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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="/static/theatlantic/syndication/feeds/atom-to-html.e8fb83e50eaf.xsl" ?><feed xml:lang="en-us" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/"><title>The Atlantic</title><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/" rel="alternate"></link><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/feed/all/" rel="self"></link><id>https://www.theatlantic.com/</id><updated>2026-11-22T14:27:42-05:00</updated><rights>Copyright 2026 by The Atlantic Monthly Group. All Rights Reserved.</rights><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689530</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;If for nothing else, the United Nations’ annual climate gathering can be useful for focusing world leaders’ attention on the fate of the planet for a week or two. During this year’s conference, though, Presidents Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin were instead meeting with one another in China, where they agreed to increase oil production; only one G7 leader, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, showed up in Antalya, Turkey, where the UN conference, known as COP 31, was held.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;When a world leader did appear at the conference, a media scrum would form, Marek Pruszewicz, a former BBC editor who now runs the climate publication&lt;em&gt; Dialogue Earth&lt;/em&gt;, told me. But when the leaders left, reporters seemed to vanish just as quickly. He saw television journalists working amid empty seats and rows of vacant press tables. “It’s just not cutting through,” Pruszewicz said.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The same could be said of the year’s biggest climate fight in the United States, over a permitting-reform bill that the Senate passed on Thursday. Proponents argue that the bill is necessary for clean energy to thrive; opponents see it as a gift to gas companies. If you talk with people involved in this debate, or dip into the corners of social media where the issues are being litigated out loud, you’ll still find vehement arguments about the fate of the planet. But it’s hard to shake the feeling that the world seems to care less about solving this problem than it once did. On Sunday, the COP negotiations collapsed for only the third time in the conference’s 30-year history.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The world’s diplomats spent more than 20 years at these climate negotiations before they agreed to even mention fossil fuels, the dominant driver of global warming, as part of the problem. That happened five years ago, at the UN climate summit in Glasgow, when negotiators agreed not on a “phase out” but on just a “phase down” of the use of coal. The following year, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, dozens of countries pressed for an agreement to “phase down” all fossil fuels; only in 2023, in Dubai, did diplomats commit to the more effervescent idea of a “transitioning away.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The negotiations over the past two weeks in Antalya made those past efforts sound ambitious, even idealistic. During the talks this week, negotiators stripped out all references to fossil fuels and to reducing the world’s dependence on them from a draft agreement. The negotiators also cut references to the historical responsibility of developed countries for causing climate change. Mohamed Adow, the director of Power Shift Africa, a climate-advocacy group, told reporters on Friday that this has been “the worst COP ever.” The negotiations ran into overtime, as negotiators tried to land on an agreement that could gain the necessary consensus to pass, but on Sunday, they admitted that they had failed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The signature proposal, set by the host nation at the conference’s outset, was to set a goal of increasing the proportion of electrification of the world’s energy consumption from 23 percent, where it is now, to 35 percent by 2035. This shift is seen as important for eventually lowering carbon emissions, by switching out internal-combusion cars and oil heaters with electric alternatives, which can be more efficient even if their electricity comes from power plants burning fossil fuels. Reaching “35 by 35” would not be easy—it would require a more than fourfold speedup in the pace of electrification—but hitting that goal still wouldn’t keep the atmosphere from warming 2 or more degrees Celsius from the baseline before the Industrial Revolution. That amounts to “catastrophic global warming,” Johan Rockström, the director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, told me from Antalya last week. The electrification goal, he said, was, to begin with, a “minor and insufficient consolation.” Ultimately, the negotiations broke down in part over the question of whether the agreement would mention fossil fuels at all.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some environmentalists worry that Congress, too, is too willing to ignore the problem of fossil fuels’ future. The bipartisan permitting bill, which will now head to the House, would rewrite bedrock environmental laws to speed up the build-out of transmission lines and new sources of clean energy. But these laws would also make it easier to build all sorts of infrastructure, including (opponents point out) gas pipelines, data centers, and ICE-detention centers, as well as (proponents note) ecological-restoration projects.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Like COP’s organizers, the architects of this bill see it as a practical measure that will continue advancing climate goals. One of its sponsors is Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, who has been one of the most consistent advocates for climate policy in Congress. The bill’s supporters argue that it clears the way for clean energy to continue its takeover, even if, in the short term, the bill also helps the fossil-fuel industry. (Opponents see fossil-fuel companies as better positioned to take advantage of any new build-out.) Some former Biden-administration staffers believe that the bill could fix a problem they ran into with their signature climate legislation: They made it easier to build solar and wind farms, but not easier to build the power lines to connect them to anything. No one thinks that the bill does enough, on its own, to dramatically change the trajectory of U.S. emissions; people on both sides of the argument fear a future in which the status quo sticks.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Climate scientists are taking encouragement where they can. If the biggest climate fights of 2027 will be focused on limited “practical” questions, then so will the clearest advances: The use of solar- and other renewable-energy sources is growing. So is the adoption of EVs. Both are happening far faster in many other countries than they are in the United States. Still, the reminders about the costs of continued warming were hard to miss this year: the glacier collapse in Nepal that swept away more than 1,500 people. The summer heat wave in Europe that killed some 50,000 more. The El Niño in an already overheated Pacific Ocean that’s spinning out droughts and floods around the world. Climate scientists say the goal of keeping warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius will inevitably be surpassed; the latest report by the World Meteorological Organization found that global mean temperatures from January to September were 1.47 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. Celeste Saulo, the WMO secretary general, told reporters last week that the past dozen years have been the warmest on record, and the past four, including 2026, were the warmest of those. “There is no end in sight,” she said.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The question has moved to how bad the “overshoot” period will be and what can be done to minimize the damage and avoid tipping points. “That includes your large ice sheets melting, glaciers melting,” Rachel Cleetus, the climate-program director at the Union of Concerned Scientists, told me. “Once that happens, you can’t bring them back.” The mood going into COP was “pretty somber,” she said, in a year when climate disasters have piled up and fossil-fuel companies reported record profits. She had left for Antalya from Boston amid fall temperatures in the 70s Fahrenheit. By the time the COP talks ended with little to show, most everyone had gone home, and the mood was grim.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Joshua Partlow</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/joshua-partlow/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/YZbUMPP_c7NnhVd3vjlbZAw0h58=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_20_Climate_Action_Gets_Practical_Josh_Partlow/original.jpg"><media:credit>Metin Aktas / Anadolu / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The World’s Biggest Climate Conference Just Fell Apart</title><published>2026-11-22T10:47:38-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-22T14:23:04-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Delegates at the annual UN climate summit failed to reach an agreement for the first time in almost 20 years.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/science/2026/11/cop31/689530/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689528</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;You were my second father.&lt;br&gt;
You found dirt in your shoe and thanked it.&lt;br&gt;
You talked in affirmations so we went to parties underdressed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Mami sent a video of you once, thumping a tambora,&lt;br&gt;
And it got me through two weeks on the other side of Earth.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That’s you driving five hours. With you I never took the bus alone.&lt;br&gt;
You bought a newsboy hat to look like Juan Luis Guerra one spring,&lt;br&gt;
And when the bro made so much fun of you at an Einstein Bros. Bagels,&lt;br&gt;
You ruffled, stood up, and threw it in the trash.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;My greetings passed through you and became songs.&lt;br&gt;
Kitchen counters feared you’d turn them into salsa beats.&lt;br&gt;
You got the water during every movie; no one was lonely on your watch.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The word for it is&lt;em&gt; stepfather&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br&gt;
But who’s to say if up or down.&lt;br&gt;
In Spanish it means “hangnail” too,&lt;br&gt;
But you know Mami, too proud,&lt;br&gt;
Won’t bite no nail about it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Now that you’re elsewhere,&lt;br&gt;
Though here in New York,&lt;br&gt;
I prefer to think of you&lt;br&gt;
As my father-on-loan:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Wondering if you bought a new hat for the snowtime,&lt;br&gt;
And if so, well, what lucky years they were,&lt;br&gt;
Your interest in me.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Valerie Trapp</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/valerie-trapp/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/QFMreXa-mRl_brFb_iET9fekz4o=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_20_Poem_Padrastro/original.jpg"><media:credit>Sohrab Hura / Magnum</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Padrastro</title><published>2026-11-22T10:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-22T10:01:56-05:00</updated><summary type="html">A poem</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/2026/11/poem-valerie-trapp-padrastro/689528/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689507</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Subscribe here:  &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-permanent-questions-with-david-brooks/id6803240325"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Apple Podcasts&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt; | &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/6S9fLpWWcHztRbNgM4Y2Y7"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Spotify&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt; | &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLEqQi52_F8ag"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;YouTube&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Throughout history, a familiar pattern has shown itself: Political elites lose touch with the people over whom they rule, and those people rebel in one way or another. But eventually a new kind of elite asserts itself. The rise of Donald Trump as a political force more than a decade ago was part of one such global wave of anti-elite sentiment. If the midterm results signal the end of the Trump era, do they also signal the beginning of the end of our populist moment?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In this episode of &lt;em&gt;The Permanent Questions&lt;/em&gt;, Fareed Zakaria joins David Brooks to discuss the history of liberal democracy and the inevitable reactions against it, why technology makes this reaction different from others, and the ways in which our liberal elite will have to change if they want to own the future.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Q6oFK55fO9E?si=QhEA8UZJwOkHUcRC" title="YouTube video player" width="560"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;The following is a transcript of the episode:&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;David Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; Today on &lt;em&gt;The Permanent Questions&lt;/em&gt; we’re going to talk about a permanent problem. It is that great nations fall when elites get too distanced from the masses and lose popular legitimacy. Here are some examples: The Roman empire in the fifth century, the French monarchy in the 18th century, the Russian aristocracy in the early 20th century, and the shah’s Iran in 1979. There is increasing economic inequality. There’s increasing social inequality.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The elites have grown insular and condescending toward the people. They become self-indulgent and corrupt. The elites break the social contract with the people, and the people withdraw their trust and any sense of legitimacy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It seems to me that the United States and many other societies around the globe have been flirting with this kind of catastrophe for many decades. Millions of people have lost faith in the elites, in institutions, in the future, and in each other. These losses of faith produce populist backlashes, and that’s what we’ve been living through over the past 15 years or so.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Populist leaders have arisen in societies across the world. Nations on nearly every continent have their own version of Donald Trump. But it turns out that the populists can be guilty of all the sins people associate with the old elite. In fact, they can be more corrupt, more incompetent, more morally bankrupt, more out of touch than the people they promised to replace.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;When that happens, the voters want to throw the populace out too, and I believe that’s what happened in the American election of 2026. So the million-dollar questions become: What comes next? Can leaders in either party reform themselves and win back the trust of the people? Can we restore the kind of popular legitimacy that any nation needs to function okay? Most immediately, are we past peak populism? Have the winds shifted so much that a new historical era is possible? And if so, what’s it going to look like?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I’ve asked Fareed Zakaria to join as we wrestle with these questions. Fareed is the host of &lt;em&gt;Fareed Zakaria GPS&lt;/em&gt;, CNN’s global-affairs show. He writes a weekly column in &lt;em&gt;The Washington Post&lt;/em&gt;. He’s the author of many celebrated and influential books, including &lt;em&gt;The Future of Freedom&lt;/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt;The Post-American World&lt;/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt;In Defense of a Liberal Education&lt;/em&gt;, and most recently, &lt;em&gt;Age of Revolutions: Progress and Backlash From 1600 to the Present&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;He’s one of the most profound thinkers in the world today, and so I’m pleased to welcome Fareed Zakaria to this table.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fareed Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; Such a pleasure, David.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; Yes, I’m sure it’s the honor of your life.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; Honestly, to have a conversation with you is a pleasure and an honor.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; You can call me anytime.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So one of the things I loved about your most recent book,&lt;em&gt; The Age of Revolutions&lt;/em&gt;, is that you describe how liberal societies were built in the first place. Some of your examples are the Netherlands and their golden age, the British golden age, America, and some of the others. I thought that might be useful as we think about where we are as liberal societies, and especially where we are in this moment of, I think, rebuilding. Hopefully, an upcoming moment of rebuilding.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;My point of view, as you know, is that this election was so big that we could say, maybe not globally, but in the U.S. at least, not only is Trumpism over, but we’ve passed peak populism.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That’s a bit of an optimistic assumption. Now, you have a more global perspective than I do. Do you agree with that?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; So I think in every way—if you look in the book, every one of these liberal experiments, you tend to see a backlash.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At some point people say, “This is too much change. We’re moving too far away from the traditions, the mooring, the community, the old faith of our fathers.” And you get a backlash. Then the question becomes how society handles that backlash. Does it find a way to rebuild, as you say, or does it end up getting mired in a certain kind of dysfunction? The French Revolution being the best example of it not working out.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I think where we are is still in that backlash to 30 or 40 years of globalization, massive economic and technological change, enormous cultural change—the rise of women, the rise of minorities, immigration being the kind of symbolic aspect of that change.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But I do think you’re right that in America we have now seen something interesting, which is Trump 2.0 was a much more pure implementation of right-wing populism than Trump 1.0. People forget that in the first Trump term, there was a lot of Paul Ryan and Steve Mnuchin and a lot of the old kind of Republican Party still at work. Trump 2 was all populism, and it (a) didn’t work—manufacturing employment is not back in America—and (b) the public didn’t like it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So there is a kind of sense that: &lt;em&gt;Okay, these guys might have been pointing to a problem that was real, but they don’t have the solution&lt;/em&gt;. Now, where that goes, I’m not as certain as you—and I know you’re saying it with optimism—because the ball is in the Democrats’ court. Can they craft a new vision that isn’t just taking advantage of this rejection? If they can’t, I do think there’s still enough life in the idea that we have to reject these open borders, open trade; we gotta look out for the working class.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Populism at some level, particularly right-wing populism, is a kind of politics of nostalgia. It’s saying, “I know the world has been changing so much. I’m going to take you back. I’m going to take you back to when it was all more comfortable.” And that’s still a very powerful appeal.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We still pine for the Garden of Eden. And there are all these politicians, whether it’s in Brexit, whether it’s Marine Le Pen in France, who are promising that. What we have had in America—the big good fortune, if you think of it that way—is that we had a very pure attempt to implement these ideas, and it didn’t work.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; I think that’s a good way to phrase it, because it reminds the Democrats Donald Trump happened for a reason, and they still have to deal with that reason.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But to put my more blindly optimistic spin on things: Whenever I ask people, “What made you who you are?,” it’s always some moment of rupture and repair. Something bad happened; they had to tear down parts of their life, and then they had to rebuild. And I think that’s happened in our personal lives, and I think it happens in national lives.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And now this—I’m a little abashed to be quoting Samuel Huntington to you. Tell me: Let’s make clear who Samuel Huntington was to you. Explain who he was.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; So Samuel Huntington was a professor at Harvard, probably the most influential political scientist of the second half of the 20th century.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;He wrote incredibly important books in almost every field of political science, comparative politics, American politics, international relations. Most famous for his book &lt;em&gt;The Clash of Civilizations&lt;/em&gt;. And he was my academic mentor. He was the chairman of my dissertation committee, but we also had a close personal relationship.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;He was an extraordinary guy. Very proper WASP gentleman, and I was this ethnic Indian immigrant, but somehow we got on amazingly well.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; And now I look back on him with sort of a reverence veering toward awe. Even the books of his I did not like were prescient. So anyway, I bring up Huntington because I think in 1983, when you were probably not yet there, he wrote a book with a very boring title, I think it was called &lt;em&gt;America’s Promise&lt;/em&gt; or—&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;em&gt;American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That was it. And I’m guessing you’re going to quote the last line.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt;What was the last line?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; It’s a great last line. He says, “The critics of America say America is a lie. It is not a lie. It is a disappointment, but it can only be a disappointment because it is [also] a hope.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; The part I cottoned onto—I read it in 2020 during COVID; I’m stuck at home. And at some point in that book, he says, &lt;em&gt;I’ve noticed this weird pattern in American history, that every couple generations&lt;/em&gt;—I don’t know if it’s 60 years, whatever—America goes through what he calls “a moral convulsion.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;People want to burn everything down. The passionate generation comes on the scene. There’s a new form of communications technology. And those moral convulsions are horrific to live through. And he pointed to the American Revolutionary period 1770s; Andrew Jackson 1830s; the 1890s, when we sort of failed at industrialization and then succeeded. The 1960s—people forget how brutal the ’60s were. There were thousands of bombings.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And he says, &lt;em&gt;I don’t know if I believe in this pattern, but if it holds, sometime around the second decade of the 21st century, America will go through another moral convulsion.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I’m sitting there in 2020 surrounded by all that, and I’m thinking, &lt;em&gt;Well done, Professor Huntington.&lt;/em&gt; And the good news is you come out of them. It’s that process of rupture and repair. And so I believe that we had to learn what Trump, what MAGA had to teach us. But I think Democrats have learned a lot of it—not all of them, and some have learned nothing. But on immigration, I think they’ve learned, on the fact that we were ignoring the working class. And so to me, it would be totally normal that we would go through a historical pivot, because we’ve gone through so many.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Jared Diamond wrote a book about international pivots; I think called &lt;em&gt;Upheaval&lt;/em&gt;. So sometimes countries just decline, but as long as countries have vitality, they can come right back, and I think we’re at one of those moments.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; I tend to share your optimism about that, and I’ll tell why it is.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Firstly, as an immigrant, I see the vitality, right? I came to this country because of that vitality. It still has it in spades. Just look at the tech sector. But don’t even just look at the tech sector. I’m struck by how Americans—you know, one of the things I always notice about America is we really wash our dirty laundry in public.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We talk every problem through. But that very act is in a sense not just cathartic, but you’re searching for solutions. And the solutions are many and myriad, and the problem is large and centralized, so you don’t see the solutions, but they bubble up from the bottom. And that’s one of the geniuses of America—this bottom-up vitality, often in smaller communities, that then moves up.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And I think we’re beginning to see that because, as you say, we now know some of the problems, but it’s also because centrally America is a country that is the embodiment of Enlightenment liberalism.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And what is Enlightenment liberalism, at the end of the day? It is that human beings should have the autonomy, the choice, the dignity, and the freedom to live the kind of life that gives them the satisfaction, the happiness, the pursuit of happiness that they want, and that’s a very powerful idea.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At the end of the day, that’s what people want. Yeah, they would like community, and yeah, they would like—but they want it if they can choose it. They don’t want it if it’s forced on them. And the problem with so much of  the illiberal critique of liberalism is ultimately it becomes coercion, because it’s like: Divorces are bad. Okay, agreed. We should have fewer divorces. Okay, agreed. We should put laws in place that make no-fault divorce harder, right? Traditional marriages are good. Great. We should therefore discourage gays from marrying. Wait, why? In other words, it all turns into: &lt;em&gt;Let me tell you how to live your life&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And to me, Enlightenment liberalism has at its core had that Kantian idea that a human being is an end unto himself, not a means to your larger ideological project. You can’t treat him as a pawn in your grand ideological adventure. And that idea will win out in the end. And so at the end of the day, we are going to be a multicultural democracy in this country. We can’t pretend that minorities don’t exist. We can’t pretend that women haven’t realized that they deserve to be first-class citizens. And we’re going to have to find a way to make that work.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; My inner conservative is coming out. So I think the one conservative idea which I think is true is that for liberal institutions which revere choice to work, they have to be based on institutions that are not based on choice.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And I would say your family is sort of not—you didn’t choose what family you were born into. For many people, their faith is not really a matter of choice. Their attachment to their town; it doesn’t feel like a choice. If you’re a Bostonian, you are Boston down to your bones. And I would include your moral order. There has to be a shared moral order that you didn’t choose, that it’s just you share with people around you.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;There’s a historian, George Marsden, who says what gave Martin Luther King’s rhetoric such force was his conviction that right and wrong were woven into the fabric of the universe, that segregation was not just wrong in some times and some places; it was eternally wrong. Slavery is eternally wrong.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And I would say the conservative critique of liberalism was, in many cases, they tried to turn covenantal relationships into voluntary transactional relationships, and the most damaging one was the moral order one, where I would say people got too carried away with liberalism—and I’m a liberal, of course—and therefore they weakened that shared sense of moral order. Without that, I can’t trust you, because we don’t agree on what we ought to do. Without that, I don’t even have my own moral philosophy, because most people can’t come up with their own moral philosophy. So what do you think of that conservative critique of liberalism, and that to be liberals we have to preserve those institutions, mostly faith, family, and flag?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; I 100 percent agree with the conservative critique that you lose something when you do that. I mean, this really began with Nietzsche. Nietzsche pointed out that at the end of the day, if you say God is dead, you have kind of upended the entire universe on which society rested. Walter Lippmann has this great book in the ’20s he writes called &lt;em&gt;A Preface to Morals&lt;/em&gt;, where he says, &lt;em&gt;The central dilemma of modern society is we have lost the certainty that came from faith, family, and community, and we have replaced it with nothing&lt;/em&gt;. And I think it remains the central dilemma.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But here’s the problem: In order to say that you have these things that are not voluntary, not chosen, how do you return to them? Are you going to say that you’re going to force people to attend church? Are you going to say that, again, you’re going to force families to stay together when there are unhappy marriages, when women want to get out?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Are you going to make it more difficult for a woman to be able to separate from a husband and live decently? Those were the mechanisms we used. They were all coercive. They were all ones where you denied the individuality and the dignity of people.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At the end of the day, people want the autonomy and dignity and freedom as individuals. You can try to persuade them that they should try to think about community and family and faith more. You can tell them: &lt;em&gt;Here’s a way to think about what religion got you, and is there a way to substitute for it with some of the—&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And frankly, David, you do a lot of that work in the many of the projects you do, but it’s all persuasion. It’s not coercion, and that I think is great. I think a liberal society should be a place where those things happen. Look, I grew up in a much more conservative society.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The divorce rate in India today is under 2 percent. Now, do not draw from that the conclusion that everybody in India is happily married. Draw from that the conclusion there are a lot of miserable women in India who are not able to break free of very bad marriages. And so when I hear sometimes these paeans to community and things like that, there’s a part of me that feels like: &lt;em&gt;Can I get an oxygen mask somewhere here?&lt;/em&gt; Because I know that those communities often came out of repression, hierarchy, conformism.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; So I offered Huntington; you matched my Huntington and gave me a Lippmann. So I’m going to quote Lippmann back to you. Then I want to get back to my optimism. So Lippmann writes another book called &lt;em&gt;The Public Philosophy&lt;/em&gt;, which I think must have been the ’50s and ’60s.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And he’s talking about the loss of the moral order that George Marsden had been talking about, and he says, “If what is right and wrong is based on what each individual feels, we are outside the bounds of civilization.” And so my view is of course you can’t force anybody to believe something. You can’t force anybody to get married. But a society can have scripts, and when I went to high school, it was just in my script, in my family, and frankly in my social class: You go to college.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And then it was a script: You get married. Or even in high school, there was a script for if you wanted to date somebody—there was a script. And I think a lot of those scripts are gone right now, and I’m not going to force anybody, but I would love to see more scripts.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; Part of what makes that harder, I think, is that we have entered into a world in which because of technology, there is the possibility of kind of radical individualism. So the world you and I grew up in, there was a common culture, and that common culture produced, I think, in its own way, almost subconsciously a common script, a common moral order, and things like that.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And it wasn’t so much religious. I think of it even in terms of the movies we watched, you know? When we were growing up and we were in college—I don’t know, everybody saw the &lt;em&gt;Indiana Jones&lt;/em&gt; movies. Everybody saw &lt;em&gt;When Harry Met Sally&lt;/em&gt;. Everybody read &lt;em&gt;The Bonfire of the Vanities&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;There is no such common culture anymore, because everything is sliced and diced. If you have three kids and they vary in age by three or four years each, they will each have found their own little silo of culture, and it’s very hard to talk about common values when everybody is choosing their own thing, and then that is reinforced over and over again. Technology enabled a kind of radical fragmentation of culture and values and morality. And I think that sometimes we underplay the degree to which technology has fractured us as a society. We look at lots of other things, but if it’s technology, how do you un-invent social media and the internet and the thousand channels people can watch?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; You may be right that’s never coming back, but that presents a bigger challenge for those of us who are trying to rebuild a liberal era, which is the challenge of: How do you rebuild liberalism in these circumstances to make it humane? And that strikes me as a very big and very daunting challenge.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But to go back to my optimism, I think it’s upon us right now—and one of the things that’s weird about history: There are certain movements; there are tides. Weirdly, you wouldn’t think there’d be global tides of history.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We’re a big, diverse world. But there are certain moments where a lot of similar things happened in a lot of different countries all at once. And so I would say in the early 20th century, we had a totalitarian tide. We had the Russian Revolution, Chinese Revolution, Mussolini, Hitler.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It just suddenly seemed totalitarianism was a thing, and people forget it was admired. Mussolini was admired. There’s that song, I won’t punish you with my version of it, but—&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; The Cole Porter song ...&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; “You’re the Top.” Mussolini was in that song.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And then in the ’60s, there’s a liberation movement. We need to throw off oppressive systems, and so you get decolonization in Africa. You get the civil-rights movement. You get feminism. You got social liberalization of the Woodstock. And then in the 1980s and 1990s, you get the neoliberal tide.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Not only Thatcher and Reagan, but in his own way, Gorbachev or Deng Xiaoping. They were all neoliberals. And then you had the global populist tide starting in 2010. And so it’s interesting to think in tides.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I feel a little guilty saying the populist tide is over, ’cause if I was sitting in France, in Germany, I may not feel that way. But their populists will screw up in their own time. And so then the question is: What’s the next tide? And I do think some sort of 21st-century liberalism is the best thing we offer, and there’s a suspicion about elites, but to me, you shouldn’t totally look at people’s credentials. You should look at how committed they are to liberalism, and those are the people who will somehow try to figure a way out.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; I largely agree with what you said, and I think the way I would put the populist revolution: If you really want to look at it globally, it is a kind of anti-elite revolution.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If you look at places like Turkey with the rise of Erdoğan—you look at India, the rise of Modi—what is striking is these are very different from Western societies. India’s very poor. Turkey’s middle income. It’s Muslim. And yet the common thread is Modi campaigned essentially proudly proclaiming that he was the first man who was going to be prime minister of India who really did not come from an elite background at all, and in fact was very much a man of the people. Now, there were others: Manmohan Singh, the prime minister before him, who actually had been born poorer than Modi. But Modi was right because Manmohan Singh then got a Ph.D., and so he, through kind of social mobility, had moved himself up into the kind of intellectual elite, whereas Modi always said he was a tea seller or his father was a tea seller. I’m not entirely sure that’s true, but he came from very modest background and never got that kind of escalator that elite education gives you.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Erdoğan similarly very much came out of a kind of common person. And almost everywhere you see that there is some kind of a reaction against the rise of this meritocratic, technocratic elite that is increasingly—I mean, you’ve written so well about all of this. These are the bourgeois bohemians.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These are the people who became the credentialed elites. In many ways, the first time I began to think of it this way, and the perpetuation of them as a kind of class, was an article you wrote, or maybe it’s in that book, about how the matrimonial columns of &lt;em&gt;The New York Times&lt;/em&gt;, the wedding announcements, were almost a kind of symbol of the mergers of the upper middle class.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; People literally called it the mergers and acquisitions page. It was Goldman marries, whatever, Skadden Arps. It was Harvard marries Princeton. Phi Beta Kappa marries Phi Beta Kappa, whatever.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; Exactly, exactly. You began to realize this is a sociological phenomena. What we should have realized was there’s a whole lot of people who don’t go to Harvard and Yale, and don’t work at Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, and they’re going to look at this world and say, “You guys think this is meritocratic, but we’re somehow shut out of it completely. You guys might think that it’s all happening because you’re so smart, but we exist too.” That’s why Trump said something—and sometimes because he is a political genius, he would say these things unintentionally profound—and he said, “I love the poorly educated.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And what in a sense he was giving voice to was that roar of protest against a world not only that is being ordered that way, but where people who are successful believe that not only do they deserve their success, but you know what? If you’re in the bottom half, maybe you deserve your lot as well because after all, I just took the test. I wasn’t born rich. Yeah but we lost that maybe Christian universalism of saying, “We’re all God’s children.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And you got a stroke of good luck and, as you said, at 16 were able to do well on your SATs, and the other person didn’t. And there isn’t a moral distinction between those two people.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So I think that piece feels to me like the most powerful critique that populism has provided to our modern liberal societies, and I don’t know what the solution is, because honestly, you do need talented people to run countries and to run societies and to run corporations and to run universities. Is there fundamentally a different system that doesn’t sort the new elite using brains, education, aptitude, talent?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; I think about my years in the elite. I was working for William F. Buckley when I was 21, when we first met. I’m part of the establishment. You can’t be a &lt;em&gt;New York Times&lt;/em&gt; columnist for 20 years and not be part of the establishment. And so, I want to get to that question of: How do we raise a better leadership class? But when I look back at my own culpability, I think a couple things I got wrong.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;First, you had mentioned that mergers and acquisition page, which then became, I think, the first chapter of a book called &lt;em&gt;Bobos in Paradise,&lt;/em&gt; which is about the new upper class. And it was about the rise of the educated class.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And I wrote a sentence in that book where I said, &lt;em&gt;Unlike previous establishments, this will not become an insular establishment because anybody can get an education and join&lt;/em&gt;. That turned out to be one of the most naive sentences I’ve ever written in my life, because they absolutely turned themselves into an insular establishment you could not crack unless you could afford the SAT prep and all the resources that were poured to the children of the educated class.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That was the one problem. Second, I don’t think I appreciated at the time how insular we were becoming. And then third, and this is the obvious one, is that in 2015, I wrote 500 columns saying, “Don’t worry, Donald Trump will never get the Republican nomination for president.” I was living in D.C., my social life was here in New York, I was traveling to New Haven. How could I be out of touch with America on the quiet car of the Acela? I don’t think I was totally blind to what was happening. I mean, a lot of my writing has been attacking my fellow establishmentarians, but I think those were the mistakes that I made.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Do you think that way? Like, what did I get wrong? What did I not see coming?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; Oh, sure. I think probably very similar to yours. I thought he could get the nomination, but I thought he would lose the election because I grew up in India and saw the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, so I had seen this kind of anger and this kind of nationalism and a kind of nationalism that is directed toward the other.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But I agree. I think that being part of this very insular elite, what I lost sight of was how many people in America felt so disconnected from that world, from that elite. I would look at the average statistics, and I would say, “America’s doing so much better than Europe.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And if you look at the data, it’s really extraordinary that this period that produces populism in America—this kind of right-wing enraged populism, anguish and enraged populism—was a period where the United States outperformed every other advanced economy in the world. The eurozone economy, roughly speaking, and the U.S. economy were the same in 2005.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today, the U.S. economy’s almost twice the size of the eurozone economy. So we’ve done extraordinarily well, but what I didn’t realize was there had been an enormous inequality, that the average concealed an Appalachia which had really collapsed. And I also did not recognize how much of this is not purely about economics.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It’s about dignity. It’s about a cultural world that has gone away. I went to one of these towns in Pennsylvania once and was talking to people around and trying to understand what was causing this right-wing populism. The answers I got were fascinating, which was essentially it’s not that people lost their jobs; they lost their lives.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Meaning, many of them had found other work, and again, the data shows that unemployment is at a 50-year low right now, roughly speaking. But what happened was in the old days, they had—there was a steel plant. They worked there. But they all worked there, and then they all went to church together, and they all went to the bowling alley together, and they all went to the hardware store. They went to the Kiwanis club together.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Now, much of that is not just about, like, the factory went to South Korea. It’s also that they used to go to the movie theater together, but Netflix took the place of the movies. They’d go to the bowling alley, but online gaming took that.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So it was a combination of technology and globalization, but the result was they had lost their lives. They had lost the community and then that feeling of dignity that came from having a good job and being a member. And I think I just looked at the numbers and was like, &lt;em&gt;Well, per capita GDP keeps going up&lt;/em&gt;, and things like that.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And I think a lot of this right-wing populism is at core cultural—a kind of cultural reaction to saying, “My world has collapsed.” The left tends to offer the 10-point Brookings Institution program that says, “Well, we can do a tax credit, and we can give you retraining, and we can ...” And the right says, “I’m going to take you back to before all this happened.