 1992) as an appropriate system for classifying and profiling these murders.

CE Article: (CERTIFIED FORENSIC CONSULTANT, CFC) 1 CE credit for this article

I would have had the

[expletive] wasted, but I’m not sorry for feeling this way. I’m sorry that I didn’t rub her out, real sorry.”

Statement of a convicted white-collar criminal regarding the woman who disclosed his fraud crimes to the authorities (Addis, 1986).

Criminal Classification Manual:

Fraud-Detection Homicide

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007 www.acfei.com

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit:

(ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

(CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants.

(CBBS) The American College of Forensic Examiners International is an approved provider of the California Board of Behavioral Sciences, approval PCE 1896. Course meets the qualifications for 1 hour of continuing education credit for MFTs and/or LCSWs as required by the California Board of Behavioral Sciences.

(APA) The American College of Forensic Examiners is approved by the American Psychological Association to sponsor continuing education for psychologists. ACFEI maintains responsibility for this program and its content.

(NBCC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International is an NBCC Approved Continuing Education Provider (ACEP) and may offer NBCC approved clock hours for events that meet NBCC requirements. The ACEP soley is responsible for all aspects of the program and its content.

By Frank S. Perri, JD, MBA, CPA, and Terrance G. Lichtenwald, PhD, FACFEI

One of the misconceptions commonly held of white-collar criminals is that they are not like criminals who lash out violently. In part, this perception is supported by a legal system that classifies white-collar crimes as non-violent. For example, the Dictionary of Criminal Justice Data Terminology, published by the Federal Bureau of Justice Statistics, defines white-collar crime as “non-violent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception . . . irrespective of the person’s occupation” (1981). The study at hand examined types of white-collar crime involving issues of fraud-based crime.

The descriptive data indicates that a sub-group of violent white-collar criminals exists and, moreover, that certain behavioral factors motivate a white-collar criminal to resort to violence. The data has been examined with a single question in mind: Is imminent threat of detection a sufficient motive for the white-collar criminal to respond violently?

The Perri Red-Collar Crime

Matrix (RCM)

Examining 27 murder cases revealed that for this sub-group of violent white-collar criminals, threat of fraud detection is a motive to kill—hence the name, fraud-detection homicide. This sub-group is referred to as red-collar criminals because they straddle both the white-collar crime arena and, eventually, the violent crime arena. In circumstances where there is threat of detection, red-collar criminals commit brutal acts of violence to silence the people who have detected their fraud and to prevent further disclosure.

First, information was assembled from murder cases where fraud pre-dated the murder, and second, for the purpose of visual comparison, information from each case was broken down into identifiable variables (i.e., type of fraud, age and gender of defendant, relationship to victim, etc.). The Perri-RCM was developed to distinguish behavioral inferences from other evidence gathered during both the investigation and subsequent trials. Clearly, the pattern characteristics in the Perri-RCM are not all-inclusive, and as more cases are analyzed, the Perri-RCM can be modified to accommodate additional characteristics that may be useful for profiling.

Third, the information was structured into a matrix. In each case where the murderer (defendant) was involved in the fraud, the case is identified by the defendant’s last name, which appears at the top of the matrix (see Table 1). For example, Case 1 is titled “Hansen.” George Hansen served as the initial case study, thus the case is identified by his last name. The only cases not listed by the name of the defendant (but include the names of the victims) are the Gamov (23), Kholodov (24), Klebnikov (25), Hovasapian (26), and Kozlov (27) cases. In these cases, the killers have not been brought to justice.

To begin, the proposed crime classification, fraud-detection homicide, is compared to the existing FBI homicide classification to illustrate why fraud-detection homicide should be considered as a separate classification. Secondly, where the behavioral aspects of red-collar criminals are compared to those of non-violent white-collar criminals, the focus is limited to concerns of psychopathy, societal misconceptions of murder defendants, ideation factors, and actual homicide case studies illustrating fraud-detection homicide.

In an interesting aside, red-collar Russian cases are compared to American murders. And finally, the role of forensic investigators in uncovering homicidal motive and its importance in the prosecution of these defendants is discussed.

Fraud-Detection Homicide and Criminal Enterprise Homicide: A Distinction

A literature review does not reveal any classification or definition for white-collar criminals who murder due to their fraud crimes being detected; further, the FBI Crime Classification Manual (CCM) (Douglas, 1992) does not include an appropriate category for the murder cases scrutinized in this study.

The FBI classification most similar to the homicides presented in this study was the criminal enterprise homicide classification; however, the classification does not fit this study’s fact patterns. Criminal enterprise homicide “entails murder committed for material gain.”

A review of the nine definitions of the criminal enterprise homicide sub-classifications demonstrates the distinctive nature of fraud-detection homicide cases—cases that do not fit into any of the sub-classifications for criminal enterprise homicide most significantly because the killer’s motive in fraud-detection homicide does not parallel the motives in the criminal enterprise homicide sub-classifications. None of the sub-classifications offers fraud detection as a motive to kill.

Secondly, by the sub-classification definitions, in order to receive the hoped-for material gain, the murder must first occur. However, in fraud-detection homicide, the material gain pre-dates the murder—it is the threat of detection that motivates the kill. For example, in insurance/inheritance homicide, the murder is the conditional antecedent event that must take place in order to receive the gain; whereas, in the fraud detection homicide case, the killer already has received the material gain, and murder is not a pre-condition for its receipt.

A new homicide classification system is recommended to categorize the type of murders presented in this study, and the FBI Crime Classification Manual would seem an appropriate forum for categorizing and profiling these homicides. With the inclusion of fraud-detection homicide in the manual, collected data on these killers can be further researched and the traits attributed to red-collar criminals can be refined.

The Threat of Fraud Detection—A Motivation for Murder

In each of the 27 cases presented, the murderer(s) belonged to the sub-group of red-collar criminals, and each demonstrated the capability of unleashing heinous and brutal violence toward individuals they believed had detected, or were in a position to detect, their fraud schemes and potentially reveal such information to third parties.

Initially, and prior to any violent act, the white-collar criminal characteristics were predominant in each murderer. As white-collar criminals, they wished to divert attention from their fraudulent schemes. Unlike other homicides, violent white-collar criminals who turn red prefer to operate clandestinely without attracting attention to themselves, though it is fair to suspect that each red-collar murderer realized that in committing a violent act, he or she was potentially increasing the risk of exposure.

The data reveal the following: each murderer had fraud detection as a motive to kill; a blitz-style attack occurred in 21 out of 27 murders; and the killers demonstrated sadistic tendencies—overkill occurred in 19 out of the 27 murders. In referencing the Perri-RCM, it is interesting to note that in the majority of the American cases revealing overkill, the defendant intimately knew the victim; for example, the victim was either a relative or had been a coworker.

The behavioral data raises questions about the extent to which red-collar criminals are willing to assume risk of detection (both for the violent act and for the underlying white-collar crime) in order to maintain anonymity. In some respects, the suggestion that the red-collar criminal is willing to risk exposure in order to maintain anonymity appears contradictory. Yet, the inclination to physical violence as a solution distinguishes these fraudsters from non-violent white-collar criminals.

Psychological Factors

The misconception that white-collar criminals are not like violent criminals is widely held. Those who hold this view argue that white-collar criminals experience a moral lapse, and then engage in fraudulent behavior. The misconception of nonviolence and moral lapse is reflected in our legal system where crimes involving fraud are referred to as crimes of moral turpitude. Crimes of moral turpitude reflect behavior that violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of the community. Although street criminals are assumed highly likely to recidivate, white-collar offenders are thought to be “one-shot” criminals, not likely to be processed into the justice system following an initial brush with the law.

Weisburd, Chayet, and Waring (1990), however, provide data that does not support this popular belief regarding the limited criminal activity of white-collar criminals. They found that adult defendants convicted under white-collar crime statutes are often repeat offenders. The results of the Weisburd et al. study contradict the prevailing notion that if white-collar criminals do engage in violent acts such as murder, the act is, somehow, a fluke—an act analogous to a crime of passion where the person’s state of mind would normally not commit such vicious violence, and where there is little or no likelihood for relapse.

Both literature and data suggest that the red-collar sub-group is capable of functioning in conventional society, to a large measure, because so few grasp, until a murder arrest is made, that red-collar criminals are truly different from both white-collar criminals and ordinary people. It is incorrect to assume that both white-collar and red-collar criminals share the same value system with the majority of society solely on the basis of the observation that they engage in many of the same “normal” societal activities—they work, go to school, have families—in other words, they “blend in” (Hare, 1993).

Many cannot resolve the cognitive dissonance that occurs among members of a community who are asked to believe that a red-collar criminal who has assimilated so well—wearing suits and ties and belonging to many of the same social groups as they do—is capable of murder. In short, we resist the notion that people who look like “us” behave brutally. Red-collar criminals feed upon this misconception to create smoke screens about their motives.

A background investigation of the red-collar criminals identified on the Perri-RCM does not support the suggestion that these persons somehow acted out of character when they committed murder. In fact, quite the opposite holds true: the capacity to kill without remorse was a seed inherent in the red-collar criminal that germinated when the proper conditions surfaced.

Psychopathy

As suggested by the Hare Psychopathic Checklist (see Exhibit 1), the defendants listed in the Perri-RCM had documented histories of exhibiting both antisocial behaviors as well as moderate to above-moderate psychopathic traits—such as being superficially charming, egocentric, insincere, manipulative, and exploitative—all for the sake of self-gratification. For example, the forensic psychologist in the Sante Kimes cases, Dr. Arthur Weider, stated that Sante demonstrated psychopathic personality features with “no guilt, conscience, remorse, or empathy;” adding that Sante was “socially charming, arrogant, full of herself, [and] egocentric coupled with a superiority complex” (King, 2002). In the Hansen (1), Porco (6), and Kimes cases (17–18), professionals knowledgeable in psychopathy agreed that all these defendants exhibited psychopathic traits.

The murderers cited in the Perri-RCM are persons who considered themselves extremely clever and who rarely learned from past negative experiences. Prior police encounters had no bearing on their current antisocial behavior, as in the Petrick case (12), where the defendant had numerous prior convictions for fraudulent behavior. Even though many of the red-collar criminals did not have criminal histories, they had exhibited antisocial behavior—they simply had not been caught. A unifying characteristic of the defendants in the Perri-RCM was the ability to assess the vulnerabilities of both the organizations and individuals from whom they stole.

On the May 4, 2005, CNN airing of the Larry King Show titled, “Inside the Mind of a Psychopath,” veteran FBI profiler Gregg McCrary said, “I think psychopaths are the best natural psychologists out there . . . they read vulnerabilities, they read people, and they can exploit those things fairly well” (CNN, 2005). Another member of King’s panel, Dr. Martha Stout, psychologist and instructor at Harvard Medical School noted, “a psychopath doesn’t have to fit all of the traits. I think three or more [traits] begins to make you suspect that you’re dealing with a sociopath or a psychopath” (CNN).

The criminals studied demonstrated an inability to accept defeat and had little remorse or guilt for their predatory attitudes. In some respects, the red-collar criminal exhibits reptilian qualities of deception and attack; they are true “intra-species predators” that use violence to control others (Hare, 1993). The presiding judge in one of the Sante Kimes cases stated, “It is clear that Ms. Kimes has spent virtually all of her life plotting and scheming, exploiting, manipulating, and preying upon the vulnerable and the gullible at every opportunity” (King, 2002). As for her son Kenny, he too was a “remorseless predator” (King).

In the case of fraud detection, red-collar criminals perceive the fraud detection as an existential threat, a blow to their self-concept, and, consequently, as an act of “self” preservation, they are willing to resort to violence. As the threat of detection increases, so does the probability that the individual will rationalize murder as a solution to his or her problems. In the Hanson case (19–22), when the sister had detected her brother’s fraud, he threatened to kill her if she told their parents that he was stealing thousands of dollars from them through fraud schemes (Rozek, 2007).

In the Hansen (1), Porco (5), Dyleski (2), Bernal (6 & 7), Barajas (7 & 8), and Petrick (12) cases, sadistic violence was unleashed shortly after these criminals realized that their white-collar behavior might be exposed to the authorities. Either they had been confronted by the victim about their wrong-doing or the probability of detection was very high. The red-collar criminal’s sudden outburst is a response to perceived provocation and is enough to propel him or her to commit violence (Hare, 1993). The case histories in the Perri-RCM further bear this out, and this is why so many of the murders have a “blitz-like” quality.

Poor behavioral controls and poor planning abilities also explain why the red-collar criminal is incapable of becoming a successful violent criminal (Perri & Lichtenwald, in press, b). For example, Christopher Porco used an axe to kill his sleeping father in bed, but tried and failed to murder his mother, who was sleeping next to her husband.

Warning signs of the younger Porco’s psychopathic qualities were later confirmed by professionals evaluating the case. He had left a trail of deceitful behavior: he was known to have manipulated college transcripts, he had burglarized both his parents’ home and that of his former employer, and he had fraudulently obtained loans using his parents as co-signers without their knowledge. During a six-hour police interview, he revealed further traits associated with psychopathy: lying, impulsivity, grandiosity, callousness, lack of remorse, and no emotional response to the murder (Porco, 2005).

Behavioral Distinctions between Red- and White-Collar Criminals

Non-violent psychopathic white-collar criminals share similar psychopathic attributes with red-collar criminals, however, the distinction for the red-collar criminal lies in the factors that contributed to and defined their personalities and allowed them to perceive violence as a viable solution (Belmore & Quinsey, 1994). In an email to the lead author of this project, Dr. Willem Martens (2003) wrote, “the internal world of the psychopath is very complex and is determined by many dimensions.” Many white-collar psychopaths exhibit antisocial traits, but not violent traits, as verified by their criminal histories. What might be an explanation for the distinction?

Although not specifically referring to violent white-collar criminals, Martens’ (2003) research indicates that violent psychopaths may have determinants such as deep-rooted antisocial coping strategies as a result of past negative environmental factors. Thus, if an individual already harbors psychopathic traits, being raised in an extremely antisocial environment may solidify the use of violence as a solution. Violence is perceived as an effective strategy to reach goals, especially if the psychopath perceives the world as a snake pit where there are only winners and losers. Psychological restraints on their criminal behavior are weakened by their jungle view of society (Stotland, 1977). In addition, research has shown certain neurobiological factors to be linked to impulsivity, recklessness, and violence; further, violent psychopaths may also have a need to restore their sense of self by silencing the victim whom they believe is threatening to them in some manner (Martens, 2003).

Dr. Martens’ research is supported by other researchers who consider dysfunctional environment a factor to consider; however, one is compelled to examine cases where there is no evidence of a negative environment. Take, for example, the Porco case where all indicators pointed to anything but a poor environment. He came from an upper-middle class home, received quality parenting, and had siblings who were well-adjusted. Chris Porco had the upbringing of a privileged child.

The Porcos of the world force researchers to consider that there are, perhaps, those who are simply born with psychopathic traits and who conceal them until the proper factors converge and reveal those traits.

Mal Animo: “Evil Mind”

One must consider what lies at the core of the violent psychopath’s personality structure: red-collar criminals do not reject violence as a solution to a perceived problem, so killing is just as viable a solution as using deceptive and manipulative characteristics to satisfy their needs. At their core, they harbor a toxicity that does not exist in, or is not as pronounced in, the non-violent psychopathic white-collar criminal. The red-collar criminal is capable of hiding his or her “core” from others by relying on psychopathic traits such as charm and manipulation as an interpersonal strategy.

A case (not included in the Perri-RCM as information is still being collected on the case) deserving of disclosure as a bona-fide fraud-detection homicide case representative of the pure evil of the defendant’s “core” is the Fredric Tokars case.

In this case, a prominent defense attorney in Atlanta, Georgia, hired one of his clients to kill his wife Sara because she had discovered documents concerning Fredric’s tax fraud and drug money laundering. Fredric told one of his associates, “[Sara] knows too much . . . I’m going to have to have her taken care of” (McDonald, 1998).

One of the prosecutors in the case stated that Sara could have destroyed Fredric with the fraud she had detected. “Sara,” he said, “was a ticking time bomb” (McDonald, 1998). Consequently, one of the hired killers shot Sara with a shotgun blast to her head while she was in the family car—their two young sons were in the backseat. Fredric’s response to an associate who asked how his children would react to their mother’s death was, “They’ll be alright . . . they’re young, they’ll get over it.” Dr. Katherine Ramsland noted in the Larry King interview, “we don’t know this for sure yet, but it may be the case . . .[that some who commit evil] are born to be that [psychopaths]” (CNN, 2005).

The non-violent psychopathic white-collar criminal also has a core that is destructive, but one could, perhaps, characterize it as bitter, rather than evil. According to Martens (2003), fraudsters sublimate their aggression into conning activities to avoid physical violence that might cause a negative consequence, such as getting arrested. Moreover, the non-violent psychopath may be able to better assess the risk-reward tradeoff associated with committing a violent act. Yet, Martens (2003) acknowledges that, although psychopathic white-collar criminals are non-violent, this does not imply that they are not destructive in their own way, but that they manifest their destruction differently. Their methods might be characterized as a “slow bleed.” Thus, we have psychopathic white-collar criminals who bring down organizations that are forced to claim bankruptcy, leaving hundreds without livelihoods and/or investments.

In one white-collar crime study known as the Maxwell Scandal, Dr. Basia Spalek (1999) examines the impact of white-collar crime on the victims. In this case, the white-collar criminal, Robert Maxwell, had stolen countless millions of dollars from investors. In the study the author was able to reveal through interviews with the victims that they experienced psychological, emotional, physical, behavioral, and financial harm.

The results of the study revealed that the harmful impact of fraud is similar in its force to the experience of victims of physical violence and property offenses. Some had, in fact, been the targets of other property and assault crimes unrelated to the fraud, and they stated that the impact the fraud had on their lives in terms of victimization was worse than the impact of assault and property crimes (Spalek, 1999).

Too often the “non-violent” quality of white-collar crime is what incorrectly distinguishes between types of criminals; that somehow white-collar criminals are inherently different from other criminals. Yet, such may not be the case. A study by Walters and Geyer (2004) found that male white-collar criminals with a criminal background exhibited the same level of deviant criminal thinking as other criminals.

The Devil’s Trident

Trying to categorize the seriousness of the criminal’s harms into violent versus non-violent is incomplete, overly simplistic, and ignores the true social harms that non-violent white-collar criminals perpetrate on society. Examining the level of aggression as a continuum of social harm offers a more well-rounded approach in observing the extent and depth of a person’s sense of malice, whether based on a violent crime or fraudulent crime.

Interestingly, the legal concept of malicious injury as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (1999) takes into account the evil aspect of one’s intent not only as it applies to violent acts, but also as it applies to fraudulent behavior. The essentially different forms of harm by which the psychopath can manifest his or her aggression may be visualized in terms of a devil’s trident. There is a prong on the trident used to harm someone emotionally, another prong that can be used to harm someone financially, and another prong that can be used to harm someone physically. Some individuals use all the trident’s prongs to impale a victim. Some choose to impale a victim using only the emotional and financial prongs; such is reflective, for example, of a non-violent fraudster. The predatory quality of some white-collar criminals resembles an exploitive nature analogous to a violent predatory criminal, yet manifested in a different form.

Ideation as an Influencing Factor

It has yet to be determined in what ways ideation can be a factor in the acceleration of violence as a solution for red-collar criminals. Two of the cases in the Perri-RCM appear to represent red-collar criminals who harbored an idealization of extremely antisocial characters. In the Hansen case, the defendant appeared to romanticize the idea of the mob. He associated with members of the Chicago Mafia and enjoyed their company (People v. Hansen, 2004). Scott Dyleski enjoyed lifestyles associated with goth music, had a fascination with serial killers, idolized Jack the Ripper (Lee, 2006), drew “bloody death scenes” (Sweetingham, 2006c), and wrote dark poetry that included such troubled lines as “Live for the kill” (“Court TV News,” 2006).

The behavioral data for the cases in the Perri-RCM does not include movies, books, music, clothing, posters, or other symbolic items that might link the murderers to those whom they may have imitated as a form of hero worship, but such material may be of interest in future cases of fraud detection homicide.

Ideation as idealization of mafia or Jack the Ripper legends may have further defined, solidified, and strengthened these killers’ core personality structures, where these types of symbols represent a form of empowerment. In Scott Dyleski’s mind, if Jack the Ripper had been a successful killer, then he too could emulate that success.

Societal Misconceptions of Murder

The question surfaced in the scrutiny of the Dyleski case as to how his anger at the possibility of not receiving the goods he had fraudulently ordered could escalate to the degree that he would commit murder (Sweetingham, 2006b), and herein lays the misconception. For Scott Dyleski, the issue was not about anger, but about using murder as a solution to a problem.

The fact that he performed the murder in a sadistic manner does not correlate the act to the amount of anger he felt. One observes how societal perception incorrectly projects a non-psychopathic explanation onto the murder by attempting to inure an emotion to the killer to suggest that, somehow, the defendant’s anger was the impetus for the killing. The data suggest that the killers had no doubt that the solution to their perceived problem of fraud detection would be successful, and like a reptile, emotions did not play a part in their decision-making process.

Fraud-Detection Homicide Case Studies

The following case studies, which can be found in the Perri-RCM, provide detailed information concerning specific red-collar crimes that were committed.

Sante and Ken Kimes

After having detected that both Sante and Ken Kimes had committed mortgage fraud by attempting to obtain a loan in his name, the victim, David Kazdin, began to receive threatening telephone calls from the killers demanding that he cooperate with the fraud scheme. After speaking to Kazdin on several occasions, Sante told her son, “He knows too much and we got to do something about him” (Sweetingham, 2004a). “We’re gonna have to kill him” (Sweetingham, 2004b). As Kenny was heading out the door she said, “Good luck. Do a good job” (Sweetingham, 2004b).

Ken Kimes said in a statement to authorities that he shot the victim in the back of the head because he and his mother believed that their fraud scheme to obtain $280,000 was about to be exposed and that the victim had, in fact, notified the lenders (Sweetingham, 2004b).

George Hansen

During the Christmas holiday season of 2004, 69-year-old Mary Anne Clibbery died, having been bludgeoned in the head with a hammer by her business partner George Hansen. According to both the court record and police reports, prior to the murder, Hansen had misappropriated more than $50,000 from the business that year.

Throughout 2004, as Clibbery’s detection of financial irregularities increased, a series of incidents began to surface; apparent attempts at drug-laced food, arson, and tampering with car brakes lent support to Mary Anne Clibbery’s suspicion that George Hansen was trying to kill her. One of the toxicology reports had determined a pink substance found in her coffee to be a sleep aid known as Zolpidem, a generic form of Ambien.

After the coffee incident, Clibbery revealed to her doctor and a police officer that she believed her business partner had committed fraud and was trying to kill her. Witnesses who were interviewed after her murder stated that Clibbery had told them she suspected George Hansen was taking money from the business and that she had begun to fear for her safety (People v. Hansen, 2004).

Eric Hanson

In this case, the defendant, Eric Hanson was charged with the murder of his mother, father, sister, and brother-in-law. According to the prosecution, the defendant is responsible for the theft of tens of thousands of dollars from his parents through forgery and identity-theft schemes.

After his sister discovered his fraud schemes, he threatened to kill her if she disclosed what she knew to their parents. The prosecution believes that the defendant killed as a means to avoid discovery for his fraudulent schemes. The parents had been shot in the head, and the prosecution claims that he carried the bodies to his sister’s home where he killed both his sister and brother-in-law (Rozek, 2007).

Comparison between the Russian Homicides and the American Homicides

In contrast to the American murders (Cases 1–22), the Russian murders (Cases 23–27) were largely committed on a contract basis, also known as “murder-for-hire.” The contract killings are not to be confused with the criminal enterprise homicide sub-classification. It is the motive behind the contract killings that is the important differential.

The motive for the Russian murders is no different than the American murders: all had fraud detection as the motive to kill. The difference lies in the fact that in the majority of American murders, the red-collar criminal was, him- or herself, willing to commit the murder, while in the Russian murders, the red-collar criminal hired someone to do the killing.

The Russian murderers had the markings of skilled professionals who were capable of avoiding detection by developing and executing a murder plan with surgical precision. It is not a coincidence that such murders go unsolved. As stated by Russian prosecutors in the Klebnikov murder (Case 25), the killing was “carefully planned” (Yasmann, 2004). To date, there is not even sufficient circumstantial evidence to bring a suspect to trial. In contrast, all of the American defendants in the study were found guilty of murder.

Furthermore, the foreign murderers go beyond silencing the victim that may have revealed their fraud. The murders were committed in such a way as to send a message to other potential victims who were in a position to detect and reveal fraud. The Perri-RCM notes that some of the Russian murders occurred in public, a distinction not evident in the American murders. The American murders appear to be restricted to silencing the intended victim without sending a message to anyone else (Perri & Lichtenwald, in press, b).

In the Kozlov murder (Case 27), the victim was gunned down in public where he and other co-workers were playing soccer in a stadium. As the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Central Bank, Andrei Kozlov played a leading role in efforts to stamp out white-collar crime in Russian banks. In 2002, he was quoted as saying, “I am being observed very closely and very seriously right now” (Chazan, 2006). The Perri-RCM notes that three out of five Russian murders were perpetrated against government officials.

The Perri-RCM further reveals the ineptitude of the American red-collar killers. The American murderers lacked skills in planning a murder that could not be connected to them (Perri & Lichtenwald, in press, b). For example, in both the Dyleski and Petrick cases, the prosecution uncovered written murder plans. Dyleski had written: “Knock-out/kidnap; Keep captive to confirm PINs; Dirty Work; Dispose of evidence; Cut up and bury” (“Court TV News,” 2006). And in the Petrick case, the prosecution recovered a murder plan from the defendant’s computer searches (Lewis, 2005b, c).

The data reveal certain behavioral traits that explain why red-collar criminals believe their white-collar crime skill-set can be duplicated as violent criminals, behavioral traits that are a result of their psychopathic natures. Most significantly, their illusions of grandeur hinder their ability to foresee the consequences of their behavior. The inability of the red-collar criminal to think through a plan that would take into account the potential risks of being caught and the evidence trail left behind is another hallmark of their behavior.

The judge presiding over one of the Sante Kimes cases stated, “Sante Kimes had grossly overestimated her own cleverness. The stupidity of a criminal keeping a to-do list added one more extraordinary note to this bizarre case” (King, 2002).

In further contrast to the American murders, the foreign killers left key forensic evidence behind to make it clear that the death was not an accident or some innocuous random act. In the Hovasapian murder (Case 26), the victim, the Head of the State Taxation Service, was in his vehicle when it exploded. The investigators found an explosive device planted under the passenger seat where the victim was seated (“Russia: High profile killings,” n.d.). In Case 24, the victim, Kholodov, was a journalist specializing in exposing white-collar crime in the Russian Defense Ministry. After receiving certain information, he had gone to the Moscow train station to pick up a suitcase. Upon returning to his office, the suitcase exploded (“Russia: High profile killings,” n.d.).

The Role of Forensic Investigators in Uncovering Motive

Forensic accountants or fraud investigators should be considered part of all homicide investigation teams where the evidence infers that fraud detection may have been the motive for the murder. Given that occupational fraud alone, according to a recent report, has exceeded $650 billion dollars (BackCheck, 2007), it is reasonable to infer that fraud-related murders are not an anomaly. Although other types of physical evidence may assist in developing possible suspects, these examiners may be in a unique position to uncover a motive that the physical evidence is unable to reveal.

Many of the cases revealed little in terms of motive until the Perri-RCM revealed evidence exposing an underlying fraud scheme that pre-dated the murder. Furthermore, by uncovering fraudulent behavior that pre-dated the murder, forensic examiners may be able to narrow the potential field of suspects. Given the behavioral and accounting data presented in the Perri-RCM, the information presented in the Fraud Detection Homicide Investigation Profile (Appendix C) may prove beneficial to forensic accountants during an investigation.

The link to fraud detection has been crucial in establishing a motive for murder where the prosecution has had weak direct evidence, but supportive circumstantial evidence of guilt. The case facts reveal that the victims were in a unique position to detect fraud, which explains why they were the homicide targets. It would behoove forensic accountants to examine what areas of the victim’s occupation or personal life would have placed them in a position to detect fraud.

Forensic accountants must attempt to put themselves in the victim’s shoes and ask themselves what the victim knew that could have been considered threatening to someone; for example, “Did the victim do anything with his or her knowledge of the defendant’s fraud activity that increased the probability that he or she would be a target of violence?” For example, in the Hansen, Porco, Bernal, Barajas, Johnson, Kimes, and Hanson cases, the victims had gone, or threatened to go, to the authorities and expose the fraud upon detection of the defendant’s behavior.

In the George Hansen case, the victim-bookkeeper was in a unique position to observe financial irregularities. A forensic accountant would have discovered not only the fraud from the defendant’s bank statements and the company records, but also a correlation between the defendant’s fraud and attempts to silence the bookkeeper as her suspicions of fraud increased.

In the Christopher Porco case, the family members would have been in a unique position to detect fraud because their personal financial positions were being used by the killer to advance his schemes. In the Bernal (Case 6 & 7) and Barajas (Case 8 & 9) cases, the business owners were in a unique position to detect the fraud of their agent.

However, in the process of discovering a potential suspect, it may be necessary for the forensic investigator to consider whether the victim was involved in the underlying fraud. For example, in the Kimes and Johnson murders, the victims had been co-conspirators in the killers’ fraud schemes.

Establishing Motive in the Prosecution of Fraud-Detection Homicide

Many of the homicide cases in the Perri-RCM indicate that the red-collar criminals harbored an inflated belief in their own competencies, and in fact, the majority of them left a trail of evidence that clearly identified them as the killer. However, the link to each fraud detection was crucial in establishing a motive for murder when the prosecution had weak direct evidence, but supportive circumstantial evidence of guilt. Establishing fraud detection as a motive is especially important when the psychopath will attempt to use his or her lack of violent criminality as an advantage when the case against him or her may be entirely circumstantial.

For example, the defense attempted to use Scott Dyleski’s (Case 2) non-violent, even gentle, background to suggest that he was not capable of such brutality (Sweetingham, 2006a, c; “Court TV News,” 2006). Defendant Christopher Porco advanced the same philosophy: “A matter of dispute between my father and me was taken completely out of context and then multiplied by the police and the prosecution because they needed to invent a reason as to why a person who has never been violent in his entire life would randomly decide one day to partake in an unspeakable destruction of life” (“Transcript,” 2006). Some of the jurors in the Porco murder were hesitant to find the defendant guilty given that he had no documented history of violence (Lyons, 2006).

Porco’s statement is demonstrative of how he tried to use his non-violent background as a strategy to convince others that he was not capable of such acts. Porco attempted to “blend in” by creating the perception that he was like most normal people who have no violence in their backgrounds and who lack the ability to commit such unspeakable violence. He went on to say, “By caving in to public pressure to hold the most convenient suspect responsible, the police deprived all of us the justice we are entitled to” (“Transcript,” 2006). His ploy was clearly to craft the perception that if he had been denied justice, then all the people with whom he “blended in” would suffer the same fate, should they be charged with a crime. The red-collar criminal’s resort to chameleon strategy is not unexpected (Perri & Lichtenwald, in press, a).

The prosecution must be cognizant of the fact that the defendant is attempting to bond with the jury by putting forward the message that “because I look like you, behave like you, and have no background in violence as you (the jury), I am not capable of such brutality.” Though motive is not necessary to prove a murder case, without motive, the jury may have only a sterile circumstantial evidence case, which is one of the most difficult types of cases to prosecute, even when the circumstantial evidence is strong. Establishing a motive for the murder neutralizes the defendant’s bonding strategy with the jury. A motive demonstrates the decision-making process that propelled the defendant to commit the heinous act.

Conclusion

Exhaustive review of cases where white-collar criminals were arrested and convicted for murder reveals that in each of the murder cases, fraud either preceded or occurred at the same time as the murder. The data gathered from the murder cases did not support the position that the killer had merely experienced a ‘lapse’ in moral judgment.

Although fraud detection may not be an apparent motive for a homicide, law enforcement and prosecutors would benefit from considering the detection of an underlying white-collar crime as a possible motive to commit homicide. It is suggested that homicide detectives consider either consulting with or including forensic accountants and certified fraud examiners as part of their investigation teams.

Further, the FBI Crime Classification Manual should offer an appropriate system for categorizing these murders for profiling reasons. For descriptive purposes, the 27 murder cases have been given the general classification of fraud-detection homicides and the perpetrators who meet the criteria of having committed a fraud-detection homicide have been classified as red-collar criminals. Other forensic examiners are welcomed to submit further findings and additions to the Perri-RCM. This matrix should be viewed as a work in progress.

Key Words: red-collar crime, white-collar crime, fraud, motive, detection, homicide, murder, psychopath, Perri’s Matrix, the Perri-RCM

no comment

Mar

Steps Taken by Computer Forensics Specialists

Posted by admin | Edit Published in THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007

Steps Taken by Computer Forensics Specialists

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007 www.acfei.com

1. Protect the subject computer system during the examination

2. Discover all the files on the subject system

3. Recover all deleted files

4. Reveal hidden or temporary files

5. Access protected or encrypted files

6. Analyze all relevant data

7. Print out an overall analysis of the examination

8. Provide expert consultation and/or testimony

Robbins, J. (no date). An explanation of computer forensics. Retrieved Sept. 5, 2007, from www.computerforensics.net/forensics.htm

Investigating Digital Devices

(Handout/MCT 2007)

Digital communications seem anonymous, but quite the opposite is true. Experts are able to investigate user activity through such applications as email, instant messaging, text messaging, and even Internet telephone conversations. Some commonly investigated devices by digital forensics experts are as follows:

• computers

• Blackberries

• iPods

• automobiles

• cell phones

(800) 423-9737 Winter 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

Although many attorneys and investigators have yet to use the

services of digital forensics experts, digital information can assist

in almost any case.”

Earn CE Credit

To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 76 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

About the Author

Gavin W. Manes, PhD, brings extensive knowledge in the field of digital forensics to his position of president of Oklahoma Digital Forensics Professionals Inc. Manes received his doctorate in computer science from the University of Tulsa (TU), where he now works as a research assistant professor. Since 1996, Manes has specialized in the fields of information assurance, computer security, and digital forensics at the Center for Information Security at TU. He has also published papers and journal articles and delivered congressional testimony in the areas of information assurance, digital forensics, and telecommunications security.

Manes has briefed the White House, National Security Council, and the Pentagon. For the last 2 years, he has given presentations on digital forensics at the ACFEI National Conference. In addition, he has all five National Information Assurance Education and Training Program federal information assurance certifications from the Committee on National Security Systems and the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Instruction. Manes has also worked closely with many local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.

Manes maintains memberships in the High Tech Crime Investigation Association, Digital Forensics Working Group, Association of Computing Machinery, Oklahoma Infragard, Information Systems Security Association, and the American College of Forensic Examiners Institute. For additional information, please visit
www.okdfp.com.

Published by Dr. Robert O’Block

no comment

Mar

Digital Forensics in the Twenty-first Century

Posted by admin | Edit Published in THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007

Abstract

Digital forensics experts are called on to collect and analyze digital information from electronic devices such as computer hard drives and cell phones. Electronic evidence is used in a wide variety of cases, ranging from corporate espionage to employee separation or divorce. Recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have legitimized the use of digital evidence in court, making this new field of forensics more relevant than ever.

CE Article: (CERTIFIED FORENSIC CONSULTANT, CFC) 1 CE credit for this article

Digital Forensics in the Twenty-first Century

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit:

(ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

(CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants.

By Gavin W. Manes, PhD

An increasing number of business and legal investigations include evidence extracted from digital devices such as computer hard drives, PDAs, and cell phones. When it becomes apparent that digital information must be used in the course of an investigation or discovery process, digital forensics experts must be employed to carefully gather pertinent evidence.

Digital forensics professionals are responsible for the collection, analysis, and investigation of electronic evidence from digital devices. The gathered “snapshot” of information must be collected in a detailed, methodical, and scientific manner, as any or all evidence can be used in discovery, in depositions, or in trial.

Historically, paper documents have been the mainstay of evidence production in the court system. However, a standard computer hard drive contains enough easily readable information to fill hundreds of thousands of sheets of paper, making the court’s reliance on paper imprudent. Digital documents in their native formats also contain information that their paper counterparts do not, such as user access dates and editing information. This type of information, called “metadata,” can offer valuable clues regarding user interaction with documents and files. For example, Microsoft Word can capture important information such as edits made using the track changes feature of the program. The production of digital documents during court proceedings is important to ensure all necessary information has been preserved.

Case Study

John Smith has a wife of 10 years and two young children and lives in the suburbs. He likes golf and the occasional fishing trip and owns his own business. And he has been cheating on his wife with an Internet girlfriend for 2 years.

They have chatted on an instant messenger at work, emailed pictures and jokes, and even planned weekend getaways to Louisiana. When she did not show up for the first trip, Smith was worried. But when she did not arrive at the prearranged hotel for the next two trips, he became suspicious. He could not imagine why someone who wrote such heartfelt emails would treat him with such disregard.

Tired of waiting for an answer, Smith hired a private investigator to identify his mystery woman. Internet searches were inconclusive, and the service provider would not give the woman’s personal information without the threat of legal action and a subpoena. After striking out on all of the usual investigative avenues, the investigator told Smith that he was not finding any significant information.

But fortunately for Smith, the private investigator had close connections with a digital forensics company that helped him identify Smith’s girlfriend through email communications.

The forensics investigators began by targeting the general area where the girlfriend was sending emails by investigating the address-like information embedded in the email. All emails contain “headers” with destination and return addresses, much like envelopes. Headers also include addresses from each routing point that the email passes through on the Internet, showing the path taken to reach a destination.

Ironically, the email headers led the forensics experts to a computer in the same city as Smith—something that came as quite a surprise to him. He could not believe that he had scheduled trips out of state and spent hours chatting with someone that might be living on the same street.

Like Smith, the private investigator found the situation suspicious. Why would someone so close and invested in a relationship want to hide her location?

The forensics experts investigated all of Smith’s emails and compared all email headers. Suspicious that Smith might be ‘dating’ someone he already knew, the investigators looked to see if any emails sent from Smith’s girlfriend matched an email sent from someone else in his mailbox.

