So it is then an unlikely source, César Azpilicueta, we refer to touch on what is at heart, the story of Arsenal’s season. In an interview with Sid Lowe for the Guardian the defender said that “a team is constructed with time and automatismos, habits, mechanisms” so as such, progress will occur gradually. That is surely the case with Arsenal.

Of course, there’s the other side of teambuilding which Chelsea in the past certainly have done and that is to buy “special players”; those players who lessen the adjustment period. Arsenal’s youngsters will soon get to that level but considering the signings made in the summer and the relative age of the squad, that is what it is: a new team. Against Everton on Wednesday evening, we saw those habits and patterns still struggling to form into one collective identity.

In the first-half of the 0-0 draw, Everton harassed Arsenal on the ball and marked them tightly to ensure that they never got into their usual passing rhythm. Arsenal stuttered and failed to get away. By the same token, Everton didn’t really threaten either – more on that later – and by the half-time whistle, both sides were separated by only one pass. In the second-half though, Everton relaxed and allowed Arsenal onto them in the hope of profiting from the gaps on the counter-attack, but held firm.

Arsenal looked disjointed, held together by one outstanding individual – Santi Cazorla – but in the end, creativity was stifled as they managed only 11 shots. And although Everton mustered only one more shot, it was at the back, strangely to say of them, that Arsenal looked more of a unit. Of course, this only confirms what Azpilicueta said at the start: that it’s easier to coach synchronicity at the back. Going forward, instinct and understanding cannot be taught; it’s developed over time. When Arsene Wenger committed his five Brits to the club – and later added Theo Walcott too – this is what he had to say: “Technical stability is important and the game we want to play demands a little bit of blind understanding, therefore it is important that we keep the same players together.”

Tactics and formations only go some way to addressing the nuances of balance and understanding. So as such, it might be better, after watching the draw with Everton, that Arsenal adjust their 4-2-3-1 to make it closer to a 4-3-3 because patently, Jack Wilshere is having a bit of trouble at the tip of the midfield. Of course, he’s still a bit rusty having just returned to the side from injury and he has too much attacking potential to not use him from the start. But Wilshere’s movement to get on the ball in the two sixty minutes he has played so far has left a lot to be desired.

Often against Everton, he dropped deep to try and escape his markers. And often, he didn’t receive the ball from the defence because there was no need. Mikel Arteta was there. And in any case, Laurent Koscielny is so good on the ball that what he needs is somebody forward to hit to. In contrast, Aaron Ramsey’s running was more intelligent, bursting forward into spaces behind the Everton midfield – where Jack Wilshere might have been – or moving wide to offer support. Other times, Santi Cazorla would drift into the attacking midfield position because Jack Wilshere wasn’t there. Indeed, Cazorla and Ramsey combined for the best chance in the first-half by creating an overload on the right before Ramsey whipped a cross into the penalty area which Olivier Giroud contrived to miss.

Wilshere’s inability to make an impact is shown by the places where he received the ball, often furrowing for possession deep to try and influence. Ramsey, perhaps due to the benefit of starting deep, often made intelligent runs to evade Everton’s midfield and had a fairly impressive game.

This conundrum, however, is nothing new to Wenger, Cesc Fabregas initially had trouble adjusting to picking up the ball with his back to goal. Wilshere similarly likes to collect the ball with his body to the goal so he can drive at the defence. When Wilshere got the opportunity to do that against Everton, it was because Arsenal had successfully penned The Toffees back in their own half.

Given that Wilshere has only just returned from injury, it was a surprise nevertheless, that he started given Tomas Rosicky recent form in that position. If Rosicky as well wasn’t quite fit, Santi Cazorla is the type of player who can make Arsenal tiki-taka from attacking midfield. But Arsene Wenger understandably didn’t want to upset the balance of his team and fielding Cazorla in a roaming role on the left allows him to field another creative midfielder. However, given the relative newness of the team, perhaps it’s not such a problem for Arsenal to depend on Cazorla for this moment because he’s just that good. (And indeed it’s arguable, without the right balance, Cazorla suffers in the wide role because he’s denied the freedom to roam laterally in the final third. In any case, he still does although it’s not without its risks).

At the end of the season, Arsenal’s position in the Premier League table will be the barometer which people will judge whether the team has made progress or not. But it doesn’t tell you the whole story.

The thing with hope is that it exists even in the most unlikeliest of circumstances. Arsenal faced 23 goal attempts, didn’t force Manuel Neuer to make a save but were still a whisker away from winning the tie. In the end, the siege at the Bayern Munich goal never came so perhaps hope errs on the side of reason.

It was a strange game; Bayern Munich didn’t play like Bayern Munich normally do and Arsenal unlike Arsenal, and that created a dynamic far different to the first leg. In truth, FC Bayern didn’t do much different to how they were set out at the Emirates. They created lots of chances (but missed) usually from the edge of the box and attacked primarily down the right with Philip Lahm and Thomas Müller, while at the end of the match, Arsene Wenger was still able to comment that Bayern Munich “defend very, very well.” But their mentality stank and the Allianz Arena shared that timorousness as soon as Arsenal took the early lead. Arsenal weren’t able to profit considering how well they generally tend to play when the momentum swings their way. And as such, we probably didn’t learn that much from Arsenal last night despite the resilience they showed.

Because this was essentially another one of those “second-halves” that seems to indicate improvement but ultimately, you might say that Arsenal only reacted because they had already “lost” the game. But that would be a little bit harsh because what was different about this 2-0 win – all the more impressive because it was played away at Munich too – was that there was a conspicuous plan. Arsenal defended compactly, dropped deep when was required, remained focus to track their runners and tried to force Bayern to “play through our lines.” That’s not an easy thing to do and it showed that there is life in this group of players and that good coaching can harness the untapped potential that we were unsure of. “Overall we never had real control of this match,” said Bayern Munich coach Juup Heynckes. “And were never able to pass the ball in the calm and controlled manner we are used to.”

The flipside of a near-perfect defensive game was that it would invariably have some sort of effect on the team’s attack but Arsenal’s passing was blunted because of Bayern Munich’s exceptionally marking off the ball. It also confirmed that The Gunners still lack a player who can spot gaps in an opposition defence bar Santi Cazorla (and the speed of Theo Walcott) and he had to be shunted out wide to find creative balance. As such, the onus fell on Aaron Ramsey as the “spare” midfielder who could spring out of the defensive block and instigate forward movements. He did just that when he was involved in creating Arsenal’s opener but after the third minute, Bayern’s midfield made sure he was not to break free into space again.

Arsenal should have made the switch earlier to move Cazorla centrally but it appeared as if Wenger was waiting to ride on the crest of momentum that a late goal would bring and that, hopefully, would spark the winner.  Laurent Koscielny’s header on the 85^th minute didn’t provoke such a reaction but Arsenal were still able to exit with their heads held high. The defence performed magnificently under the inevitable quality that FC Hollywood possess in attack while Lukasz Fabianski not only pull-off some brilliant saves, but was the vocal organiser that the back four needed to defend perform as it did. But a word on Fabiasnki’s shot-stopping: his technique is probably surer than Wojciech Szczesny’s (Wenger frequently compliments that side of his game) and as such, the fumbles and mis-parries that Szczesny’s recent displays has been littered with, were eliminated.