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;You know, if you think about “Make America Great Again.” The Brexit slogan was “Take back control.” There is a kind of hearkening to an earlier, more simple time. And it’s very powerfully appealing. I mean, there’s a reason we all have that sense of nostalgia. I remember Nikki Haley once tweeted when she was trying her best to do an impersonation of a MAGA politician, she said, “Wasn’t life so much simpler when we were kids?”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And I think I did the math, and I thought that would’ve been around 1975 for her, and I’m thinking, &lt;em&gt;Okay, the United States had just lost its first war in history, Vietnam. The president had just been impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors. The oil prices quadrupled&lt;/em&gt;. &lt;em&gt;And the economy was so bad you had to invent a term—&lt;/em&gt;stagflation&lt;em&gt;—to describe high unemployment and high inflation.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; Crime tripled.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; But it’s something fascinating. It’s almost evolutionary that you want to go back. You want to think about a time when it was all better.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; We’ve admitted some of our sins. Let’s talk about the question you asked, which was: how to build a better leadership class. And my view, which I hope is yours, maybe, is every society has a leadership class.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The idea that you’re going to get away without an elite—that’s not going to happen. Somebody’s gotta run the government, and somebody’s gotta run the big institutions and educational institutions. So I would never want to go back to the establishment of 1950, because you and I would not be sitting at tables like this one.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; Exactly.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; But I think they had a couple of advantages that we could learn from but not replicate. The first is they read Plutarch. Like, how do you create a leadership class that’s going to govern well? This has been a problem thought about for thousands of years. Well, read Plutarch. Read the greats. Read Thucydides. Read Clausewitz. Read Sun Tzu. There are great wisdom literature in how to be a leader and what your responsibilities are. This podcast is an attempt to bring back some of that kind of humanistic learning. The second thing is to tell people, “You’re the elite. You have responsibilities.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; Act like it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; Act like it. If FDR was sitting there in—where’d he go? Groton or Choate, one of those schools.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; Groton.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; And his headmaster was telling him that.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; Endicott Peabody.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; Exactly. But today, you go to—I don’t want to single out one school—to an elite institution. It’s like, &lt;em&gt;You’re oppressed; you’re marginalized. You poor Harvard students&lt;/em&gt;. So they’re not told that. But then the third thing that they had the advantage of was, at least for some of them, they served in the military.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And so you might have gone to Groton or Choate or Andover, Exeter, and those kinds of schools, but along comes World War I or World War II, and suddenly you’re in the barracks with all of America. And so they did not have the opportunity to become as insular as our elite is becoming, even more insular than the Protestant establishment, which is saying something.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And so to me, when I think of how do you raise a better elite: First, I would hope our institution of education of all varieties would go back and teach what social leadership looks like; second, what social responsibility looks like; but third, would tell the truth—not in the way I’m about to say it, ’cause when I say it it’s laced with a bit of bitterness—which is stop being segregationists.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Higher ed is a segregation system. And you tell people, “We’re blocking social mobility for your kids”; they will flip the tables. And so as a leadership class, there’s a lot of work that needs to be done on us, and I think there’s some dawning recognition that this needs to happen, but I’m not sure.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; No, I agree with everything you said. The question becomes: How do you fix it? I remember my first boss. I worked at &lt;em&gt;Foreign Affairs;&lt;/em&gt; Jim Hoge, had gone to, I think, Exeter and Yale.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But he then went—&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks: &lt;/strong&gt;Amazingly good-looking guy, by the way.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria: &lt;/strong&gt;Yes, yes. There was an &lt;em&gt;Esquire&lt;/em&gt; magazine in which he and Robert Redford were both—and it was sort of: What do you do when you’re so good-looking that no one thinks you’re smart? Or something like that.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And I have to confess—&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; Never been my problem.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria: &lt;/strong&gt;I thought to myself, &lt;em&gt;I would kill to have that problem&lt;/em&gt;. But I think that the point he made to me, which I remember vividly, is he went from there, from Yale, to the&lt;em&gt; Chicago Sun-Times&lt;/em&gt; as a cub reporter or an intern, and he said not only was he the only person on the entire news floor who had gone to Yale; there were only about 20 percent of them who had gone to college.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Eighty percent of the reporters. And journalism was a much more mixed enterprise. Now it’s an entirely elite enterprise. It may not be high-paying, but it’s intellectually elite, and that creates a certain conformism and insularity. And I think that one of the challenges has got to be to figure out—I think we still, in the way we do sorting and education, we have not figured out how to find smart poor kids.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Statistically, intelligence is sprinkled roughly equally throughout the entire population.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What that means is we’re not searching hard enough for the smart poor kid who didn’t go through the hoops, who didn’t get that early jump in or didn’t have a great teacher, and maybe that person then needs a little remedial education, or maybe they need to go to summer school.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But we are missing that because we need those people because it’s right; it’s fair; it’s just. But it’s also that energy is a different kind of energy. That drive is a different kind of drive, and I don’t think we’ve figured out how to do it. The other point I want to make about Plutarch is I think here I’m somewhat hopeful for an unusual reason.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I think AI is going to be on almost everything an absolutely revolutionary phenomena, but think about it this way. I think since the Enlightenment, human beings have begun to think of themselves almost entirely as analytic machines. Before that, when we couldn’t understand something, we said, “God did it.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Why is there day and night? Well, the sun god moves his chariot across the sky, and that’s why you have day and night. And why do we have spring? Well, Persephone, the goddess of spring, wakes up. And then we started to apply our minds and reason and the scientific method to uncover the mysteries of the universe, and it was mind-blowing. We were able to understand all these things that we hadn’t been able to.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;AI is now going to take us back to a world where, to uncover the mysteries of the universe, we have to rely on another black box. It’s not called religion; it’s called AI. But the AI will explain things and solve things and do stuff that we just cannot do analytically.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We are no longer the best analytic machine in the universe. And so then the question is: What do we do as human beings? Well, maybe we recover the older qualities of character and temperament and intellect that mattered, which is that we search for wisdom and judgment and courage and leadership and those qualities that inspire people. That’s what they built statues for thousands of years ago. It wasn’t the smartest kid in the class; it was the person who had courage, who could inspire, who did lead.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So maybe, in a strange way, it will bring us back to that because we can’t pretend that we’re just going to be analytic machines because there’s going to be an actual machine that does it better.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; I would just say the thing that to me matters most is desire and determination, and that if we were awarded that, we would have a much more democratic meritocracy. But the hopeful thing—&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; And by the way, that’s one of the great things about America, and that gives me great hope because in every rich society, the challenges drive determination because you become rich.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Sometimes when I talk to a bunch of bankers or, you know, rich people, I will sometimes say, “Now let me ask you a question. You guys are all incredibly talented, and you have extraordinary capabilities. But when you look at your children, do you think they have the same drive that you did?”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And usually about 10 percent of the audience will put their hands up. Because at the end of the day, the children are reacting rationally to their circumstances. They’re growing up in enormous wealth, and it’s hard to have that. But immigrants do. And the fact that America still takes more legal immigrants than, for example, all of Europe put together every year, I think that is one of the things that makes sure that the United States remains forward-leaning, optimistic, driven. It has that culture of growth and aspiration because it’s very hard to force it, to tell people, “I know you’re rich, but pretend you’re poor.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That doesn’t work. You kind of actually have to be from the outside, trying to break in.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; One of the things I think we agree upon is this is a moment of shaking loose a lot. Even before the midterms, you wrote a column on, and yeah, I’m going to read two sentences from you: “We are living in an age of anxiety, and that means people are unsure about their political allegiances.” Boy, did that turn out to be true.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Everybody’s floating all over the place.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; Think about Hispanics moved 20 points in 2024 and then 20 points back in 2026.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; So suddenly we’re in a period of flux, and not only a period of political flux; I think we’re in a period of moral flux.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I think basically people took a look at MAGA, and they felt some sense of moral shame. I’ve always had a certain idea about America, is that we were vain; we were overconfident; we could be dumb and naive and crass, but we were not malevolent.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And I’ve now thought, &lt;em&gt;Okay, we’ve been malevolent&lt;/em&gt;. And so to me that gives us an opportunity really to turn a page and to reinvent the liberalism that you and I both believe in. So the question is: What part of liberalism do you lead?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It’s not only a set of ideas; it’s a way of life. But what is the part that is most needing to be recovered or reemphasized, or something like that?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; So to me, the part I think that we have to get right, and we can get right, is we have created a highly unequal society. Partly the machinations of capitalism sometimes do that.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;There are some winner-take-all dynamics to, for example, technology industry, where everybody wants to use the same search engine that everybody else uses, so you get this winner-take-all phenomena. But a lot of it is also, frankly, corruption and structural advantages.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Then there’s, of course, the massive inequality in wealth and the taxation system that, for example, taxes capital gains at a much lower rate than income, which probably makes no sense. So if we can fix all of that and create a more genuinely open, fair, level playing field, greater access for people, giving people the ability, in enormously rich countries, to not have to worry about very basic things like health care. I actually think that universal health care would be a very pro-growth policy because one of the things that happens when you have the kind of crazy system we have is people don’t leave their jobs for fear of losing health care.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;When I was at &lt;em&gt;Newsweek&lt;/em&gt;, I had to do four sets of layoffs, and every person I laid off understood we were in this collapsing market for magazines, and so I didn’t want to do it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;They knew that this was being forced on me, but every single one, every single person I laid off asked me, “Is there any way I can keep my health care for a year or two years because of my kids?” And I think if you made it so that everyone had it—you know, a basic level—I think it would create more entrepreneurship, more people willing to take risks.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If you can fix all that, which I think is possible, you can renew the idea of the promise of a genuinely liberal society, where individuals are treated like individuals and have certain benefits but rights. The question I have for you is: If some of this right-wing populism, if some of this reaction, negative reaction, to a liberal society is cultural, is this sense of, &lt;em&gt;What happened to that world of community and faith and belonging that I believed in?—&lt;/em&gt;we can’t just put Humpty Dumpty back together again; we can’t create a white Christian America again, whether or not that was as good or as stable even as people remember—so what do you do?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; I’m pretty open to some radical left ideas. I don’t know about universal health care because I’m not sure how we make the transition, and I don’t know how we afford it. My radical part on the left would be some sort of basic insurance, so there’s security, whether it’s EITC, or an earned income tax credit, subsidies, some sort of health care. It can’t be crazy the way it is now.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I worry about sapping the spirit of energy the way I believe Europe has. I would adopt some much bigger welfare state, but you gotta give me job growth and economic dynamism. And to me that’s regulations, but also—and this is the thing maybe we can close on, and I don’t know if America will ever believe in this again—but to me one of the greatest things about liberalism is pluralism.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That America, like your family and my family, it was a crossroads nation. We attracted hungry immigrants, and they did great things. And there’s a book by a guy named Sir Peter Hall named [&lt;em&gt;Cities in Civilization&lt;/em&gt;], and he looked at the most innovative places in world history, and they were all crossroads nations:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Athens, Florence, Vienna, New York, Silicon Valley. And Hall writes, “People meet, people talk, people listen to each other’s music and each other’s words. They dance each other’s dances and take in each other’s thoughts. Sparks might be struck and something new comes out of the encounter.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That’s liberalism to me, and America’s so averse to diversity now all of a sudden. Maybe we can’t go back there, but I’ll give you your socialist welfare state if you give me free capitalism and a lot of economic and demographic diversity.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; So the challenge then is if you want that diversity—and I entirely agree with you. I mean, you look at any of the great societies in the world—you know, the Netherlands that I talk about in the book—that invented really modern liberalism, modern capitalism, incredibly diverse. They were willing to take in persecuted Protestants. They were willing to take in Jews.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But it does cause people to feel like we are losing our common culture. We are losing our traditions. And that’s in some ways what’s happened here, and to me, that remains the central challenge.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;How do you create a society where you celebrate diversity? You encourage it; you want those people; you love the vitality, the spread; you love the kind of enriching and ennobling that takes place with those kind of encounters. But you do create anxiety.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;You do create a sense that people feel like, &lt;em&gt;I don’t recognize my country anymore. This world is passing me by&lt;/em&gt;. And it’s fascinating that this reaction, this backlash, has been with us as long as liberalism has.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And nobody has come up with an adequate solution to it. Because at the end of the day, the solution that is often tried, which is some kind of coercion or repression, not only doesn’t work, but it so runs counter to the spirit of liberalism. How do you resolve this dilemma?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; A strong national narrative and strong symbols of America that unite us all. We need bigger White House ballrooms and maybe an arch near Reagan National. Fareed Zakaria, thank you so much for joining us on &lt;em&gt;The Permanent Questions&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Zakaria:&lt;/strong&gt; David Brooks, such a pleasure.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brooks:&lt;/strong&gt; One of the things I appreciate about Fareed is that he is a journalist. He has a weekly show on CNN, so he’s covering the news right up to the date. But as you heard, he has this background with Samuel Huntington, and he’s got a broader historical perspective, which came out especially in that last book, [&lt;em&gt;Age of Revolutions&lt;/em&gt;].&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And having someone who has a historical perspective on our current moment in one sense was sobering to me because he said we’ve been here before. There are these moments of great diversity, great change. People rebel. You get a backlash. But the problem is not so easy to put it back together. And I think if you were hopefully like, “Oh, we’re just turning the page on MAGA; we’re all going to move forward now,” I think you should not believe that.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But the nice thing about him, which I found exciting, was that he did talk about how big the change is. We can’t go back to the things I’m sort of nostalgic for: some of the moral order, some of the way things used to be, the notion that marriage was sort of a natural thing that most people were going to be aiming for at some point in their life. That’s not all happening. And technology is technology, and AI is AI. And so what we have to do, I guess, as people who want to restore liberal democracies where people get to run their lives and do things like that, is we have to reenvision these systems for an entirely different era.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And I think that’s a project that is not going to just take the removal of Donald Trump and MAGA, but will take a lot of thinking over maybe the next 15, 20 years. And so that’s a new age. But it does reinforce the idea to me that we are past peak populism, that at least in the United States, that era is over, and now we’re in the process of what is struggling to be born.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Thanks so much for joining us at &lt;em&gt;The Permanent Questions&lt;/em&gt; with Fareed Zakaria.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Permanent Questions&lt;/em&gt; is produced and edited by &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt; in partnership with Yale University. New episodes come out on Sundays. You can watch &lt;em&gt;The Permanent Questions&lt;/em&gt; on &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;’s YouTube channel, on Spotify, Apple, or wherever you get your podcasts. If you want to support this work and the work of my colleagues, you can subscribe to the publication at TheAtlantic.com/Listener. See you next week.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>David Brooks</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/david-brooks/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/psN9r2o2iRh8W4JpLepapQYO_Lc=/0x0:1919x1079/media/img/mt/2026/11/1120_TPQ_thumbnail-1/original.png"><media:credit>The Atlantic</media:credit><media:description>David Brooks and Fareed Zakaria</media:description></media:content><title type="html">Is the Populist Moment Over?</title><published>2026-11-22T09:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-22T09:14:38-05:00</updated><summary type="html">The decline of Donald Trump may spell the beginning of the end for the global movement he represents.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/2026/11/populist-moment-over/689507/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:39-689413</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;High-tech gadgets&lt;/span&gt; proliferated almost as rapidly in Mark Twain’s time as they do in ours, and he prided himself on being an early adopter. So when Alexander Graham Bell’s new telephone company began to offer service in Hartford, Connecticut, in 1877, Twain signed up, boasting (incorrectly) that his was the first line “ever used in a private house in the world.” Shortly afterward, he did set a record, becoming “the first author to deploy the telephone in fiction, in a peculiar story for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic Monthly&lt;/em&gt;,” James Gleick writes in &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9780374618940"&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Telephone: A New History&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;aside data-source="magazine-issue" class="callout-placeholder"&gt;&lt;/aside&gt;&lt;p&gt;The comedy of “&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1878/03/the-loves-of-alonzo-fitz-clarence-and-rosannah-ethelton/538638/?utm_source=feed"&gt;The Loves of Alonzo Fitz Clarence and Rosannah Ethelton&lt;/a&gt;” comes mainly from its high-concept premise: The title characters fall in love, quarrel, reconcile, and get married entirely over the phone, without ever meeting in person. At the time the story appeared, in March 1878, very few Americans had actually seen a telephone, and Twain plays up the strangeness of the new technology. When we are first introduced to Alonzo, in his study in Eastport, Maine, he seems to be talking to himself, or to someone in the next room, before it’s revealed that he’s actually on the phone with his Aunt Susan in San Francisco.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But although Twain found technology fascinating, he also knew that things—even things that do amazing things—don’t make for good stories. The only subject that human beings find enduringly interesting is one another, and Twain was remarkably prescient about how the telephone would challenge traditional terms of interaction. The lovers in Twain’s story are separated by thousands of miles, but the conversation between them is not at either end, nor is it somewhere in the middle; it is a meeting of minds that have escaped the body’s requirement of place. This raises questions that we’re still asking today, in the age of dating apps and OnlyFans. Can people be real to one another without physical presence? Can there be love without touch? “There was a feeble but frantic sound for some little time, as if wool-lipped, disembodied spirits were exchanging kisses,” Twain writes about his telephone lovers. Is that funny or nightmarish?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Gleick’s great achievement&lt;/span&gt; as a science writer has been to show how complicated, abstract ideas end up changing the way we experience the world. In &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9780143113454"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Chaos&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, he explored chaos theory, which used new mathematical tools to explain why weather and other complex systems are so unpredictable. In &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9781400096237"&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Information&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, he showed how modern discoveries such as DNA and the computer involved new ways of thinking about data and communication. &lt;em&gt;The Telephone&lt;/em&gt;, too, is the story of a scientific discovery. But it’s just as much the history of a business—the Bell System, a group of companies led by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&amp;amp;T) that became America’s most powerful and enduring monopoly. The book is also a wide-ranging cultural history, showing how the telephone changed people’s lives and how they tried to make sense of those changes. When Bell gave a public demonstration of his invention in Salem, Massachusetts, speaking with Thomas Watson 18 miles away, in Boston, “it seemed as if an electric thrill went through the audience,” he remembered. “They recognized for the first time—what was meant by the ‘Telephone.’ ”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="review-placeholder"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p&gt;But what did it mean, exactly? That is where novelists like Twain came in—along with playwrights, psychologists, social scientists, and legions of pundits in what Gleick calls the “Telephone Century.” Like artificial intelligence today, the telephone was an obviously momentous new technology that everyone had heard about and no one fully understood. If the parallel holds, we won’t know how AI is going to change the world until after it happens, because early predictions about how people would use the telephone turned out to be wildly off base.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A &lt;em&gt;New York Times&lt;/em&gt; article imagined it as a way to listen to sermons without having to go to church, joking that soon houses for rent would offer Baptist preachers “laid on in every room,” like hot and cold water. In France, the Théâtrophone service allowed subscribers (including Marcel Proust) to listen to live opera performances over the phone. In both cases, the telephone was viewed as a one-way delivery system. But its power would lie in being a network—literally, a web of metal cables spanning continents and oceans, which allowed any two people, anywhere in the world, to have a back-and-forth exchange.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Not even Bell knew at first exactly what he was inventing. The initial goal of his research wasn’t to transmit the human voice, but to increase the carrying capacity of existing telegraph lines by sending multiple messages simultaneously at different pitches. In the course of his experiments with vibrating steel reeds, he discovered the principle that made the telephone possible: Sound and electricity speak the same language. Sound travels through the air in waves of pressure, and electromagnetic force also takes the form of a wave. The telephone was a tool for translating between the two kinds of waves. A small magnet, vibrating in response to a speaking voice, would generate an electrical current, which could be sent down a wire and reconverted into sound at the other end.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Bell wasn’t the only person to make this discovery. Philipp Reis had built a device he called &lt;em&gt;das&lt;/em&gt; &lt;em&gt;Telephon&lt;/em&gt; in Germany in 1861, and Elisha Gray, an American inventor, was so close on Bell’s heels that both men’s applications reached the U.S. Patent Office on the same day. Bell was awarded the patent, as well as the chance to go down in history as the inventor of the telephone, mainly because his well-connected Washington lawyer bribed the patent examiner with $100 and a gold watch.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Making the new invention useful would be a lot more expensive. As Gleick observes, other Industrial Age enterprises benefited from economies of scale. The more automobiles you make, the cheaper manufacturing each one becomes. With the telephone, the calculation was reversed: The bigger the network, the greater the cost per call, given how many lines and switchboards were required to put all the calls through. Raising capital from ultrarich investors became crucial. Originally Bell was one of four partners in the company that bore his name. Within three years, he had been reduced to one of 540 shareholders and ceased to play any real role.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At first, independent telephone companies tried to challenge the Bell System, in business and in court. Some enterprising farmers even turned their barbed-wire fences into telephone lines by running electric current through them. But Bell’s patents gave AT&amp;amp;T an unbeatable head start, and it ruthlessly maintained its advantage for more than a century. In the 1920s, for instance, a small company called Hush-a-Phone started to sell a cheap plastic device that attached to the mouthpiece of a telephone; talking into it would make your desk phone “private as a booth.” But AT&amp;amp;T prohibited customers from using any third-party equipment, and “when company repair personnel saw a Hush-a-Phone in a customer’s home, they threatened to disconnect service altogether,” Gleick writes. Not until the case reached a federal appeals court, in 1956, did the company finally win the right to sell its $10 product.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;An antitrust suit led to the breakup of AT&amp;amp;T in 1984. By then, the telephone was so ubiquitous that its effect on modern life could hardly be grasped. Over a century, the meaning of distance had changed: The other side of the country, or the planet, didn’t seem so far away when you could communicate across it instantly, instead of waiting weeks to exchange letters. Privacy had become more accessible—teenagers could take the phone into their room, or a closet, and talk without a chaperone. But it was also more vulnerable. You couldn’t be sure that you weren’t being eavesdropped on—in the early days, by an operator or by a neighbor on a party line; later on, by someone picking up an extension or, if you were important enough, by a government wiretapper.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/yA96RBx42oGWaFS7FaPIJiwUymI=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/11/2_Kirsch_Telephone/original.png" width="665" height="545" alt="black-and-white archival photo of woman wearing headset and plugging in heavily wired plugs, criscrossing on elaborate vertical switchboard" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/11/2_Kirsch_Telephone/original.png" data-thumb-id="14458444" data-image-id="1873707" data-orig-w="1524" data-orig-h="1250"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;FPG / Getty&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Operating switchboards came to be seen as women’s work—mainly because women were thought to be better than young men at sitting still and could be paid less.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;The telephone helped bring women into the public sphere, too, by creating a new kind of job. “As if by heavenly decree,” Gleick writes, “a consensus formed that operating a switchboard was women’s work,” and that “only women were suited to it”—mainly because they were better than young men at sitting still and could be paid lower wages. Even so, the job offered many women a path to personal independence and professional respect. When the U.S. Army needed skilled telephone operators during World War I, it had no choice but to hire women, although by law they couldn’t enlist in the military. In 1918, the 33 women of Telephone Unit No. 1 shipped out for France, where they “ate army food and slept in army barracks,” and wore their own armbands, embroidered with “black telephone transmitters and yellow streaks of lightning.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;After that war, and even more so after World War II, women found new telephone-related jobs in offices as receptionists and secretaries. But switchboard operators were doomed by their own success. America’s telephone network was expanding so fast that there weren’t enough women to keep up. Around 1910, AT&amp;amp;T’s chief engineer estimated that by 1930, at least a quarter of New York City’s population would be needed just to run its switchboards. The company had to find a way to automate the process of making phone calls. The solution turned out to be the rotary dial, which allowed callers to enter the phone number they wanted to reach instead of telling it to an operator. Gleick shows that each major advance in telephone technology followed the same pattern: Science would rise to the demands of business. Technical challenges, such as signal amplification for long-distance calls, seemed insurmountable until they were solved. Then they were taken for granted.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/P6mdCeufPE2Wh02ILcUUWHCLMFw=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/11/3_Kirsch_Telephone/original.png" width="665" height="516" alt="archival photo of a woman holding the handset and dialing a rotary-dial phone" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/11/3_Kirsch_Telephone/original.png" data-thumb-id="14458445" data-image-id="1873709" data-orig-w="1920" data-orig-h="1490"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Harold M. Lambert / Getty&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;How to dial a rotary phone.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;This dynamic &lt;/span&gt;is familiar in our own time too. Yesterday’s miracle becomes today’s necessity and tomorrow’s antique. The rotary dial was so cutting-edge in the 1920s that AT&amp;amp;T worried that customers wouldn’t be able to use it. New phones came printed with instructions: “Remove receiver. Put finger in hole over first figure wanted. Turn to stop and let go.” Today, you’d need to give the same explanation to people under 30, who have grown up in a world of touch screens. Among other things, &lt;em&gt;The Telephone&lt;/em&gt; is an almanac of this kind of extinct knowledge. Depending on how old you are, you’ll feel nostalgic about different phases of telephone history: Remember dial tones? The Yellow Pages? Pay phones? Calling for the time?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Now the telephone itself is history. By collective agreement, we refer to the devices in our hands at every waking moment as phones—maybe iPhones or cellphones, but never telephones. Phones can do a million things that telephones never dreamed of, while the one thing telephones did is starting to feel unnecessary, even impolite. When a phone rings—an anachronism; phones don’t ring, they vibrate or light up or play a tune—it’s more likely to be a scammer or a salesperson than a friend. If you really want to communicate with someone, you send a text or set up a Zoom call. Fittingly, Gleick ends his book with a visit to a disconnected telephone booth in Japan, which a local man has turned into a shrine of sorts—a place to think about the absent and the dead, who have no phone number.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/a8HTzh-P3TanJBzit67nCRO5C_E=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/11/4_Kirsch_Telephone/original.png" width="665" height="818" alt="archival photo of a man with feathered hair wearing barn jacket and holding enormous brick-sized phone with antenna to one ear" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/11/4_Kirsch_Telephone/original.png" data-thumb-id="14458446" data-image-id="1873710" data-orig-w="1920" data-orig-h="2362"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Duncan Raban / Popperfoto / Getty&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A Motorola DynaTAC 8000x, the first commercial mobile phone, circa 1985.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;Even if we’ve moved beyond telephones, however, we still inhabit the strange new dimension they opened up. The telephone gave humanity its first experience of what we now call the virtual—a kind of reality that is divorced from presence. By translating the human voice into a signal transmitted through a wire, the telephone gave it the reach of electricity and the abstractness of data. At first, telephone users experienced this as a magic power—“this admirable magic that needs only a few seconds to bring before us, unseen but present, the person to whom we wish to speak,” as Proust described it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What Bell did not foresee is that once human beings got a taste of this freedom, having a body and being in a place began to feel burdensome, a concession to the limitations of the physical world. Ever since, the information-technology revolution that began in the 1870s with the telephone and phonograph has been steadily lightening that burden. Radio, television, movies, and the internet have claimed an ever larger share of our attention for people and things not actually &lt;em&gt;there&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;AI is completing the emancipation from reality that the telephone began. When you had a conversation on the phone, you could at least be sure that the voice on the other end of the line belonged to a real person. Today we are surrounded by sounds and images that never corresponded to anything real—lifelike photos of people who were never born, intimate conversations with machines that can’t think or feel. The great irony of the telephone is that a device born as a tool of communication, bringing people together across distances, has evolved into our most effective tool of solipsism. No long-distance call can bridge the space between two people absorbed in their phones, even when they’re sitting side by side.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;This article appears in the &lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/toc/2027/01/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;January 2027&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt; print edition with the headline “The World the Telephone Made.”&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Adam Kirsch</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/adam-kirsch/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/GvMBF_bpZ3iSDh-GZFiLz5JT_BM=/0x186:2098x1366/media/img/2026/11/1_Kirsch_Telephone-1/original.png"><media:credit>DEA / Biblioteca Ambrosiana / Getty</media:credit><media:description>An 1877 etching of an early public demonstration of the telephone. Thomas Watson, stationed in Boston, listens to Alexander Graham Bell speaking 18 miles away, in Salem.</media:description></media:content><title type="html">The Rise and Fall of the Telephone Century</title><published>2026-11-22T09:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-22T10:03:08-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Nobody foresaw where the new technology would lead.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/2027/01/james-gleick-telephone-new-history-review/689413/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689541</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;If you don’t speak&lt;/span&gt; with a relative for years, you’re probably estranged. If you’re dating someone who’s dropped contact for the past month, you’ve been ghosted. You haven’t heard from your boss in six months? Uh-oh. But one kind of relationship seems to consistently defy the laws of interpersonal physics: friendship. When friends reunite, the fabric of time can pleat seamlessly, allowing them to simply, as the saying goes, pick up where they left off.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Time doesn’t take away from true friendship, nor does separation,” Tennessee Williams wrote in &lt;em&gt;Memoirs&lt;/em&gt;. “When we’re together, the years fall away,” Judy Blume &lt;a href="https://judyblume.com/reference-desk/autobiographical-essays/essays-friends-2/"&gt;once wrote&lt;/a&gt; of her best friend, Mary. In the 100 interviews with groups of friends that I conducted for my series &lt;em&gt;The Friendship Files&lt;/em&gt;, I often heard similar sentiments. “It was like we’d never been apart,” one person told me of reconnecting with &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/03/friendship-files-how-14-friends-vietnam-war-lost-and-found-one-another/583714/?utm_source=feed"&gt;his Army buddies&lt;/a&gt; after more than a decade. “It’s as if nothing has changed,” another said of their relationship with &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2021/04/unique-experience-jewish-elementary-school/618485/?utm_source=feed"&gt;friends from kindergarten&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If friendship has a superpower, it is the time travel of reconnection. Before these moments, sometimes weeks, months, or years pass with only sporadic communication, if not complete silence. Yet through these fallow periods, friendship can persist without diminishing in strength.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I’ve come to think of these empty spaces as friendship’s dark matter. It is the part of friendship we can’t see, directly measure, or definitively prove exists—but we know it’s there, and we feel its effects. In a &lt;a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2885.1991.tb00008.x"&gt;1991 paper&lt;/a&gt;, Stuart Sigman, a communication researcher, emphasized the importance of the part of relationships that happens in the silence between interactions. “Relationships do not cease after the face-to-face events (conversations) engaged in by co-members are terminated,” he wrote. “In a sense, relationships are ‘larger’ than the physical presence or interactional accessibility of the participants.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Although all relationships have some of this dark matter, friendship is unusual because of how much silence it can survive. Someone doesn’t necessarily lose the title of “friend” just because you haven’t talked to them in a while. With family or romantic partners, a reunion after a long separation could be expected to bring some drama. Yet seeing an old friend is often described as frictionless.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/how-friendships-change-over-time-in-adulthood/411466/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: How friendships change in adulthood&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The nature of friendship allows for this goodwill. “Freedom lives at the heart of friendship,” William Rawlins, an emeritus professor of communication at Ohio University, told me. You can’t choose your parents, but every friendship is created from scratch by the participants themselves. It can take any form they imagine. Cultures have shared expectations for how romantic relationships progress and when families ought to gather. Although couples and families don’t necessarily conform to those scripts, they’re still aware of them.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Those cultural guideposts barely exist for friendship. There is no universal prescription for how often friends ought to talk to or see one another. “Our friendship is going to exist as long as we are living up to each other’s expectations of the friendship,” Rawlins said. Friendships can go dormant for a while without dying, he wrote in his 1992 book, &lt;em&gt;Friendship Matters&lt;/em&gt;, so long as all parties still think of one another as friends: “The unspoken in friendship, its shared image, may excuse former neglect.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;So what is happening&lt;/span&gt; when nothing is happening between friends? This is the question Kinneret Lahad, a professor of women’s studies at Tel Aviv University, explored in a &lt;a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14649365.2025.2522650#abstract"&gt;paper&lt;/a&gt; she published last year. The short answer, as she wrote, is that when nothing happens, “everything happens at the same time.” The full answer is more complicated.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Friendship is imbued with so many sensations, so many intensities that cannot be quantified or qualified or represented in narratives,” Lahad told me. (I’ll try my best to represent some of them in this narrative nevertheless.) Nothing visible or measurable may be happening between two friends; they may be, by all appearances, out of touch. But perhaps they think of each other often. Maybe one helped the other find a job that took them to a new place many years ago; their whole life trajectory remains shaped by that friendship, even though they’re now apart. One friend might see something that makes them think of the other, wonder whether they should reach out, and almost do it, only to hesitate at the last moment. Any or all of that could be happening when a friendship appears dormant. “When nothing is happening in friendship, all of friendship’s ambiguities, possibilities, and constraints are laid bare,” Rawlins said. Lahad’s point is that all of these almosts, maybes, and intangible thoughts still matter. They still affect the friendship and the people within it. This dark matter can, like the universe’s, be the glue that keeps friends together, or it can be the shadows in which misunderstandings and resentments fester.