Both the forensics experts and the private investigator were correct. After making a careful comparison and double-checking the results, the forensics experts found that the girlfriend’s emails were being sent from the same address as Smith’s home computer. They concluded that Smith had been cheating on his wife with his wife for more than 2 years.

Smith was understandably shocked! Although forensics cannot answer all the questions that would naturally follow such a revelation, it did catch a woman who believed she was anonymous on the Internet.

Common Forensics Investigations

Two surprisingly common misconceptions are that emails cannot be traced and that chat room participants cannot be found. As a result, people often do and say things online that they would not in a face-to-face conversation. The impersonal nature of email and instant messaging can lead to problems, both personal and professional.

The majority of forensics cases involve employee separation and discrimination issues. Most often, an employee exits a company with proprietary information and uses it to establish a competing business.

Some are brazen enough to email themselves client lists, engineering specifications, and account information. Others are more discreet, preferring to burn such information to a CD or download it to a flash drive. Fortunately, forensics experts can not only examine system files to determine whether a transfer has been made to external media, but also conduct thorough examinations for email attachments.

Forensics experts are often called to examine computers from employment lawsuits, such as discrimination, sexual harassment, and wrongful termination. In these cases, the investigated computer has often been used for several months since the employee’s departure, presenting challenges to forensics examiners. This is particularly true if the key information has been deleted.

Deleted Information Is Not Gone

When information is deleted from a digital device, the file itself is not erased but, rather, the computer’s reference point for the file is erased. It is much like removing a card from the library’s card catalogue, but not taking the book off the shelf. The computer then marks the space containing the file as available. If a large amount of data is added to the drive, there is a chance that the “deleted” file can be overwritten. However, the use of very large hard drives in most current computers makes the chance of overwriting unlikely, and fragments of documents can often be found even a year after normal computer use.

Another recent forensics case involved a wrongful termination suit brought against a construction company by a former employee. He had been fired due to cost overruns on the company’s biggest project. The employee’s suit claimed his superior directed the project into overruns and blamed the results on other employees. The documents produced by his lawyers included emails sent to the superior, which cited warnings of overruns and suggestions to avoid them.

Forensics experts were asked to investigate the former employee’s computer for evidence of these emails, which the superior claimed never to have received. Examination of the computer showed pieces of the email text within the hard drive’s “unallocated space,” the areas where deleted information is sent. Yet the text did not appear in the former employee’s email folders.

The forensics company recommended a review of the company’s email servers through which the emails would have passed if they had been sent. No evidence of the emails was found.

Later, evidence of a forgery was discovered on the employee’s new office computer. He had used an engineering tool to fabricate documents to look like the printout of an email. The presentation of this evidence was the turning point in the case, which was summarily dismissed.

Recent Changes to the Rules of Civil Procedure

Both law makers and policymakers at the national level recognize the involvement of digital devices in modern-day litigation. Recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that the court system is recognizing the crucial importance of electronic information in the process of investigation and litigation. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have changed the production of electronic information, most decisions related to its evidentiary value are defined under the Federal Rules of Evidence. These rules apply to both civil and criminal proceedings, but most challenges and decisions related to digital evidence have been made in criminal courts.

In particular, the new rules indicate that digital documents are given the same weight and status as paper documents in terms of production. These rule changes underscore the fundamental shift of modern litigation toward the inclusion of electronic information in the legal process. Although the implications of these rule changes will not be clear until they are tested in the courts, it is expected that demand will increase for properly performed data collection and digital forensics investigations. As always, the admission of digital forensics evidence into cases will continue to be governed by the Daubert rules.

Licensing Requirements

Licensing requirements for forensic examiners have yet to be standardized on a national level, but most states require some level of certification to handle evidence and perform investigations. In the majority of states, digital forensics professionals are required to obtain a private investigator license; however, three states (Alabama, Alaska, and Wyoming) have licensing requirements only in certain cities, and others (Colorado, Idaho, and South Dakota) have no licensing requirements whatsoever. Given that this is a relatively recently established field, it is likely that a national certification for digital forensics examiners is on the horizon, particularly with Federal Rule changes that all but mandate the use of such experts to handle digital information.

Most licensing organizations impose both penalties and fines if examiners do not follow the proper evidentiary handling rules. The specific injunctions vary by state but typically include both financial sanctions and the revocation of licenses. It is important to investigate the certifications required by your state when seeking a digital forensics examiner. Knowingly hiring an unlicensed person can be punished through sanctions, fines, or worse: inadmissible evidence.

As digital devices become more pervasive in the modern world, the amount of electronic information processed into the legal landscape will continue to increase. Although many attorneys and investigators have yet to use the services of digital forensics experts, digital information can assist in almost any case. The complexity of such devices and the changeable nature of such information necessitates the establishment of digital forensics examiners as a crucial addition to the forensics field.

References

Arkfeld, M. (2003). Electronic discovery and evidence. Phoenix, AZ: Law Partner Publishing.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Mac Avoy, J., & Eng, G. (2006, June 19). Litigation: Forging ahead on e-discovery [special issue]. New York Law Journal.

Ryan, D. J., & Shpantzer, G. (2005). Legal aspects of digital forensics. Retrieved April 12, 2007, from http://
www.danjryan.com/Legal%20Issues.doc

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg (S.D.N.Y. 2002-2005). n

This article published by Dr. Robert O’Block

no comment

Mar

Letters to the Editor

Posted by admin | Edit Published in THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007

Letters to the Editor

Dear Editor,

We read with interest “Antidepressant Withdrawal Syndrome and DUI Evaluation” by Drs. Spiller and Sawyer in the Fall 2007 issue of The Forensic Examiner. The article points out the effects of drugs on the neurotransmitter system of the body and how alterations can take place so that the withdrawal syndrome can be created. This is the normal homeostatic reaction of the body when a drug disrupts the body’s normal state of function for that person. The sudden withdrawal of a drug will disrupt the body’s adjustment to the drug and can cause the withdrawal syndrome, which leads to an impaired state for that person.

We would like to discuss the statement, “this produces the paradox of a potentially impaired driver not under the influence of any drug or alcohol.” It is because of the drugs and the homeostatic reaction of the body that the syndrome is produced. The officer has the responsibility to remove an impaired driver from the road, whether a medical call, reckless driving, or DUI. The SFSTs are tools for making decisions for substance impairment. If four or more clues from the HGN exam are present, drugs such as alcohol, dissociative anesthetics, depressants, inhalants, or a combination are the likely cause. Breath testing determines alcohol levels. In many states a Drug Recognition Expert evaluation aid in determination if alcohol, drugs or substance is the cause or a medical call. If drug/substance is indicated, then blood urine, or other biologic specimen may be analyzed for toxicology. Standard field sobriety tests (SFSTs) were designed to help remove the impaired driver from the road. It does not matter how someone becomes impaired—they are impaired. SFSTs do what they are designed to do: take impaired drivers off the road.

The article mentions the already existing jerking eye movements. If there is existing nystagmus prior to the administration of the HGN exam, it is typically congenital, an existing condition or of recent occurrence, in which case it may show the need for a neurological evaluation, possibly saving the person’s life. Nystagmus from HGN does not present itself in the resting position; it is manifest while following a target that is presented during the HGN exam. Therefore, an existing nystagmus is of interest but is not confused with the eye movements observed during HGN testing.

Prescribing doctors must be vigilant in educating their patients about the effects of using prescription drugs, discontinuing prescription drugs, and drug interactions, especially when driving and operating power tools or machinery. The patient must follow instructions and be responsible for his or her decision to drive or not drive. In many states, the physician is responsible for communication with DMV if a patient is not fit to safely drive a motor vehicle, for whatever reason.

Law enforcement officers often encounter individuals who exhibit behaviors consistent with impairment. Regardless of reasons, impaired drivers have failed to stop themselves from being a danger to themselves and others. Officers are trained to observe potentially impaired drivers, and SFSTs are not the only information officers use when deciding to remove drivers from the road. If not alcohol or drugs, a medical problem may be responsible for the impairment. For the safety of the driver and the safety of the public, any impairment cannot be ignored.

Dominic R. Pannone, OD, CMI-V, CHS-III and Eugene R. Bertolli, OD, FACFEI, DABCHS, CMI-V, CHS-V

Dear Editor,

We thank Drs. Pannone and Bertolli for their comments, but respectfully disagree and appreciate the chance to respond. Our review “Antidepressant Withdrawal Syndrome and DUI Evaluation” was intended to bring to light a potential problem: that the absence of a drug may produce an impaired driver.

As we stated “while there may be significant impairment, the term driving under the influence may be inappropriate for these cases” (pages 52–53). Following evaluation by a field officer using the SFST, there may be a suggestion that the driver is under the influence of either drugs and/or alcohol. Follow-up testing, in these specific SSRI withdrawal cases, would show no drugs or alcohol detected. This follow-up testing is often a critical part of evidence in prosecution of these cases.

A similar situation might occur if a diabetic patient becomes hypoglycemic while driving. During a moderate-to-severe hypoglycemic episode, the driver may become confused and be “impaired” by his or her low blood sugar. But again, “driving under the influence” may be inappropriate, as no drugs or alcohol involved.

In reference to the concept of “impaired but not under the influence,” these patients have not taken any medication and that is, in fact, their problem. They do potentially pose a risk to themselves and other drivers and we stated so in our review: “patients should be warned about the dangers of operating a motor vehicle if they begin experiencing moderate-to-severe withdrawal symptoms” (page 52). We agree that prescribing doctors must be vigilant in educating their patients about the effects of using prescription drugs, discontinuing prescription drugs, and drug interactions, especially when driving and operating power tools or machinery, and that patients should be vigilant in following such instructions.

Henry A. Spiller, MS, DABAT, DABFE and Tama Sawyer, PharmD

no comment

Mar

Editor’s Note: Pictoral review of the Forensic Examiner since 1992

Posted by admin | Edit Published in THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007

Editor’s Note

The Forensic Examiner started as a 3-page newsletter in August of 1992.

Viewing past covers of The Forensic Examiner demonstrates how much the journal has evolved.

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2007 www.acfei.com

Love our New Look!

The Forensic Examiner, nearing the end of its 16th year, has come a long way. From the three-page letter that Founder Dr. Robert O’Block created and sent to a few members from his tiny home office back in 1992, to the 88-page, 4-color, peer-reviewed journal that you have before you now, The Forensic Examiner has become a prestigious publication of which our entire staff is extremely proud.

Our most recent achievement has us all beaming especially brightly. The Forensic Examiner is now on newsstands across the United States and in Canada, including Barnes and Noble, Borders, Hastings, and many other independent bookstores! Joining the ranks of esteemed magazines such as Scientific American and The Economist, we are one of the only academic peer-reviewed journals to be featured on the newsstands of major bookstores. And just to put any fears immediately to rest, an academic journal is how we will always remain.

There is no doubt that long-standing members have noticed the changes in design over the past few years. We’ve encouraged our art director, Brandon Alms, to be creative with layout and cover designs, and we have not been disappointed. Our editorial staff has also put forth a lot of effort to maintain a level of discourse within the journal that is accessible to individuals outside the field. However, we would never dream of compromising our scholarly standards. Our goals do not include catering to people looking for sensational stories similar to those found on popular television networks, but we do want to appeal to a broader audience.

As the cover states, we want to show the general public real cases, real experts, and real science. Offering subscriptions and selling on limited newsstands over the past couple of years has made us aware of a growing population of individuals who are not formally educated in forensic science, but who are fascinated with the field. By sharing academic articles with these individuals, we plan to show them that true forensics, though not nearly as glamorous, can be just as interesting and dynamic as any hour-long drama.

By expanding our audience, we hope to inspire more young readers to pursue careers in forensics and to bring a higher level of awareness to the importance of forensics funding. Our authors have the chance not only to reach a larger audience, but also to influence a new demographic in a way they never before imagined.

ACFEI Members: It goes without saying that the journal wouldn’t be anywhere near what it is today if it weren’t for the dedication and loyalty of you, our members. Above all else, this is your journal, and its main purpose is to serve you. Thanks for helping make The Forensic Examiner the world’s leading forensic journal!

New Readers: We’re thrilled you have chosen to explore the real world of forensics with us. We have no doubts that you will love learning about the science behind forensics and enjoy discovering areas of the field new to you!

We’re delighted to be the first journal able to maintain high academic standards while appealing to the general public, and we plan to take full advantage of our opportunity to disseminate knowledge to a larger and more diverse audience. This issue in particular reflects a lot of design changes that we hope will be more inviting to all readers. If all goes according to plan, forensic accountants just might find themselves reading forensic engineering articles, and visa versa.

Falsely Accused

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 16:19:00 +0000

Falsely Accused

On June 20, 1996, Kevin Lee Green left the Honorable Robert Fitzgerald’s courtroom—after 17 years confined in a California prison—finally a free man.

On September 30, 1979, Kevin Lee Green went out to get a hamburger, leaving his pregnant wife Dianna at home. When he returned around 20 minutes later, he found his wife had been attacked and beaten. Dianna was left in a coma for 1 month following the attack due to a blow to the middle of her forehead. She was 9 months pregnant with Kevin’s child, and their unborn daughter died in the womb. When Dianna awoke from the coma, she suffered from substantial memory loss and had “considerable brain damage” (Assembly Bill, 1999).

Kevin Green told police he left the apartment where the two lived to get a hamburger, and the employee at the hamburger stand testified that Green had been there. Police found that the food Green had in his possession was still warm when they arrived. These statements and evidence, however, did not prevent them from charging Green for the murder of his unborn child and the attempted murder of his wife.

On October 2, 1980, an Orange County Superior Court jury convicted Kevin Lee Green of one count of second degree murder, one count of attempted murder, and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon.

The prosecution’s main witness was Dianna Green herself. In fact, because there was a complete lack of corroborative evidence, the entire case rested on Dianna’s testimony. Although she had lost much of her memory and suffered incredible brain damage, Dianna testified that her husband had struck her in the head that night, serving as the only witness against Kevin Green. Psychiatrist Dr. Martin Brenner found Dianna a reliable witness, enabling her to take the stand. The defense’s request to have an independent psychiatrist evaluate her mental state was denied. While on the stand, Dianna found it difficult to spell her own last name.

Never did Kevin Green admit guilt, maintaining his innocence throughout the trial and the years he would spend in jail. He testified that upon his return home from the hamburger stand, he saw a man in a dark van quickly leaving the crime scene, but police did not consider this important enough to investigate.

On November 7, 1980, for allegedly attacking his wife and killing his unborn child, a judge sentenced Green to 15 years to life in prison. Although he knew that his chances for parole were higher if he expressed regret for his “crimes,” Green held to his assertion of innocence throughout the entire time he was in prison. His refusal to lie led to his being denied parole four separate times.

When Dianna was attacked, Kevin was a corporal in the United States Marine Corps, and he intended to make military service his career, as his father had done. The Marine Corps gave Green a less than honorable discharge, which further penalized him as it prevented him from serving in the military again or from receiving retirement and other military benefits.

Vaginal slides taken from Dianna Green after the attack showed the presence of spermatozoa. Kevin Green tried, while in prison, to raise enough money to take a DNA test to prove the evidence left in Dianna did not match his DNA. This would allow the case to be reopened. He was never able to afford the test, and although he had passed at least one polygraph test before the trial, investigators refused to reopen the case.

In 1982, an appeal in district court affirmed the conviction, so Green petitioned the State of California Supreme Court for a hearing.

When the DNA offender database was created in California, examiners discovered that the DNA profile in the spermatozoa found in Dianna Green was a match to another felon. Gerald Parker gave a full confession and admitted guilt to five other murders. Parker, also known as the serial killer called the “Bedroom Basher,” was responsible for the attack on Dianna Green and the death of the Greens’ unborn daughter.

Kevin Lee Green was granted habeas corpus and immediately released from prison on June 20, 1996, by the Honorable Robert Fitzgerald, Judge of the Superior Court for the County of Orange. The same day, “the Honorable Robert Fitzgerald further found and ordered that Kevin Lee Green was factually innocent of all charges and that all allegations against him relating to the September 30, 1979, attack on Dianna Green were untrue” (Assembly Bill, 1999).

Green had spent approximately 17 years in prison for crimes he did not commit. Kevin Lee Green entered prison at age 21, and was exonerated when he was 37. He was unable to attend the funerals of both his grandmothers and his grandfather because he was incarcerated at the times of their deaths. His sister and brother both married while Green was in prison.

In October 1999, California Governor Gray Davis awarded Green $620,000 as compensation for his time spent wrongfully imprisoned. Currently, Green lives in Jefferson City, Missouri, and is trying to rebuild his life.

References

California State Legislature. (1995, October 5). Assembly Bill No. 110. Retrieved March 21, 2007, from http://info.sen.ca.gov

Innocence Project. (n.d.) Kevin Green. Retrieved March 21, 2007, from http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/162.php

Williams, M. (2001, February 22). Following other states’ lead, Missouri lawmakers consider funding post-conviction DNA testing. Retrieved March 21, 2007, from http://www.mdn.org/2001/STORIES/DNA.htm

Violent Criminal Apprehension, by Greg Cooper

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 15:52:00 +0000

There are literally thousands of separate and independent federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the United States. Although each of the agencies share common goals in their distinct jurisdictions of “keeping the peace,” “protecting the public,” and “maintaining law and order,” they do not generally share common databases or records management systems. Amazingly, each agency maintains separate and independent systems aligned with their own geographical or legal jurisdiction.

This condition exists in spite of their common goals and the common sense of sharing and maintaining inter-dependent systems that could otherwise effectively facilitate coordination and cooperation between agencies. Inter-dependent systems would also improve relations and the mutual best interest of both law enforcement and the public at large. Some authorities list several reasons for preserving the status quo. Their arguments are understandable and justifiable under certain circumstances; however, they do not pass muster when measuried up against the benefits derived from merging their collective efforts or the expectation of the public. The primary prohibitive factors against combining criminal and information management systems between agencies are issues of privacy and finance. There are other obstacles that must be overcome as well, including organizational politics, pride, and ego. Unfortunately, the legitimate objections are often presented as a blanket excuse when, in some cases, the root or heart of the matter lies in the personality of the organization, either in its leadership or historical policies. Regardless, most public safety executives concede that sharing and coordinating information is the “best-case scenario” and publicly support the concept while bemoaning the realities of financial restrictions and potential legalities.

Recognizing the valid rationale for either resisting, delaying, or preventing attempts to merge separate data and independent systems, authorities have incorporated creative and resourceful alternative approaches. In support of law enforcement’s efforts to overcome such obstacles, specialized autonomous databases have been created. These databases are separate from the individual agencies, allowing access to outside agency information while still protecting privacy restrictions and reducing financial considerations. Several databases have been created, monitored, and administered by official federal, state, and even private institutions. Legitimate law enforcement entities are allowed full access through compliance with strict standards, rules, and guidelines. The existing databases are examples of excellent resources made available to law enforcement agencies in their collective efforts to share, coordinate, and cooperate while supporting each other in identifying, investigating, and apprehending offenders. A representation of various databases and informational resources are summarized in chapters 5 and 10 of a book I authored with Mike King, Cold Case Methodology (Law Tech Custom Publishing, 2005). Among the resources listed and described in that work is the FBI’s Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VICAP). It is the only national database that exists for the purpose of assisting law enforcement agencies in determining if cases from separate jurisdictions may have been committed by the same offender.

Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VICAP)

In 1985, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced the birth of VICAP. The purpose of VICAP is to provide a national clearinghouse for law enforcement agencies to coordinate information on missing persons, unidentified bodies, and homicides. Participation in the program is voluntary and is available to all law enforcement agencies in the country. It was determined that a significant number of cases bearing common characteristics could be identified by collating these categories together. In 1997, I was promoted to the VICAP National Program Manager. As a criminal profiler, I re-engineered the program to work more closely and in alignment with the Criminal Investigative Analysis Program (FBI’s Criminal Profilers). Additionally, the stated mission and focus of the program was streamlined to “facilitate cooperation, communication, and coordination between law enforcement agencies in their efforts to investigate, identify, track, apprehend, and prosecute violent serial offenders.” VICAP is a nationwide data information center designed to collect, collate, and analyze crimes of violence, specifically murder. Cases examined by VICAP include

solved or unsolved homicides or attempts, especially those that involve an abduction; are apparently random, motiveless, or sexually oriented; or are known or suspected to be part of a series;
missing persons, where the circumstances indicate a strong possibility of foul play and the victim is still missing;
unidentified dead bodies where the manner of death is known or suspected to be homicide;
abductions of children or attempts;
solved or unsolved sexual assaults or attempts.

Currently, VICAP is working toward implementing a sexual assault component for the VICAP tracking system. For VICAP to work effectively, it needs an invitation from local law enforcement to participate in an investigation. The FBI provides, free of charge, the software to set up the VICAP database.

Cases with an arrested individual or identified offender can be submitted to the VICAP system by local law enforcement investigators for comparison and possible matching with unsolved cases. Once the case is entered into the database, it is compared continually against all other entries on the basis of certain aspects of the case. The purpose of this is to detect signature aspects of a crime and similar patterns of modus operandi (MO), which will, in turn, allow VICAP personnel to pinpoint those crimes that may have been committed by the same offender in other areas of the country. If patterns are found, the VICAP coordinators will then work with all of the law enforcement agencies involved to solve the crime.

When a pattern of criminal activity is discovered; (for example, a serial murder suspect has been identified), VICAP can then assist law enforcement agencies by coordinating a multi-agency investigative conference. These conferences can be very beneficial, especially if it has been determined that the suspects have traveled throughout the country. A pivotal product of prior conferences has been the coordination of activities such as search warrants, interview matters, and laboratory testing. The VICAP database is effective in solving crimes from the past to the present. Current cases may be entered as well as cases as far back as the 1950s; or any case that law enforcement thinks VICAP can assist in may be offered (Cold Case Methodology).

Current VICAP Services

The Second Edition of the FBI’s Crime Classification Manual (Jossey-Bass, 2006), of which I was a contributing author, reports that VICAPs services provided to local law enforcement include the following:

Analytical support for cold case investigation, to include homicide and sexual assault matters that may potentially involve transient or serial offenders
Mapping, trend analysis, training, and case coordination support and analysis
A full range of analytical services for all member agencies on submitted cases, as well as limited analysis for nonmember agencies which submit criteria cases
Written products prepared and disseminated in the Criminal Intelligence Assessment Report (CIAR) format
Offender timelines, matrices, and mapping products
NCIC interface for off-line searches of suspects or vehicles
National Law Enforcement Telecommunication Systems (NLETS) searches of messages dating back to 1986
National crime analyst training inservices to include crime analysis, behavioral analysis, and case management
VICAP Alerts published in the FBI’s Law Enforcement Bulletin and other publications (VICAP Alerts feature crime information notices of general interest to law enforcement)

Revised Form

In the early-to-mid 1990s during my tenure as the National Program Manager, the VICAP crime analysts began a detailed examination of the submission report. Their efforts resulted in a reduction of the questions from 190 to only 95. The current format is in an “intelligent layout and design and it looks less imposing and more like an attractive, easy-to-use reporting instrument.” It has always been my opinion that the VICAP form also serves as an excellent reference guide while conducting a thorough and well thought-out investigation of homicide, missing persons, unidentified bodies, and sexual assaults. If the questions posed by the VICAP form are completed, it can be presumed that the investigation is complete and thorough.

In conclusion, it is critical that American law enforcement agencies foster a stronger will toward a more interdependent network of their respective resources in order to optimize a strong and safe society. This is particularly applicable in resolving difficult cases. Individual agencies, regardless of their size, that work exclusively and independently, will never have sufficient resources alone to complete their mission. However, those agencies that apply the three-pronged approach of cooperating, communicating, and coordinating their efforts and resources will reap an abundance of success while being extolled by the citizens that they have taken an oath to protect and serve.

In the next issue of The Forensic Examiner, I will provide an example that demonstrates the type and nature of cases for which VICAP’s services can provide critical assistance and support: the case of Robert Ben Rhoades.

Greg Cooper, MPA, FBI (retired), Chief of Police (retired), started his law enforcement career as a police officer in Provo Utah in 1977. He began his criminal profiling career in 1986 with the FBI, Seattle Division. Just a couple of years later, he was soon promoted to field coordinator for the Criminal Profiling Unit at the FBI Academy in Quantico, VA, and then in Los Angeles, CA. In 1990 he was again promoted to profiler with the Quantico unit, where he was also able to teach several classes at the FBI’s prestigious National Academy and supervise VICAP. In 1995, Cooper left the FBI to serve as the chief of police in Provo, Utah. Currently, Cooper enjoys instructing psychological profiling and anatomy of homicide courses and serving as an expert witness in the legal arena. He is a coauthor of the Crime Classification Manual and, the recently released, Predators: Who Are They and How to Avoid Them.

Do not miss Greg Cooper’s criminal profiling workshop at the 2007 ACFEI National Conference in Kansas City, Missouri. He will be speaking from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, October 6, and attendance at his workshop is free with conference registration! For more information about the National Conference, see pages 42–48.

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

By Greg Cooper, MPA, FBI (retired), Chief of Poice (retired)

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER- published by Robert OBlock

Book Review: Trials and Tribulations

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 15:04:00 +0000

To purchase this book, please go to Amazon.com

Book Description

Medical malpractice has become a hot issue in our litigious society. The trial lawyers are locked in battle with the doctors, while the politicians and the patients look on. This is about one skirmish in that battle, told by one of the casualties.

Donald Austin, M.D., was a well-respected neurosurgeon, operating at the cutting edge of medical technology. He was justly regarded as an expert in the field, and as such gave testimony for the defense in many malpractice lawsuits. However, he was shocked by some instances of malpractice, and when he decided to testify for plaintiffs as well, he did not bargain for what ensued. As his testifying became known, both his professional colleagues and the medical societies carried out a smear campaign that ended his professional career.

About the Author

Donald Austin, M.D., is a third-generation doctor. A native of Indiana, he now lives in Michigan. He was chief of the neurosurgery section of the Hutzel Hospital in Detroit for many years and associate professor of neurosurgery at Wayne State University. He is married, with four grown children, and is now, reluctantly, retired.

There is no such thing as a small fire. Fire knows no boundaries and adheres to no restrictions. It is limited only by its supply of oxygen and the availability of a fuel source. Someone can set a small and insignificant fire, but fires only start small. They can fizzle out and die, but all too often they grow, vast and terrible. They destroy property. They take lives.

Sadly, the most persistent and dangerous incendiary fire-setters are the weakest and least responsible of us all: children. According to the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety, juveniles in the United States annually set 41,900 fires that result in 165 deaths, 1,900 injuries, and $272 million in property damage. Fifty-five percent of all arson arrests in the United States are children under the age of 18, nearly half of whom are under the age of 15, and 6.8% of whom are younger than 10 years old. Who are these children, and why do they set fires?

A 3-year-old innocently playing with a cigarette lighter left out by a careless parent might cause a conflagration in which his entire family dies. A 10-year-old might ignite his mattress in a desperate attempt to draw attention to an intolerable home situation. A high school student might throw a match into a wastebasket so that an alarm will go off and disrupt a dreaded test. One teenager might set fire to a car. Another might set fire to a rival’s home. Some have even been known to toss flammable liquids on derelicts because it amused them to watch the wretched souls flailing frantically at flames and screaming in pain. A successful actress I once knew told me that as a child, she had set fires for emotional relief. Children set fires out of boredom, anger, and rage. The motivations of youthful fire-setters run the gamut from curiosity to pathology, from innocence to evil.

Recently, I received a letter from a special education teacher, whom I will call Sarah Nelson, who works for the New York City school system. Her letter began:

Dear Shelly,

Gerald, who is repeating third grade, did so well that I was wondering WHY he had been placed in my class until, following a real fire evacuation at about 11 o’clock that morning (after someone had set the paper towel dispenser in the boys’ bathroom ablaze), I was called into the principal’s office.

There sat Gerald, two other boys, and his teacher.

“Mrs. Nelson,” asked the principal. “Was Gerald with you between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m. today?”

“Yes. He was taking the assessment test.”

“Did Gerald leave you at any time to use the bathroom?”

In the 47 seconds or so that Gerald had taken “to relieve himself,” he had pulled out a purloined lighter from his pocket and lit up the paper towels.

And this was not his first fire of the day!

A few hours before, Gerald, in the presence of the other two boys sitting in the principal’s office, had used matches to light up a toilet paper roll!

In the case of the paper towels, one of the male teachers had happened by, saw flames coming from the dispenser, rushed to the science room where there were two buckets filled with water, and attacked the fire. It was then that smoke had come pouring out of the bathroom and the alarm had been sounded.

Dismayed as I was to hear about these fires, it was not until I had read the next paragraph that I changed my mind about how I was going to approach this subject:

Of course, we did not DARE disturb the fire department to check our suppression efforts and/or “light” into the student body about fire safety. And our principal refuses to let us cover the incident in our student newspaper. It is for this reason I thought of you and wondered if you could give me some tips about juvenile fire-setters.

Needless to say, the small, unreported fires in Sarah’s school did not loom in my mind as small. I saw them as the deadly conflagrations that they might so easily have become. To alert my friend to the seriousness of her situation, I related some frightening statistics accumulated in the spring of 2004 by the Massachusetts Coalition for Kids in Danger. The Coalition’s purpose was to track media coverage of children who set fires or set off bombs.

In the first 201 days of the project, children burned over 57 vehicles, set fires that destroyed over 48,594 acres of forest, set 218 houses on fire, and destroyed 228 apartments, 30 businesses, and 13 churches. Additionally, they killed 80 people (26 of whom were children who perished in fires that they, themselves, had set) and injured 346 people, including 63 firefighters, police officers, and bomb technicians. Relative to institutions of learning, in its first 7 months of information gathering, the study found that 301 or 31% of the 901 fires set by children had targeted schools. These statistics, however, reflect only fires that were reported in the media. If we could add in fires like those described to me by Sarah Nelson—ones left unreported because principals do not want their schools to look bad—the statistics would become ominous indeed.

My involvement with juvenile fire-setters began when a polygraph expert contacted my late husband and me. He had been hired by a drug rehabilitation facility that I will call Kid City (my version of Boys Town) to determine which of the young people on the premises was responsible for setting a series of fires. Because there were hundreds of suspects and the polygraphist could not possibly test them all, he suggested that Kid City hire us. Our company, Charles G. King Associates, investigates the origin and cause of fires (origin: where a fire started; cause: what or who initiated the blaze).

At that time, most of the high school-aged children in Kid City had either been remanded there by the courts or had been placed there by family members or guardians for drug rehabilitation. The greatest percentage of those in the facility were criminals, and some were hardened criminals. All were underage. Their ages were relevant because Kid City was mandated by law to maintain the absolute confidentiality of their juvenile population. This meant that, although the local fire department could be called in to fight a fire, after extinguishment, they were required to leave. Nor would a city, county, or state fire marshal be permitted to enter the building to analyze the fire scene, search for hidden stashes of matches, or interview the residents.

This left Kid City in a terrible bind because at least one of their residents had set a series of fires, but, unlike the public school system situation related to me by Sarah Nelson, Kid City was completely committed to the continued safety of the young people in its charge. This is why they brought us in to investigate the fires. First, Charlie and I were asked to sign documents protecting the confidentiality of the residents (all of the names and places in this article have been changed); then we were briefed.

Kid City was located about 2 hours north of a big eastern city. The four-story structure was slightly larger than a county hospital, and it was surrounded by acres of beautiful farmland where residents were encouraged to grow crops and take nature walks. Other than some pleasant administrative offices on the ground floor and an elegant wood-paneled religious sanctuary, the building itself was institutional and utilitarian: cinderblock classrooms, cinderblock dormitory, communal dining rooms, and so on.

During our briefing by the director of Kid City, we were told that over the past seven months, three fires had occurred:

February 28 –Someone had taken a bunch of papers, piled them in a bin in the basement of Kid City, and ignited them. The fire was set at 8:20 a.m.
July 13 –Someone had shoved a wad of toilet paper between the arm and cushion of a sofa and set it on fire. This fire had not occurred at Kid City proper, but at its induction facility over 50 miles south. The fire had been discovered a little after midnight.
August 14 – This fire was set between two mattresses stored in the cinderblock closet of an empty room on the fourth floor of Kid City where the kids used to “coop,” or hang out. The fire occurred at 6:57 p.m.

We were called in after the third fire. Initially, the task of discovering who had set these fires was daunting, in no small part because our pool of suspects was upward of 150 residents. We then had to multiply this pool by three (once for each fire). In order to cut the list down to a manageable size, we asked the administrators to go through their files and give us only the names of those residents who had been at Kid City for at least the last two and optimally for all three of the fires. This reduced our pool to a little over one hundred suspects. To whittle the list down further, we drafted an affidavit and had copies distributed to the 100 plus residents on the list, as well as to all of the counselors, teachers, and administrators in Kid City.

The affidavit asked the individual to write his or her name and to answer four questions about each of the three fires. The questions were carefully worded to make the respondents feel that they were only reporting their observations, and not being tattletales or informants. It was not their job to identify the fire setter, it was ours. The four questions were

Where were you at the time of the fire?
What were you doing?
Who did you see?
Who saw you?

After the forms had been filled out, they were returned to us. Once we had a chance to look them over, we realized, somewhat to our surprise, that not only had the residents been willing to answer our questions, they had done so eagerly. We also noticed that fear of injury or death superseded peer group loyalty. The teenagers in the facility had a firm grasp of how dangerous a fire could be. Most of the students had been in residence only for the fires that had occurred in Kid City and made no mention of the fire at the induction facility. Many gave detailed observations that specified locations, recalled times, and named names. What follows is a sampling of typical responses:

Richard C.

During the first fire I was with my clan leader Evelyn V. talking about my problems. Then I went to seminar at 1:00 o’clock.

During the second fire I was in the rec room relating with Margaret C. Rene D., Dave H., Todd M., Marty E., and Jerome L.

Ken B.

First Fire – I was eating lunch until approx. 12:45. Then I went down to the auditorium for seminar. I do not remember who I was with at the time. Evelyn V. was going to give the seminar. I was reading until the fire began. At approx. 1:05 the alarm went off and I went outside.

Second Fire – I was in the recreation room, listening to music with Donald A., Joe Z., Joe B., and one other person. At approx. 9:30 I went upstairs to my room, and was still there when the alarm went off. When I was leaving the floor during the alarm, Bill D., saw me on the floor.

From these responses, we extrapolated where people were, when they were there, what they were doing, whom they saw, and who saw them. Then we tediously cross-referenced times, places, and residents. If Donna wrote that she had seen Thomas, Iris, and Edwin in the basement, we wanted to know if Thomas, Iris, and Edwin had also seen Donna. Our ultimate goal was to identify who had been in the area of the various fire scenes at the times of the fire and who had not.

The work was time-consuming and required meticulous attention to detail, but it produced results. Once we had completed and studied our charts, we were able to eliminate all but four suspects: Chris Ramirez, Fred Pozniak, Tyrell Washington, and Randy Scarp.

Chris Ramiriz

Chris Ramirez had been seen on the fourth floor immediately before the fire.
When the alarm went off, he was overheard saying that there were mattresses in room 411 that would be easy to set on fire.
He was seen smoking a cigarette on the fourth floor immediately prior to the fire.
He had set two fires before he was 6 years old. One in his grandfather’s garbage and one in his father’s grocery store. Coincidentally, the pizza store next door to his father’s grocery store had also burned down.

Fred Pozniak

Fred Pozniak was seen on the fourth floor shortly before the fire.
He was moody, quiet, and used to hang out on the mattresses in the “fire room.”
He was a bed wetter and claimed to have been an abused child.
He was a loner and was picked on and teased for being unattractive.
He was very grim and depressed on the day of the fire.

Tyrell Washington

Tyrell Washington had told two other boys at Kid City that he had a prior arrest for arson that was not in his records.
He was present for all three fires.
He had a hostile attitude and was overheard threatening to blow up the building.

Randy Scarp

Randy Scarp wanted to leave Kid City and hated the place.
He was reported to have a sadistic streak and laughed when other people were in pain.
He seemed to have no control over his emotions.
He was heard stating that “people are going to start dropping” at Kid City.
Many of the other residents thought that he was not really a drug addict, but that he was crazy.

Once our list had become manageable, we moved to the next phase of our investigation. This was to interview each suspect individually and ask him what he had seen, when and where he had seen it, and who he thought had set the fires. Our interview strategy was low-key. Each youngster would be brought into a private room, asked questions, and invited to respond at length. None of the interviews were tape-recorded. Nobody from the staff was present. Charlie and I took turns asking questions, and I took all the notes.

After we had finished our interviews, we created four final charts, one for each suspect. Each consisted of three columns. The first column was headed “Witness” and listed the names of the residents who had seen one of the four main suspects at the time of a fire. The Second column was headed “What clears him” and delineated what the witness had seen that seemed to exculpate the suspect. The third column, headed “What makes him look suspicious,” did the same for what made him look guilty.

The following might be a typical entry for Tyrell Washington:

Witness—Bill Hix
What clears him— Bill saw Tyrell in the courtyard after dinner.
What makes him look suspicious—Tyrell was present for all three fires and is known to have a hostile attitude. He told Bill and at least two other kids that he had been arrested for arson prior to coming to Kid City. Bill also overheard Tyrell threatening to blow up a building.

Our analysis of the entries on these four charts made it evident that only Randy Scarp had been sighted by multiple witnesses in the areas of all three fires. The “conclusion” column on his chart read:

Randy Scarp is the only suspect who was confirmed to be on the fourth floor at the time of the fire and who admits to being there. He denies setting the fire, but cannot explain why he did not see who did, because he was in the hall at the time the fire was set. There is also a problem with his disposal of a cigarette he was smoking at the time, as he said that he tossed it out a window, but that window is covered with a screen.

At the interview, he presented himself as compassionate and good-natured. He said he did not resent being accused of setting the fire, that he was not angry, and that he had not been out to get anybody lately.

The most suspicious thing about Randy, other than his proximity to both fires, is the benign way in which he presented himself. This benevolence is in complete contrast to the way others describe him. Also, unlike the others who were interviewed, at the end of his interview, we felt that Randy gave an audible sigh of relief that it was over.

After we had finished our interviews, our charts, and our analyses, we told the Kid City director that we had eliminated three of our four prime suspects and that we believed Randy Scarp, alone, had set all three fires. He responded that they were going to polygraph all four boys.