Failure might have been herioc and glorious and some pride restored but ultimately, elimination by a “technicality” leaves many regrets, tracing back to a fortnight ago in London where not conceding was of paramount importance. But it may also go as far back to the summer where the squad was stripped of a “game changer” for the first time Arsene Wenger’s reign. Arsenal had everything else last night.

While Gareth Bale often finds his free-kicks hit the back of the net with pinpoint accuracy, Theo Walcott can sometimes see his shanked horribly off-target. Both practice hard at set-pieces; Theo Walcott more so on his technique than necessarily trying to craft a niche from such shooting opportunities. For Gareth Bale, detail is everything, from the stance to the run up, and he strikes the ball in particular way so that it achieves maximum top spin rather than bend.

From that example, one might dissect a harsh conclusion of the paths of the two careers, but come the North London Derby on Sunday; both will start the match at roughly the same places of their football careers. And at 6pm, one might even overtake the other.

For most people, with both players at 23 years old, Bale is in front. His form has been scintillating for the last two years but never has he played better than he is now. He models his game conspicuously on Cristiano Ronaldo and may soon reach his level. But while Bale admits admiration for the 2008 Ballon d’Or winner, he identified this evolution last season under Harry Redknapp. Indeed, the same can be said of Theo Walcott, who has finally been given his chance to play as a central striker having been destined to play there in his head at least, since he was placed under the wing of Theirry Henry. However, if there is uncertainty about one of the player’s future and excitement about the other’s, it’s because Gareth Bale’s style just fits better in today’s game.

“He is quick and powerful, technically gifted and can strike the ball ferociously with his left foot,” eulogised one piece by Jonathan Wilson for the Guardian, summing up why Bale has provoked such joy among spectators. If the modern game’s fixation on conditioning has a means to an end, it’d be a player like Gareth Bale. Theo Walcott, on the other hand, has bags of pace but wants to play as a poacher, a position which was horribly exposed as a dated craft against the might of Bayern Munich (although Arsene Wenger has still used Walcott up front in a number of high-profile games). To be fair to Walcott, his finishing is probably his other great trait (although, and while I don’t want to encourage comparisons, you wouldn’t say it’s massively superior to Bale who is deadly anywhere from about 45 degrees from the centre of the goal.

The main objective, though, of both players is to play with freedom so that they can be explosive and for that, credit must go to the coaches. Gareth Bale has talked highly about the tactical structure put in place by manager, Andre Villas-Boas, which allows him to cut inside with the security that his position is covered. Tottenham Hotspur work rigorously on shape in training. For Wenger, the deployment of Walcott centrally has been years in the making, stating that by playing a player wide, it allows him to “get used to using the ball in a small space, as the touchline effectively divides the space that’s available to him by two; when you move the same player back to the middle, he breathes more easily and can exploit space better.” That probably explains the apprehension in not using Walcott in a striking position earlier and certainly, in recent months, his dribbling has improved dramatically. There’s still uncertainty about what is Theo Walcott’s best position but given the freedom he’s been allowed by Wenger, has allowed him to turn in more consistent, game-changing performances. (Although the by-product is that it has said to have exposed Bacary Sagna, and perhaps that’s an area Villas-Boas’s side have the upper-hand over Arsenal).

The evolution of the Bale and Walcott ties in nicely too, with my piece two years ago on the contrasting styles of the two players. Because, while comparisons between the pair are always going to persist, they’re actually more similar in role now than they were even last season when both played as wingers. Then, Bale was the traditional touchline hugger and Walcott a modern-day inside forward, attempting to profit from the spaces in between the full-back and the centre-back (something which he still does frequently now).

Freedom has made both players more effective, although for Bale it’s made the bigger difference. Two seasons ago, when I wrote a piece entitled, “Crossing is football’s greatest divide” I concluded that Bale’s style of getting to the byline and getting crosses in is very inefficient and almost out-dated. The statistics concurred, finding that although 27% of all goals scored in 2010/11 came from crosses, only 1.6% of ALL crosses lead to goals. Bale’s return was similar at 2%. Walcott’s, whose style was about timing his runs and then measuring crosses if need be on the other hand, was 53%. A professor, Jan Vecer from the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, has taken this research further and published a paper (which you can download here) highlighting the negative impact crossing has on scoring.

Since the change in style, to a roaming role, Bale has doubled his goalscoring output on each of the last two seasons with 15 goals. His assists have dropped this season, creating only one goal (although he’s setting up much more chances than he did in previous seasons), indicating that he’s become more self-centred with more freedom. However, if Bale read Vecer’s paper today, “Crossing in Soccer has a Strong Negative Impact on Scoring: Evidence from the English Premier League”, it’d give him very sound advice, telling him to give up crossing altogether. Because conversely, despite the change in role, Bale is actually crossing more! Vecer says that teams like Arsenal and Tottenham “have the potential to score one more extra game per match if they reduced open [play] crossing.”

Certainly, that’s not what Theo Walcott’s game is about although circumstances dictate he puts the ball into the box more than he should. Statistically, though, he is doing the right things and with 11 goals and 8 assists in the league, Walcott might actually be the key player when the North London Derby kicks-off at 4pm on Sunday.

At the stroke of half-time, Bayern Munich had the chance to go an unassailable three goals up instead of the 3-1 scoreline it eventually finished. The Germans had possession of the ball at the back before they quickly switched it forward to the on-rushing Philip Lahm. As the full-back picked up the ball, Jack Wilshere stretched his arms out as if to say “how did that happen.” Bayern Munich might have felt the same sense of bewilderment when Mario Mandzukic flashed a header wide from Lahm’s cross.

However, it was the story of Arsenal’s night. And Bayern Munich were generally more clinical when good chances fell their way. It also summed up the gulf in intelligence. Bayern Munich had a plan and understood their game much clearer than Arsenal did. In a way, the selection of Theo Walcott up front typified that. Arsenal are at their best when they bump passes quickly off each other, usually off an inverted pivot, as is the feature of most of their second-half fightbacks – and for a period here, they did just that. But the deployment of Walcott centrally meant they had to find a different way to get through, typically by looking to spring the striker in behind. That proved too difficult against an expert Bayern defence. They nearly got Walcott through three times in the first fifteen minutes and as such; we might have been talking about how well it worked. As it turned out, the best chance Arsenal created from open play was when Olivier Giroud struck from Walcott’s swung cross.

There was an inevitability about it all when Bayern Munich raced to a two-goal lead. First Toni Kroos opened the scoring with an excellent half-volley and then Thomas Müller bundled the ball over the line when Wojciech Szczesny should have held. Arsenal would have been made aware of the enormity of the task ahead and conceding early dealt a massive blow to their plans. The truth is, one day practice could never be enough preparation and whatever structure they had at the start of the season, supposedly the Steve Bould influence, has inexplicably disappeared. Indeed, at times Arsenal looked over-prepared, if you can say that, tried too hard to be switched on and organised, that they forgot to track runners. They became too narrow and especially let the full-backs run free. For Bayern’s third, Mandzukic and Lahm combined again, this time successfully, as Mandzukic forced in a cross from the FC Bayern captain.