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One indirect piece of evidence for the existence of friendship dark matter is that the feeling of closeness between friends is not necessarily linked to how often they are in touch. In a study of long-distance and geographically close friends, Amy Janan Johnson, a professor of communication at the University of Oklahoma, found that although far-flung friends did fewer “maintenance behaviors”—such as calling each other, joking around together, and offering emotional support—that did not mean they felt less connected or invested in the relationship.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In fact, she told me, some long-distance friends’ commitment to the relationship was “still increasing.” Johnson suggested that in addition to the active maintenance of talking to and seeing one another, people might also engage in passive maintenance of their friendships by, for instance, looking at old photos and feeling fond feelings, or thinking of someone and wishing them well. These things seem small and ephemeral, but they are ways that friendship can be present even in absence. And they may contribute to the feeling, upon reunion, that the friendship was never interrupted at all.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2022/06/how-vacations-make-friendships-stronger/661349/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Want closer friendships? Move away from your friends.&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Lahad recently published &lt;a href="https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/emsoc/aop/article-10.1332-26316897Y2026D000000106/article-10.1332-26316897Y2026D000000106.xml"&gt;another paper&lt;/a&gt;, with her friend and co-author Klara Goedecke, about the feeling of reconnecting after a period of nothingness. And in the most scholarly way possible, they basically said that it’s magic: “Sensed suspension of the sociotemporal order that would otherwise cast time apart as rupture has a ‘mythical’ or ‘extra-temporal’ quality,” they wrote, “which we conceptualize as a sense of wonder.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;This wonder is not guaranteed&lt;/span&gt;. Let us not over-romanticize the flexibility of friendship; it is completely possible that the dark matter contains not the comforting certainty of continued connection, but confusion and hurt. Friends can drift apart over long separations, and reuniting may be awkward rather than smooth. “Meeting up with an old friend constituted a friendship trial,” Lahad and Goedecke wrote, “a moment where the friendship was put to the test, as it were.” Reconnection comes with risk. Although you may have thought that everything was fine, that it was mutually understood that you still loved each other through the silence, your friend might be upset with you for not reaching out. “Treasured old friendships persist partly as vital (and hopefully mutual) fantasies,” Rawlins wrote. The risk is that the fantasy is not mutual.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As technology has made keeping in touch easier and easier, the dark matter of friendship may feel heavier than it did in previous generations. Rawlins and Johnson both pointed out that for those who didn’t grow up with the internet and social media, and had only calls and letters to bridge the distance, long silences between friends may have felt more benign. Friends have so many ways to reach out to one another now that it may feel more fraught when they don’t.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This sense that reconnection is risky could be why, &lt;a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11332216/"&gt;as a couple of studies have found&lt;/a&gt;, people tend to be reluctant to contact their old friends. Even when they say they’d like to, many hesitate to actually do it. But the risk may not be as high as they think. &lt;a href="https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/psp-pspi0000402.pdf"&gt;Another study&lt;/a&gt; found that people tend to consistently underestimate how happy those in their social circle are to hear from them.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What makes a friendship more or less likely to pick up where it left off? Kristina Castaneto, a psychology Ph.D. student at Simon Fraser University, in Canada, is trying to investigate what makes a person more likely to reconnect with an old friend; her adviser, Lara Aknin, worked on the study about reluctance to reach out. In a &lt;a href="https://online.ucpress.edu/collabra/article/11/1/143319/212890/Who-Reaches-Out-to-Old-Friends-and-What-Do-They"&gt;recent study&lt;/a&gt;, they could not find any personality traits that were linked to someone’s likelihood of getting back in touch. The only thing that seemed to move the needle was a new concept they’ve come up with: friendship resiliency, which they define as “the belief that the friendship will remain despite how much time has passed,” Castaneto told me. That sounds, essentially, like a belief in friendship dark matter. She is still working on developing a way to reliably measure this concept. But it seems possible that the very thing that brings friends back together might be the belief that they’re never truly separated, even when they’re apart.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Yet I can’t help&lt;/span&gt; but wonder how much this phenomenon is a special property of friendship, and how much it is a survival mechanism in a culture that puts friendship last. Lahad said that she and Goedecke got a similar critique from a colleague regarding their paper on reconnection and wonder. People should be working on their friendships, this person said, not coasting on the assumption that the time apart will collapse when they get back together. The dominant values of American culture—and many other cultures—still say that you should prioritize your work and your family before your friends. When friendship is expected to make way for these other things, people may get used to tolerating lapses in contact, or think that they have no choice but to accept them as part of friendship.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The “assumption of benevolence” through a dormant period, as Rawlins put it, can be a beautiful part of friendship. But “at the same time, Julie, at some point, you kind of have to live that with each other,” he told me. You have to prove the benevolent assumption correct. You have to actually pick up where you left off. That’s the thing about friendship dark matter—it can hold the visible matter together … so long as there &lt;em&gt;is&lt;/em&gt; some visible matter.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Friendship does require taking action, at some point, if you want it to be more than a fond memory. But it is more than the sum of the actions taken. Even if you do make your friends a priority, even if you are regularly in touch, the magic, unmeasurable dark matter remains. Lahad told me about a woman she’d interviewed whose friend had offered her a room to stay in when she was thinking of divorcing her husband. She never took her friend up on it, but just knowing that she had that safety net if she needed it helped give her the confidence to take action and get divorced. Something that wasn’t actually happening was shaping everything. “Friendship also exists in these ways that cannot be boiled down only to how often we meet and how often we talk,” Lahad said.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the dark matter, there is uncertainty, yes. But, as Rawlins said, “the other side of uncertainty is faith.”&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Julie Beck</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/julie-beck/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/T9G9wEL5fG5nWB5u0QzgKMiAwyw=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_16_Dark_Matter_Friendship/original.png"><media:credit>Illustration by Tina Zhou / The Atlantic. Source: Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Relationship That Can Survive Not Talking for Years</title><published>2026-11-22T08:30:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-22T14:22:51-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Something unusual happens when friends reconnect.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/2026/11/friends-dark-matter/689541/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689536</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;In early August, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. staged a “policy celebration” at the Department of Health and Human Services headquarters to give an update on one of his signature initiatives: a new definition of &lt;em&gt;ultra-processed food&lt;/em&gt;. Publishing the definition would be the first step toward achieving several “Make America Healthy Again” goals, such as new front-of-package labels to steer consumers away from unhealthy foods and, eventually, a reduction in preventable disease. But even as Kennedy was planning the festivities, a months-long bureaucratic battle was threatening to derail it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Days before the planned event, senior staff at the White House told Kennedy’s team that the definition would need to stay secret because it had not yet cleared a review process at the Office of Management and Budget. That review had become a major point of contention. Some inside the administration wanted more data on the economic effects of policies that could follow from the definition; others insisted that the delay was unnecessary and political. When Kennedy took the stage, flanked by children holding &lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Eat Real Food&lt;/span&gt; posters, he could announce only that an announcement was still coming.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This dispute over regulatory language has since helped unravel the team that cemented the MAHA-MAGA alliance and has guided Donald Trump for years. Less than two weeks before the midterms, a Kennedy ally named Calley Means quit his job at the White House in protest. White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles then mounted a new effort to release the definition before the election, only to have Kennedy pause it. On the same day that Wiles announced her resignation following a poor Republican showing in the midterm election, Means appeared on Joe Rogan’s podcast to accuse her of caving to the food industry. Inside the White House, some staff were outraged. One White House official that day called Means a liar and a failure who “confuses his own inability to persuade with others’ malfeasance.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Now, under the new regime of Chief of Staff Stephen Miller—who has long claimed his own special affinity for MAHA—the ultra-processed-food language, a draft of which we obtained, is once again moving forward. According to several people with knowledge of the plan, HHS has been preparing again for a long-awaited release of the definition, which is expected as soon as next week. (When asked for comment, HHS directed us to the White House, which sent a statement that listed past MAHA accomplishments and declared, “Stephen Miller and Secretary Kennedy have been working closely together since day one, and they will continue advancing bipartisan MAHA victories.”)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The story of the conflagration at the White House, which involves Trump-administration staff trading accusations of corruption and incompetence, is based on interviews with eight current and former officials involved in the process, most of whom requested anonymity to describe conversations that occurred behind closed doors. The dispute exposed major divisions within the White House over how far to take Kennedy’s Make America Healthy Again agenda. Now the future of the UPF definition will signal whether the alliance between MAGA and MAHA can survive.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr class="c-section-divider"&gt;&lt;p&gt;The government’s proposed definition of ultra-processed food has remained largely unchanged since a team led by then&lt;b&gt;–&lt;/b&gt;Food and Drug Commissioner Marty Makary first drafted it, in the summer of 2025, according to people close to the process. In about 200 words, it classifies as ultra-processed any food or drink containing a chemical preservative, artificial color, added flavor, or low- or no-calorie sweetener such as stevia and aspartame. Additives intended to thicken foods or otherwise alter their texture, such as guar gum and sodium alginate, will also land a food on the UPF list.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The definition relies heavily on existing federal regulations that spell out what, exactly, qualifies as a color, sweetener, or other additive. It excludes infant formula, dietary supplements, and foods that qualify as “healthy” under an FDA standard that sets limits on added sugar, sodium, and saturated fat. (Those products also must contain minimum amounts of healthy ingredients such as fruit and whole grains.) Even with those exceptions, experts we spoke with said, the definition of an ultra-processed food would likely cover most packaged products on grocery-store shelves—not just classic junk food, like cheese-filled pretzel bites, but also many flavored yogurts, instant oatmeals, and protein bars. Most packaged breads, which contain additives that prevent mold and maintain softness, would go on the list too.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That’s a frightening proposition to the food industry. The Consumer Brands Association, which represents some of the country’s largest food and beverage manufacturers, including PepsiCo and Tyson Foods, argues that the suspected harms of UPFs—obesity, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancer—have not been confirmed by strong scientific evidence. It’s true that the science on UPFs, including which ingredients or processes might make them unhealthy, remains unsettled. But nutrition experts told us that enough evidence links them to poor health outcomes that consumers should be warned.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That prospect—that the UPF definition will lead to new regulations and legal actions—has been the crux of the fight inside the administration. Kennedy has advocated for new front-of-package UPF labeling that would be similar to cigarette warnings. The Consumer Brands Association has argued that such a requirement would place an undue burden on food manufacturers. The association has touted a recent study by University of Chicago economists predicting that a mandatory label would prompt food companies to spend billions to reformulate their products, raising the average household’s annual grocery bill by $60. But several nutrition experts we spoke with questioned the study’s assumptions. Lindsey Smith Taillie, a nutritional epidemiologist, told us that companies are “reformulating and changing their packaging all the time” and still manage to bring in billions in profit. In fact, some companies have done so recently as part of Kennedy’s push to remove artificial dyes from the American food supply. So far General Mills has voluntarily dropped them from cereals sold in the United States, and Kellogg says it plans to ship reformulated Froot Loops and Apple Jacks by year’s end.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Food companies are also concerned that a federal definition might be used in litigation. In the past two years, consumers, as well as the city of San Francisco, have sued major food companies over alleged harmful health effects, and advocates hope that a new definition could make their cases more credible. One attorney, John Morgan of Morgan &amp;amp; Morgan, has been especially active in these suits; his firm previously collaborated with Kennedy on an environmental case and maintained a working relationship with him until he became health secretary. That connection “does raise questions in our mind” about Kennedy’s motivations, Rhonda Bentz, a spokesperson for the Consumer Brands Association, told us. Morgan told us that he doesn’t need a new federal definition to help him make a case against food companies but did not rule out incorporating one. “Their defense is always the same one,” he told us. “It’s deny, delay, deny, delay.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr class="c-section-divider"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Given how vehemently the food industry opposes these measures, some drama over a government UPF definition was inevitable. But at the beginning of the second Trump administration, the two people at the center of the fight nonetheless believed that they could find a solution. Besides Trump and Kennedy, Means and Wiles were the most significant players in the unlikely merger of MAHA and MAGA. Wiles had reached out to Means in 2023 after reading his ideas about public-health reform, and Means first connected Kennedy to Trump. In the weeks that followed, Wiles led the negotiations to merge the Kennedy and Trump campaigns. “Susie Wiles is the best choice of chief of staff for MAHA,” Means posted on X in November 2024, when she was named to the post. In 2025, Wiles green-lighted an aggressive series of reports and announcements in which Kennedy put forward his plans to define ultra-processed food, redesign the food pyramid, and review school and military meals.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But Wiles also established a policy process that rankled Means and his allies, allowing different Cabinet departments—as well as lobbyists and industry leaders—to weigh in on changes. “Susie wanted to get to yes, but we had to do it in a way that doesn’t endanger the U.S. food supply,” a government official involved in the policy discussions told us. Means came to believe that the process was just an excuse for further delay, he told us. “The problem with Susie’s leadership was there was no process, and special-interest phone calls were able to delay or kill key priorities that the president ran on,” he said. (Wiles declined to comment for this article.) Kennedy’s staff frequently clashed with farmers, food producers, and Department of Agriculture staff. As we &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/07/heidi-overton-maha-rfk/688038/?utm_source=feed"&gt;reported in July&lt;/a&gt;, MAHA activists inside and outside the administration had become especially frustrated with Heidi Overton, a medical doctor and White House policy adviser, who often slowed down health-policy changes to refine them. Wiles vocally defended Overton and the process at the time, telling us that the White House was focused on making sure “things are correct, legally durable, done with policy consistency.” (Trump nominated Overton to be FDA commissioner in August, but withdrew that nomination earlier this week.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;By late last summer, officials at HHS believed that the UPF definition was ready to go. But at an interagency gathering this July, Means was peppered with questions about what the new definition would mean for food prices and the liability of food producers, as well as whether it would be vulnerable to legal challenge, according to people familiar with the meeting. For his part, Means warned other officials that they would be seen as catering to industry interests if they did not embrace the definition, which had then been circulating inside the administration for about nine months. Wiles’s team later insisted that the concerns raised at the meeting had not been addressed. The fact that Republicans were being hammered in campaigns across the country for the rising costs of food also weighed on the White House.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Backers of the UPF definition viewed such complaints as stonewalling and were concerned that the delay would endanger their ability to get regulations such as new food labels in place before the end of Trump’s term. “It was two pages,” another person involved in the policy discussions told us. “The idea that you have to do some complex policy process for a two-page proposal is laughable.” Means told us that hundreds of meetings were held to discuss the definition, and he stopped believing that the White House would release one before the election. So he quit.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;When Means appeared on Rogan’s podcast, he alleged that Wiles had told him that she had concerns about a separate MAHA-coded effort—this one to regulate additives—because Republicans needed money from the sugar industry for the midterms. Allies of Wiles denied that she ever said this, and people who worked with her pointed out that the sugar industry ranked low among top donors to Republican election efforts. The day after his Rogan appearance, Means invited Wiles to sue him.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr class="c-section-divider"&gt;&lt;p&gt;After Means left the White House, Wiles and Kennedy started working again to release the UPF definition so that it could receive public comment before being finalized next year. In the week before the election, the White House and Wiles cleared a version of the definition, including a preamble specifying that it should not yet be used in litigation or for shaping legislation. Then, just days before the election, Kennedy decided that the process was too rushed and opted to wait to announce the language until after the election. The definition that is set to be released now is not expected to be materially different, people involved in the process told us.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Kennedy has also carefully kept some distance from the controversy. After Means denounced Wiles as corrupt, Kennedy praised her “inspiring leadership and wisdom” in a post on social media. Trump—who has at times sounded even more aggressive than Kennedy on some MAHA issues, especially those related to childhood vaccines—has remained silent. The White House has not yet announced whether the president will be involved in the release of the new ultra-processed-food standards.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Following Means’s departure and the Republicans’ midterms disaster, some pundits were ready to write off MAHA entirely. The unlikely coalition appeared to be fraying, its supporters were demoralized, and most of the candidates backed by its political-action committee lost their race. But MAHA’s obituary may turn out to be premature. A federal UPF definition would be Kennedy’s most tangible win yet, and a sign that MAHA might still have some life left. Assuming, that is, it finally gets published.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Michael Scherer</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/michael-scherer/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><author><name>Tom Bartlett</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/tom-bartlett/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/umQhRerLZ-xIhyeNFau1i1g0dzg=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_21_Inside_the_Trump_Administrations_Ultra_Processed_Food_Fight_Tom_Bartlett_Michael_Scherer_1/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by The Atlantic. Sources: Anna Moneymaker / Getty; Jc Milhet / AFP / Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">How ‘Real Food’ Nearly Broke the White House</title><published>2026-11-22T08:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-22T10:53:59-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Inside the Trump administration’s ultra-processed-food fight</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/health/2026/11/ultra-processed-food-definition-wiles-means-kennedy/689536/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689493</id><content type="html">&lt;p data-flatplan-paragraph="true"&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;i data-stringify-type="italic"&gt;This article was featured in the One Story to Read Today newsletter. &lt;a data-event-element="inline link" data-gtm-vis-first-on-screen31117857_899="984608" data-gtm-vis-has-fired31117857_899="1" data-gtm-vis-total-visible-time31117857_899="100" data-sk="tooltip_parent" data-stringify-link="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/one-story-to-read-today/" delay="150" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/one-story-to-read-today/?utm_source=feed" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"&gt;Sign up for it here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;A&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;fter any election,&lt;/span&gt; it’s natural to hunt for results that prove you were right all along. Landslides in particular provide the winners with ample evidence to sustain just about every prior position. At the moment, Democrats are engaged in a familiar argument over which faction, the progressives or the moderates, can claim responsibility for the party’s remarkable new majority. If you support Medicare for All, you’ll point to Abdul El-Sayed’s victory in Michigan. If you’re a skeptic, Roy Cooper of North Carolina won the election’s biggest blowout for a flipped Senate seat. If you want to retire the culture war, look at Gina Hinojosa and James Talarico in Texas. If you thought the race was about Palestine and trans issues, Victoria Broderick just became Tennessee’s first queer member-elect of Congress. Latinos, independents, southern Black women, men under 30, the white working class: bragging rights for all.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But it might be more useful to search for what you got wrong. Views that are exploded by subsequent events have a way of disappearing from the mind, making it easy to forget you ever held them in the first place, and creating an illusion that your political wishes always accord with reality. We’re all prone to squeezing facts into the shape of narratives we carry in our heads and ignoring facts that undermine them. These mental habits contribute to a culture of total vindication and no compromise. They also make it difficult to understand present events or predict future ones.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Last year, &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/09/america-authoritarian-regime-ai-suicide/684350/?utm_source=feed"&gt;I wrote&lt;/a&gt; that America was becoming an authoritarian state. There were grounds for believing it. Think back to the country that America seemed to have become. President Trump ruled with almost no checks on his power. The Supreme Court offered little resistance and Congress none, as if the Constitution had been suspended and the entire federal government had come under the control of one man. The civil service had been gutted, independent agencies neutered, and the Justice Department warped into the president’s personal tool for rewarding friends, punishing enemies, and enriching himself. Long-standing norms of language, behavior, and probity collapsed daily. Elites in business, media, academia, and law lay supine before Trump’s demands for fealty and lucre. After returning to power a man who had tried to nullify democracy, the public seemed entirely passive: content, checked out, or too stunned to react.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/autocracy-in-america/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Listen: Autocracy in America&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;i&gt; &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Remember the fear, the confusion turning to panic. Masked gunmen swept through American neighborhoods, foreigners stayed away from American airports, and international students began to disappear from American universities. After Charlie Kirk’s murder, the White House set out to purge his detractors, and Stephen Miller warned the enemies of goodness—perhaps half the country—that they had awakened a dragon. In red towns, regime critics lowered their voices. In blue cities, families talked seriously about the possibility of moving to another country. Famous figures in the resistance &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/04/dont-flee-just-yet/682350/?utm_source=feed"&gt;began to leave&lt;/a&gt;, while some people I knew tried to parlay a deceased grandparent into a foreign passport and had their children apply to overseas colleges. How could you raise kids here? What if the previous election had returned to power a president who would make sure there would never be another?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;No one wanted to be the fool who waited too long to get out. But how would you know when it was too late? Having no experience with these dilemmas, we looked to history for guidance. The spirit of the moment was captured in a recent translation of &lt;i&gt;The&lt;/i&gt; &lt;i&gt;Oppermanns&lt;/i&gt;, written in 1933 by the German Jewish novelist Lion Feuchtwanger, who had the foresight to flee as soon as Hitler came to power. The lesson seemed to be: Get out while you still can.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In its annual democracy index for 2025, Freedom House gave the United States its lowest score ever—on par with South Africa and below Panama. Political minds debated what to call this radical deformation of democracy: right-wing populist, illiberal, authoritarian, patrimonialist—even fascist. I wrote an article about this ominous state of affairs with the title “&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/09/america-authoritarian-regime-ai-suicide/684350/?utm_source=feed"&gt;America’s Zombie Democracy&lt;/a&gt;.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Now a free election has delivered an overwhelming rebuke to Trump and his rule. What kind of fascist allows that to happen?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;I&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;f I were to summarize&lt;/span&gt; the flaws in my own thinking, I would say that I overrated Trump’s competence as a dictator, and I underrated the resilience of American democracy. “I don’t think that people were wrong to be worried, and I don’t think the threat is over,” Lawrence Norden, an election-security expert at the Brennan Center for Justice, told me. “I do think maybe some people underestimated the ability to fight back.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Trump wants to rule as a fascist. His governing style emulates the classic features of fascism: cult of the leader, nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric, glorification of the “real” people, demonization of minorities and political opponents, relish for violence, a blizzard of propaganda and lies. Last January, at what was probably the peak of his power following the raid on Venezuela, he declared that only “my own morality, my own mind,” could stop him from doing anything he wanted around the world.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But Trump is too shallow, undisciplined, and selfish to lead a great movement with an idealistic vision of the state that can outlive him. He has spent much of his second term distracted by vanity construction projects and self-enrichment schemes. His lifelong attraction to crassly beautiful women has become, in his less priapic ninth decade, an attraction to crassly rich men—Elon Musk, Larry Ellison, Jensen Huang. Trump, his family, and his circle have shown their contempt for the MAGA base by descending into unprecedented depths of corruption at a time of rising prices and interest rates. A competent dictator wouldn’t lose touch with the people whose voice he claims to be. He wouldn’t allow his regime to take the place of the arrogant elites who had served as foils on his way to power. He wouldn’t keep harping on his new ballroom. Trump is a failed fascist.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Just as Americans who have known no system other than liberal democracy struggle to imagine its downfall, to understand an authoritarian American president, we tried to compare him to analogues past and present. When Trump was first elected, in 2016, a friend said, “We have to hope he’s Berlusconi, not Mussolini.” Trump is both, and the mix of showman and strongman makes him harder to predict than either one separately. It’s intellectually more straightforward to think of him in the mold of a figure like Vladimir Putin than, say, Alberto Fujimori. It’s also emotionally more satisfying: The lines are clear; the stakes couldn’t be higher; a great battle is on. When, a year ago, I wrote the words “We are living in an authoritarian state,” I felt a shudder of fear and gloom, but also, unmistakably, of excitement.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I thought that in his second term Trump would focus single-mindedly on keeping and using power. In the first year he did, and many of us worried that in the second year he might rig or annul the midterms. This wasn’t a far-fetched concern: Trump tried to change voting rules, disqualify registered voters, intimidate election officials with threats of criminal charges, mobilize the Justice Department to challenge results. With election denialists holding key state offices and rogue immigration agents possibly guarding the polls, Trump could keep an irrevocably gerrymandered Congress Republican and harden MAGA’s lock on power. Then he might find a way to continue as president for a third term or install one of his children in the White House.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;None of this was a fever dream, but it gave Trump too much credit. As it turned out, the midterms held his attention only fitfully. When courts struck down his executive orders, he didn’t defy them. When people in Minneapolis found the courage to protest the thugs with guns who were terrorizing their neighbors and killing American citizens, Trump backed off. Almost on a whim, he started a ruinous war with Iran. While his popularity sank, he went about relining the Reflecting Pool, changing the interior design of the White House ballroom, and enlarging plans for the Triumphal Arch. He spent a lot of time organizing garish celebrations of America’s 250th birthday, claiming it as his own. Actually governing the country hardly seemed to interest him. His appearances in the fall campaign grew more and more bizarre—no one remembers anything from those speeches except a few obscene insults and a peculiar fixation on a Republican senator’s buttocks. Historical analogies pointed to the Roman emperor Caligula. And when, on November 3, the voters gave a shattering blow to Trump and his movement—a loss too big to rig or overturn—his initial response was a shrug. After all, his name wasn’t on the ballot. Within the gilded walls of his own mind, he remained undiminished.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Whereas Trump proved unequal to the demands of holding autocratic power, American democracy in 2026 showed a resilience that seemed to have disappeared in 2025. A year ago I thought that little stood between Trump and the consolidation of authoritarian rule. The institutions were hollow and the elites spineless. But this year two of those institutions made sure that the public would have a say: the federal courts and the state and local election system. Almost every attempt by the administration to change voting rules, interfere with election officials, and manipulate the vote count was blocked by the courts, including, in at least one case, the Supreme Court. Election officials around the country resisted the administration’s efforts to intimidate them. Norden, of the Brennan Center, said, “We are lucky that we have a very decentralized election system in the U.S., and the states and civil society were able to take advantage of that to be ready for the assault.” So the people would get a chance to speak.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/11/future-democracy/689280/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: How Americans defeated an autocrat-in-waiting&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Despite Trump’s abysmal ratings, I hadn’t forgotten that this electorate returned him to power after he had summoned a mob to try to stop the peaceful transition of power for the first time since the Civil War. Nothing has ever shaken my faith in my compatriots like a presidential election in which the price of eggs mattered more than the fate of democracy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The midterms showed that democracy still matters to most Americans—fitfully, like Trump’s interest in ruling, and not necessarily as a set of abstract concepts called &lt;i&gt;separation of powers&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;i&gt;rule of law&lt;/i&gt;, and &lt;i&gt;independent judiciary&lt;/i&gt;, but in a more visceral way, as a sense of fairness and common decency. Few Americans cared about the destruction of foreign aid by a private citizen who happens to be the richest man in the world. The firing of inspectors general across the federal government aroused little protest. But this didn’t mean that the public had entirely lost its self-respect. Americans who voted for Trump three times were still capable of turning against him.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Throughout the year, offense at Trump’s callous excesses slowly rose until it became unstoppable. His greatest mistake was thinking that his spectacular corruption would be of no concern to ordinary people, as if grift on a grand scale came with the divine right to rule. Americans are more likely to ignore abuses of power when times are good. But in a year when health premiums along with the price of gas and diesel spiked, Trump’s gold ballroom and Qatari jet affronted a people who apparently still believe that they are their own masters in a self-governing republic. They just had to be reminded.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It was better to exaggerate than underrate Trump’s ability to bring 250 years of democracy to an end. For a distracted and amnesiac people, sleepwalking into authoritarianism remains a risk; the vigilance aroused by Trump’s lawless presidency should be our constant state. But those 250 years have left expectations and habits in American minds that, though they might disappear for a time, are not easily killed.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>George Packer</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/george-packer/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/QOmClfjFftu-QphOVpS0J3JtZYs=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_18_Trump_Packer_16x9/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by Adam Maida / The Atlantic. Source: Sarah Silbiger / Bloomberg / Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">My Apology to American Democracy</title><published>2026-11-22T08:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-22T08:17:56-05:00</updated><summary type="html">I underestimated voters’ sense of self-respect.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/doomerism-elections-authoritarianism-trump/689493/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689524</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;P&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;resident Trump&lt;/span&gt; and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have a ready answer to the question of how the nine-month conflict with Iran has gone: &lt;i&gt;We won&lt;/i&gt;. But the administration has done just about everything in its power to obstruct scrutiny of that dubious claim, hiding from the public the full cost of the operation in both lives and money.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;When Senator Chris Murphy, a Democrat from Connecticut, headed to the Persian Gulf last month, he made what would once have been considered a routine request to visit Al Udeid, the giant U.S. air base outside the capital of Qatar that is home to the regional headquarters of Central Command. Typically, the base is home to 10,000 troops and more than 100 aircraft. Iran pounded it with air strikes soon after Trump launched the Iran war in February, but the conflict was largely paused when Murphy showed up.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Murphy sits on the Senate Appropriations Committee, which must decide how the government spends taxpayer money. It’s the committee that has to sign off on expected funding requests to repair Al Udeid and other bases hit by Iranian attacks, as well as the extra $67 billion the administration has sought for war costs. Murphy requested a tour, a briefing, anything that could help him make an assessment of the damage and cost of repairs. The Pentagon said no. When Republican Senator Joni Ernst of Iowa, an Army veteran who sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee, made her own trip to the Gulf around the same time, the Defense Department told her that she would not be able to conduct base visits, a person familiar with the matter told me. Ernst’s office did not reply to a request for comment.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Behind the rebuffs lies a decision made by Hegseth early in the war to discourage congressional travel to the region. The Pentagon couldn’t ban lawmakers from heading to the Middle East. But Hegseth instructed the Pentagon’s legislative office to “inform the appropriate congressional leadership that DoW support to congressional delegation visits will be unavailable,” according to a March 3 memo I reviewed. (DoW is an acronym for the Department of War, Hegseth’s preferred name for the Department of Defense.) To emphasize the point, the memo added: “No DoW support shall be made available for congressional travel to the USCENTCOM AOR without my approval.” (U.S. Central Command is in charge of war operations; AOR stands for “area of responsibility.”) Perhaps the edict made sense in the war’s earliest days. But the campaign had &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/11/iran-war-trump-limbo/689471/?utm_source=feed"&gt;already been in limbo&lt;/a&gt; for many months by the time Murphy and Ernst made their requests. The policy remains in effect.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Senators aren’t the only people being denied access. Early in the war, the U.S. military provided a drumbeat of information about how the war was going. But that information was highly selective: The Defense Department offered a tally of “targets struck” (13,000 in the initial weeks) and the hardware deployed. The Pentagon regularly turned down media requests for more detail, citing “operational security.” And it has allowed only a handful of reporters to embed with troops, far fewer than in previous wars.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Hegseth and General Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, also held sporadic press conferences at the start of the conflict, during which Hegseth detailed how much of Iran’s military had been destroyed. The secretary insisted that the U.S. military was being transparent and that anyone who thought otherwise was trying to attack the president or was being unpatriotic. (This was &lt;i&gt;after &lt;/i&gt;he had severely restricted media access to the Pentagon and vowed to go after purported leaks.) But as the war ground on, the press conferences stopped. Hegseth hadn’t held one since early May until last week, when he used the occasion to argue against &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/11/pete-hegseth-thomas-massie-impeachment/689353/?utm_source=feed"&gt;an effort to impeach him&lt;/a&gt; by a congressman of his own party.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/archive/2025/10/pentagon-press-corps-hegseth/684570/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The last days of the Pentagon press corps&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Although Congress and the public have continued to pose questions that are central to understanding the war, the administration has provided only inadequate answers.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What exactly led to a U.S. strike on a school in Minab, Iran, on the first day of the war, killing more than 170 civilians? A targeting error was reportedly to blame, but a Centcom report on the incident has not been released, and Hegseth has never addressed the cause.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;How much damage have Iran’s strikes done to U.S. facilities in the Middle East? What little we know comes largely from photos taken by witnesses that were posted to social media, satellite images (many of them released by Iranian media), and outside estimates.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What happened to U.S. citizens and government personnel in the region? We learned details of the hasty evacuation of military families from the giant Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain only when some of the evacuees &lt;a href="https://www.ms.now/news/military-families-retreat-navy-base-bahrain"&gt;claimed&lt;/a&gt;, months later, that the Pentagon had treated them poorly.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What has the war done to the supply of air-defense missiles? The Trump administration has banned some news organizations from the White House, citing their reporting on the dramatic shortfalls, among other factors.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;How many times has Iran hit U.S. bases in the region? Some significant attacks have not been disclosed, including missile strikes on the &lt;a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/us-air-operations-center-qatar-severely-damaged-iran/"&gt;air command center at Al Udeid&lt;/a&gt; or on a &lt;a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-marines-injured-recent-iranian-attack-rcna600097"&gt;U.S. ship&lt;/a&gt; in the Strait of Hormuz, both of which were later reported by the media. What were the circumstances that caused the deaths of 23 American service members and injuries to more than 850 others? And is that casualty count even accurate?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Trump is now considering resuming strikes on Iran in an attempt to head off the reconstitution of its nuclear and missile programs, despite the strong signal of disapproval that voters sent in the midterms. Plans for a renewed escalation are on his desk, and he has told Vice President Vance not to make any overtures to Tehran, saying the time for diplomacy is over. The information vacuum of the last nine months means that even as the president contemplates taking the nation back into conflict, we have a limited picture of what has already happened.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;H&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;egseth’s disdain for the press&lt;/span&gt; and for engaging with Congress began long before the war. Before his 2025 confirmation hearings, he declined to hold customary meetings with most Democratic senators on the Senate Armed Services Committee. Once in office, he barred even very senior Pentagon officials from engaging Congress without authorization.