Subsequently, the polygraphist told us that Randy Scarp was, and I quote from my notes, “heavy duty guilty.”

Nevertheless, all four boys were kicked out. Charlie and I may have cleared Chris Ramirez, Fred Pozniak, and Tyrell Washington of involvement in those specific incendiary incidents, but Kid City was not going to take any chances. Fire is too dangerous, and too many lives were at stake. They knew, as we do, that children who set fires are a fact of reality, an unfortunate fact brought home to me when my friend, Sarah Nelson, contacted me again—this time on a cell phone from her classroom. After a minute or two, I had calmed her down enough to learn that two more fires had been set that morning in her school. As before, school officials had themselves extinguished the fires and had not contacted the fire department. Unlike the administrators at Kid City, they had not learned the most important lesson about fire, one I believe should be engraved in giant letters for all to see:

THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A SMALL FIRE. THERE ARE ONLY FIRES THAT HAVE NOT GOTTEN BIG—YET.

Shelly Reuben King is the author of Tabula Rasa, Origin & Cause, Spent Matches, the Edgar-nominated Julian Solo, and Weeping. She is a licensed private detective and a certified fire investigator who has been investigating fires and arson for more than 20 years. King is a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Examiners and has been a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners since 1996.

He Made Mute Evidence Speak: Edward O. Heinrich

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 14:57:00 +0000

He Made Mute Evidence Speak: Edward O. Heinrich

he crowded Number 13 train was on its usual route as it headed into Tunnel 13 through the Siskiyou Mountains in Oregon, just north of the California border. It was October 11, 1923, and the train was bound for San Francisco. Nothing that day appeared to be out of the ordinary, so engineer Sidney Bates was oblivious to what awaited him on the other side of the half-mile tunnel. As the train emerged from the dark into daylight again, two masked men with guns jumped out and demanded that Bates stop the train. When he complied, a third man appeared, shoved a bundle through the door of the mail car, and ran. A second later, a blast shook the train, triggering a fire. Shots were fired in the ensuing confusion that left three trainmen, including Bates, dead. The clerk trapped in the mail car burned to death and the three bandits-turned-killers fled without the money they had come to grab. Some of the horrified passengers managed to alert authorities.

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

By Katherine Ramsland, PhD, CMI-V

Daniel O’Connell, chief of the Southern Pacific police force, was the first investigating officer to arrive. Near the damaged train he found a battery linked to a detonating device, a pair of gunny-sack shoe covers, a revolver, and a pair of greasy denim overalls. Although teams equipped with dogs had caught the killers’ trail, they did not track them down. The discovered battery led officials to a mechanic in a nearby town and, noticing that his overalls were greasy, arrested him. He claimed he had never seen the battery before, but when the overalls taken from the scene fit him, he was detained. Authorities were unable to connect him to the crime, but, having no other leads, they were not about to let go of this rather sensational investigation.

Someone had heard of a chemist down in Berkeley, California, with a reputation for tackling tough cases. His name was Edward O. Heinrich, and, reportedly, he used science to solve crime. While not everyone trusted his techniques in an era when science was not yet common practice for investigators, he had often surprised people with solutions that stood up in court. Using objects such as hair, threads, dust particles, and bullet fragments, he could coax otherwise mute evidence into telling a story. Some people called him the “Edison of crime detection.”

Although the Oregon investigators saw nothing on the overalls that could possibly offer any leads, they sent them on to Heinrich, along with the shoe covers, the revolver, a summary of the facts, and a description of their jailed suspect. He accepted the case, and thanks to a chemical analysis, a microscope, and careful observation, he spotted a lot.

“You have the wrong man,” he told them, adding that the overalls had been worn by a left-handed, twenty-something-year-old Caucasian lumberjack who worked in the Pacific Northwest. The wearer of the overalls, according to Heinrich, stood no taller than 5’10 and weighed about 165 pounds. He also had small feet for his size, light brown hair, and a fastidious habit. The mechanic, who did not resemble this description, was freed.

Heinrich pointed out that stains on the overalls were not car grease, but pitch from fir trees; their size, with the shoe covers, had provided the suspect’s height and approximate weight. Tiny wood chips in the right pocket indicated the position the man took when cutting a tree, and because the overalls buttoned on the left and there was more wear on the left-hand pocket than the right, it stood to reason that the person who wore them was left-handed. Hair shafts caught on an overall button indicated his race, age, and hair color, while fingernail clippings in one pocket affirmed his tendency toward neatness. More interesting was a receipt for registered mail overlooked by other investigators: it was burrowed deep inside the narrow bib pocket, and magnification had offered a number.

This evidence led to the three D’Autremont brothers, missing since the incident, one of whom was a left-handed lumberjack of the right size and age. Evidence from the brothers’ personal effects matched evidence on the overalls, and strands of hair and fibers from items in their homes were consistent with evidence from the scene. A knapsack found days later near the train tunnel yielded minute grains of dust like that on pine needles taken from the overall pocket. In fact, the knapsack had been mended in the same manner and with the same type of thread as a worn area on the overalls.

Heinrich also turned his skill to the revolver, which the investigators had deemed worthless for clues because only part of the serial number was legible. He found a hidden serial number that led to a sales slip that had been signed with an alias; however, the handwriting, according to his expert analysis, was that of Roy D’Autremont. After a tedious manhunt that spanned several years, the youngest brother was finally caught, creating press coverage that led to the apprehension of the other two. They all confessed and were given life in prison (Thorwald, 1966).

This case earned Heinrich another nickname: the American Sherlock Holmes, which he disliked. He claimed that Holmes acted on hunches rather than calculating methodically with solid science. “Hunches play no part in my crime laboratory,” Heinrich told reporter Eugene Block, explaining further that all criminals left clues that decreased the pool of suspect possibilities. His procedure was to reconstruct the crime “by visualizing the habits and actions of the criminal.” He started with the manner in which the crime had been committed and applied the relevant area of science to the debris left behind (Block, 1958). Hunches had no place.

The forensic arena during the 1920s was in a state of chaos, as charlatans touted themselves as “experts” and no one held them accountable. Heinrich was aware of this and wanted to improve the situation, at least in his corner of the world, so he went to work learning everything he could about forensic chemistry, handwriting analysis, ballistics, and trace evidence investigation. He excelled in all of these areas. He was among the first investigators to use strings to compute bullet trajectories. Despite having a wife and two sons, Heinrich despised vacations and was most happy when he could immerse fully in a project that exercised his intellectual skills.

He became one of the greatest forensic scientists of the early twentieth century, a living encyclopedia of the natural sciences, and his reputation spread across the country and abroad. His formula relied on answering five questions: what, when, where, why, and who, and his specialty lay in ferreting out more key minutiae at a crime scene than anyone else—including the bad guys. “The smaller the detail,” he would say, “the more likely it is that the criminal has overlooked it” (Block, 1958).

In the course of one case, Heinrich actually learned several Hindu dialects. It was during World War I in 1916, and British military intelligence sought information about a conspiracy of revolutionaries who threatened to weaken the country’s resources. The authorities had papers in different dialects, which they could translate, but they were unable to identify the authorship. When Heinrich consulted, the only solution he could see was to translate the papers himself, so that he could discern between analogous styles; this would mean learning all the dialects. Tutors were employed and the task took months. The process that eventually solved the puzzle included a chemical analysis of the inks used and a complete examination of several confiscated typewriters. Finally, however, Heinrich provided the information necessary to connect the papers with specific people. The conspiracy was larger and more complex than anyone had realized, and, ultimately, 31 participants were arrested and convicted. For Heinrich, the triumph belonged to science.

As a teenager growing up in Tacoma, Washington, he had acquired part-time employment in a pharmacy. He used the opportunity to learn everything he could about the trade, and he would later comment, “A drugstore is a veritable laboratory in behavioristic psychology. I learned what people do in secret” (Block, 1958). Without the benefit of formal schooling in the subject, at only 18 years of age, he passed the state pharmacy exam. A pharmaceutical career was not to be his destiny, but was just one step along the way.

Heinrich received a chemistry degree from the University of California at Berkeley. He went to work for the city of Tacoma, but his knack for solving crimes put him in demand as an investigative consultant. By 1916, he had become the chief of police in Alameda, California, where he trained his investigators in scientific procedures; 3 years later, he accepted a post in San Francisco as a hand-writing expert. He also taught courses at his alma mater.

Journalist Eugene Block collected Heinrich’s most “insoluble” cases into a book and called Heinrich the “Wizard of Berkeley” to convey a sense of his extraordinary intuitive powers, though Heinrich himself believed his deductions were merely a matter of the proper application of scientific methods. In Heinrich’s mind, science was never wrong.

On the night of August 2, 1921, a man arrived at the home of Father Patrick Heslin in Colma, California, in urgent need of a priest: a friend of his was dying. Father Heslin accompanied this stranger, but failed to return. Soon, an anonymous and disjointed letter arrived from San Francisco demanding a ransom of $6,500 for the priest. The correspondent indicated that Heslin had been beaten unconscious and described an elaborate arrangement that involved releasing chemicals to kill him. The kidnapper promised another letter, but it failed to arrive. Unable to develop leads and fearing the worst, local police contacted Heinrich.

Heinrich had worked, by this time, with August Vollmer, the police chief in Berkeley who had encouraged Sergeant John Larson to devise a machine that could measure deception via elevated heart rhythms and systolic blood pressure. Now, they would have cause to put the device to the test.

Heinrich arrived in Colma and studied the ransom letter. He could not tell them much, but of one thing he was certain: the correspondent was a baker. The police were skeptical, but Heinrich was firm that the lettering was the style taught to cake bakers. How he knew this he did not say, but after the manner of Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, he trained himself daily in gathering information about a diverse range of subjects. Still, this identification did not offer much in the way of leads, so authorities offered a reward.

A week passed and a Texan named William Hightower entered the Archbishop’s office. He told an elaborate yarn that included how he had heard that Father Heslin was dead and buried. In fact, while digging for bootleg liquor he had found what he believed must be the spot, because the dirt was loose. He had seen the offer of a reward and he wanted to claim it. So Hightower led detectives to the suspected burial spot, indicating the location of the grave’s foot end, and some digging soon unearthed the corpse; Heslin had been beaten over the head and shot twice. The police then took Hightower, who was a baker, in for further questioning. They thought he knew the burial site just a little too well, but he stuck by his original story.

Larson brought in his lie detector, and as Hightower answered questions, it was clear from changes in his blood pressure that he was lying. Larson concluded that Hightower had murdered the priest, but it remained for the evidence analysis to prove it (Wilson, 2003).

Further searching of the burial place produced a tent peg wrapped with white cord. In Hightower’s room they found a canvas tent imprinted with the word Tuberculosis. Heinrich’s inspection of a jackknife removed from Hightower’s pocket showed microscopic shreds of white cotton like that of the cord on both the tent peg and the tent. Sand in the knife’s hilt was identical to that at both the burial site and in the tent seams. Heinrich also compared the handwriting on the tent to that in the ransom note and in poems penned by Hightower, affirming that they all originated from the same source. Also, a typed section of the note had been produced on a typewriter traced to Hightower.

From this stack of evidence, Heinrich surmised that Hightower had slain the priest at the burial site, wrapped the body in the tent to await burial the following night, and used the disease label to prevent the curious from looking inside. Hightower was convicted of murder and given a life sentence.

In another case, Heinrich introduced a new type of evidence into the courtroom. John McCarthy, foreman for the Vallejo Street Department, entered his home on December 19, 1925, and was shot in the chest. As he was dying, McCarthy stated again and again, “I fired Colwell.” The police believed he was referring to Martin Colwell, 59, a local ruffian with a criminal record for assault. McCarthy had dismissed Colwell from a street labor gang and Colwell had, on drunken binges, threatened revenge.

A .38-caliber bullet was recovered from McCarthy’s body, and when police arrested Colwell, they found a .38 revolver in his pocket with one chamber empty. He had three more bullets on his person, and a box of ammunition from his home showed four bullets gone. Colwell could not account for the missing bullet, protesting he had been drunk at the time of the incident. He remembered nothing.

The gun and bullets went right to Heinrich. Having versed himself in the emerging science of ballistics, he used the gun to test-fire one bullet retrieved from Colwell’s pocket, several from his ammunition box, and others from an unrelated batch similar in caliber. Examining the bullets under a stereoscopic microscope, along with the recovered bullet that had killed McCarthy, Heinrich found convincing similarities that led him to believe that Colwell’s revolver had fired the fatal bullet.

However, as the January trial approached, the prosecutor was concerned that the ballistics analysis would prove insufficient, so Heinrich strove to produce photographs that would show the tiny rifling scratches on the bullets in a side-by-side comparison, as a single three-dimensional image. He experimented over and over until he was able to successfully click his two cameras simultaneously over the dual microscope lenses. No court officer had ever before seen such an image, where the photographs of two different bullets seemed to perfectly merge, and they thought it was impressive. As Heinrich made his presentation to the jury, with photographs, he called the marks the weapon left on the spent bullets a “bullet fingerprint,” setting a precedent in an American court. Another ballistics expert confirmed Heinrich’s work, but the defense had a witness as well who contradicted them both, so the jury hung.

The case went back to trial. This time jury members asked to look into the microscope to see for themselves what Heinrich had observed. Heinrich took advantage of the unique opportunity to teach laypeople the methods of science and arranged for a demonstration, allowing each jury member to look through the lenses. But they wanted more. They asked Heinrich to re-shoot the photographs in front of them. He accepted the challenge and then took the negatives to a nearby darkroom, accompanied by the bailiff. Under these difficult conditions, he replicated his laboratory feat and the jury was finally convinced. Despite the defense’s attempt to introduce new alibi witnesses, after only an hour of deliberation, the jury sent Colwell to prison. Heinrich’s approach inspired refinement of the equipment so that future scientists could more efficiently offer results.

Throughout his long career, Heinrich continued to expand his knowledge into other fields, including even the authentication of works of art and the restoration of burned papers to the point of legibility. He kept working past the typical retirement age, but on September 28, 1953, the world lost a brilliant forensic scientist when the Wizard of Berkeley, at age 72, suffered a stroke and died. He would have enjoyed seeing the procedures he developed or refined nearly a century ago still being used today to make mute evidence speak.

Works Consulted

Block, E. The wizard of Berkeley. New York: Coward-McCann, 1958.

Evans, C. The second casebook of forensic detection. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2004.

Thorwald, J. Crime and science. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966.

Wilson, C., & Wilson, D. Written in blood: A history of forensic detection. New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2003.

About the Author

Katherine Ramsland, PhD, CMI-V, has published 29 books, including The CSI Effect and Beating the Devil’s Game: A History of Forensic Science and Criminal Investigation. Dr. Ramsland is an assistant professor of forensic psychology at DeSales University in Pennsylvania, is a Certified Medical Investigator (CMI-V), and has been a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners since 1998.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

Redefining Mental Retardation in Capital Murder

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 14:30:00 +0000

Redefining Mental Retardation in Capital Murder

Of Unsound Mind

According to court records, Jorge Junior Vidal was born in Delano, California, on October 23, 1969 [See: People v. Superior Court (Vidal), 07 S.O.S. 1781; People v. Superior Court (Vidal), Ct. App. 5 F045226 (2004); People v. Vidal, Tulare County Super. Ct. No. 69782-C]. On January 24, 2001, Vidal was one of seven men who invited Eric Jones to enter a private garage to join them in “getting high.” Once inside the garage, instead of partying, Jones was bound, hands and feet, with an extension cord and beaten severely. Vidal reportedly stripped an electrical cord, attached the exposed ends to Jones’ fingers, poured water on the garage floor where Jones lay, repeatedly inserted and removed the plug from a wall outlet, and as Jones was being shocked, asked, “Are you feeling energized?” At some point, Jones’ clothes were cut off, and while he was being brutally sodomized, stabbed with a screwdriver, and jolted with a stun gun, music blasting from a car radio was used to drown out his screams. Eventually, Jones was thrown into the trunk of a car and driven to a field in southern Tulare County, where he was shot nine times at close range in the back and through his cheek. Left naked in the field, Eric Sean Jones, who was 17 years old at the time, bled to death within a few minutes, after having been tortured for nearly 2 hours. All this was apparently done in response to or in retribution for Jones’ earlier alleged attempt to steal Vidal’s car.

Three days after Jones was killed, Vidal and two others were arrested and charged with Jones’ “torture killing.” Of the seven men involved in the crime, two, Juan Dedios Soto and his younger brother Gerardo Soto, have yet to be apprehended and are believed to have fled to Mexico. Gerardo Zavala was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 16 years to life. Keith John Seriales and Daniel Portugal were each convicted and sentenced to life in prison, without the possibility of parole. Tyrone Ebaniz’s conviction (for 1st degree murder, torture, and kidnapping) and sentence (36 years to life) has been overturned twice on appeal (because of error in jury instructions), with his third trial pending. Ebaniz was 16 years old at the time and, reportedly, Jones’ best friend.

Vidal was charged with murder (with special circumstances and enhancement), torture, forcible sexual penetration, sexual assault in concert, unlawful sexual penetration of person under age 18, kidnapping, false imprisonment, multiple counts of unlawful weapon possession, and other lesser charges. The prosecution filed the case as a capital offense; the defense responded by filing a motion to preclude the imposition of the death penalty under Atkins, as implemented in California law [See: Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and California Penal Code Section 1376]. California law allows defendants a choice in this matter: to have the issue decided by a judge in a pretrial hearing or by a jury after the guilt phase of trial. Opting for the former, in October 2003 and March 2004, Vidal’s motion was heard during an evidentiary hearing.

Proving Mental Retardation

As might be expected, psychological experts for the defense (who has the burden of proof) and the prosecution disagreed as to whether Vidal met the legal standard for mental retardation. Consistent with the clinical diagnosis of mental retardation or intellectual disability of both the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities [AAIDD; known as the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) prior to 01/01/07] and the American Psychiatric Association (APA), the legal definition of mental retardation set forth in both Atkins and the California Penal Code involves a three-pronged test: significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning, which must exist concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and which must have a manifest onset before the age of 18 (AAMR, 2002; West, 2007; APA, 2000; Atkins v. Virginia, 2002).

In assessing the first prong of mental retardation—Vidal’s general intellectual functioning—the psychologists were able to review several standardized intelligence tests administered to Vidal through the public school system as early as 1980 (when he was 11), as well as one administered by a defense expert in 2003. Across administrations, Vidal consistently scored in the mentally retarded range in terms of his Verbal Intelligence Quotient (VIQ), while his Performance Intelligence Quotient (PIQ) ranged from average to high average (See Table 1). Vidal’s Full Scale Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ) ranged from borderline mental retardation to average intelligence. With each administration, there was a strikingly significant split between his VIQ and PIQ.

In addition to administering the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence to Vidal in 2003, the defense expert, psychologist Eugene Couture, also administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, which is designed to assess the respondent’s ability to understand spoken language. As Vidal’s first language was Spanish, the Peabody was given in both English and Spanish, with Vidal scoring in the lowest percentile on both versions (as he had on prior administrations in 1980 and 1989).

According to family members, it was clear early on that Vidal was “not very smart.” His older sister noted his ability to read and write was not the same as his peers and that, even with help, he was unable to understand and complete homework assignments. As early as kindergarten, Vidal’s academic records identified him as having language problems. He was held back in the 4th grade, and while his communication skills had improved somewhat by the 9th grade, Vidal was never completely fluent in Spanish or English (he was never able to read or write anything beyond the simplest of words) and had difficulty understanding both languages. Throughout his school years, Vidal took approximately seven achievement tests, never performing at grade level (with the exception of scoring at the 12th-grade level on a letter identification subtest when in 8th grade) and never showing improvement between administrations. Several individualized educational plans were constructed (and unsuccessfully implemented) for Vidal and he received the support of special education services or a resource specialist throughout his education. While he reached the 12th grade, Vidal did not graduate and never functioned beyond a 2nd- or 3rd-grade level academically.

To address the second prong of mental retardation, “deficits in adaptive functioning,” Couture administered the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, using Vidal’s sisters and ex-wife as informants. Vidal’s scores were below 70 on “daily living,” “communication,” and “social” across informants, while Vidal rated himself as below 70 on only two of the three subscales. In addition to standardized test results, lay witnesses described Vidal’s historical difficulties with routine tasks and with remembering chores and household rules. Thirty-two years old at the time of Jones’ murder, Vidal never lived independently, only leaving his mother’s home when he married. The father of several children, Vidal was described as a loving father who occasionally provided his children with a degree of care. Over the years, Vidal had worked as a seasonal field laborer.

After hearing all the evidence, in mid-March 2004, the Superior Court judge ruled that Vidal had met his burden of proof. The judge reasoned that Vidal’s VIQ (combined with clear deficits in adaptive functioning) was sufficient to establish a severe lack of verbal ability that went to the issues of “premeditation, deliberation, appreciation of concepts of wrongful conduct, ability to think and weigh reasons for and not for doing things and logic [and] foresight,” as proscribed by Atkins. A finding that Vidal was, in fact, mentally retarded was issued, thereby blocking the prosecution from seeking the death penalty.

The prosecution appealed the decision in the 5th District Court of Appeals on several grounds. Most relevant to this discussion was the People’s contention that the trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction” by basing its decision on the defendant’s VIQ score—rather then the FSIQ score—combined with adaptive behavior scores. The People argued that Vidal’s behavior in the instant offense calls into question the nature and degree of any manifest adaptive deficits and that while his VIQ had been consistently low, his PIQ and FSIQ argued against mental retardation. In May 2005, the lower court’s ruling was reversed when, in a split decision, the Appeals Court held that the FSIQ is (or should be) the primary determinant of intellectual functioning and mental retardation.

Intellectual Error

Since 1976, when the death penalty was reinstated, approximately 44 persons with mental retardation have been executed, with others pending (Keyes, Edwards, & Perske, 2002). In Virginia, a mentally retarded man sat on death row for 10 years before being exonerated by DNA evidence (Elgie, 2001). In Texas, a man is awaiting execution whose IQ scores (on three different administrations), as entered into evidence, were 65, 68, and 74 (Clark v. Dretke, 2004). Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins in 2002, 18 states and the federal government had existing laws that banned the execution of persons identified as mentally retarded. Of those 19 jurisdictions, nine specified a FSIQ score of 70 or below (on a standardized assessment procedure) as the cut-off for classification.

However, when the Supreme Court published its opinion in Atkins, it did not operationally define, delimit, or quantify “subaverage general intellectual functioning” or “deficits in adaptive functioning.” The Court intentionally did not provide a specific cut-off score for mental retardation or identify a particular measure (or measures) to be employed in that determination. The Court’s intention was that the best measure of intellectual functioning remains a matter of fact to be resolved on the trial court level, based on the evidence unique to each given case.

Despite this, of the eight states that passed new legislation to be in compliance with Atkins, two opted to institute a cut-off FSIQ of 70 and one, a FSIQ of 75. Like Atkins, the remaining states’ statutes had no fixed IQ score, thereby allowing trial courts greater flexibility in determining the degree of weight given to different categories of evidence. In those states, which include California, the trier of fact is bound to treat each defendant individually when determining whether the death penalty is an appropriate sentencing option.

Given this, on April 2007, the California Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Fifth District Court of Appeals ruling in Vidal. In writing the opinion, Justice Werdegar noted that the District Court erred in presuming that the best measure of intellectual functioning is a matter of law when in actuality, it is a factual question to be determined or decided in each case by the trier of fact. In turn, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court judge did not exceed his authority or use an incorrect standard when finding Vidal was mentally retarded. In other words, although Vidal’s FSIQ scores were generally within the standard average range of intellectual functioning, as a matter of law that fact alone does not preclude a finding of mental retardation. Because Atkins does not incorporate the set requirement of a specific test score, the Supreme Court did not find error in the trial court giving greater weight to one piece of evidence (Vidal’s VIQ) over another (his FSIQ), even when the evidence comes from the same source or test.

Between Black and White

There are issues in the domain of forensic psychology where clinical definitions are not a clean match to legal definitions, nor do they directly inform the factual question at hand. The definition and determination of mental retardation appears to be one such issue. In terms of clinical diagnosis, the purported purpose of which is to direct treatment interventions, the APA has established three criteria for a diagnosis of mental retardation: “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning”; concurrent “deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning”; and onset of these indicators before age 18 (APA, 2000).

To be diagnosed with “mild mental retardation,” the APA requires an approximate IQ score of 70 or below (on an individually administered test). The more impaired subcategories of mental retardation (i.e., moderate, profound, and severe) do not have a set range of scores, but allows for a “give-or-take” of 5 to 10 points. The APA’s adaptive functioning criterion is defined as “the person’s effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her cultural group.” To meet this criteria, the individual must demonstrate deficits or impairments in at least two areas specified by the APA. These include communication, social/interpersonal skills, self-care, health, safety, home living, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, and leisure.

The Social Security Administration (SSA) uses comparatively flexible eligibility requirements (in terms of qualifying criteria, domains, cut-off scores, and age) when classifying individuals as mentally retarded for the purpose of assigning financial benefits (SSA, 2003). The AAIDD, which influences the definition of mental retardation used by other agencies and service providers (such as the Department of Education), is expected to issue a new definition of mental retardation or intellectual disability in 2009 or 2010. As with the APA, the AAIDD’s existing definition requires “subaverage intellectual functioning,” “deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning,” and onset/manifestation by the age of 18 years (this is to rule out brain/neurological damage in a previously non-retarded adult) (AAMR, 2002). In order to account for measurement error, the AAIDD’s ceiling for “subaverage intellectual functioning” is an IQ score of 75, or a score representing at least two standard deviations above the mean on a standardized test.

The AAIDD currently defines adaptive behavior as “the collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that people have learned so they can function in their everyday lives.” According to the AAIDD, significant limitations in adaptive functioning “impact a persons’ daily life and affect the [individual’s] ability to respond to a particular situation or to the environment.” When standardized tests are used to assess “deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning,” the AAIDD requires a score of at least two standard deviations below the mean on a measure of one or more of the three domains. While adaptive functioning can be assessed by standardized measures, it is often determined by subjective impressions, reported observations, integrated documentation, and/or clinical assessment.

How mental retardation is defined has bearing on several legal issues, such as determining juvenile fitness and adult competence, proving certain elements of murder, and whether the death penalty is an appropriate sentence in a given case. In the context of capital murder by defendants who are mentally retarded, the Atkins Court found that, “Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against mentally retarded defendants.”

Redefining Mental Retardation

In 2005, the California Supreme Court chose not to adopt an IQ score of 70 as the upper limit for making a “prima facie” showing of mental retardation (Hawthorne, 2005). Rather than base the finding on a single test score (measuring either intellectual or adaptive functioning), the Court concluded that making a finding of mental retardation requires “an assessment of the individual’s overall capacity, based on a consideration of all the relevant evidence.” In 2007, with Vidal, the Court went further, holding that even with a FSIQ score that would preclude clinical diagnosis, a defendant may be found mentally retarded based on subscores of the same test (provided the other two prongs of mental retardation have been proved).

Many states (and expert witnesses) have held to a definitive IQ score cut-off despite the clear intention of Atkins. Using a cut-off score obviously makes the decision of whether a defendant is mentally retarded a simple one; it is not, however, sufficient to make the decision one that is definitively accurate or just. Our understanding of intelligence is constantly evolving, with no universally accepted definition of the construct itself. Likewise, our understanding of how to best measure “intelligence” is evolving. While re-norming standardized intelligence tests may help offset the Flynn Effect, defendants tested at either end are at risk of being misdiagnosed, especially if experts do not determine exactly when each test was administered in the given test’s life-cycle.

To ensure that neither proceedings nor the punishment of a capital crime of those with mental retardation is cruel, unusual, or excessive, the trier of fact must be given more information than is necessary for making a clinical diagnosis. As was the case for Vidal, a defendant may have a FSIQ that precludes a diagnosis of mental retardation, but may manifest significant deficits in components of intelligence that have great legal relevance, such as in the ability to process information. Another defendant may have IQ scores that indicate retardation, yet possess the capacity to create intent and to kill with premeditation by “lying in wait.” As noted in Atkins, “there are many persons who have been diagnosed as mentally retarded who know the difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial, but, by definition, they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand others’ reactions. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but diminish their personal culpability.”

A thorough forensic evaluation of intellectual and adaptive functioning must address each and every aspect of intelligence as provided in the legal definition of mental retardation. For example, beyond the initial question of whether the defendant knows right from wrong in both a social and cultural context, comes the matter of how complex a moral question the defendant can answer. Beyond that, how capable is the defendant of controlling his or her impulses, and in the context of what degree and nature of internal and external pressures? Ultimately, the expert witness must provide information for the trier of fact to use in deciding whether the defendant meets the legal definition of mental retardation, a definition that determines moral culpability.

References

American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR). (2002). Mental retardation: Definition, classification, and systems of supports (10th ed.) Annapolis, MD: Author.

American Psychiatric Association (APA). (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 4th edition – test revision (DSM IV-TR). Arlington, VA: Author.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

Clark v. Dretke, No. 5:04-cv-00124-DF (2004).

Elgie T. (2001, July 10). The death penalty in Virginia: Attempts at legislative reform. The Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest. Retrieved June 18, 2007, from http://law.richmond.edu/rjolpi/Issues_Archived/2001_Spring_Issue/Elgie.html

Keyes, D., Edwards, W., & Perske, R. (2002). People with mental retardation are dying—legally: At least 44 have been executed. Mental Retardation, 3, 243–244.

Penry I (Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

Penry II (Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II).

People v. Hawthorne, 35 Cal.4th 40 (2005).

People v. Superior Court (Vidal), 07 S.O.S. 1781.

People v. Superior Court (Vidal), Ct.App. 5 F045226 (2004).

People v. Vidal, Tulare County Super. Ct. No. 69782-C.

Social Security Administration (SSA), Office of Disability Programs. (2003). Disability evaluation under social security. [SSA Pub. No. 64-039]. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

West. (2007). California penal code section 1376. Retreived June 18, 2007, from http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=01001-02000&file=1367-1376

About the Author

Bruce Gross, PhD, JD, MBA, is a Fellow of the American College of Forensic Examiners and is an Executive Advisory Board member of the American Board of Forensic Examiners. Dr. Gross is also a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Examiners and the American Board Psychological Specialties. He has been an ACFEI member since 1996 and is also a Diplomate of the American Psychotherapy Association.

In two separate but related decisions, in 1989 and 2001, the United States Supreme Court held that mental retardation is a mitigating factor to be considered by capital juries during sentencing, that the class of individuals diagnosed as “mentally retarded” is not homogeneous in terms of their capacity for legal and moral culpability, and that capital punishment of mentally retarded persons is not a universal or per se violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against “cruel and unusual punishment” (Penry I, 1989; Penry II, 2001). One year later, in deciding the 2002 case of Atkins v. Virginia, the Court noted the shift in social thought and practice regarding the execution of mentally retarded defendants, reversed its position in Penry, and made the mentally retarded a class exempt from the death penalty. In April 2007, a ruling by the California Supreme Court gave trial court judges broader discretion in determining if a defendant is mentally retarded and, therefore, exempt from the death penalty. Not only in California, but throughout the United States, this ruling has the potential to affect those persons on death row and currently facing capital charges whose intellectual functioning borders on the classification of mentally retarded.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

By Bruce Gross, PhD, JD, MBA, FACFEI, DABFE, DABPS, DABFM, DAPA

The American College of Forensic Examiners

Antidepressant Withdrawal Syndrome and DUI Evaluation

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 14:17:00 +0000

Antidepressant Withdrawal Syndrome and DUI Evaluation

By Henry Spiller, MS, DABAT, FACFEI, DABFE, and Tama S. Sawyer, PharmD, CSPI

Key Words: withdrawal syndrome, DUI, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor

Abstract

Millions of Americans annually receive selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor antidepressants and dual-action antidepressants for their symptoms of depression. These patients are at risk for a well-documented withdrawal syndrome if they abruptly stop their medication. This withdrawal syndrome may produce significant effects that may impair a person’s ability to drive, putting at risk both the driver and others on the road. In a situation of the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome, the impairment is due to the absence of drugs in the patient, producing the paradox of a potentially impaired driver because of an absence of the influence of a drug. This article reviews the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome and describes the effects on cognition, memory, vision, and motor performance and reviews how these clinical effects might be misinterpreted using standardized field sobriety tests suggesting the patient is intoxicated in the absence of other drugs or alcohol.

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit:

(ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

(CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants.

The American College of Forensic Examiners International is accredited by the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education to provide continuing medical education for physicians. This activity has been planned and implemented in accordance with the Essential Areas and Policies of the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME). The American College of Forensic Examiners International designates this educational activity for a maximum of 1 hour AMA PRA Category 1 Credits™.. Physicians should only claim credit commensurate with the extent of their participation in the activity.

Introduction

Worldwide use of antidepressants has increased dramatically in the past decade (Berndt, Bhattacharjya, Mishol, Arcelus, & Lasky, 2002; Ciuna et al., 2004; Helgason, Tomasson, & Zoega, 2004; Hemels, Koren, & Einarson, 2002). Use of antidepressants may range from 26 to 72 defined daily doses per 1000 people, depending on the country (Ciuna et al.; Helgason et al.; Hemels et al.). The estimated range of Americans using antidepressants is from 7 to 18 million patients annually. Of the various classes of antidepressants available, the Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI) and Dual Action Antidepressants (DAA), involving serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibition, make up more than 75% of the prescriptions filled for antidepressants (Berndt et al.; Hemels et al.). Additionally, use of SSRIs and DAAs has increased more than 600% in the last 10 years (Ciuna et al.). While the drugs in these two classes have proven to be generally safe and effective, studies have documented a problem with the effects of withdrawal (Stahl et al., 1997).

Though symptoms from withdrawal are diverse, all include effects on cognition (impaired concentration and/or confusion) and motor performance (impaired coordination, loss of balance). (See Table 2 for a complete list of the clinical effects reported with withdrawal syndrome associated with the SSRI and DAA drugs.) These withdrawal effects may put patients at risk of impaired driving in the absence of other drugs or alcohol. While this is a potentially serious problem for both the patient/driver and others on the road, it has not been previously explored in the literature. This article describes the withdrawal syndrome associated with the SSRI and DAA drugs including clinical effects, with a focus on the potential effects these drugs may have on driving. Additionally, this article includes a discussion on the impact antidepressant withdrawal syndrome might have on field evaluation of a driver with tests such as the standard field sobriety test.
Antidepressant Withdrawal syndrome

Several groups of antidepressants, including the tricyclic antidepressants, the tetracyclic antidepressants, the SSRIs, the DAAs, and newer antidepressants such as mirtazapine (Remeron), may produce a withdrawal syndrome (Benazzi, 1998a; Coupland, Bell, & Potokar, 1996; Dilsaver, Kronfol, Sackellares, & Greden, 1983; Hindmarch, Kimber, & Cockle, 2000; Rosenbaum, Fava, Hoog, Ascroft, & Krebs, 1998). However, the withdrawal syndrome produced by the SSRIs and the DAAs is clinically different from that produced by the classic tricyclic antidepressants (Lejoyeux, Ades, Mourad, Solomon, & Dilsaver, 1996; Stahl et al., 1997). The withdrawal syndrome from the tricyclic and tetracyclic antidepressants is primarily a cholinergic syndrome with symptoms such as nausea, vomiting, anorexia, diarrhea, rhinorrhea (runny nose), diaphoresis (excessive sweating), myalgias (muscle pain), increased anxiety, agitation, and sleep disturbances (Dilsaver, 1994; Dilsaver et al.). In contrast, the withdrawal syndrome from the SSRIs and DAAs is primarily a serotonergic syndrome, with symptoms such as dizziness, lethargy, impaired concentration, electric-like shock sensations, impaired coordination, blurred vision, and sleep disturbances (see Table 2). This article discusses the impact of the serotonin-related antidepressants. The SSRI and DAA drugs that may produce a withdrawal syndrome are listed in Table 1. The syndrome may be seen in a substantial minority of patients taking these drugs—up to 25% (Coupland et al.; Michelson et al., 2000; Rosenbaum et al., 1998).

A brief understanding of the mechanism(s) of action of these drugs will improve the understanding of the withdrawal syndrome. The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor class includes 6 drugs that are widely available. (See Table 1 for a list of drugs in this class with associated pharmacokinetic information.) These drugs inhibit the human serotonin transporter, inhibiting re-uptake of serotonin into presynaptic neurons (Schmidt, Fuller, & Wond, 1988). This allows for persistence of serotonin in the neuronal synapse and increased serotonergic neuron transmission. In effect, it increases activity on the pathways of the brain that use serotonin as the neurotransmitter. Chronic use has been shown to cause reduced serotonin transporter density, maintenance of normal cell-firing rates, and increased activation of post-synaptic firing.

The SSRIs produce little or no clinically significant activity on dopamine, norepinephrine, histamine, or acetylcholine receptors, or re-uptake transporters. The DAAs inhibit both the human serotonin transporter and the human norepinephrine transporter, inhibiting re-uptake of both serotonin and norepinephrine. The end result of the actions of both these classes of drugs is increased nerve transmission in select areas of the brain because of prolonged duration of neurotransmitters in the synapse. The sudden withdrawal of these drugs produces a sudden decrease in serotonin transmission due to reduced persistence of the neurotransmitter in the synaptic cleft (Zajecka, Tracey, & Mitchell, 1997). In effect, it produces a reduction of activity in some areas of the brain controlled by serotonin in the case of SSRIs and by serotonin and norepinephrine in the case of the DAAs.

It is this sudden decrease in activity that is responsible for the effects seen in these patients. If the decrease is of sufficient magnitude, an antidepressant withdrawal syndrome will occur. The dosage range of these drugs varies, with as much as a five-fold difference in some of the drugs between the lower and upper range of the therapeutic dose. (See table 1.) Any decrease that significantly effects serotonin transmission may produce a withdrawal syndrome. The withdrawal syndrome is transitory but may persist for days to weeks as the brain adjusts to new levels of activity on these neuronal pathways. Additionally, the syndrome may be reversed by restarting the antidepressant therapy. The true incidence of the withdrawal syndrome is unclear, with reports suggesting that 3%–30% of patients experience some form of the syndrome (Coupland et al., 1996; Oehrberg et al., 1995; Stahl et al., 1997).