The difference in football intelligence was apparent. Bayern Munich didn’t just let Arsenal pass the ball – The Gunners had 55% possession at the end of the game and Per Mertesacker to Mikel Arteta was the most bountiful combination (29 passes). But they made it hard to pass through them, creating a wall of black shirts, each one marking a man and zone. It’s not if Arsenal can’t do this; in the season of 2010/11, when Arsenal beat Barcelona at the Emirates, they defended with a combination of high-pressing and the Dutch principle of “through-marking” which Bayern displayed.

This season, there seems almost an acceptance that Arsenal can’t defend that way. Perhaps because the effect we saw it have on their potency at the start of the season when Arsenal drew twice against Sunderland and Stoke. Perhaps also, like the Brazil team of 1970, they’re a team not “characterised by strong marking,” said the coach Mario Zagallo. So “we brought our team back behind the line of the ball.” But then, Arsene Wenger’s side are not as good an attacking outlet as that team. “It looked like we could come back to 2-2, but unfortunately we conceded another goal,” said Wenger. “The 3-1 was a big blow for the team. From that moment on, you could see that we might even concede one more because we didn’t keep our structure anymore.”

The inclusion of Aaron Ramsey was supposed to give Arsenal that solidity. Instead, for all his efforts, he was outshone by his opposite number Javi Martinez. Ramsey couldn’t assert himself as the spare man in midfield, often outnumbered when he received the ball. In contrast, Martinez, signed for €40m, even had the opportunity to get forward a few times, read play superbly (one interception from a pass by Mertesacker stuck in the mind) and alternated well with Bastian Schweinsteiger. Actually, Ramsey and Martinez’s stats ended up very similar: both made 6 interceptions and their passing accuracy were in the seventies. But as a collective, FC Bayern was far superior.

The movement of goalscorers Thomas Müller and Toni Kroos were superb too although Arsenal gave considerably more time on the ball. Kroos has a curious way of playing which had ITV Sport commentator, Andy Townsend saying he’s “never seen him dominate a game.” What he didn’t see is the way that he gets into positions which allow others to profit, often dropping deep in the first-half to receive possession, or moving to the left side to create an overload and then switching the ball quickly to the other side. Müller describes his style as “ready for action, unorthodox and efficient.” And he also highlighted what sets the top sides apart in the Champions League, something which was the talk in Germany when Borussia Dortmund crashed out of the tournament last season. “In the Bundesliga, you could say we lack concentration sometimes,” says Müller. “But when it is the round of 16 in the Champions League, everyone is really fired up and focused. We know how important these games are, as you don’t have much time to make up for mistakes.”

Arsenal certainly realised that end the end of the game, chasing an equaliser when not conceding was arguably more important. But the tie might have been over before it began because Arsenal hadn’t adequately readied themselves psychologically. When Philip Lahm bypassed Jack Wilshere late in the first-half, it encapsulated their problems. “We sort of questioned ourselves in the first half: ‘Can we really live with it?” he said. They couldn’t. Bayern’s game intelligence was simply too much.

1. Bacary Sagna typifies Arsenal’s defensive performance

The referee had barely put his lips to the whistle when Bacary Sagna punched both arms in the air and let out a cry of both jubilation and relief. Wojciech Szczesny crashed to the floor and held the ball tightly to his chest, knowing that all three points were finally secure. Sunderland had just pelted their 48^th cross into the box and a little less than that many long passes, and Arsenal survived them all. When one of them did get through, however, Arsenal had Szczesny to thank (he also made some crucial punches to go with his saves), some wasteful finishing – and Titus Bramble.

It was one of Arsenal’s most impressive defensive performances to date this season, certainly from a last-ditch perspective with Bacary Sagna typifying the fight. This was an important game for him as recently, his form has come into question. Certainly it’s not been of the same high standards he had set in his last five seasons but then again, watch how Carl Jenkinson coped when deputising during the 1-0 win and then see how much of a bitch it is to play right-back for Arsenal.

With Laurent Koscielny a late withdrawal through injury, Sagna had to slot in at centre-back and was excellent. Last week, we talked about how good he is in the air (despite his 5 ft 9 frame) and against Sunderland, the stats bore that out. He won six out of ten of his aerial challenges, and cleared the ball 15 times, 11 of which were with his head. In the second-half, those skills were increasingly asked to come to the fore but in the first-half, with Sunderland playing wider and on the floor, he could use his knowledge of the full-back position to help Jenkinson.

That’s not to say the whole of the game was a war of attrition. Arsenal were so comfortable in the first-half that they should have scored more, playing some beautiful football in the process. But things started to dissipate when Carl Jenkinson was red-carded and Arsenal were forced increasingly back. But they were still a danger in the second-half, particularly on the break and actually at times even with ten men, passed the ball with relative comfort. However, it proved more difficult to hang on as time passed and Arsenal – and Sunderland too – spurned decent openings.

After the red-card, Aaron Ramsey moved to right-back and performed admirably against the dangerous Stéphane Sessègnon. Arsene Wenger waited until the 87th minute to make his final substitution, when Ignasi Miquel replaced Theo Walcott, as Arsenal were still a threat on the counter-attack and they switched to a 5-3-1. They held firm despite the growing number of balls that were now entering the box and when Szczesny grabbed the ball with the last cross of the game, they knew that they secured the win that they deserved.

2. Selection gets the best out of fantastic three

With the way the early decisions went, on another day Sunderland’s wanton intimidation might have ruffled Arsenal. They pressed Arsenal up the pitch and sometimes left a foot in the challenge longer than necessary. But Arsenal’s response wasn’t just to fight fire with fire – indeed, by 20 minutes; they had committed 7 fouls to Sunderland’s 2 – but they simply upped the pace of their passing where it didn’t look possible. Jack Wilshere was the drive and seemingly acted as the resistor as he rebuffed challenge after challenge and when he was on the ball, Arsenal passed faster and faster. Soon, they were rebounding one-twos off each other and got into full flow.

It was perhaps fitting then, that when Arsenal did score, it featured the three players that look unstoppable at the moment with the ball at their feet: first Jack Wilshere, who took three players out with his burst, then Theo Walcott as he spun and played the ball back and finally Santi Cazorla who applied the finish. It was probably no accident too that the goal featured a combination between the three players because the selection to put them on the same line was to encourage them to get on the ball more. Actually, the line that they played on wasn’t a straight one, it was slanted.

Arsenal’s 4-2-3-1 saw Cazorla on the left, asked to cut in and link-up with the central midfielders thus allowing Walcott the freedom to play high up. At times, it looked like a 4-2-2-2 but Walcott didn’t get in behind as a wide striker might be expected to – probably because the way Arsenal were set up forced the play to become narrow quickly. Instead, he found space when Arsenal quickly switched emphasis from left to right and he could dart inside his full-back. Walcott had two early chances and of course, the effectiveness of the freedom he was given to move was best demonstrated by his pass to set up Santi Cazorla coming in from deep.