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pentagon officials have provided a series of classified briefings on the Iran war for lawmakers. U.S. Central Command told me that it has engaged with them roughly 60 times this year, through testimony, briefings, and phone calls. But the Pentagon’s flow of information has been restricted to partisan allies. Republican Senator Mike Rounds of South Dakota this week criticized the Pentagon for excluding Democrats from classified briefings about threats while defense officials are asking Congress for new funding. The same has happened in the House. “Pretty tough to ask all of my colleagues to support that, if they’re not even invited in to hear the information in the first place,” Rounds told Hung Cao, Trump’s nominee to lead the Navy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Military officials have also limited disclosures to official government watchdogs. In a September report on the costs of the war, the Congressional Budget Office—Capitol Hill’s resident bean counter—was forced to piece together information, largely from public reporting, to estimate the value of lost equipment (at least $1.9 billion, it concluded) because the Pentagon didn’t respond to its requests for information. Pentagon officials have estimated the cost of the war’s operations and replacement of munitions at about $48 billion as of mid-November, but many people believe that the full tally is far higher. Senator Elizabeth Warren, a Democrat, and several Senate colleagues complained last month that the Pentagon provided only a classified cost estimate that they were unable to share with the public. The State Department had no such qualms and disclosed its own estimate for the repair of U.S. diplomatic facilities in the region: about $184 million through the end of June.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/08/shortage-weapons-shaping-war-iran/688201/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: How the U.S. squandered its strategic advantage&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Pentagon has said it can’t provide a cost estimate for the damage because officials haven’t decided what and where to rebuild. A spokesperson for the Pentagon declined to provide an on-the-record comment for this story.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Murphy told me he has been trying to fill in some of the information gaps. “How on earth could we make decisions that we are empowered by the Constitution to make about whether we fund war if we can’t see it?” he said during an event last month.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Of course, there is always an element of political grandstanding to lawmaker trips. But lawmakers have asserted their prerogative to make fact-finding missions as part of the U.S. system of checks and balances. Some congressional staff members told me they understood the Pentagon would want to avoid diverting resources during an active fight. And one former Biden administration official told me that, early in the Ukraine war, the administration at times barred lawmakers from traveling to Kyiv. But the Pentagon ultimately relaxed the ban and made security arrangements to support lawmakers’ visits, even though the Ukraine war, unlike the Iran war, is not one where the U.S. has been a direct participant.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Robert Wilkie, who served as the Pentagon’s top legislative-affairs official during the Iraq War, told me that Hegseth’s blanket ban on access for lawmakers marked a departure from a practice that dated to at least World War II. Military leaders may not have always loved the spectacle associated with those visits, but they knew such trips were an essential part of congressional oversight. They’re also a tool the military uses to persuade lawmakers to favor bigger budgets. As Wilkie put it, referring to the gun-slinging action hero of the 20th century: “The commanders understand that it’s ‘No bucks, no Buck Rogers.’”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;T&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;he Pentagon’s disclosures&lt;/span&gt; about the war’s toll on military personnel have been limited and obscured by bureaucratic choices. A Pentagon-run website lists the deaths and injuries of service members for all major U.S. conflicts going back to World War I. But in July, four deaths and dozens of injuries disappeared from its totals for Operation Epic Fury, the military’s name for the Iran war. At first, the Pentagon blamed a “data disruption” and said that there was no effort to mask the true toll. Days later, the website was updated with a new category: “Overseas Operations.” The deaths and injuries that had disappeared reemerged under the new listing. Officials pointed to a letter Trump had sent to Congress claiming that a new conflict with Iran had started on July 7.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some of the service members wounded in Iranian attacks have said that the military downplayed or dismissed their injuries. The Defense Department’s division of casualties into two categories makes it harder for the public to see the total toll. The Pentagon has defended the system’s accuracy despite what it has described as “website glitches.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/07/top-gun-hegseth-pentagon-leadership/687997/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The Top Gun: Maverick theory of Pete Hegseth&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Hegseth has at times appeared dismissive of casualties. A drone attack in the opening days of the war killed six troops at Port Shuaiba in Kuwait. When reporters sought details, Hegseth accused the press of hyping the loss. “When a few drones get through or tragic things happen, it’s front-page news,” he told reporters at a news conference on March 4. “The press only wants to make the president look bad.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Congress’s new Democratic leaders can be &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/10/democrats-impeachment-plans-hegseth-pentagon/689195/?utm_source=feed"&gt;expected to push&lt;/a&gt; the Pentagon on its handling of casualties when they take over early next year. Hegseth and Trump may want to portray the war as a victory already in hand. But the defense secretary still needs lawmakers on at least one front: money. In a video statement before the planned impeachment vote, Hegseth included a pitch for the administration’s $1.5 trillion military budget request and for tens of billions more to cover the already sunk costs of the Iran war—whatever those really are.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Missy Ryan</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/missy-ryan/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/IoNgrvJmTKckxz1widvM-3s8_BI=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_19_Pentagon_Still_Hiding_Toll_of_Iran_War/original.jpg"><media:credit>Pete Kiehart / Bloomberg / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">What We Don’t Know About the Iran War</title><published>2026-11-22T07:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-22T14:27:42-05:00</updated><summary type="html">The president is thinking about restarting the conflict while continuing to obscure information about the cost.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/11/iran-war-pentagon-information-access/689524/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689511</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;i&gt;This is an edition of The&lt;/i&gt; Atlantic&lt;i&gt; Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. &lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/atlantic-daily/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Sign up for it here.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Welcome back to The Daily’s Sunday culture edition, in which one &lt;i&gt;Atlantic&lt;/i&gt; writer or editor reveals what’s keeping them entertained. Today’s special guest is Fiza Kuzhiyil, an assistant editor on the Community team who works on &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/games/rabbithole/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Rabbithole&lt;/a&gt;, the magazine’s daily trivia game.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Fiza has dedicated her year to a timeless read: &lt;i&gt;Anna Karenina&lt;/i&gt;. She also enjoys the movie &lt;i&gt;Club Kid&lt;/i&gt;, playing &lt;i&gt;Overcooked 2&lt;/i&gt; with her brother, and visiting the Rothko Chapel when she goes home to Houston.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;— &lt;a data-event-element="inline link" data-gtm-vis-first-on-screen31117857_899="222" data-gtm-vis-has-fired31117857_899="1" data-gtm-vis-total-visible-time31117857_899="100" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/author/stephanie-bai/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Stephanie Bai, senior associate editor&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Culture Survey&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;The last thing that made me cry: &lt;/b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Club Kid&lt;/i&gt;—a touching story about what happens when the party is over. This film is the grown-up version of the only Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson movie I have ever seen: the 2007 Disney classic (at least in my household) &lt;i&gt;The Game Plan&lt;/i&gt;. Rather than depicting the queer party scene as a hedonistic trap,&lt;i&gt; Club Kid&lt;/i&gt; celebrates it as a source of real joy and community. This film feels like the Uber ride home after a party, so how could I—someone who cries at the end of a hangout because I’m so grateful for my friends—not leave in tears?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;The last thing that made me snort with laughter: &lt;/b&gt;Also &lt;i&gt;Club Kid&lt;/i&gt;. If you’re as online as I am, you’ll roll your eyes at the meme-speak, but it’s impossible not to laugh when you get the references—the kind that make you feel seen, then immediately worried about your screen time.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Best novel I’ve recently read: &lt;/b&gt;Instead of setting a numerical reading goal this year, a friend and I decided to commit to one great, long classic: &lt;a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9780199536061"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Anna Karenina&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. When people ask me if I’ve read anything good recently, I almost always skip over it, not because it didn’t rank, but because what more is there to say than &lt;i&gt;Anna Karenina&lt;/i&gt; is the best novel of all time? I can hardly add to what these 19th-century Russian characters have already described about the emotions that I also know—emotions so familiar, they transcend language. Reading it showed me how everyone who came before me has expressed the same thrills, fears, and heartbreaks that I have. The joy of experiencing this novel comes not from deep revelations of plot, but from immersing yourself in the lives of these characters; or, in Leo Tolstoy’s own words, “Pleasure lies not in discovering truth, but in seeking it.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;A quiet song that I love, and a loud song that I love: &lt;/b&gt;“Oh, What a World,” by Kacey Musgraves is always my reminder to be quiet, listen to the world, and take note of my senses. Its counter in my life is the rhapsodic “Trinidad,” by Geese, which is my reminder to accept the tension buzzing among everything I see, hear, and touch. That being said, my loved ones don’t find it amusing when I let go of these tensions by randomly yelling the lyrics to this song (“THERE’S A BOMB IN MY CAR”).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;A musical artist who means a lot to me: &lt;/b&gt;Lorde’s four-year music-release cycles have aligned perfectly with major chapters of my life. I made a big cross-country move listening to &lt;i&gt;Pure Heroine&lt;/i&gt;, spent late nights in high school with &lt;i&gt;Melodrama&lt;/i&gt;, emerged from the pandemic bubble with &lt;i&gt;Solar Power&lt;/i&gt;, and started my first years out of college with &lt;i&gt;Virgin&lt;/i&gt;. I saw her three times on her most recent tour, and each time, she sang and spoke about the same themes many artists do—&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2025/06/lorde-virgin-review/683345/?utm_source=feed"&gt;love, loss, youth, autonomy&lt;/a&gt;—but the rawness and precision in her delivery has always affected me a step above the others.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;A painting, sculpture, or other piece of visual art that I cherish: &lt;/b&gt;The Rothko Chapel in Houston, both a nondenominational meditative space and an art exhibition, is the only place of worship I visit regularly. I was lucky to have lived on the same street as the chapel for some time. Whenever I feel disoriented or untethered, a quiet moment with the blackout triptychs feels baptismal.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Something I recently revisited: &lt;/b&gt;My Beatles album ranking—I was always a &lt;i&gt;Sgt. Pepper&lt;/i&gt; girl, but I think I’m entering a &lt;i&gt;Rubber Soul&lt;/i&gt; time of my life.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;A piece of journalism that recently changed my perspective on a topic: &lt;/b&gt;Some of my D.C. friends call me the one-woman Houston Department of Tourism—which is to say that I won’t shut up about Houston or Texas. Inevitably, non-Texans ask me about Buc-ee’s, the behemoth of a gas station. For a while, its outsize Texas-ness felt like a point of cultural pride; I liked being asked about it. But Forrest Wilder’s &lt;a href="https://thebaffler.com/outbursts/leave-it-to-beaver-wilder"&gt;essay in &lt;i&gt;The Baffler&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt; about the company’s water-rights battles and the cost taxpayers incur for its expansion changed the way I felt about letting Buc-ee’s represent me or my state. I may still wear my beaver-printed running shorts, but I think differently about allowing a corporation to serve as a cultural marker.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;My favorite way of wasting time on my phone: &lt;/b&gt;I am delighted by the recent obsession with browser games among my friends. &lt;a href="https://krillion.io/"&gt;Krillion&lt;/a&gt; rewards obscure and rare answers with more points, which, frankly, panders well to my uniqueness complex. I also spend too much time playing &lt;a href="https://catfishing.net/"&gt;Catfishing&lt;/a&gt;, but I consider it “research” for the trivia questions I write for &lt;i&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/i&gt;’s &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/games/rabbithole/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Rabbithole game&lt;/a&gt; (shameless plug).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Something delightful introduced to me by a kid in my life: &lt;/b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Overcooked 2&lt;/i&gt;. I don’t know if I’d call the game itself delightful, because I often take breaks so as to not get too angry, but I am delighted by how my little brother and I are forced to communicate better when we play it. I once preferred the soothing music and satisfying chopping of &lt;i&gt;Cooking Mama &lt;/i&gt;on Nintendo DS, but my brother put me on to the new wave of cooking games: cooperative, stressful, and fast-paced. A major perk of our large sibling age gap is that our daily functions rarely overlap, so we have few reasons to get mad at each other. But through &lt;i&gt;Overcooked&lt;/i&gt;, we have finally found a way.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Here are three Sunday reads from &lt;i&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/major-server-outage-response/689486/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Ian Bogost: What on earth is going on?&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/robert-pattinson-james-bond-casting/689468/?utm_source=feed"&gt;The real reason Robert Pattinson is the new James Bond&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/kennedy-trump-arch-arlington/689478/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Maxwell Taylor Kennedy: Trump’s arch must be stopped.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Week Ahead&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ol&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt34966140/"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Focker-in-Law&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, a new installment in the &lt;i&gt;Meet the Parents &lt;/i&gt;comedy franchise, starring Robert De Niro and Ariana Grande (in theaters Wednesday)&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt18224594/"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Blade Runner 2099&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, a sci-fi series set in the dystopian world of the &lt;i&gt;Blade Runner 2049&lt;/i&gt; film, 50 years later (streaming Wednesday on Prime Video)&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9780593188989"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Long Wave&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, a novel by Daisy Johnson about three generations of women and the family secrets that begin to unravel when a toddler is found alone on a remote island (out Tuesday)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Essay&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img alt="Illusrtation of Jason and Lucia from 'GTA 6' walking toward the viewer, leaving behind an explosion of money and household objects." height="4688" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_16_GTA/original.png" width="8334"&gt;
&lt;figcaption class="caption"&gt;Illustration by Tina Zhou / The Atlantic&lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Least Productive Day of the Year&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;By Sophia Nguyen&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kelsey Rogers, a 26-year-old working in construction in San Antonio, Texas, didn’t want to tell her boss why she was asking for time off. First, she chalked it up to “personal reasons.” Then she said her birthday was coming up. But eventually, she came clean: She wanted to play &lt;i&gt;Grand Theft Auto VI &lt;/i&gt;right when the game dropped, on November 19. Rogers had big plans—decorating with neon lights, stocking up on energy drinks, adorning those drinks with little paper umbrellas. She and her fiancé were going to play until their eyes gave out.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;She didn’t have to worry: Her boss admitted that he was taking time off for the same reason. “I don’t think the company’s even going to be up and running for probably two or three days,” Rogers told me. If you’ve got a metal roof that needs replacing in south-central Texas, it just might have to wait.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/gta-6-launch-time-off-work/689466/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read the full article.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;More in Culture&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/2026/11/ai-text-message-analysis-friendship/689436/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Anna Holmes: ChatGPT analyzed 32,245 of my text messages.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/confessions-of-a-shopaholic-future-of-shopping-loneliness/689455/?utm_source=feed"&gt;The loneliness of buying too many things&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/2026/11/sarah-j-maas-acotar-second-screen-reading/689474/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Welcome to the era of second-screen reading.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Catch Up on &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/2027/01/albania-kushner-flamingo-revolution/689407/?utm_source=feed"&gt;How Jared Kushner sparked a revolution in the Balkans&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/11/democrat-investigations-trump-allies/689484/?utm_source=feed"&gt;The likely targets of Democratic investigations&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/trump-xi-putin-summit/689503/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Anne Applebaum on Trump’s embarrassing, inconsequential summit&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Photo Album&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img alt="A view of the historic Rakotzbrucke, a 19th-century bridge built with basalt stones, in Kromlau, Germany" height="1226" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/newsletters/2026/11/original_8/original.jpg" width="1856"&gt;
&lt;figcaption class="caption"&gt;A view of the historic Rakotzbrucke, a 19th-century bridge built with basalt stones, in Kromlau, Germany (Halil Sagirkaya / Anadolu / Getty)&lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;Explore &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photography/2026/11/fall-photos-2026/689253/?utm_source=feed"&gt;images of the season&lt;/a&gt;, as autumn colors reach their peak.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;i data-stringify-type="italic"&gt;Rafaela Jinich contributed to this newsletter.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/free-daily-crossword-puzzle/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Play our daily crossword.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;a href="https://link.theatlantic.com/click/29767897.0/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudGhlYXRsYW50aWMuY29tL25ld3NsZXR0ZXJzLz91dG1fc291cmNlPW5ld3NsZXR0ZXImdXRtX21lZGl1bT1lbWFpbCZ1dG1fY2FtcGFpZ249YXRsYW50aWMtZGFpbHktbmV3c2xldHRlciZ1dG1fY29udGVudD0yMDIyMTEyMQ/61813432e16c7128e42f4628B52865c35"&gt;Explore all of our newsletters.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;em&gt;When you buy a book using a link in this newsletter, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting &lt;/em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;em&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Fiza Kuzhiyil</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/fiza-kuzhiyil/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/jCBtDZeGA_axHPRFY6zkw0-mROw=/156x0:7836x4320/media/newsletters/2026/11/CLUBKID_A252_v2_087455_2xTopazEnhanced/original.jpg"><media:credit>A24</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">A Movie About What Happens When the Party’s Over</title><published>2026-11-22T07:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-22T07:01:56-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Culture and entertainment recommendations including &lt;em&gt;Club Kid&lt;/em&gt;, the Rothko Chapel, and more</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/11/culture-entertainment-recs-club-kid-anna-karenina-nintendo/689511/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689539</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Editor&amp;rsquo;s Note:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;em&gt;Washington Week With The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt; is a partnership between NewsHour Productions, WETA, and &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt; airing every Friday on PBS stations nationwide. &lt;a href="https://www.pbs.org/weta/washingtonweek/tv-listing"&gt;Check your local listings&lt;/a&gt;, watch full episodes &lt;a href="https://www.pbs.org/weta/washingtonweek/"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;, or listen to the weekly podcast &lt;a href="https://www.pbs.org/weta/washingtonweek/podcast"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;President Trump is back in Washington after a week in Asia, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. On &lt;em&gt;Washington Week With The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;, panelists joined to discuss the summit and more.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;When Trump arrived in China, he was greeted on the tarmac by Xi. “For somebody who is so concerned with optics, who has been so built around the idea of his own personal image, I think that actually does play a lot into this,” Adam Harris, the host of &lt;em&gt;Radio&lt;/em&gt; &lt;em&gt;Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;, said of Trump last night. But, Harris argued, while the president conducts a “shaking-hands-and-slapping-back sort of diplomacy,” the rest of the world “acknowledges that this isn’t necessarily anything but smoke.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;Joining the editor in chief of &lt;em&gt;The&lt;/em&gt; &lt;em&gt;Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;, Jeffrey Goldberg, to discuss this and more: Susan Glasser, a staff writer at &lt;em&gt;The New Yorker&lt;/em&gt;; Harris; Liz Landers, a White House correspondent at PBS News; and Nancy Youssef, a staff writer at &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;Watch the full episode &lt;a href="https://www.pbs.org/weta/washingtonweek/video/2026/11/washington-week-with-the-atlantic-full-episode-112026"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="oembed" data-oembed-name="www.youtube.com" data-oembed-src="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHdrUGZX_jw"&gt;&lt;iframe allow="autoplay; fullscreen; encrypted-media; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="true" class="embedly-embed" frameborder="0" height="480" scrolling="no" src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FZHdrUGZX_jw%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DZHdrUGZX_jw&amp;amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FZHdrUGZX_jw%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;amp;schema=youtube" title="YouTube embed" width="854"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><author><name>The Editors</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/the-editors/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/mVP8oIJnVmvc1LFHN3CyiA-O5IE=/11x0:2989x1674/media/img/mt/2026/11/Screenshot_2026_11_21_at_8.43.07AM/original.png"><media:credit>Courtesy of Washington Week With The Atlantic</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">What Trump’s Summit in China Reveals</title><published>2026-11-21T11:18:16-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-21T16:18:45-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Panelists on &lt;em&gt;Washington Week With The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt; joined to discuss the president’s week in China with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national/2026/11/trump-summit-china-washington-week/689539/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689538</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;A lot of NFL games this time of year are as appealing as day-old oatmeal. By late November, half of the teams in the league have a losing record and muddle around at midfield. Coaches call plays that seem calculated to keep their job, soothe critics, and justify their run-pass and go-or-no-go decisions to their owners. Sunday night’s matchup between the San Francisco 49ers and the Minnesota Vikings, however, will be genuine must-see TV for anyone interested in artful, inventive football—and for anyone who cares about leadership.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Kyle Shanahan, the head coach of the 49ers, and Brian Flores, the Vikings’ defensive coordinator, are the two most nonconformist minds in the NFL, and each has been punished at times for high-risk unorthodoxy. They will bring the No. 1 offense and the No. 1 defense, respectively, to the game—a meeting that promises to be revealing for each of them. These guys take &lt;em&gt;chances&lt;/em&gt;, and they are worth watching to see how comfortable they are with the consequences of their decisions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Both go all-in with their play-calling. According to a &lt;a href="https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/kyle-shanahan-brian-flores-vikings-49ers-matchup-modern-nfl/"&gt;CBS Sports analysis&lt;/a&gt;, Shanahan leads the league in sending all five eligible receivers downfield, declining to hold anything back for extra quarterback protection. The same analysis found Flores leading the league in blitzing—sending at least five men rushing headlong at the passer—at risk of leaving gaps on the field. “There’s going to be a lot of hit and miss both ways,” Shanahan &lt;a href="https://49ers.1rmg.com/transcripts/head-coach-kyle-shanahan-press-conference_11-18-26/"&gt;said at a press conference&lt;/a&gt; this week.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/health/2026/09/nfl-australia-jet-lag-49ers-rams/688577/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The Los Angeles Rams are trying to defeat time&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Shanahan has lost the Super Bowl three agonizing times as a head coach or deputy. In 2017, he was blamed for surrendering the biggest comeback in the game’s history as the play caller for the Atlanta Falcons, who at one point had led the New England Patriots 28–3, only to be defeated in overtime. Shanahan’s own quarterback, Matt Ryan, openly second-guessed his decisions in the aftermath. Three years later, Shanahan was back in the game with the 49ers and lost a 10-point lead to the Kansas City Chiefs. In 2024, he lost another Lombardi Trophy to the Chiefs in overtime, 25–22. “Everyone talks to me about &lt;em&gt;How do you live with what happened in the Super Bowl?&lt;/em&gt;” Shanahan told me a few years ago. He said that if he makes a wrong call, “I never regret it. I’m like, &lt;em&gt;Fuck it. Maybe I didn’t make the right call.&lt;/em&gt;”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As for Flores, he won four Super Bowls as an assistant coach with the Patriots before becoming the Miami Dolphins’ head coach, and then was fired in 2022 despite having gone 10–6 and 9–8 in his final two seasons. When he couldn’t get another head-coaching job, he risked retaliation and career immolation by filing a racial-discrimination class-action suit against the NFL, which is headed to court.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;His creative defense has carried the 7–2 Vikings all season by blitzing at a rate of more than 70 percent. “The only regrets I ever have come when we didn’t blitz,” Flores said at a press conference this month. To put the numbers in context, no other team in the league blitzes much more than 40 percent of the time, avoiding it for fear of giving up foolish-looking big plays. “Usually, people get got, if you do it too much,” Shanahan told journalists this week. “That’s what’s been so impressive.” The Vikings have allowed 12 touchdowns all season, but have sacked opposing quarterbacks 37 times.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One reason Flores’s strategy has been so successful is that he is a master of disguise. He gives his players discretion to make on-the-fly adjustments, so opposing teams have trouble knowing who is coming and frequently hesitate or are thrown into confusion. The Vikings’ 37 sacks have come from a dozen different players, which means quarterbacks often don’t know where to look.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/2026/07/american-sports-culture-origins/687302/?utm_source=feed"&gt;From the July 2026 issue: As American as the forward pass&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But the Vikings will meet an equal and opposing force in the 49ers, who are 8–1. Most teams regularly commit at least one receiver to help protect the quarterback. Not these guys. Shanahan fans out an array of versatile, sticky-handed speed burners, including Christian McCaffrey, who runs like a downhill boulder, and the human streamer kite George Kittle. Opponents wrench their necks trying to cover 11 players who have caught five or more passes. According to the CBS Sports analysis, the 49ers play “five out” on 80.1 percent of their passing plays. They don’t attack for the sake of attacking; instead, they deploy a coherent design that creates vertical and horizontal states of emergency for the other team. “It’s thought out,” Flores &lt;a href="https://www.foxsports.com/articles/nfl/vikings49ers-matchup-in-mexico-features-the-best-defense-vs-the-best-offense"&gt;said&lt;/a&gt; at a press conference this week. “There’s a rhyme and reason behind it all.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Shanahan and Flores are not flinchers. In a 2022 podcast, Shanahan &lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FOT-RiUnYEY"&gt;explained&lt;/a&gt; his play-calling philosophy: “It’s not ever going to be based off of, &lt;em&gt;Yeah, this is probably a little risky to do this. I totally believe it’s right, but I’m not going to do it, because it’s risky, perception-wise, and this could get me blamed&lt;/em&gt;,” he said, and added, “That’s not what you want from a play caller. That’s not what you want from a leader.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This will be one game that doesn’t need Carrie Underwood’s “Waiting All Day for Sunday Night” power-yodeling to amp it up. On exhibit will be two strong decision makers who have prepared as thoroughly as possible, make their calls clearheadedly, and don’t worry about appearances.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Sally Jenkins</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/sally-jenkins/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/IPbTMWzxVfBFykt4r6I2VIqhodc=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_20_49_Vikings/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by The Atlantic. Source: Adam Bettcher / Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Two Risk-Takers Walk Into a Football Stadium</title><published>2026-11-21T09:05:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-21T16:18:28-05:00</updated><summary type="html">When the 49ers and Vikings play this weekend, the most nonconformist coaching minds in the NFL will face off.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/vikings-49ers-coaching/689538/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689535</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;H&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;ollywood earned &lt;/span&gt;its cultural monopoly by absorbing radical technologies that it first resisted: sound, color, computer graphics. People in the industry initially feared that Pixar’s computer animation would replace human actors with “digital doubles.” Similarly, most of the conversation about AI today revolves around cost savings and artist displacement. These issues are important, but they miss an even bigger shift that AI is accelerating. Ask a teenager where their favorite characters come from, and the answer is as likely to be a creator platform—YouTube, Roblox, TikTok—as a Hollywood studio. Unless moviemakers evolve, they risk losing their place at the center of culture. Those who combine new technology with storytelling, and who bring audiences into the creative process, will define the next century of entertainment.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Silicon Valley and Hollywood went through a version of this before, during the early partnership between Pixar and Disney that was crucial to Pixar’s success. Disney storytellers gave Pixar pointed feedback on early Pixar characters, leading John Lasseter, Pete Docter, and the rest of the brain trust to take screenwriting classes. Pixar didn’t believe that technical people were any less creative than artists. Every discipline mattered. The result: &lt;i&gt;Toy Story&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Disney didn’t produce &lt;i&gt;Toy Story&lt;/i&gt; by hiring more CGI artists into its 2-D pipeline. Instead, it partnered with Pixar, whose mission was to make movies with the new technology, and eventually acquired it. Pixar had tech that worked, artists who were intimate with it, and a culture of mutual admiration among its artistic and technological creators. Disney had marketing, distribution, major capital, logistical know-how, and a glorious legacy. Neither could build what the other had.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Something similar needs to happen now. Hollywood has an opportunity to partner with studios built for AI, but the rise of creator culture will make the transition harder. During the shift to computer animation and graphics in the 1980s and ’90s, the distribution formats stayed the same—theaters, home video, and broadcast. Today, format, distribution, and production technology are changing all at once.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/07/animation-industry-ai-hollywood-job-cuts/687830/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The corner of Hollywood that’s most susceptible to AI&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;YouTube made more than $60 billion last year, about $15 billion more than Netflix brought in. To keep up, Hollywood studios are adapting properties from creator platforms. They found success with &lt;i&gt;Backrooms&lt;/i&gt; (which cost about $10 million to make but collected more than $400 million at the box office) and &lt;i&gt;Obsession&lt;/i&gt; (less than $1 million to make; more than $520 million at the box office), and are now rushing to find more YouTube properties and talent. Though this is smart, these audiences were formed and cultivated on other platforms. The &lt;i&gt;Minecraft&lt;/i&gt; movie made almost $1 billion, a fraction of the game franchise’s $10 to $12 billion. The movie was effectively a marketing event for the game.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;AI didn’t cause the shift to creator platforms, but it will accelerate it. MrBeast, who has more than 500 million YouTube subscribers, built an empire without AI, but the technology allows would-be creators to realize their visions, and it enables existing creators to work more efficiently.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But what about the ethics of using AI models that were trained on artists’ work without their permission or payment? Artists should be compensated for the work that was used to train models. These issues need to be settled in court and through regulation and licensing. The technology won’t go away, so we need artists to help set its terms.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But rejecting AI altogether is not the answer. Across Asia, creators face many of the same concerns, but the technological and cultural shift is further along. In China, &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/microdramas-festival-vertical-entertainment/689361/?utm_source=feed"&gt;microdramas&lt;/a&gt;—scripted series typically filmed in portrait mode and designed for smartphone viewing, with episodes lasting one to three minutes—have compressed the distance between creation, distribution, and monetization; generative AI fits naturally into an industrial ecosystem built around rapid iteration, low production costs, and huge volumes of content. In Korea, webtoons and web novels move across streaming, games, music, and other formats. In India, a multilingual audience creates especially strong incentives for AI-assisted dubbing. It is a misperception that creators in the global South care less about copyright, labor costs, or artistic integrity—if anything, Asia’s creator industries are quickly converging with the West on these questions. The difference is that much of the experimentation is happening within entertainment industries that have been more entrepreneurial and are more willing to embrace new technology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The first “&lt;i&gt;Toy Story&lt;/i&gt; moment” for both AI and the new formats it enables—a work whose artistic and cultural appeal makes the technology itself almost beside the point—may not be far away. The companies and countries that achieve it first could change perceptions of AI in creative work and accrue outsize cultural reach. In that sense, the U.S.-China technology competition is also becoming a competition over who builds the tools, platforms, and creative communities that shape global culture.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;H&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;ollywood has defined&lt;/span&gt; mainstream culture for a century, and storytelling remains its greatest asset. However, treating YouTube, Roblox, and TikTok as farm systems to feed traditional distribution misses that audiences are on the farm.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Netflix recently laid off 1,000 employees; Disney laid off roughly 1,500 this year and has said more layoffs are coming. Skydance’s co-CEOs have told staff to expect layoffs too. Studios have focused on cutting costs, but Hollywood needs to build for new formats, not just make old ones cheaper.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Hollywood needs to fundamentally shift the way it operates, moving from producing finished products meant for passive consumption to developing stories and characters using input from their audiences. Instead of performing autopsies in hindsight, every major studio could put out drafts and iterate with audiences, the way creators do. Kane Parsons started &lt;i&gt;Backrooms&lt;/i&gt; with one YouTube short and expanded it into a series when audiences responded positively. Vivienne Medrano released a fan-financed YouTube pilot of &lt;i&gt;Hazbin Hotel&lt;/i&gt;; A24 ordered a full series after it drew a huge following.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Refining work using audience input doesn’t mean asking fans to vote on every creative choice. Strong directors have always filtered feedback, taking notes that tighten their narrative and discarding what dilutes their core vision. Borrowing a page from tech, studios could also be much more rigorous with data sourcing, A/B testing, and analysis to understand their audience’s behavior.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This audience-centered approach can be applied to all parts of moviemaking. Films that perform well after an inexpensive tease, such as an animatic (storyboards that are cut together), can secure financing quickly, because financiers aren’t being asked to gamble many millions of dollars on an untested idea. Marketing happens in parallel with production. Your audience becomes not just fans but ambassadors, because they feel they are part of the process. The production becomes part of the story. Markiplier, a YouTuber whose real name is Mark Fischbach, created and financed a film, &lt;i&gt;Iron Lung&lt;/i&gt;, which he planned to release in a small number of independent theaters. His fans emailed exhibitors until national chains picked it up.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Vision is not replaced by data; instead, data can help studios find the audiences for visionary work, position it well, and understand which ambitious projects have real demand before committing hundreds of millions of dollars to them. If Orson Welles could have shared his early ideas with audiences in the 1940s, while making &lt;i&gt;Citizen Kane&lt;/i&gt;, data wouldn’t have diluted the ambition of his deep-focus shots, broken timeline, and montages. Analyzing the public feedback could have helped him find his audience faster.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Hollywood has a finite window to make these changes. Creators who already operate this way, such as MrBeast, are building their own production studios and will have less incentive to partner. Others will follow.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/01/college-students-movies-attention-span/685812/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Rose Horowitch: The film students who can no longer sit through films&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Studios are experimenting by launching short phone series on YouTube and TikTok, signing deals with top creators, and hiring creator-platform experts into executive positions. This is smart, but these initiatives still prioritize bringing existing franchises to new screens over developing stories alongside audiences. Dropping a digital executive into a traditional, risk-averse studio pipeline doesn’t change the entire studio’s culture. The business model, people, and creative culture that make a great film studio differ from those that are best for building a YouTube series or Roblox game.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Hollywood doesn’t need to become a tech company, and Silicon Valley shouldn’t arrogantly assume that tech is superior to a story’s ability to move culture. Legacy studios still have what many creators need: capital, global marketing, distribution know-how, and deep story expertise. Just as Disney secured its future by partnering with and acquiring Pixar, today’s legacy studios need to collaborate with a new class of studios, ones that know how to build on creator platforms, are rooted in Hollywood storytelling, and treat technologists and artists equally.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Disney-Pixar relationship worked because Bob Iger gave Pixar co-founder Ed Catmull real power over Disney Animation. Other Hollywood acquisitions of gaming studios or creator talent have struggled when the acquired company lacked similar authority. A real partnership would allow legacy media to originate ideas on new platforms instead of being licensing arms for new players.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;AI will have its &lt;i&gt;Toy Story &lt;/i&gt;moment. The studios that achieve it will know how to reach audiences on newer platforms, in formats that bring the audience along for the ride.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Maureen Fan</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/maureen-fan/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><author><name>Alvy Ray Smith</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/alvy-ray-smith/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><author><name>Lizzi Lee</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/lizzi-lee/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/v9wjUUUBhuDUERrd4kbXZm2BuEk=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_10_27_AI_Needs_a_Toy_Story_/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by The Atlantic. Source: CSA Images / Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Hollywood Needs a New Pixar</title><published>2026-11-21T08:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-21T16:18:00-05:00</updated><summary type="html">AI is accelerating culture’s move to YouTube, Roblox, and TikTok. Movie studios can make the move that transformed Disney.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/movies-pixar-animation-media/689535/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689518</id><content type="html">&lt;p data-flatplan-paragraph="true"&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;em&gt;This is an edition of The Wonder Reader, a newsletter in which our editors recommend a set of stories to spark your curiosity and fill you with delight. &lt;a data-event-element="inline link" data-gtm-vis-first-on-screen31117857_899="425" data-gtm-vis-has-fired31117857_899="1" data-gtm-vis-total-visible-time31117857_899="100" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/the-wonder-reader/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Sign up here&lt;/a&gt; to get it every Saturday morning.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Between Black Friday deals, holiday gift guides, and the endless stream of targeted ads, it’s hard to avoid the temptation to buy something right now. And with just a few taps on our phones, we can purchase almost anything without having to leave the couch. Shopping has never been easier—or more solitary.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In a new essay, Lily Meyer revisits Sophie Kinsella’s &lt;i&gt;Confessions of a Shopaholic&lt;/i&gt;, 25 years after its publication in the United States, to explore how shopping has become an ever more isolating activity. The novel’s protagonist spends much of her time wandering through stores, accumulating debt. But at least her shopping takes place in the company of other people. Today, much of that experience has moved online, where influencers recommend products with the familiar tone of a friend, even as their relationships with followers remain fundamentally commercial. Meyer argues that modern shopping doesn't just isolate us from others; it can also create the illusion of companionship, blurring the line between genuine connection and consumption. Her essay offers a reminder that shopping can’t substitute for human connection.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Loneliness of Buying Too Many Things&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;By Lily Meyer&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Confessions of a Shopaholic&lt;/em&gt;, 25 years later, suggests that the way we buy things has gotten too isolated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/confessions-of-a-shopaholic-future-of-shopping-loneliness/689455/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read the article.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Shopping Is Impossible&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;By Rachel Sugar&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It’s never been more exhausting to buy stuff.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/2026/08/online-shopping-inescapable/688254/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read the article.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;It’s Too Easy to Buy Stuff You Don’t Want&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;By Amanda Mull&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Online shopping is too fast for good decisions. (&lt;em&gt;From 2023&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2023/11/online-shopping-frictionless-checkout/676067/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read the article.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Still Curious?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;If you are still looking for something to delight the people in your life, &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/holiday-gift-guide-2026/689100/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;b&gt;explore the 2026 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Atlantic&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt; gift guide&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;b&gt;, &lt;/b&gt;where &lt;i&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/i&gt;’s editorial team shares its gift recommendations for this holiday season.&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2025/11/black-friday-nostalgia-shopping-holidays/685062/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Black Friday nostalgia&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;b&gt;: &lt;/b&gt;If we’re going to worship consumerism and consumption, we should at least do it together, Annie Joy Williams wrote last year.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Other Diversions&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/reading-tracking-app/689499/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Let’s not make reading a wellness trend.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/robert-pattinson-james-bond-casting/689468/?utm_source=feed"&gt;The real reason Robert Pattinson is the new James Bond&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/science/2026/11/voyager-light-day-life-earth/689481/?utm_source=feed"&gt;A new milestone for life on Earth&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;PS&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img alt="Ice bow" height="412" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/newsletters/2026/11/01_January_Ice_bow/original.jpg" width="551"&gt;