The most frequently reported symptoms from the serotonin antidepressant withdrawal syndrome are dizziness, altered balance, lethargy, parathesias (numbness, tingling feeling, electric shock-like sensations), nausea, behavioral changes, and sleep disturbances. The clinical effects that can occur with the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome are diverse, and a broader list is provided in Table 2. It should be noted that the syndrome is varied from patient to patient—from mild to severe—and not all symptoms will be seen in every patient.

Criteria for diagnosis of antidepressant withdrawal syndrome vary, but generally include sudden discontinuance or reduction of dosage of an SSRI or DAA after a period of at least 1 month of use, two or more symptoms from Table 2, and symptoms not triggered by a general medical condition or other recognized cause (Black, Shea, Dursun, & Kutcher, 2000; Ditto, 2003). The onset of symptoms may be interpreted as a return of psychiatric symptoms (Benazzi, 1998b). Additionally, it may be interpreted by the patient as the onset of a flu-like syndrome (nausea, fatigue/lethargy, dizziness) along with return of depression (behavioral changes and sleep disturbances). The symptoms may be sufficiently severe to interrupt activities of daily living, such as going to work or driving a car, and patients should be warned about the dangers of operating a motor vehicle if they begin experiencing moderate to severe withdrawal symptoms. In some cases, the symptoms may be severe enough for the patients to recognize they should not drive (Campagne, 2005). However, in other cases, the patients may not recognize the degree of impairment and attempt to continue with their daily lives including commitments to work, school, or other outside commitments.

Patients may have an interruption in their medication for a number of reasons. They might miss one or several days of therapy due to non-compliance (“drug holiday”) (Hylan, Dunn, Tepner, & Meurgey, 1998) or there may be an interruption in the patients’ medication supply due to travel, lack of access to a pharmacy, or inability to pay (Campagne, 2005). In some cases, the patient will suddenly stop taking the medication due to perceived problems with the side effects of the medication itself (Leiter, Nierenberg, Sanders, & Stern, 1995).

Symptoms of the SSRI and DDA withdrawal syndrome may occur from as early as 12 hours after a missed dose and up to 3 weeks after discontinuance, although the average time of onset of symptoms is 1 to 3 days (Campagne, 2005; Zajecka et al., 1997). One factor impacting the onset of symptoms is the half-life of the drug involved, which can vary significantly depending on the drug involved (Michelson et al., 2000) (See Table 1).

Withdrawal Syndrome and Driving

Generally speaking, impaired driving (driving while intoxicated) is considered secondary to the effects of drugs or alcohol while these substances are in the patient and producing a direct effect on cognition, attention, motor control, and reaction time. However, in the situation of the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome, the impairment is due to the absence of drugs in the patient. This produces the paradox of a potentially impaired driver that is not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol. While there may be significant impairment, the term driving under the influence may be an inappropriate term for these cases.

There are a number of symptoms of the withdrawal syndrome that could potentially cause a patient to operate a motor vehicle in a manner that might be interpreted as operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs. These symptoms include visual disturbances, dizziness/vertigo, impaired coordination, tremors, confusion, impaired concentration, and jerking eye movements that cause difficulty with tracking and memory impairment. These clinical effects might produce an altered driving pattern, including weaving, erratic speed and erratic lane changes, which might be interpreted as driving while intoxicated. Additionally, if the vehicle were stopped for possible impaired driving and the patient evaluated, there are a number of symptoms that might be interpreted as the patient being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. These symptoms include confusion, agitated behavior, distracted affect if the patient is experiencing repeated sensations of electric shocks, an unsteady gait, and inattention to questions because of inability to hear on account of tinnitus.

Withdrawal Syndrome and the Standard Field Sobriety Test

When a police officer stops a driver for suspicion of impaired driving, the most common procedure is to have the driver perform a field sobriety test. The National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) has validated three tests that have become generally recognized as the Standardized Field Sobriety Test (Tharp, Burns, & Moskowitz, 1981). These three tests are the Walk and Turn (WAT), Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN), and One Leg Stand (OLS). However, other tests may be performed at the discretion of the police officer or local jurisdiction such as asking the driver to count backwards from a certain number and to stop at a certain number (e.g. count down from 55 to 18) or to recite the alphabet beginning at a particular letter and ending at a particular letter (e.g., beginning at F and ending at R). These latter tests have not been validated by NHTSA.

In the course of administering the WAT, the subject is given oral instructions to take nine steps heel-to-toe along a straight line. After taking nine steps the subject must execute a one-foot turn and return in the same manner in the opposite direction. There are 7 indicators of impairment for which the police officer is instructed to watch to indicate successful completion or failure of the test: 1) subject cannot maintain balance while listening to instructions, 2) subject begins test before instructions are complete, 3) subject stops to regain balance while walking, 4) subject does not touch heel-to-toe, 5) subject uses arms to maintain balance, 6) subject loses balance during turn, and 7) subject takes incorrect number of steps. In a patient experiencing antidepressant withdrawal syndrome, there are a number of symptoms that would cause them to fail the WAT test, even in the absence of intoxicants. The most important of these are gait instability, dizziness/vertigo, lack of coordination, and loss of balance. Additionally, such symptoms as confusion, impaired concentration, and short-term memory impairment might cause the patient to fail by beginning too soon, failing to take the correct number of steps, or failing to walk heel-to-toe on the return walk.

In the course of administering the HGN, the subject is instructed to focus on an object 12 to 15 inches in front of his or her face as the object is moved horizontally to the left and right. The police officer is instructed to watch for smooth pursuit, nystagmus before onset of 45 degrees, distinct nystagmus at maximal deviation, and head movements and/or jerks. A patient experiencing antidepressant withdrawal syndrome might fail the HGN because of misinterpretation of already existing jerking eye movements and blurred vision.

In the course of administering the OLS, the subject is instructed to stand with one foot held approximately 6 inches off the ground and to count by thousands (e.g. one thousand one, one thousand two, etc.) until told to put the foot down. The subject is timed for 30 seconds. There are 4 indicators of impairment that the police officer is instructed to watch for to indicate successful completion or failure of the test: 1) swaying while balancing; 2) using arms to balance; 3) hopping to maintain balance; and 4) putting the raised foot down. There are numerous symptoms that could cause a patient experiencing antidepressant withdrawal syndrome to fail the OLS test, even in the absence of intoxicants. The most important of these are dizziness/vertigo, lack of coordination, and loss of balance.

Finally, the patient may be agitated and experiencing significant anxiety. The patient’s behavior may initially be interpreted by the police officer as a refusal to obey commands during the initial evaluation or during one of the SFSTs. In either case, refusal may be interpreted as reason to suspect intoxication.

It should be noted that the primary role of field sobriety tests is to give the police officer a reasonably accurate tool to determine if intoxication might be suspected and if further verifiable documentation such as an alcohol breathalyzer test or blood alcohol test should be administered. The tests themselves should not be sufficient evidence of intoxication without clinical evidence such as a breathalyzer test or blood alcohol test. In the case of drug intoxication, field sobriety tests again are not sufficient evidence of intoxication without supporting evidence of a blood concentration of the suspected drug. Because of situations such as the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome, the field sobriety tests may provide misleading indications of intoxication when no intoxication has occurred.

Conclusion

Millions of Americans annually receive SSRIs and DAAs for their symptoms of depression. These patients are at risk for a well-documented withdrawal syndrome if they abruptly stop their medication. The antidepressant withdrawal syndrome may produce significant effects on cognition and motor performance. Further, these effects might be misinterpreted in the use of standardized field sobriety tests to suggest the patient is intoxicated in the absence of other drugs or alcohol.

References

Benazzi, F. (1998a). Mirtazapine withdrawal symptoms. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 43(5), 525.

Benazzi, F. (1998b). Sertraline discontinuation syndrome presenting with severe depression and compulsions. Biological Psychiatry, 43(12), 929–930.

Berndt, E. R., Bhattacharjya, A., Mishol, D. N., Arcelus, A., & Lasky, T. (2002). An analysis of the diffusion of new antidepressants: Variety, quality, and marketing efforts. Journal of Mental Health Policy and Economics, 5(1), 3–19.

Black, K., Shea, C., Dursun, S., & Kutcher, S. (2000). Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor discontinuation syndrome: proposed diagnostic criteria. Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, 25(3), 255–261.

Campagne, D. M. (2005). Venlafaxine and serious withdrawal symptoms: Warning to drivers. Medscape General Medicine, 7(3), 22.

Ciuna, A., Andretta, M., Corbari, L., Levi, D., Mirandola, M., Sorio, A., et al. (2004). Are we going to increase the use of antidepressants up to that of benzodiazepines? European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 60(9), 629–634.

Coupland, N. J., Bell, C. J., & Potokar, J. P. (1996). Serotonin reuptake inhibitor withdrawal. Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology, 16(5), 356–62.

Dilsaver, S. C. (1994). Withdrawal phenomena associated with antidepressant and antipsychotic agents. Drug Safety, 10(2), 103–114.

Dilsaver, S. C., Kronfol, Z., Sackellares, J. C., & Greden, J. F. (1983). Antidepressant withdrawal syndromes: Evidence supporting the cholinergic overdrive hypothesis. Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology, 3(3), 157–164.

Ditto, K .E. (2003). SSRI discontinuance syndrome: Awareness as an approach to prevention. Postgrad Medicine, 114(2), 79–84.

Helgason, T., Tomasson, H., & Zoega, T. (2004). Antidepressants and public health in Iceland. Time series analysis of national data. British Journal of Psychiatry, 184(2), 157–162.

Hemels, M. E., Koren, G., & Einarson, T. R. (2002). Increased use of antidepressants in Canada 1991–2000. Annals of Pharmacotherapy, 36(9), 1375–1379.

Hindmarch, I., Kimber, S., & Cockle, S. M. (2000). Abrupt and brief discontinuation of antidepressant treatment: Effects on cognitive function and psychomotor performance. International Clinical Psychopharmacology, 15(6), 305–318.

Hylan, T. R., Dunn, R. L., Tepner, R. G., & Meurgey, F. (1998). Gaps in antidepressant prescribing in primary care in the United Kingdom. International Clinical Psychopharmacology, 13(6), 235–243.

Leiter, F. L., Nierenberg, A. A., Sanders, K. M., & Stern, T. A. (1995). Discontinuation reactions following sertraline. Biological Psychiatry, 38(10), 694–695.

Lejoyeux, M., Ades, J., Mourad, I., Solomon, J., & Dilsaver, S. (1996). Antidepressant withdrawal syndrome. Recognition, prevention and management. CNS Drugs, 5(4), 278–292.

Michelson, D., Fava, M., Amsterdam, J., Apter, J., Londborg, P., Tamura, R., et al. (2000). Interruption of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor treatment: Double-blind placebo-controlled trial. British Journal of Psychiatry, 176(4), 363–368.

Oehrberg, S., Christiansen, P. E., Behnke, K., Borup, A. L., Severin, B., Soegaard, J., et al. (1995). Paroxetine in the treatment of panic disorder. British Journal of Psychiatry, 167(3), 374–397.

Rosenbaum, J. F., Fava, M., Hoog, S. L., Ascroft, R. C., & Krebs, W. B. (1998). Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor discontinuation syndrome: A randomized clinical trial. Biological Psychiatry, 44(2), 77–87.

Schmidt, M. J., Fuller, R. W., & Wond, D. T. (1988). Fluoxetine, a highly selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor: A review of preclinical studies. British Journal of Psychiatry, 153(3), 40–46.

Stahl, M. M. S., Lindquist, M., Pettersson, M., Edwards, I. R., Sanderson, J. H., Taylor, N. F. A., et al. (1997). Withdrawal reactions with selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors as reported to the WHO system. European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 53(3–4), 163–169.

Tharp, V., Burns, M., & Moskowitz, H. (1981). Development and field test of psychophysical tests for DWI arrest. (DOT HS 805–864). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, NHTSA.

Young, A., & Haddad, P. (2000). Discontinuation symptoms and psychotropic drugs. Lancet, 355(9210), 1184.

Zajecka, J., Tracey, K. A., & Mitchell, S. (1997). Discontinuation symptoms after treatment with serotonin reuptake inhibitors: a literature review. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 58(7), 291–297.

Henry A. Spiller, MS, DABAT, DABFE, FACFEI, is board certified in Toxicology and the Director of a certified regional poison center, with more than 20 years clinical experience. He has authored more than 180 toxicology related publications, including peer-reviewed medical/scientific journals, comprehensive toxicology textbooks, and scientific abstracts. He has more than a decade of experience in training toxicologists and specialists in poison information and has directed, as principal investigator, more than 35 multi-center national studies in toxicology. He has made toxicology-related presentations at scientific meetings in North America, South America, and Europe and has presented evidence as an expert in numerous state and federal courts on toxicology related subjects.

Tama Sawyer, PharmD, is a Certified Specialist in Poison Information with more than 20 years clinical experience at a regional poison center.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Table 1: SSRI and DAA Medications

Generic Drug Name Brand Name Drug Class Elimination Half-life Starting Dose Dosing Range

Escitalopram

Citalopram

Fluoxetine

Fluvoxamine

Paroxetine

Sertraline

Duloxetine

Venalfaxine

Lexapro

Celexa

Prozac

Luvox

Paxil

Zoloft

Cymbalta

Effexor

SSRI

DAA

22–32 hours

33–37 hours

70 hours

17–23 hours

15–22 hours

24–27 hours

11–16 hours

5 hours

10mg

20mg

50mg

10mg

50mg

20mg

75mg

10–20mg

20–60mg

50–300mg

10–50mg

50–200mg

20–60mg

75–375mg

Cognitive Impairment Effects

Agitation
Anxiety
Confusion
Depersonalization/detachment
Electric shock-like sensations
Impaired concentration
Irritability
Short-term memory impairment

(Table complied from references: Black, Shea, Durson, & Kutcher, 2000; Campagne, 2005; Coupland, Bell, & Potokar, 1996; Leiter, Nierenberg, Sanders, & Stern, 1995; Michelson et al., 2000; Rosenbaum, Fava, Hoog, Ascroft, & Krebs, 1998; Stahl et al., 1997; Young & Haddad, 2000; Zajecka, Tracey, & Mitchell, 1997)

Table 2: Clinical Effects Reported with Antidepressant Withdrawal Syndrome

Motor Impairment Effects

Blurred vision
Dizziness/lightheaded/vertigo
Gait instability
Incoordination or impaired coordination
Jerking eye movements
Loss of balance
Tremor
Visual disturbances

Other Effects

Diarrhea
Chills
Headache
Insomnia
Myalgia
Nausea/vomiting
Parathesias
Sleep disturbances
Suicide thoughts or behavior
Sweating
Tinnitus (ringing in the ears)
Vivid dreams or nightmares

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007 - published by Dr. Robert OBlock

Review of Mass Homicides of Intelligentsia as a Marker for Genocide

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 14:16:00 +0000

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Review of Mass Homicides of Intelligentsia as a Marker for Genocide

Abstract

This article reviews the mass homicide of 140 Turkish intellectuals of Armenian heritage to determine whether their mass execution was consistent with the selective mass extermination of intelligentsia observed in other genocides during the twentieth century. All the victims were arrested on April 24, 1915, in Istanbul and subsequently killed.

Review of data demonstrates a robust correlation between certain markers, social profiles, and the death rate of the 140 Turkish men. The data suggests that their religious and ethnic identity (all men were of Armenian heritage) was a preeminent factor in their demise.

The authors’ review suggests that the selective persecution and homicides of intelligentsia, which this article defines as cerebrogenocide, was similar to genocidal killings and selective persecution and extermination of distinct subgroups in the genocides of Jewish and Serbian citizens in 1940, Jewish intellectuals in Nazi Europe, Jewish doctors in the Soviet Union in 1953, the homicides of Nuba in Sudan from 1960–1972, and western-friendly or eyeglass-wearing Cambodians in the Cambodian Killings Fields from 1975–1978.

This article suggests recognition of early signs may help prevent genocide and that health-care professionals may play a key role in combating future genocides.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER - published by Dr. Robert O’Block

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit:

(ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

(CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants.

By Alen J. Salerian, MD; Pars Tuglaci; Gregory Salerian, LGSW; Janice Berry Edwards, PhD; Antonia Baum, MD; and Barry Mendelsohn, MD

Key Words: genocide, United Nations, Armenian, Turkish, Ottoman

Background

According to United Nations Resolution 96, genocide is a crime with intent to destroy either in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group (Charny, 1999). In the twentieth century, genocide has been a common phenomenon, and scholarly descriptions of many crucial aspects of this uniquely human invention of menace have been described (Charny, 1999).

It has been suggested that genocide is a premeditated set of actions to eradicate partially or totally a particular group and to silence opponents (Lieberman, 2006). A common trait of genocide is the precise targeting of people with a particular shared group identity (i.e., professional or social status) or appearance, distinct from their religious, ethnic, racial, or political identity, for persecution and/or execution (Lieberman, 2006). Examples of such selective targeting include the following:

In 1933, special legislation enacted by the Nazi regime barred all German-Jewish physicians from government jobs and excluded German-Jewish students from medical school (Morse, 1967). The evidence of Nazi persecution of German Jewish professionals affecting 42% of lawyers, 50% of doctors, and 83% of government employees shows this persecution preceded the main extermination of Jews (Morse, 1967) (Table 1).

In 1942, the Ustasha pursued national purity by identifying Serbian, Gypsy, and Jewish individuals as national enemies of Croatia and then killing them systematically. The persecution of Serbs and Jews began before their mass homicides when they were excluded from work in the press, radio, theater, and other professions of cultural life (Lieberman, 2006).

In 1953, Soviet Jewish doctors and other professionals were targeted for persecution and death (Lieberman, 2006).

In 1962, during the genocide of Nuba, the Sudanese government took special measures to persecute and exterminate the educated Nuba (Charny, 1999).

In 1975, to cleanse Cambodia of the “impure,” the Khmer Rouge first persecuted, then liquidated, Cambodians with higher education and Western ties, those who were bilingual in English and French, and those who wore eyeglasses (Charny, 1999).

In 1915, during the first genocide of the 20th century, Armenian intellectuals became the early victims (Charny, 1999) (Table 2). Despite documentation that verifies the targeting of intellectuals or community leaders of a victimized minority, the genocide literature—with the exception of The Holocaust—lacks adequate statistical data of the selective mass persecutions and homicides of intelligentsia. The purpose of this article is to determine whether the mass homicides of the 140 Turkish intellectuals of Armenian heritage arrested in 1915 were a marker consistent with targeting intelligentsia before genocide or in the early phases of genocide and the implications such a discovery should have on today’s health-care professionals. This article defines the mass and premeditated extermination of intelligentsia as cerebrogenocide.

History

For almost 700 years, Armenians, as Christian subjects, lived under the Ottoman rule as a conquered people. As a minority, they were one of the millets (minority nationalities) and were given limited authority for self-government. But like other minorities, Turkish-Armenians had almost no legal rights in the Ottoman Empire. A Turkish-Armenian had no recourse in the Islamic court system, for in the religious court, non-Muslim testimony was either disallowed or accorded significantly less value. At least 1 million, and possibly more than half of the Turkish-Armenian population, was killed or death-marched by the orders of the ruling triumvirate of the Ottoman government between 1915 and 1918 (Balakian, 2003).

The ruling powers, Talat Pacha, Enver Pacha, and Djemal Pacha, viewed the Turkish-Armenian minority of approximately 2 million people as a potential threat to the survival of the empire and forced the “cleansing” of the republic of the Turkish-Armenian population.

Several strategies were used to cleanse the empire of the Turkish-Armenians:

Massive deportations of civilian population via death marches without any regard for the safety or the survival of the deported
Disarmament and execution of all Armenian males serving in the Turkish army
Early arrests and executions of intelligentsia (cerebrogenocide)
Voluntary or involuntary assimilation of a large number of Armenian survivors into the Turkish society with a new cultural religious identity (Muslim Turk) and the absolute severance of any cultural or ethnic bonds to their Armenian heritage (see the story of Sabiha Gokcen in Discussion section) (Akyol, 2004; Alpay, 2004)

Method

The authors of this article studied data from numerous sources including the official records of the U.S., British, German, and Ottoman-Turkish national archives. In addition, the Google Internet search engine (www.google.com) provided links to websites with articles and statistics about genocide such as www.genocidewatch.com and www.isg-iags.org (Institute for the Study of Genocide & International Association of Genocide Scholars).

There were four publications of paramount significance in gathering statistical data: The History of Western Armenians, The Encyclopedia of Genocide, While Six Million Died, and Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics.

Review of the Killings

On April 24, 1915, in Istanbul, 140 men were taken into custody. Subsequently, without a trial or any other formal charges brought against them, they were killed. Their mass homicides occurred between April 24, 1915, and September 30, 1915, in the early phase of the genocide that lasted until the end of 1918 (Charny, 1999). None of the victims had a criminal history. All the victims were better educated than the average Turkish-Armenian of his community, with activities consistent with higher-than-average participation in civic and community affairs. Further, their psychosocial status crowned them as leaders of their subgroup.

Methods of homicides included death by hanging, gunshot, stabbing, and blunt trauma (Tuglaci, 2004). Of those 140, 62 were physicians, 10 poets, 16 congressmen, 7 pharmacists, 4 clergymen, 1 comedian, and 36 newspaper reporters.

Results

The review suggests that the homicides of the 140 men were premeditated. There seems to be a correlation between the death rate for a Turkish-Armenian in Istanbul and his or her occupation, gender, and age, with women and individuals younger than 17 having full immunity against death by homicide. Among the health-care professionals who were victimized, there was a striking difference of risk of homicide among physicians (45%), pharmacists (6%), and hospital executives (0%). It appeared that the risk of being a victim of homicide for any Turkish-Armenian in Istanbul in 1915 was 1.3%, whereas it was greater for Turkish-Armenian men (2.6%). The death rate from homicide increased to 100% for congressmen, newspaper reporters, poets, and comedians. Collectively, the data suggest that the victims’ potential leadership profile was of significance and indeed made them the preeminent targets for genocide.

The ethnic cleansing of Turkish-Armenians was nearly perfect. In 1915, the Turkish-Armenian population in Ottoman Turkey was estimated to be between 1,161,169 and 2,133,190, with a total population of 25 million people (Karpat, 1985; Balakian, 2003). In 2004, Turkey had a population of more than 70 million with a Turkish-Armenian population of 65,000 (Tuglaci, 2004). Before 1915, there were 2339 Armenian churches in Turkey. After the genocide, most had been destroyed or deserted. The most recent statistics suggest the presence of only 40 churches serving the Turkish-Armenian minority in Turkey (Tuglaci, 2005). In 1915, Turkish-Armenians represented 16% of the Ottoman population. After 1916, the percentage of Turkish-Armenians in Turkey dropped to 0.4%. The latest official census indicates the Turkish-Armenian population in Turkey is 65,000, or less than 0.01% of the overall population (Tuglaci, 2004).

Discussion

The Turkish-Armenian genocide, as the first genocide of the 20th century, is the template for most of the genocides that followed. Prevention of genocide poses a challenge, yet it is preventable. Passionate and unconditional commitment to defend and reinforce U.N. Resolution 96 and educational efforts to teach the history and effects of genocide are essential.

Physicians and other health-care professionals may play a key role in preventing or combating genocide with the knowledge gained from the past genocides.

Four general observations can be made about genocides of the twentieth century:

Genocide requires secret, premeditated, methodical mass homicides of a victimized group, often followed by the premeditated destruction or alteration of evidence to cover-up the genocide.
Genocidal killings are contrary to the Hippocratic Oath and the common ethical principles of the American Medical Association (AMA), American Psychological Association (APA), and American Psychiatric Association (APA).
Cerebrogenocide is a common marker, not a defining one, identifiable by alert and well-informed health-care professionals.
Many physicians, health-care professionals, and other scientists played crucial roles in the design and execution of genocides during the twentieth century.

Physicians and Genocide in the Twentieth Century

In the first genocide of the twentieth century, many physicians played key roles in exterminating Armenians. Dr. Mehmed Reshid, the governor of the Ottoman province of Diyarbekir, once raised a rhetorical question about Armenians: “Isn’t it the duty of a doctor to destroy microbes?” After the genocide, Dr. Reshid proclaimed, “My Turkishness prevailed over my medical calling.” Drs. Behaeddin Shakir and Mehmed Nazim, both Committee of Unity and Progress (CUP) party leaders, condemned Armenians as infidels (gavurs), like tubercular microbes infecting the state. During the official trials of the Armenian genocide from February 5 until April 7, 1919, a Turkish physician, Dr. Ziya Fuad, testified in writing that Dr. Ali Saib had caused the deaths of untold numbers of Armenian children with injections of morphine (Balakian, 2003).

The summer of 1915 witnessed the homicides of two Turkish-Armenian physicians by two of their Turkish colleagues. The homicide of Dr. Nerses Shabagliyan by Dr. Asaf and the homocide of Dr. Ormayan by Dr. Sani Yaver were the first documented homicides of physicians by physicians in the 20th century (Tuglaci, 2004).

In 1946 and 1947, 23 Nazi doctors stood trial in Nuremberg for crimes against humanity and were found guilty. Among them were the dean of faculty at Berlin University, Dr. Franz Six, responsible for the murder of more than 50,000 Jews; Dr. Josef Mengele, the director of the Institute of Hereditary Biology and Racial Hygiene; and Dr. August Hirt, director of the Strasburg Anatomical Institute in France, who in 1941 gassed 86 Auschwitz concentration camp victims to study their bones to prove Aryan superiority. The euthanasia program (code name T4 Unit) was the brainchild of Dr. Karl Brandt in his relentless drive to design the perfect machine for the mass extermination of the mentally ill and physically handicapped (Hogan, 2003).

From 1932 until 1945, in a quest to develop germ warfare capability, some 20,000 scientists, including doctors and nurses, participated in one of history’s most gruesome medical experiments on prisoners. Some 580,000 Chinese civilians and American, British, and Australian prisoners of war were killed under the medical leadership of Dr. Shiro Ishii, Japanese microbiologist and Lieutenant General of Unit 731, a biological warefare unit of the Imperial Japanese Amry during the Sino-Japanese War (Miller, Engelberg, & Broad, 2002).

Barriers to Education of the Public and Prevention of Genocide

For many complex psychological, social, economic, and political reasons, scholarly research and teaching of genocide have been difficult. Understandably, collective guilt or national shame may inhibit open discussion of tragic events even in the most advanced societies. After all, what American or British citizen would consider the hypothetical possibility that the terror bombings of German and Japanese civilians during the Second World War was a form of genocidal killing, particularly if financial compensation and demands may emerge as a result of such a discussion?

Perhaps similar dynamics also inhibit a country like China from studying the genocidal deaths of millions who perished under the rule of Mao in the 1950s. Politics may also influence educational efforts. If it is not for strict national interests, it is hard to explain why Israel today does not allow the education of young Israelis to include the history of Armenian genocide. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom officially acknowledges the Armenian genocide. The Japanese government denies the atrocities of Unit 731.

The recent political storm prompted by media reports about Sabiha Gokcen, the adopted daughter of modern Turkey’s founder and first president, Kemal Ataturk, may illustrate the political obstacles that hinder educational and preventive efforts in combating genocide (Millyet, 2004; Alpay, 2004). Hatun Sebilciyan spent several years at an orphanage before her adoption at the age of 12 by Kemal Ataturk. The reality remains that her adoption helped her become an accomplished leader of the young Turkish republic, as she became the first female pilot of the country. Yet, the death of her parents and her adoption were genocidal acts according to United Nations Resolution of 96. However, public expression of this point is a crime punishable by imprisonment of up to 10 years according to current Turkish law, Article 301.

In essence, the challenges associated with any inquiry of Sabiha Gokcen’s life may represent the core challenges faced by all genocide scholars around the world. It is simply a sad reality that today the politics of power and national interests make scholarly discussions or dissemination of historically accurate information very difficult, if not impossible.

In summary, it appears that today the biggest obstacle both to educating the world about genocide and to preventing genocide is the political climate, which makes it very difficult for evidence-based teaching to investigate past genocidal acts.

Conclusion

Although genocide seems to be only a nightmare of the past, the unthinkable act has occurred in several countries throughout the twentieth century, and, considering the situation in Darfur, has extended into the present. In order to prevent future acts of genocide, it is imperative to let go of the belief that genocide is not a threat to or a concern for this era or “our” country. During the period in which genocides are born and grow, they never seem as heinous and barbaric to the people committing them as they do to other countries when remembered years later as distant historical events—if remembered by other countries at all. Genocide, with its history being such a stranger to today’s younger Western generations, could pose quite a future threat, as an unsuspected enemy is doubly dangerous.

Along with specific measures to prevent genocide described by Charny (1999), including the creation of an International Peace Army (IPA), teaching evidence-based history and promoting accurate dissemination of historical facts of all genocides may be the best weapon against genocide. Educating all future generations about the past genocides would be one logical first step. Another initial measure to be taken is to incorporate the genocide literature into the standard curriculum for all health-care professionals. As this article has demonstrated, in the event of a future genocide, health-care professionals would likely be targeted as either victims or perpetrators because of the valuable knowledge they possess. Given their influence, scientists and all health-care professionals may also play a key role in educating political forces. Health-care professionals can lead educational efforts to influence legislative initiatives to create and defend genocide research and scholars.

By informing the public and the media and by actively resisting the presumed governmental authority to override the ethical obligations of health-care professionals defined by the American Medical Association, American Psychological Association, and American Psychiatric Association, health-care professionals can play an active role in combating genocide.

References

Akyol, T. (2004, March 2). Sabiha Gokcen tartismasi [Debate about Sabika Gokcen]. Milliyet, 15.

Alpay, S. (2004, February 28). Sabiha Gokcen 80 yillik sirri [The 80-year-old secret of Sabiha Gokcen]. Zaman, 121.

Balakian, K. (1977). Hai golgotha [Armenian golgotha]. Beirut, Lebanon: Plenetta Printing.

Balakian, P. (2003). The burning tigris: The Armenian genocide and America’s response. New York: Harper Collins.

Boghosian, K. (n.d.). My arrest and exile on April 24, 1915: An eyewitness account of the start of the Armenian genocide. Retrieved October 12, 2005, from http://www.armenianreporteronline.com/old/21042001/c-hachig.htm.

Charny, I. (Ed.). (1999). Encyclopedia of genocide (vol. 1). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc.

Hogan, D. (2003). The holocaust chronicle: A history in words and pictures. Lincolnwood, IL: Publications International Ltd.

Kansu, A. (2000). Politics in post-revolutionary Turkey, 1908–1913. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers.

Karpat, K. (2002). Ottoman population 1830-1914: Demographic and social characteristics. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Lieberman, B. (2006). Terrible Fate: Ethnic cleansing in the making of modern Europe. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, Publisher.

Miller, J., Engelberg, S., & Broad, W. (2002). Germs: Biological weapons and America’s secret war. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Tuglaci, P. (2004). Bati ermenileri [Western Armenians]. Istanbul, Turkey: Pars Yayin Tc Ltd Sti.

Yarman, A. (2001). Osmanli saglik hizmetterinde ermeniler-ana-basime [Ottoman Health Professionals of Armenian Heritage]. Istanbul, Turkey: Sanayever.

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to acknowledge and thank Mr. Ara Guler for his magical photos of old Istanbul.

About the Author

Alen J. Salerian, MD, is a psychiatrist and the medical director of Washington Center for Psychiatry in Washington, DC. He is also a former chief consultant for the FBI and a frequent contributor to national newspapers such as, the Los Angeles Times and USA Today. Dr. Salerian has co-authored several psychiatric articles in peer-reviewed journals. He has made more than 100 appearances on various news shows including CBS’s 60 Minutes and 48 Hours and the BBC’s Panorama. He is a regular analyst and commentator on the Washington, DC CBS television affiliate WUSA-TV. Dr. Salerian is a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Medicine and has been a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners since 1997.

Pars Tuglaci is an accomplished historian, linguist, and author of more than 20 scholarly books, who lives in Istanbul, Turkey. A graduate of Malconian Educational Institute in Cypress (1951) and Michigan University (1955), Professor Tuglaci published the first modern Turkish medical dictionary.

Professor Tuglaci’s most recent work, The History of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, has been the product of his lifetime research at numerous museums, libraries, and state archives in more than 30 countries dating back to the early 70’s.

Gregory H. Salerian, MSW, LGSW, holds a master’s degree in clinical social work from the Catholic University of America and a bachelor’s degree in psychology from the University of Delaware. He is in full-time private practice at Washington Center for Psychiatry in Washington, DC. He is a member of the National Association of Social Workers as well as the Greater Washington Society of Clinical Social Workers.

Janice Berry Edwards, PhD, is an assistant professor in the School of Social Work at Virginia Commonwealth University’s Northern Virginia campus in Alexandria. She maintains a private practice with the Washington Center or Psychiatry, in Washington, DC. She holds a doctorate in social work from Catholic University School of Social Work. Her teaching areas include micro practice (advanced clinical social work practice), social justice, and psychopharmacology. Her research and scholarship interests include African American women, multiple intelligences and social work education, relational/cultural theory applied to teaching social work education and field instruction, psychopharmacology and the elderly, as well as domestic violence in law enforcement.

Antonia L. Baum, MD, is on the clinical faculty at the George Washington University School of Medicine’s Department of Psychiatry. She is in private practice in Chevy Chase, Maryland, and specializes in the treatment of athletes and eating disorders. She is a graduate of the Brown University program in medicine (BA and MD).

Barry Mendelsohn, MD, a Board Certified Psychiatrist, currently serves as the medical director of an Assertive Community Treatment Team in Prince Georges County, MD. The program has as its charge the care and treatment of a segment of the population often overlooked or underserved. Dr. Mendelsohn maintains a private practice as well, focusing on the mental health needs of deaf children and their families. He is known in the musical community through his years of involvement in opera and musical theatre.

Dr. Mendelsohn completed his medical school training at Stanford University. His internship was at UCLA in pediatrics, and his psychiatric residency was completed at the University of San Francisco.

Table 1: Nazi Persecution of German Jewish Professionals

Profession

Lawyers

Doctors

Government Workers

Reference: Morse, 1967

Total Population

out of 500,000

2,800

7,000

6,000

Number

Persecuted

1,200

3,500

5,000

Percentage

Persecuted

42%

50%

83%

Table 2: The Selective Homicides of Turkish-Armenian Intellectuals in Istanbul in 1915

Reference: Balakian, 1977; Boghosian, 2005; Kansu, 2000; Tuglaci, 2004; Yarman, 2001

All Turkish-Armenian Residents

Men

Women

Children (under age 17)

Congressman

Newspaper Reporters

Comedians

Poets

Physicians

Bankers

Clergy

Pharmacists

Hospital Executives

Population

162,000

77,760

84,240

Unknown

135

120

Number of

Genocidal Deaths

2,345

None

Percentage of Genocidal Deaths

1.3%

2.6%

100%

91%

45%

25%

10%

Table 1: Nazi Persecution of German Jewish Professionals

Profession

Lawyers

Doctors

Government Workers

Reference: Morse, 1967

Total Population

out of 500,000

2,800

7,000

6,000

Number

Persecuted

1,200

3,500

5,000

Percentage

Persecuted

42%

50%

83%

Table 2: The Selective Homicides of Turkish-Armenian Intellectuals in Istanbul in 1915

Reference: Balakian, 1977; Boghosian, 2005; Kansu, 2000; Tuglaci, 2004; Yarman, 2001

All Turkish-Armenian Residents

Men

Women

Children (under age 17)

Congressman

Newspaper Reporters

Comedians

Poets

Physicians

Bankers

Clergy

Pharmacists

Hospital Executives

Population

162,000

77,760

84,240

Unknown

135

120

Number of

Genocidal Deaths

2,345

None

Percentage of Genocidal Deaths

1.3%

2.6%

100%

91%

45%

25%

10%

Ethnic Group Country Year Who Ruling Power

Armenians

Jews, Serbs, & Gypsies

German Jews

Soviet Jews

Nuba

Cambodians

Reference: Encyclopedia of Genocide, Charny, 1999.

Table 3: Early Signs of an Impending Genocide: Intellectual, Social, and Cultural Persecution and Liquidation of a Subgroup

Ottoman Turkey

Croatia

Germany

Soviet Union

Sudan

Cambodia

1915

1941

1945

1953

1966

1975

Doctors, poets & newspaper reporters

Jews, Serbs barred from professions of cultural life, the press and radio

Jewish doctors barred from government jobs, Jewish students barred from German medical schools

Jews barred from practicing medicine in the Soviet Union

Persecution and execution of Nuba intellectuals

Western-friendly Cambodians, Cambodians wearing eyeglasses, and Cambodians bilingual in English and French

Ruling triumvirate of Talat, Enver, & Jamal Pasha

Ustasha

Hitler

Stalin

Sudanese Government

Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot

Did it Precede or Occur in the First Half of the Genocidal Period

Yes

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Forensic Engineering Evaluation of Premises Maintenance

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 14:09:00 +0000

Forensic Engineering Evaluation of Premises Maintenance

Abstract

A premises (building and its site) consists of components to form a safe, usable facility. The components must be maintained in order to keep them functioning. Forensic engineers are often asked to render their opinions concerning a component’s performance and the maintenance it has received. Because the results are to be used in a forensic forum, the engineer must have a well-documented methodology and a firm basis for his or her opinions. One method of making such an evaluation is to employ a systems approach.

When a component and its maintenance are treated as a system, the engineer considers its various aspects and the interaction between those aspects. Furthermore, the examiner can test “what if” hypotheses using the same method. This article discusses a method to achieve that end while giving the forensic engineer a strong foundation for his or her opinion.

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit:

(ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

By John A. D’Onofrio, MS, CE, PE, DABFE, DABFET, DNAFE

Key Words: buildings, premises, maintenance, systems evaluation

Introduction

A premises (buildings and its site) consists of a group of systems working together to form a facility. The components of these systems must be maintained in order to keep them functioning. Following an accident or system failure, a forensic engineer is often asked to make an examination and render an opinion concerning a component’s performance and the maintenance it received. Such requests are most common in civil litigation, but may be required in a criminal case as well. Because of the complexity of a premises (both the building and its site), such services may be requested from engineers in many disciplines and some examinations may require an interdisciplinary team. Because the result is to be used in a forensic forum, the engineer must have a well-documented methodology and a firm basis for his or her opinions.