In the second-half, Arsenal’s formation didn’t actually change that much despite the red card. Walcott still buzzed about with freedom, as did Cazorla who ended up wherever he felt he could be dangerous. That liberty wasn’t limited to just an attacking capacity, though, because Cazorla also worked hard defensively to cover the gaps. The one blemish to his performance, though, was that he was so wasteful, failing to hit the target with his four other shots. Nevertheless, it was an impressive performance from Arsenal in attack despite the profligacy. What would have been equally encouraging though, was that not only are Arsenal playing beautiful football again, but they are now more difficult to rough up.

3. Olivier Giroud needs to add robustness to his game. Or something like that

Olivier Giroud does a lot of things. He can hold the ball up, combine quickly with his team-mates, win headers, make poacher-like runs towards the near-post and create chances. The problem is, because he can do all of these things, when he’s not doing at least one of these things well, it’s easy to criticise him. Last week, against Stoke, he was better as a creative fulcrum but when the chances were presented to him, he wasn’t greedy enough to take them. He was afforded the same level of opportunities against Sunderland but he was once again the wall which Arsenal bounced passes off. Except this time, they didn’t really stick and the passes of his own were often very ambitious (who’s heard of a striker who attempts four through balls! – though only one was successful). But Giroud deserves a bit of slack; he’s doing a commendable job as the only recognised striker.

4. Arteta still the main man

When Sunderland began the game by pressing Arsenal up the pitch, it looked like they might pose Arsenal familiar problems when they’re closed down high up the pitch. Alfred N’Diaye in particular harassed Mikel Arteta and his discomfort when marked tightly looked like it might rear it’s ugly head. It’s not that Arteta is not able to manoeuvre away from opponents; his close control is superb. But rather, Arsenal’s strategy to push the midfielders up the pitch and isolate the centre-backs so they have more time on the ball, looked like it might be vulnerable. But like the rest of the half, Arsenal grew more comfortable and Arteta once again showed why he’s indispensable to Wenger. Tactically, he was superb, hassling Sunderland in a gritty early period and was a calming presence when the team went down to ten men. He had Aaron Ramsey alongside him this time and the presence of the Welshman even allowed him to get forward and show his effective, and under-used, burst to get away from opponents.

Ramsey may harbour hopes of making Arteta’s position his own in the near future but whatever he brings to the side with his passing (although his tendency to dwell was almost exposed at one point), he’s not ready to replace in stature.

5. Sunderland should just wing-it

Martin O’Neill’s managerial reputation may be a little over hyped. As a player, he was a nippy little winger who played on the right side for Brian Clough’s NottinghamForest. He’s taken on that style as manager where his teams’ have generally focused on wing-play and getting crosses into the box. But he might have to realise that it’s part of his side’s problem as well.

O’Neill has just brought in Danny Graham and the expectation is that he’ll partner Steven Fletcher up front thus giving Sunderland another body to aim crosses at. Except crossing is a highly inefficient strategy – only about 1.7% of all crosses lead to goals. That’s not to say it should be eschewed altogether but as a primary tactic, it’s not to be relied upon. Because it’s effectiveness is determined by a lot of factors: the amount of crosses you put in, the number of players in the box, the quality of the delivery and your teams’ mentality. And sometimes that’s not enough. Sunderland might be better off adding a little dexterity to their play and mixing it up with their crossing game. Indeed, Sessegnon frequently got the better of Nacho Monreal and then Carl Jenkinson that it seems a little bit of a waste that his other team-mates can’t match his skill, and that his only option was to just fling it in. And indeed, after the 48^th cross that Sunderland failed to convert, you’d have expected somebody of Martin O’Neill’s calibre to have recognised that.

1. Arsenal revert back to type to win

In the end, it was probably appropriate that Lukas Podolski scored from a free-kick. Because it was a game in which Arsenal struggled to create chances through their established way of playing, as Stoke defended deep and forced Arsenal to try and find a different way to score – usually through crosses. And it generally did work, with Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, Olivier Giroud and to a lesser extent, Laurent Koscielny, spurning good chances from corners. However, the best chance Arsenal did create in the first-half actually came from a quick, flowing move which started with Giroud dropping deep and then spinning away from his marker wwith a deft touch and ended with Oxlade-Chamberlain’s shot tipped wide.

If chances few and far were created through an extended passing move, it’s not as if Arsenal played badly. It’s true, that for the most part they were a bit ponderous, with Abou Diaby tending to slow down play. But when he got into the mood, like the rest of his Arsenal team-mates, and played like they can with quick give-and-goes and getting runners beyond quickly, some of Arsenal’s play with a joy to watch. It wasn’t quite as scintillating as their performances in the second-halves against both Liverpool and Chelsea where I can’t overstate enough, just how good it was. Put it this way, it’s been a long time since I’ve seen Arsenal ping the ball one-touch accurately to feet like that.

So perhaps it was apt in the end that Lukas Podolski did score because when he and Santi Cazorla both came on, it gave Arsenal something different. Or rather, got them playing the way they normally play. Which is a bit worrying in a sense because it suggests that they’re still very reliant on a core XI of players but make no bones about, this is the way Arsenal must play. They were probably too reliant on wing-play for 60 minutes of the game as Arsene Wenger chose to go with two wingers because he knew Stoke would defend narrow, and as such, their most potent outlet was Theo Walcott on the right. Lukas Podolski, on the other hand, is another striker that Arsenal like to play on the wings but he is different to Walcott in that he’s not so direct. Actually, he fits in imperceptibly to Arsenal’s give-and-go style and his partnership on the left side with Cazorla, Kieran Gibbs and Jack Wilshere looks so potent at the moment.

2. Assured début for Monreal

There could be no greater culture shock for Nacho Monreal than Stoke City for his English league debut and fears whether he could mix it with the physical stuff were allayed when he bloodied Jonathan Walters in an unfortunate clash of heads. Actually, it was probably the type of collision a rookie would make but for everything else, Monreal looked very assured.

He started the game cautiously but grew more confident in the second-half and played in some telling crosses. At £8m, Monreal is not just a back-up; he’s someone in full ownership of his career and will challenge Gibbs for a starting berth from the off. His passing was neat here, which is what you’d expect from a Spaniard (although his first club, Osasuna, were noted for being the most Stoke-like team in La Liga). It’s tactically, though, which he might be a step up for Wenger as he is positionally sound and is built a bit like a centre-back, giving balance to both sides of defence.

3. Improved defensive display (but it was only Stoke)

How can one explain the difference in performances which can see Arsenal defend as securely as they did here and so jittery in their last few matches? Thomas Vermaelen says they have started recent matches cautiously as they chose to sit and examine opponents’ approaches but as we’ve found out, it’s often proved costly in first-halves. At least it would be easier against Stoke, if that’s even possible to say, because everyone knows how they play. And indeed, Wenger admitted that his side prepared mentally for this test which saw them hardly conceded anything from set-pieces. Of course, Stoke City are a different team away than they are at the Britannia Stadium and often, they were pushed so far back by Arsenal that they couldn’t build out with long passes.

If anything, it hints at Arsenal’s problems being psychological, both from a defensive viewpoint and an attacking one. Because going forward, it demands a certain level of understanding and intuition, and defensively, a lack of confidence often pervades the team and its fans. It’s gotten to the point where nervousness has become self-perpetuating, and The Emirates can be a difficult place to play. However on Saturday, the fans were fully behind their team.