&lt;figcaption class="caption"&gt;Courtesy of Jennie H.&lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;My colleague Isabel Fattal recently asked readers to share a photo of something that sparks their sense of awe in the world. Last week, Jennie H. from Aitkin, Minnesota, shared a picture from January 1, 2024, of an ice bow over her farm, which “doesn’t happen often. It was well below zero that morning.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We’ll continue to feature your responses in the coming weeks.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;— Rafaela&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Rafaela Jinich</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/rafaela-jinich/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/iRqOkbfyamCNZPoPIqFOLpZpWhs=/media/img/mt/2026/11/GettyImages_1349108950-1/original.jpg"><media:credit>Akinbostanci / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The False Comfort of Online Shopping</title><published>2026-11-21T08:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-21T08:23:22-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Buying things has never been easier—or more isolating.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/11/false-comfort-of-online-shopping/689518/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689532</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;In late October, I met&lt;/span&gt; a Yemeni military officer at a high-end mall in Riyadh. He wore a dishdasha and had the gruff, weary manner of an aging career soldier. His unit had been fighting the Houthi militia in southern Yemen, more than 800 miles from the immaculate, marble-floored refuge at the center of the Saudi capital where we ordered coffee.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;He was mapping the battlefield on the table with his hands, describing how the latest round of fighting had played out, when cellphones began beeping simultaneously all around us: an incoming-missile warning. Moments later, loud booms echoed through the mall, followed by audible gasps from nearby tables and a child’s cry of fear. Shoppers froze in their tracks, some glancing anxiously toward the glass dome above us.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Yemeni officer looked at me without speaking. A grim smile played on his lips, as if to say: &lt;i&gt;They are all learning about the Houthis now.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The missiles were intercepted, but the moment stayed with me. A new reality was intruding on a population coddled for years by visions of a frictionless post-oil future, when new technologies would keep everyone happy and entertained.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia is at war. The Houthis have demonstrated, by means of recurring missile barrages, that they can shut down much of the country’s economy at will. A deadly strike on the main airport in Riyadh killed at least 14 people in mid-October and injured hundreds. More than a month later, few flights have resumed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“The kingdom today faces the most dangerous crisis in its history,” the Saudi journalist Abdulrahman al-Rashed told a Saudi podcaster last month.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That kind of candor is extremely hard to come by in Saudi Arabia. None of the Saudi or Yemeni officials I met in Riyadh in October would speak with me on the record. They told me that the monarchy is now taking the Houthi threat far more seriously than in the past. Riyadh has struck deals to bring thousands of soldiers from Pakistan and Syria to help defend the country’s border with Yemen. But these efforts may not be enough. The Houthis are building up their forces too, with help from Iran, China, North Korea, and Russia.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/10/only-thing-houthis-have-done-successfully/688972/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Graeme Wood: The only thing the Houthis have done successfully&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Houthis are no longer the rebel upstarts of a decade ago. They are well on their way to becoming the North Korea of the Arab world: an insular, well-armed, and fanatical statelet that poses a threat to the entire region. They have an AI-assisted weapons industry and have studied the Ukraine war; their information operations are way ahead of their Saudi and Yemeni rivals’. The Houthis could soon become more dangerous than Iran, their long-standing patron.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Saudi military was not designed for this kind of war. The country’s rulers have long been reluctant to build an army that could one day pose a threat to the monarchy. Even now they have dismissed the notion of sending their own troops, apart from elite special forces already deployed in Yemen, to fight the Houthis. But they may soon find that you cannot rely on foreigners when your country is facing a very real threat of invasion.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;The current Houthi military offensive&lt;/span&gt; began in September, when the group captured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, on the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia’s leaders believe that this plan was largely devised by Iran. In October, I met with a senior Saudi official who described a strategy coordinated by Tehran and its allies in the “Axis of Resistance” over the past several months. The latest chapter, the official said, began in the spring, when President Trump ordered the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. That left Tehran with limited options to retaliate, so Iranian officials met with their Houthi allies and persuaded them to launch an offensive on the Bab el-Mandeb.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Iranians, the official said, agreed to help make it happen. A Houthi delegation attended the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran in July, he told me, and when it returned, the Mahan Air flight that carried it also conveyed a whole team of Axis military technicians and commanders, including two North Koreans, a Syrian who had been part of the Assad regime, and members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and of Lebanese Hezbollah, the Shiite militia. The plane was loaded with cash and weapons, including drone parts and missile-guidance systems, the Saudi official told me. (Some details of the Mahan Air flight have been reported previously, including the weapons and Iranian officers on board.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Saudis had gotten word of the plane’s cargo and bombed the runway of the airport in the Yemeni capital to prevent it from landing. But the flight was diverted to Hodeida, a city on the Red Sea coast that is also under Houthi control, and landed there. Separately, the Saudi official told me, Russia delivered a large shipment of weapons and technology, concealed under thousands of tons of wheat.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If the Saudi official’s account is accurate, it would suggest that the Houthis are receiving more international support than ever. Even if the report was exaggerated for the benefit of an American journalist—Saudi officials are desperate to get more military assistance from the United States—it still points to a larger truth about what the Houthis have become.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Houthis are the world’s problem. They have proved that they can block a waterway that carries about 15 percent of the world’s trade. They now control about a third of Yemen’s territory and most of its population, and aim to conquer it all. Their use of child soldiers has been well documented for a decade, as has their frequent use of torture, arbitrary detentions, and disappearances. Their rule is rooted in a revolutionary ideology that does not stop at Yemen’s borders and that thrives on constant war. They have challenged Saudi control of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest cities, and they often boast that they will liberate Jerusalem.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/06/iran-defeat-marshall-plan-price/687600/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Thomas Wright: The price of defeat in Iran&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These are not empty ambitions. The Houthis are constantly expanding their missile and drone production, using fiber optics and other materials supplied by China. Evidence recently &lt;a href="https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026"&gt;came to light&lt;/a&gt; that they have used the AI tool Claude to improve their guided-missile technology. They have developed pragmatic relationships with al-Qaeda and the al-Shabaab terrorist group, despite sectarian differences (the Houthis adhere to an offshoot of Shiite Islam; the other two groups are Sunni). And, in a show of political dexterity and ideological fervor, they have been recruiting and providing training to ethnic and tribal subgroups throughout the Horn of Africa, in Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. These outreaches appear to be modeled on Iran’s efforts to build up regional allies, and could add more tinder to an already volatile region of Africa.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;For now, Saudi Arabia&lt;/span&gt; lies on the front line of any effort to contain the Houthis’ power. The United States is too deep in its war with Iran to provide anything more than minimal help, and the Europeans are focused on Ukraine. The other Gulf countries have good reasons to fight the Houthis, but for various reasons, they will not.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Omanis have been hedging their bets for years—allowing the Houthis to smuggle arms across their border with Yemen and providing some intelligence—in case the Houthis end up as the winners. The United Arab Emirates fought the Houthis inside Yemen for years alongside the Saudis, but late last year, long-running tensions between the two countries reached a breaking point, and the Saudis ordered the Emiratis to withdraw. The Emiratis’ absence has damaged the broader war effort.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Saudis, who have long backed the internationally recognized Yemeni government in Aden, organized a counteroffensive after the Houthis captured the Bab el-Mandeb. They embedded Saudi commandos with Yemeni government forces across the country. Some were killed in a devastating Houthi strike on October 19. The Saudi official I met in Riyadh told me that the near-term goal is to recapture all of the territory that was lost in September, and then secure some kind of truce. The Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have not yet achieved that, and it is not clear that they will. “I don’t see a way out unless the U.S. agrees to provide direct air support,” Nadwa al-Dawsari, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute, told me.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Even if the Saudis are able to achieve a respite from the fighting, the Houthis will retain the whip hand in the conflict, because they will still be able to strike the kingdom’s airports and oil facilities. And they will surely use any truce to continue expanding their military, as they have in the past. The Saudi official told me that the kingdom’s long-term plan is to build a larger and more unified Yemeni military that is capable of pushing the Houthis back and “eliminating their military capabilities.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That is a tall order. The Yemeni military officer I met in Riyadh last month described a fighting force that is hamstrung by clashing political and regional loyalties. “There are forces loyal to Islah”—the Yemeni Islamist party—“and they hate us,” he said, referring to his own more secular faction. (He did not need to add that the feeling is mutual.) In the south, many of the soldiers are more interested in creating a separate state than in fighting the Houthis. “The Houthis know all about the divisions on our side,” the officer said, “and they take advantage of it.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Saudis bring problems of their own to the conflict. One is the kingdom’s culture of entitlement and corruption, which has bled into its behavior in Yemen. For decades, the Saudis maintained their influence in Yemen through a patronage system of stipends paid to tribal sheikhs and military figures, and they took a quasi-imperial view of Yemenis as primitive underlings. They had a reputation for paying their proxy soldiers so poorly or so late that some had to sell their weapons in order to feed their children.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This pattern of behavior generated deep resentment, partly because the Yemenis got a glimpse of a different approach. The Emiratis spent decades fostering a culture of discipline and accountability in their own country, and in Yemen, they had a reputation for training their allies, paying them higher salaries, and demanding results in return. The Emiratis—who run a small but highly effective military of their own—therefore had far more success with their Yemeni recruits. The Saudis say they are reforming their system, but that will take time.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;The Saudis and their allies&lt;/span&gt; are now struggling to relieve the month-long Houthi siege of Taiz, one of Yemen’s largest cities. If the Houthis capture it, nothing but open roads will separate them from Aden, the base of Yemen’s internationally recognized government and its military headquarters. “There is nothing going on to defend Aden,” Henry Thompson, a Yemen expert who has worked with the United Nations, told me. (Just in the past few days, the threat to Aden has grown, and some signs of defensive preparations have become evident there.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Houthis, meanwhile, have taken measures in the territories they control that could pull Yemeni troops into protracted conflict even if they succeed in retaking ground. Some recent seizures of cargo destined for Houthi ports have intercepted equipment for digging tunnels, including excavation tools and ventilation systems. The Houthis appear to have successfully imported large quantities of this kind of gear in recent years.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/houthi-strikes-saudi-arabia/688990/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Robert F. Worth: Saudi Arabia is running out of options&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“In Hodeida, the Houthis have built a city underneath the city,” Mohammed al-Basha, a Yemen analyst and the founder of the Basha Report, a geopolitical-risk advisory firm, told me. “For anyone trying to capture that place, it would be like going into Gaza.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;For the moment, the war is not going well. After making some gains in October, the Saudi-backed forces announced on November 15 that they had been forced to withdraw from the area around the Bab el-Mandeb. I met several members of Yemen’s internationally recognized government in Riyadh—their rear base—and they tried to put on a brave face, with varying degrees of success. Some seem resigned to deeper losses. “The Houthis will take Aden, and they will keep going,” one told me.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The current battlefield is in southern Yemen, but everyone I spoke with agreed that the Houthis will eventually open a new front in the north and attempt to invade Saudi Arabia. That would make it impossible for the Saudis to deny that they are at war. Until now, they have held firmly to the claim that this is an intra-Yemeni conflict, and that Saudi Arabia is a third party. But the Houthis have made clear for years that they consider themselves to be at war with Riyadh, and they frequently mock Yemen’s internationally recognized government as a Saudi fig leaf.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Almost no one in Saudi Arabia wants to acknowledge the possibility that they could soon be forced to defend their country. “Why should we send our young men to defend the Bab el-Mandeb?” one official asked me in Riyadh. “The conflict is inside Yemen.” He went on to describe the Houthis as nothing more than an “annoyance.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;None of the ordinary Saudis I spoke with in Riyadh, whether old friends or people I approached in cafés, seemed comfortable talking about the war. Saudi Arabia is an autocratic society where dissent can land a person in jail—but the reticence may also reflect the dissonance people feel between the war and everything their ruler has been telling them for the past decade. Saudi Arabia’s problems are supposed to be solved through technology and innovation. Being dragged into a bloody war with a radical militia is not part of that plan.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It is not part of America’s plans, either—especially not since the Trump administration waged an expensive and largely futile air war against the Houthis lasting seven weeks in early 2025. But that could change. The Houthis, like their Iranian allies, believe that they are waging a metaphysical battle against America, and they are determined to topple every outpost of American influence in the region.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;*Illustration sources: Kay Nietfeld / Picture Alliance / Getty; Arne Hodalic / Getty; Encyclopaedia Britannica / Universal Images Group / Getty; Wolfgang Kaehler / LightRocket / Getty; Mohammed Huwais / AFP / Getty; Mohammad Daher / NurPhoto / Getty&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Robert F. Worth</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/robert-worth/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/nZ8DGP0CZc-C4lD3RxrowLevs3o=/0x43:2700x1562/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_20_Can_Saudi_Arabia_defeat_the_Houthis_4/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by Mark Harris*</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Fighting a Radical Militia Was Not Part of the Plan</title><published>2026-11-21T07:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-21T16:17:29-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Saudi Arabia was looking forward to a frictionless future before the Houthis got involved.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/houthis-saudi-arabia-war/689532/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689537</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;If Donald Trump has maintained one pretense continuously throughout his career in politics, it is that his entire goal is to help the United States of America. The founding conceit of the first Trump campaign was that he would set aside his business interests, at great personal expense, to rescue the country he loved. It was embedded in his slogans (“America First,” “Make America Great Again”) and his palace-building binge, which he naturally justified as his service to the symbols of the country. He &lt;i&gt;hugged flags&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Finally, at a press conference this afternoon, he broke character.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The CNN reporter Kaitlan Collins asked the president a question about his comment earlier this week to Vladimir Putin. Seeing the Russian dictator, Trump broke into a wide smile, perhaps a more genuine expression of delight than he has ever displayed before in public, and called Putin “my friend.” Collins asked Trump, “You said Putin is your friend. Russia, of course, is Iran’s biggest ally. Do you believe Putin is a friend to America?”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Trump replied:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“I can’t speak to America. I’ve been dealing with Putin during the fake Russia, Russia, Russia hoax, and to be honest, he was very nice about it. It was a rigged hoax. It was a hoax that was made up by the Democrats. It probably helped me win the election—re-win the election.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Even by Trumpian standards, this was an extraordinary confession.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;First, he said he cannot speak for what is good for America, as if the United States were some foreign entity with interests totally inscrutable to him. He then explained that Putin is very good to him personally. Any other world leader caught using covert measures to help a pro-Russian candidate win the American presidency would apparently have been cross, but Putin was “very nice about it,” which just shows what a swell guy he is.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/trump-shenzhen-summit-xi-putin/689522/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Philips Payson O’Brien: Trump’s axis of ignorance&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Recall that the Trumpian line has always been that Trump sides with Russia so frequently because he is coldly looking out for the American wallet. Last year, Trump batted away a reporter’s question about his tilt toward Russia by saying, “I’m not aligned with Putin. I’m not aligned with anybody. I’m aligned with the United States of America and for the good of the world.” This week, after Trump’s display of warmth and love toward Putin, J. D. Vance posted a clip of the encounter and &lt;a href="https://x.com/JDVance/status/2123509806925550045"&gt;commented&lt;/a&gt; on X, “The president will talk to anyone, anywhere, to advocate for American interests.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It was obvious enough, given that Trump had called in to a meeting of Europeans who were supporting Ukraine to urge them to stop doing so. Trump “told Ukraine’s European allies on Thursday they could save money as well as lives by ending the war with Russia, according to five European officials who were briefed on the discussion,” &lt;i&gt;Politico&lt;/i&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-presses-european-leaders-about-ukraine-aid-after-vladimir-putin-summit/"&gt;reported&lt;/a&gt;. The White House denies this.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Trump has always claimed to oppose sending aid to Ukraine because he resents sending American money overseas. But his effort to persuade Europeans to stop aiding Ukraine suggests that his actual motivation is that he wants Russia to win because he admires and sympathizes with its leader, his personal friend. “America First” has always meant Trump first.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Jonathan Chait</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/jonathan-chait/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/XAkBjtojLp3nzbzMUgkmftAWqEE=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_20_Trump_vs._America_Jonathan_Chait/original.jpg"><media:credit>Samuel Corum / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Trump vs. America</title><published>2026-11-20T16:36:56-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T16:56:16-05:00</updated><summary type="html">The president finally admitted that his interests do not always align with the nation’s.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/trump-putin-ukraine-collins/689537/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689534</id><content type="html">&lt;p data-flatplan-paragraph="true"&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;i&gt;This is an edition of &lt;/i&gt;The Atlantic&lt;i&gt; Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. &lt;/i&gt;&lt;a data-event-element="inline link" data-gtm-vis-first-on-screen31117857_899="446" data-gtm-vis-has-fired31117857_899="1" data-gtm-vis-recent-on-screen31117857_899="446" data-gtm-vis-total-visible-time31117857_899="100" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/atlantic-daily/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Sign up for it here.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In &lt;i&gt;The Lord of the Rings&lt;/i&gt;, a palantir is a crystal ball that allows users to peer into the future—but it gives only partial information. This might have been a warning to Alex Karp, the CEO of the tech company named Palantir. Earlier this year, Karp &lt;a href="https://newrepublic.com/post/207693/palantir-ceo-karp-disrupting-democratic-power"&gt;crowed&lt;/a&gt; that AI would reduce the power of “highly educated, often female voters, who vote mostly Democrat.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Postelection, he’s singing a different tune. “I’ve been a Democrat my whole life. I grew up in a far-left environment,” Karp recently &lt;a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/playbook/2026/11/11/the-tech-right-pivots-left-01160648"&gt;told &lt;i&gt;Politico&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. “I know more about being a progressive than almost anybody on the planet, and I absolutely believe Palantir—all of our products are essentially progressive.” He used that last word, &lt;i&gt;progressive&lt;/i&gt;, eight times in the interview. Karp also claimed that he’d been critical of Donald Trump in private, though he somehow decided to disclose it only now.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;His fellow tech titan Elon Musk—once described as Trump’s “co-president” and the biggest donor to his 2024 campaign—&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/2026/11/elon-musk-maga-pivot/689517/?utm_source=feed"&gt;now says&lt;/a&gt; he’s “not MAGA” and “doesn’t know what MAGA means.” Perhaps he should have inquired before he made MAGA hats part of his wardrobe. Musk’s SpaceX is backing off from &lt;a href="https://oligarchwatch.substack.com/p/spacexs-awkward-political-makeover"&gt;referring&lt;/a&gt; to the “Gulf of America” too.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These flips are particularly brazen (and unconvincing), but they are not unique. On Election Night, as the size of Democrats’ victory became clear, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, who had praised the Trump administration for producing a “breath of fresh air” in Silicon Valley, &lt;a href="https://x.com/sama/status/2117794005165748448?lang=fa"&gt;declared&lt;/a&gt;, “People should always be in control of the future.” Kalshi abruptly &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/12/us/politics/kalshi-donald-trump-jr.html"&gt;cut ties&lt;/a&gt; with Donald Trump Jr. Meanwhile, Dana White, the Ultimate Fighting Championship impresario who’d spoken at the Republican National Convention and whom Trump had recently &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/11/trump-lame-duck-era-dana-white/689355/?utm_source=feed"&gt;suggested&lt;/a&gt; as White House press secretary, said that he wants “nothing to do with politics.” If he grasped the irony of saying this on Lara Trump’s Fox News show, he didn’t let it on.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Jeff Bezos is also &lt;a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/11/17/2026/trump-reaches-out-a-lot-jeff-bezos-says-shutting-out-business-leaders-is-a-mistake?utm_source=cnn_Reliable+Sources&amp;amp;utm_medium=email"&gt;tempering&lt;/a&gt; his enthusiasm for Trump, saying that he is “on the side of America,” not either party, and noting that he has worked with “every president since Clinton.” VIPs who rushed to get tickets to a Trump crypto gala in years past are &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/interest-trumps-meme-coin-dinner-fades-trump-sinks-record-lows-2026-11-16/"&gt;no longer so eager&lt;/a&gt;. The podcaster Joe Rogan, a major influence on young men who swung to Trump in the 2024 election, is now disillusioned. “They didn’t just lose the podcast bros,” he said. “They lost most of the country.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLL24AhG5U8KqWLqYuQnJzJLCfTRviUoLF"&gt;Emily Litella&lt;/a&gt;—the &lt;i&gt;Saturday Night Live &lt;/i&gt;character with the catchphrase “Never mind”—would feel right at home with this bunch. The clumsy reversals have &lt;a href="https://www.liberalcurrents.com/the-first-vibe-shift-left-in-years/"&gt;inevitably&lt;/a&gt; been &lt;a href="https://www.npr.org/2026/11/17/nx-s1-6036795/after-democrats-midterm-wins-some-hope-attacks-on-dei-will-ease"&gt;labeled&lt;/a&gt;, in the au courant fashion, a “&lt;a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2026/11/midterms-vibe-shift-trump-vance-russell-brand-jensen-huang-nvidia-kalshi-palantir/"&gt;vibe shift&lt;/a&gt;.” This is perhaps an apt description. Postelection, it is tempting to treat these statements from corporate leaders as evidence of a major paradigm change. In reality, they are better understood as ephemeral marketing.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;For many years, big companies tried to avoid getting sucked into divisive political issues. (The billionaire Michael Jordan crisply encapsulated the reason when he said, “Republicans buy sneakers too.”) But the killing of George Floyd in 2020, and the enormous demonstrations that followed, led some business leaders to adopt public social-justice stances. Others announced after the January 6 riot that they would no longer donate to election deniers. This drew the ire of Republicans who labeled it “&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/04/dont-buy-conservative-rebellion-against-corporations/618519/?utm_source=feed"&gt;woke capital&lt;/a&gt;,” a possible contradiction in terms. As I &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/04/corporations-are-not-friends-people/618561/?utm_source=feed"&gt;wrote at the time&lt;/a&gt;, though, “These corporations are acting in a majoritarian manner. But no one should conclude that they are progressive.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Indeed, when Trump returned to office, the corporate establishment quickly adapted itself to the new regime, moving to accommodate Trump by giving large donations or by shutting down DEI programs. (Some of the companies that had pledged to halt giving to deniers &lt;a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/06/corporations-election-objectors-donations-00076668"&gt;quietly dropped&lt;/a&gt; their commitment.) Institutions that forcefully jumped on the Trump bandwagon were responding to analysis that suggested that the 2024 election represented a serious and lasting change in American politics. As it turned out, &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/08/trump-loosing-black-hispanic-young-republican-voters/688164/?utm_source=feed"&gt;the shift was just vibes&lt;/a&gt;—fleeting and easily dispelled rather than solid and real. By late this summer, the problems of betting on Trump were &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/08/people-bad-bet-maga-future-2024-election/688240/?utm_source=feed"&gt;becoming apparent&lt;/a&gt;, and the scale of Democrats’ victories in the midterms now has executives rushing to get back in their good graces.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One element of these reversals is that people have shortsighted perspectives on politics, tending to overrate the importance of whatever the most recent election result was. In this century alone, pundits and operatives have declared both major political parties dead, yet they both remain peskily alive. No one should be surprised if executives are just as prone to overestimating the durability of any new ruling coalition.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The more important factor, though, is prudent (or, depending on whom you ask, cynical) business concerns: Companies like Palantir and SpaceX rely heavily on government contracts; Kalshi and OpenAI need a friendly regulatory environment. Should a Republican win the 2028 election, expect &lt;i&gt;progressive&lt;/i&gt; to vanish from Alex Karp’s vernacular just as quickly as it entered. Big companies will always seek to curry favor, and elected officials are too often susceptible to their flattery, no matter how shallow. These transactional relationships serve both sides well, but they don’t necessarily serve the people.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Related:&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/2026/11/elon-musk-maga-pivot/689517/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Elon Musk would like to pretend that the past two years didn’t happen.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/08/people-bad-bet-maga-future-2024-election/688240/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Hindsight is 2024.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h1&gt;&lt;/h1&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Here are three new stories from &lt;i&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/trump-shenzhen-summit-xi-putin/689522/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Trump’s axis of ignorance&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/gerrymandering-redistricting-black-voters/689492/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Gerrymandering worked—it just isn’t magic.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/11/melania-tv-show-melaniaverse/689519/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Alexandra Petri: Welcome to the Melaniaverse.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Today’s News&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ol&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Donald Trump tapped &lt;a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/11/19/trump-national-cyber-director-sean-cairncross-leaving"&gt;Kirsten A. Davies to be the new national cyber director&lt;/a&gt; yesterday after a series of countrywide outages sparked concern over America’s technological infrastructure.&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;A second federal judge has blocked the construction of Trump’s triumphal arch, describing the project as a &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/virginia-judge-blocks-construction-trumps-triumphal-arch-project-2026-11-20/"&gt;“rush job”&lt;/a&gt; that lacks legal basis.&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;The Justice Department &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/19/us/politics/justice-department-gives-up-on-alaska-senate-lawsuit.html"&gt;abandoned its lawsuit from last month against Alaska&lt;/a&gt;; the lawsuit sought to prevent the Democrat Mary Peltola from winning a Senate seat. Peltola won her race three days ago against the Republican incumbent, Dan S. Sullivan.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Dispatches&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/books-briefing/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;b&gt;The Books Briefing&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;b&gt;: &lt;/b&gt;The &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/11/books-briefing-benefits-reading-incalculable/689527/?utm_source=feed"&gt;benefits of reading are incalculable&lt;/a&gt;, Emma Sarappo writes. Books can alter a life, undermine foundational beliefs, even change the world.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;a href="https://link.theatlantic.com/click/29767897.0/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudGhlYXRsYW50aWMuY29tL25ld3NsZXR0ZXJzLz91dG1fc291cmNlPW5ld3NsZXR0ZXImdXRtX21lZGl1bT1lbWFpbCZ1dG1fY2FtcGFpZ249YXRsYW50aWMtZGFpbHktbmV3c2xldHRlciZ1dG1fY29udGVudD0yMDIyMTEyMQ/61813432e16c7128e42f4628B52865c35"&gt;Explore all of our newsletters here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Evening Read&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img alt="A still from Grand Theft Auto 6 featuring the male protagonist holding a gun into a car window and the female protagonist holding a bag" height="1125" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_16_GTA_6/original.png" width="2000"&gt;
&lt;figcaption class="caption"&gt;Rockstar Games&lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Grand Theft Auto VI&lt;/em&gt; Is Really Weird&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;By Ian Bogost&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jason Duval lives in a shack on the Leonida Keys, in the simulated Florida where &lt;i&gt;Grand Theft Auto VI&lt;/i&gt; is set. I began playing the game after its release at midnight, and I have already tried and failed to outrun the police, roamed the hallways of a prison, driven a speedboat to collect cocaine dropped by a seaplane pilot who was skimming from a more upmarket criminal, and flown the seaplane to escape an RV park full of wild-animal-and-narcotics traffickers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If you know anything at all about the game, which almost 5,000 people worked on for more than a decade at a reported cost of more than $1 billion, it is that Leonida is enormous. Early reviewers are bragging on social media about spending more than 100 hours in the world of the game, while only scratching the surface of what is possible. The prospect seems overwhelming because I already have a life that requires labor and demands diversion, and I am worried about how to fit &lt;i&gt;GTA VI&lt;/i&gt;’s simulated work and recreation into my supposedly real life.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/grand-theft-auto-vi-review/689514/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read the full article.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;More From &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/2026/11/split-bill-first-date-debate/689516/?utm_source=feed"&gt;The old-school dating ritual people can’t seem to shake&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/health/2026/11/kardashian-products-week/689363/?utm_source=feed"&gt;“I went full Kardashian for a week,” Nancy Walecki writes.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/2026/11/whats-so-important-about-nvidias-chips/689521/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Galaxy Brain&lt;/i&gt;: What’s so important about Nvidia’s chips?&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/iran-opposition-strategic-options/689510/?utm_source=feed"&gt;What war has brought Iran’s opposition&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Culture Break&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img alt="A still from Sunrise on the Reaping showing two groups of tributes facing off with each other" height="1098" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/newsletters/2026/11/culture/original.png" width="1952"&gt;