One method to make such an evaluation is to employ a systems approach. System analysis, as defined in this article, is the critical examination of the technical and managerial skills used to maintain the premises. This approach recognizes that continued, acceptable operation of a component is dependent upon a system consisting of the component itself and the maintenance it receives. Systems, whether including human activity or not, are subject to limitations whose effects can best be understood through system analysis. Furthermore, the examiner can test “what if” hypotheses by assuming changes in the system and analyzing the results. The result of an analysis is a simple statement of opinion; however, time, work, and data are needed to posit an opinion with a strong foundation.

The remainder of this article discusses a method to achieve that end. Many of the principles discussed have their origin in health and safety engineering. Often, premises maintenance evaluations are required when an accident or injury has occurred. Therefore, the method described here is closely related to safety engineering practice.

The Flow Chart (Figure 1)

By applying the evaulation flow chart, the examiner covers a wide range of pertinent topics. Not only does this provide a guideline to the examination, but it also provides an excellent foundation for the engineer’s opinions. The flow chart has two flow paths, Component and Maintenance. Each path consists of decision points where the engineer finds the aspect under consideration either acceptable (yes) or unacceptable (no). A “no” evaluation leads to an Inadequate System rating. A series of “yes” evaluations leads to the And gate toward the bottom of the flow chart. Both paths of the flowchart must be evaluated and lead to the And gate in order for the system to receive a Good rating. If the first path leads to the And gate, then the second path must be evaluated to complete the process.

Once an Inadequate System rating is reached, theoretically, there is no need for further evaluation. However, an Inadequate System rating is often the beginning of the next phase of the investigation, an explanation of cause. Because a system may be inadequate for numerous causes, the engineer alone must decide whether he or she should continue the evaluation further.

An Example

The following example follows Figure 1 and includes a discussion of the evaluation process. The example is a request to evaluate the floor of a small mercantile establishment where a patron slipped and fell on a rainy day. There is an allegation that water was present on the floor at the time of this fall. The component to be evaluated is the flooring. The maintenance program is that which the proprietor uses for safety during inclement weather.

Operating Conditions

The first step in the evaluation process is to determine the operating conditions. These are the conditions under which the system is expected to operate and give the engineer insight to the system when working the evaluation paths.

The operating conditions are best determined by site inspection, document review, and testimony of various parties. A document review may include but is not limited to:

Plans and specifications prepared by the building architect or design engineer
Lease documents that may specify permitted activities within the building
Building and maintenance codes
Zoning ordinances and other regulatory documents
Indoor environmental standards common to the industry

In this example, the site inspection revealed that the space was being used as a haberdashery. Flooring was a commercial grade vinyl tile. The slip location was approximately 7 feet from the entry. The document review has determined that, at the time of the fall, the building was approximately 25 years old. The architect’s plans indicate the space to be used for retail use. The use of the space for mercantile purposes is consistent with the permitted uses in the zoning ordinance. The lease between the owner and tenant indicates that the space is to be used for the legal, retail sale of goods, not to include food or personal services. Based on the site inspection and document review the engineer can reasonably conclude that the use of the space is “anticipated.”

Note from Figure 1 that the evaluation process does not depend upon the operating conditions; however, if unanticipated conditions are involved, the examiner must decide and note if the evaluation is made for the actual conditions encountered, the anticipated conditions, or both. The examiner must also recognize that a component may be exposed to an unanticipated condition and continue to function well.

Component

Component evaluation follows the right side of Figure 1. Here, the specific component under examination is scrutinized under the chosen operating conditions.

Component Specifications. The next step in component evaluation is to determine if it meets specification. This step implies that the engineer has determined the component’s specification and an appropriate test for compliance. The component specification may be either specific (specified by size, make, and model) or performance (i.e. 100 cfm fan, 230VA) oriented. Oftentimes, component specifications are not specific and must be derived from document review. These include, but are not limited to:

Plans and specifications prepared by the building architect or design engineer
Manufacturer’s specifications
Building codes
Typical architectural and engineering details (graphic standards)
Engineering organization standards
Authoritative consensus standards

In the example, the architectural plans were silent on the flooring material. According to testimony, the vinyl tile was selected by the owner and was in place when the tenant moved in. The manufacturer is unknown at this time. The tenant space was inspected by the construction official before opening to the public and received a certificate of occupancy. The local building code requires that all walking surfaces be slip-resistant.

A literature search revealed an ASTM standard that relates slip resistance to the floor’s static coefficient of friction with a shoe-leather test surface and a threshold level. On-site testing of the floor material was conducted and determined it to be slip-resistant.

Based on the site inspection, document review, and testing, the engineer can reasonably conclude that the material used to construct the floor surface meets specification.

Component Installation. The next step in Figure 1 is to examine the component installation. Poor workmanship should be noted and described. The manufacturer’s installation guide for the component should be consulted, if possible, whenever installation is drawn into question. In the example, the vinyl tile was examined and found to be tight, stable, and planar. Based on the site inspection, the engineer was able to reasonably conclude that the installation was not an issue and probably followed the manufacturer’s specification.

Maintenance

The maintenance flow path follows the left side of Figure 1. Here, the maintenance program under examination is scrutinized under the chosen operating conditions. This flow path incorporates work on safety done in the United States and the United Kingdom. The U.S. recommendations were developed and promulgated for workplace safety. The U.S. Department of Labor, through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), publishes a document entitled Keeping Your Workplace Safe (1999). This document describes four elements that every effective program should have:

Management, leadership, and employee involvement
Workplace analysis
Hazard prevention and control
Training and education

Similarly, the Health and Safety Executive of the United Kingdom publishes a document entitled Managing Health and Safety – Five Steps to Success (1998). The document states: “This leaflet contains notes on good practice which are not compulsory, but which you may find helpful in considering what you need to do.” The five steps are

set up your policy;
organize your staff;
plan and set standards;
measure your performance;
learn from experience.

Figure 1 incorporates these into the four aspects of the maintenance procedure flow path.

Maintenance Procedure

Maintenance procedures may be written and formalized. This is commonly found at locations that have a maintenance department or are part of a nationally operated or franchised establishment. Managers responsible for large buildings or multiple premises may have routine and preventative maintenance scheduled and noted by computer. On the other side of the spectrum, other business or industrial locations may not have a written plan, and the examiner must determine the maintenance procedure through investigation, interview, or testimony.

The second aspect of the maintenance procedure is to determine if it conforms to or follows a standard. The examiner must keep an open mind and not judge the book by its cover. Policies and procedures that are extensive, written, and neatly bound are not necessarily more compliant with standards than those that are less organized. A lack of organization and record-keeping may be a regulatory violation, but is insufficient by itself to consider the system inadequate. However, policies and procedures that are unclear may be considered outside the standards because of ambiguity. Further, loosely stated maintenance procedures can have an effect on other aspects of the maintenance program.

The engineer must determine the appropriate standard by which to measure the subject procedure. The manufacturer’s specification on how to maintain the component should be investigated and may specify a performance standard for maintenance. For example, certain filters may need to be checked at a maximum time interval and cleaned following a specified process. Property maintenance regulation may specify the maximum time that snow or ice may be allowed to remain untreated or the length of time that rainwater may accumulate before it is considered stagnant.

In cases where the standard is not straightforward, the engineer must be prepared to ascertain industry standards for maintenance based on authoritative and circulated industry publications. Standards organizations such as the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) publish a wealth of information. The insurance industry has a long history of underwriting standards for buildings and sites. They pioneered sprinkler system standards for fire control, and many insurance companies sponsor safety research to this day. Over time, these findings become industry standards and find their way into loss-control and underwriting literature. The National Safety Council (NSC) and the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASEE) are another source of information. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force have extensive procedures for maintaining buildings and sites with a wealth of information available on their websites (Secretary, 2004; U.S. Army, 2003).

When deciding on an appropriate standard, the examiner must be sure that the standard is widely circulated and does not conflict with jurisdictional building codes, maintenance regulations, or site improvement standards. The challenge is to determine reasonable industry standards for a given situation, especially in view of critics that are always present around any issue. Cutting-edge academic and scientific papers should be used with caution. They may be useful to explain or substantiate a principle, but most are not widely circulated amongst maintenance practitioners, and the author’s view may not be widely accepted or adopted as a standard.

When researching standards, remember that a maintenance procedure in practice must include a method of discovering conditions that need to be maintained. Discovery of a condition that has developed relative to a component is an essential part of maintenance. The time required to correct such conditions (correction time) includes both the amount of time the condition exists before it is discovered (discovery time) and the amount of time required to do the work using reasonable dispatch (work time). Hence, there will always be a time interval between the instant a component develops a condition requiring work and when the work is completed. Often a condition that develops will not be obvious and the maintenance procedure must be proactive to minimize the discovery time. For example, mechanical equipment should be checked on a periodic basis to assure it is either functioning properly or exhibiting telltale signs of impending failure.

Published standards must also be read with this principle in mind. They will often indicate that certain actions must be taken “immediately.” This should be interpreted as acting “without delay upon discovery” because instantaneous discovery (zero discovery time) and correction (zero work time) is, in most cases, impossible.

The procedure and standard examination may require some iteration. The examiner should have the standard in mind when examining the procedure and the procedure in mind when examining the standard. After interviewing the various parties or reviewing their deposition testimony, review both the procedure and the standard for modifications afterward. This will help assure that nothing out of the ordinary is missed.

In the example, the engineer researched Best’s Loss Control Manual (2000), a loss-control engineering guide and authoritative publication for insurance underwriting. After selecting the appropriate use, he reviewed the various items of concern and selected those that were appropriate to floor maintenance and the conditions at hand. This subset of conditions became the performance standard for the evaluation. Also, it was determined that local building and maintenance codes provided no performance standard for floor maintenance. Further review of a NSC publication concerning falls on floors revealed similar recommendations therein. The engineer felt confident that the items selected represented good practice and industry standard.

The maintenance procedures for floor maintenance were written and posted on the bulletin board in the employee area of the store along with emergency phone numbers. While not detailed, they covered the items in the standard and were straightforward and easy to understand. They included employee assignments and response measures to inclement weather conditions. The engineer determined that the maintenance procedure did follow standard.

Education

Education refers to the training that maintenance personnel receive. Depending upon the maintenance tasks, the education may require specialized training or schooling. Most commonly, however, maintenance personnel receive on-the-job training, especially if the maintenance tasks are more janitorial than repair in nature. Management must be involved to assure that education is not a one-time experience. New equipment or changes in business operations may require re-training of maintenance personnel. Further, it must also be determined that the specific personnel responsible for the maintenance had received the training and understood their duty. Maintenance personnel must be taught and encouraged to trust their judgment and report their opinions concerning the component or the maintenance procedure to management without fear of reprisal.

In the example, it was determined that all employees are instructed as to the safety procedures for inclement weather. The maintenance was basically a janitorial function. Safety posters were on the employee bulletin board, and the owner discussed safety at all employee meetings, instructing them to place mats on the floors and warning cones at the entrance when it starts to rain. Employees were instructed how to properly clean water and spills from the floor and to watch for such conditions as they move about the store. The specific employee at the store when the incident occurred had 3 years of experience with the company and was thoroughly familiar with the procedures. The engineer concluded that the personnel were sufficiently trained to properly maintain the floor.

Management

Management works hand-in-hand with education and is a critical component in resources. Management must consider maintenance a priority aspect of their business and be committed to keeping the system working. The attitude of management influences the personnel; if the boss does not care, neither will the staff. Management should

have a system of reporting and tracking maintenance functions. This data can point to problems and the need for improvement in the system;
check to assure that adequate resources in the form of manpower and equipment are available to keep the system running;
reinforce education amongst the workers;
create a climate where maintenance is a priority.

Sometimes an evaluation of management can be simple and straightforward. In other situations, it can be complex and difficult. A proprietor of a space that ships and receives merchandise from one or two loading docks may have no problem both scheduling and managing his truck traffic. The traffic manager for an industrial or warehouse operation may have traffic engineering and safety problems to be solved while, at the same time, keeping the system running. It is important that the examiner keep his own house in order and recognize when a consultant or team approach is required.

The proprietor of the establishment in the example had two locations to manage. He visited both of them more than five times a week and had constant cell-phone contact whenever the stores were open for business. He met with employees and conversed with each one every 2 weeks. Premises maintenance was always discussed. Furthermore, he rotated and replaced the signs, posters, and instructions posted in the employee areas. Based on this testimony, the engineer concluded that the management of the system is adequate.

Resources

Resources are the manpower, equipment, and material required to keep the maintenance program working. It is tied to management because management allocates the funds, hires the people, and sets the work schedules. Management also determines how and when the resources are allocated. Personnel view resources as a management statement, equating adequate allocation of resources to a top management priority. Conversely, management that is perceived as “doing-it-on-the-cheap” is considered to have maintenance as a low priority.

Although budgets are an important factor in any business, resources are best measured by what takes place at the premises. It is one thing to budget for an adequate number of filters and another thing to have them in the supply room when they are needed. It is one thing to budget for a snow removal contractor and another thing to have sufficient manpower to do the job properly. Therefore, resources are a topic of investigation with both management and the personnel at the site.

At many small premises, maintenance responsibilities are shared amongst the general staff. Workers in a machine shop may also do regular maintenance on the machines and pitch in for janitorial work. At large premises, there will be a maintenance department. Each can be satisfactory, and each presents challenges to the examiner. Staffing levels will vary from place to place, and the examiner will often rely on management testimony concerning overall staffing levels. However, the examiner needs to assure him or herself that there is adequate manpower to maintain the component under consideration. In any examination, testimony from the personnel specifically assigned to the component’s maintenance will be valuable. This is another area where the examiner may need input from a consultant.

Communication is another resource. At small premises, a few employees can respond quickly when a condition arises based on verbal communications. Larger premises may require radio or telephone communication systems to report a condition when it is discovered and to dispatch personnel to do the work.

The engineer must keep in mind that a maintenance evaluation of a particular building component is not an examination of the entire building. If the examiner fails to properly limit his investigation, he runs the risk of following many irrelevant paths at a cost of much time and effort. He also exposes himself to irrelevant information that clouds his judgment. This leaves the engineer open to charges of bias or “witch-hunting.”

In the example, the proprietor scheduled a minimum of two employees on each shift, one for general operations and one at the cash register. The retail space is not large and the operations employee were easily able to make half-hour inspection rounds. Furthermore, he observed the store while moving about and assisting customers and responded to instructions from the cash register station by a hand-held radio. Floor mats, warning signs, mops, and buckets were kept in the maintenance closet. Floor mats were serviced by an outside contractor every 2 months. Three mops and buckets were available—one for each employee and a spare.

Based on the site inspection and testimony from the various parties, the engineer concluded that the system was supported by sufficient resources to properly maintain the floor during wet weather. This results in a “yes” for resources.

However, during his examination the engineer discovered that one employee was sick the day of the incident, leaving only one person to man both the cash register station and cover general operations. There was no one else available to cover the shift. When the rain started he placed the mats and warning signs at the entrance. However, he was unable to make regular rounds of the store looking for water and spills on the floor. The water on the floor was brought to his attention when the patron fell.

Opinions and Conclusions

According to the flow chart, when there are two “yes” results at the And gate, the engineer can feel confident that the component is adequate and the maintenance system can keep it functioning properly under the expected operating conditions. Therefore, a Good System rating is in order.

The fact that a component has failed does not affect this rating; it is the system being evaluated and not a single event. Components and maintenance can fail, even in a good system, because all systems have limitations; they are subject to randomly occurring and unpredictable events.

In the floor accident example, the system recieved a Good rating. However, insight into the event under consideration was gained by analyzing the conditions at the time of the failure. A re-analysis using the staffing conditions on the day of the component failure resulted in a “no” (not adequate) classification for resources because staffing fell below management’s recommended levels, and proper inspections were not taking place because of the short-staffing condition. Under these conditions, the flow chart leads to an Inadequate System rating for that particular circumstance. The forensic engineer must clearly make the distinction between the system’s rating overall and its rating as operating at a particular time. This distinction can be important in a forensic forum.

The use of systems analysis, as presented here, offers the forensic engineer a methodology of evaluation that is both comprehensive and flexible. The example presented shows that the method has application to simple as well as complex systems. The engineer must remember that the analysis is only as good as the input data, the end result is the opinion of an engineer who may have to defend it, and this analysis and opinion are seldom the end of the questions to be answered.

References

A. M. Best Company, Inc. (2000). Best’s loss control manual (version 2006). Oldwick, NJ: Author.

Brauer, R. L. (1990). Safety and health for engineers. New York: VanNostrand Reinhold.

Health and Safety Executive Books. (1998). Managing health and safety—Five steps to success. United Kingdom: Author.

Secretary of the Air Force. (2004). Safety and health standards. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (2003). Safety and health requirements manual. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of Labor. (1999). Keeping your workplace safe. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Wausau Insurance Company. (1990). Hazard survey guide. Wausea, MN: Author.

About the Author

John A. D’Onofrio, MS, CE, PE, is a professional engineer in private practice with more than 30 years experience in the engineering design and forensic evaluation of buildings and premises. He holds a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree in civil engineering from the New Jersey Institute of Technology. D’Onofrio is a licensed professional engineer in New York, New Jersey, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and has been recognized as an expert in federal court and in the courts of all three states. He has taught at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey, and at the Community College of Morris in Randolph, New Jersey. He has been a guest lecturer before the New Jersey Municipal Engineer’s Foundation and the New Jersey Society of Professional Land Surveyors.

This article published by Dr. O’Block

Eyewitness Memory in Context: Toward a Systematic Understanding of Eyewitness Evidence

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 14:07:00 +0000

Toward a Systematic Understanding of Eyewitness Evidence

Abstract

Eyewitness identification research has typically been focused either on isolated specific factors or on more broadly defined and more ecologically valid contexts that occur in more realistic but less-controlled crime simulations. However, a paucity of studies have addressed both controlled and realistic contexts, investigating specific factors systematically in context. In the present study, researchers have addressed the effects of the following circumstances on memory: stimulus complexity, gender of assailant, gender of respondent, presence of weapons, clothing and physical characteristics of assailants, peripheral sources of hazard, and seeing perpetrators in lineups. Standardized contexts were used to strengthen experimental controls. Results indicated that eyewitness memory, even under idealized conditions, was highly unreliable, both for perpetrator characteristics and for other aspects of the crime scene, including weapons and peripheral sources of hazard. These results provide important information about the elements of eyewitness testimony that are most likely to yield difficulties in both investigative and courtroom settings.

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit:

(ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

(CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants.

(APA) The American College of Forensic Examiners International is approved by the American Psychological Association to sponsor continuing education for psychologists. ACFEI maintains responsibility for this program and its content.

By Matthew J. Sharps, PhD, DABPS, FACFEI; Adam B. Hess, MA; Hilary Casner; Bethany Ranes, BA; and Jenna Jones, BA

Key Words: eyewitness memory, recognition memory

Over the past century, numerous studies have addressed eyewitness identification. Many sophisticated studies have addressed individual factors of importance, such as exposure time, suspect race, witness gender, or weapon presence (e.g., Narby, Cutler, & Penrod, 1996), typically in isolation. Such studies of isolated variables have been designed to improve experimental control. However, isolating such critical factors from their contexts, while increasing experimental control, has typically reduced ecological validity (for review, see Sporer, Malpass, & Koehnken, 1996; also, see Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001).

Other research has been directed at field studies, video, or live simulations of crime events. However, these studies, which improve on ecological validity, are necessarily less controlled (Morgan et al., 2004) and, consequently, are more difficult to interpret. There is a lack of systematic research on eyewitness testimony that bridges the gaps between isolated variables with better experimental controls and more realistic ecological variables with better validity. Additionally, whether an isolated-variable focus or a more ecological approach, there has been little research on eyewitness memory for forensically important elements other than identification of persons (elements such as recall of weapons and peripheral sources of hazard) (e.g., Sharps, Barber, Stahl, & Villegas, 2003; Villegas, Sharps, Satterthwaite, & Chisholm, 2005).

The integration of experimental control with more realistic environmental validity formed the foundation for the studies reported in this research. The experiments described in this research were designed to enhance the development of a systematic contextual understanding of eyewitness memory, which would help bridge the gap between isolated variables in experimentally controlled designs and environmental variables that are more realistic, but less controlled. Also, the present research was designed to address the broader context of eyewitness memory to include important inanimate elements of crime scenes while identifying the narrower specifics for each individual to get the highest degree of experimental precision possible.

In previous studies, Sharps et al. (2003) and Villegas et al. (2005) utilized this integrated tradition of addressing relatively ecologically valid contexts in experimentally controlled environments—in the important, but hitherto neglected, areas of weapon and vehicle identification. These studies were conducted under conditions of ideal lighting, exposure time, and freedom from contextual distraction. Even under these ideal conditions, which would be considerably diminished under the real-world conditions of a typical crime-scene, eyewitness memory was shockingly poor.

In our study of weapon identification (Sharps et al., 2003), response rates for semi-automatic pistol identification were correct in fewer than half the cases. More familiar handgun types were better recognized than less familiar types, but even familiar revolvers were recognized correctly only 43% of the time. Even assault weapons, which are used less frequently in crimes but are larger in size and have greater complexity of features and, consequently, are subject to a higher level of feature-intensive processing (Sharps, 2003; Sharps & Nunes, 2002), were correctly recognized less than three-quarters of the time. These data strongly suggest appreciable reconfiguration of memory for weapons after initial encoding at the given crime scene.

A similar study of vehicle identification (Villegas et al., 2005) yielded even poorer results. Again under idealized conditions, vehicles were identified correctly, on average, only one quarter of the time.

In Villegas et al.’s study (2005), vehicle color was more important in the generation of errors than vehicle model. This result was consistent with the Gestalt/Feature-Intensive Processing (G/FI) theory of visual cognition, which has proven useful in several areas of eyewitness memory research (Sharps, 2003; Sharps et al., 2003; Sharps & Nunes, 2002). Color, an identifiable feature of an object that may readily be processed linguistically, was more important in the generation of errors than was the vehicle model, which depends on the less linguistically-accessible shapes of the various structural elements of the given vehicle body type (see Sharps & Nunes).

The results of this research may be helpful in explaining such apparent anomalies as occurred in the Washington sniper case, in which the suspect vehicle, a dark-blue Chevrolet Caprice, was apparently misidentified by multiple witnesses as a white or cream-colored van (Blades, 2005). In this case, of course, neither color nor vehicle model were particularly helpful to witness memory. The repetition of the error is explicable in view of the relatively poor performance of witnesses in our laboratory situation, in which factors of darkness, brief exposure, occlusion, movement, and perceived danger had not been present. In these studies, memory for vehicles and for weapons was reconfigured in young, healthy witnesses to an extent that reliable eyewitness identification was unlikely.

The fact that such reconfiguration of memory occurs has been known for more than 70 years. Bartlett (1932) showed that memory is not the static, videotape-like system of popular imagination. Rather, memories become reconfigured in three primary ways. First, memories become shorter and more abbreviated. Second, details are lost, leaving a general representation upon which information obtained after the fact may act to alter elements of initial memory that may or may not have been correct in the first place. Finally, personal belief can alter memory significantly in both the visual and verbal realms. Bartlett showed that custom and cultural beliefs significantly reconfigured British subjects’ memories of Native American stories and that relatively abstract figures were recalled by respondents as specific, meaningful pictures of everyday objects if suggested to be such by the experimenter. Modern work in several venues has confirmed the major points originally described by Bartlett (e.g., Ahlberg & Sharps, 2002; Bergman & Roediger, 1999).

Research in G/FI theory has shown that these various phenomena may be encapsulated along a single processing dimension (Sharps, 2003; Sharps & Nunes, 2002). People in eyewitness situations typically encode a given original memory in a gestalt manner, with little attention to details that might assist in making a correct identification.

However, as the witness reviews the given memories over time, especially under circumstances in which others such as attorneys and investigators are directing and framing the viewpoint from which the events are considered, reviewed, and reported, the resultant feature-intensive analysis will process both actual/true details as well as details that have been derived from a reconfigurative process or from post-event suggestions. As Bartlett demonstrated, such details may readily be fabricated wholly unconsciously on the part of the witness from vague impressions, post-event information, or other sources. Thus, researchers can now explain the respondents’ tendencies to focus on feature-intensive factors such as vehicle color or on the greater number of identifiable features presented by a large assault weapon than by a small, simple handgun. Witnesses may search their memories for veridical features of the given crime situation, but then focus instead on inconsequential, inaccurate, or even accidentally fabricated elements that alter their memories further from the underlying genuine memory stimuli.

What happens to eyewitness memory in a context where features and details must be sorted and separated from visual situations with differing elements such as weapon presence and complexity? The experiments reported herein are initial attempts to cohere variable-by-variable studies of the variable components of eyewitness memory typically addressed solely in isolation, with more ecologically valid but less controlled studies employing simulated live or video-based crime scenes. In this initial effort, researchers employed high-quality digital photographs of ecologically valid crime scenes developed under the advice and supervision of expert senior field-training officers of the Fresno, California, Police Department. These officers were highly experienced in tactical realities and in the sorts of situations encountered by witnesses and officers on the street.

The photographs employed in these studies depicted a potentially violent crime scene in which either a male or a female perpetrator appeared armed with a Beretta handgun. The scene was either simple, sparse in terms of potentially distracting objects, or complex, including a victim being threatened by an armed perpetrator and typical street clutter. Peripheral sources of hazard were also included in the complex scenes. Researchers included in the complex scene an explicit explosive device (i.e., a disarmed and hollowed-out surplus hand grenade, which, from outward appearance, could not be distinguished from a live weapon) and a potentially implicit explosive device (i.e., a military-surplus ammunition box which may or may not have contained live explosives, but which was clearly out of place in the street scene and was placed next to the hand grenade, near the perpetrator). These crime elements were included because such weapons and ambush tactics have become increasingly important in real-world criminal and terrorist operations (Gelles, 2006).

For the sake of control in the case of weapon identification, in one full set of conditions (either a simple or complex context, and each with either male or female perpetrator), the Beretta was replaced by a power screwdriver, which the perpetrator might have been pointing or waving for emphasis in a non-lethal argument with the victim.

The conditions for all scenes involved uniformly excellent lighting (strong sunlight), extended exposure time, and the relative comfort of witnesses being seated 10–20 feet from a standard white movie screen, which they faced and on which the given scene was projected. There was no movement or occlusion of important elements of the scene, and of course, there was an absence of personal danger. As in our previous work (Sharps et al., 2003; Villegas et al., 2005), these idealized conditions were selected with the knowledge that an actual crime scene might well involve uncertain lighting and potentially occluded conditions and would typically result in poorer performance of eyewitnesses because of established dynamics of human visual cognition (e.g., Narby et al., 1996; Spoehr & Lehmkule, 1982).

Method

The participants in this study were 149 women (mean age 19.86 years, SD = 2.48) and 49 men (mean age = 21.10 years, SD = 4.59) recruited from freshman psychology classes at California State University, Fresno. Gender proportions reflect the proportions of the classes. Also, this population was generally younger and probably in better health than the population at large. A Snellen test of visual acuity was performed, and all respondents possessed at least 20/40 eyesight corrected or uncorrected. Each respondent viewed only one scene (simple or complex, with a male or female perpetrator either armed or holding the power tool).

In real-world eyewitness identification situations in general, exposures to critical stimuli are frequently brief and fragmented. Witnesses may be under stress and may be operating under elevated levels of arousal. Also, elements that might be important for later identification may actually be obscured in real crime situations by vehicles, buildings, curbs, or other contextual features. Further research should address eyewitness memory under systematically varied conditions of these critical parameters, and efforts along these lines are currently in progress in this laboratory. However, in this preliminary research, researchers sought to evaluate identification under ideal conditions and to establish baseline data as outlined above. Therefore, the condition of an extended exposure time was imposed—a full 5 seconds. Law enforcement experts suggest that, generally, a firearm assault situation, such as the one depicted in this study, tends to develop rapidly and may result in a violent conclusion in literally less than a second (e.g., Moore, 2006; Montejano, 2005; Tietjen, 2005). Therefore, respondents in this research had substantially more than the typical period of observation and processing time.

In order to evaluate witness performance, the aid of senior, experienced Fresno Police field training officers were enlisted to produce a realistic police interview focused on the scenes viewed by respondents. The interview administered requested information on the perpetrator’s dress, physical characteristics (as both general verbal descriptions and as specific numerical estimates of height, weight, and age), weapon type if any, and the presence of other sources of hazard in the scene. This information was collected via multiple methods for each topic. Respondents were scored on each item in an objective scoring system from 1 to 3: 3 reflected a correct answer, 1 reflected an incorrect answer, and 2 reflected uncertainty or an answer too vague to be of use.

These scores were combined and summed into specific indices: a clothing index (composed of 3-point scales for hat, coat, shirt, and shoes), and a physical characteristics index (composed of 3-point scales for complexion, facial hair, marks or tattoos, height, weight, and age). Numerical estimates for the latter three elements of this index were also obtained, although these were not entered into the combined score to avoid potential redundancy. Finally, there was an index of weapon characteristics (3-point scales on whether the respondent was armed, with what type of weapon generally, and then requesting a specific description of the firearm in question).

These combined indices were subjected to analysis of variance against four independent variables: the complexity of the scene; the gender of the perpetrator; whether or not the perpetrator was actually armed or carried the power screwdriver; and the gender of the witness.

A second study employing a sample of 47 college students (thirty-one females, mean age 25.68, years, SD = 7.44, and sixteen males, mean age 23.38 years, SD =3.14), was conducted to investigate standard line-up identification under the conditions provided by the same scenes described above. To replicate typical and realistic crime scenes, only the scenes involving the armed male perpetrator were employed in the second study. Witnesses were exposed to the given scene for the usual 5-second exposure, followed by administration of a “six-pack” photographic lineup recognition test, to which the sample responded between 10 and 15 minutes after termination of the exposure.

The lineup was administered according to Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines (1999). In the lineups, the perpetrator was placed at either position 3 or 5. A simultaneous lineup procedure was chosen because this remains the most commonly employed technique in actual criminal investigations (Wogalter, Malpass, & Burger, 1993), despite research that indicates sequential lineups are typically more accurate (e.g., MacLin, Zimmerman, & Malpass, 2005; Wells, 1993; Wogalther, Malpass, & McQuiston, 2004).

Finally, all respondents in both experiments completed the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scales (CAARS) (Conners, Erhardt, & Sparrow, 1999) and the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) (Carlson et al., 1991). These scales were included to explore the possibility that symptoms of attention deficit and dissociation at levels found in a general, non-diagnosed population and falling below the threshold of identifiable clinical significance might influence performance in eyewitness identification. These specific factors were analyzed, as they have been shown in previous research to influence performance in other areas of G/FI processing (e.g., Sharps, Matthews, & Asten, 2006; Sharps, Price-Sharps, Day, Villegas, & Nunes, 2005).

Results and Discussion

Neither DES scores nor scores on any subscales of the CAARS were significantly predictive of performance on any index or measurement in either of these experiments. Within the present research framework, and with symptomatology at clinically non-significant levels, eyewitness abilities were influenced minimally, if at all, by attention deficit or dissociative anomalies. These results do not, of course, speak to clinically significant disorders or syndromes or to other possible frameworks of research.

Specific memory results for each index described above are as follows:

Memory for Clothing

The average combined score for witness recall of perpetrator clothing was a respectable 9.64 out of 12 (SD = 1.67), an accuracy of 80.3%. The effect of scene complexity was significant, F (1,182) = 4.60, p = .033, but modest; complex scenes resulted in only 3.3% less accuracy than did simple (sparse) scenes. The effect of perpetrator gender was also significant, F (1,182) = 12.55, p < .001, with the female perpetrator’s clothing being described 12.6% better than that of the male on average. This effect interacted significantly with the effect of scene complexity, F (1,182) = 3.93, p = .049. The presence or absence of a weapon was not significant on clothing description, but the gender of the witness was, F (1,182) = 4.08, p = .045. This effect should be interpreted with caution because of the disparity in numbers of the two sexes, but within this research framework, women were 7.46% better than men on average at describing perpetrator clothing.

Memory for Physical Characteristics

The average combined score for witness recall of perpetrator physical appearance was less impressive than that for clothing—only 12.71 out of a possible 18 points (SD = 1.81), an accuracy of 70.6%. For this index, the effects of scene complexity, witness gender, and weapon were non-significant; the only significant variable was gender of perpetrator, F (1,182) = 12.64, p < .001, with the appearance description scores for the female perpetrator 11.97% higher on average than those of the male.

As noted above, in addition to the questions requesting verbal descriptions of height, weight, and age, numerical estimates were sought from witnesses as well. There was no identifiable correlation, significant or otherwise, between numerical or verbal estimates. In other words, a descriptive term like heavy, thin, or tall had no identifiable relationship with numerical estimates of the same quantities. Further research will be needed to understand the mechanisms by which witnesses arrived at these apparently unrelated qualitative and quantitative descriptions. However, if confirmed in other research, this finding may have important implications for police interview techniques. For example, respondents may be better at making general, qualitative descriptions of persons than they are at attempting to convert their observations into realistic quantitative estimates. How law enforcement officers elicit such information (qualitatively or quantitatively) may result in differences in the utility of such information in searches, investigations, and courtroom proceedings.

Memory for Weapons and for Peripheral Sources of Hazard.

In contrast to the data concerning the physical description of the perpetrator, the independent variables of scene complexity, perpetrator gender, and gun-versus-screwdriver all resulted in significant effects on identification of the weapon carried by the perpetrator. Also significant were the interaction of complexity and perpetrator gender and the interaction of these factors with the gun/screwdriver variable [F values, respectively, were F (1,182) = 4.18, p = .042; F (1,182) = 4.053, p = .046; F (1,182) = 242.69, p < .001; F (1,182) = 7.50, p = .007; and F (1,182) = 8.17, p = .005].

The effect of witness gender was not significant. Average performance across conditions was not impressive, with a mean score of 6.20 (SD = 2.63) out of a possible 9 points, producing an average witness accuracy of 68.9%. The simple scene yielded better performance than the complex scene by 4.12%. The male perpetrator resulted in better performance than the female by 22.28%. Further, the gun condition was massively superior to the screwdriver condition, by 211%.

This gun condition results warranted further investigation. In the screwdriver condition, out of 103 respondents, 92 were in error, believing the screwdriver to have been, in fact, a firearm. Only five witnesses had been uncertain as to what they had seen, and a mere six correctly identified the power tool. It should be reiterated that this result was obtained under conditions of ideal lighting and exposure, as well as an exposure period several times longer than typical for real-world criminal activity.

Even with enhanced light and time, most witnesses identified the tool as a gun. This result may prove useful in explaining the large numbers of cases in which civilians and police mistake an innocuous object for a firearm. Rather than having anything to do with witness or law enforcement duplicity, such errors may frequently derive from typical characteristics of human visual cognition when witnesses are faced with this type of situation (see Sharps et al., 2003). It is important to develop a better empirical understanding of the types of conditions under which such errors are most prevalent.

Identification of peripheral sources of hazard was also unexpectedly poor. Only a single respondent, out of 94, identified the hand grenade, even though the grenade was in plain sight and viewed under the optimized observation conditions described above. Not a single individual identified the ammunition box as a potential source of hazard, even though it was placed close to the hand grenade and was clearly an anomalous object in a normal street scene.

In view of the terrorist threats currently confronting law enforcement and military authorities in much of the world and the relative reliance of terrorists on ambush tactics and pre-placed improvised explosive devices (e.g., Gelles, 2006), the failure to detect a grenade hazard clearly highlights the need for a better understanding of witness, bystander, and professional perceptual and cognitive responses to such devices. This is especially important in view of the fact that such devices are not normally placed in plain sight, as they were in the present study.

On a train or in a crowded street, observation of such peripheral sources of explosive hazard prior to their detonation and the recognition of an anomaly—something that simply should not be there—is likely to come from a law enforcement officer, a security officer, or a particularly alert civilian. Given the poor performance of respondents in this study to such hazards placed in plain sight and under optimal viewing conditions, more research on the topic of observation, detection, and interpretation of anomalous threatening devices is clearly needed.

Lineup Performance

This experiment required witnesses to respond to a typical police lineup, only 10 to 15 minutes after viewing the simple or the complex scene of the armed male perpetrator under ideal conditions. The sole visual transformation required of the respondents involved viewing the perpetrator in profile in the crime scenes and viewing the perpetrator and foils full-face in the lineup photographs. Though there appear to be no current statistics on this subject, it seems that in a typical, actual crime situation, witnesses rarely have the opportunity to gaze full-face on a suspect. Actual perpetrators are typically in motion, frequently with their faces occluded by a partial disguise, such as a hood, cap, or even stocking mask, and conditions are seldom optimal (e.g., Narby et al., 1996). Thus, this simple transformation of the view of the alleged perpetrator under optimized laboratory conditions would seem to pose little challenge compared to the use of lineups in real-world forensic practice (e.g., DOJ, 1999).

However, the results of this experiment led to little cause for optimism in the realm of alleged perpetrator identification. Out of 47 respondents, only 5 were able to identify the perpetrator correctly from a standard simultaneous lineup. Position 5 (central, bottom row) was slightly more likely to result in a correct identification than Position 3 (more visually peripheral). However, the level of identification observed here was sufficiently poor as to render miniscule the position effect, and, essentially, render moot this picture-placement finding. Of the five correct identifications, four of the five came from the simple condition. Only one individual in the complex and more realistic condition was able to make the identification correctly.

These results are sufficiently close to the statistical “floor” as to defy inferential statistical testing. The data clearly indicate that, at least within the conditions of this research, at best, only about 10% of witnesses can be anticipated to be correct in their identifications. Furthermore, accuracy is probably likely to be lower in more complex, and hence more realistic, visual situations. These results may at first seem to fly in the face of some schools of conventional wisdom on this subject. For example, human visual recognition memory was shown to be quite efficient in a series of classic studies, especially for detailed pictures (e.g., Nelson, Metzler, & Reed, 1974), but performance declined with shorter exposure times (e.g., Loftus & Bell, 1975). However, these studies required recognition of pictures in their entirety, rather than the recognition of abstracted elements of original encoding situations involving visual transformations, which is typical of lineup procedures.