From a tactical perspective, Wenger says defensive frailties are a consequence of “our philosophy.” It’s true; attack is a form of Arsenal’s defence, not necessarily in the form of pressing but when the team keeps the ball, it keeps trouble away from their goal. However, it’s when they lose the ball that sometimes Arsenal are not adequately prepared. Often both full-backs push forwards at the same time while Arsenal style anyway, demands resources to be committed to the attack quickly, exposing the backline.

Arsenal’s style is inherently risky but not anymore so than Barcelona, who achieve equilibrium by pressing intensely and strategically while suffocating opponents by religiously keeping the ball. Arsenal’s Champions League opponents, Bayern Munich actually play very similar but while he difference can even be amounted to a 3-5% possession variation or better players, they are probably just better at controlling the nuances of attacking play than Arsenal. Indeed, a study in the 1960’s from the labs of Dynamo Kiev says that “a team that makes errors in no more than 15 to 18% of its acts is unbeatable.” You do this by making the pitch as big as possible when you have the ball and as small as possible when you don’t. Arsenal achieved the latter against Stoke but need to do it more consistently if they are to be more competitive.

4. Arteta still the man

Often managers have their favourites and it’s undeniable that Mikel Arteta is Wenger’s. Arteta represents exactly what Wenger wants from his midfielders tactically: someone that can pass the ball and tackle, and from his position, Arteta is his eye on the pitch. His return meant Aaron Ramsey was the one to miss out who some might say unluckily so. But whatever impressions he might have made with his passing, positionally Ramsey is not as advanced as Arteta. That was shown against Liverpool where, despite completing more than 100 passes in successive league games (Arteta made 105 out of 116 against Stoke) he was a bit late in sensing the danger. That could be shown by his positioning when the two goals were scored. For Suarez’s goal, the ball took an unfortunate nick off him as he rushed back to help out when Thomas Vermalen mis-kicked the cross. And when Henderson broke through, his slide tackle was a bit unnecessary as Arsenal had men around the Liverpool midfielder, but felt he had to because of the desperateness of the situation. (His energy, however, brings an interesting dynamic and might even replicate Mathieu Flamini in importance in time).

What Ramsey might have going for him ahead of Arteta is his passing range and what I liked about him in that role is that he collects the ball in between the centre-backs, forcing them to spread wide. This makes it harder for opponents to press Arsenal. (When Arteta plays, he tends to push up when Arsenal have it at the back and that puts more onus on the centre-backs, especially Per Mertesacker who the opponents want to have the ball). What Arsenal did well, however, against Stoke with Arteta and Diaby, was that both midfielders alternated dropping deep for possession so whatever plans Stoke had getting tight to them on the ball, was made more difficult.

Arteta can also be criticised for being a bit too passive with his passing which is a bit unfair because he made the most final third passes yesterday. Indeed, Arsenal’s style, which is about rebounding quick one-touch passes in the final third like a puck between hockey sticks, gives the impression that it should always be fast and forward moving. What Arteta probably understands is that it’s not always possible and sometimes, moving the ball back and across is equally as effective in creating space.

5. Giroud needs to be more greedy

Might Arsenal rue not bringing in another striker in the transfer window? That’s the impression Olivier Giroud gave at times, especially when he incomprehensibly headed across goal from a corner-kick when he should have tried to score. His touch was graceful at times, dropping deep to link up play or acting as the pivot for the midfielders to play around. But he lacks the goal-scoring instinct or the explosive moment that could make something out of nothing for Arsenal. Alas, Podolski’s goal probably postponed such tedious discussions of needing another striker but to avoid it in the future, Giroud might need to add a greedy streak to his game.

6. Theo Walcott continues to make an impact on the game on a stunning level

That’s it. Granted, his direct contribution to the result was winning a free-kick but he was brilliant throughout on the right of the attack, which might actually be his best position. Nevertheless, the key is seemingly to let him play to his ego, let him take free-kicks and corners however wild they might be. Thierry Henry did the same thing at the start.

7. Sagna’s lack of form exaggerated

His form has come into question recently but Wenger remains forever grateful to Giles Grimandi for bringing Bacary Sagna to his attentions. He can do everything and as such, at 29 years old, Arsenal would be foolish to not offer Sagna a final, big contract. A downturn in performance is probably just a blip – just ask Patrice Evra what they were saying about him this time last season. But Carl Jenkinson must be pushing Sagna close, especially in these types of matches where opponents sit deep and his crossing can come to the fore. But Sagna brings height and tactical understanding, especially when Walcott is granted the freedom that he has been given recently. As such, Sagna’s lack of form might be a little exaggerated: his role in the side has been adjusted slightly recently. Even so, he’s still a very important player to Arsenal.

Normally, nostalgia is evoked by watching a movie, looking at photos or merely by way of conversation. It’s not, however, normal for someone to come back and do exactly the same thing again. That’s how it felt when Thierry Henry returned to Arsenal in the January of 2012 and, against Leeds United in the League Cup, scored in exactly the same way that he had made a trademark.

Starting from a position on the inside-left channel, Henry darted inside to receive a pass from Alex Song. When the ball landed at his feet, the angle was fairly tight; improbable even to some players as defenders encircled him. But Henry, as we learnt in Philippe Auclair’s biography of the French Striker, Thierry Henry: Lonely at the Top, had perfected the art on the training fields of Monaco with then fitness coach, Claude Puel [Page 52]. The open body shape, leaning awkwardly to his left and with almost all of his weight transferred to one foot, and hitting the ball on the bottom-right corner to achieve maximum deviation away from the goalkeeper. When he scored, I gathered this is how it might feel for Napoli fans to see Diego Maradona once more pirouette on the centre-circle. Or for Manchester United fans, seeing Eric Cantona lift his famous collar again.

Of course, that might just be the romantic in me. After all, Henry had played his last game for the club back in 2007, only some four seasons ago. And he came back a year-and-a-half before signing on loan for Arsenal as a Barcelona player with credentials still strong. (The Arsenal fans gave him a rapturous applause when he came on at the Emirates Stadium and then booed him when he touched the ball, somewhat acknowledging the danger he can cause. On an aside note, the first 20 minutes from Barcelona was the most breathtaking and relentless exhibition of football I have ever seen).  But at that age, there was a doubt that he would only be a hologram of the player we remembered; the power, the grace, the athleticism, the absolutefuckingbrilliantness – what of that would remain? Thankfully those fears, how ever much was not already engulfed by excitement, were allayed. Arsène Wenger used him sparingly in only moments he could be absolutely effective (his winner away to Sunderland cannot be overstated) and his goal against Leeds United, as Auclair tells Gunnerblog.com, came “to be the defining image of his relationships with Wenger, the club, and the club’s fans.”