&lt;figcaption class="caption"&gt;Lionsgate&lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Watch (or skip).&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt; &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;i&gt;The Hunger Games: Sunrise on the Reaping&lt;/i&gt; (out now in theaters) &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/hunger-games-sunrise-on-the-reaping-movie-review/689509/?utm_source=feed"&gt;struggles to find meaning&lt;/a&gt; in its violent spectacle.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Explore.&lt;/b&gt; Art museums have to get creative right now. But the &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/taylor-swift-museum-boston/689520/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Taylor Swift exhibition&lt;/a&gt; is an SOS call—museums can do better than this, Kelsey Ables argues.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/free-daily-crossword-puzzle/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Play our daily crossword.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;i&gt;Stephanie Bai contributed to this newsletter.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;em&gt;When you buy a book using a link in this newsletter, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting &lt;/em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;em&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>David A. Graham</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/david-a-graham/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/vIlqBNyoKIpHVuD57wt6v0lDUsE=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_20_The_Daily_The_Vibe_Shift_Away_From_Trump_David_Graham/original.jpg"><media:credit>Matt Ramey / Redux</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Silicon Valley Is Scrambling Now</title><published>2026-11-20T16:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T16:17:55-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Companies’ attempts to prepare for a post-Trump moment are making them look foolish.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/11/karp-musk-trump-midterms/689534/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689521</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Subscribe here: &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/galaxy-brain/id1378618386"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Apple Podcasts&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt; | &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/542WHgdiDTJhEjn1Py4J7n"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Spotify&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt; | &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;a href="https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLDamP-pfOskMYR8cxhI6vyz1XPxRhVjAx&amp;amp;si=Ol8X6CGTcXCmpwhO"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;YouTube&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt; &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Beyond the salacious details of the Nvidia–Jensen Huang scandal is a story about national security and the advanced chips powering the AI boom. But what exactly are these chips, and why do they matter? Ben Buchanan was one of President Biden’s AI advisers and helped write some of the U.S. policies on chip controls, in conversation with people like Huang. In this episode of &lt;i&gt;Galaxy Brain&lt;/i&gt;, he breaks down what makes those chips so valuable and why they have such implications for the U.S.-Chinese relationship and the future of AI.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/P68tHQwDNuI?si=E59bTqAxZsm9bFs2" title="YouTube video player" width="560"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;The following is a transcript of the episode:&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Ben Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;We had a lot of conversations with Jensen and with Nvidia. They were conversations about technology, not spies or sex or anything like that. So that’s a new dimension to it. But from a technology perspective, this is actually remarkably consistent with the concerns that we had in the Biden administration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;[&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Music&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;]&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Charlie Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;The further we get out from the Nvidia–Jensen Huang scandal, the more it seems clear that, despite all the salacious details, there’s a lot more to this story than meets the eye.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It’s an alleged Chinese-spy sex scandal, yes. It’s the fall of a tech giant. It’s this huge, Silicon Valley palace-intrigue story. But as time goes by, it seems that the epicenter of this story is in Washington, D.C. The Nvidia–Jensen Huang affair is, at heart, a geopolitical thriller. It is a series of cascading events that’s been set in motion by a cold war between China and the United States over advanced AI chips and the AI race.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And so to really understand why Huang had to resign, why he’s being called before Congress to testify, why the SEC has reportedly launched a probe into Nvidia—you have to understand how the U.S. got locked in this AI race with China, and how Nvidia’s chips work to power the AI boom. You have to understand the policies that have led to the export restrictions on the chips that Nvidia sells, and the convoluted loopholes that Nvidia and Alice Huang have allegedly used to get chips into China.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And my guest today: He not only understands every element of this story; he helps shape it. Ben Buchanan is the former White House special adviser on AI during the Biden administration. Buchanan helped design the chip-export controls on China that Huang and Nvidia lobbied against.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And along with Tantum Collins, he’s the author of this new book, &lt;a href="https://bookshop.org/p/books/the-bitter-struggle-superintelligence-superpowers-and-the-fate-of-the-world-ben-buchanan/febee404ef7814fa"&gt;&lt;i&gt;The Bitter Struggle: Superintelligence, Superpowers, and the Fate of the World&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. He was in the room for so many of the events that led to where we are now. And today, he’s going to help us mere mortals actually understand what the heck is going on with China, chips, Jensen Huang, the AI race, and crucially, why all of it matters. He joins me now.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I’m Charlie Warzel, and this is &lt;i&gt;Galaxy Brain&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;[&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Music&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;]&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;Ben Buchanan, welcome to &lt;i&gt;Galaxy Brain&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Ben Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;Thanks for having me.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;So I’m hoping in this interview that we could do some very basic questions that will lead to this deeper understanding of the U.S.-China race, the labs; what’s going on. But first I just want to ask about Jensen Huang. Have you taken what we know now and reexamined any of either the interactions you’ve had with him or his company? Like, were there things in retrospect that now that look like signs of vulnerability? How are you processing this news moment, given your relationship to this entire story?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;For background, I was the White House special adviser for AI and worked in the National Security Council, and was the architect of a lot of the chip controls that seem to be at the crux of this story here.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the course of doing that work for four years, we had a lot of conversations with Jensen and with Nvidia. They were conversations about technology, not spies or sex or anything like that. So that’s a new dimension to it. But from a technology perspective, this is actually remarkably consistent with the concerns that we had in the Biden administration. Certainly about the importance of chips to national security, the importance of AI to national security, and the necessity to cut off smuggling routes and remote access routes for China to get access to that technology. So, in some sense, it’s like a new chapter in a long-running novel. Maybe a particularly salacious and interesting chapter. But it fits the themes of the novel that I’ve lived, I guess now for six years.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;Some of this stuff, especially. And I want to get into the stuff about Megaspeed: the company that Huang’s alleged mistress, and alleged Chinese intelligence asset, worked for. That’s in your book. Megaspeed is in your book.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And so I’m just curious. Like, was all this on your radar, and you were expecting it all to come out in some fashion? Or were you pretty shocked by the fact that we’re all talking about this right now?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;I never knew of the sex thing. As best I can recall, I did not know of Megaspeed in the government. I definitely don’t think I ever heard the name Alice Huang. Megaspeed is in the book because &lt;i&gt;The New York Times&lt;/i&gt; did a good story on it 13 or 14 months ago. And it looked to us, when we were writing the book, as a great avatar or example of exactly the kind of smuggling and remote access we were worried about, and we were trying to prevent.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;While the particulars of this case are new to me, or at least were not something we discussed in the government, the general idea of circumvention of the export controls because this technology is so important was something that we spent a lot of time on and in fact were actively trying to combat.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;So I wanna ask some basic questions here, because I imagine I’m not alone in what is essentially like a pretty shallow understanding of the story in Nvidia. I think, you know, reading the news, a lot of people understand they make advanced AI chips, power the boom we’re experiencing here. They have an extraordinary amount of market share. But walk me through just to set the table here. Like, why is that? What makes Nvidia’s chips so great, so necessary, such a fundamental part of this whole boom?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;I would look at Nvidia as a key part of maybe the world’s most advanced supply chain and manufacturing process. So Nvidia designs the chips that are incredibly intricate—hundreds of billions of transistors at nanometer scale—that enable this AI revolution that we’re part of, for better or for worse. And those chips are made in Taiwan almost exclusively at TSMC using equipment from ASML in the Netherlands.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These are three companies we profile in a lot of detail in the book, because they’re three of the most important companies in the world. Everyone knows of Nvidia; some people know of TSMC; almost no one knows of ASML. But it’s that kind of supply chain, and then all their subcontractors from there, that is at the core of AI.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In AI, we have this notion called &lt;i&gt;the bitter lesson&lt;/i&gt;, which is the inspiration for the book’s title, &lt;i&gt;The Bitter Struggle&lt;/i&gt;. And the bitter lesson is that AI scientists want to make AI systems almost in this divine-creation process, in which they’re handcrafting the algorithms to perfectly mimic or encapsulate human knowledge. But actually, what works much better, we’ve observed, is giving the systems a flexible algorithm from which to learn. A lot of computing power. And getting out of the way.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And that’s why it’s computing power—and in particular these days, Nvidia’s chips—that are at the absolute forefront of this AI story, and therefore this geopolitical story. Because what companies have realized is they can scale up the amount of computing power. They can scale up the amount of Nvidia chips that are used to make AI systems, and they get much more powerful systems as a result. In a very predictable fashion. And that, more than any other single factor, I think, has been the tailwind that’s propelled AI progress over the last 10 or 15 years.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;And it’s what’s made them these companies just basically insatiable, right? In terms of how much they want to purchase. How much they want to use.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;That’s right.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yeah, it’s worth dwelling, for one second, just on the numbers here. Because they’re absolutely mind blowing. And they underscore one of the other important elements in the book and in our policy—which is that AI is the first revolutionary technology of the last hundred or so years that comes from the private sector. Think about nukes and space, and so much else, coming from the government. The government’s cutting the checks at a minimum, and has some capacity to steer where the technology goes. The modern paradigm of AI, this computing power–driven paradigm that we were just talking about, comes from the private sector.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And it really is just eye-popping: the amount of investment the private sector is making in pursuit of the bitter lesson, or what’s sometimes called the scaling law. In 2026 alone, the estimates are that the hyperscalers, the big compute companies, will spend $700 billion on infrastructure and growing to a trillion or so dollars by 2027. Just taking the 2026 number, that’s akin to a Manhattan Project basically every two or three weeks.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That’s more than America spent building the entire interstate-highway system, adjusting for inflation over 35 years. So it’s just so hard to overestimate the amount of computing power at play here in making these AI systems.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;And it sets the stakes of this, I think, extremely well. Before we get into the nuts and bolts of this Nvidia story, I wanna step back; talk to a little bit about our technological relationship to China. You’ve said in the book, in the past, that AI will be the fulcrum on which the U.S.-China rivalry turns. So help me understand why that is. And also why it’s so bad that China gets access to these chips.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;We entered the White House in 2021 with the belief that AI would become very relevant, if not at the absolute center, of national-security affairs. Not just with China, but around the world. There’s a number of ways in which that importance could manifest over time, which we thought would take five or so years.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Let’s take the one that’s the most concrete right now, and that’s cyber operations. It’s no secret that the United States and China engage every single day in cyber operations; cyber espionage against one another. That this is one of the key contours of competition between the two nations—that if you have an advantage in cyber operations, you have a substantial national-security advantage. I don’t think anyone can test that at this point.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What was speculative in 2021—but that we believed would come to pass before too long—was that AI would change cyber operations. In 2026, it has. In 2026 alone, AI systems have discovered thousands, if not tens of thousands, of critical vulnerabilities in vital software all over the internet.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The AI companies that have built this software, working in concert with the U.S. government, have turned these vulnerabilities over to vendors and to other network defenders, so that they can be patched and remediated. Essentially making the internet as a whole more secure. My belief, and I think this is pretty well supported, is that if China had access to such a technology and was finding these kinds of vulnerabilities in software, it would not be turning them over to be fixed and remediated. It would be using them for intelligence purposes. And that would put key parts of American critical infrastructure at risk.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Just recently, this past week, as we’re recording this here, an AI company using an advanced AI system disclosed that they had found a vulnerability in Java, one of the absolute core languages that makes the modern economy go. A couple of weeks ago, the same company announced that they found a vulnerability in PHP, which is the back end for 70 percent of the websites on the internet. So we are talking about mega-vulnerabilities that AI systems are finding that have profound national-security implications in the wrong hand. And our view was certainly that it was better for the United States to get to that threshold first.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;So you’ve also said that this race to unlock all these capabilities, including the cyber capabilities, may be “winner take all,” I think is how you described it. Help me understand why that’s a zero-sum game.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;I think we should be very precise here. So the dynamics are close to winner take all—which is to say, if you get to these critical thresholds first, then you can aggregate for yourself a lot of the power that comes from reaching those thresholds. We just gave the cyber example. I think there’s no doubt that the nation that got there first has a lot of power. What you choose to do with that power does not need to be zero sum.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And in fact, I would argue throughout American history, a lot of the moments where American policymaking was at its best was when it had a fair amount of power and in some ways ceded that power to institutions, or built a stabilizing framework. So I don’t know that it’s zero sum in the geopolitical sense.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Certainly, when I was in the government, we spent a lot of time trying to negotiate with China. And trying to say to China: &lt;i&gt;Look, we’re taking competitive actions here, of course. But we think there’s interest, and that both of us have, that are shared. Let’s work on making this a positive-sum relationship.&lt;/i&gt; The Chinese largely blew us off. We can talk about it if you’d like. But this was certainly a key part of our overall AI strategy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;How would you describe the “they blew us off” part of that?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;So in October 2023, President Biden signed an executive order that included a line that when you translate from the legalese, essentially, said the United States will engage on AI safety—not just with its allies and its partners, but with its competitors. And that of course meant China. And President Biden personally took that line to President Xi [Jinping] three weeks later when the two leaders met in Woodside, California. And essentially he said: &lt;i&gt;I’m serious about this. We have to work together on this and have a positive-sum relationship&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The two leaders agreed to set up a dialogue of the AI experts in Geneva in May of ’24. It happened. I was there. It was maybe 10 or so U.S.-government officials, 10 or so Chinese-government officials. We took it incredibly seriously. We sent essentially everyone who was an AI leader in the U.S. government, went on this trip. The Chinese did not.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And the Chinese subordinated it to their political apparatus, and spent the entire meeting essentially saying, like: &lt;i&gt;We’re not sure why you’re talking about risks. We don’t see risks in AI. All this discussion of risks, even shared risks, is American imperialism.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We pushed anyway. And we said, &lt;i&gt;No, we really think there’s shared risks here. We really think there’s things we can do that are positive sum.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Eventually, after six months of pushing on that point, we got the most common-sense thing, the thing that you should think would take six minutes. And that was an agreement between the two leaders, President Biden and President Xi, when they met for the last time, in November 2024—to not put AI in nuclear command and control. And I think we can all agree we don’t want AI firing nuclear weapons. So this should be the most simple thing in the world, but it took 13 months of pushing to get China to even get there.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I’m hopeful China’s posture is different now. Certainly if we had had a second term, we would have—we were making plans to continue outreach to China on this point. But there wasn’t a lot of doubt in my mind that China was not, at the time, ready to have a serious conversation about shared interests and shared risks, and how we could all work together.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;Do you have any sense of where you think China sits now on this? Given that, you know, the capabilities have skyrocketed? This is clearly a more of a top-of-mind geopolitical issue probably than it was, you know, during the Biden administration.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;I can point to some pieces of evidence that suggests China’s taking it more seriously. There’s some suggestion they’re thinking about cyber risks and talking to their companies about cyber risks. There’s some suggestion in some of the Chinese Communist Party publications that they’re warning about the dangers of AI and so forth.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So I think there’s some evidence. And certainly, those are the threads I would be pulling if I were in the government. But also, China is essentially a nation run by one person.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And I think it’s very hard, you know, even when you have access to U.S. intelligence to know exactly what Xi Jinping is thinking. I don’t have access to U.S. intelligence right now. So I wouldn’t wanna pretend to know what’s in his head when it comes to AI. And that, really, at the end of the day is the ultimate question when it comes to China.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;[&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Break&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;]&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;So the Biden White House has a, you know, very specific policy about China having access to Nvidia’s chips. There’s a real focus on this amongst all the AI-policy folks, including yourself. Take me to [Jensen] Huang and Nvidia. What is Huang’s policy toward China when it comes to selling to them or around this period?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;He said the same thing in private that he said in public. Which is, we put this policy in place in 2022. We said to him, essentially: &lt;i&gt;The supply of chips in the world is fixed, because it’s so hard to make them. There’s not gonna be that many more coming off the line. And we want those chips to not go to China. Because we’re worried they’re gonna modernize their military; they’re gonna repress their population with these surveillance tools and the like. Instead, we want those chips to go to the rest of the world, but especially companies in democratic nations.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And Nvidia’s posture was that this would really hurt them; that this was bad for them economically. And that they needed the China market in order to compete. And sometimes, to give the sort of steel man of Jensen’s position, Jensen would often say things like—or Jensen and, I should say, his supporters, because there’s a whole group of folks who had this view—would say things like: &lt;i&gt;Well, we need to keep China dependent on American chips. And we’ve got to sell them the chips, so they don’t make their own.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We disagreed with the two prongs of that argument. The first prong we disagreed with was that this would be very bad for Nvidia. And essentially, our view was that the bitter lesson that we talked about before was so dominant, that the tailwinds of demand for American compute—I think you said the companies in the United States are insatiable when it comes to compute. That’s absolutely right. Jensen said that as well. And they would buy every single chip Nvidia made, and they would buy it for a significant profit. And that’s exactly what happened.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Nvidia’s market capitalization in 2022, when we did the controls, was something like $350 billion. Just before the Jensen scandal a couple of weeks ago, it was $5 trillion. They’ve had a rough week here. But depending on how you do the math, they’re probably up 10 or 15 X on where they were when the compute control started, because of the tailwind that we foresaw about the scaling law and the bitter lesson and the demand for compute. So Nvidia has done great.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And in fact, on the Nvidia earnings call just this week, when asked about a recent Trump action to close some of these loopholes and reassert export controls, they downplayed the impact of it, because they’re now acknowledging the demand is so big around the world.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So we don’t think we were hurting Nvidia. We think Nvidia was going to do very well under our policy, and indeed they did.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The second question is: Are we hurting the United States? Because, do the chip controls cause China to indigenize production in a way they wouldn’t otherwise have? And therefore we lose some leverage over China because they’re no longer dependent on American chips? I also think this was wrong, and we thought it was wrong at the time. The reason why is that China knew the importance of advanced chips. As far back as 2014, when America was off fighting ISIS, China recognized, up to the Xi Jinping level and the State Council of China, recognized how important chipmaking was. China at the time was spending more money importing chips than it was spending importing oil.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And they couldn’t make any advanced chips at home. So Xi Jinping began an effort when you count the public and private capital upwards of $200 billion to build a chipmaking industry in China. So they had the pedal to the metal on indigenization before we ever took any action.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Trump administration, in their first term, made it a little bit harder. They cut China off the top end of equipment called EV machines—from the company I mentioned before, ASML. And then when we took the controls, we put the controls in place in 2022 on chips. We also put controls in place on chipmaking equipment, another generation of chipmaking equipment, which were imperfect, but what held China back.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So the bottom line is even today, even despite the controls and despite China’s more than a decade-long effort to indigenize, chipmaking is so hard that China has failed. And don’t take my word for it: [Commerce Secretary Howard] Lutnick, one of the men at the center of this recent export-control story, testified in 2025 China can make just 200,000 chips.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And together, 200,000 for the whole country is not nearly enough. It’s not even enough for a single data center. So those were Nvidia’s arguments, and what our responses were to them.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;So in 2022, as you said, the U.S. implements these pretty sweeping export controls on semiconductors or on the chips. Can you briefly explain to me that policy in broad source for people who are not familiar with, you know, the export controls?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;Basically, our view was the risk of diversion was so high—that the chips could be sold to a civilian buyer, but would end up in PLA, the Chinese-military data centers, or end up in the domestic surveillance apparatus—that we had to control the sale of chips. Not just to the particular military buyers in China, but to the whole country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So the policy in 2022, and then some tightenings thereafter, was to say to companies like Nvidia: &lt;i&gt;You may not sell your product; these advanced chips. You can sell lower-end chips, but you cannot sell these particular advanced chips into China, full stop&lt;/i&gt;. And that was a big step.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;This is a dumb question, but what’s the penalty there?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;It’s a crime. The Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce have together pursued investigations to arrest and charge people who have violated U.S. export controls or smuggled chips into China, or things like that.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;So the export controls, as I know it in the story, is ultimately one of the decisions that brings Huang and Nvidia—who are not, you know, huge political players leading up to this—more into the D.C. fold, right? It seems that a lot of like their advocacy, especially Huang’s, really ramps up in response to this.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So I’m curious: Tell me how Nvidia started rolling up its sleeves and lobbying against those bans starting around 2022, when you guys put them in.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;We consulted with Nvidia as we were doing it, even before it happened. Because we were trying to understand the technology, and we were certainly not trying to surprise them out of the blue. So it’s not like they woke up one morning and said, &lt;i&gt;Well, you know, the policy is in effect right now.&lt;/i&gt; So there were conversations all along.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I think those conversations obviously intensified once the policy was in effect, and as we were making adjustments to it and so forth. But these were the reasonably standard conversations that the government has with companies.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And you know, when I was the White House special adviser for AI, I talked to all the AI companies pretty regularly. I think it’s part of the job of the government, especially when the private sector is inventing the technology. It’s part of the job of the government to understand what they’re doing, and what its implications are.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;But I’m curious. Like the tenor, the tone of it—as someone who had the opportunity to be in the room. I’ve seen some reports. There’s a report that I read recently from &lt;em&gt;Semafor&lt;/em&gt; about Nvidia’s more recent lobbying efforts. Quoting an anonymous congressional staffer saying their MO has been largely gaslighting: creating an intense trust deficit between government, the Hill, and Nvidia.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Like, were these conversations acrimonious? What’s the tenor of these conversations?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;I think they were strident, maybe even aggressive, but it didn’t bother me. I don’t—you know, I just felt like Jensen was doing his job, and talking his book. And those of us in the White House, and they were a group of us in the White House who had very strong conviction on this, felt like we were here to serve U.S. national security. And serve the public, and also serve American innovation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But we certainly felt like we had the technical depth to have detailed conversations with Nvidia, and we did. And you know, the policy ended where, I think, in general the policy should have ended. I would have probably been a little bit more aggressive, if you had asked me, in terms of some of the controls.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But in general, I think the policy got to where it needed to be. Probably got there slower than it needed to get there. But in general, I’m happy with certainly our core strategic and technological thesis, which I think has been borne out at this point.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;So now we’re at the current scandal. The affair with Alice Huang—no relation, and former executive at Megaspeed. Allegedly the Chinese intelligence asset. With the caveat that Megaspeed has denied all allegations of wrongdoing, can you explain a little bit about how this alleged chip smuggling works in practice?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;So I want to be clear here that I don’t have firsthand knowledge of Megaspeed. I’m only going off the news reports. I’ve left the U.S. government, obviously, in January 2025. But it does seem like Megaspeed is an exemplar of two categories of risk that worried us quite a bit when it comes to China’s access to chips.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The first is that the chips themselves would be smuggled into China. So they would be purchased in a place like Malaysia or Singapore. There might be some facade of a buyer, potentially a company like Megaspeed in one of those places, that is taking the chips into their data center; is saying, &lt;i&gt;Yes, we’re going to run them here. Everything is good. Don’t worry.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And then they’re taking the chips out of the data center, and they’re shipping them into China. And they’re ending up in a Chinese-military data center or the data center of a company that works for the Chinese military, or something like that. And that obviously is a very significant concern for the United States, because that’s direct smuggling of the chips themselves. And we don’t know—once they go into China, we don’t know what the chips are going to be used for.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The second category of concern is what’s called remote access. The chips still go to a kind of shady company in Malaysia or Singapore, or a place like that. They go into a data center, but they stay there. The difference is China—Chinese military, Chinese companies—just access that data center remotely over the internet.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So the chips stay there, but China can train their next-frontier AI system on this data center, remote. So it’s a different way of circumvent export controls. And we made a decision in one of the export-control updates to try to block that. To say: &lt;i&gt;As a condition of taking these chips, you have to pledge that you will not use them to enable Chinese AI training.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;President Trump, when he came into office, declined to enforce that rule. So there’s at least a legal gray space—of maybe it was permitted, or the administration wasn’t enforcing it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But those are the two big categories of concern: the actual physical smuggling of the chip, and then the remote access. It’s worth saying Nvidia spent a great deal of time in 2025 and 2026, including Jensen personally, saying chip smuggling is not an issue. And I think it’s obviously incorrect. Not just because of the Megaspeed case, but also because of other cases in which the Department of Justice has brought really well-documented indictments and criminal charges against people for smuggling chips in the way that I described.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;In terms of that remote access to those data centers that are outside of China, for training purposes, it’s known that China has distilled—or sort of reverse-engineered, you know—U.S. models in order to kind of keep up in the race here. Is that where that is happening in your mind? Like, inside those places? Or is that happening more locally? Or is it a mix of the two?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;Assume it’s a mix. So let’s just be very precise about what’s happening. Distillation is a process in which you can essentially—you know, if folks here are Formula 1 fans, you can draft behind the car in front of you. And you can get the outputs of a leading AI system and come up with the facsimile of that system, imperfectly. You’ll lag capabilities, but it’s cheaper.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That is a general concern. And one of the ways in which China has been trying to compensate for the lack of computing power. Essentially, is copying the Americans’ homework. That process of distillation still requires some computing power. And I would imagine China is using whatever computing power it has available to do the process of distillation, whether that’s chips overseas or chips in China.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Companies have gotten much better at stopping distillation. So Anthropic, a company that I advise, but I don’t speak for, reported that they came up with methods in the summer of 2026 to stop distillation. I think it was like up to like 99 percent. And I think OpenAI is making some moves in that direction as well.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So my suspicion, hard to know for sure, is that we will look at this kind of adversarial distillation as an artifact of a period from 2025 to 2026 where China really struggled with access to computing power, in part due to the export controls, and was using distillation as a way to try to keep up with the frontier. But I don’t think that will be sustainable for them in the long run. And then they’ll be back to the same box of not having enough computing power.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;[&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Break&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;]&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;Given what we’ve learned about Megaspeed, and what you’ve said about the Department of Justice also bringing cases about people trying to, you know, navigate around these export controls—what is your sense of just how much Nvidia helped China get access to these chips? Like, how bad is this going to get for Jensen, for Nvidia, in terms of where this can go?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;It’s a great question. Again, I don’t have firsthand knowledge of the facts here, and I don’t want to pretend. It does seem like the amount of chips going through these channels was really significant, potentially even more than the number of chips China could make as a whole country itself. I think &lt;i&gt;The Wall Street Journal&lt;/i&gt; reported something like $12 billion of chips. I’ve seen other reportings saying it was $4 billion to $5 billion of chips.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Megaspeed is just one company. There were other companies that were potentially doing this. What Nvidia knew, what Jensen knew—that is all for congressional and maybe criminal investigators to find out. I don’t pretend to know.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But certainly, as a national-security matter, I do think that the flow of chips to China in this way—smuggling and through remote data centers—is one of the biggest national-security weaknesses the United States has. And what you’ve seen really is a pretty clear bipartisan consensus to change the policy. And there’s bipartisan bills in the Congress—introduced by, you know, MAGA senators like Tom Cotton and Jim Banks, and people like that—that would cut China off chips and chipmaking equipment as a matter of law. So the president couldn’t change it, even if he wanted to.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And then, even the Trump administration, this past Monday, changed their policy and cut off remote access to data centers and required licenses for shipments to Southeast Asia to try to cut off the smuggling. They’re not quite done; there’s still a couple loopholes in their rule. But that was a very significant action for an administration that really, you know, from the middle of 2025 to today, was only taking export controls away and not enforcing them, rather than putting them into practice.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;So there are calls from Silicon Valley right—from the shareholders, from the, you know, VC types, the other tech founders of some esteem. They want Jensen Huang to come back. &lt;i&gt;He’s a visionary; he’s integral to the AI economy&lt;/i&gt;. Help me understand the rationale here, because China is enemy No. 1 in terms of the race to superintelligence. But also, it just seems like they’re abandoning the China fears all of a sudden, or excusing this dalliance. This potential dalliance.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;I think a lot of the folks who are making those calls—which, to be clear, the Nvidia board pretty clearly rejected on their earnings call this week. A lot of that constellation of people has been pretty dismissive of the China concern. So they’re often the ones supporting selling chips to China. So at least they’re consistent on that front, in that they’re just not worried about this. I think there’s probably a key difference between my view and their view. Which is: I think AI really is going to matter for national security. And at least their revealed preference is they don’t think that, because they’re willing to let China in the game. But as a national-security matter, I certainly am very concerned and think these activities should be investigated.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;What is so hard for me to understand with that is that the national-security imperative is part of the imperative of the companies, that are saying: &lt;i&gt;We can’t afford to truly pace the frontier—&lt;/i&gt;or “stop” or “pause” or whatever&lt;i&gt;—because it’s imperative that we beat China to this.&lt;/i&gt; I mean, I do feel like they’re speaking out of both corners of their mouth here.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;I do think, yeah. So if what you’re saying is sometimes the same people who are saying &lt;i&gt;We can’t regulate AI&lt;/i&gt; are also saying &lt;i&gt;Let’s sell chips to China.&lt;/i&gt; I mean: &lt;i&gt;We can’t regulate AI, because we have to beat China&lt;/i&gt; are also saying &lt;i&gt;Let’s sell chips to China&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I agree. That is totally incoherent. It doesn’t make any sense to me. President Trump himself—in, you know, militaristic terms that I would not use, given our discussion before about how we hope to have a positive-sum outcome here—President Trump is very fond of saying: &lt;i&gt;Whoever wins AI, wins&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;You would think if that is your policy, you would not want to sell chips to China. I don’t get it. I think it’s incoherent for the reason you describe. To be clear about what I do believe, my view is: American companies in fact do have to slow down. And I support pacing the frontier.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We haven’t talked about it, but you know, part two of the book is all about how we regulated the AI companies, and what more we need to do on the regulation side. That was sort of huge part of our policy. And my view is that, in fact, the way in which we can create the space for regulation—as far back as 2021, we believed—was to slow China down.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And China’s absolute dependence on American computing power was a way for us to slow China down, to build a lead for the United States. And then to, if you’d like, spend that lead on safety, to when the technology got to a critical moment. Which is what we’re in right now. To regulate the companies pretty aggressively, if I had my way. To make sure this technology is safe before it’s rolled out. Without this argument of: &lt;i&gt;Well, we’re in an arms race with China; we must forge ahead&lt;/i&gt;. Which I thought was just very destructive.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;So where does this all leave us right now, as we’re sitting in the story here? We’re talking Wednesday, November 18th. Obviously, things are changing by the minute.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;Always good to timestamp these conversations, ’cause it’s been changing every 24 hours.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;Genuinely, it is. How much hot water is Jensen in? How dangerous and serious is this for Nvidia, as Huang goes to testify before Congress in December? Like, what are the stakes for both Huang and Nvidia going forward?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;I think they’re very high. Congress, in a bipartisan way, said it’s gonna do an investigation here. I don’t know what’s gonna turn up, but certainly they’ve got a lot of threads to pull. Whether or not there’s a criminal investigation, I have no idea. But I do suspect there will be a lot of government investigations into what happened here, and there should be.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I guess in the medium term, Nvidia’s chips are still gonna be really good, and there’s still gonna be big demand for them. So as long as Nvidia can keep making great products, I think they will continue to sell those products. I guess it’s an open question of: Can they make great products without Jensen? We’ll see. They’ve got 31,000 research engineers, or something like that. So there’s a lot of smart people there, and they’ve got a lot of great technology. So we’ll see what happens to them technologically. But yeah; in the context of the investigations, certainly I would describe this as a serious moment.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;What should senators be asking? Or what should anyone in Congress be asking Huang when he’s up there, you know, in front of Congress?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;It’s the most important, age-old question in any kind of D.C. investigation, which is: &lt;i&gt;What did you know, and when did you know it?&lt;/i&gt; And they should be asking Jensen that, and they should be asking the commerce secretary, Howard Lutnick, that. Who knew what about where these chips were going. Who was getting them. How active was Nvidia’s role in enabling smuggling? How active was Jensen’s role?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Again, I don’t have firsthand knowledge of the answers. But those were all the questions I’d be asking.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;And I think lastly here, what has this done for the AI ecosystem right now? Like, is it in a worse place than it was? Or let’s just say, the American AI ecosystem?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Is it in a worse place than it was two weeks ago, before all of this stuff really trickled out into the press? Or it was about the same?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;I think it probably creates some turbulence in the waters, but my suspicion is we’ll look back at this in six or 12 months, and the big story of AI will be largely unchanged by this. And the big story of AI, you know—as we spent a lot of detail on the book—is: You have really powerful chips being used by really capable algorithms, at larger and larger scales. Yielding extraordinarily capable systems, with profound national-security implications and profound implications for everyday life and democratic values. That story.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To be clear, I’m not a cheerleader for that story. You know, you don’t write a book called &lt;i&gt;The Bitter Struggle&lt;/i&gt; if you’re a cheerleader. But I think that story is largely undiminished by these events here.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;What about China? Where are they better off? Are they worse off than they were?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;They’re worse off. They’re absolutely worse off. Because there was a bipartisan consensus that was forming on denying China access to computing power. But they had big allies that were saying, &lt;i&gt;You know, let’s sell China the chips&lt;/i&gt;. And those allies were having some success. Chief amongst some, Jensen. David Sacks, Trump’s—my successor, as you know—AI adviser to the president, was advocating for this, at least based on the reporting. President Trump had advocated for in some context.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And now the bipartisan consensus has, at least so far, started to harden against them. That is bad for China’s access to compute, and ultimately that is bad for China.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;Ben Buchanan: Thank you for coming and helping to demystify this; talking about it in these very plain terms. I wanna have you back on, to talk about the regulation part of this, later. But this has been very helpful.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;It is great to talk about this subject, and it’s great to have interest in this subject of the chips and chip controls. Because this is a wonky subject for sure—that now has gotten this gloss of a sex scandal and a spy story. But I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say this is one of the most important subjects in the world for U.S. national policy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel: &lt;/b&gt;And we’ll keep following it. Thank you very much, Ben, for coming on.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Buchanan: &lt;/b&gt;Thanks for having me.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;[&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Music&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;]&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Warzel:&lt;/b&gt; If you liked what you saw here, new episodes of &lt;i&gt;Galaxy Brain&lt;/i&gt; drop every Friday. You can subscribe on &lt;i&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/i&gt;’s YouTube channel, or on Apple or Spotify, or wherever it is that you get your podcasts. And if you want to support this work, and the work of my fellow colleagues, you can subscribe to the publication at TheAtlantic.com/Listener. That’s TheAtlantic.com/Listener. Thanks so much, and I’ll see you on the internet.