Other studies have, of course, found recall or recognition-enhancing effects of, for example, instructional manipulations (e.g., Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987), which may enhance lineup memory (in the case of the Cutler et al. study, to 44% accuracy). However, in the absence of such manipulations, and with only a single visual change in the aspect of the individual to be identified, the present results add to the growing body of information suggesting that person identification, even when obtained from properly conducted police lineups (DOJ, 1999), must be viewed with extreme caution by law enforcement and judicial personnel.

Summary and Conclusions

As anticipated from previous research (e.g., Narby et al., 1996; Sporer, Malpass, & Koehnken, 1996; Sharps et al.; Villegas et al., 2005), levels of eyewitness performance in person description, weapon description, and person identification were generally low. When a contextual systematic assessment of specific factors involved in these effects was conducted, more complex (and hence more realistic) scenes resulted in diminished performance compared to simpler situations. Witnesses generally reported an innocuous object (i.e., the screwdriver) to have been a handgun, even under the ideal viewing conditions employed here. Under typical, approved lineup conditions, recognition of a perpetrator seen in context was effectively at a statistical floor. Peripheral sources of hazard, even when placed in plain view, generally went unnoticed and unreported. Finally, the viewing of a female perpetrator, as opposed to a male, improved person description significantly but reduced weapon recognition.

An immediate limitation on the present research is noted. The use of a single male and female perpetrator in these studies obviously does not allow broad general conclusions about perpetrator gender and identification. A more exhaustive accounting of this effect would require depictions of a large number of individuals of both sexes, systematically varied according to race, physique, perceived attractiveness, and other characteristics. Such an effort would require a substantial long-term research project devoted to this question alone, well beyond the scope of this preliminary research. There must be, however, limitations to the generalized results of such a broad effort, as any given real-world perpetrator might possess characteristics that differed significantly from those evaluated.

For the present, there is a reasonable, parsimonious working explanation for the significant effects of perpetrator gender observed here. Although women do commit violent crimes, the vast majority are committed by men. Confronting a female perpetrator may reduce processing and performance, even in seasoned combatants and law-enforcement officers (e.g., Grossman, 1996; Kessler, 2002). The authors suggest that the witnesses’ patterns of attention and cognitive resources may have been altered by the surprise or the violation of expectations, engendered by the depiction of the female perpetrator. The higher average reportage of the female perpetrator’s clothing and physical characteristics than those of the male may speak to this effect. Attention and processing resources were drawn to her as an unexpected stimulus, resulting in the superior description of her clothing and body per se.

However, with better identification of the female perpetrator, resources were reciprocally drawn away from other elements of the scene, such as the gun, which might have been more expected in the hands of a male. As a result, the study suggests that weapon identification was superior with the male perpetrator.

The role of expectations may also help explain the tendency of witnesses to report the innocuous power screwdriver as a firearm. There may have been a tacit expectation that a given object, pointed by one individual at another, was in fact a weapon. This expectation-based reconfiguration (see Bartlett, 1932; Ahlberg & Sharps, 2002) could have resulted in the potentially vast witness misperception observed in this research. However, these impressions are conjectural at present. A significant body of future research will be needed to elucidate the mechanisms of these effects.

The gender of the witness had a significant effect on clothing description. Women’s performance exceeded that of men on average. However, and perhaps contrary to expectations, no gender differences were observed in weapon identification, physical description, or lineup recognition of persons. Because of the extremely poor performance of witnesses of both sexes, lineup recognition could not even be analyzed statistically.

Also, there was also no evidence of an effect, in this civilian witness population, of familiarity with weapons on witnesses’ ability to identify them. One might, however, expect such an effect with trained law-enforcement or military personnel, who are familiar with the idiosyncratic features of many weapons, including the standard police Beretta used in these studies. Finally, tendencies toward attention deficit and dissociation at subclinical levels did not influence eyewitness performance.

In aggregate, these studies attest to the importance of the empirical evaluation of eyewitness memory in systematically-varied context. The combined effects observed here further add to the growing body of evidence indicating the necessity of viewing eyewitness evidence with extreme caution. Contrary to beliefs often observed to prevail in courtroom proceedings, eyewitness identifications of persons, weapons, and peripheral sources of hazard in crime scenes are unlikely to be highly accurate, especially under the relatively brief conditions of exposure, the high levels of arousal, and the poor viewing conditions typical of real-world crime scenes.

References

Ahlberg, S. W., & Sharps, M. J. (2002). Bartlett revisited: Reconfiguration of long-term memory in young and older adults. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 163, 211–218.

Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bergman, E. T., & Roediger, H.L. (1999). Can Bartlett’s repeated reproduction experiments be replicated? Memory and Cognition, 27, 937–947.

Blades, H. B. (2005). The Washington, D.C. sniper case: A case study in how eyewitness identification of vehicles can go wrong. The Forensic Examiner, 14(3), 26.

Carlson, E. B., Putnam, F. W., Ross, C. A., Torem, M., Coons, P., Dill, D., et al. (1991). Factor analysis of the Dissociative Experiences Scale: A multicenter study. In B. G. Braun & E. B. Carlson (Eds.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Multiple Personality and Dissociative States. Chicago: Rush.

Conners, C. K., Erhardt, D., & Sparrow, M. A. (1999). Conners’ CAARS adult ADHD rating scales. North Tonawanda, NY: Multi-Health Systems.

Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Martens, T. K. (1987). The reliability of eyewitness identifications: The role of system and estimator variables. Law and Human Behavior, 11(3), 23–258,

Department of Justice (1999). Eyewitness evidence: A guide for law enforcement. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.

Gelles, M. (2006, October). Behavioral threat assessment: Law enforcement considerations. Washington DC: Society for Police and Criminal Psychology.

Grossman, D. (1996). On killing. Boston: Little, Brown.

Kassin, S. M., Tubb, V. A., Hosch, H. M., & Memon, A. (2001). On the “general acceptance” of eyewitness testimony research: A new survey of the experts. American Psychologist, 56(3), 405–416.

Kessler, R. (2002). The bureau. New York: St. Martin’s.

Loftus, G. R., & Bell, S. M. (1975). Two types of information in picture memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 104(2), 103–113.

MacLin, O. H., Zimmerman, L. A., & Malpass, R. S. (2005). PC_Eyewitness and the Sequential Superiority Effect: Computer Based lineup administration. Law and Human Behavior, 29(3), 303–321.

Morgan, C. A., Hazlett, G., Doran, A., Gattett, S., Hoyt, G., Thomas, P., et al. (2004). Accuracy of eyewitness memory for persons encountered during exposure to highly intense stress. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 27(3), 265–279.

Montejano, D. (2005). The impact of job related stress on individuals in law enforcement. Frenso, CA: Fresno Police Department, Sierra Education and Research Institute, and Alliant International University.

Moore, L. (2006, November). Conference on the use of force in law enforcement. Office of the United States Marshal, Fresno, CA.

Narby, D. J., Cutler, B. L., & Penrod, S. D. (1996). The effects of witness, target, and situational factors on eyewitness identifications. In S. L. Sporer, R. S. Malpass, & G. Koehnken (Eds.), Psychological issues in eyewitness identification (pp. 23–52). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Nelson, T. O., Metzler, J., & Reed, D. A. (1974). Role of details in the long-term recognition of pictures and verbal descriptions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 102(1), 184–186.

Sharps, M. J. (2003). Aging, representation, and thought: Gestalt and feature-intensive processing. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction.

Sharps, M. J., Barber, T. L., Stahl, H., & Villegas, A. B. (2003). Eyewitness memory for weapons. The Forensic Examiner, 12(5), 34–37.

Sharps, M. J., Matthews, J., & Asten, J. (2006). Cognition, affect, and beliefs in paranormal phenomena: Gestalt/Feature Intensive Processing Theory and tendencies toward ADHD, depression, and dissociation. Journal of Psychology, 140(6), 579–590.

Sharps, M. J., & Nunes, M. A. (2002). Gestalt and feature-intensive processing: Toward a unified model of human information processing. Current Psychology, 21(1), 68–84.

Sharps, M. J., Price-Sharps, J. L., Day, S. S., Villegas, A. B., & Nunes, M. A. (2005). Cognitive predisposition to substance abuse in adult attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Addictive Behaviors, 30(2), 355–359.

Spoehr, K. T., & Lehmkule, S. W. (1982). Visual information processing. San Francisco: Freeman.

Sporer, S. L., Malpass, R. S., & Koehnken, G. (1996). Psychological issues in eyewitness identification. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Tietjen, T. (2005, January). The impact of job related stress on individuals in law enforcement. Fresno Police Department, Sierra Education and Research Institute, and Alliant International University, Fresno, CA.

Villegas, A. B., Sharps, M. J., Satterthwaite, B., & Chisholm, S. (2005). Eyewitness memory for vehicles. The Forensic Examiner, 14(3), 24–28.

Wells, G. L. (1993). What do we know about eyewitness identification? American Psychologist, 48(5), 553–571.

Wogalter, M. S., Malpass, R. S., & Burger, M. A. (1993). How police officers construct lineups: A national survey. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (pp. 640–644). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

Wogalter, M. S., Malpass, R. S., & McQuiston, D. E. (2004). A national survey of police on preparation and conduct of identification lineups. Psychology, Crime and Law, 10(1), 69–82.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Chief of Police Jerry Dyer of the Fresno Police Department and the staff and field training officers of the Fresno Police Department for giving of their time and expertise and for their continued and very generous assistance, advice, and support of this research. They would also like to thank Officer Scott Larson, Los Angeles Police Department and Amy Neff, Morgan Goodwin, and Randy Vaughn-Dotta for their excellent help in the preparation of the materials for this research. The research, views, and opinions presented in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Fresno or Los Angeles Police Departments or their chiefs, staffs, officers, or employees.

About the Authors

Matthew J. Sharps, PhD, DABPS, FACFEI, is professor of psychology at California State University, Fresno, and adjunct faculty member at Alliant International University. He received his MA (clinical psychology) from UCLA and MA and PhD (psychology) from the University of Colorado. He is the author of numerous articles and papers on visual cognition and related topics as well as the book Aging, Representation, and Thought: Gestalt and Feature-Intensive Processing (2003, Transaction Publishers). He has consulted on issues of eyewitness identification in more than 160 criminal cases.

Adam B. Hess, MA, is a lecturer in Criminology at California State University, Fresno, and a doctoral candidate in forensic clincical psychology at Alliant International University, Fresno.

Bethany Ranes, BA, is a doctoral candidate in Forensic Clinical Psychology at Alliant International University, Fresno.

Jenna Jones, BA, is a doctoral candidate in Forensic Clinical Psychology at Alliant International University, Fresno.

Hilary Casner, BA, is a graduate student in psychology at the University of Arkansas.

Factors Leading to Wrongful Convictions

The most common factors leading to wrongful convictions that were found in the first 130 DNA exonerations.

Mistaken I.D. (101)

False Confessions (35)

Microscopic Hair Comparison Matches (21)

Informants/Snitches (21)

DNA Inclusions at Time of Trial (3)

Detecting Deception in Neuropsychological Cases:

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 13:33:00 +0000

Detecting Deception in Neuropsychological Cases:

Toward an Applied Model

Abstract

The neuropsychological literature and clinical-forensic experience in both criminal and civil contexts suggest an applied model of deception analysis. This article presents such a model in terms of a faker’s (1) target/symptoms, (2) response styles, and (3) detection strategies. The deceiver’s targets/symptoms can be broken down into distorted behavioral, affective, cognitive, psychophysiological, and somatic problems. Response styles include honest responding (from the perception of the assessee), faking bad (malingering), faking good (defensiveness), attempts at invalidation, mixed responding (faking good and bad), and a fluctuating, changing style that occurs within one evaluation session. Detection strategies involve the use of neurometric and psychometric testing, observation, clinical and structured interviews, and comparison to values such as base rates for the deceptive group to which the faker holds membership. Expert testimony that meets Daubert standards, based on such an applied model of deception analysis and report writing, clearly communicates the decision path and findings of the forensic evaluator.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

By Harold V. Hall, PhD; Jane S. Thompson, PhD; and Joseph G. Poirier, PhD, ABPP

Key Words: deception analysis, neuropsychological malingering, faking good, faking bad, applied model

Introduction

Faking cerebral dysfunction has an extensive and infamous history. Malingering brain damage has long been recognized in forensic settings despite an unwarranted belief that neuropsychological tests could not be malingered (Hart, 1995; Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & Vogt, 1978; Miller & Cartlidge, 1972; Ziskin & Faust, 1988). The assessment of malingered traumatic brain injury (TBI) is difficult for several reasons. To begin, in spite of considerable research, there is little support for any type of “malingering profile” on neuropsychological tests (Franzen, Iverson, & McCracken, 1990; Heubrock & Peterman, 1998; van Gorp et al., 1999). Actual malingerers rarely acknowledge their deception and, therefore, it is difficult to distinguish malingerers from honest responders for empirical comparison (Greiffenstein, Baker, & Gola, 1994; Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, & Vrij, 2005; Kassin, 2004; Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Vrij, 2000).

Few applied models of feigning cerebral dysfunctions have been offered in the forensic neuropsychological literature. This article incorporates Hall & Poirier’s (2001) model, which scrutinizes targets of the faker, response styles employed, and the detection strategies used to uncover feigned neuropsychological dysfunctions (see Table 1).

Targets

For the first part of the model involving targets and goals of the faker, the basic questions concern whether the individual has a motive for faking and the most likely targets of deception. Keep in mind that in deliberate deception, of which malingering is an example, DSM-IV-TR states that the individual is externally motivated and is aware of the motivation behind the deception. According to DSM-IV-TR, a factitious disorder is shown by an individual who is usually not aware of his or her own motivation behind the distorted behavior and who lacks external incentives. However, this article considers deceptive behavior to include factitious disorders because the symptoms of both are deliberately faked.

Targets can be broken down into the building blocks of personality—behavioral, somatic, sensory, affective, cognitive, and interpersonal—as discussed by Lazarus (1976, 2002, 2006). For example, a faker may display a deficiency in behavior such as mutism, or pretending to have lost the ability to speak. The selection of targets by the deceiver is limited only by the deceiver’s imagination, and targets have been found to take myriad forms within those categories listed above (Hall & Poirier, 2001; Rogers, 1997). One faker may wish to present an exaggerated pain response in an attempt to feign difficulty in ambulation, whereas another may show slowness of response or a festinating gait to convey the same problem. The evaluator should keep in mind that targets of the faker may change, but the long-range objective of the deception (for example, increased compensation) usually does not (Hall & Poirier; Hall & Pritchard, 1996).

The evaluator is urged to take into account that fear of getting caught may affect the selection of faking criteria. As described by Freedland (1982), this occurs for two reasons:

First, mild deficits are easier to fake than severe ones; therefore a mild faking criterion is less likely to be questioned by an examiner. Second, choices of criteria may be influenced by the effects they will have on the patient’s lifestyle. For example, fake unilateral deafness is seen more often than fake bilateral deafness. Bilateral deafness might merit a larger compensatory settlement, but the patient wishing to avoid later charges of fraud might have to feign total deafness indefinitely. Unilateral deafness is worth less money, but the patient is able to engage in most of his or her favorite activities without arousing suspicion.

Response Styles

Response styles are behaviors exhibited by the faker to achieve some outcome. The assessment of response styles lies at the crux of a deception analysis using the applied model. The response styles themselves provide the basis of the detection strategies employed by the evaluator presented in the next section.

With regard to the applied model, six primary response styles should be considered. The first is honest responding, where the examinee, from his or her perspective, presents non-deceptive behavior. Honest responding is not equivalent to a good performance in that some examinees may consistently err on testing tasks because of genuine deficiencies (e.g., mental retardation, florid psychosis, dementia; Rogers & Bender, 2003).

The second response style is faking bad, or malingering. This is the category in which most of the examples in this article fall, where the assessee deliberately attempts to exaggerate or fabricate a problem or denies or minimizes his or her strengths. There are many behaviors that fakers may employ in attempts to feign believable deficits on neuropsychological evaluations (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule, 1989; Craine, 1981, 1990; Drummond, 2004; Hall, 1985, 1990; Hall & Pritchard, 1996; Hall & Poirier, 2001):

Present realistic symptoms—A deceiver will employ a common sense or popular schema of what persons with brain damage are like and will select symptoms that accord with that naive view (Aubrey et al., 1989).
Distribute errors—To cover their targets, fakers tend to make deliberate mistakes throughout their evaluations rather than miss only difficult items. A balance is sought between appearing fully functional (missing too few items) and appearing too impaired (missing too many items). Fakers attempt to control their errors as much as possible, but, in practice, they fail to maintain a realistic percentage of errors.
Protest that tasks are too difficult and/or feign confusion and frustration—The faker may feign confusion, anger, or other emotions superimposed upon adequate cooperation and task compliance.
Perform at a crudely estimated fraction of actual ability—Speed may be deliberately decreased. The faker is generally knowledgeable of his or her true rate of responding but may decide to show a partial performance.

Table 1 presents 12 types of faking bad, the associated behavior strategy, and an example of each.

A third response style is faking good, which involves denial or downplaying real problems and/or fabricating or exaggerating existing strengths and abilities. Fourth is invalidation, which is the deliberate attempt to sabotage or render useless evaluation efforts (e.g., missing appointments, incorrect marking on computer-scored measures). A fifth response style is mixed responding, such as faking both bad and good during one evaluation session (e.g., denial of sexual problems with exaggeration of depression on the MMPI). Finally, the last response style is a fluctuating style, which is, within one session, changing how one responds to test questions or the examiner (e.g., from honesty to malingering in accordance with a plan to do so; from faking good to attempts to invalidate testing as the examinee becomes fatigued).

Detection Strategies

Detection strategies employed by the evaluator have been investigated for their effectiveness at detecting particular response patterns of the faker as well as for characteristics of standardized tests used to assess deception. As a measure of response set, most neuropsychologists employ personality tests in addition to specific tests of malingering.

The most widely used personality test is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) (Butcher, 2006). The original MMPI has been a mainstay component of neuropsychological test batteries (Lezak, 1995), and the MMPI-2 has been demonstrated to have comparable utility to the MMPI with neurological populations (Miller & Paniak, 1995; Mittenberg, Tremont, & Rayls, 1996). The MMPI-2 provides the neuropsychologist with valuable information about the patient’s non-cognitive functioning to include behavioral, emotional, and psychiatric issues. Also particularly useful in forensic circumstances are the MMPI-2 scales designed to indicate response bias. Lamb, Berry, Wetter, and Baer (1994) noted that the MMPI-2 is vulnerable to simulated closed head injury; MMPI-2 findings alone, however, should not be relied upon as the sole indicator of malingering of a head injury.

Detection strategies to measure specific areas of neuropsychological faking outside the domain of personality fall into several categories (Craine, 1990; Freedland & Craine, personal communication, 1981; Hall, Shooter, Craine, & Paulsen, 1991). These include assessing lack of neurological fit, retesting or comparison strategies, assessing certain test characteristics, and searching for departures from expected levels of accuracy on forced-choice tests.

Lack of Neurological Fit

Reported history, presenting symptoms, or responses on neuropsychological tests or on individual test items must make sense compared to what is known about the functional neurological systems involved. Otherwise, a lack of neurological fit exists. For single items or symptoms, does the assessee present signs that do not make sense neurologically to a supposedly involved hemisphere (such as glove amnesia or hemiparesis ipsilateral)? On multidimensional tests, does the assessee produce a pattern of scores (profile) that is consistent with known neuropsychological syndromes?

Retesting or Comparison Strategies

There are three types of resting or comparison strategies.

Easy versus difficult versions of similar tests. The faker may not understand that a second testing may be easier or more difficult than the first. Thus, fakers may perform similarly on the two versions whereas non-fakers would perform differently.

The Dot Counting Test (DCT) illustrates this method. Cards A, B, and C (consisting of massed dots) are more difficult than their counterparts, Cards, D, E, and F (consisting of clusters of dots), even though the two sets have the same number of dots to count. Administration of the two sets of the Dot Counting Test may yield such inconsistent results that only a conscious attempt to control performance can explain them. In a meta-analytic review of selected malingering detection procedures, Vickery, Berry, Inman, Harris, and Orey (2001) found that on the DCT, malingerers scored .75 standard deviations below honest responders. In analyzing 32 studies of commonly researched neuropsychological malingering tests, Vickery et al. found that the Digit Memory Test (DMT) and the Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT) could effectively discriminate honest responders from fakers, separating the two groups by approximately 2 standard deviations.

Another test with built-in easy-versus-difficult items is the Auditory Discrimination Test (ADT) (Language Research Association, 1958). Initial administration of the ADT involves informing the assessee that words will be read, two at a time, and that the task is to say whether the two words are the same or different (e.g., tub - tub, lack - lack, web - wed, leg - led, chap - chap). A second form presents same or different word pairs of similar difficulty and number (N = 40) as the first form (e.g., gear - beer, cad - cab, bug - bud). In terms of threshold values, the faker may not realize that normals can miss many of the “same” items (<> 4) before the performance appears suspicious. Comparison of the hit rates for same versus different items may detect a suspicious asymmetry in the types of items missed.

Caution should be exercised, however, in deciding that failures of easy items within a test are more characteristic of deliberate distortion than of genuine responding. Mittenberg, Hammeke, and Rao (1989) examined the distribution of intratest scatter among brain-damaged and normal subjects on the vocabulary, comprehension, and similarities subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R). Their results suggested high cut-off scores (e.g., more than six failed items interpolated among passed items) for distinguishing brain-damaged subjects from normal subjects. If intratest scatter is to be used as an index of faking bad as well as an index of brain damage, then the cut-off scores for distinguishing actual brain damage from malingered brain damage would have to be even higher than those for distinguishing brain damaged from normal subjects.

In another study, Mittenberg, Theroux-Fichera, Zielinski, and Heilbronner (1995) compared selected WAIS-R subtest score differences between a group of recruited simulators and a mild head injury group. A significant discriminant function was identified, and the cutoffs differentiated the two groups. The TBI group showed negligible differences between vocabulary and digit span subtest performance. The simulators performed better on vocabulary compared to digit span. The authors acknowledged the limitation of their experimental cutoff scores being used with actual clinical populations.

In a third study, from a survey of the members of the American Board of Clinical Neuropsychology (ABCN), Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, and Condit (2002) determined the base rate for faking bad based on more than 33,500 cases involving personal injury, disability, criminal, and medical matters. Base rates for malingering did not change for geographic location or type of setting but were affected by type of referral (plaintiff vs. defense). The following rates for probable malingering were reported: personal injury, 29%; disability, 30%; criminal, 19%; medical cases, 8%; mild head injury, 39%; fibromyalgia/chronic fatigue, 35%; chronic pain, 31%; neurotoxic, 27%; and electrical injury, 22%. Mittenberg et al. (2002) stated the following:

Diagnosis was supported by multiple sources of evidence, including severity (65% of cases) or pattern (64% of cases) of cognitive impairment that was inconsistent with the condition, scores below empirical cutoffs on forced choice tests (57% of cases); discrepancies among records, self-report, and observed behavior (56%); implausible self-reported symptoms in interview (46%); implausible changes in test scores across repeated examinations (45%); and validity scales on objective personality tests (38% of cases).

Parallel testing. Repeatedly administrating the same test or a parallel form of a test should yield similar performances. The faker may not understand that a repeat of the test will be given and, therefore, may have difficulty replicating the previous performance. Faked scores in general are less stable than genuine scores.

The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) as a test of receptive vocabulary is an example. Faking or malingering clients often have difficulty obtaining the same score on a parallel form even when the test is administered a short time later.

Deviations from predicted scores. The evaluator can compare predicted scores on a test with actual performance on that test. For example, regression equations have been developed to predict WAIS-R scores from scores on the Shipley-Hartford Institute of Living Scale (Weiss & Schell, 1991; Zachry, 1986), Ravens Progressive Matrices (O’Leary, Rusch, & Gudstello, 1991), and the National Adult Reading Test (Willshire, Kinsella, & Pryor, 1991). A faker’s obtained score on the WAIS-R may fall outside the confidence interval predicted from one of these three other tests.

The Shipley-Hartford and Ravens Progressive Matrices in particular are useful screening measures of intelligence because they take only a short time to administer. In addition, the Shipley-Hartford provides alternate forms that will yield information on retest performance as well as gives an estimated WAIS-R IQ. Impaired non-faking subjects should obtain WAIS-R IQ scores similar to those predicted by these two tests.

Certain Test Characteristics

Some tests expose fakers by measuring inconsistencies between similar tasks or gauging a assessee’s failure to exhibit that he or she has learned.

Inconsistencies across similar items or tasks. Within the same test, the faker may not pay attention to item similarity and, therefore, not perform in an identical fashion. A less stable performance on similar items is frequently seen in fakers, just as with parallel tests. On tests with repeated trials of the same task (e.g., finger tapping, dynamometer), intertrial variability also increases with faking. However, it should be remembered that the reliability of item-level scores is much lower than the reliability of scale-level scores. Therefore, less confidence should be placed in item-level or trial-level inconsistencies than in scale-level inconsistencies.

Failure to show learning. Fakers often do not show expected learning curves (or may perhaps even show deterioration) across repeated trials of a task. The Mirror Tracing Test (Andreas, 1960; Millard, 1985) illustrates this expectation. The subject is told to trace the path between the two solid lines of a maze while viewing the maze in a mirror. An error is counted each time the subject’s pencil touches a guideline. If the subject crosses the line, he or she must re-enter at the same point; otherwise, a re-entry counts as a second error. Faking may be suspected if the expected bilateral transfer of training (improved performance with the opposite hand after training with one hand) does not occur, if the expected improvement over trials (learning curve) is not apparent, or if the total time exceeds 5 minutes.

Departures from Expected Accuracy

Forced-choice testing and forced-choice reaction-time testing provide powerful methods of assessing deception of deficits. These tasks are all so easy that even severely impaired persons should perform satisfactorily. Departures from expected levels of performance provide a measure of a conscious attempt to manipulate performance.

Symptom Validity Testing (SVT) and Explicit Alternative Testing (EAT) both attempt to measure faked sensory and recall deficits (Grosz & Zimmerman, 1965; Hall & Shooter, 1989; Hall & Thompson, 2007; Pankratz, 1979, 1983, 1988; Pankratz, Fausti, & Peed, 1975; Theodor & Mandelcorn, 1973). EAT involves the presentation of stimuli whose perception or recognition is either affirmed or denied by the assessee. An interference period may be added if recall, rather than sensory perception, is the target of evaluation.

Almost no one should miss the presented items unless a genuine impairment exists. In the case of total impairment (e.g., total blindness or deafness), one’s performance should approximate chance responding (50% accuracy with two-choice tasks). A significant deviation from chance responding is defined as an accuracy score with a probability less than some specified level (e.g., p < .05 or p < .01) as determined by the binomial distribution; for example, the one-tailed probability of obtaining fewer than 40 correct responses in 100 trials of a two-choice task is less than 2% (p = .0176). Achieving fewer than 36 correct answers would occur by chance less than twice in a thousand tests (p = .0018).

Fakers usually assume that impaired performance requires less than 50% accuracy (Haughton, Lewsley, Wilson, & Williams, 1979; Pankratz, 1988). Persons genuinely impaired will usually guess randomly on EAT testing. Fakers do worse than chance because they intentionally suppress the correct answers on items to which they know the answers.

The Smell Identification Test (SIT) provides an illustration of forced-choice testing of faked sensory deficits. Developed by Doty and colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania (Doty, Shaman, & Dann, 1984; Doty, Shaman, & Kimmelman, 1984), the 40-item SIT provides a quantitative measure of olfactory dysfunction in less than 15 minutes. The authors note that problems with the sense of smell are frequently associated with head trauma, with anosmia found in between 7% and 8% of cases.

The SIT may be useful when the assessee is suspected of malingering with regard to his or her sense of smell such as when insurance/accident claims are filed and there appears to be no basis for the claim. Four choices of smells are presented upon release of an odorant, yielding a 25% chance of accuracy in correctly identifying the designated smell, given total anosmia (10 out of 40). Most non-faking patients will correctly identify 35 or more of the 40 odorants, with females generally outscoring males at all age levels. Zero was the modal number of correct guesses for 158 men and women instructed to fake bad in the Doty, Shaman, & Kimmelman (1984) study. Doty (personal communication, 1991) notes that under the assumption that p = 0.25, the probability of obtaining a score of zero by chance is one in 100,000; the chance of obtaining five or fewer correct on the SIT is less than 5 in 100. Those with genuine problems reflecting total loss of smell (i.e., anosmia) generally score around 10 at chance level because of essentially random responding. Patients with partial dysfunction have intermediate SIT scores. Patients with multiple sclerosis yield scores slightly above average; Parkinson’s or Alzheimer’s patients produce scores that are significantly lower than average, but that are still substantially above the expected range for random responding.

Frederick (1997) described the Validity Indicator Profile (VIP), a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) procedure designed to identify when the results of cognitive and neuropsychological testing may be invalid because of malingering or other problematic response styles. The instrument is comprised of 100 problems that assess nonverbal abstraction capacity and 78 word-definition problems. The VIP attempts to establish a subject’s performance as representative of the subject’s overall capacity (i.e., valid or invalid). A valid performance is classified as compliant, and an invalid performance is sub-classified as careless (low effort to respond correctly), irrelevant (low effort to respond incorrectly), or malingering (high effort to respond incorrectly). Frederick & Crosby (2000) reported a cross-validation study with 152 non-clinical subjects, 61 brain-injured subjects, 49 subjects considered to be at risk for malingering, and 100 randomly generated VIP protocols. The nonverbal and verbal subtests of the VIP demonstrated overall classification rates of 79.8% (73.5% sensitivity and 85.7% specificity) and 75.5% (67.3% sensitivity and 83.1% specificity) respectively. The VIP is another promising instrument for the detection of malingering. Its author suggested that the instrument’s fourfold classification scheme (i.e., cross classification of high to low motivation and high to low effort) reduces problems with false-positive classifications.

The Victoria Symptom Validity Test (VSVT) (Slick, Hopp, Strauss, & Thompson, 1997) is a forced-choice instrument. The VSVT was designed to address the validity of reported cognitive impairments. The VSVT is computer-administered and consists of five-digit numbers of varying difficulty. One feature of the VSVT is an administration time of 10–15 minutes, while another is its production of probability values (scores for valid, questionable, and invalid profiles). The test manual has a table of binomial probability values that is used to estimate the probability of obtaining the number of correct items out of the total number of items completed. The VSVT was found to be effective in detecting feigned memory impairment (Bauer & McCaffrey, 2006; Loring, Lee, & Meador, 2005; Slick, Hopp, Strauss, & Spellacy, 1996; Slick et al., 2003). Overall, validity and reliability data are encouraging (see review by Lees-Haley, Dunn, & Betz, 1999).

Another instrument is the widely used Rey 15-Item Memory Test (FIT) (Liff, 2004; Rey, 1964). The FIT is a screening instrument designed to identify malingered memory complaints. To the examinee, the FIT initially appears to be more difficult than it actually is. The redundancy of simple character sets makes the memory task relatively simple, such that significant memory problems are necessary to generate actual deficit performance. Twenty years of studies (for a review, see Hart, 1995), mostly consisting of cutoff score refinements and adjustments, have indicated the FIT to be vulnerable to false positive findings. The FIT is unique in its simplicity and brevity, but these same attributes render it not able to yield meaningful discriminant functions. In Vickery et al.’s (2001) study, they found that the FIT separated the two groups by .75 of a standard deviation.

Importantly, the evaluator should note that empirically designed tests of deception are likely to meet the Daubert standards for admission of scientific evidence (Hall & Poirier, 2001; Hall & Thompson, 2007).

Caveats

Neuropsychologists, firstly, should understand that their training, especially in clinical settings, poorly prepares them for deception analysis. The emerging literature discussed in this article has the typical neuropsychological practice-incorporated deception analysis. Likewise, in actual clinical practice, a multidimensional view is necessary in that genuine symptoms may be distorted and/or exaggerated in intensity, frequency, and duration (Zielinski, 1995).

Secondly, the evaluator should be wary of the traditionally accepted signs of hysteria and malingering, which actually may reflect cerebral dysfunction. One study, Gould, Miller, Goldberg, & Benson (1986), surveyed the literature and found that the majority of clients (60% to 80%) thought to be hysteric or presenting neurological problems because of secondary gain, actually suffered brain damage.

A third caveat concerns the need for multiple measures of distortion. When evaluating neuropsychological patients for forensic purposes, the authors use specific devices for detecting deception in addition to a composite neuropsychological battery and as much historical and premorbid information available.

A fourth caveat involves the array of factors that are reviewed in assessing neuropsychological symptoms. In a study of base-rate data regarding postconcussive syndrome (PCS) with a large sample (N = 1,116), neurological, psychological, and environmental variables were found to affect symptom presentation (Fox, Lees-Haley, Earnest, & Dolezal-Wood, 1995). The authors observed that neuropsychological test data must be reviewed in the context of a broad range of factors before PCS complaints are used as a basis for brain damage.

A fifth caveat notes that the effects of coaching or priming others should be carefully scrutinized. There have been forensic cases in which the adversarial attorneys made available to their clients books and journal articles on deception and distortion. The implicit aspects of coaching in these situations were impossible to demonstrate but were suspected. In these cases, ironically, the clients were detected in their faking by a battery of tests, suggesting as a testable hypothesis that even with knowledge of the literature on faking, deceptive persons can nevertheless be identified.

But this may not be true. Despite widespread use of malingering instruments, few, if any, empirical studies have been published determining the vulnerability of malingering measures to explicit coaching. Dunn, Shear, Howe, and Ris (2003) studied two commonly used measures of deception—The Computerized Assessment of Response Bias-97 and The Word Memory Test—with participants aged 18–30 years, and found that both tests could detect malingering, but neither test differentiated between naïve and coached participants. They also found that response times and items correct were the two best indicators of participants not giving their full effort. Borckardt et al. (2003) found similar results on the Cognitive Behavioral Driver’s Inventory for 98 student subjects. The students were divided into a coached group and an un-coached group; the coached students performed indistinguishably from the un-coached students on the measure.

In an attempt to detect malingering on the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices, McKinzey, Prieler, and Raven (2003), found that all but 2 of 44 subjects (ages 7–17 years) could produce lower scores when asked to malinger on the test. Yet a simple rule involving missing any of three easy items (i.e., A3, A4, or B1) yielded 5% true positives and negatives and an overall hit rate of 95%.

A sixth caveat rests on the necessity of the examiner’s attempting to reconstruct the malingering experience from the perspective of the suspected faker. Alban (2003) found that subjects who were asked to malinger were unable to maintain faked responses under cognitive overload for reaction-time measures, but this finding did not hold true for other neuropsychological domains. It can be speculated that for timed tasks, fakers would have difficulty determining which temporal limitation was associated with impairment.

As a last concern, the evaluator who provides expert testimony in court should be cognizant of Daubert standards for admissibility of evidence. Relevant questions for a deception analysis may include those designed to reveal the sensitivity and specificity of the measures employed, as well as the degree of error associated with the different procedure’s steps employed (e.g., order of administration). Findings that stem from empirical studies on deception may be more helpful to the trier of fact (as well as less painful to the expert who is cross examined) than subjectively based findings or clinical judgment. The expert who opines on deception in a particular case should be prepared to share with the courts his or her own accuracy level in attempting to detect deception in forensic cases.
References

Alban, A. D. (2003). Neuropsychological malingering and cognitive load: Disrupting deception of neuropsychological measures through cognitive overload. Dissertation Abstracts International, 63(09), 4358B.

Andreas, B. G. (1960). Experimental psychology. New York: Wiley.

Aubrey, J., Dobbs, A., & Rule, B. (1989). Laypersons’ knowledge about the sequelae of minor head injury and whiplash, Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 52(7), 842–846.

Bauer, L., & McCaffrey, R. J. (2006). Coverage of the test of memory malingering, Victoria Symptom Validity Test, and Word Memory Test on the Internet: Is test security threatened? Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 21(1), 121–126.

Borckardt, J. J., Engum, E. S., Lambert, E. W., Nash, M., Bracy, O. L., & Ray, E. C. (2003). Use of the CBDI to detect malingering when malingerers do their “homework.” Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 18(1), 57–69.

Butcher, J. N. (2006). MMPI-2: A practitioner’s guide. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Craine, J. (1981). Faking on neuropsychological tests. Paper presented at the meeting of the Hawaii Psychological Association, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Craine, J. (1990). Minimizing and denying: A testing approach to feigned amnesia. In Truth or lies: Guidelines for detecting malingering and deception. Workshop presented by the Psychological Consultants and Forest Institute of Professional Psychology, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Doty, R. L., Shaman, P. S., & Dann, M. (1984). Development of the University of Pennsylvania Smell Identification Test: A standardized microencapsulated test of olfactory function. Physiology & Behavior, 32, 489–502.

Doty, R. L., Shaman, P. S., & Kimmelman, C. P. (1984). University of Pennsylvania smell identification test: A rapid quantitative olfactory function test for the clinic. Laryngoscope, 94, 176–178.

Drummond, R. J. (2004). Appraisal procedures for counselors and helping professionals (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Merrill/Prentice Hall.

Dunn, T. M., Shear, P. K., Howe, S., & Ris, M. D. (2003). Detecting neuropsychological malingering: Effects of coaching and information. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 18(2), 121–134.

Fox, D. D., Lees-Haley, P. R., Earnest, K., & Dolezal-Wood, S. (1995). Base rates of postconcussive symptoms in health maintenance organization patients and controls. Neuropsychology, 9(4), 606–611.

Franzen, M. D., Iverson, G. L., & McCraken, L. M. (1990). The detection of malingering in neuropsychological assessment. Neuropsychological Review, 1, 247–279.

Frederick, R. I. (1997). Validity indicator profile manual. Minnetonka, MN: NCS Assessments.

Frederick, R. I., & Crosby, R. D. (2000). Development and validation of the Validity Indicator Profile. Law and Human Behavior, 24(1), 59–82.

Freedland, K. (1982). The detection of faking on neuropsychological tests. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Hawaii, Manoa.

Gould, R., Miller, B., Goldberg, M., & Benson, D. (1986). The validity of hysterical signs and symptoms. Journal of Nervous & Mental Diseases, 174(10), 593–597.