That magical night in January is the somewhat reluctant ending to Lonely at the Top because, while the book predominately charts how the love affair with Arsenal came to be, Henry’s story develops into another, less savoury tangent; that of his image in his own country. Whatever reservations the French public had of Henry’s character – the botched transfer to Real Madrid early on in his career certainly didn’t help (although he quickly recoiled those scepticisms with his ability on the pitch), or his aloofness off it – that all came to a head after the “Hand of Gaul” incident which cost lowly, plucky and thus loveable, Ireland a place in the World Cup. France’s subsequent failure in the tournament and the “shameful” bus strike midway through saw Thierry Henry, among others, come under severe criticism. Here, the book switches to a more serious tone and Auclair provides a wonderful, if precautionary, dissection of modern France and it’s relationship with the national team; one that is not limited to one country it must be said, but France’s seems a bit of a watershed.* One of the reasons why Henry might have been as criticised as he was, was that he was seen as a talisman of a mediocre France side and when the time came “when the foolishness of others gave him the chance of being a hero”, Henry did nothing. (Henry’s place in the selection was previously in doubt anyway, as Raymond Domenech admitted in his memoirs, Tout seul: Souvenirs, that he ended up picking Henry for “emotional reasons” as he couldn’t bear to face the impending uproar from the public – who saw Henry as a talisman and leader of a leaderless group before and after the tournament – were he not taken).

*Auclair’s explanation of France’s tolerance to nationalised citizens and its value of supranationality helps understand why Wenger had traditionally, before now it seems, ignored a player’s passport when making transfers.

If that seems at odds with the image of Henry we have on these shores, it’s because Auclair wants to make you aware of the dichotomy “between the troubled image of Henry in his own country, and his status as a genuine hero for Arsenal fans.” His route to the latter might be less sensational but it is no less straightforward. In fact, much of it is owed to hard work, as Henry when converted back to a striker at Arsenal, would practice his finishing for hours on end to the mockery of his teammates because he was horrible initially, and the faith of his father and coaches in his formative years before Wenger (Gérard Houllier and Jean Tigana at Monaco most well-known). Wenger, though, had the foresight – or hindsight one might even call it, to use him in the position he played as a teenager.

The transformation was metamorphic as it wasn’t entirely natural. Henry needed a lot of convincing at first and there even seemed to be a bit of science about it. That owes much to the analytical mind of Henry as Auclair reveals, especially of his knowledge of the game (the striker says he relished playing against Italian defenders like Alessandro Nesta as his game was too quick for them which helps explain his success against them although conversely, my memory of him was that he struggled against the opposite: of pacy, intelligent anticipatory centre-backs such as William Gallas/Ricardo Carvalho or Ledley King). Henry is also capable of being self-critical – self-aware even – to the point of being obsessive, cosying up to certain journalists to make sure that not only does he survive, but his legacy thrives.

Two months before Henry rejoined Arsenal on loan from New York Red Bulls, his legend was crystalised when a statue was unveiled of him celebrating a fine solo run from his own half before scoring against Tottenham Hotspur in 2002. (The design of which I have a bone to pick because, whilst artistically perfect, it didn’t capture Henry in his usual swagger, his grace: the features that defined him as statues are meant to capture). That might go down as one of Henry’s finest performances but certainly not his defining moment. Indeed, Lonely at the Top fails to underpin one defining moment which might be to Henry’s detriment but certainly not the book’s. There are plenty of great moments; his hat-trick against Liverpool at 2-1 down when Arsenal’s “Invicible” status was yet to be confirmed was probably his best. A personal favourite was his double away at Internazionale to win 5-1 which only further confirmed to me and Arsenal fans of his untouchable status. But he was more than just a goalscorer which is why it’s said “Wenger owes as much to Henry as Henry does to Wenger.” His assist before the assist against Aston Villa (drifting to the right this time, beating two or three defenders before playing a wonderful “banana” pass to Dennis Bergkamp – whose deft touch was just as deadly – found Ashley Cole) best encapsulates how Henry was the system.

As I neared the conclusion of Lonely at the Top, I couldn’t help but feel the real star of the book wasn’t actually Henry but Auclair himself. That’s not meant to be an indictment of Henry’s interestingness, although at first, he doesn’t seem like the most obvious candidate for a biography. Indeed, Auclair prefers to describe this as a “biographical essay”, an apt description of a unique account of Arsenal’s greatest player. It’s a brilliantly written book with great distance between the writer and its subject, and Auclair’s insight genuinely adds to the narrative of Henry’s career when with others, it might get in the way (the use of statistics however, does get tedious at times). At the end of it, Auclair won’t make you love Henry more, but you will certainly have a deeper understanding of him. And as such, love him more because we get to appreciate that what we got wasn’t the Henry after the debacle of South Africa 2010, but 8 years of greatness. When he returned and scored against Leeds, and then the adulation he received; perhaps we are the wisest of all when judging Thierry Henry.

Thierry Henry: Life at the Top by Philipe Auclair is available at all good bookstores. (Actually, “good” is harsh because all bookstores are good. I especially like the ones owned by middle-aged men with ponytails. Which is all of them, really).

- Interesting battle between two key midfielders
- Ramsey’s role in 1-1 draw once again under-appreciated
- Wenger needs his side to find their fluency again if they are to push on

Marouane Fellaini’s stock has risen higher than even his prominent ‘fro. Last season, he was a good player for Everton playing in a box-to-box midfield role; this season, he’s become an important one mainly used as an advanced midfielder, linking up play, not with deft passes or dribbles past opponents – although he’s capable of that, as shown by his goal – but with his head: a half target-man, half midfield-pivot. It’s a strange role and one that Arsenal had to shackle if they were to stop an uncompromising Everton side. They nearly did; the match finished 1-1 and both sides had the potential to win it, if not for the special bit of quality to actually pull it off.

Everton’s play revolves around Fellaini. David Moyes creed is to create lots of 2 v 1 situations down the flanks and Fellaini is the reference point. If the ball is not played up to him, he can still act as the decoy which allows Everton to quickly ping the ball out wide, usually down the left hand-side with Leighton Baines and Steven Pienaar and work into the box from there. As such, stopping Fellaini would go a long way to stopping Everton (although a bigger case could be made for Baines being their most important player, as shown by the way his side’s game suffered when he picked up an injury with 15 minutes to go).

That job would primarily be Mikel Arteta’s (while if Everton went longer, he would pass Fellaini on to one of the centre-backs). It was to be Arteta’s greatest test since being converted into a deep-lying playmaker. However, there is a growing thought that moving Arteta deeper is detrimental to his wider skill-set, yet that notion couldn’t be more misguided. After all, it hasn’t worked too badly for Andrea Pirlo. There is an argument that this team needs his passing higher up the pitch yet last season, he wasn’t Arsenal’s most penetrative midfielder – that was the holding midfielder Alex Song. Rather, Arteta’s role was about giving the team continuity and stability in possession, exactly what he is doing this season. Even so, moving Arteta further forward is not really an option.

Arsène Wenger’s perplexing decision to build a squad this season, with crucial areas under-manned mean Arsenal don’t have another holding midfielder to call upon. “Sometimes you have no possibility because you might only have one player in one position,” said Wenger before the game on his lack of flexibility to rotate. Francis Coquelin is purely not disciplined enough to hold a midfield on his own while the rest of Arsenal’s midfield is more suited to the box-to-box positions: Jack Wilshere Aaron Ramsey and Abou Diaby. Unfortunately, even with that talent at their disposal, they still haven’t got enough from that position this season. Hopefully, Wilshere can push on from his promising performance last night.