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This episode of &lt;i&gt;Galaxy Brain &lt;/i&gt;was produced by Hadley Robinson, with story editing by Dave Shaw; the video was edited by Alisa Selman; and the audio was engineered by Rob Smierciak. Claudine Ebeid is the executive producer of &lt;i&gt;Atlantic&lt;/i&gt; podcasts, and Andrea Valdez is our managing editor.Learn more about your ad choices. Visit &lt;a href="https://podcastchoices.com/adchoices"&gt;podcastchoices.com/adchoices&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Charlie Warzel</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/charlie-warzel/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/rwfjWFKD119-m699FebviU8Dxog=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_19_GB_Chips_and_China/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by The Atlantic</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">What’s So Important About Nvidia’s Chips?</title><published>2026-11-20T13:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T14:53:59-05:00</updated><summary type="html">The truth about chip smuggling and the AI race with China</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/2026/11/whats-so-important-about-nvidias-chips/689521/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689527</id><content type="html">&lt;p data-flatplan-paragraph="true"&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;em&gt;This is an edition of the Books Briefing, our editors’ weekly guide to the best in books. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;i data-stringify-type="italic"&gt;&lt;a data-event-element="inline link" data-gtm-vis-first-on-screen31117857_899="592" data-gtm-vis-has-fired31117857_899="1" data-gtm-vis-total-visible-time31117857_899="100" data-sk="tooltip_parent" data-stringify-link="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/books-briefing/" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/books-briefing/?utm_source=feed" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"&gt;Sign up for it here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The next wellness craze is reading, my colleague &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/reading-tracking-app/689499/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Sophie Haigney reported in &lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/reading-tracking-app/689499/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/reading-tracking-app/689499/?utm_source=feed"&gt; this week&lt;/a&gt;. She tried a new app called Readwise Books, which tracks a user’s words-per-minute the way a health app might track their mileage or heart rate. This is just one example of how influencers and the health-conscious have recently been making “a case for reading’s value that sounds a lot like the way we talk about physical health,” Haigney wrote. The fitness challenge 75 Hard, she noted, doesn’t just prescribe workouts and a specific water intake. It also requires participants to read “10 pages of nonfiction a day.” But it offers no guidance about what those titles should be or how to discern the value of any given 10-page chunk. More confusing to me was a claim, from the bodybuilder and former California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, that picking up books is “a low-risk behavior (really, there’s no risk in reading more).”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;First, here are 6 new stories from &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic’s &lt;/em&gt;Books section:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/2026/11/four-letter-nation-steven-h-jaffe-excerpt-curseword-history/689431/?utm_source=feed"&gt;One word to explain America&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/2026/11/sarah-j-maas-acotar-second-screen-reading/689474/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Welcome to the era of second-screen reading&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/confessions-of-a-shopaholic-future-of-shopping-loneliness/689455/?utm_source=feed"&gt;The loneliness of buying too many things&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/2026/11/m-f-k-fisher-made-food-writing-pleasurable-book-review/689398/?utm_source=feed"&gt;The writer who made food fun&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/2026/11/daisy-johnson-long-wave/689456/?utm_source=feed"&gt;“Long Wave,” a short story by Daisy Johnson&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/2026/11/poem-peter-balakian-caravaggio/689422/?utm_source=feed"&gt;“Caravaggio,” a poem by Peter Balakian&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;That stopped me in my tracks. No risk? If Schwarzenegger, or any other literature-as-wellbeing influencer, truly believes that the activity is as powerful as they say it is, how can that be true? Written language is so central to our society because it can, and does, lead to real action. If printed matter has the potential to change stubborn minds, inspire the most unlikely empathy, and transmit the wildest human ideas, then perusing 10 pages of a hateful manifesto could, under the right circumstances, entail a lot of risk.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I don’t mean to make an argument for locking away dangerous ideas or for thinking of books as vectors of unwholesome thoughts. Instead, like Haigney, I’m skeptical of anyone who posits reading as a harmless, vaguely healthful behavior akin to eating vegetables or wearing sunscreen. I think that people arguing for reading as a practice of personal and spiritual transformation should follow their premise to its conclusions: Books can alter a life, undermine foundational beliefs, even change the world.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Tracking one’s reading as if it were a workout shortchanges its power. What debates over the end of literacy sometimes miss is that the content of a book is far more important than any metric—whether words-per-minute or year-over-year sales. &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2024/01/books-briefing-against-counting-books-new-year/677031/?utm_source=feed"&gt;I’ve argued this before&lt;/a&gt;, when I encouraged people to measure themselves not by statistics but instead by qualitative benchmarks: “Finish &lt;em&gt;Anna Karenina&lt;/em&gt;” is a more meaningful goal than “turn 900 pages.” Slipping and sliding across &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/2026/11/sarah-j-maas-acotar-second-screen-reading/689474/?utm_source=feed"&gt;3,200 frictionless pages of &lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/2026/11/sarah-j-maas-acotar-second-screen-reading/689474/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;em&gt;A Court of Thorns and Roses&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; feels like a wholly different exercise than the deliberate, engaged immersion of Edward P. Jones’s &lt;em&gt;The Known World&lt;/em&gt;. And neither is going to improve my VO2 max—which is fine by me, because that’s not why I’m reading them.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img alt="An illustration of stacks of books next to data" height="2074" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/mt/2026/11/The_Oura_Ring_of_Reading/original.jpg" width="3687"&gt;
&lt;figcaption class="caption"&gt;Illustration by Steph Wu / The Atlantic. Source: Getty.&lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Let’s Not Make Reading a Wellness Trend&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;By Sophie Haigney&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Books have long been considered morally and intellectually virtuous. Now some influencers are claiming that they’re good for your physical health.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/reading-tracking-app/689499/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read the full article.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;What to Read&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://tertulia.com/book/the-invisible-kingdom-reimagining-chronic-illness-meghan-o-rourke/9780399573309?affiliate_id=atl-347"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Invisible Kingdom&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;strong&gt;, by Meghan O’Rourke&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The best memoirs are those that take an occurrence, a life, or a history that is not our own, and so fully transport the reader into the world of the writer that our capacity for empathy expands in ways we could not have imagined. That is the experience I had reading O’Rourke’s &lt;em&gt;The Invisible Kingdom&lt;/em&gt;, in which she writes beautifully and honestly about living with a chronic, mysterious, and often debilitating illness. Some of my loved ones live with their own enigmatic, ongoing health issues, and this book provided me with insight and context with which to more fully understand their experiences. O’Rourke places her life in conversation with the larger body of historical research on chronic illness, to provide a narrative that is both deeply personal and deeply investigated. In the age of COVID, when so many across the world are &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2023/04/long-covid-symptoms-invisible-disability-chronic-illness/673773/?utm_source=feed"&gt;still living&lt;/a&gt; with the lingering, enervating symptoms of the virus, the lessons and stories here are becoming more relevant to all of us—just as they were for me.  &lt;em&gt;— &lt;/em&gt;Clint Smith&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/archive/2023/10/books-changed-perspective-recommendations/675751/?utm_source=feed"&gt;From our list:&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/books/archive/2023/10/books-changed-perspective-recommendations/675751/?utm_source=feed"&gt;A book that changed how I think&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;Out Next Week&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;📚 &lt;/em&gt;&lt;a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9780593188989"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Long Wave&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9780593188989"&gt;, by Daisy Johnson&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr" role="presentation"&gt;&lt;em&gt;📚 &lt;/em&gt;&lt;a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9781469696584"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Arlington: An African American History&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9781469696584"&gt;, by William A. Blair&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr" role="presentation"&gt;&lt;em&gt;📚 &lt;/em&gt;&lt;a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9781668008232"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Secrets: A Reporter’s Memoir&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9781668008232"&gt;, by Bob Woodward&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr" role="presentation"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Your Weekend Read&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img alt="Illusrtation of Jason and Lucia from 'GTA 6' walking toward the viewer, leaving behind an explosion of money and household objects." height="4688" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_16_GTA/original.png" width="8334"&gt;
&lt;figcaption class="caption"&gt;Illustration by Tina Zhou / The Atlantic&lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Least Productive Day of the Year&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;By Sophia Nguyen&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Kelsey Rogers, a 26-year-old working in construction in San Antonio, Texas, didn’t want to tell her boss why she was asking for time off. First, she chalked it up to “personal reasons.” Then she said her birthday was coming up. But eventually, she came clean: She wanted to play &lt;em&gt;Grand Theft Auto VI &lt;/em&gt;right when the game dropped, on November 19. Rogers had big plans—decorating with neon lights, stocking up on energy drinks, adorning those drinks with little paper umbrellas. She and her fiancé were going to play until their eyes gave out.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/gta-6-launch-time-off-work/689466/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read the full article.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-flatplan-paragraph="true"&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;em&gt;When you buy a book using a link in this newsletter, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting &lt;/em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;em&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-flatplan-paragraph="true"&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;a data-event-element="inline link" data-gtm-vis-first-on-screen31117857_899="46853" data-gtm-vis-has-fired31117857_899="1" data-gtm-vis-total-visible-time31117857_899="100" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/video-village/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Sign up for Video Village&lt;/a&gt;, a newsletter in which &lt;/i&gt;&lt;i&gt;David Sims unearths cinematic gems and brings readers into his movie obsession.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-flatplan-paragraph="true"&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;i&gt;Explore &lt;/i&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;a data-event-element="inline link" data-gtm-vis-first-on-screen31117857_899="39421" data-gtm-vis-has-fired31117857_899="1" data-gtm-vis-total-visible-time31117857_899="100" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://link.theatlantic.com/click/29381641.11692/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudGhlYXRsYW50aWMuY29tL25ld3NsZXR0ZXJzLz91dG1fc291cmNlPW5ld3NsZXR0ZXImdXRtX21lZGl1bT1lbWFpbCZ1dG1fY2FtcGFpZ249YXRsYW50aWMtZGFpbHktbmV3c2xldHRlciZ1dG1fY29udGVudD0yMDIyMTAxNg/6050e2b21fc16d137f83c038B888c1a2f?utm_source%3Dnewsletter%26utm_medium%3Demail%26utm_campaign%3Datlantic-daily-newsletter%26utm_content%3D20221120&amp;amp;source=gmail&amp;amp;ust=1669076263133000&amp;amp;usg=AOvVaw0FT9aC-6eYp6UHNOGI2EDT" href="https://link.theatlantic.com/click/29381641.11692/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudGhlYXRsYW50aWMuY29tL25ld3NsZXR0ZXJzLz91dG1fc291cmNlPW5ld3NsZXR0ZXImdXRtX21lZGl1bT1lbWFpbCZ1dG1fY2FtcGFpZ249YXRsYW50aWMtZGFpbHktbmV3c2xldHRlciZ1dG1fY29udGVudD0yMDIyMTAxNg/6050e2b21fc16d137f83c038B888c1a2f?utm_source=newsletter&amp;amp;utm_medium=email&amp;amp;utm_campaign=atlantic-daily-newsletter&amp;amp;utm_content=20221120" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"&gt;all of our newsletters&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Emma Sarappo</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/emma-sarappo/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/OWghNSV2yepVpMfmTfcJCCEtdew=/media/newsletters/2026/11/2026_11_20_Books_Briefing_Reading_as_a_workout_1/original.jpg"><media:credit>Reg Burkett / Daily Express/Hulton Archive / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Benefits of Reading Are Incalculable</title><published>2026-11-20T11:50:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T12:08:29-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Books can alter a life, undermine foundational beliefs, even change the world.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/11/books-briefing-benefits-reading-incalculable/689527/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689520</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;When the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, &lt;a href="https://www.mfa.org/press-release/taylor-swift-the-eras-collection"&gt;shared&lt;/a&gt; Tuesday that it would mount an exhibition of Taylor Swift costumes, instruments, and other objects next year, the public response seemed to fall into two camps. Swifties were thrilled, and art purists criticized the museum for succumbing to visitor bait. But really, neither scorn nor celebration is the right response to a show that one of the museum’s curators describes as representing “a remarkable musical journey across genres over the last 20 years.” A 156-year-old institution raiding a pop star’s closet should be seen for what it is: a cry for help.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The show does not entirely flout museum norms. The MFA’s collection includes fashion and musical instruments. Art institutions have examined celebrity wardrobes in the past (see the landmark David Bowie exhibition that traveled around the world), and museums frequently highlight living visual artists and designers—sometimes, as in the &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/09/met-gala-museum-john-galliano-canceled/688501/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Met’s recent plans&lt;/a&gt; for a John Galliano exhibit, to their peril. Why not Swift? She seems to have conquered nearly every other corner of the culture. An illustration of her range: She both is the &lt;a href="https://cssh.northeastern.edu/taylor-swift-beyond-the-stage-how-universities-from-harvard-to-stanford-teach-the-swiftie-lesson/"&gt;subject of university courses&lt;/a&gt; and once had her &lt;a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/27/business/heinz-ketchup-seemingly-ranch-condiment/index.html"&gt;own special-edition ketchup bottle&lt;/a&gt;. Perhaps to her fans, her rightful place in history is alongside the old masters and the Impressionists. Step back, and you can see why there’s hype for the show, but it’s still a mismatch.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The museum sector has been having a hard time lately, making this type of pop-culture play understandably tempting. But after the MFA laid off 33 employees, including curators of Islamic art, Native American art, and fashion arts, earlier this year, the show choice looks more than a little desperate. Although Taylor Swift’s sartorial history may be worthy of serious scholarly analysis—mass culture certainly has a place in art museums, which should help us understand the visual world writ large—tackling the subject of a living celebrity at the height of her fame renders hagiography practically a foregone conclusion. The MFA is not even pretending otherwise: One staffer made a point of extending a special welcome to Swifties in the announcement. The exhibition will very likely serve as an advertisement for a star who needs no such boost in the hopes that the museum can lure more visitors, who will be paying $40 each to look at her stuff.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;For an institution that contains one of the finest art collections in the world, the decision belies a deep insecurity. When I saw the news, I had an urge to shout at the MFA like it’s a friend of mine who’s in a toxic relationship: &lt;em&gt;You don’t need her, buddy! You’re great!&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The tendency to star-cast museum shows does not necessarily lead to bad or uninteresting results. These exhibitions have historically taken one of two approaches: In one, the celebrity might be drafted to curate an exhibition (which must be a tad annoying to the curators who might’ve gone through the trouble of getting a degree to do that). In the other, the museum assembles an exhibit of the celebrity’s belongings or artistic ephemera.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, which went through its own round of layoffs last year, recently opened an exhibition doing a bit of both. The institution is currently showcasing nearly 150 works from the art collection of the BTS member RM, and the show is co-curated by the K-pop star himself. Some celebrity-infused endeavors have succeeded, such as the acclaimed Bowie show or a well-liked &lt;a href="https://observer.com/2026/02/review-exhibition-dean-collection-of-swizz-beatz-and-alicia-keys-virginia-museum-of-fine-arts/"&gt;exhibition&lt;/a&gt; of Alicia Keys and Swizz Beatz’s collection that the Brooklyn Museum organized. Others, such as &lt;a href="https://news.artnet.com/art-world/ladies-and-gentlemen-the-bjork-show-at-moma-is-bad-273020"&gt;Björk at the Museum of Modern Art&lt;/a&gt; in 2015 or the &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/01/arts/design/hannah-gadsby-brooklyn-museum-picasso.html"&gt;Pablo Picasso show co-curated by Hannah Gadsby&lt;/a&gt; at the Brooklyn Museum in 2023, flopped with critics but drew crowds, presumably fulfilling their purpose.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If it’s not clear, I am neither a Swiftie nor a K-pop stan, which may disqualify me from a conversation for the truly devout. That said, having lived in Seoul, I am a real admirer of Korean art and would accept almost any strategy to show more Americans Kim Whanki’s moving abstractions or Chang Ucchin’s charming pastoral scenes. And the RM exhibit has done that, breaking museum records. Even so, something feels off to me.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Such shows can raise ethical questions—displaying any person’s art collection, for example, can inflate its value—but more than that, they can hurt a museum’s credibility. A doctor would not hand her sutures over to Beyoncé just because her surgery numbers are down, nor would a losing football team throw Justin Bieber on the field because he might bring in some new fans. The stakes are different in museums, but these places shape history, care for cultural heritage, and at their core, are meant to challenge and educate visitors. The stakes of swapping in celebrities for curators and their paraphernalia for objects are not exactly low either.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Many museums have struggled to rebound after the pandemic &lt;a href="https://www.aam-us.org/2026/11/19/after-last-years-setback-more-than-half-of-museums-report-attendance-gains-national-survey-finds/"&gt;changed visitor habits&lt;/a&gt; and have not found their way in a world that seems to become more digital by the day. They’ve faced alternating allegations of being overly woke and being complicit in colonialism. And although they are &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/08/smithsonian-trump-trust/688165/?utm_source=feed"&gt;widely trusted&lt;/a&gt;, museums remain one of the few places that spark anxiety among would-be visitors over not having done their homework. No one hesitates to go to a concert because they didn’t study music theory. Perhaps you cannot blame the MFA or SFMOMA for looking to the crowd-pleaser to pad the numbers. It’s easy. Too easy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Paying the bills, for the MFA, might mean loosening up a bit—not everyone wants to parse the stories told by an intricate Japanese folding screen or sit long enough with a Mondrian to see how it’s more than just a colorful grid. But museums’ usual purview holds plenty of mass appeal as is. In a way, the situation parallels how museums tap certain go-to artists and genres to woo the public: &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/08/yayoi-kusama-obituary/688432/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Yayoi Kusama&lt;/a&gt; with her impossibly photogenic mirrors; Impressionists with their coffee-table-book-ready textural landscapes; the treasures of &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/2026/11/public-monuments-egyptian-art-exhibits/688700/?utm_source=feed"&gt;ancient Egypt&lt;/a&gt;. The best museums don’t just give people what they want, though; they teach us how to look, and empower us to find aesthetic joy for ourselves.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;More compelling than celebrity shows are efforts to pull new audiences that confidently lean into what museums already do. Many have started opening for late-night hours, becoming the kinds of &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2022/04/third-places-meet-new-people-pandemic/629468/?utm_source=feed"&gt;third places&lt;/a&gt; so many communities are short on. The Museum of Vancouver recently went the Brené Brown route and highlighted its vulnerability, giving “austerity tours” that showed the toll of low funding. (Kind of depressing—but it definitely got people talking.) The National Gallery of Art, meanwhile, has a curator translating old objects into the language of Gen Z on social media; the institution is also inviting people in for “Finding Awe” sessions that train visitors to look closely and patiently at objects. During a recent session, a visitor commented that after seeing so much AI content, noticing the imperfections of an Agnes Martin canvas felt rewarding. Museums can make themselves relevant to contemporary viewers by finding the relatable and the universal in the art they’re trusted with stewarding, not borrowing relevance in the shape of a celebrity’s dress.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A common justification for more populist shows goes something like: &lt;em&gt;The exhibition gets visitors in the door. After that, they might encounter something that could spark a lifelong interest in art&lt;/em&gt;. I don’t love the way this logic characterizes art like a bad-tasting pill that must go down coated in peanut butter. The art museum’s job, if nothing else, is to convince us that the art &lt;em&gt;is&lt;/em&gt; the peanut butter. So if there must be a Swift show, I hope the thinking proves true. During the Swift exhibit’s run, the MFA will also, at one point, be hosting a show of paintings by &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/05/mary-cassatt-mothers-day/687090/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Mary Cassatt&lt;/a&gt;, the only American to exhibit with the French Impressionists. Cassatt had an intimate and intentional way of capturing women’s experiences in a male-dominated world. Sound familiar? Maybe some of those visiting Swifties will enter their Cassatt era next.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;*Illustration sources: Brooke Sutton / Getty; Ethan Miller / ACMA / Getty; iStock / Getty; Kevin Mazur / Getty; Kevin Winter / Getty; TAS24 / Getty; Tibrina Hobson / Getty; Tommaso Boddi / Wire Image / Getty.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Kelsey Ables</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/kelsey-ables/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/guT7osc_fQUWFq4Ir4RbnS-xDrQ=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_19_TaylorSwift/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by The Atlantic*</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Taylor Swift Museum Exhibition Is an SOS Call</title><published>2026-11-20T09:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T12:28:16-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Art museums have to get creative right now. They can do better than this.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/taylor-swift-museum-boston/689520/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689516</id><content type="html">&lt;p data-flatplan-paragraph="true"&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;i data-stringify-type="italic"&gt;This article was featured in the One Story to Read Today newsletter. &lt;a data-event-element="inline link" data-gtm-vis-first-on-screen31117857_899="984608" data-gtm-vis-has-fired31117857_899="1" data-gtm-vis-total-visible-time31117857_899="100" data-sk="tooltip_parent" data-stringify-link="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/one-story-to-read-today/" delay="150" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/one-story-to-read-today/?utm_source=feed" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"&gt;Sign up for it here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A man and woman leave a restaurant. “I had a nice time—” she begins, but he’s already off, skateboarding away with nothing more than a “Call me.” Then she receives a Venmo request: “your half.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Out pops the actor Julia Fox, here to impart a warning. She shows a montage of how a relationship might unfold with this scruffy, nonchalant man—flashes of him playing video games in a filthy apartment, holding an umbrella over himself while she gets drenched, presenting her with a cheap engagement ring. The message is clear: If he won’t pay for your dinner now, he’ll be a stingy, unchivalrous man-child forever.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This trailer isn’t for Fox’s next film. It’s for the new “Anti 50/50 Campaign” she’s promoting with the dating site Seeking, which involves a $50,000 fund to reimburse singles who have split the check on a date (up to $50 a person). “Seeking is challenging what it sees as a decline in generosity,” the press release reads. That statement is not gender-neutral. In the company’s own survey, 75 percent of women said they prefer men to “take the lead on dates,” including planning and paying—yet 61 percent of female Zoomers said they’ve been asked to share the bill. Seeking regards this as an affront to straight women everywhere. “I’m all for women being independent,” Fox says in the release, “but that doesn’t mean we have to entertain low-effort men who think splitting a check is the height of romance. If you’re going to court somebody, COURT THEM.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Of all the causes Fox could take up in our year 2026, this one is oddly old-fashioned. But Seeking is taking advantage of something real: The expectation that men should foot the bill, especially on the first date, is still stubbornly &lt;a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34874209/"&gt;ubiquitous&lt;/a&gt;, even among women who see themselves as progressive or critical of strict gender norms. In a dating world that can feel hard and confusing, many singles are looking for explicit rules—and many straight women are looking for a man who offers care and consistency. Alas, a paid check does not a gentleman make.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/2026/08/bumble-dating-app-men-message-first/688298/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Bumble moves the first move back to men&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The bill-paying convention, like it or not, has its roots in a philosophy of clear-cut gender difference: Men are born providers and leaders, whereas women are passive and dependent. For many years, this was the logic by which American society generally operated. Women had precious few career opportunities; their presumed job was to be a wife and mother. So in the early 20th century, when more women began dating in public spaces rather than having suitors visit their home, men were &lt;a href="https://now.tufts.edu/2011/02/11/love-american-style"&gt;expected to pay&lt;/a&gt;. They were the ones with money to fork up.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Now, though, a far greater number of women are financially self-sufficient. In this context, the assumption that men should pay for dates seems a bit weird, and weirdly pervasive. For her 2020 book, &lt;a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9780520298699"&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Mating Game: How Gender Still Shapes How We Date&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, the Appalachian State University sociologist Ellen Lamont interviewed college-educated young adults and found that more than two-thirds of women participants said that all of their first dates were covered by the man. Many of them would offer to split the check as a test, hoping that the man would insist on paying. One 27-year-old told Lamont that she didn’t find it important for a man to grab the first check, but “I would expect it, and then if he expected me to pay for half, or if he expected me to pay, then I’d be like, &lt;em&gt;I’m out&lt;/em&gt;.” &lt;em&gt;So it was important, then? &lt;/em&gt;Lamont clarified. “I guess it is,” the woman conceded. “’Cause I’d be like, man, he didn’t even pay, what a douche.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Lamont has found that courtship norms are unusually sticky. Many people dismiss the idea of stark, inherent gender differences in other realms—they think that women are just as equipped as men to have a career, or that men should be equally involved parents. Yet at the same time, they quietly maintain that men should be the ones to ask women out, pay for dates, suggest exclusivity or commitment, and propose marriage. People are motivated by their own interests, after all; women fought for the right to vote and to enter the workforce not just for the abstract concept of equality but also because they wanted a say and a paycheck. A woman might find splitting the bill about as appealing as a man might view splitting the housework. And guidelines can be comforting, especially for a ritual as intimidating as dating. No one wants to misstep. So people tend to follow the rules—even rules they don’t fully stand behind in theory.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;They rationalize, of course. Some people have told me that men should get the tab because they make more money on average. (If this was really the logic, shouldn’t the higher-earning person pay, whoever it may be?) Others—including some men I’ve spoken with—hold that the least men can do is front the bill, given that the woman otherwise tends to bring more to the table: better listening skills, empathy, social graces. The man, according to this line of thinking, is lucky to be there at all, whereas the woman has more to lose—especially in a climate of misogyny and prevalent harassment. But putting women on such a pedestal, presuming that they’re inherently soft and nurturing and pulled together, is flattening in its own way.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Many women also see willingness to pay as a sign of genuine interest: “an easy gimme,” Lamont said, particularly for young women who have recently left college hookup culture behind and are looking for courtship that feels serious and grown-up. Regardless of gender, reading someone’s feelings is difficult. And a lot of women look for tokens of dedication, she said, because they’ve been told again and again that men are commitment-phobic libertines. Something as prosaic as a credit card in a cup, when you’re scanning for green flags, can take on outsize significance.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This was true at the time of Lamont’s research, and it may be even truer now, when a lot of straight women are fed up with a perceived lack of enthusiasm from male prospects. The dating app Bumble, once known for its “women message first” policy, now &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/2026/08/bumble-dating-app-men-message-first/688298/?utm_source=feed"&gt;allows men&lt;/a&gt; to initiate; when the company surveyed women, it found that many were tired of putting themselves out there and wanted men to step up—to be present, active, eager. Meanwhile, a slew of think pieces have captured a similar yearning. “Lately I have been bruised by the ambivalence of men,” the writer Jean Garnett &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/21/magazine/men-heterofatalism-dating-relationships.html"&gt;wrote&lt;/a&gt; in &lt;em&gt;The&lt;/em&gt; &lt;em&gt;New York Times&lt;/em&gt;, recalling a man who’d canceled their date when he was feeling anxious. “Where were the men who could handle hard stuff? Like leaving the house for sex?” The headline of another &lt;em&gt;Times&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/20/style/modern-love-men-where-have-you-gone-please-come-back.html"&gt;story&lt;/a&gt; summed up the sentiment: “Men, Where Have You Gone? Please Come Back.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The problem is that bill paying alone isn’t actually a good gauge of emotional investment. Many of the men Lamont interviewed told her that they’d grab the check even when they had no interest in seeing their date again. A man can also be rich, keen, &lt;em&gt;and&lt;/em&gt; a self-involved jerk. (A 2016 &lt;a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/302973089_Heterosexual_Dating_Double_Standards_in_Undergraduate_Women_and_Men"&gt;study&lt;/a&gt; of university students in California found that, among male participants, embracing traditional courtship norms was associated with “hostile sexism” and the disavowal of feminism.) On the flip side, a man who suggests splitting the bill might be earnestly trying to foster an equitable dynamic. Or maybe he just doesn’t have the money to throw down $100 every time he takes someone out, and maybe—going out on a limb here—being broke doesn’t make someone a lazy schlub.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A ton of single people today, men and women alike, say they’re &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/03/nyregion/gen-z-dating-too-expensive-cost.html"&gt;forgoing&lt;/a&gt; dating because it’s &lt;a href="https://mashable.com/life/zelle-economics-of-dating-report"&gt;too expensive&lt;/a&gt;. The team behind Seeking understands this on some level; the company refers to “rising dating costs and growing frustration with the modern dating experience” as its raison d’être—but it seems to find that strain to be a problem for only half the population. When men see dating as cost-prohibitive, though, that’s an issue for straight women too. Where have the men gone? Perhaps home to spare their aching wallet.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/08/one-night-only-movie-sex-singles/688283/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The dystopia of modern singlehood&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;      &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If courtship is going to evolve beyond outdated gender expectations, the transition will not always feel smooth. Women who want new models of masculinity will need to let go of old ones—trading the comfort of paternalism for the satisfaction of being seen as a capable adult, or the convenience of covered costs for a connection between equals. And sometimes, two people will have to chuckle at the awkwardness of not knowing who initiates or pays or plans. I actually find this to be a sweet part of dating: when both people reach for their card, lock eyes, and laugh; or when one gets to show that they’re having fun by saying, “I’ll get us next time.” Eventually, you realize that, despite plenty of ambiguity, you’ve both been trading little affirmations back and forth, one person texting first, the other suggesting a location or giving a compliment. You find that uncertainty can be survived. And only by working through it together do you discover what fits—not for men and women as abstract categories, but for two distinct human beings.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;em&gt;​​When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting &lt;/em&gt;The Atlantic.&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Faith Hill</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/faith-hill/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/oE7CrYXwjwQqLr7Whib9SAI07gw=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_17_The_Worst_Way_to_Show_Your_Date_You_Care_2/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by Alisa Gao / The Atlantic</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Old-School Dating Ritual People Can’t Seem to Shake</title><published>2026-11-20T08:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T13:32:00-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Who pays the bill matters less than many people think.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/2026/11/split-bill-first-date-debate/689516/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689363</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;L&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;ooking back&lt;/span&gt;, I’m not sure why I’d expected subtlety from a garment whose name promised to defy physics—especially one that I’d ordered from Kim Kardashian’s shapewear-and-loungewear company, Skims. But when I first tried the “Butt Lifting Short” under the dress I planned to wear to my father’s 80th birthday party, then asked my mother for a second opinion, her eyes widened. “Well, they’re a little bit of a statement,” she said—the same phrase, in the same tone, that she had used when, as a teenager, I had asked her what she thought about nose rings.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This was my first mistake with a Kardashian-branded item, but it would not be my last. I’d wanted to understand just how much America’s most famous influencers had infiltrated American consumption. So for seven days in October, while on a trip to visit my parents in the center of the Kardashians’ universe (Los Angeles), everything I put on and in my body came from companies associated with the Kardashian daughters; their mother, Kris; and their half sisters, Kendall and Kylie Jenner. The family’s dedication to launching brand after brand, in product category after product category, had made it easy to obtain everything I needed to live a life made in their image: Clothes. Food. Drinks. Cosmetics. Supplements. Cleaning supplies. Novelty socks.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;My usual aesthetic oscillates between office casual and babysitting casual, so I didn’t expect to covet much from brands whose standout products include lipstick that tries to mimic the look of lip filler and a slip dress that makes everybody look positively bodacious. When I drove to the Skims store to swap my shapewear for something less shapely, I had every intention of making my exchange and leaving. But then I saw the cashmere sweatpants. And the silky pajamas. And the leggings—a genre of clothing plucked from the depths of hell to make women insecure about their thighs—which somehow looked nice on the women modeling for their friends outside the dressing rooms. One reason I’d never bought into the Kardashians’ world was that I had no interest in looking like Jessica Rabbit. But I &lt;em&gt;was &lt;/em&gt;interested in these delicious cashmere sweatpants. Hours into accepting the Kardashians into my life, did I already want what they were selling?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These days, the Kardashians are somewhat less visible than they were in the 2000s and 2010s, when &lt;em&gt;Keeping Up With the Kardashians &lt;/em&gt;was still airing on &lt;em&gt;E!&lt;/em&gt;, and millions of Americans knew by osmosis that Kourtney was on-again, off-again with Scott and that Kylie had finally admitted to using lip filler. Their current reality show—&lt;em&gt;The Kardashians&lt;/em&gt;, on Hulu—is less beloved by fans than their original show&lt;em&gt;, &lt;/em&gt;and although Kim has 343 million followers on Instagram, she has gone from being the most-followed person on the platform, circa 2014, to the eighth. (According to one account that tracks such metrics, Kylie is neck and neck with the Rock for the No. 5 spot.) “But it doesn’t matter anymore,” MJ Corey, the author of &lt;em&gt;Dekonstructing the Kardashians&lt;/em&gt;, told me. Even if the Kardashians are themselves less omnipresent, because of their many product lines, they’re more ubiquitous than ever.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;For my week living in the Kardashian brandiverse, I wore clothes from Skims and Khloé’s Good American brand; did my makeup with Kylie Cosmetics’ Kyliner, Kylash, and Kybrow; and even pulled my hair back with hair ties from Skims’s collaboration with the mulberry-silk company Slip. I swapped my morning coffee for Kim’s energy drinks, sprinkled Kylie’s K&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;O “skin hydration mix” into my water, snacked on Khloé’s Khloud protein popcorn, and ate meals from the L.A. fast-casual restaurant chain Health Nut, which Kris has invested in. At night, I washed my face with 111Skin products—another investment—only because Kim’s skin-care line won’t launch until next year. I thought oral care was the last product vertical that the Kardashians hadn’t touched, so I used Crest—only to learn later that I could have been using purple color-correcting toothpaste from Moon, an oral-care company that Kendall has invested in.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In an attempt to reach a moment of peak Kardashian-ness (at least as I imagined it), I drove to Health Nut later that week in the bodacious Skims dress. Before I left the car, I applied my Kylie Cosmetics lip kit duo of lip liner and lipstick; its patented HotFlux technology temporarily plumped my lips by essentially burning them, but I told myself that a true Kardashian would know that beauty is pain. (Kim once wore a corset so tight, she described breathing in it as an “art form.”) By the time I’d ordered my salad—a romaine, mozzarella, and sprout concoction straight out of 2007—I looked, for better or worse, like I’d gotten some Juvéderm lip filler. When I returned home, I donned a complimentary face mask included in my 111Skin order, because in the Kardashian world, one can never have too much skin care. In my bedazzled Skims claw clip, Kylie lip products, Good American T-shirt, and Skims hoodie and yoga pants, I felt precisely how the slogan on my Rob Kardashian novelty socks described me: a “Classy Bitch.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img alt="photo of Nancy standing in front of a Calabasas neighborhood sign, posed with an energy drink" height="374" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/11/2026_11_11_Kardashians_inline_1/1b516c8e4.jpg" width="665"&gt;