Greiffenstein, M. F., Baker, W. J., & Gola, T. (1994). Validation of malingered amnesia with a large clinical sample. Psychological Assessment, 6(3), 218–224.

Grosz, H., & Zimmerman, J. (1965). Experimental analysis of hysterical blindness: A follow-up report and new experiment data. Archives of General Psychiatry, 13, 255–260.

Hall, H. V. (1985). Cognitive and volitional capacity assessment: A proposed decision tree. American Journal of Forensic Psychology, 3, 3–17.

Hall, H. V. (1990). Faking good and faking bad: In Truth or lies: Guidelines for detecting malingering and deception. Workshop presented by Psychological Consultants and Forest Institute of Professional Psychology, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Hall, H. V., & Poirier, J. G. (2001). Detecting malingering and deception: Forensic distortion analysis. (2nd ed.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

Hall, H. V., & Pritchard, D. (1996). Detecting malingering and deception: The forensic distortion analysis. Winter Park, FL: GR Press.

Hall, H. V., & Shooter, E. A. (1989). Explicit alternative testing for feigned memory deficits. Forensic Reports, 2, 277–286.

Hall, H. V., Shooter, E. A., Craine, J., & Paulsen, S. (1991). Explicit alternative testing: A trilogy of studies on faked memory deficits. Forensic Reports, 4(3), 259–279.

Hall, H. V., & Thompson, J. (2007). Explicit alternative testing (EAT): Application of the binomial probability distribution to clinical-forensic evaluations. The Forensic Examiner, 16(1), 38–43.

Hart, K. (1995). The assessment of malingering in neuropsychological evaluations: Research-based concepts and methods for consultants. Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 47(4), 246–254.

Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., Stromwall, L. A., & Vrij, A. (2005). Detecting deception via strategic disclosure of evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 29(4), 469–484.

Haughton, P. M., Lewsley, A., Wilson, M., & Williams, R. G. (1979). A forced-choice procedure to detect feigned or exaggerated hearing loss. British Journal of Audiology, 13, 135–138.

Heaton, R., Smith, H., Lehman, R., & Vogt. A. (1978). Prospects for faking believable deficits on neuropsychological testing. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 892–900.

Heubrock, D., & Peterman, F. (1998). Neuropsychological assessment of suspected malingering: Research results, evaluation techniques, and further directions of research and application. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 14(3), 211–225.

Kassin, S. M. (2004). True or false: “I’d know a false confession if I saw one.” In P. A. Granhag & L. A. Stromwall (Eds.), The detection of deception in forensic contexts (pp. 172–194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lamb, D. G., Berry, D. T. R., Wetter, M. W., & Baer, R. A. (1994). Effects of two types of information on malingering of closed head injury on the MMPI-2: An analog investigation. Psychological Assessment, 6(1), 8–13.

Language Research Association. (1958). The Auditory Discrimination Test. Chicago, IL: Author.

Lazarus, A. A. (1976). Multimodal behavior therapy: I. Oxford, England: Springer.

Lazarus, A. A. (2002). The multimodal assessment therapy approach. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Lazarus, A. A. (Ed.). (2006). Multimodal therapy: A seven-point integration. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Lees-Haley, P. R., Dunn, J. T., & Betz, B. P. (1999). Test review: The Victoria Symptom Validity Test. American Psychology-Law Society Newsletter, 19(3), 12–16.

Lezak, M. (1995). Neuropsychological Assessment (3rd. ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Liff, C. D. A. (2004). The detection of neuropsychological malingering. Dissertation Abstracts International, 64(09), 4623B.

Loring, D. W., Lee, G. P., & Meador, K. J. (2005). Victoria symptom validity test performance in non-litigating epilepsy surgery candidates. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 27(5), 610–617.

McKinzey, R. K., Prieler, J., & Raven, J. (2003). Detection of children’s malingering on raven’s standard progressive matrices. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 42(1), 95–99.

Meissner, C. A., & Kassin, S. M. (2002). “He’s guilty!”: Investigator bias in judgments of truth and deception. Law and Human Behavior, 26, 469–480.

Millard, R.W. (1985). Application of selected measures for detecting neuropsychological impairment among alcoholics. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Hawaii, Manoa.

Miller, H., & Cartlidge, N. (1972). Simulation and malingering after injuries to the brain and spinal cord. Lancet, 1, 580–584.

Miller, H. B., & Paniak, C. E. (1995). MMPI and MMPI-2 profile and code type congruence in a brain-injured sample. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 17(1), 58–64.

Mittenberg, W., Hammeke, T., & Rao, S. (1989). Intrasubtest scatter on the WAIS-R as a pathognomonic sign of brain injury. Psychological Assessment: A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1, 273–276.

Mittenberg, W., Patton, C., Canyock, E. M., & Condit, D. C. (2002). Base rates of malingering and symptom exaggeration. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 24(8), 1094–1102.

Mittenberg, W., Theroux-Fichera, S., Zielinski, R. E., & Heilbronner, R. L. (1995). Identification of malingered head injury on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 26(5), 491–498.

Mittenberg, W., Tremont, G., & Rayls, K. R. (1996). Impact of cognitive function on MMPI-2 validity in neurologically impaired patients. Assessment, 3(2), 157–163.

O’Leary, U., Rusch, K., & Gudstello, S. (1991). Estimating age-stratified WAIS-R IQs from scores on the Ravess Standard Progressive Matrices. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 47(2), 277–284.

Pankratz, L. (1979). Symptom validity testing and symptom retraining: Procedures for the assessment and treatment of functional sensory deficits. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 47, 409–410.

Pankratz, L. (1983). A new technique for the assessment and modification of feigned memory deficits. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 57, 367–372.

Pankratz, L. (1988). Malingering on intellectual and neuropsychological measures. In R. Rogers (Ed.), Clinical assessment of malingering and deception (pp. 169–192). New York: Guilford Press.

Pankratz, L., Fausti, S. A., & Peed, S. (1975). A forced-choice technique to evaluate deafness in a hysterical or malingering patient. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 421–422.

Rey, A. (1964). L’examen clinique en psycholgic [The clinical examination in psychology]. Paris: Presse Universitaires de France.

Rogers, R. (1997). Clinical Assessment of Malingering and Deception (2nd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.

Rogers, R., & Bender, S. D. (Eds.). (2003). Evaluation of malingering and deception. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Slick, D. J., Hopp, G., Strauss, E., & Spellacy, F. J. (1996). Victoria Symptom Validity Test: Efficiency for detecting feigned memory impairment and relationship to neuropsychological tests and MMPI-2 validity scales. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 18(6), 911–922.

Slick, D. J., Hopp, G., Strauss, E., & Thompson, G. B. (1997). Victoria Symptom Validity Test,Version 1.0, professional manual. Odessa, FL: Professional Resource, Inc.

Slick, D. J., Tan, J. E., Strauss, E., Mateer, C. A., Harnadek, M., & Sherman, E. M. S. (2003). Victoria symptom validity test scores of patients with profound memory impairment: NonLitigant case studies. Clinical Neuropsychologist, 17(3), 390–394.

Theodor, L. H. & Mandelcorn, M. S. (1973). Hysterical blindness: A case report and study using a modern psychophysical technique. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 82, 552–553.

van Gorp, W. G., Humphrey, L. A., Kalechstein, A., Brumm, V. L., McMullen, W. J., & Stoddard, M., et al. (1999). How well do standard clinical neuropsychological tests identify malingering? A preliminary analysis. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 21(2), 245–250.

Vickery, C. D., Berry, D. T. R., Inman, T. H., Harris, M. J., & Orey, S. A. (2001). Detection of inadequate effort on neuropsychological testing: A meta-analytic review of selected procedures. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 16(1), 45–73.

Vrij, A. (2000). Detecting lies and deceit: The psychology of lying and its implications for professional practice. Chichester, England: Wiley.

Weiss, J., & Schell, R. (1991). Estimating WAIS-R IQ from the Shipley Institute of Living Scale: A replication. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 47(4), 558–562.

Willshire, D., Kinsella, G., & Pryor, M. (1991). Estimating WAIS-R IQ from the National Adult Reading Test: A cross-validation. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 13(2), 204–216.

Zachry, R. (1986). Manual for Shipley Institute of Living Scale. Los Angeles: Western Psychological Services.

Zielinski, J. J. (1995). Malingering and defensiveness in the neuropsychological assessment of mild traumatic brain injury. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 1(2), 169–184.

Ziskin, J., & Faust, D. (1988). Coping with psychiatric and psychological testimony (4th ed.). Los Angeles: Law and Psychology Press.

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit:

(ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

(CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants.

(NBCC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International is an NBCC Approved Continuing Education Provider (ACEP) and may offer NBCC approved clock hours for events that meet NBCC requirements. The ACEP solely is responsible for all aspects of the program. Provider #5812.

Style Behavioral Strategy Examples

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

1. Verbal fabrication

2. Verbal exaggeration

3. Verbal denial

4. Verbal minimizing

5. Misattribution

6. Behavioral fractionalizing

7. Behavioral approximating

8. Behavioral infrequency

9. Behavioral disengagement

10. Impusivity

11. Perseveration

12. Randomizing

Table 1: Faking Bad Response Styles

Claiming a nonexistent problem Amplifying real problem

Disclaiming an ability

Downplaying an ability

Stating deficit due to false cause rather than true etiology

Shows crudely estimated fraction of ability

Gets a close, but not exact, answer

Sprinkles errors throughout performance on graduated scale

Shows confusion and frustration—may give up

Answering quickly, presents first thing on mind

Persists with one response mode regardless of feedback

No consistent pattern of errors

“I have ringing in my ear.”

“I’m more forgetful than usual.”

“I can’t smell anything.”

“I can walk only one block.”

Claiming developmental learning diability caused by a vehicular accident

Hand grip scores only 1/2 of ability

“6+6=13; 7×3=22”

Errors on WAIS-R Comp. and Vocab. on initial items

Claims total inability during blindfolded period of TPT testing

Poor on Arith. and Block Design compared to untimed performance

Alternates errors on WCST or Explicit Alternative Testing

Speech Perception Test errors due to deliberate inattention

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

There have been forensic cases in which the adversarial attorneys made available to their clients books and journal articles on deception and distortion . . . . ironically, the clients were detected in their faking by a battery of tests, suggesting a testible hypothesis that even with knowledge of the literature on faking, deceptive persons can nevertheless be identified.

Summary of Suggestive Signs of Faking

Neuropsychological testing lends itself well to deception analysis. Fruitful areas of inquiry are plentiful within a composite battery consistent with an applied model. Tests for cerebral functioning can be combined with personality tests, clinical observation, and cross-validating sources to provide conclusions regarding faking.

The following list presents cross-validated signs suggestive of deception:

Failure on specific measures adapted to assess faking of cerebral impairment (e.g., illusorily difficult tests)
Inconsistency between clinical/test behaviors and known neuropsychological syndromes (i.e., goodness of neurological fit)
Failure to exhibit impaired function outside the context of evaluation
Skill performance changes on parallel testing
Anterograde memory that is better than retrograde memory
Approximate answers in interviews when concurrent testing reveals adequate skills
Neuropsychological test results consistent with statistical rules for detecting malingering
Similar or better performance on easy compared to difficult versions of the same test
Less than accurate performance on forced-choice sensory, recall, and reaction-time tests
No improvement where expected (e.g., absence of learning curve)
Test scores outside of predicted confidence intervals (e.g., actual WAIS-R Full Scale IQ outside the confidence interval predicted by the score on the Shipley)

While not definitive in themselves, these factors are suggestive enough of distorted performance to justify a more intensive investigation of the possibility of deliberate deception.

Clinically-based empirical research in this area is strongly encouraged. Much is unknown concerning the dimensions of faking, under what conditions it most likely will occur, its magnitude and direction, the role of motivation and vested interest in given outcomes by the faker and, importantly, interventions that could reduce deliberate deception while simultaneously offering a reliable and valid evaluation of the forensic client. Practically, a deception analysis could be applied to every forensic examination by integrating measures of faking good and faking bad into the battery of tests employed. Thus, all forensic professionals, not only neuropsychologists and psychologists, who use evaluation findings corrected for deception would benefit from its application. Finally, the proposed model lends itself well to research that will ultimately lead to an empirically-based theory of human deception.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

Earn CE Credit

To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 76 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

About the Authors

Harold V. Hall, PhD, ABPS, is a forensic neuropsychologist and director of The Pacific Institute for the Study of Conflict and Aggression. He is board certified in forensic neuropsychology. He has written 10 books including Detecting Malingering and Deception, Second Edition, which was nominated for the Manfried Guttmacher Award of the American Psychiatric Association.

Jane Thompson, PhD, received her doctoral degree in quantitative psychology from the University of California at Davis in 2004. She is now on the faculty at the University of Hawaii at Hilo, specializing in teaching courses in statistics and methodology.

Joseph G. Poirier, PhD, ABPP, is a clinical psychologist with a specialty in forensic psychology. He is currently in private practice in Maryland, having worked decades for several Maryland agencies that oversee forensic assessments of criminal, juvenile, civil, and domestic matters.

Publisher Robert L. OBlock

4 Types of Terrorists - with Dr. Hamden

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Wed, 12 Mar 2008 23:11:00 +0000

Demo Interview of Dr. Michael Karagiozis about the ...

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Wed, 12 Mar 2008 23:10:00 +0000

This is a demo clip of an interview with CMI instructor Dr. Michael Karagiozis about the American College of Forensic Examiner's Certified Medical Investigator course (offered online and at our national conference).

4 Types of Terrorists - with Dr. Hamden

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Wed, 12 Mar 2008 23:10:00 +0000

4 Types of Terrorists - with Dr. Hamden

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Wed, 12 Mar 2008 23:10:00 +0000

Strategies for Understanding and Assessing Suicide Risk in Psychotherapy

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Tue, 11 Mar 2008 19:18:00 +0000

This 1-credit continuing education opportunity is co-sponsored by the American College of Forensic Examiners International (ACFEI) and the American Psychotherapy Association. ACFEI maintains responsibility for all continuing education accreditations. This article is approved by the following for 1 continuing education credit:

APA provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

The American College of Forensic Examiners International is an NBCC Approved Continuing Education Provider (ACEP) and may offer NBCC approved clock hours for events that meet NBCC requirements. The ACEP solely is responsible for all aspects of the program. Provider #5812.

The American College of Forensic Examiners International is approved by the American Psychological Association to sponsor continuing education for psychologists. ACFEI maintains responsibility for this program and its content.

The American College of Forensic Examiners International is an approved provider of the California Board of Behavioral Sciences, approval PCE 1896. Course meets the qualifications for 1 hour of continuing education credit for MFTs and/or LCSWs as required by the California Board of Behavioral Sciences.

This organization, American College of Forensic Examiners International Approval Number 1052, is approved as a provider for continuing education by the Association of Social Work Boards 400 South Ridge Parkway, Suite B, Culpeper, VA 22701. www.aswb.org. ASWB Approval Period: 9/13/2004 to 9/13/2007. Social workers should contact their regulatory board to determine course approval. Social workers will receive 1 continuing education clock hours in participating in this course.

Suicide is one of the few topics that almost uniformly triggers anxiety and apprehension in clinicians, both novice students and seasoned practitioners (Rudd, 2006). Moreover, the actual assessment and subsequent treatment plans for suicidal clients are perhaps the most challenging clinical endeavors mental health practitioners may face during their careers. Literature shows that this is often the case because one concrete outcome of negligence in this area is a client fatality and resultant liability for the clinician (Jobes, 2006; Jobes & Drozd, 2004; Packman, Marlitt, Bongar, & O’Connor-Pennuto, 2004; Peruzzi & Bongar, 1994). Perhaps this explains one reason why psychotherapists seem to focus on collecting data surrounding lethality and risk factors instead of exploring the narrative story of the suicidal client (Rogers & Soyka, 2004). As Schwartz and Rogers (2004) explain, psychotherapists should realize that although they will be unable to successfully prevent all instances of suicide due to the unpredictability of human nature, clinicians can lessen the number of completed suicides by being able to better identify at-risk populations and common themes of suicidality. However, clinicians should also remember not to omit a thorough exploration of the individual meanings of suicidality for a particular client.

Approximately 71% of psychotherapists report managing at least one client who has attempted suicide, with 28% reporting having had at least one client die by suicide (Rogers, Gueulette, Abbey-Hines, Carney, & Werth, 2001). For psychotherapists, the psychological impact of losing a client by suicide is similar to the stress and trauma that would be experienced in the death of a loved one (Chemtob, Hamada, Bauer, Torigoe, & Kinney, 1988). Therefore, updated information surrounding suicide risk factors, myths, assessment strategies, treatment options, and additional resources are crucial when working with this particularly challenging population.

Information on Suicide Risk Factors

Suicide takes the lives of over 30,000 Americans every year according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Fatal Injury Report, making it the eighth leading cause of death for males and the 19th leading cause of death for females (Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 2006). Overall, in the United States, suicides outnumber homicides 3:2 and take the lives of twice as many persons as HIV/AIDS (CDC, 2006). Over the last century, researchers have tried to produce a set of “risk factors,” which, when identified, would label a client as someone who might take his or her own life (Maris, Berman, & Silverman, 2000). The underlying premise is that if there were a way to predict suicidal behavior, lives would be saved (Maris et al., 2000). Unfortunately, research has not yielded a specific flow chart that all clinicians can follow when working with a suicidal individual. In fact, according to research by Plutchik (1995), 41 factors correlate with the risk of completed suicide. Although no one person could either remember or assess all potential risk factors, below are some of the most common ones discussed in the literature.

First, suicide among young people between the ages of 15 and 24 ranks as the third leading cause of death (National Center for Health Statistics, 2002). This represents 7.9 deaths per 100,000 persons, with a male-to-female ratio of 3:1. Between the ages of 20–24, suicide claims the lives of 12 persons per 100,000, with a male-to-female ratio of 7:1 (National Institute of Mental Health, 2001). Within the last few decades, teen suicides have steadily been on the rise. In fact, in a study conducted of high school age students, as many as 15% have made at least one suicide attempt (King, 1997), with teen girls being particularly vulnerable (Lewinsohn, Rohde, Seeley, & Baldwin, 2001). Teens who suffer from depression and substance abuse are at a higher risk, and both of these factors are on the rise (Gould & Kramer, 2001). Perhaps teens are more at risk due to their lack of financial and social resources, lack of emotional self-control, poorer problem-solving capacity, and lack of mobility (Reynolds & Mazza, 1994).

Currently, the age group considered most at risk contains white males who are over the age of 65 (CDC, 2006). Suicide among the elderly represents 14.6 deaths per 100,000 persons, a highly at-risk age group that is often under-assessed by mental health professionals. Particularly distressing is that 75% of the elderly use a gun of some sort, leaving a significantly reduced margin for failed attempts (Frierson & Melikian, 2002). It has been speculated that at this age, the elderly are struggling with physical and mental depreciation, as well as with the loss of friends and family members, leading to a mild or moderate depression that they may never have experienced before. Therefore, their coping strategies may be inadequate (CDC, 2006; Maris et al., 2000).

Although age is considered one important risk factor to evaluate, gender also provides information regarding the plausibility of a client attempting and/or completing suicide. As stated above, suicide is the eighth leading cause of death for males and the 19th leading cause of death for females (CDC, 2006). Subsequently, there are four male-completed suicides for every one female-completed suicide, but there are three female-attempted suicides for every one male attempt (CDC, 2006). Simply stated, more men complete suicide, while more women attempt it.

In addition to age and gender, people suffering from a mental illness (e.g., DSM diagnosis) are another at-risk group, accounting for an estimated 95% of all completed suicides (Shea, 2002). One of the most reliable predictors of suicidality is current, severe, depressive symptoms. In fact, the risk of suicide in clients with Major Depressive Disorder is approximately 20 times that of the general population (American Association of Suicidality [AAS], 2005). Research shows that seven out of every 100 men and one out of every 100 women who have had clinical depression at some point in their lifetime will go on to complete suicide (AAS, 2005). Although depression is a primary risk factor, a diagnosis of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and severe borderline personality disorder are also considered to put an individual at risk for completing suicide (Maris et al., 2000; Schwartz & Rogers, 2004; Shea, 2002).

It is important to monitor clients with mental illness under a psychiatrist’s care, as well as those currently in psychotherapy. Between 50% to 67% of individuals completing suicide had seen a doctor less than one month prior, between 10%–40% saw a doctor in the week preceding death, and in over half of suicides via overdose, the prescription had been either written, or refilled a week prior to the overdose (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1996). Therefore, clients taking psychotropic medications should be monitored closely. Also, clients who are actively engaging in substance use and abuse are more likely to complete suicide due to the exacerbation of other environmental problems, as well as lowered inhibition when making a suicide attempt (Maris et al., 2000; Westefeld et al., 2000). Moreover, clients who are dependent on substances often have a number of supplementary risk factors for suicide (i.e., depression, engagement in high risk/self-injurious behaviors, or financial problems), which should be assessed by psychotherapists (Jobes, 2006; Shea, 2002).

Clients who are coping with chronic illness or chronic pain may be unable to imagine the possibility of change or progress in their struggle and may look to suicide as a way of absolving themselves of being “stuck” (Reeves, Bowl, Wheeler, & Guthrie, 2004). Moreover, these clients may be psychologically overwhelmed to the point that they can no longer cope with their current suffering, nor find a means of relief from it (Jobes, 2006; Shneidman, 1993; Schwartz & Rogers, 2004). Finally, the three most critical at-risk factors for suicide assessment are the number and severity of previous attempts, a family history of suicide, and current suicidal ideation (Jobes, 2006; Maris et al., 2000; Peruzzi & Bongar, 1994; Rogers & Soyka, 2004). Consequently, research by Packman, Marlitt, Bongar, and O’Connor-Pennuto (2004) found that multiple attempters possessed a greater overall baseline risk, indicating that suicide attempts increase the overall vulnerability for future suicide completion. Moreover, a familial pattern of suicidal behavior is considered an amplifier of risk through genetic and temperament influences and possible behavioral modeling (Packman et al., 2004).

Myths About Suicide and the Psychotherapy Relationship

There are several myths surrounding suicide that may inadvertently influence a clinician’s ability to accurately assess a client’s lethality. Most importantly, individuals in general (and some clinicians, as well) often believe that discussing suicide may directly lead to increased suicide risk. As Schwartz and Singer (2005) point out, clients kill themselves because they decide to, not because it was discussed in a psychotherapy session. In fact, there are data suggesting that psychotherapists rarely explore with their clients past experiences with suicidal thoughts or attempts (Rogers & Soyka, 2004). This clinical pattern may serve the purpose of helping clinicians to “feel better” while unwittingly contaminating the suicide assessment process (Schwartz & Singer, 2005).

Other common misperceptions about suicide are that suicide is an “irrational” act, or that suicidal behaviors are always “impulsive” acts, that children and elderly may be at risk but do not actually complete suicide, and that people who commit suicide usually do not actively seek help beforehand (Peruzzi & Bongar, 1994; Schwartz & Rogers, 2004; Schwartz & Singer, 2005; Wingate, Joiner, Walker, Rudd, & Jobes, 2004). However, a review of 71 completed suicides showed that more than half of the victims communicated their suicidal ideation within 3 months before the fatal attempt (Isometas et al., 1994). A final myth that should be noted is that people whose suicide attempts have failed really were not seriously contemplating suicide. That is, these clients were only looking for sympathy or attention (Segal, 2000). Unfortunately, research has shown that 40% of all suicide victims (i.e., those who completed suicide) made previous attempts or threats, and as the number of attempts increases, so does the likelihood that a future attempt will be fatal (Goldstein, Black, Nasrallah, & Winokur, 1991). In fact, all of the myths described above have been disputed both by clinical reports, as well as empirical research findings. Even though these suicide-related myths abound in American popular culture, it is crucial that clinicians do not succumb to their damaging influence. For various reasons—discomfort with the suicide assessment process, fears of client vulnerability and suicidality, clinician countertransference (perhaps one’s friend or relative attempted or completed suicide)—psychotherapists are at risk of not hearing clients’ calls for help. Clinicians should be aware of the myths outlined above because by increasing their understanding of what is, and is not, linked to suicidality, psychotherapists can remain open and objective during the assessment process (Schwartz & Rogers, 2004).

It is vital that psychotherapists listen intently to what clients mean behind what they say, objectively and empathically, in order to fully engage clients in a thorough suicide assessment (Schwartz & Singer, 2005). Jobes (2006, p. 7) observes that given what we currently know about people who commit suicide, there are “three essential truisms” for clinicians to note:

1) Most suicidal people do not want to end to their biological existence; rather, they want an end to their psychological pain and suffering.

2) Most suicidal people tell others (including mental health professionals) that they are thinking about suicide as a compelling option for coping with their pain.

3) Most suicidal people have psychological problems, social problems, and poor methods for coping with pain—all things that mental health professionals are usually well trained to tackle.

Strategies for Suicide Assessment

Despite the fact that several useful surveys and questionnaires are available to help clinicians evaluate suicide risk, a face-to-face clinician/client interview is thought to be both preferential and necessary to the assessment process (Reeves, Bowl, Wheeler, & Guthrie, 2004). Whether this interview is done from a crisis intervention framework, a cognitive framework, an existential-constructionist framework, or a collaborative framework, a face-to-face thorough assessment remains the only valid method for determining risk (O’Connor, Warby, Raphael, and Vassallo, 2004). The psychotherapy relationship therefore becomes the pivotal pathway for clinicians to access clients’ lethality. In order to accomplish this task, it is the responsibility of the psychotherapist to maintain an awareness of current information on suicide risk assessment practices (Westfeld et al., 2000). In this regard, the crisis interview method utilizing Shea’s validity techniques (2002), the Collaborative Assessment and Management of Suicidality (CAMS) model (Jobes, 2006), and the Aeschi Group’s Guidelines for Clinicians will be examined below.

One of the first things a clinician must be willing to participate in is a self-inventory for the identification of biases regarding suicide as an act. This self-reflection can determine whether an intervention will be a success or a failure (Shea, 2002). Self-exploration is not a static awareness, but on ongoing process (Shea, 2002). Attitudes can range vastly from “suicide is wrong” to “suicide has intrinsic positive worth” (Shea, 2002). Suicide is a difficult topic for discussion, even for the experienced therapist. It is for this reason that the therapist should be aware and keep track of his or her values and ongoing emotional experiences. Counter-transference is one phenomenon the psychotherapist should be continually checking in with, as this can create a power struggle between client and therapist. For example, Maris, Berman, and Silverman posit that suicidal clients can actually be “help-rejecting” as well as engaging in a wide variety of “interpersonally alienating behaviors” (p. 513), which may create negative counter-transference.

There are many schools of thought on how to assess a suicidal individual. One such assessment is the crisis interview wherein the psychotherapist directly asks questions regarding suicidality (e.g., ideation, intent, plan, means of completion). During this process, a helpful hint is to use very specific and concrete wording such as “kill yourself” or “commit suicide” versus general “softer” words such as “stop the pain” (Shea, 2002). The client needs to know that the psychotherapist can handle their thoughts surrounding taking their own life, as many clients do not have anyone else with whom to discuss these confusing thoughts.

Shea (2002) offers several other points to keep in mind when assessing a client’s lethality. First, the slightest hesitancy in a client’s response may suggest that he or she has thought about suicidal ideation (even if they deny it). Next, answers such as “no, not really” when clients are questioned about suicidal ideation usually means there have been at least some suicidal thinking. Clinicians should also try to be as present with the client as possible to pick up on any non-verbal cues he or she may be sending. For this reason, it may be beneficial for clinicians not to take notes (or to do so sparingly) during the suicide assessment, so they may be 100% available to the client during the process. Clinicians should routinely check themselves during the interview, asking “What am I feeling right now?” and “Is there any part of me that doesn’t want to hear the truth right now?” These simple preparations can help guide the techniques the clinician will use when eliciting suicidal intent.

In The Practical Art of Suicide Assessment, Shea (2002) discusses six validity techniques that clinicians can utilize to explore sensitive material with a client. These can be used with a variety of sensitive topics, such as domestic violence, substance abuse, antisocial behavior, sexual abuse, and suicide. The first validity technique, the behavioral incident, is when the clinician asks about concrete behavioral facts. Questions like, “Exactly how many pills did you take?” provide the facts of the incident. The next technique is shame attenuation, which relates to the therapists’ ability to inquire about information without making the client feel shame or guilt. Instead of asking the client, “Do you have a bad temper and tend to pick fights?” the clinician could ask, “Do you find people tend to pick fights with you when you are out trying to have a good time?” Or, “Some people have told me that when they get angry they tend to pick fights, has that happened with you?”

The next technique is designed to help increase the chances the client will be open with sensitive information. Gentle assumption is a technique that proposes that the behavior is already happening. Instead of asking, “Do you drink?” The therapist can ask, “How much do you drink?” In the case of potential suicidality, if the client is severely depressed the clinician may ask, “During the past two weeks how difficult has it been to not think about taking your own life?” This technique helps clients bypass the psychological hurdle of admitting to problem behaviors in the first place.

The technique symptom amplification uses the client’s natural tendency to minimize or downplay quantitative information about problem behaviors. By setting the upper limits of the quantity higher than average during questioning, the client has “room to move” while being more truthful about the actual number. For example, rather than asking, “Have you had thoughts of suicide during the past week?” the therapist could ask, “How many times has the thought of suicide entered your mind during the past week, fifteen or twenty?” This allows the client to ease his or her natural defense mechanisms and avoid confrontation. The question may be particularly effective after a gentle assumption (see above) has already exposed suicidality.

The technique denial of the specific involves asking the client specific questions versus generic or global questions. The rationale is that it is easier to deny a generic question than a specific one. If trying to assess the use of drugs a clinician might ask, “Have you ever tried cocaine?” or, “Have you ever smoked crack?” or, “Have you ever used crystal meth?” or, “Have you ever dropped acid?” rather than, “Do you use illegal drugs?” Regarding suicidality, when assessing a plan after suicidal ideation and/or intent has been revealed, the clinician may ask, “Have you thought about overdosing on your medication?” and, “Have you thought about taking your life by hanging?” and, “Have you considered using a gun to take your life?”

The last validity technique Shea (2002) offers is normalization. By normalizing their problem behavior, the client may not feel as embarrassed or anxious when discussing it. For example, regarding depressive symptoms, the therapist may ask, “Sometimes when people are depressed they will have a decrease in their sex drive . . . has this happened to you?” When assessing suicidality, a therapist might ask, “Many times when people are sad and ‘in the dumps’ as you have described yourself, they say the thought of wanting to die comes into their minds . . . has this thought surfaced for you?” Letting people know they aren’t the only ones to experience the behavior allows them to feel less anxious about it and free to share it with the interviewer.

When completing an assessment of a potentially suicidal client, the clinician must be aware of the most important information needed from the client: mainly, the client’s current level of suicidal ideation, suicidal intentions, whether a plan for action has been considered, and what access the client has for the means of completion (O’Connor et al., 2004; Packman et al., 2004; Schwartz & Rogers, 2004; Shea, 2002; Wingate et al., 2004). As the amount of information from these four areas increases, so does the probability that the client may be truly at risk. For example, if suicidal ideation is present, the clinician should evaluate how often these thoughts are occurring, how long the thoughts have been present, whether or not the thoughts have become more intense over time, and how difficult is it for the client to keep from acting upon these thoughts (Schwartz & Rogers, 2004). Another clinically important area would be to determine whether or not the client has a specific plan to harm him or herself. If a plan exists, the clinician would need to determine how well developed the plan is and whether the client has the means accessible to complete the plan. Not only will this exploration of ideation help to determine the lethality of the client, but it will also provide direct suggestions for setting up a safety plan.

Lethality is a function not only of risk factors, but also of whether or not protective factors are present (Maris et al., 2000). Below are some general guidelines provided by Schwartz and Rogers (2004) that may be helpful in determining the lethality of a client who acknowledges suicidal ideation:

* Low lethality—suicidal ideation is present but intent is denied, client does not have a concrete plan, and has never attempted suicide in the past.
* Moderate lethality—more than one general risk factor for suicide is present, suicidal ideation and intent are present but a clear plan is denied, and the client is motivated to improve his/her psychological state if possible.
* High lethality—several general risk factors for suicide are present, client has verbalized suicidal ideation and intent, has a coherent plan to harm him or herself, and reports access to resources needed to complete the plan.
* Very high lethality—client verbalizes suicidal ideation and intent, he or she has communicated a well thought out plan with immediate access to resources needed to complete the plan, demonstrates cognitive rigidity and hopelessness for the future, denies any available social support, and has made previous suicide attempts in the past.

Although suicide involves a complex range of behaviors, thoughts, and affective states, the evaluation of concrete suicide markers (i.e., ideation, intent, planning, and means) may increase a clinician’s success in predicting a client’s overall lethality (Schwartz & Rogers, 2004; Shea, 2002). However, as O’Connor et al. (2004) state, it is important to realize that “every clinician lives with the knowledge that even with our best efforts and exemplary care, there will still be some suicide deaths” (p. 359).

Another assessment approach that has been gaining popularity is an inclusive or “team-building” approach called the Collaborative Assessment and Management of Suicidality (CAMS), created from the research of David Jobes and associates. The main focus and uniqueness of this assessment model is that it targets the client’s subjective suicidality as the central clinical problem, independent of objective diagnosis (Jobes, 2006). In addition, by utilizing the Suicide Status Form (SSF), both the clinician and client develop a shared understanding of the client’s suicidality by rating the client’s current psychological pain, press (stress), perturbation (agitation), hopelessness, and poor self-regard (self-hate) (Jobes, 2006; Jobes & Drozd, 2004). With the CAMS model, even the traditional face-to-face seating is changed once suicide is mentioned. The clinician asks for permission to sit side-by-side the client while filling out the SSF in order to facilitate a more collaborative feeling (Jobes, 2006; Jobes & Drozd, 2004).

In addition to ranking risk-related characteristics, the CAMS model also helps the client to identify reasons for living as well as reasons for dying. In doing this, the clinician receives a glimpse at some of the protective factors that have kept the client from taking his or her life up to this point. As Jobes & Drozd (2004) profess, it is our job as clinicians to help suicidal individuals find alternative ways of coping with the unbearable pain and stress in their lives in order to alleviate suicide as a viable option. Finding a common ground and being able to agree on mutual goals increases collaboration immensely (Ellis, 2004).

The CAMS model incorporates its own documentation throughout each of the stages. In this model, the SSF has 4 sections:

Section A: This initial section is completed collaboratively in order to extract a true understanding of the meaning the world has for the client currently.

Section B: This section is completed by the clinician who asks specific questions regarding plan, preparation, rehearsal, history of suicidality, and so on.

Section C: This section is completed collaboratively and explicitly states what the outpatient treatment plan will be.

Section D: This section is completed by the clinician post-session and includes a mental status exam, preliminary diagnosis, and the client’s overall suicide risk level. Also, this section provides a place for the clinicians to jot down any additional information not otherwise covered in sections A-D.

There is a place at the bottom of each section for the client and clinician’s signature and date. This aspect of the model also reinforces collaboration during the assessment process, because the information collected is reviewed and agreed to by both clinician and client. This same process would be completed each session until there were three consecutive sessions without suicidal ideations (Jobes, 2006). As Jobes (2006) states, “I truly believe that through collaboration all things are possible, not the least of which is coaxing a life to be meaningfully lived back from the jaws of suicidal death” (p. 137)

By Michelle E. Toth, MA; Robert C. Schwartz, PhD; and Sandy T. Kurka, MA

Pharmacotherapy of Combat-stress-related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Tue, 11 Mar 2008 19:17:00 +0000

ANNALS Winter 2007 www.americanpsychotherapy.com

This 1-credit continuing education opportunity is co-sponsored by the American College of Forensic Examiners International (ACFEI) and the American Psychotherapy Association. ACFEI maintains responsibility for all continuing education accreditations. This article is approved by the following for 1 continuing education credit:

APA provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

The American College of Forensic Examiners International is approved by the American Psychological Association to sponsor continuing education for psychologists. ACFEI maintains responsibility for this program and its content.

The American College of Forensic Examiners International is accredited by the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education to provide continuing medical education for physicians. This activity has been planned and implemented in accordance with the Essential Areas and Policies of the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME). The American College of Forensic Examiners International designates this educational activity for a maximum of 1 hour AMA PRA Category 1 Credits™.. Physicians should only claim credit commensurate with the extent of their participation in the activity.

By Harpriya A. (Sonya) Bhagar, MBBS and Alan D. Schmetzer, MD, Fellow of the American Psychotherapy Association, and Master Therapist

A number of veterans from Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) are returning home with signs of combat-stress-related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). In a recent study, 16.6% of the soldiers met the screening criteria for PTSD. On average, they showed a significant increase in sick visits, missed workdays, severity of somatic symptoms, and poorer overall health (Hoge et al., 2007). In another study, the youngest age group, 18–24 years, was at greater risk compared with veterans 40 years of age or above. Diagnosis was made early (median of 13 days), and most of them were detected in primary care clinics (Seal et al., 2007).

Upon return from the war zone, veterans frequently report intrusive thoughts, flashbacks, increased vigilance, avoidance of social situations, hyperarousal, and nightmares. Treatment involves integration of mental health, primary care, physical medicine, attention to substance abuse, and vocational services. The mental health portion involves an initial screening of the combat veteran for PTSD and other mental illnesses, followed by a full assessment. Both pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy (individual, couple, and group) are offered for treatment.

From a pharmacological perspective, several studies have found the traditional anti-depressants effective in PTSD. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), like sertraline (Zoloft®), paroxetine (Paxil®), and fluoxetine (Prozac®), have been studied extensively for PTSD, and sertraline and paroxetine have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration for PTSD. SSRIs have been found to be effective both in short-term trials and long-term maintenance treatment for relapse prevention (Asnis et al., 2004). However, earlier studies have focused mainly on PTSD secondary to interpersonal trauma in a civilian setting. In a multicenter study, venlafaxine extended release (Effexor XR®), a serotonin norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor, was found to improve both the re-experiencing and the avoidance symptoms of PTSD, but not hyperarousal. The drug was effective and well tolerated in both short-term and continuation treatment of PTSD (Davidson et al., 2006). In a small study, mirtazapine (Remeron) was found to be effective in both short-term and continuation treatment of combat-stress-related PTSD without any serious side effects (Kim et al., 2005). In addition, sedation from mirtazapine can even prove beneficial in improving sleep in PTSD. In a randomized trial comparing phenelzine (a monoamine oxidase inhibitor) and imipramine (a tricyclic antidepressant), both significantly reduced combat stress related PTSD symptoms (Kosten et al., 1991). Benzodiazepines are used in PTSD for panic attacks or anxiety states. They provide temporary relief but run the risk of tolerance and addiction.