Nevertheless, there’s a compelling case to make for Mikel Arteta being main reason for Arsenal’s defensive improvement this season. Because for all the expertise that Steve Bould brings, there needs to be someone who embodies that know-how on the pitch and Arteta has done that. His defensive statistics are some of the best in the Premier League: he’s the sixth-best defensive performer in the Premier League on average, winning nearly 60% of his duels, with 52 tackles and 40 interceptions.

Continuing that theme against Everton last night, Arteta won 4/5 tackles and made 6 interceptions, while also clearing the ball four times. His tussle with Fellaini was engrossing as it was watching two completely contrasting styles. They niggled, fouled each other, and tugged one another’s shirts in the effort to win some sort of space in the midfield battle. (Both players are among the most fouled in the league too not coincidently). Arteta was not scared to put his body in front of the considerable frame of Fellaini and their tussle encapsulated the frantic nature of the fixture. Arteta showed that he had the physicality to play in the position – his tactical nous is already one the best – but due to the attentions of the Belgian midfielder, couldn’t really influence the game enough with his passing.

Marouane Fellaini got his goal when Steven Pienaar won the ball off Arteta following a lax pass from Bacary Sagna (in that sequence leading up to the equaliser, Pienaar actually recovered possession of the ball twice, the first time robbing Aaron Ramsey). Arteta could only watch, dumped to the floor as Sagna’s challenge inadvertently saw the ball squeeze its way to Fellaini and he shot accurately into the bottom corner with his left-foot.

Before that, Arsenal started wondrously, scoring inside the first minute but due to Everton’s pressing, but mainly some poor passing and understanding on their part, Arsenal never really dominated for a discernable period. Indeed, Everton’s equaliser came from a spell in which Arsenal kept the ball for good two-minutes before a certain level of cautiousness to play the killer ball and cockiness from Ramsey, saw them lose it in a dangerous area. That would be the most galling thing for Arsène Wenger to come out of this impotent period; that Arsenal haven’t moved the ball around effectively in the last month-and-a-half. After the draw, he said that the team “missed a little bit of accuracy in our final ball” and while Everton are always difficult opponents, Wenger’s way is set up for the midfield to win the game and they are not doing that at the moment.

Lukas Podolski’s absence meant Arsenal started with Ramsey on the left, four central midfielders in the line-up. The idea was to start as they did last season, where they kept the ball brilliantly for half an hour before Everton eventually threatened. Ramsey was key then and he was again, in a slightly different way this time. He created Arsenal’s goal, a Cesc-y reverse pass to Theo Walcott and made two other chances in the game (both with through-passes, possibly the hardest art in the sport). Yet, in between he showed some parts of his game which make him the maligned figure that he regretfully is.

He was dispossessed before Everton’s goal and overall, was pick-pocketed off the ball six times – the most of any player on the pitch. However, there were other parts of his game that went unnoticed such as the defensive work he did on Baines and Pienaar to limit as much as possible, their threat down that flank. Indeed, and that may partly be down to Walcott’s injury, Wenger switched Ramsey to Arsenal’s left in the second-half, to act as a balancing winger and allow Walcott to play on the counter-attack, almost as the second-striker. Arsenal’s problem, though, was the failure to successfully combine midfield with attack in transitions, especially with Santi Cazorla having a tired game. Ramsey did his part though, and one would hope his stint wide will make him a better user of the ball once he moves back centrally. Wenger once said that by deploying a central player wide, it allows him to “get used to using the ball in a small space, as the touchline effectively divides the space that’s available to him by two; when you move the same player back to the middle, he breathes more easily and can exploit space better.” That’s the aim with Ramsey.

All in all, though, a point was a fair result. Arsenal have a period of kind fixtures coming up which they must perform better. Against Everton, they showed the spirit required against normally troublesome opponents. Now they must hope that they find their technical accuracy consistently again. It’s Arsenal’s one trick but success is making it their one very good trick.

Arsène Wenger’s tactical reputation has been predicated on his insistence on playing the game one way: “his way”. But on Wednesday night against Montpellier, he showed why that perception of him may be a little misguided.

First was the use of Olivier Giroud. At his best, he was the complete striker, delivering two assists, one which was a deft chip over the defence to Lukas Podolski; the other a more routine knock-down. But there was the other side of his game which suggests Arsenal would be foolish to completely rely in Giroud to lead the attack. His distribution was erratic and when he dropped deep, he didn’t always find his team-mate. Wenger says Giroud “still has some work to do” balancing both sides of his game.

However, there is a good reason for Arsenal to stick faith with Giroud to be their focal point. In recent matches, he has been decisive, not necessarily with goals but also with assists (although he has now scored five goals in his last nine matches. His previous eight only yielded one goal). In a sense, Giroud’s goal record is a bit like Thierry Henry’s when he first signed, if you allow me to get carried a *little* away. The Arsenal legend had struck only once in his first twelve league games yet ended up at the end of the season as the team’s top-scorer with seventeen. Giroud may not end up with that many and it’s likely, the goals will be shared but there is scope for a purple patch. And like Henry, who Philippe Auclair chronicled in his biography Thierry Henry: Life at the Top, Wenger had little choice but to build his team’s playing style around his talismanic striker. This version of his Arsenal could thrive playing with Olivier Giroud.

Wenger wants to use Giroud as a “target man”. That may sound like a compromise of his established ideals but it’s not. Because Wenger, contrary to common belief, abhors possession for the sake of it. Rather, a team’s dominance is measured by the chances it creates to the ones it concedes. Thus, the more of the ball Arsenal has, the more chances it can create.

With Giroud pushed higher in the second-half against Montpellier and told to stop furrowing for possession deep, Arsenal proceeded to be more effective. They played the ball forward quicker with runners beyond, something which they fail to do in the first-half and that’s where we must add a caveat comes; Arsenal must find their fluency again with the ball at the back because in recent games it’s undermined their effectiveness. When they play the ball quickly, they’re deadly as Spurs with ten men found out.

“Giroud is good when he plays completely on the offside line,” said Wenger. “Sometimes when he doesn’t get the ball enough he wants to come deep. That is not his game. When he is a target man and uses his link-up play, he is fantastic because he can win in the air, he can score with his feet and can be a complete striker.”

Suddenly Giroud makes a lot of sense: in a side who pass the ball accurately in the final third and a striker who wins most of his duels, it could work really, really well.

Podolski-Cazorla

The other facet of Wenger’s tactical acumen is one which we often take for granted as fluidity. That usually involves making subtle alterations to player’s roles as opposed to wholesale formation changes. It’s less easy to understand this say, when he uses a player typically unsuited to a certain role, such as Aaron Ramsey on the right. But the idea might be one such as what he did against Manchester City this season when Arsenal drew 1-1, where Gervinho, playing up front, was allowed to take up the positions which Ramsey vacated to try and get behind with runs from that side. In Lonely at the Top, Auclair talks about a subtle change he noticed to Arsenal’s layout in one game which he said Ray Parlour’s positioning high up the field made the system look like a skewed 4-3-3. Henry proceeded to him explain why Wenger adapted their shape on that occasion. Likewise, Ray Parlour used to drop back when playing with Marc Overmars on the other side, so the Dutchman could play close to the strikers.