&lt;figcaption class="credit"&gt;Kathy Bidart Walecki&lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;F&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;rom the beginning&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;em&gt;Keeping Up With the Kardashians&lt;/em&gt;, the family has been working the same hustle: They sell a view into their world, and then use that screen time to advertise their products. Even in Season 1, the sisters’ boutique, Dash, served as a key setting and occasional plot driver. As the show scaled, so did Dash: A spin-off series, &lt;em&gt;Kourtney and Khloé Take Miami&lt;/em&gt;, revolved around the sisters opening a new location, and the spin-off to the spin-off, &lt;em&gt;Kim and Kourtney Take New York&lt;/em&gt;, was about opening one in SoHo. Dash became a fan pilgrimage site; it was also one of the Kardashian ventures criticized for being insultingly expensive. Similarly, SKKN by Kim shut down after getting ridiculed for its $600 skin-care routine; the Kardashian Kard, a prepaid debit card that cost $99.95 to activate for a year, was scrapped the same month it launched. The family also developed a bit of a snake-oil-salesman reputation for making sponsored Instagram posts about QuickTrim weight-loss supplements (basically caffeine pills) and Flat Tummy teas (basically laxatives).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But over the years, the family has found more reputable products to sell at a lower price point—often with the help of business leaders such as Emma Grede, who has worked with them on several of their most successful brands. The daughters have concentrated on launching companies that represent their archetypes: Kim, the curvy one, has shapewear; Kendall, the enigmatic tomboy, has 818 Tequila; Kylie, famous for her voluptuous lips and meticulous makeup, has Kylie Cosmetics; Khloé, who was subjected to ceaseless comments about her weight, launched a size-inclusive clothing company. And Kourtney, who is so health-conscious that she once objected to candy being served at her child’s Candyland-themed birthday party, has a supplement line, Lemme. (Kourtney declined to be interviewed for this story; the rest of the Kardashian-Jenners did not respond to interview requests.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some of these brands have been extraordinarily successful. Another beauty company bought 51 percent of Kylie Cosmetics for $600 million in 2019; Skims is worth $5 billion (four times as much as Spanx, which essentially invented modern shapewear). The day that Skims announced a collaboration with Nike, the athletic brand’s market value went up by &lt;a href="https://www.sportico.com/business/commerce/2025/nike-skims-partnership-kim-kardashian-1234828732/"&gt;$6.7 billion&lt;/a&gt;. Kim became a billionaire in 2021, and the entire family, at least according to some estimates, has amassed a net worth roughly equivalent to the GDP of Belize.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Which is to say, the Kardashians have long since become so wealthy that the people they’re selling products to have zero chance of keeping up with their lifestyles (if that was ever possible). What they’re selling instead is a splurge for the middle-ish class. To anyone who shops at J.Crew or Madewell, Good American prices would feel comparable; Skims products generally sell for about the same as Spanx’s. Many Kardashian brands are carried at Walmart, Target, and Ulta, a Sephora competitor with a slightly lower price point. A full Kardashian transformation wasn’t cheap: It cost me about $3,000, enough that my credit-card company sent me fraud alerts twice because its algorithms could not comprehend why I—a person who doesn’t spend much on clothing or cosmetics—had suddenly dropped so much on Skims and skin care. But for many Americans, buying just a bit of the family’s world is within reach.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Because of their early days hawking Flat Tummy teas online, I hadn’t expected much from the Kardashians’ products, but some of them were indeed superior to my norm. As someone who doesn’t take a multivitamin and just hopes for the best, I looked forward to taking my citrus-flavored immunity gummies from Lemme, every morning. Several people complimented my Good American jeans, and the Kylie Cosmetics’ products really were long-lasting—plus, for those &lt;em&gt;wanting &lt;/em&gt;to look like they’d gotten Juvéderm, the lip kit is a cheaper alternative. I wouldn’t say shapewear by any brand is actually comfortable, but Skims did make being encased, sausage-like, in nylon relatively painless.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But that was the good stuff. My order from Kris’s cleaning company, Safely, never arrived, so I gave up and used Dawn. I did not expect Kylie’s K&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;O drink mix to actually “increase skin elasticity &amp;amp; reduce wrinkles &amp;amp; fine lines,” as the package claimed, but I did expect it to be drinkable. I never figured out how to get the powder to fully dissolve, so I periodically swallowed peach-flavored clumps of trademarked “bioactive collagen peptides.” Consuming Khloud’s white-cheddar protein popcorn was worse: Imagine chewing Styrofoam coated in pulverized drywall. (A couple of my friends have told me that the kettle-corn variety isn’t as bad.) At least I had Khloud Plus protein chips, also featuring collagen. The nacho flavor was good enough, in a nacho-flavored-tree-bark sort of way.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Anyone who wanted to go to a restaurant with me knew that the meal would need to be at Health Nut. I made the 30-minute drive there a few times a week to stock up on salads, sandwiches, and a delightful iced green-tea drink known as the Mango Greentini. I became the restaurant’s most devoted regular, except perhaps for the Kardashian-Jenners, who regularly consumed the salads on &lt;em&gt;Keeping Up With the Kardashians&lt;/em&gt;. But it did not save me from the times when I had to watch my parents drink coffee while I sipped Kim’s Update energy drinks. Desperate for a warm morning beverage, I tried heating the drinks up, but that didn’t help much: They still tasted of Pez and contained a caffeine alternative that gave me the urge to clench my jaw. I couldn’t tell if my loss of appetite meant that my Lemme supplements, which supposedly “promote your body’s GLP-1 production,” were actually working, or that I simply dreaded the Khloud popcorn.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But soon enough, I settled into my Kardashian routine. My parents started alerting our loved ones to my project before family gatherings, to ward off any concerns that I’d suddenly developed a penchant for dressing like a Mafia wife on her way to Pilates. The distance between my life and that of some of the most successful influencers of our era seemed slightly smaller, because now I was someone who relaxed in dedicated loungewear and not just a sweatshirt from her high-school softball team. Like the Kardashians, I now went out in public dressed, for work, in clothes so tight that they might as well have been body paint—and, yes, those clothes did get me more stares than I was used to. And while I was driving back and forth to Health Nut on canyon roads overlooking the Pacific Ocean, I was reminded that—like Kim—I might rent in New York City, but California was my &lt;a href="https://people.com/kim-kardashian-says-she-can-t-imagine-moving-due-to-home-memories-8669026"&gt;forever home&lt;/a&gt;. In fact, my parents’ house is close enough to the Kardashians’ in Calabasas that when a wildfire caused a power outage during my visit, both areas were affected, according to an outage map. &lt;em&gt;Do they have a full-house generator? &lt;/em&gt;I wondered, as I sat in the dark in my Kylie lip liner.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="u-block-center"&gt;&lt;img alt="left: photo of Nancy pouring 818 Tequila in a kitchen. right: close up photo of Nancy's hair in a bedazzled Skims claw clip" height="442" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/11/2026_11_11_Kardashians_inline_2/ff16c5c59.jpg" width="665"&gt;
&lt;figcaption class="credit"&gt;Kathy Bidart Walecki&lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;B&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;y the end of day seven&lt;/span&gt;, when I took a shot of Kendall’s 818 Tequila to celebrate my release from the Kardashians’ grip, it didn’t feel like much of a finale. The Kardashian brand ecosystem had been easy enough to inhabit. The bodacious Skims dress—which, like the Butt Lifting Short, proved too powerful for its own good—had mostly stayed in my closet. (My mom had also forbidden me from wearing it to church.) Good American’s more casual offerings had meant that I could wear jeans and T-shirts as usual, and the family’s skin-care products, cosmetics, and salads had fit fairly seamlessly into my routine. I had even started to sort of like the Khloud popcorn—although maybe that was just Stockholm syndrome, which science tells us can set in after six days.   &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;                                                           &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the weeks since that tequila shot, I’ve still used Kardashian products and have frequently found myself forgetting that they’re Kardashian products at all. Some of their brands, such as Khloud, still trade on the family members’ fame by featuring them in ads and on packaging, but many of them don’t. I’d expected the Los Angeles Skims store to be a shrine to Kim, but I didn’t see an image of her anywhere. The store’s minimalist, curvaceous design was meant to highlight beige shapewear and beige shapewear only. In a way, that’s a testament to Skims’s success: Over the past five years, Google searches for the brand have occasionally outnumbered searches for Kim herself.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Maybe the family is quietly coming to accept that they are no longer the cultural centerpiece that they were in the 2010s. The Kardashians have spent two decades vying for people’s attention, and now they have to fight a new generation of YouTube and TikTok creators. But if there is any logical end point to influencing, it may be in the same playbook that Chip and Joanna Gaines have used to build their home-goods juggernaut and that Gwyneth Paltrow has used for Goop: merchandise. By that measure, the Kardashian product empire is the best outcome that any influencer could aspire to. The family has monetized their fame to the point that people still buy their products even if those customers are no longer paying as much attention to them. Instagram likes are fleeting, but Khloud popcorn could probably survive a nuclear blast.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Kardashians do seem to be giving viewers less of themselves than they used to. &lt;em&gt;Keeping Up With the Kardashians &lt;/em&gt;went off the air in 2021, and even the title of their Hulu show, &lt;em&gt;The Kardashians&lt;/em&gt;, seems to acknowledge that viewers can’t &lt;em&gt;really &lt;/em&gt;keep up with them anymore. Fans tend to complain that the new series is boring. The eighth season, currently airing, is basically product placement for the girls’ businesses: Kim debuts NikeSKIMS; Kendall does an event for 818 Tequila; Khloé feels awkward during a steamy photoshoot with a male model for her new perfume line, XO Blue by Khloé Kardashian. (While shooting, she and the model, Brandon, discuss how the line is going to be available at Sephora.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Hulu did not reply when I asked for viewership numbers, but I can’t imagine that a show in which a major plotline involves Kourtney’s stepson getting his driver’s license gets as many eyeballs as Season 8 of &lt;em&gt;Keeping Up With the Kardashians&lt;/em&gt;. Yes, that one included a photoshoot for their brother’s sock company, but it was mostly about Kim having a baby with the rapper Kanye West (now known as Ye). The Kardashians’ shows were always a business endeavor, but more and more, part of what they’re selling is the ability to watch them sell us things.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;For now, the Kardashians are still grinding. They have a show and several spin-offs; they post pictures and videos of themselves on social media. They still trade on the idea that their lives are glamorous enough—or at least strange enough—that we should both pay attention to them and purchase bits of their lifestyles. If more of the sisters’ products reach Skims-level heights, they may no longer need to spend half their time advertising their merchandise. But would they really want that? Kim has presented herself for years as a businesswoman first and foremost: Her recently released authorized biography, &lt;em&gt;Citizen Kim&lt;/em&gt;, includes a family &lt;a href="https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/citizen-kim-kardashian-jonathan-van-meter-biography-jenner/"&gt;history of the several generations of mother-daughter duos w&lt;/a&gt;ho started antique shops, beauty parlors, and children’s-clothing boutiques and grew them into local retail dynasties. The Kardashians love attention, yes, but they &lt;em&gt;really &lt;/em&gt;love to sell—their image, their drama, their products.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some of those products, it turns out, are pretty good. I wouldn’t recommend that you build your life around them, and I definitely wouldn’t recommend K&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;O. But after a week inside the family’s brandiverse, I am surprised to feel more impressed than terrified when I consider that America may never escape the Kardashians.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Nancy Walecki</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/nancy-walecki/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/ohVLUnmzc7gWlWDdtYKYMvMM4fQ=/0x551:2160x1766/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_11_Kardashians-2/original.gif"><media:credit>Illustration by Alisa Gao / The Atlantic</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">I Went Full Kardashian</title><published>2026-11-20T08:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T12:26:59-05:00</updated><summary type="html">The Kardashians now have so many brands that approximating their lifestyle is more possible than ever before.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/health/2026/11/kardashian-products-week/689363/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689509</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;Prequels for long-running franchises are tough to pull off. Too many Easter eggs, and the whole project comes across as hollow fan service. Too different from the other installments, and the new entry risks not making sense. But &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/03/the-hunger-games-crosses-child-warfare-with-class-warfare/254834/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;i&gt;The Hunger Games&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt; &lt;/i&gt;had a lot of potential to mine new stories from its past. Panem, the totalitarian nation behind the titular battles royal, had a turbulent history filled with cinematic potential, as well as complicated characters whose lives could be further explored. And besides, the original tetralogy, based on Suzanne Collins’s popular YA books, made more than $3 billion at the box office worldwide.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In 2023, &lt;i&gt;The Ballad of Songbirds and Snakes&lt;/i&gt; proved to be an &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2023/11/hunger-games-franchise-cultural-influence/676033/?utm_source=feed"&gt;uneven but inspired reentry&lt;/a&gt;. The film examined the teenage years of the villain Coriolanus Snow, and told the story of how the brutal Hunger Games became mass entertainment. The newest movie, &lt;i&gt;Sunrise on the Reaping&lt;/i&gt;, follows a similar formula: It chronicles the coming-of-age of the series mainstay Haymitch Abernathy, as he’s forced to enter the Games and fight other youngsters to the death. Unfortunately, the film is a pale imitation of its predecessors. It looks like a &lt;i&gt;Hunger Games &lt;/i&gt;movie. It sounds like a &lt;i&gt;Hunger Games &lt;/i&gt;movie. But it misses the emotional and political stakes that had elevated the franchise above a once-crowded field of dystopian YA stories. If anything, it exemplifies Hollywood’s worst tendencies when revisiting beloved worlds.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the initial movies, Haymitch (played by Woody Harrelson) is a hard-drinking former Games winner who’s assigned to mentor Katniss Everdeen (Jennifer Lawrence), the strong-willed protagonist. He goes from dismissive and withdrawn to a pivotal player in the movement against the rulers of Panem. A prequel could not only fill in the blanks about his character arc but also scrutinize how revolutions tend to begin in fits and starts—and how maintaining passion for resistance can be much harder than it already seems.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/03/oscars-2026-young-character-deaths-hamnet-sirat/686332/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Cinema’s newest, grimmest trend&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, &lt;i&gt;Sunrise &lt;/i&gt;isn’t up to the task. Directed by Francis Lawrence, the franchise’s steward since the standout &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/11/-em-catching-fire-em-a-leaner-hungrier-em-hunger-games-em/281747/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Catching Fire&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, the film covers an unwieldy amount of narrative ground. The movie begins with 16-year-old Haymitch (Joseph Zada) participating in the Second Quarter Quell, a special edition of the Games that doubles the number of competitors, known as “tributes”; its epilogue catches up with Haymitch decades into the future, at the end of the &lt;i&gt;Hunger Games &lt;/i&gt;series. In between, Haymitch meets a parade of one-note fellow challengers, delivers interminable monologues about Panem’s broken system, and joins a rushed conspiracy to dismantle the Games from within. The increase in competitors and plot points, however, yields only threadbare momentum and perfunctory thrills. What could have been a potent study of the consequences of believing in an abstract future becomes a hackneyed tale of unavoidable tragedy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Part of the issue comes from how indebted the prequel is to the other installments. &lt;i&gt;Sunrise&lt;/i&gt; uses familiar setups: The reaping, the lottery through which tributes are chosen, is staged the same way as it was in &lt;i&gt;The Hunger Games&lt;/i&gt;, all greige outfits and over-the-top theatrics from the tributes’ escort, Drusilla (an eye-searingly yassified but delightfully hammy Glenn Close). Haymitch visits his love interest in idyllic fields, just as Katniss (and Snow, in &lt;i&gt;Ballad&lt;/i&gt;) did. Younger versions of characters from the original tetralogy make brief appearances, each spouting dialogue nodding to things their older selves say in those films. These cues may be intended to emphasize how history repeats itself, but they drain &lt;i&gt;Sunrise &lt;/i&gt;of fresh nuance. The movie seems more preoccupied with this nostalgia bait than it is with Haymitch, never interrogating why he is vulnerable to being recruited into a cause he barely understands.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Then again, one of the biggest draws of &lt;i&gt;The Hunger Games &lt;/i&gt;has always been the Games themselves. The franchise has tried to make clear how violent and wrong they are, yet on this front, &lt;i&gt;Sunrise &lt;/i&gt;also falls short. The spectacle consists mostly of choppy action sequences involving characters whom audiences never get to invest in. Some of the deaths are appallingly inventive—one boy is eaten alive by carnivorous squirrels—but they’re hamstrung by the CGI sludge that makes up the bulk of the arena’s threats. The lackluster visuals may help dilute the horror of watching children get hurt, but they also make for uncharacteristically bland set pieces.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The result is a long shrug of a film that, on the whole, seems thoroughly underdeveloped. Most of the new, more than capable actors, such as Lili Taylor, Maya Hawke, McKenna Grace, and Ben Wang, go wasted in thankless parts. (Jesse Plemons emerges unscathed, standing out from the ensemble the same way his role’s predecessor, Philip Seymour Hoffman, did with an understated performance.) The best entries in the franchise have balanced bloodshed with heady ideas about class, complicity, and youthful righteousness—and &lt;i&gt;Sunrise&lt;/i&gt;, with its many homages to those films, clearly understands how much it owes to its forebears. It just never finds a perspective of its own.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Shirley Li</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/shirley-li/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/mnjp1hBTq6NBBSfPUgNBYlLjAq4=/media/img/mt/2026/11/IMG_5621/original.jpg"><media:credit>Lionsgate</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Hollywood’s Worst Tendencies, in One Movie</title><published>2026-11-20T07:30:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T07:31:57-05:00</updated><summary type="html">The &lt;em&gt;Hunger Games&lt;/em&gt; franchise once found meaning in its violent spectacle.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/11/hunger-games-sunrise-on-the-reaping-movie-review/689509/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689492</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;Republicans got wiped out in the midterms, which means that fears about gerrymandering, diminished Black representation, and the undermining of democracy were all completely overblown. Because Republicans didn’t succeed, nothing was wrong with their efforts.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Or at least that’s the incorrect conclusion many people are drawing.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Last week’s election shattered myriad myths, not least that America is ‘structurally’ racist,” &lt;i&gt;The Wall Street Journal&lt;/i&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/opinion/midterms-minority-candidates-structural-racism-1d66f2d3"&gt;editorialized&lt;/a&gt;. “Minority candidates across the country won races up and down the ballot.” Other outlets described the Republican gerrymanders as a &lt;a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d99f635f-6223-45fc-8429-2ac36b28d080?syn-25a6b1a6=1"&gt;“flop”&lt;/a&gt; or asserted that they had “&lt;a href="https://www.npr.org/2026/11/04/nx-s1-6028588/redistricting-efforts-failed-republicans"&gt;failed&lt;/a&gt;,” while the conservative columnist Quin Hilyer argued that “even after significant post-Callais redistricting, and despite Democrats’ worries, this year’s results showed that Black candidates did just fine.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This argument is a little like the episode of &lt;i&gt;The Simpsons&lt;/i&gt; in which Sideshow Bob insists on his innocence because: “Attempted murder? Now, honestly, what is that? Do they give a Nobel Prize for attempted chemistry?” Similarly, the idea now is that because attempts to insulate Republican incumbents from democracy and deprive Black voters of political influence failed, no harm was done.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Even if the gerrymanders didn’t produce the sort of absolute gains that Republicans had hoped, they absolutely worked in terms of preventing a fair or more proportional change to the status quo,” Justin Levitt, a professor at Loyola Law School, told me. “If you set up a 100-yard dash and you saddle one contestant in the 100-yard dash with running with a 75-pound weighted tie to their ankle, the fact that they may manage to win under extraordinary conditions doesn’t mean that the race looks fair.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/09/missouri-gerrymandering-election-rules/688622/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: An electoral mess in Missouri&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Democratic voters did overcome some attempts to protect GOP incumbents. They did so by turning out in once-in-a-century numbers against an unpopular president who’d promised no more inflation and no more wars and broken both pledges. If you judge Republican gerrymanders on the basis of whether the GOP kept the House, then you could say that this time, they didn’t work. But they succeeded in both limiting the damage and keeping huge majorities in the delegations of states where Democrats came close to winning or won more than half of the votes. Conversely, Democratic gerrymanders left Republicans with a much lower proportion of seats than their percentage of the vote. A gun doesn’t stop being a lethal weapon just because you miss.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Republicans still gained anywhere from four to seven seats as a result of the new maps, even if they didn’t pay off as Republicans hoped,” &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/13/upshot/gerrymanders-midterm-elections-republicans.html"&gt;&lt;i&gt;The New York Times &lt;/i&gt;reported&lt;/a&gt; in a preliminary analysis last weekend. “If every congressional map had been drawn fairly, with party-blind nonpartisan methods, Democrats might have come close to winning a veto-proof two-thirds majority in the House, with the party winning nearly 20 additional districts in Texas, Florida and Georgia alone.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In Texas, Democrats won more than half of the popular vote but netted 14 seats; Republicans won 24, almost twice as many. With a “hypothetical party-blind map, like one drawn by computer simulations,” the &lt;i&gt;Times&lt;/i&gt; noted, “Democrats almost certainly would have won a majority of Texas’ House seats.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Votes are still being counted, so the numbers remain preliminary. But based on what we know so far, thanks to mid-decade redistricting, only eight of Florida’s 28 congressional districts will go to Democrats, despite Democrats winning about 48 percent of the vote. Eight out of nine congressional districts will go to Republicans in Tennessee, with one close race still uncalled, after Democrats won about 44 percent of the vote. On the Democratic side, California’s gerrymander will leave Republicans with only four seats out of 52, after the GOP won about 30 percent of the vote. Some discrepancy can be explained by political geography—Democratic votes cluster in cities or suburbs while Republican voters are more rural and spread out—but not all of it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It is true that some gerrymanders backfired by making the wrong assumptions about the midterm electorate and spreading Republican votes too thin; this happened in Ohio and North Carolina. But the fact that Republicans didn’t succeed in thwarting the will of the electorate does not make the gerrymandering right. Nor do Black voters defying attempts to neutralize their votes by turning out in such huge numbers mean that those attempts were legitimate.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Even in North Carolina, whose GOP-favorable map has been judged a textbook “dummymander,” Republican lawmakers aren’t clamoring to redraw the map, because they think it will produce the results they want next time. “If any map can withstand a 15-, 20-point swing, it’ll be the first one that I have seen,” Destin Hall, the GOP speaker of the North Carolina House, &lt;a href="https://x.com/BryanRAnderson/status/2122764544259113024?s=20"&gt;told reporters&lt;/a&gt;. “I’m confident that my party will be able to get back all those congressional seats they lost.” This is as concise a summary as one can get: These gerrymanders failed to thwart the will of so many voters, but in a more normal election, they can be expected to succeed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/10/gerrymander-north-carolina-voting/689189/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Redistricting isn’t going as Republicans planned&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“The harm doesn’t disappear from gerrymandering, from voter suppression and the like, just because people overcame it,” Sophia Lin Lakin, the director of the voting-rights project at the ACLU, told me. “These structures, these maps—they’re gonna be in place for a while.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The &lt;i&gt;Journal &lt;/i&gt;editorial cites Scott Colom’s victory in Mississippi as &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/opinion/midterms-minority-candidates-structural-racism-1d66f2d3"&gt;evidence&lt;/a&gt; that concerns about Black-voter suppression were overblown. A U.S. Senate race by definition cannot be gerrymandered, because senators are elected by statewide popular vote. Never mind that Colom will become the &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/scott-colom-us-senate-democrats/689395/?utm_source=feed"&gt;first Black senator from Mississippi&lt;/a&gt; in 150 years—the previous one was born enslaved—in a state where nearly half the population is Black.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A win of this magnitude is unlikely to repeat itself. The question now is whether the parties will realize that trying to disenfranchise their rival constituents is bad for democracy, and be willing to pass federal legislation to prevent it. Unfortunately, at the moment, it seems as though the GOP position is that it just needs to wait for the next election for the lopsided maps to do their work.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Then there is the particular debt the Democrats owe to Black voters, who powered their wins across the South despite Republicans’ efforts to suppress them. “Black voters have made it abundantly clear that they expect their elected representatives to be looking out for them,” Levitt said. “Along with that comes an expectation, a real firm claim to having voting-rights legislation front and center so that it doesn’t take an extraordinary election with extraordinary turnout in order to produce technical results.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Restoring the Voting Rights Act after its virtual nullification by the Supreme Court and imposing some kind of federal limit on partisan gerrymandering would go a long way toward preventing politicians from seeking to disempower voters rather than win them over.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Adam Serwer</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/adam-serwer/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/SZqr-8B_vBwIlqwBRKrHEApdmuE=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_18_Gerrymandering_Bad/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by Adam Maida / The Atlantic. Source: Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Gerrymandering Worked</title><published>2026-11-20T07:30:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T14:24:41-05:00</updated><summary type="html">It just isn’t magic.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/gerrymandering-redistricting-black-voters/689492/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689510</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nine months into the United States and Israel’s war on Iran, the Islamic Republic rules over a shattered economy and a society weary of the limbo between war and peace. The Iranian regime is deeply unpopular, but the opposition, divided over the war and faced with brutal repression, has no strategic path forward.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The regime has executed 74 political prisoners since the war broke out, and more than 100 others remain on death row, according to the Oslo-based organization Iran Human Rights. Small acts of nonconformity, even when they are not explicitly political, can incur harsh punishment. Several café &lt;a href="https://farsnews.ir/azizim49/1793469981332970881"&gt;owners&lt;/a&gt; in Tehran are being prosecuted for celebrating Halloween. At least 118 Baha’is have been arrested or summoned to court in recent months for the crime of following a faith unrecognized by the regime. On Tuesday, security forces raided the home of the women’s-rights activist Sepideh Qolian, in the southwestern city of Dezful. She wasn’t there—so they beat her father and teenage niece and arrested them, along with her brother, instead.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“A lot of us were happy when the dictator was killed,” a 40-year-old teacher in Tehran told me, referring to the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. “But the war has turned a religious dictatorship into a military dictatorship. Even our teachers’ union can’t do its basic work anymore.” (He and others who spoke with me from Iran asked for their names to be withheld for their safety.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Many of the Iranians I spoke with linked the ferocity of the current repression to the conflict. “After the war, we can’t even stage civic protests anymore,” a Karaj-based left-leaning journalist in his 30s told me. “The war was supposed to bring freedom, but it has suffocated it. We now have so little hope for advancing progressive and democratic demands.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Precisely because the war raised so many hopes, the disappointment with current conditions is particularly bitter. And that disappointment extends to the person who perhaps most embodied the notion that outside intervention could bring freedom: the opposition leader and former crown prince Reza Pahlavi. Last winter he promoted the conflict as a vehicle for popular Iranian aspirations. Even he has now recalibrated, if subtly: “We needed this humanitarian intervention and we do not apologize for it,” Pahlavi &lt;a href="https://www.freiheit.org/germany/acceptance-remarks-reza-pahlavi"&gt;said&lt;/a&gt; earlier this month, while accepting the Freedom Prize in Frankfurt on behalf of the Iranian people. But he added that he grieved “every innocent Iranian lost in this war” and that Iranians didn’t want to see their country bombed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pahlavi’s alignment with the Israeli-American attacks on Iran has posed problems for some of his supporters, two people close to his group told me. At least two of his former staffers became critics over the issue. One of these is Mehrdad Marty Youssefiani, his former chief of staff, who told me that he considered Pahlavi’s camp to be “in violation of fundamental national values.” Pahlavi’s mother, Iran’s former queen, Farah Pahlavi, &lt;a href="https://farahpahlavi.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Point-de-Vue-4076-SM-Farah-Pahlavi.pdf"&gt;came out&lt;/a&gt; against the war, in what may have been an indirect rebuke to her son. A well-known pro-Pahlavi documentary filmmaker last month also &lt;a href="https://x.com/AliHamid27/status/2114794762452472157?a=sch22UMq7w0E2bYSEQk&amp;amp;s=20"&gt;condemned&lt;/a&gt; the war and those who supported it—implicitly including Pahlavi.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Esmail Abdi, a former trade unionist who now heads the exile-based Iran Freedom Congress, suggested to me that Pahlavi’s support for the war left him with a lot to answer for. “We must ask him: How does foreign intervention help with Iran’s political independence, sovereignty, and democracy? We’ve seen that war doesn’t bring freedom.” The Karaj-based journalist told me of Pahlavi, “When Iranians were dying under air strikes, he sent condolences messages for American soldiers but not for thousands of killed Iranian civilians. This has definitely cost him some support. It was a big mistake by him.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/04/iranian-opposition-united/686679/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The Iranian opposition’s urgent task&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Many of Pahlavi’s supporters also criticize the role he played in the demonstrations last winter. Pahlavi called Iranians to the streets on January 8, having previously assured them that he had &lt;a href="https://www.iranintl.com/202507262852"&gt;secured&lt;/a&gt; the defections of more than 50,000 of the regime’s security forces and civil servants. The regime massacred thousands of protesters, and no defectors materialized. Nor did a follow-up plan from the former crown prince.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“I am upset at him because he lied to us,” a young woman in Tehran who took part in pro-Pahlavi protests in January told me. “We thought he was ready to come back to the homeland. We believed him when he said he had the support of thousands of defectors. Our trust is now tarnished.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Nonetheless, Pahlavi retains a significant social base inside Iran. On Tuesday, demonstrators in the small city of Abdanan in western Iran, which had been the site of major demonstrations back in January, chanted his name. Ali, an artist who left Iran for Europe a few months ago and doesn’t support the crown prince, conceded to me that he thought Pahlavi would win a free election if one were held tomorrow.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And Pahlavi has not given up. Writing in a Belgian newspaper earlier this month, he unveiled a &lt;a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/opinion/2388691/europe-must-stand-with-the-iranian-people"&gt;plan&lt;/a&gt; that includes building a movement inside the country, securing defections from the regime’s security forces, uniting the Iranian diaspora, and winning support from the West. The trouble is that little in his past shows him capable of carrying out that strategy. Last month, he started a new initiative asking “not just military and government personnel” but “Iranians from every walk of life” to join his camp by communicating with an AI-powered bot on the messaging app Telegram.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Not a single prominent political official or diplomat of the Islamic Republic has publicly joined Pahlavi. He recently said that he would hesitate before calling for another street uprising, because he wouldn’t want more people to be killed. Yet in September, Pahlavi &lt;a href="https://www.foxnews.com/video/6405444851112"&gt;advocated&lt;/a&gt; arming anti-regime Iranians—an inflammatory step that one Iranian journalist &lt;a href="https://x.com/matin25388/status/2102753805423022497?a=IKlnEpjbMghI4lg4HJ0&amp;amp;s=20"&gt;decried&lt;/a&gt; as “promoting civil war” and “a new level of vileness.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Further complicating his efforts, Pahlavi’s movement, which once promised to be unifying, has turned exclusionary in recent years. His close advisers have &lt;a href="https://www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php/politic/more/110046/"&gt;derisively&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="https://x.com/alirezakiani2/status/2059450806550552685?a=nrtocaKqPizdOa0gvMs&amp;amp;s=20"&gt;referred&lt;/a&gt; to other opponents of the regime as “79ers,” identifying them with the revolutionary coalition that brought down the shah in 1979, and which encompassed liberal nationalists, Marxists, and Islamists, among others. Last year, Pahlavi’s supporters in Iran threw stones at the Nobel peace laureate Narges Mohammadi, a human-rights activist, at a &lt;a href="https://andisheh-nou.org/?p=72678"&gt;speech&lt;/a&gt; she gave. Earlier this month, the actor Taraneh Alidoosti met with broad public sympathy when she appeared without hijab at the funeral of her father, Hamid, a well-known footballer. Yet &lt;a href="https://x.com/weiblicheloewe/status/2117539298887266426?s=20"&gt;Pahlavi&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="https://x.com/HAMEDilamy/status/2117885124142387466?s=20"&gt;supporters&lt;/a&gt; attacked her online. When Pahlavi issued condolences for the footballer, he didn’t mention &lt;a href="https://x.com/PahlaviComms/status/2118845994762703237?a=fmzs9VvxQZ820q2dHfQ&amp;amp;s=20"&gt;Taraneh&lt;/a&gt; by name. Mohammadi and Alidoosti represent a liberal and feminist section of the opposition.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/05/iran-exile-reza-pahlavi/687088/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Robert Worth: The Iranian royalists’ thuggish edge&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Such attitudes make Pahlavi at best a factional leader, not the unifying transitional figure he claims, and once appeared, to be. But other sections of the opposition don’t have a clear path forward, either. The Mojahedin-e-Khalq, with its eclectic mix of Maoist and Islamist convictions, remains enormously unpopular. The Kurdish and Balochi ethnic groups have occasionally mounted armed uprisings, but these have been limited to small areas in Iran’s remote southwest and southeastern regions. The Iranian Freedom Congress has brought together an impressive array of pro-democracy voices but hasn’t taken much political initiative since it was founded earlier this year.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These groups are all headquartered in exile. Inside Iran, any oppositional act is punished harshly, as the treatment meted out to Qolian shows. Pro-democracy advocates include former regime officials (such as the former prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, and the former deputy interior minister, Mostafa Tajzadeh), as well as nationalists, feminists, socialists, and liberals. But the regime has imprisoned most of the best-known figures from these groups and effectively stopped them from so much as holding meetings. Even Pahlavi’s latest strategy starts with a movement inside the country with room enough to breathe.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Arash Azizi</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/arash-azizi/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/HFUgh8COL65RJ1oWIg0LU6O-rdw=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_06_Reza_Pahlavi/original.jpg"><media:credit>Steffen Boettcher / laif / Redux</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">What War Has Brought Iran’s Opposition</title><published>2026-11-20T07:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T10:04:01-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Domestic repression and exile infighting leave few strategic options.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/iran-opposition-strategic-options/689510/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689519</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;Don’t you hear it? The clamoring, everywhere, in places of business and houses of worship and schools and dining establishments: MELANIA! MELANIA! GIVE US MORE MELANIA!&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;You know how it is. You’re in the grocery store, looking at the beef prices and pursing your lips, and someone turns to you totally unprompted and says, “What a relief that the expanded Melaniaverse is &lt;a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt50666033/"&gt;hitting screens&lt;/a&gt; nationwide on November 20 on Amazon Prime.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But one new TV series cannot possibly be enough. The demand is insatiable. Every time I shop, there are little children throwing tantrums in the checkout line, gnashing their teeth, jumping up and down. “WE WANT MORE MELANIA!” Their parents, hands clenched in fists, pound the floor beside them. “BRING MELANIA TO OUR SCREENS, IN HER SIGNATURE BLACK AND WHITE!” As I leave the store with my purchases, a mob is starting to form. “LET BRETT RATNER DIRECT AGAIN IF IT WILL BRING HER TO US SOONER! WE CAN OVERLOOK WHATEVER WE NEED TO! WE MUST HAVE MELANIA!!”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Someone (a fool! A troll! A cynic!) once tried to suggest that there was not, in fact, very much organic demand for Melania content, and that her continued infliction on our screens is just because Amazon wants to curry favor with the present administration. But we tore him limb from limb and, I think, ate him for his heresy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We know what we need. More Melania, right now! Not just on Amazon, but on every streamer. Always flawlessly lit. Always tastefully attired. Always exquisitely detached from the universe in which the rest of us have to live.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Not just every streamer! Put her on every channel! Melania, on &lt;i&gt;60 Minute&lt;/i&gt;&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;, interviewing herself. (It’s a hard-hitting interview. Melania knows the right questions to ask. Soon, Melania is weeping, unable to reply. “This interview is over,” she says. But Melania won’t let it be over.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Melania, on the History Channel, explaining the Civil War. She poses with a smile as, one by one, they put all the old monuments back.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Melania is on the Food Network! Melania has invented a new way to make salad! What’s that in the salad? I am frightened.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Melania, on Netflix. She takes a long, sharp knife and cuts into the White House. It is cake. Melania does not smile: This revelation brings her no pleasure.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Melania, on &lt;i&gt;How It’s Made&lt;/i&gt;, turning straw into gold, but she won’t let them show us anything. Is it real straw? Is it real gold?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Melania, on Lifetime, solving a mystery. (The culprit is her husband, but he is the last person she thinks to consider.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On Paramount+, Melania, in her hat, riding a horse. (All of Yellowstone belongs to her. She is going to develop it and fill it with beautiful buildings.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On QVC, Melania, selling something. Every time you blink, it looks like something different. A cream. A supplement. One single peptide. A raw, beating human heart.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;No more &lt;i&gt;The&lt;/i&gt; &lt;i&gt;Gilded Age&lt;/i&gt; on HBO. Just Melania, turning slowly in a complete circle, with no smile at all in her eyes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Melania, on Hallmark, saving a Christmas-tree farm and turning all of the trees a bright blood red.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Melania (Melania’s Version)&lt;/i&gt;, now with new downloadable content.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We are bringing back the monoculture. Melania is that monoculture. Melania, the last thing you see in the dark space behind your eyelids when you shut your eyes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Finally, today, on Amazon, the people are getting what they want.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Only two episodes, which seems ludicrously insufficient, when you consider how much the people want Melania. But why am I bothering to tell you this? I am sure you were awake at 3 a.m. to watch it as it premiered. Everyone was!&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Two episodes&lt;/i&gt;. I only pray that it will be enough to satisfy our hunger.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Alexandra Petri</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/alexandra-petri/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/fjSMsOJkS__kO7Q6Va13NBBU6uI=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_19_Melaniaverse/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by Adam Maida / The Atlantic. Sources: Mandel Ngan / AFP / Getty; Annabelle Gordon / Pool / Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Welcome to the Melaniaverse</title><published>2026-11-20T06:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T14:20:22-05:00</updated><summary type="html">We are bringing back the monoculture. Melania is that monoculture.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2026/11/melania-tv-show-melaniaverse/689519/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry></feed>