Veterans with PTSD find it hard both to fall asleep and to maintain sleep due to hyperarousal and vivid nightmares related to combat. Significant others often report that patients scream in their sleep and may even wake up soaked in sweat. Prasozin and clonidine both decrease the central nervous system’s noradrenergic activity. They have been found to be effective in decreasing hyperarousal symptoms and improving sleep (Boehnlein, 2007). Other drugs used for sleep are the benzodiazepine class of drugs, like temazepam, and non-benzodiazepines, like zolpidem (Ambien™) and ezopiclone (Lunesta™). However, caution must be taken regarding the habit-forming potential of these drugs (Bhagar and Schmetzer, 2006).

The presence of psychotic symptoms in PTSD can further complicate the clinical picture. In one study, 20% of the 91 males with combat-stress-related PTSD were found to be suffering from hallucinations and delusions, and hyperarousal was positively associated with the occurrence of psychotic symptoms (Kastelan, 2007). In a small study, augmentation of SSRI with olanzapine (Zyprexa), an atypical antipsychotic, was effective in treating SSRI-resistant combat-related PTSD symptoms, especially sleep (Stein, 2002). In another study, monotherapy with typical or atypical antipsychotics, reduced both PTSD and psychotic symptoms, and antipsychotics seemed to offer another approach to treat the psychotic subtype of combat–related PTSD resistant to previous antidepressant therapy (Pivac, 2006).

Overall, PTSD pharmacotherapy involves several drugs based on our experience with PTSD in general, but well-designed studies are needed to establish treatment guidelines specifically for combat-stress-related PTSD.

References

Asnis, G. M., Kohn, S. R., Henderson, M., & Brown, N. L. (2004). SSRIs versus non-SSRIs in post traumatic stress disorder: an update with recommendations. Drugs, 64(4), 383–404.

Bhagar, H. A., & Schmetzer, A. D. (2006). The newest medicines for sleep. Annals of American Psychotherapy Association, 9(2), 25–26.

Boehnlein, J. K., & Kinzie, J. D. (2007). Pharmacologic reduction of CNS noradrenergic activity in PTSD: The case for clonidine and prazosin. Journal of Psychiatric Practice, 13(2), 72–78.

Davidson, J., Baldwin D., Stein, D.J., Kuper, E., Benattia, I., Ahmed, S., et al. (2006). Treatment of post traumatic stress disorder with venlafaxine extended release: a 6-month randomized controlled trial. Archives of General Psychiatry, 63(10), 1158–1165.

Hoge, C. W., Terhakopian, A., Castro, C. A., Messer, S. C., & Engel, C. C. (2007). Association of post traumatic stress disorder with somatic symptoms, health care visits, and absenteeism among Iraq war veterans. American Journal of Psychiatry,164(1), 150–153.

Kastelan, A., Franciskovi,? T., Moro, L., Roncevic-Grzeta, I., Grkovic, J., Jurcan, V., et al. (2007). Psychotic symptoms in combat-related post traumatic stress disorder. Military Medicine, 172(3), 273–277.

Kim, W., Pae, C. U., Chae, J. H., Jun, T. Y., & Bahk, W. M. (2005). The effectiveness of mirtazapine in the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder: A 24-week continuation therapy. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 59(6), 743–747.

Kosten, T. R., Frank, J. B., Dan, E., McDougle, C. J., & Gille, E. L., Jr. (1991). Pharmacotherapy for posttraumatic stress disorder using phenelzine or imipramine. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 179(6), 366–370.

Martényi, F. (2005). [Three paradigms in the treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder]. Neuropsychopharmacol Hung, 7(1), 11–21.

Pivac, N., & Kozari?-Kovaci,? D. (2006). Pharmacotherapy of treatment-resistant combat-related posttraumatic stress disorder with psychotic features. Croatian Medical Journal, 47(3), 440–451.

Seal, K. H., Bertenthal, D., Miner, C. R., Sen, S., & Marmar, C. (2007). Bringing the war back home: mental health disorders among 103,788 US veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan seen at Department of Veterans Affairs facilities. Archives of Internal Medicine, 167(5), 476–482.

(800) 205-9165 Winter 2007 ANNALS

For Individuals who might view online courses as an easy way to gain credit, online courses are not an easy option for either the students or the instructor—the are, in fact, far from it.”

Earn CE Credit

Take CE questions online at www.americanpsychotherapy.com (click “Online CE”)

Inside the Mind of the Mind Hunter: An Interview with Legendary FBI Agent John Douglas

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Tue, 11 Mar 2008 19:13:00 +0000

You are well known for your exceptional career in criminal profiling. Please tell our readers about your background and how you became a famous FBI profiler.

As a child I watched a popular television show called The FBI starring Efrem Zimbalist Jr. who played the part of Inspector Erskine. This show was on television for 9 years (1965–74) and had 240 episodes based on the work of the Inspector Erskine, who was all business. He didn’t laugh, didn’t love, and didn’t play. He worked every type of case and flew in a private jet to wherever the action was. In truth, this position was non-existent. A FBI agent was, and still is, assigned to 1 of 59 field offices and generally remains in that office unless transferred. Little did I know in 1970 when I joined the FBI, that one day I would actually create a position within the FBI based on Inspector Erskine that would have me traveling throughout the United States and abroad providing on-site consultations in the form of crime analysis and criminal profiling.

As a young FBI agent I enjoyed investigations that included interpersonal violence, cases where the subjects were attempting to avoid prosecution or confinement, and cases where the subjects were fugitives from justice. While the investigations and arrests were fun, I was really interested in learning something about who they were and why they perpetrated their crimes, particularly violent crimes, against innocent people.

Along the way I obtained graduate degrees in educational psychology, guidance and counseling, and adult education. I enrolled in many abnormal and clinical psychology courses, but while I found the classes interesting, they never really addressed the question of motive. Perhaps because the professors teaching those courses had little, if any, experience with the criminal element.

In 1977 when I was promoted and transferred to the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy, I hoped I would learn more about the motives behind criminal behavior. The students (law enforcement officers enrolled in the criminal psychology classes taught at the FBI Academy) and I found the classes entertaining and sometimes humorous, and the instructors received the highest praises each semester from their students. Yet, I still felt there was something missing. None of these instructors had actually gone into prisons and personally asked violent offenders about the specifics of their crimes. I wanted to know about pre-offense behavior, victim selection, the offender’s personal background, their motivation, their post offense behavior, and how they were identified and apply that information to present-day cases.

By the early 1980s, another colleague and I received a federal grant to conduct research on serial murderers. It seemed obvious to me that to learn from the “experts,” it is necessary to speak with them. My personal mantra in all of my books has always been the following:

“To understand the artist, look at the art work.”

“Behavior reflects personality.”

“The crime is a reflection of the offender.”

The above seemed so obvious that I was surprised and somewhat amused when some people and organizations began praising this enlightenment into the criminal mind. However, not everyone praised my ideas. Individuals in mental health, probation and parole, and corrections did not like what I was advocating. In sum, all I said was that anyone in such positions of responsibility must not base their findings and conclusions on an offender’s self-reporting. The interview is only one piece of the puzzle. The criminal case, which includes analyzing the complete crime scene and autopsy photos (in the case of a homicide); the autopsy protocol; and law enforcement preliminary reports must all be reviewed, and how the offenders were apprehended must be determined. Relying on self-reporting alone is a disservice to the criminal justice system and threatens those who want to live and work in a safe community.

A few years ago on a book tour in New Zealand, I spoke before a group of psychologists and psychiatrists at their institution for the criminally insane. Before I began my lecture I could tell by their body language that they had a problem with me. Apparently, they had read some of my books where I criticized making evaluations of an inmate without ever looking at the facts of the case. Their response to me was that by looking at the crime scene photos or reading preliminary police reports they would unfairly pre-judge the patient/inmate. I responded by saying that if you don’t take time to look at those types of case information then they, as mental health professionals, would have no idea to whom they were talking. I told them they cannot and should not rely on self-reporting alone because the bad guys lie. They may not have liked what I said, but that is the truth based on my own experiences.

During the span of your career, the progression of criminal profiling made vast advancements. Can you describe your position as an FBI profiler and your role in implementing the expansion of this field?

In 1977, when I was transferred to the FBI Academy as a criminal psychology instructor, the criminal profiler position did not exist. After first conducting the research and then passing on what I learned in classes, we began to receive cases for analysis. Starting in 1981 I began creating a criminal profiling program within the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit. During the first year we received approximately 54 cases and every subsequent year the caseload expanded. By the time I retired from the FBI in 1995, we were analyzing over 1,000 cases a year. When I retired I had 43 employees in my unit. Only 12 of those employees profiled, so it was very stressful for all of us. We had to deal with life and death situations with very short deadlines.

Even today, there are many people who think the FBI only profiles serial murder cases. In reality, the majority of cases are single homicides, and every type of violent crime has been researched and analyzed by profilers.

Profiling is not the only investigative tool available. For example, there are some cases where profiling an unknown offender would not be suitable because of the high risk-level of the victim. What could possibly still be provided are proactive techniques, research-based probable cause for search warrants, interview and interrogation techniques, prosecution and defense counseling, and possibly expert testimony.

Criminal profiling is a rough line of work. Please describe some of the more difficult aspects of the job.

The very nature of profiling violent crimes makes for a highly stressful job. One must be able to identify with both the subject and victim in order to answer the investigative formula of why + how = who.

It has been my experience that if a profiler uses the defense mechanism of “isolation of affect” they will not be successful. When I train profilers I tell them they must walk in the shoes of both the subject and victim. You have to experience the feelings and emotions of both.

There is danger in this technique. In 1983 I nearly died in Seattle, Washington, while working on the Green River murder case. I was found in my hotel room in a coma caused by a body temperature btween 104 and 107 degrees. After 5 days in a coma I woke up and found myself paralyzed on my left side. I had viral encephalitis and doctors attributed my weakened immune system to the amount of stress I was under. I was later treated for post-traumatic stress disorder.

Please describe the most fascinating case of which you have been a part.

There have been many interesting and personally rewarding cases in my career. Most recently I was able to interview Dennis Rader, the “BTK Strangler” whose murders resurfaced after 30 years. I did the original profile in 1979 and later updated it with my colleagues. I briefly wrote and profiled the BTK Strangler in my book Obsession. When I interviewed Rader he told me he read Obsession and personally critiqued my analysis. He said my analysis was very good, but his identification, arrest, and conviction were not attributed to it. In August 2007, Jossey-Bass will be publishing my book on the BTK and during the 2007 ACFEI National Conference I will be presenting this case along with many others.

What else can attendees expect to learn from your presentation at the 2007 ACFEI National Conference?

Profiling, in the right hands and with good training, can be a viable investigative tool. Those attending the seminar will have a better appreciation and understanding of the overall profiling process. Criminal profiling is not accurately portrayed in the movies and on television. Attendees will learn the process of criminal profiling, and I will demonstrate that criminal investigative analysis is very similar to a physician’s act of diagnosing a patient with an unknown illness or disease. Both the medical doctor and criminal profiler can be wrong at times. We are only as good as the information provided to us for analysis. Unfortunately, not every case investigated is a perfect one, but it is important to recognize the imperfections and consider them in the overall analysis.

ACFEI is made up of members from a wide array of forensic backgrounds. How will your presentation relate to all attendees’ professions?

In the past I’ve spoken to college students, physicians, lawyers, school teachers, nurses, stock brokers, sales personnel, and many other persons from a variety of occupations. At the very least the audience will be entertained in a forensic area with which most are not intimately familiar. Others will find that the seminar will have direct application to their forensic specialty. I hope that everyone attending the seminar will take the information provided, digest it, and then apply it, not only to their work, but also to their lives.

Don’t miss John Douglas’s presentation at the 2007 ACFEI National Conference in Kansas City! For more information visit www.acfei.com or call 800-423-9737. For more information about John Douglas, visit www.johndouglasmindhunter.com.

Interview with Professor Gary W. Dill

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Tue, 11 Mar 2008 19:01:00 +0000

Gary Dill is developing ACFEI's upcoming course, "Homeland Combatives". Below is his interview with ACFEI staff:

Please explain your background and experience in the homeland security arena.

I have experience in the intelligence, military, and law enforcement fields. I initially spent 7 years in the U.S. Marine Corps and U. S. Navy and am a Vietnam veteran. In the 1970s I was a civilian special agent with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), now called NCIS. While serving in that capacity, I dealt with terrorism in Europe and the Phillipine Islands and its threat to our naval facilities overseas. I later worked as an agent with the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation and was chief of police of two cities. As a collateral duty, I served as the training coordinator for the southeast U.S. district of ONI/NIS, training agents in defensive tactics and combat firearms. I was a senior police defensive tactics instructor for the state of Oklahoma CLEET (police training and certification agency), and was also commissioned to upgrade and develop their statewide police defensive tactics program in the 1980’s. I am a certified grandmaster in the martial arts and have being training military, civilians, and law enforcement officers since 1965. I am presently personally teaching special operations combat units of the U.S. Air Force as well as providing exclusive seminars in the area of anti-terrorist empty-hand combatives.

You are the founder and chief instructor of SDS Combat Systems. Please explain your company and the services it provides.

SDS Combat Systems (CS) was developed 3 years ago in order to address the requested needs of U.S. military special operations units in the area of close quarters combat training. It is a division of Self-Defense Systems, International, which is my worldwide martial arts organization. We provide specialized training in non-firearm combatives to military, government, law enforcement, and civilian entities. CS is a no-nonsense, realistic training program based on various martial arts techniques and tactics, but it is not a martial arts program. There are not sport or aesthetics, but the essence of pure hand-to-hand combat for street and battlefield survival.

The CS program is based upon my many years of personal experience in the military and law enforcement, as well as input from various military spec ops personnel. It is stripped down to the bare essentials of what will work in an actual combat or personal defense situation. It is extremely effective, easy to learn (based on natural movements), easy to execute, and has a high retention rate due to the training format.

How did the SDS Combat Systems get started?

Around 3 years ago, an east coast company that specializes in military, government, and private corporate security services and training approached me. They requested I develop a close-quarters combat training program in order to contract my services to their clients. Since then they have set up CS training for Air Force special operations personnel and are in the process of having our program contracted out to various other clients.

Who usually attends the training?

CS training is open-ended. We have trained military as well as law enforcement, government agents, and civilians throughout the years.

The SDS Combat Systems program can be specially modified to meet the needs and mission of each individual client. Can you explain this in more detail?

Each client has their own specific needs in regards to defensive tactics and military combatives. We customize the training to fit their needs. One client, perhaps a police or private security company, may want primarily compliance-based techniques and tactics, which are geared to control the assailant. Another client, such as a military unit, may request more of a combat version, which results in the neutralization or termination of the enemy. Another client may wish to have a combination of both ranges of combat. One program may consist of only a weekend seminar, whereas our Air Force “Phase One” program is a 5-day program. It all depends on the needs and mission of the client. We do anywhere from a 1-day program up to programs that last several days or weeks.

What curriculum is typically covered during training?

Once again it is up to the needs of the client. But a good example is our Air Force 5-day “Phase One” training program. The students train in punching skills (boxing and Jeet Kune Do), working on the focus mitts; open hand strikes; blocking: low level kicks to the foot, leg, and groin; grappling skills (chokes, takedowns, joint locks, bone breaks, neck breaks, ground combat); how to enter and attack the opponent; breakholds; weapons defense; gun disarms; use of the knife and the baton; and improvising weapons from common items (ink pen, belt, blanket. jacket, magazine, etc). Because of the nature of their mission, the Air Force “Phase One” is very aggressive and offensive in nature. We can modify much of the above material for a more defensive mode using compliance techniques.

What is the most enjoyable aspect of your job?

No doubt about it, the most enjoyable part is when I am training our military special operations personnel. These men and women are motivated, in shape, and know they are learning skills that may one day save their lives. Most of them have already served more than one mission in the “sand box.” They give me 100% of their attention and effort. It is extremely satisfying when they come up to me after the course, shake my hand, and personally thank me for the training. I know I am making a difference and contributing to their survival. It is also rewarding to know that perhaps one of the people in your class, either military or civilian, may be on a commercial aircraft or in a federal or private building or may be the one who steps up and stops a terrorist attack because he or she had the personal combat skills to take control of the terrorist and eliminate the threat. It is an amazing feeling to get a message from a former student that the training he received saved his life in combat or even to receive a comment on a course evaluation sheet stating “this is the best training that I have had since I have been in the military.” There is nothing that can match this type of enjoyment. Personal security and national security—that is what it is all about.

Why did you decide to become a member of the CHS program?

I was personally recruited by Dr. Robert O’Block while I was on vacation in Branson, Missouri last July. A mutual acquaintance, Grandmaster Wayne Carmen of Branson, asked me if I would like to meet a friend of his who shares my interest in homeland security and anti-terrorism. That friend was Dr. O’Block. We had a long meeting and I was very impressed with the CHS organization and its mission. Two days later, Dr. O’Block and I met again, and he had the application for CHS membership, and I was honored to join. Since then I have joined the CHS Defensive Tactics Board of Advisors.

I feel it is an obligation for private citizens to become active in contributing to the homeland security of our country. It has given many opportunities to us and now it is time to return our individuals skills to the aid of our country.

How has membership in the program benefited you?

I am a new member and haven’t had the opportunity to meet the other members in the CHS program, but I feel honored to be a member of a national organization that contributes to the security of our country and to be with men and women who share the same interest and passion that I have for homeland security and anti-terrorism. The famous phase from President Kennedy’s inaugural speech, “Ask not what your country can do for you, but what can you do for your country” is in my opinion, the essence of the CHS program.

What steps should CHS members interested in SDS Combat Systems training take to get more information?

I can be contacted personally by telephone at (918) 335-0003, or by email at PDillJKD@aol.com. My mailing address is:

P.O. Box 3396

Bartlesville, Oklahoma 74006

I have a martial arts website at www.JKD-GaryDill.com but have no links to the CS program because it is not available to the general public. No training session is too small or too big for the CS team. I have over a dozen certified instructors, personally trained by me, who, along with me, are available for providing training.

Is there anything else that you would like to add?

I plan on having a long relationship with the CHS program and hope that one day I may be an asset to the organization. I am looking forward to meeting the other members in Kansas City next year. I would also like to thank Dr. O’Block for his assistance and for making me aware of this outstanding organization.

Inside the Mind of the Mind Hunter: an Interview With Legendary Fbi Agent John Douglas

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:57:00 +0000

You are well known for your exceptional career in criminal profiling. Please tell our readers about your background and how you became a famous FBI profiler.

As a child I watched a popular television show called The FBI starring Efrem Zimbalist Jr. who played the part of Inspector Erskine. This show was on television for 9 years (1965–74) and had 240 episodes based on the work of the Inspector Erskine, who was all business. He didn’t laugh, didn’t love, and didn’t play. He worked every type of case and flew in a private jet to wherever the action was. In truth, this position was non-existent. A FBI agent was, and still is, assigned to 1 of 59 field offices and generally remains in that office unless transferred. Little did I know in 1970 when I joined the FBI, that one day I would actually create a position within the FBI based on Inspector Erskine that would have me traveling throughout the United States and abroad providing on-site consultations in the form of crime analysis and criminal profiling.

As a young FBI agent I enjoyed investigations that included interpersonal violence, cases where the subjects were attempting to avoid prosecution or confinement, and cases where the subjects were fugitives from justice. While the investigations and arrests were fun, I was really interested in learning something about who they were and why they perpetrated their crimes, particularly violent crimes, against innocent people.

Along the way I obtained graduate degrees in educational psychology, guidance and counseling, and adult education. I enrolled in many abnormal and clinical psychology courses, but while I found the classes interesting, they never really addressed the question of motive. Perhaps because the professors teaching those courses had little, if any, experience with the criminal element.

In 1977 when I was promoted and transferred to the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy, I hoped I would learn more about the motives behind criminal behavior. The students (law enforcement officers enrolled in the criminal psychology classes taught at the FBI Academy) and I found the classes entertaining and sometimes humorous, and the instructors received the highest praises each semester from their students. Yet, I still felt there was something missing. None of these instructors had actually gone into prisons and personally asked violent offenders about the specifics of their crimes. I wanted to know about pre-offense behavior, victim selection, the offender’s personal background, their motivation, their post offense behavior, and how they were identified and apply that information to present-day cases.

By the early 1980s, another colleague and I received a federal grant to conduct research on serial murderers. It seemed obvious to me that to learn from the “experts,” it is necessary to speak with them. My personal mantra in all of my books has always been the following:

“To understand the artist, look at the art work.”

“Behavior reflects personality.”

“The crime is a reflection of the offender.”

The above seemed so obvious that I was surprised and somewhat amused when some people and organizations began praising this enlightenment into the criminal mind. However, not everyone praised my ideas. Individuals in mental health, probation and parole, and corrections did not like what I was advocating. In sum, all I said was that anyone in such positions of responsibility must not base their findings and conclusions on an offender’s self-reporting. The interview is only one piece of the puzzle. The criminal case, which includes analyzing the complete crime scene and autopsy photos (in the case of a homicide); the autopsy protocol; and law enforcement preliminary reports must all be reviewed, and how the offenders were apprehended must be determined. Relying on self-reporting alone is a disservice to the criminal justice system and threatens those who want to live and work in a safe community.

A few years ago on a book tour in New Zealand, I spoke before a group of psychologists and psychiatrists at their institution for the criminally insane. Before I began my lecture I could tell by their body language that they had a problem with me. Apparently, they had read some of my books where I criticized making evaluations of an inmate without ever looking at the facts of the case. Their response to me was that by looking at the crime scene photos or reading preliminary police reports they would unfairly pre-judge the patient/inmate. I responded by saying that if you don’t take time to look at those types of case information then they, as mental health professionals, would have no idea to whom they were talking. I told them they cannot and should not rely on self-reporting alone because the bad guys lie. They may not have liked what I said, but that is the truth based on my own experiences.

During the span of your career, the progression of criminal profiling made vast advancements. Can you describe your position as an FBI profiler and your role in implementing the expansion of this field?

In 1977, when I was transferred to the FBI Academy as a criminal psychology instructor, the criminal profiler position did not exist. After first conducting the research and then passing on what I learned in classes, we began to receive cases for analysis. Starting in 1981 I began creating a criminal profiling program within the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit. During the first year we received approximately 54 cases and every subsequent year the caseload expanded. By the time I retired from the FBI in 1995, we were analyzing over 1,000 cases a year. When I retired I had 43 employees in my unit. Only 12 of those employees profiled, so it was very stressful for all of us. We had to deal with life and death situations with very short deadlines.

Even today, there are many people who think the FBI only profiles serial murder cases. In reality, the majority of cases are single homicides, and every type of violent crime has been researched and analyzed by profilers.

Profiling is not the only investigative tool available. For example, there are some cases where profiling an unknown offender would not be suitable because of the high risk-level of the victim. What could possibly still be provided are proactive techniques, research-based probable cause for search warrants, interview and interrogation techniques, prosecution and defense counseling, and possibly expert testimony.

Criminal profiling is a rough line of work. Please describe some of the more difficult aspects of the job.

The very nature of profiling violent crimes makes for a highly stressful job. One must be able to identify with both the subject and victim in order to answer the investigative formula of why + how = who.

It has been my experience that if a profiler uses the defense mechanism of “isolation of affect” they will not be successful. When I train profilers I tell them they must walk in the shoes of both the subject and victim. You have to experience the feelings and emotions of both.

There is danger in this technique. In 1983 I nearly died in Seattle, Washington, while working on the Green River murder case. I was found in my hotel room in a coma caused by a body temperature btween 104 and 107 degrees. After 5 days in a coma I woke up and found myself paralyzed on my left side. I had viral encephalitis and doctors attributed my weakened immune system to the amount of stress I was under. I was later treated for post-traumatic stress disorder.

Please describe the most fascinating case of which you have been a part.

There have been many interesting and personally rewarding cases in my career. Most recently I was able to interview Dennis Rader, the “BTK Strangler” whose murders resurfaced after 30 years. I did the original profile in 1979 and later updated it with my colleagues. I briefly wrote and profiled the BTK Strangler in my book Obsession. When I interviewed Rader he told me he read Obsession and personally critiqued my analysis. He said my analysis was very good, but his identification, arrest, and conviction were not attributed to it. In August 2007, Jossey-Bass will be publishing my book on the BTK and during the 2007 ACFEI National Conference I will be presenting this case along with many others.

What else can be learned from your seminars with ACFEI?

Profiling, in the right hands and with good training, can be a viable investigative tool. Those attending the seminar will have a better appreciation and understanding of the overall profiling process. Criminal profiling is not accurately portrayed in the movies and on television. Attendees will learn the process of criminal profiling, and I will demonstrate that criminal investigative analysis is very similar to a physician’s act of diagnosing a patient with an unknown illness or disease. Both the medical doctor and criminal profiler can be wrong at times. We are only as good as the information provided to us for analysis. Unfortunately, not every case investigated is a perfect one, but it is important to recognize the imperfections and consider them in the overall analysis.

ACFEI is made up of members from a wide array of forensic backgrounds. How does your presentation relate to all attendees’ professions?

In the past I’ve spoken to college students, physicians, lawyers, school teachers, nurses, stock brokers, sales personnel, and many other persons from a variety of occupations. At the very least the audience will be entertained in a forensic area with which most are not intimately familiar. Others will find that the seminar will have direct application to their forensic specialty. I hope that everyone attending the seminar will take the information provided, digest it, and then apply it, not only to their work, but also to their lives.

When Women Kill Together

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 21:11:00 +0000

When Women Kill Together

By Katherine Ramsland, PhD, CMI-V

Traditional ideas about female serial killers hold that such offenders are motivated primarily by gain, are less violent than males, are largely reactive rather than initiating, and are not sexually compulsive in their bid to kill. But there are exceptions to every rule, particularly when it comes to stereotypes about serial killers. Some women who repeatedly kill have certainly been predatory and brutal. A few have even been sexually compulsive. There’s no reason to believe that females are immune to an erotic rush from the act of murder, and we’ll examine several cases to illustrate this. Not surprisingly, many turn up in the healthcare industry.

Jane Toppan, a nurse at the end of the nineteenth century, experimented on patients with a mixture of drugs that killed slowly. As they gradually lost consciousness, she would climb into bed to cradle them while they slipped into oblivion. (Schechter 2003). After she went to work for a family, its members began to die, one by one, with gentle Jane by their side. Finally, someone grew suspicious and examined these deaths more closely, leading to Toppan’s arrest. During her examination and trial, Toppan admitted to being aroused by death, which places her squarely in the category of a lust killer. In fact, she said that her sole regret was that she had been stopped so soon, and had she married and had a family, she was certain she would have killed them all as well.

There has been little to no research on female lust killers, in part because it’s an unexpected phenomenon and in part because the cases are rare. However, similar to male lust murder, the female counterpart is often driven by a paraphilia, such as arousal upon viewing a corpse or when rubbing inappropriately against someone. Often, there’s something deviant in their sexual development that consistently triggers arousal and thus feeds a compulsion.

Erotic motivation is even more prevalent among women who kill in partnerships with other women (although this behavior does not show up in all cases). There aren’t many documented examples, but those we have identified involved at least one person with a scheming mind, a degree of psychopathy, and the capacity for getting a thrill from deciding that others should die. In our first case involving two women, it’s not altogether clear who was actually the dominant partner, but violence apparently gave them both a sexual rush.

Catherine May Wood was described by her former husband, Ken Wood, as flighty, overly sensitive, moody, and unpredictable (Cauffiel 1992). She would start something and even pursue it for months, but would then drop it to do something else. He said that he could never count on her to commit and believed that she had never known unconditional love. As a result, he thought, she was both needy and insecure. She surprised him once by admitting that she wondered what it would be like to stab someone. She also felt no maternal affection for their daughter. Bothered by her excessive weight, she nevertheless continued to eat junk food.

The Woods separated in 1986, but not before Ken caught a glimpse of the kinds of friends Cathy was keeping at the nursing home where she worked as a supervisor —the Alpine Manor in Walker, Michigan. Apparently, a clique of lesbians employed there had become party friends, Cathy among them. Her sense of morality, already tenuous, seemed to Ken to have taken a back seat completely.

Cathy told Ken that she was in love with an aide, Gwendolyn Gail Graham, but that some of the things they did together frightened her. Graham had arrived from Texas, and this 22-year-old motorcycle rider had a tough side. Cauffiel (1992) states that people viewed her as masculine. She had been seriously injured several times and she often displayed the scars on her arms, sometimes lying about how she got them. She apparently had severe reactions to what she perceived as abandonment, which included the type of self-mutilation common to people with borderline personality disorder. Several of Graham’s coworkers liked her, but she took up with Cathy and they became lovers. Then they became killing partners.

Alpine Manor, with more than 200 beds, averaged about 40 deaths a year, and thus, six unnatural deaths, especially of “total care” patients who required the most attention, did not stand out. One victim had gangrene, another had Alzheimer’s, and all of them had been expected to die there at some point. It was an easy situation to exploit, especially with 70 staff members covering all the shifts.

According to Wood, whose tale became the primary legal record, it was Graham who first broached the subject of murder. At first Wood claimed she was just a witness, but later admitted to participating. Under interrogation and later at trial, Wood described how they had practiced sexual asphyxia to achieve greater orgasms, so she thought Graham was kidding when she suggested killing a patient. Yet the linked pain and pleasure of their sexual games had become threaded with images of cruelty against others. Just talking about murder, she said, got them both sexually excited. Finally, they decided to do it.

They started killing patients in January 1987 and continued for three months, initially attempting to select victims whose names would be part of a spelling game. The idea occurred while working on a crossword puzzle. They knew that the Alpine Manor recorded the names of patients who had died or were discharged in a book. Just for fun, they wanted to make the first initial of six names in a row, when read down, spell MURDER.

However, it proved too complicated to select the right patients in a way that minimized risk and also spelled the word, so they just selected patients that seemed easy to kill without discovery. Their new motive, said Wood, was to share this secret so they would be bonded “forever.” With each killing, they added one more day to that time period, so that after the third murder they might sign a love letter, “forever and three days.” Wood said she agreed to be an accomplice because she feared losing Graham, who apparently killed to relieve personal tension.

Acting as sentry, Wood watched as Graham attempted to smother elderly women, but some struggled so hard she had to back off. Oddly enough, none registered a complaint, and in fact most of the patients liked these two women. In many respects, they appeared to be good at this job, patient and compassionate.

The first victim to actually die was a woman suffering from Alzheimer’s disease whom both knew would be unable to fight. Her last name began with an “M.” Placing a washcloth over the woman’s nose and mouth, Graham smothered her to death. In the weeks that followed, Graham moved on to another, and then another, leaving a washcloth in the room as her “calling card.” After she failed at killing one of the male patients, they stuck to females, especially those who proved difficult to care for. In one version of the story, they had targeted at least 20 different people, including other aides.

To relive the crimes, Graham took items off the victims, such as jewelry, personal keepsakes, and socks. She and Wood placed these souvenirs at home on a special shelf. In a morbid postscript, they sometimes washed down the bodies as part of the postmortem routine, and handling their deceased victims further excited them.

Then they grew bolder. They told colleagues what they were doing, because the confessions added to their heightened sexual drive, but their accounts were dismissed as sick jokes. No one could believe that a person who entered healthcare would actively kill a patient, let alone become an outright predator. Wood, in particular, was known to lie and play mind games, so few associates took her seriously. Even her shelf of souvenirs impressed no one.

Graham then pressured Wood to take a more active role: she would have to kill one of the patients herself. Wood wasn’t ready for this, or so she later claimed. This angered Graham, who took up with another woman and returned to Texas. From there, she wrote disturbing letters about wanting to smash the faces of babies in her care at another facility. Wood swore her ex-husband to secrecy and confessed everything, admitting they had killed patients because it was fun. Despite his promise to her, Ken felt endangered just by knowing about their activities, so he notified a therapist, and a year later, the police. Wood attempted to deflect their investigation but quickly caved and blamed Graham. (There is some speculation that she set Graham up with this confession to punish her for leaving.)

After an investigation that involved two exhumations (which offered no physical evidence), both women were arrested. Wood turned state’s witness against her former lover for a sentence of 20 to 40 years, with the possibility of parole. Graham, too, testified, but the most telling witness was Graham’s current lover, who admitted that Graham had confessed six murders to her. Others testified in a similar vein.

On September 20, 1989, the jury deliberated for only 6 hours before they rendered a verdict: Graham was convicted of five counts of first-degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. She drew six life sentences, with no possibility of parole. In media accounts, Wood’s role was downplayed to “occasional lookout,” and the case remains controversial today over whether there were more murders, as well as whether there were any murders at all. There is some speculation, especially after a psychological evaluation of Graham, that even if Graham did the killing, Wood had been the mastermind.

In studies of team killers, researchers have found that many couples, no matter what gender, follow a common pattern: Two people meet, feel a strong attraction, and establish an intimate familiarity that allows them to share fantasies—even violent ones. When eroticized, this approval encourages acting out, and if the partners succeed in committing a violent crime without getting caught, they grow bolder. The dominant person is generally charismatic and maintains psychological control—his or her erotic preferences set the tone.

In the case of Graham and Wood, regardless of who actually performed the murders, their fantasies and activities enhanced their sadomasochistic sex. Thus, until they broke up, the “game” became an essential aspect of their pleasure and a way for each to manipulate the other. They egged each other on, but they also exploited the fear of discovery to threaten each other. The fact that killing elderly women also gave them an outlet for issues they both had with their mothers added yet another level of motivation. All in all, murder was both fun and satisfying.

When lust is not the propellant, but females nevertheless kill for camaraderie, there still appears to be an element of thrill with erotic manifestations. They don’t kill specifically for a sexual thrill, but their pact and the actions that sustain it provide the stimulation. We see this phenomenon in a series of murders in Vienna, Austria.

It was again a nurse’s aide who initiated the 6-year spree at Lainz General Hospital. Most of the victims were elderly, many terminally ill. The killing began in 1983, and by the time officials began to investigate, the death toll stood at 49 (Protzman 1989). Reports of the trial turned up in the New York Times.

Waltraud Wagner, 23, had a 77-year-old patient who one day asked for help to end her suffering. Many nurses in elder care units or facilities face such requests. Wagner hesitatingly obliged, overdosing the ailing woman with morphine. Once she accomplished this without being caught, she apparently felt a surge of energy. She soon recruited accomplices from the night shift to engage in this “mercy-killing.” Maria Gruber, 19, and a nursing school dropout, was happy to join. So was Ilene Leidolf, 21. The third recruit was a grandmother, 43-year-old Stephanija Mayer. While the initial idea was to do something beneficial, they soon found pleasure in killing patients who got on their nerves. Many were not even deathly ill; they were just annoying.

Wagner showed the others how to give lethal injections with insulin and tranquilizers, and added a mechanism of her own creation: the “water cure.” This brutal method involved holding a patient’s nose while forcing him or her to drink water, which then filled the lungs and caused an agonizing death. Yet it was virtually undiscoverable as murder, because many elderly patients already had a certain amount of fluid in their lungs.

At first, the nurses killed sporadically, but by 1987 they had escalated and rumors spread that there was a killer on Pavilion 5. Allegedly, Wagner may have killed as many as 75—her own estimate before she withdrew parts of her confession. She then said she had only killed nine, although one of her accomplices placed her victim toll closer to 200.

As they grew bold, the nurses also grew careless. Over drinks one day, they relived one of their latest cases. A doctor overheard them, and he went to the police, who launched an investigation. It took 6 weeks, but all four women were arrested on April 7, 1989. The doctor in charge of their ward, who had been alerted to the killings a year earlier, was suspended.

While Wagner and the others insisted on selfless motives, the jury did not agree. Ultimately, Wagner was convicted of 15 murders, 17 attempted murders, and two counts of assault. She received life in prison. Leidolf, too, got life for five murders, while the other two drew 15 years for manslaughter and several attempted murder charges. This set of relatively light sentences may indicate how difficult it is for society to accept the idea of a predatory female killer—let alone four working together.

Researcher Carol Anne Davis (2001), who wrote about Graham and Wood, states that many female killers do plan their crimes, feeling empowered when they get away with them. Alone, they might be “bad news” in other ways, but engaging a partner willing to go the distance can provide a catalyst for repeat murder. Dominant women intent on violence, she says, tend to be sexually-driven, narcissistic, secretive, and manipulative. Often victimized in some manner during their lives, they turn this around by victimizing others. Having an approving or submissive partner energizes them, perhaps even making them feel invincible. Once caught, they attempt to manipulate the system, still believing in their own power. Sometimes they even succeed, thanks in part to the misperception of violent females fostered by erroneous stereotypes. As more cases emerge, we’ll learn more about this type of crime, and formal studies of female killing teams is clearly in order.

References

Associated Press. (1989, November 3). Ex-nursing home aide gets life term in five patient killings [Electronic Version]. The New York Times.

Cauffiel, L. (1992). Forever and five days. New York: Zebra Books.

Davis, C. (2001) Women who kill. London: Allison & Busby.

Yeomen, B. (1999). Bad girls. Psychology Today, 32(6).

Protzman, F. (1989, April 18). Killing of 49 patients by 4 nurse’s aids stuns the Austrians [Electronic version]. The New York Times.

Schechter, H. (2003). Fatal: The poisonous life of a female serial killer. New York: Pocket Books.

Women killed to assure love, one testifies,” (1989, September 14). Detroit Free Press.

About the Author

Katherine Ramsland, PhD, CMI-V, has published 25 books including The Human Predator: A historical Chronicle of Serial Murder and Forensic Investigation. Dr. Ramsland is an assistant professor of forensic psychology at DeSales University in Pennsylvania. She is a Certified Medical Investigator (CMI-V) and has been a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners since 1999.

Demo Interview of Dr. Michael Karagiozis about the ...

noreply@blogger.com (ACFEI) — Tue, 04 Mar 2008 14:29:00 +0000