Against Montpellier, we saw Wenger continue on with an experiment which he started against Schalke 04 in the previous Champions League game at the Emirates. In that encounter, Wenger was banned from the touchline and as such, the experiment lasted more than it needed to. In fact, it was a bit of a disaster. The idea was to ask Santi Cazorla and Lukas Podolski to switch positions at various phases of the match, in the hope that it confuses Schalke’s defence and allows the respective players to attack with a degree of unpredictability (see image). It didn’t work because The Germans defended particularly stoutly and Arsenal’s passing just failed on that day.

There was a chance to resurrect that tactic against a Montpellier side lacking in confidence and any attacking bite themselves. Wenger, though, waiting until half-time to apply the change, asking Podolski to get closer to Giroud – who had also been instructed to play higher up the pitch – and when he did, the ever-willing Cazorla would fill in. It was a success this time: Podolski was in the box for the first goal, in which the cross came from his side. And when Podolski scored his goal, Cazorla ensured he back covering.

I’m unsure to what degree you would constitute these movements as instinctive movements; as by-products of Arsenal’s fluid game. But the fact that it didn’t happen besides this 20-25 period hints that it was planned. Indeed, we’ve often seen interchange between Santi Cazorla and Lukas Podolski this season but not necessarily in the same vein. It’s often in-game, through quick passes between each other (and a full-back overlapping). Here, the interchanges seemed triggered by different phases of play. When the ball when out, they’d switch. It’ll be interesting to see how this develops, if indeed it does.

<Click to enlarge>: Podolski’s positioning in the second-half became more central, drifting closer to Olivier Giroud while Santi Cazorla, especially in the period between 60-75 minutes, slanted to the left-hand side.

The About page on this website reads:

The goals, the refereeing decisions and the mistakes, ultimately decide the outcome of the match – that’s the usual argument. However, football is played on the pitch and to assume such solitary factors are the only things that matter, renders the rest of the game useless. Which is an absurd argument. That’s why The Arsenal Column serves to exist; to analyse the pattern of play, the tactics, as well as the individual factors which prove crucial in deciding the final result.

But after Arsenal’s 5-2 win over Tottenham Hotspur (no, not that one), we’re going to ignore our usual little principle. Because this latest edition of the North London Derby – in its 125^th year – was ultimately shaped by a refereeing decision.

It was one, however, which Howard Webb had no choice. Emmanuel Adebayor’s challenge on Santi Cazorla was high and dangerous and as much as Andre Villas-Boas argued that it did not change “the running of the game”, after that it was all Arsenal even with their susceptibility to collapse like England’€™s middle order – against spin.

Before Adebayor’s sending off in the seventeenth minute, the game was tantalisingly poised. In fact, it had all the ingredients of a classic; the nervous energy, the recent history which dictated that taking the lead is the most dangerous thing: Spurs did. (Of the last 19 encounters, the team that has scored first has only won 6 times). Then there was a battle of the systems; Tottenham surprisingly played a 4-4-2 chosen on the backdrop of a win against Hungarian side, Maribor. Arsenal recalled Jack Wilshere and bar Kieran Gibbs, who was out through injury, this was the strongest side Arsenal could put out.

The game started tentatively, with both sides trading possession as if to scrutinise each others’ (slightly damaged) credentials. When Tottenham scored with the first meaningful attempt at goal, it hinted at a vulnerability that has been the hallmark of North London Derbies. Wilshere and Cazorla were just beginning to get on the ball, the former in particular catching the eye with a neat turn to initiate an attack. But then, Adebayor saw the red mist.

It was over as a competitive spectacle after Spurs were reduced to ten-men. The game became embarrassingly one-sided, apart from a spell in which Gareth Bale pulled one back. Not that it mattered. Football is about one-upmanship and revelling in the glory whenever it comes and given the position Arsenal are in, and that the team is still gelling, Wenger would have cared little about facing opponents in the best possible condition. Besides, Arsenal’s attacking play, due to the numerical advantage, was breathtakingly dizzying for the most part and despite Wenger admitting the “confidence was not completely there” in the second-half, it’s a step closer to where they want to be.

The return of the Bakary Sagna-Theo Walcott axis was shown to be Arsenal’s strongest weapon while Wilshere and Cazorla look like they could be a formidable duo. At times, the way the two midfielders supported Olvier Giroud, it looked like the team played a 4-1-4-1 with Mikel Arteta at the base.

It was strange then, in the little time Spurs had two strikers on the field, that they didn’t drop somebody on Arteta. And given that Arsenal have had trouble building from the back against both Fulham and Manchester United, we didn’t see the potentially tantalising tactical battle unfold. Credit to Tottenham (and Villas-Boas), however, for still posing The Gunners questions. The switch to 3-4-2 at half-time was interesting as it gave Spurs a man advantage – however futile it may seem – at the back when playing it out. And when Bale scored a fine individual goal, it seemed like Arsenal’s defensive creakiness might rear its ugly head. But perhaps the point isn’t that there is a discernible weakness at the back but the fault lies because, as Wenger says, they lacked confidence in the second-half. Because as Arsenal’s passing and movement play has regressed in recent games – particularly the latter – so it has exposed the backline. Of course, Tottenham’s opener was avoidable; it came from a puzzling decision by Per Mertesacker to push up neither to play an offside or pre-empt Jermaine Defoe’s movement (except, he tried to read the pass which proved fatal).

That one of Arsenal’s goals came from an individual mistake wasn’t really unexpected. The football statistic website, WhoScored.com, lists “avoiding individual errors” as Arsenal’s biggest weakness. Indeed, and unfortunately I can’t prove the veracity of these claims, but I think it came during the systemised footballing days of Valeriy Lobanovskyi derived from laboratories of Kyiv, which said that “a team that makes errors in no more than 15 to 18% of its acts is unbeatable.” They also stipulated, however, that you can’t control mistakes and refereeing decisions so as such; football is centred on minimising errors through a style which makes the pitch as large as possible when in possession and small as possible, without the ball.

This season, Arsenal have chosen, not to press, but to drop back in their own half for the most part and to try and deny opponents space in front of the back four. It’s their way of minimising errors: Brazil’s fabled 1970 team did the same thing. “We played as a block, compact,” said coach Mario Zagallo. “Leaving only Tostao up field. Jairzinho, Pele, Rivelino, all tracked back to join Gerson and Clodoaldo in the midfield. I’m happy to see the team in terms of 4-5-1. We brought our team back behind the line of the ball….Our team was not characterised by strong marking.” (The Blizzard, Issue Three).

Previously, you might have said the same thing about Arsenal. That pressing up the pitch was too high a demand for such a young team and as a result, it left copious amount of space behind the midfield. When Tottenham scored their opener, it happened when they committed four players beyond Mikel Arteta and Jack Wilshere. But to talk about defensive misgivings is beside the point if mentioning nothing about Arsenal’s passing. That’s the mechanism in which the team uses to reduce errors – the more they attack, the less they have to defend. And as such, the most important thing to come out of the North London Derby is not just the result but the confidence gained from dismantling quality opponents. I’m sure the referee had a part to play in that but it’s best not to talk about it…